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1975-76



Wait until informed what has happened. Read & wait until for call from Paul Ash.

P. Cook

Write to Carey w/ human

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING MEMORANDUM

S/S

February 23, 1981

within 2 weeks

UNCLASSIFIED

TO: P - Mr. Stoessel
FROM: INR - Ronald I. Spiers
SUBJECT: Support for III Soviet Emigration Project - INFORMATION



FILE

I would like to inform you of the status within the Department and in the Intelligence Community of a major project to study the III Soviet emigration, 110,000-plus of which are now resident in the US. Interagency funding for the project in FY 81 is dependent upon reprogramming of the CIA supplemental budget and Department acceptance of \$1.9 million to manage the project on behalf of the USG.

Background

After some 10 years of effort, the USG has approved use of Soviet emigres as the prime resource for a 5-year contract project updating the Harvard Refugee Interview Project of the early 1950's. Because of its sensitivity, all such efforts would be conducted under stringent conditions (at Tab A).

The III Emigration Project's design and testing phase, costing some \$300,000 and funded by DOD and State, was approved by the previous administration, Secretaries Muskie and Brown, NSC--Brzezinski, Admiral Turner, Reinhardt of ICA, and Marshall Shulman and Ben Read. It was conducted by James Millar of Illinois, Brian Silver of Michigan State, and Bill Zimmerman of Michigan, with the cooperation of over one hundred scholars from various universities across the country, under the auspices of the National Council of Soviet and East European Research (NCSEER).*

I am unaware of any other project so thoroughly staffed out.

*The NCSEER is a consortia of representatives of the 17 university presidents whose schools have the largest Soviet and East European programs. It is funded by a number of USG agencies, including, State, but principally by DOD Net Assessments--Andy Marshall. Vlad Toumanoff is the Executive Director of the NCSEER.

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Scope of Project

The project plan calls for structured interviews with a systematically selected sample of approximately 3,000 emigrants and for the integration of this survey protocol with another sample of approximately 1,500 intensive interviews focused on important specialized topics, such as demography, science and technology, civil defense, education, etc. Three themes will be emphasized:

- How does the Soviet system really work?
- How do Soviet citizens work the system? And
- Where is the Soviet system going?

(A 5-page narrative summary is at Tab B and our expanded at Tab C.)

Successful accomplishment requires the active support of US emigre organizations, especially Jewish ones like HIAS, and of academia. Both have pledged their cooperation provided State manages.

Proposed Funding

Prior to the change of administrations, it was proposed that funding be shared by CIA, DOD, ICA and Commerce (the latter has since dropped out), with State managing the contract with the NCSEER. At present, for FY 81,

- CIA is considering reprogramming \$890,000 in its supplemental, to be matched by
- \$890,000 from DOD/Net Assessment--Andy Marshall, who originally was to have funded the entire project; and
- \$100,000 from ICA once they have a new leadership.

Proposed Management

Should the project develop as planned, the contributing agencies would transfer funds to State/INR to negotiate and manage the contract. Such an arrangement is acceptable to the emigre organizations and to academia. Ben Read agreed in principle and I still favor it.

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Because of the complex and specialized nature of the project, I would assign overall project management to Paul Cook, my Special Assistant for Soviet and East European Affairs, who has been associated with it from its inception; his deputy would be Richard Combs of EUR/SOV. Eric Willenz of INR's Office of Long-Range Assessments (formerly XR) would have fiscal and administrative responsibility.

Cook has formed an in-house working group including EUR/SOV--Combs, S/P--McCormack, INR/SEE--Baraz, and INR/LAR--Willenz. He plans to form an interagency board of monitors including representatives from each contributor or prime user.

Gary Mathews of your staff is familiar with the background of the project.

No action is necessary at this time.

Attachments:

- Tab A - Sensitivity Guidance
- Tab B - The Soviet Interview Project: A Summary
- Tab C - Executive Summary

Drafted: INR - P. Cook
ext. 22292 2/19/81

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TAB A

SENSITIVITY GUIDANCE

You should be guided by the following approved criteria in passing upon contract research proposals.

The involvement of ex-Soviet citizens in research projects funded by the USG is highly sensitive since their misuse could adversely affect the flow of emigration, become a matter of contention in our relations with the USSR, and have political fallout in the U.S. The Department nonetheless believes the national interest dictates their involvement while placing special burdens upon the contracting agency to avoid giving the impression that the USG is "exploiting" emigres for "intelligence" purposes. Emphasis should be placed on the knowledge gained from these respondents/analysts which contributes to a reduction in misperceptions and thus can, therefore, make our bilateral relations less troubled.

In each instance emigre participation must be unambiguously voluntary and individuals must be afforded full protection under the Privacy Act. Whenever possible the fact of contract research should be publicly available and the results publishable. When this is not the case, all the strictures regarding sources and methods must be applied and the results classified. Sensitivity clearance in these instances will receive particularly careful scrutiny on a case by case basis.

The foregoing criteria apply to unclassified and classified contract research both at home and abroad.

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THE SOVIET INTERVIEW PROJECT: A SUMMARY

Throughout the remainder of the century, U.S. - Soviet relations will occupy a central place--very likely the central place--in the attention of American leaders, scholars, and informed publics with foreign policy concerns. Knowledge of the Soviet Union, relations between its leaders and its citizens, the functioning of its economy and the burden of defense, the impact of Soviet civil and military institutions on Soviet society, the impact of large scale societal and structural changes on the attitudes and behavior of key elements in the Soviet Union will be essential to the intelligent pursuit of American national interests.

Knowledge about the Soviet Union is easier to obtain today through the means scholars customarily employ than it was a generation ago. By any comparison other than with the Stalin period, however, the acquisition of data about the Soviet system and its actual workings remains exceedingly difficult. It is still standard Soviet practice to omit and to prohibit detailed commentary about topics which even in other communist states are treated extensively in official statistical sources, the media, or academic journals. "Memory holes" persist and mass interviews and interviews of officials remain rarities.

Fortunately, there are now in the United States approximately 100,000 former Soviet citizens who emigrated during the past decade. They are mostly Jewish but they also include thousands of Armenians and Russians, as well as others. This wave of emigrants represents a vast potential source for multiplying our knowledge about the Soviet Union. Remarkably, however, there has as yet been no really extensive effort to interview thoroughly a sizeable

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representation of these people, although a few important projects have been undertaken or are now underway. (Most of these projects have been funded by the National Council for Soviet-East European Research and involve interviews with select segments of the current emigration.)

There are reasons why a large and exhaustive project employing the current Soviet emigration as the major data source has not been undertaken already. There was a view, now long since discarded, in the U.S. Government that mass interviews of former Soviet citizens might complicate U.S. - Soviet relations. For several years, relations between government departments and agencies and the universities were inconducive to the cooperation necessary for such a project. To do such a project right required the identification and recruitment of competent researchers from several disciplines drawn from several universities and headed by a responsible leadership--all of which took time.

