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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EUROPEAN AND SOVIET AFFAIRS DIRECTORATE, NSC
: RECORDS

Withdrawer

MJD 4/27/2005

File Folder REYKJAVIK (4]

FOIA

F05-097

Box Number ~~90907~~ *RAC Box 12*

HARRIS, WILLIAM

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9115	MEMO	JOHN POINDEXTER TO THE PRESIDENT RE MEETING IN REYKAVICK R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	2	ND	B1
9117	AGENDA	RE REYKJAVIK R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	2	10/6/1986	B1
9118	TABLE OF CONTENTS	RE BACKGROUND BOOK R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1
9119	TABLE OF CONTENTS	RE OVERALL BRIEFING BOOK R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1
9120	PAPER	RE BRIEFING MATEIRAL R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1
9121	TABLE OF CONTENTS	TEXT SAME AS # 9119 R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
9122	DRAFT PAPER	RE FIRST DAY R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	5	ND	B1
9123	DRAFT PAPER	RE SECOND DAY R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1
9124	DRAFT LETTER	RE DANILOFF AFFAIR R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1
9125	PAPER	RE DANILOFF CASE R 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097	1	ND	B1

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FOS-097 #9/15

BY CU NARA DATE 11/21/07

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Your Meetings with Gorbachev in Reykjavik

Gorbachev's immediate objective in meeting you in Iceland is to define one or more agreements in the arms control area which can be completed during his trip to the United States. Your objective will be impress upon him the necessity for progress across the range of issues as you have defined them, and to determine how far he is likely to go to reach concrete agreements.

The most favorable outcome from our point of view would be an agreed date for Gorbachev's trip to the United States. However, the best way to maximize the odds that Gorbachev will commit himself to a date is to avoid seeming too eager. If Gorbachev feels that the fact of a meeting in the United States is supremely important to you, he is more likely to try to extract a substantive payment for it. It will be best to maintain the attitude that Gorbachev is welcome to come at any reasonable time convenient to him, and that you wish his visit to be as productive as possible (thus your agreement to the meeting in Reykjavik), but it is up to him to make agreements possible on fair terms if he seeks them.

In Geneva, you engaged him in considerable debate about philosophical attitudes and historical experience. In Reykjavik, Gorbachev is likely to be more goal-oriented, concentrating on what can be achieved -- though he will doubtless rise to sharp debate if he feels challenged on matters affecting his pride or the prestige of his country.

Since time will be severely limited, you will want to concentrate on a few key issues which either seem good candidates for further movement on the Soviet part, or else are of such importance that firm markers must be set down. Several arms control issues fall in the first category, while regional issues like Afghanistan and Central America fall in the second. Human rights issues fall somewhere in between: they are unlikely to be candidates for formal agreements, but Gorbachev must be convinced that more progress is required in this area if some of the other things he wants are to become feasible.

~~SECRET~~

Although Gorbachev may possibly throw in a few "sweeteners" at the outset, he probably will reserve most of his real concessions (if he is bringing any) until late in the day (or rather, until the second day). Therefore, it will probably be wise to use the first day to lay out and defend our current positions and listen carefully to what he says. By your final session, it should be clear whether we are near closure on any important points -- and whether Gorbachev is prepared to move enough on some key issues to justify movement on our part.

The people Gorbachev has named to his "official delegation" are all very close to him personally and bureaucratically: all, except for Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, come from his immediate office or the Central Committee Secretariat which is under his direct command. This means that he retains considerable flexibility to interpret the results of your meetings as he wishes in reporting to his Politburo colleagues.

My guess is that he has a keen interest in a "successful" meeting, which would enhance his prestige and authority at home and prepare the way for a visit to the U.S. -- which could bring further domestic benefits. If so, you will enter the meeting with a very strong hand, and should be able to secure some significant movement in some Soviet positions. On the other hand, if Gorbachev turns out to be unyielding, your willingness to meet him in Reykjavik should make clear to U.S. and allied publics that Gorbachev is the problem.

Prepared by:
Jack F. Matlock

Scott Dean

1 pm Oct 6

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK
October 9-12, 1986

ANNOTATED AGENDA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9

- 9:30 a.m. President departs White House.
- 7:05 p.m. Arrive Iceland (Brief Arrival Ceremony).
(local time)
- 8:05 p.m. Arrive Ambassador's Residence.

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10

- Morning Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on general strategy for the meeting.
- 12:30 p.m. Briefing lunch at Residence.
- Afternoon Briefing and private time.
Briefing to focus on arms control issues.
- 4:30 - Meetings with Iceland President, Prime
5:00 p.m. Minister and Foreign Minister.
General discussion of U.S.-Icelandic relations.
- Evening Private dinner at Residence.

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11

- 10:30 a.m.-
12:30 p.m. First session. Emphasis: Overview, including human rights and arms control. At Hofdi House.

You will host this session, which means you will arrive first, greet Gorbachev and initiate the meeting.
- 1:00 -
2:00 p.m. Briefing lunch. At Residence.
- 3:30 -
5:30 p.m. Second Session. Emphasis: Continuation of previous discussion with emphasis on arms control and human rights, some exchange on regional and bilateral issues. At Hofdi House.