Whatever the reasons why such a project has not been attempted hitherto, there is an urgency to moving forward now with a major, scholarly, emigre based research project on the USSR. A relatively minor concern is that it may not be possible to keep together much longer a research team which was carefully selected in 1979-80 after a systematic canvas of the entire field of Soviet specialists. Much more important, the number of migrants from the USSR to the U.S. has dwindled substantially and it appears the numbers will never again approach the volume of the late 1970s. The relevance of information and the accuracy of recall deteriorate rapidly over a period of very few years abroad. There is consequently a real danger that the value of the emigrants as a source of substantial policy-relevant knowledge about the

Soviet Union will dissipate rapidly.

That would be a tragedy. Scholars and policy makers alike have strong reasons for wanting to achieve a massive infusion of new and extensive data about the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union has changed just enough since the 1950s to make specialists question the applicability to the contemporary USSR of concepts which were relevant for an earlier period in Soviet history. What is lacking is the detailed and extensive data about the real workings of the contemporary Soviet system that would make possible an empirically grounded evaluation of the direction and magnitude of the change over that time span, much less permit informed projections about likely possible alternative futures for the USSR.

The accompanying documentation represents a substantial initial effort to identify precisely what it is we wish to know that can be properly derived from a mass interview of several thousand erstwhile Soviet citizens and from additional closed and open-ended interviews of persons whose special knowledge and experience makes them distinctively able to comment on particular aspects of Soviet reality.

The proposal is a broad one. It addresses the interactions between the realms of politics, work, and everyday life in the Soviet Union as they are experienced both by ordinary citizens and by those who in the broadest sense constitute, whether through official channels or through such nonofficial sectors of the Soviet system as samizdat and the second economy, the "producers" of the goods and services in Soviet society. Among the major questions the project addresses are the following. How large is the gap between declared national policy as articulated by the national leadership and

actual political behavior? How successful is the contemporary regime in mobilizing support and resources in peacetime conditions and in the absence of terror? Are there intergenerational differences in the degree and basis of citizen support? How successful are which Soviet institutions in inculcating the values of the regime? Are ostensibly mandatory and effective practices, such as civil defense training, in practice avoidable and routine? Does the answer vary across regions or social status? All specialists know that theoretically the party, through its control over appointments (the nomenklatura system), determines key appointments in all walks of Soviet life. Whether this is true in practice for various Soviet work domains needs very much to be determined. Likewise there is much that is not known about the Soviet economy. How in the contemporary Soviet Union do Soviet economic institutions really work? By what criteria are investment and technological innovation decisions made? To what extent are consumer goods produced by the defense industry and vice versa? How effectively is the educational system harnessed to economic needs? How do Soviet citizens respond to the environment in which they operate on a day-to-day basis--what for instance, explains family size choices, job choices, on-the-job behavior?

At the same time the proposal, while broad and ambitious, is deliberately selective and reflects considerable thought about what can be properly derived from mass and specialized interviews, no matter how methodologically sophisticated, of emigrants, that is, of persons who, through deliberate choice, have left the Soviet Union. Thus a conscious decision was made to focus on obligatory or unavoidable experiences--experiences with military service, in education, in encounters with bureaucrats, and on the job--and

less on attitudes which may be characteristic of emigrants or Jews and not at all characteristic of non-Jewish Soviet citizens. Likewise the focus will be on collecting information from respondents on the life experiences of their friends and colleagues, not on the behavior of those who in fact emigrated. There will of course still be a considerable effort to obtain data about attitudes. Strategies have been identified which will utilize the direction of the bias to advantage by maximizing the diversity of those interviewed--that is, by interviewing as many emigrants of non-Jewish origin (non-Jewish spouses, members of other ethnic groups) and from as diverse demographic backgrounds as possible and by controlling for the reasons that prompted the decision to emigrate. Finally, conscious choices have been taken to be deliberately selective in what the project will attempt to ascertain. The current emigration, derived as it is from a largely urban background, is not a promising source for data about Soviet agriculture and no claims are made in this respect. Similarly no claim is made that the project will be able to develop new information about the behavior and attitudes of the Soviet leadership. No one from that rarefied group is included among the emigrants and it is very unlikely that there are more than a handful among the 100,000 who are even in a position to speak knowledgeably about that narrow group. Instead, the project focuses on what the emigrants are best equipped to tell us about the Soviet Union: the relations between the political system and Soviet society, the real workings of Soviet civil and military institutions and intergenerational attitude differences.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

July 1, 1980

Politics, Work and Daily Life in the USSR
Evidence, Mechanisms and Outlook for Change

A Proposal Submitted to the
National Council for Soviet and
East European Research

5 year

by

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INTRODUCTION

More than 250,000 Soviet citizens have emigrated from the USSR since 1970. Very nearly 100,000 have elected to settle in the United States. According to estimates available to us, approximately 85,000 of the latter group are members of families in which one or both spouses are "Jewish." Another 9,000 or so are Armenian in background. The remainder contains a wide variety of ethnic backgrounds.

This "Third Soviet Emigration" provides Western scholars with an unparalleled opportunity to talk with a large number of former Soviet citizens about how the Soviet system works and about their behavior and attitudes while participants in the system. The project we propose is designed to take advantage of this opportunity in a systematic and efficient way. Our research plan calls for structured interviews with a systematically selected sample of approximately 3000 recent emigrants and for the integration of this protocol with another sample of approximately 1500 intensive interviews focused upon a predetermined number of specialized topics. The latter will be based upon "expert" testimony of persons who have special knowledge (such as scientists, doctors, economic planners or artists) or upon certain individuals whose experiences are particularly interesting to us (such as selected industrial workers, nonworking wives or active dissidents).

The design of the current project takes the Harvard Interview Project of the early 1950's as a point of departure, and it will make maximum use of official Soviet data that have been published in the meantime. We shall also rely heavily in preparation of our protocols upon the current state of (unclassified) research on the USSR in the

West, upon models for cross-national survey research that have been developed in the various disciplines, and upon the several small-scale interview projects involving Soviet immigrants that are already underway in this country, West Germany, Israel, and Canada.

We shall focus our efforts on the important gaps that remain in our knowledge of the structure and function of the contemporary Soviet system. Using these previous and ongoing studies as points of reference, we shall also explore the dynamics of the Soviet system at both micro and macro levels, and we shall be able to do so more effectively than was possible at the time of the Harvard project of the early 1950s. We seek, therefore, not merely to model the structure of contemporary Soviet society, but to assess what changes have taken place in recent decades and to project our results into the future of the Soviet political, economic and social system.

The project design calls for a five-year effort. The first three years will be devoted primarily to collection and documentation of data. The National Opinion Research Center, which is associated with the University of Chicago, will provide professional assistance during this phase of the project, and the data will subsequently be made available to reputable scholars through the Interuniversity Consortium for Social Research of the University of Michigan. Full analysis and publication of results is expected to require at least two years, although preliminary analyses will be prepared by the end of the third project year.

The project will be directed by a nine-person Research Team, drawn from nine different academic institutions. A large number of

other scholars and graduate students, also drawn from a wide variety of scholarly institutions, will be involved in the project at every stage, including the conduct of interviews, coding of open-ended questions, preparation of clean, accessible data tapes, analysis and publication of results. The project is designed, therefore, as a truly national scholarly effort.

RESEARCH OBJECTIVES

The research project has been designed with the assistance of many Soviet affairs analysts and specialists in a series of seminars that were held throughout the country between December 1979 and April 1980. The design calls for a cross-disciplinary research effort guided by three main objectives: (1) to eliminate some crucial gaps in our knowledge of the structure of important institutions, our descriptions of the behavior of important segments of the Soviet population (elites and non-elites alike) and our understanding of basic popular attitudes toward vital aspects of the system; (2) to use the Harvard Interview Project and other similar studies both Western and Soviet to seek evidence of change in the Soviet system, to identify the mechanisms that foster change, and to assess the outlook for change in the foreseeable future and (3) to orient what we know and what we learn about Soviet society to recent major cross-national studies for comparative interpretive purposes.

Objective One: The Structure of Soviet Society

Although it is certainly true that we know much more about the Soviet Union today than was available to those who conducted the

Harvard Interview Project of the early 1950s, there remain remarkable gaps in our current knowledge. Official Soviet publications and scholarly articles and monographs provide a vastly superior basis for the analysis of Soviet society today when compared to what was available in the early 1950s. Even so, and as anyone who has worked with these data can report, the practice of omitting crucial data series, the problem of poor specification of operational definitions, and persistent official avoidance of certain topic areas, most notably those dealing with values, attitudes, and informal behavior, leave whole areas of Soviet political, social, and economic life uncharted. As a result, many analytic procedures that are standard in the West cannot at present be conducted for the USSR. Elimination of several crucial gaps will allow us to test and refine certain key hypotheses about the Soviet system and citizen behavior for the first time, such as the relation between socioeconomic change and the distribution of political power, or between rising income, fertility and female labor participation rates, and in this sense the "gaps" we seek to fill have conceptual implications far beyond their importance simply as "missing facts."

Our first objective, therefore, is to add directly to our knowledge of the Soviet system, and its theoretical underpinning is provided by standing hypotheses in the field of Soviet studies. Western literature on the Soviet political system is, for example, replete with terms such as "penetration" and "mobilization," and the domain of the political system is widely conceived as virtually unlimited, even in a "post-totalitarian" Soviet Union. At the same time, however, we know that the boundaries of the national leadership's decisional prerogatives

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have been subject to recurrent bargaining between the top leadership and other elements of society.

An example that comes immediately to mind is the well-known dispute that occurred between the political leadership and the professional military about decision making in any future war. Similarly, we have witnessed the Brezhnev leadership assuring Soviet citizens, in effect, of the continued prospect for "living quietly," that is, suggesting relatively modest regime demands for affirmation and mobilization even from the rank and file. Meanwhile, the national leadership obviously continues to report on political participation, such as voting for official candidates, in ways that suggest the undiminished importance of unanimity and mass political engagement.

The project that we propose will seek to identify and analyze contradictory evidence of this kind both at the top and the bottom of Soviet society. In particular, we shall attempt to answer such questions as: How large is the gap between declared national leadership policy and actual political behavior? How successful is the regime in mobilizing support and economic resources under prolonged peacetime conditions? How easily and how often do citizens obtain and use absentee ballots instead of voting directly in elections? What ostensible mandatory patterns associated with putative mobilization systems in fact have insignificant behavioral consequences in practice? How effective are special-purpose, elite schools in socialization of positive attitudes in today's youth? And, as an illustration of a broader class of phenomena, to what extent is civil defense preparation mandatory and effective, as opposed to avoidable and routine, and is the answer differentiated for different regions?

Similarly, it is surprising just how little we really know about the actual penetration of contemporary Soviet society by official regime priorities. Consider, for example, the workplace, where we do not know which jobs are governed by formal nomenklatura lists, how these lists compare with informal appointment criteria, and how differences between the two are resolved in practice. Are there, in fact, two nomenklatura systems, one formal and the other de facto? Here, as elsewhere, the issue of routinization is important. We need to know whether the nomenklatura system is, in at least some areas, more significant behaviorally than the true, but irrelevant statement large American universities universally make to the effect that only the Boards of Regents make final decisions on tenure matters.

A principal aim of the project will be to achieve a better assessment than previously obtained of the actual degree of politicization of Soviet society. Cultural and leisure activities offer potentially very sensitive tests of the extent of politicization, for these activities are enjoyed outside the workplace and generally represent private choices for the spending of free time. Our expectation is that we shall find not just the "islands of privacy" Friedrich and Brzezinski described in an earlier study, but veritable continents--at least among the politically unengaged. These are, of course, empirical issues that we can explore with questions designed to specify how people spent leisure time, what media they preferred, especially their access to foreign, non-communist and communist materials and programs, and so forth. Answers will ultimately provide us with a highly nuanced appreciation of contemporary regime-society relations in the Soviet Union.

Cultural and other leisure time activities obviously constitute a significant part of daily experiences in the Soviet Union, as they do elsewhere. We want to learn more about the extent to which, and how, popular tastes are shaped by national leadership (or local political) preferences and tastes. We also want to find out how regime tastes and preferences impinge upon those who produce cultural products--that is, through career choice decisions, special reward structures, censorship (self and imposed) and so forth, and we plan to integrate these questions with the political, sociological and economic sections of the study.

Another major theme is regional differentiation in regime-society relations. This pertains to economic differentiation as well as to political differentiation. We expect to be able to stratify our sample in such a way as to specify what significant differences are manifest in regime-society interactions in the Ukraine and in the RSFSR, and, more specifically, among several different cities, such as Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Riga, Yerevan, and perhaps Kharkov or Odessa.

The design of the general survey protocol will also allow economists and those in related disciplines to determine the basic relationships that govern economic life in the Soviet Union at both macro and micro levels. What determines, for example, the degree to which individuals (who have a choice) work in the socialized or in private economic activity? How do women decide when to reenter the labor force after the birth of a child? What is the effect of the housing shortage on fertility? How does the availability of consumer durables impact upon work and savings decisions? What are the opportunity

costs to the Soviet family of having large families, and do rising opportunity costs account for declining Soviet fertility? How do Soviet workers respond to regional wage differentials and to economic incentives in general? What are the work attitudes of Soviet workers, and how do job tenure rules affect worker motivation?

These are, of course, merely examples of crucial questions, and the list could be expanded indefinitely. The basic pay-off of such research is, however, that the Western scientific community stands to gain an integrated, non-anecdotal understanding of many hitherto uncharted or puzzling dimensions of economic, demographic and political life in the Soviet Union by means of a systematic general survey protocol.

The richness of the emigrant population in educational attainment and professional representation offers the possibility of also conducting interviews with middle elite groups (managers, scientific workers, engineers, workers in specific industries, planners, statisticians, educational personnel, and so forth) who have been responsible for mediating institutional, societal and individual interaction, and can provide detailed information about specific aspects of the Soviet system about which we know very little. "Expert testimony" of this sort can provide insights into issues of crucial importance to an understanding of the way Soviet economic institutions really work. Have Soviet managers, for example, become more "rational" since Berliner's study? By what criteria are investment and technological innovation decisions made? To what extent are consumer goods produced by the defense industry, and vice versa? In what particular branches are "hidden" defense goods

produced, and how widely diffused is this knowledge? How well does the educational system serve economic needs? What are the forces, institutional, political, and psychological that resist economic reform?

Many other examples of ways in which our knowledge of the structure of Soviet society can benefit from systematic general and specialized interviews with recent Soviet emigrants could be elaborated. They would include our intention to test labor market efficiency, to evaluate career choice decisions, to construct subjective political maps in order to test, among other things, the saliency of politics and the organization of political perceptions, to duplicate certain important official Soviet census questions in order to improve their analytic utility, and to evaluate ethnic relations in various regions of the USSR, in the military, on the shop floor, and elsewhere.

Moreover, we can find out things that Soviet emigrants "don't know they know," that is, we can identify behavior that is unconsciously conditioned by variables such as social status, ethnic origin, geographical location, income level, educational attainment, and the like. This kind of information can provide a basis for expansion and systematization of our descriptions of, to paraphrase a product of the Harvard Project, "How the Soviet System Really Works."

Objective Two: Change in the Soviet System

The second objective of the proposed project is to use the existence of the Harvard Interview Project and of many previous studies by Western (and even by some Soviet) scholars as benchmarks by which we may identify evidence of change over the last several decades, specify

formal and informal mechanisms that have fostered change during these years, and produce an outlook for change in the foreseeable future.

Forecasting the future of a complex phenomenon like Soviet society is, of course, the most hazardous of all scholarly tasks. But it is also potentially the most rewarding, and it offers the ultimate test of the theories about Soviet society which inform both the first and the third objectives of the project. Thus, although we shall need to make our forecasts with great care and an equal part of skepticism, scientific rigor obliges us to subject our results to possible falsification. Inkeles and Bauer, notably, accepted a comparable obligation in The Soviet Citizen:

Our study ... not only serves to fill out the picture of the nature of the Soviet system under Stalin, but offers us a base line against which to assess changes in Soviet life. The very extensive studies which Western students of the Soviet Union have made in recent years, together with the evidence of trends within our own data, make it possible to identify the direction and areas of change in Soviet life. It is a major intention of this work to make such an assessment, and to indicate in each instance what the changes have been and probably will be (p. 7).

The extent of change in the USSR is a matter of sharply conflicting opinion among Western scholars, and the fundamental causal relationships governing (or inhibiting) observed change are subjects of even greater controversy. A principal issue concerns, for example, the relative weights that should be assigned to regime-directed change versus societal changes originating with deep-seated economic and demographic forces that appear to be affecting all large, multinational industrial societies. This disagreement is conditioned in part by a fundamental cleavage between those who seek to explain Soviet reality and change primarily in terms of models that are specific

to the Soviet (communist) experience and those who seek to de-esoterize Soviet experience by relating Soviet development to development experiences elsewhere. The second objective ties in, therefore, to our other two objectives. The proposed project will seek to identify the direction, nature and sources of change over the last several decades.

Understanding the relationships that govern economic life in the USSR, for example, provides a scientific basis for identifying and projecting basic trends in the economy. Once behavioral relationships among, say, educational choice, quantitative and qualitative labor force decisions, fertility behavior, locational choice, consumption and savings behavior under varying states of disequilibria are known, projections can be made on the basis of these relationships.

In addition, comparative analysis of the second and third Soviet emigrations will allow us to make judgments about how Soviet economic life has changed over the last quarter century. Should one view Soviet working economic arrangements as essentially static, or have significant changes indeed occurred? Do plant managers, for example, still engage in "satisficing?" Or, have they become neutral technocrats, as some claim today? Have educational-vocational goals changed? By plotting the course of change over the past quarter century, the ability of the Soviet economy to adapt to change may be gauged. Specification of the dynamics of the Soviet economy requires not only parallel special studies, but reexamination of the raw data of the Harvard Project to provide longitudinal information for comparison.

A completely different opportunity is presented by the fact that many members of the current Soviet emigration were involved in

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decision-making, or high-level staff positions in a variety of Soviet political, economic and administrative institutions. Thus, another avenue to specifying change in the Soviet system is provided by the emigrants' own experiences as participants in conferences, planning sessions and other agencies with advance responsibilities for reform and change. Additional examples of recent changes in the Soviet system could be given, including changing admission requirements to educational institutions, increasing adult mortality rates, declining female labor participation rates, the continued drift of educated rural youth to urban employments and so forth. The important point for our purposes is that change is taking place in the Soviet Union and requires measurement, interpretation and projection.

Objective Three: Social Science Theory

The third objective of the project is to contribute to general social science, particularly comparative studies, as well as to Soviet studies proper. Here the theoretical orientation is toward major, standing hypotheses in general social science, and the implication is that questions that have been asked in previous Western cross-national surveys should be replicated as nearly as possible to ensure valid comparative perspectives. A significant proportion of the general survey protocol (as opposed to intensive interviews on specialized topics) will be devoted to comparative socioeconomic, demographic, and political hypotheses that have been developed to analyze growth, development and other forms of structural change and conflict in industrial and "post-industrial" societies of the world.

We shall be interested in analyzing, for example, the determinants of fertility, family expenditures, marital behavior, occupational and geographic mobility, and family savings behavior by adapting models that have been used to explore these characteristics in non-communist, industrial and industrializing countries.

Adaptation of concepts such as "civic competence," a concept which seeks to ascertain the degree of influence individual citizens feel that they have over political and economic events at various levels of society, is one way to tie our study in with previous or ongoing social science survey research projects in the West. The issue is, of course, not just the measurement of "civic competence," but identification of the means, if any, individuals would expect to serve effectively in particular situations.

Another cross-national application involves an attempt to ascertain the "saliency" of politics in the USSR. Modifying methods used to measure salience in other societies, we intend to place "politics" and "political concerns" in the context of everyday life, that is, to measure political salience relative to other concerns, such as health, material standards of living, job satisfaction, security of person and wealth and so forth.

A related investigation will be made into the "quality of life" in the USSR. Here the issue is not merely economic well being, but perceived general accessibility of "necessities" such as medical and psychiatric care, availability of appropriate schooling, experiences with discrimination, corruption, and the like. These concerns can be augmented by explorations of private evaluation of scientific and

technological "progress," of economic "success" as defined by the regime, and of the provision of cultural facilities and programs.

The application of these and other hypotheses drawn from studies of other societies will offer both new ideas and the opportunity "to place" Soviet society, economy, and polity relative to the other major industrial nations of the world. One need not subscribe to a "stages theory" of growth and development to find such comparisons fruitful and interesting.

In summary, the research objectives of the project are designed to improve and to systematize our knowledge about the fundamental structure and functions of the contemporary Soviet system, to place the system (and its component parts) on the continuum that is implied by international comparative studies for advanced industrial countries, and, most ambitiously, to seek to measure evidence of change in the Soviet system, identify mechanisms that contribute to change, and to provide an outlook for change in the foreseeable future.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The three objectives of the project--(1) Structure of Soviet Society; (2) Change in the Soviet System and (3) Social Science Theory-- would ideally be satisfied by a research design oriented along three main perspectives, or levels of analysis. We would like to ask questions of (a) members of the general public, the "non-elites," (b) individuals who played important intermediate managerial and decision-making roles in the various administrative, economic, political and military bureaucracies, that is, the level represented by "middle elites," and (c) members

of the national leadership and others in the highest policy-making institutions of the USSR, the "top elite." These three levels and their interaction in contemporary Soviet society provide a dynamic picture of the Soviet Union today. A matrix illustrating the intersection of the top elites, middle elites and non-elites with the areas of politics, work and daily life in the Soviet Union is presented in Table I.

It goes without saying that we shall be able to develop little new information from our sample about top-elite behavior and attitudes. The top-elite view is assumed to be expressed in official pronouncements and public expressions of position as indicated in Row 1 of Table I. Similarly, the rural, less educated, non-Jewish populations (Row 3) are under-represented in this migration, but we hope to compensate by over-sampling emigrants who are less educated, of lower economic background, and non-Jews. However, one of the most salient features of the population we have available to sample is that it over-represents members of the middle elite (Row 2) substantially. A good research design is one, therefore, that can take advantage of the richness offered by the bias in favor of education, middle-elite employments, and ethnic self-identification.

Intensive Interviews with the Middle Elite

The middle elite represents those who are intermediaries, or "producers" of services and of goods (broadly defined) in Soviet society. It includes, by our definition, middle-level members of the Party apparatus, government officials, enterprise managers and other economic decision makers, white-collar workers who are responsible for delivering social

Table 1. Research Design: Sample Topics

Behavior Analytic Perspective	"Politics" (1)	"Work" (2)	"Daily Life" (3)
1. National leadership or Top elite	Ideology Policy formulation Mature socialism Nationality policy	Plan Economic priorities Educational planning	Social control Behavioral norms Compulsory behavior Scientific socialism
2. Middle elite or "Producers"	Local Party control Bureaucratic encounters Local partisanship Regional differentials	Investment decisions Censorship Technological innovation Informal decision rules Second economy Blat Samizdat Nepotism	Career choice Privileges Covert privileges
3. Non-elite or Individual actors and "Consumers"	Conventional activism Interest articulation Bureaucratic encounters Sources of regime support Prejudice Value hierarchies	Supply of labor Career choice Labor mobility Job preferences Location decisions Socialized industry	Purchases in CFM Reciprocity Language preference Consumption of culture Educational attainment Attitudes to science Ethnic self-identification Urban values Aesthetic preferences Leisure preferences

welfare services, educators, and the intermediate military and police leadership, plus those who participate in the production of culture and other media. We include also those who "produce" for the second economy, for samizdat or for other non-official sectors of the Soviet system. Of particular concern will be the exploration of informal middle-elite behavior (especially in non-economic realms).

Another, related concern of this middle-elite perspective will be to ascertain how these individuals, as intermediaries, balance the "demands" upon them for their products or services as expressed, on the one hand, by regime norms and goals and, on the other, by households. The question is, to what extent did members of the middle-level elite discern conflicts between the preferences of the top elite and the wants and needs of non-elite members of Soviet society? How did welfare officials or educators, for example, determine the most appropriate regional distribution and levels of services? How did they evaluate effectiveness of their programs?

Emphasis in interviews with middle elites will be upon informal behavior. The model of this aspect of the project is the "second economy" investigation that Gregory Grossman and Vlad Treml have been engaged in for several years now. We shall be especially interested in uncovering the structure of informal relationships in areas other than economics. A prime question is the extent to which informal decision rules and conduct by the middle elite undermine or, on the contrary, actually serve regime interests. The conflicts of interests that obtain among top elite, middle elite, and non-elite will presumably be greatest and most apparent in the "second," or informal, world of social, political and economic relationships. This dimension of the project addresses, therefore, the question: How Does the Soviet System Really Work?

The collection of information on such intermediate actors will be primarily through intensive interviews conducted by highly-trained specialists in the field of Soviet studies. The approach adopted in these interviews will consist of a blend of detailed intensive interviews and systematic, mainly closed-ended interviews of relatively large subsets (50-150) of the emigrant population--scientists, creative writers, engineers--with a view to assessing the relative impact on work and life experiences of divergent strata of Soviet middle-level elites.

The study of several key professions and specialities that are exceptionally well represented in the Third Soviet Emigration is conceived as an important basis for analyzing the differential impact of the regime on various sub-elites. It will also allow us to assess regime-society relations from the perspective of those who mediated them. Moreover, this group should be able to help in the identification of the forces and mechanisms that foster or inhibit change at the level of middle management.

Finally, some questions in the general survey will be formulated specifically to correspond to questions in the intensive interviews. For example, intensive interviews with members of various professions will ask them to evaluate their own sensitivity to public needs, demands or complaints. Corresponding general survey questions will ask respondents to evaluate the responsiveness of professional personnel. In this way, an interface is created between the intensive interviews and the general survey protocol.

Surveying Non-Elites

We are highly interested in the general public's view as it corresponds or contradicts that of the middle elite, and as it relates

to micro-analytic patterns of political, economic and social behavior and attitudes, that is, to the family and its members as "actors" and "consumers." The underlying assumption of the non-elite perspective is of the Soviet system as one in which the society is not merely acted upon. Rather, independent political and economic action by individuals, groups and larger social and institutional aggregates are important subjects of study. Taken together with the informal behavior of the middle elite, the behavior of individuals affords a basis for exploring: How to Work the Soviet System, that is, how individuals and families succeed in reaping the benefits and rewards that are available in the system and how they cope with the obstacles they find in their way.

There are, of course, genuine problems in attempting to make statements about the prevalence of various forms of political behavior in the Soviet Union on the basis of emigrant experiences, and the same holds for other forms of behavior with diminishing but real force. But we can most assuredly provide answers, for example, to questions about whether or not, and with respect to what issues, and in what circumstances informal interest articulation occurs in the USSR.

Another aspect of the microanalytic perspective is still more controversial and difficult. Here we must state quite forthrightly that the methodological problems of moving from the values of a group that emigrated to those of the parent population are particularly acute. We have concluded, nonetheless, that a value, or attitudinal, perspective is, given sufficient care and modest goals, both necessary and possible. It is necessary because it provides a key link to the Harvard Project and

thus touches directly upon our ability to address the critical issue of change in the Soviet system. It is also necessary because the study of values is a primary way by which we can compare Soviet society with other industrial countries.

That it is possible we conclude from The Soviet Citizen, where Inkeles and Bauer demonstrated that on many important dimensions, most notably what many have described as "welfare authoritarianism dimensions," even those who chose to leave the Soviet Union shared certain values of Soviet society. This finding affords us some confidence in extrapolating our results to values held by citizens who remain in the Soviet Union--precisely because the expected bias of ex-citizens is countered by these shared values.

The exploration of family/individual behavior and attitudes represents, therefore, a "bottom up" perspective and will be conducted primarily by means of the general survey protocol, particularly by means of branching and five special supplements attached to the core general protocol.

POPULATION AND SAMPLE DESIGN

Our sample design is guided by two aims. The first is to achieve a scientifically accurate, cost-effective sample of the persons who have moved from the Soviet Union to the United States between January 1, 1977, and December 31, 1980. This will allow precise definition of the degree of homogeneity or heterogeneity that characterizes the emigrant community. This step was not feasible in the Harvard Project. Having characterized the emigrant population, the second aim is to construct

a sample that makes full use of the range and depth of knowledge it contains. As it was put in The Soviet Citizen, "The ideal sample design... [is]... one with equal numbers of cases within each [designated] category (p. 21)."

The sample we shall draw from the emigrant population is not intended to be a representative mapping of the population of the USSR. The strength of our inferences and confidence in our ability to project to the entire Soviet population will depend primarily upon the extent to which certain statistical patterns are present in the interview data. We expect to find, for example, relations between the respondent's social status and his political attitude. Although we would not contend that the attitudes typical of our respondents will correspond to attitudes of the Soviet population as a whole, we do expect the relationships within the sample to be subsets of relationships that do prevail in the Soviet population at large. The range of response within the general population will doubtless be greater than for the sample, but it cannot be less. Thus, the presence of significant differences among our respondents will increase our confidence that the sample of emigrants is representative in certain respects and in measurable degree of the Soviet population.

To measure these important differences accurately, it is necessary to have sufficient sample members in each social category to guarantee enough interviews to conduct statistically reliable analyses. Borrowing a phrase again from The Soviet Citizen (p. 23),

the main question concerning adequacy of our sample is whether or not we have sufficient numbers of persons in various categories to permit us to make meaningful statements about subgroups within our sample.

No one can deny that we are faced with a major problem of sample bias. The presence of a known bias means that there are certain questions to which answers are uninteresting from a scientific point of view. These include many types of attitudinal questions, but it does not include all of them. Sample bias is less likely to affect certain types of reported behavior, and, in other cases, the known direction of the bias can be used to powerful advantage. Certain rules will be followed to minimize the problem of sample bias. These include, for example:

1. Interviewing as many emigrants of non-Jewish origins as possible. This includes members of other ethnic groups, other religious groups, and spouses of non-Soviet citizens.
2. Concentrating on obligatory or unavoidable experiences, which are least affected therefore by a respondent's "Jewishness," e.g., experiences with social and medical services, housing, primary and secondary education.
3. Collecting information from respondents on the life experiences of their friends and colleagues.
4. Seeking out demographic heterogeneity among the Jewish emigrants, rather than demographic similarity.
5. Maximizing heterogeneity as regards the decision to emigrate. This includes interviews with "co-emigrants," i.e., those who emigrated reluctantly in order to remain with emigrating spouses, parents, children, and friends.
6. Comparing data with that collected on earlier Soviet emigrants, particularly with that of the Harvard Project and studies done on earlier "Third Wave" emigrants.
7. Comparing data with official Soviet statistics and published survey results.

It is important to emphasize that any type of interview with Soviet emigrants, including one-on-one interviews with "experts," is subject to sample bias. The problem must be met squarely and cannot be

avoided. In addition, intensive interviews are also peculiarly subject to the problem of manipulation of the interviewer by the interviewee.

Another source of possible bias stems from respondent self-selection. A purpose of following prescribed survey research procedures and, indeed, of employing a professional survey research organization, is to minimize this potential source of bias.

Finally, all respondents will be assured of strict confidentiality. All federal and other legal protections of privacy rights will be adhered to strictly, interview records will be maintained in secure storage, and names and answer sheets will be separated permanently, once processing is complete.

TECHNICAL RESEARCH PLAN

We have explained in the research design why we plan to administer an integrated set of intensive and general survey protocols. What follows is a brief description of the two types of protocols.

The General Survey (Schedule G) Protocol / Coordinator: Brian D. Silver

The project calls for administering a general survey protocol (Schedule G protocol) to 3,000 adult emigrants. This protocol will consist of a two-hour core of questions, plus five supplements of one hour, each of which will be administered to 600 interviewees within the sample. The sample size of 3,000 is chosen for several reasons. First, we must draw a large sample in order to permit "oversampling" (stratification) of the categories of the Soviet population that are less well represented in the emigration as a whole. Increasing the number of "atypical"

respondents is not simply a matter of selecting people with diverse backgrounds; it also requires interviewing enough people with particular backgrounds so that the survey responses represent more than the opinions of just a few individuals. Also, because of the novelty of this survey, we cannot predetermine as well as we might wish what kinds of respondents (in terms of social backgrounds) might prove to offer important information.

Interview length is determined by a number of factors. Each respondent will (on average) be questioned for three hours. A longer questionnaire would risk respondent fatigue. A shorter questionnaire, on the other hand, would force us to narrow the study too much.

Breaking the Schedule G protocol into a two-hour core and a one-hour supplement permits us to design and to administer up to seven hours of structured questions. Although the individual respondents will be interviewed for only three hours on average, we will be able to generate information from the seven hours of questionnaire by administering both the two-hour core questionnaire and one of the five one-hour supplements to subsamples of approximately 600 respondents each.

A second reason for dividing the questionnaire into core and supplements is to allow setting priorities in the questionnaire. The core questionnaire will cover much standard material, such as the educational and career backgrounds, as well as high priority questions in most major subject areas of the project. The supplements will be devoted to particular subject areas, such as detailed questions on demographic behavior, or detailed questions on military and civil defense training and experience.

A third reason for dividing the questionnaire into the two components is to encourage innovation: the supplements (as opposed to the core protocol), will be more likely to include questions that are experimental in form or content (although, of course, all questions in the core and supplements will have been pretested).

Alternatively, of course, we could use a single questionnaire form (of three hours) for all 3,000 respondents. But this would permit us to cover far less ground in the interviews. The supplements will be assigned to respondents in either of two basic ways: on the basis of some predetermined respondent characteristic (e.g., a subsample of 600 men might be questioned in detail about military service) or on the basis of simple random selection (e.g., a sample of 600 respondents might be questioned in detail about family formation, health, and welfare).

Of course, within both the core questionnaire and the supplements, questionnaire branching will be used, where persons who respond in certain ways to a "filter" question will then be asked a number of follow-up questions. For example, women who had borne children during the last 10 years might be asked several questions about prenatal, postnatal, and infant care. This may permit us, for example, to discover why Soviet infant mortality rates have been climbing in recent years.

Intensive (Schedule S) Protocols /Coordinator: William Zimmerman

In addition to the general survey, the project will undertake a series of intensive interview subprojects. Special subprojects are scheduled to interview members of the Soviet scientific and technological

community, enterprise managers and planners, educators and middle-elite noneconomic administrators, for example. Six of these intensive sub-projects will include one to one and one-half hour screeners completed by NORC according to protocols worked out in advance by the appropriate members of the Research Team, their assistants, and advisors. Another six will be wholly conducted by members of the Research Team without any direct input from NORC (apart from identification and location). NORC's services are felt to be unnecessary since several of the S schedule projects will be almost entirely open-ended, may require several return visits by the interviewers, and will require extensive area knowledge and excellent language skills. S schedule projects are expected to involve from 50 to 200 subjects, depending upon the topic and the available population. Subjects of intensive interviews will be identified through several processes, including the initial list building conducted by NORC and the Research Team.

Design of individual S schedule projects and the final selection of topics for inclusion will be undertaken in Urbana during the summer of 1980 and will proceed simultaneously with the development of the G schedule (the general large-scale survey protocol) in order to integrate the S and G schedules where appropriate.

Intensive interviews will play a significant and integral role in the project. First, these interviews provide a mechanism for tapping the views and experiences of those who are the producers or deliverers of ideas, economic goods, political goods and services. Our interest is in the links between the central political leadership, the citizenry and the middle-level elite that must mediate their interests. This stems from our overall concern to assess regime responsiveness, to evaluate

autonomous action within the confines of the official Soviet rules of the game, and to identify the values of key groups.

Second, by rigorous, structured interviews--a fraction of which will parallel the mass survey--of particular professions which are over-represented in the emigrant population we expect to achieve a differentiated perspective on the links between the party and other key groups. How intrusive are party officials? To what extent are the relationships between party officials and various segments of Soviet society characterized by cooperation or conflict?

Third, we view intensive interviews as providing an unparalleled opportunity to assess Soviet responses to particular problems and experiences. We expect sizable minorities of our mass sample to have had military experience. Similarly, workers will represent different types of industrial establishments. We shall seek to capitalize on the experiences of these individuals to explore military life, to compare special benefit differentials, and the like.

The list of possible intensive interviews is longer than feasible and we have had to limit the number of topics to be studied. The three criteria used in choosing intensive subprojects are: (1) personnel; (2) nonduplication; and (3) significance. In each case, we have identified a scholar or scholars willing to commit themselves to a five-year effort, involving the development of specific topics, the conduct interviews and analysis of the results. In addition, an attempt has been made to avoid duplication of effort by choosing topics which are not currently being conducted by other scholars. (We are, of course, interested in learning from previous studies and in coordinating with ongoing studies in order

to maximize comparability.) The most important criterion in choosing the S schedules has naturally been, however, the question of general significance. The studies included are of paramount importance in our opinion, particularly with respect to the theme of change. The "middle" group of emigrants—those most concerned in the Soviet Union with production, policy implementation, management and so forth—should provide a dynamic view of Soviet society, especially its informal workings. Further, since these middle-elite members are likely to have been involved in the most recent conferences and planning sessions in the Soviet Union, they may have unique knowledge about the direction of Soviet society. This is not meant to refer to actual intelligence about the USSR, but rather to knowledge about the general trends and developing policy currents in the Soviet Union today.

EXPECTED RESEARCH PRODUCTS

The Harvard Interview Project is remembered as a scholarly venture mainly for five major publications. Two of these, How the Soviet System Works, by Raymond Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, and The Soviet Citizen, by Inkeles and Bauer, were general works designed to synthesize the results of the study taken as a whole. Mark Field's Doctor and Patient in the USSR, H. Kent Gieger's The Family in Soviet Russia, and Joe Berliner's Factory and Manager in the USSR derived predominantly from specialized, intensive interview projects.

The research products that we anticipate will present a similar pattern, and they will represent answers to the four general questions that the project addresses: How is the Soviet System Supposed to Work?;

How Does the Soviet System Really Work?; How Do Soviet Citizens Work the System?; and Where is the Soviet System Going? The works we propose will, therefore, integrate our findings with current literature on Soviet society and economy and develop the results in terms of existing models of the Soviet and other societies. The project seeks, therefore, to contrast--by its emphasis upon informal mechanisms, behaviors, and communication systems--the way the system really works with the way it is supposed to work. This major study reflects our first objective of filling in critical gaps in our understanding of the de facto contemporary structure and function of the system.

A second major synthetic product will be based upon the cross-national dimensions of the current survey project. Recent studies of Soviet political, economic and sociological phenomena have demonstrated the value of seeking out cross-national patterns in the Soviet experience, and one result has been a tendency to de-esoterize certain features and developments and thereby render them more amenable to standard analytical techniques of the various disciplines. It is not possible to determine in advance, of course, whether a systematic examination of such characteristics will result, in the end, in reducing the "perceived analytical distance" between the Soviet experience and that of other industrial and "post-industrial" societies, but a major work (entitled something like: The USSR in the 1970s--Cross National Parallels and Differences) summarizing and analyzing these issues will certainly be a product of the proposed project.

The third, and most ambitious work which will emerge from the project is summarized by the sub-title: Evidence, Mechanisms and Outlook for Change in Soviet Political, Social and Economic Institutions. This


product will build directly upon the foundation afforded by The Soviet Citizen and the archives of the Harvard Interview Project, and it will be constructed--as will the actual interview protocol--to anticipate the possibility of another major out-migration from the USSR sometime in the next two or three decades. We can be confident that the description that emerges from this cross-disciplinary synthesis (of what was known and what the interview project can add) will serve as a benchmark for study of post-Brezhnev Soviet Russia, much as the Bauer, Inkeles and Kluckhohn study did for the post-Stalin era.

A number of major monographs may also be expected. Several have already been identified tentatively by Research Team members: Regime-Society Relations in the USSR in the 1970s, Emerging Patterns in Soviet Popular Culture, Communal and Social Behavior in the USSR, Ethnic Politics and Relations in Soviet Russia, Soviet Scientific and Technological Communities, and The Cost to the USSR of the Third Soviet Emigration. In addition, periodic reports will be submitted to the project funders, and the third-year progress report will include a preliminary analysis of the data. Several studies, particularly some of those from the S schedule interviews, may be expected earlier.

A timetable flow chart is presented in Table 2.

ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, ACCOUNTABILITY AND REPORTING

The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign will serve as home office for the Project. The Research Team will serve as the planning and decision-making unit, determine any changes in its own composition, and provide supervision for all subprojects conducted on and away from the campus of the University of Illinois.



Research Team and Associates


All basic project costs (for labor, materials, survey work, and so forth) will be financed through a contract between the National Council for Soviet and East European Research (NCSEER) and the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. The Contracts Office of the University of Illinois, following procedures set by Illinois state law, will monitor and be accountable for all project expenditures, and will provide, as required, reports to NCSEER.

The Project Director, with the participation of the Research Team, will prepare semi-annual progress reports and any other reports that NCSEER may require. The Research Team, consisting of eight Senior Researchers (plus Millar), will participate jointly in project planning and design, coordination of research and data collection and analysis. The eight Senior Researchers have agreed and will be expected to participate as members of the Research Team for the project's duration. An Executive Committee composed of the coordinators for the general and interview survey protocols, plus the Project Director, has been designated to make decisions in the interim between formal Research Team meetings. An organizational chart is provided in Table 3.

The Research Team will meet collectively (with the Project Director) at least twice each year for planning and review of project activities. The Team will review and approve substantive emphasis and final forms of both the general survey protocol and the intensive interviews. The Team will also review and approve the selection of all research personnel. The Project Director may call upon the advice of the Senior Researchers as individuals, as required by Project needs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHART

Table 3



As part of its subcontract, NORC will also submit annual reports to the Project Director. These reports, and other documents regarding the survey design and administration, will also be summarized and included in the Director's annual reports to NCSEER.

RESEARCH ABROAD

It is the hope of the Research Team that a subset of our surveys, or parallel projects, can be carried out in West Germany, Canada and Israel. The ultimate success of the study is closely linked to our success in securing a sample which includes respondents with varying characteristics and experiences. Adding to our respondent pool persons who have migrated from the USSR to countries other than the U.S.A. would be a significant step in this direction.

Official requests are planned for permission to conduct a portion of our research in West Germany and Canada. Should permission be granted, and should the necessary cooperation be forthcoming, a separate budget and special proposal will be submitted. Organizationally, research abroad will be closely linked to the main project and the data collected will be treated as an integral part of the summary results.

SUMMARY BUDGET

Summary budgets are provided in Tables 4 and 5. (Detailed budgets are presented in Appendix F, Annex I, and in Appendix B, Annex I, of the full proposal).

All participating universities have agreed to abide by the 20% direct cost limitation required by the National Council, and the University of Illinois has also agreed to apply no surcharge to subcontracts with either other universities or NORC. (The indirect cost charge applied by NORC is explained and justified in Annex II.) Budgets for years beyond 1980-81 assume a 9% general inflation rate, but the project will, of course, pay only actual salary increases. The subcontracts referred to in Table 4 represent an administrative convention and do not represent independent subprojects. The project as a whole, including the work done by NORC, will be directed by the Project Director and the Research Team from headquarters at the University of Illinois.

NORC will complete its work in three years. Analysis of the data tapes by the Research Team will begin at that time. The bulk of the expenditures of the Headquarters and the Research Team during the first three years of the project will consist of: (1) specification and testing of survey protocols for both the general and the specialized interviews; (2) conduct of the specialized interview projects; (3) coding and cleaning tapes for the specialized, intensive interviews.

The final two years of the project will be devoted to our analysis of the data collected by NORC and by the Research Team and to preparation of our results for publication. It is essential, in our view, to fund these last two years in order to avoid the one major pitfall that the Harvard Interview Project failed to escape: inadequate exploitation of the data.

Table 4: Summary Budget

 Contemporary Soviet Society
 (October 1-September 30)

	<u>1980-81</u>	<u>1981-82</u>	<u>1982-83</u>	<u>1983-84</u>	<u>1984-85</u>	<u>Five-year totals</u>	
A. Headquarters (University of Illinois)							
1. Nonacademic staff	\$ 54,000						
2. Research personnel, including Project Director	178,991						
3. Fringe benefits (all above)	30,701						
4. Total salaries and benefits	\$263,692	\$288,243	\$263,886	\$261,172	\$314,910	\$1,391,903	
5. Office expenses	18,589	20,262	22,085	24,072	26,238	111,246	
6. Consultant and advisor expenses	27,000	32,000	27,000	-	-	86,000	
7. Travel budget							
a. Domestic	97,350						
b. Foreign	9,400	106,750	106,111	92,285	22,050	8,400	335,596
8. Instrument development and admini- stration	100,000	100,000	100,000	-	-	300,000	
9. Computer time	-	-	15,000	25,000	10,000	50,000	
10. Subtotal for Headquarters							
a. Direct	516,031	546,616	520,256	332,294	359,548	2,274,745	
b. Indirect (@ 20%)	103,206	109,323	104,051	66,458	71,909	454,947	
	<u>\$619,237</u>	<u>\$655,939</u>	<u>\$624,307</u>	<u>\$398,752</u>	<u>\$431,457</u>	<u>\$2,729,692</u>	
B. Subcontracts for Research Team Members							
1. Direct	\$217,079	\$236,697	\$246,825	\$253,927	\$281,212	\$1,235,740	
2. Indirect	43,410	47,336	49,363	50,784	56,240	247,133	
3. Subtotal for subcontracts						<u>\$1,482,873</u>	
C. Total Headquarters and Subcontracts	\$879,732	\$1,038,972	\$920,495	\$703,463	\$768,463	\$4,212,618	
D. NORC 1980-83 (See Table 5 for breakdown)						<u>\$2,696,000</u>	
E. Grand Total						<u>\$6,909,000</u>	

TABLE 5: NORC Summary Budget

National Opinion Research Center
Study on Contemporary Soviet Society

	Instrument Development	Sampling	Data Collection	Data Processing	Management	Total
Staff Labor	58,352	55,908	210,278	453,276	98,094	875,908
Interviewer Labor			274,637			274,637
Overhead	36,761	35,222	305,497	285,563	61,799	724,842
Other Direct Expense	71,221	93,512	235,662	190,857	30,356	621,608
Estimated Cost	166,334	184,642	1,026,074	929,696	190,249	2,496,995
Fixed Fee	13,308	14,772	82,085	74,376	15,219	199,760
Total Cost Plus Fee	179,642	199,414	1,108,159	1,004,072	205,468	2,696,755