Gorbachev will host this session, which means that he will arrive first to greet you and initiate the meeting.
- Evening Private dinner at Residence.

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NLRR FOS-097 #9117

BY AS NARA DATE 11/21/07

~~SECRET~~

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12

11:00 a.m.
1:00 p.m.

Third Session. Emphasis: Wrapup.
At Hofdi House

You host this meeting.

1:00 -
2:00 p.m.

Private Lunch. At Residence.

3:00 p.m.

Drop-by event for U.S. military and
Embassy personnel and families.

This will be an opportunity to thank them for
the job they are doing, and particularly for
their assistance in helping with the meeting
this weekend. It will also provide a forum
for any post-meeting public remarks.

3:00 -
3:20 p.m.

Farewell ceremony at Keflavik.

3:45 p.m.

Depart Iceland.

5:50 p.m.

Arrive at Andrews.

6:05 p.m.

Arrive at White House.

~~SECRET~~

JACK

- Note change in
meeting structure

- 4

Matlock

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7106

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

September 30, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB/PETER R. SOMMER *the* *Peter*

SUBJECT: Briefing Material Requirements for President's Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev

Attached for your approval are the briefing material requirements for the President's meeting with Gorbachev. The requirements include the Overall Briefing Book, the Background Book, and possible public remarks. The tasker addresses, as well, a possible meeting with Icelandic leaders and U.S. forces. The tasker also makes it clear that the schedule, as outlined in the briefing book, is notional.

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize Rod McDaniel to sign the Tab I tasker to State, with an info copy to Defense and USIA.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

the for
Jack Matlock, Bob *Agst* Leonard, Frank *PPS for* Lavin, and Judyt Mandel concur. *the for*

Attachment:

- Tab I Memorandum to State
- Tab A Overall Briefing Book
- Tab B Background Book
- Tab C Guidance for Reykjavik Preparatory Meeting

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *MJN* NARA, Date *4/28/05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Briefing Material Requirements for President's
Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev (U)

We need by COB, October 7, the following briefing material: (C)

- President's Visit to Reykjavik, October 10 - 12, 1986:
Overall Briefing Book (details at Tab A)
- President's Visit to Reykjavik, October 10 - 12, 1986:
Background Book (details at Tab B)

The schedule outlined in the Tab A Table of Contents, as well as the proposed public remarks (see below), are notional. We will provide an updated schedule as soon as it is available. (C)

For contingency purposes, we need by OOB, October 3, the following draft public remarks: (C)

- October 10: Arrival Statement
- October 11: Toast for Icelandic hosted dinner for President and Gorbachev.
- October 12: Departure/Opening of Press Conference Statement
- TBD: Greetings to U.S. Forces at Keflavik Base.
(To be coordinated with Defense)

The suggested Talking Points for the Overall Briefing Book should be interagency cleared, as appropriate. The Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) will be the coordinating body for the arms control talking points. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By M30 NARA, Date 4/25/05

CONFIDENTIAL

2

Overall meeting guidance to help focus development of the briefing material is at Tab C. ~~(C)~~

Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab A Overall Briefing Book
Tab B Background Briefing Book
Tab C Guidance for Reykjavik

cc: Department of Defense, United States Information Agency

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK

October 10 - 12, 1986

B A C K G R O U N D B O O K

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Arms Control

Nuclear and Space Talks
Compliance and Interim Restraint
Sharing the Benefits of Defense
Verification
CSCE
CDE
Chemical Weapons Treaty/Non-Proliferation
Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Nuclear Testing
Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
Conventional Arms Control
Hotline Upgrade

Regional Issues

General Points on Regional Dialogue
Middle East
Iran-Iraq
Terrorism
Southern Africa
Central America/Caribbean
East Asia/Pacific
Afghanistan

Bilateral Issues

Human Rights
Economic Issues (GATT and Bilateral)
U.S.-Soviet Trade
Kiev/New York Consulates
Exchanges
Scientific Cooperation
Space Cooperation
Transportation Agreement
U.S.-Soviet Maritime Boundary
Bilateral Review Commission
Fusion
Energy Agreement

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NLRR #05-097 #9118

BY Cv NARA DATE 11/21/07

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK

October 10 -12, 1986

O V E R A L L B R I E F I N G B O O K

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1. Poindexter Overview Paper (NSC will prepare)
2. Shultz Overview Paper

II. SCHEDULE

Annotated Agenda

III. ICELAND

Friday, October 10:

Courtesy meeting with President Finnbogadottir and Prime Minister Hermannsson

- Scene setter
- Talking points
- Background paper on Iceland

IV. SCENE SETTERS AND TALKING POINTS:

Saturday, October 11:

Morning Session (Emphasis on Human Rights and Regional; Limited Bilateral)

Afternoon Session (Emphasis on Arms Control)

Sunday, October 12:

Morning Session (Arms Control and Wrapup)

V. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

(To be provided by State in coordination with USIA)

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NLRR F05-097 #9119
BY CW NARA DATE 11/21/07

Guidance for Reykjavik Preparatory Meeting
to Help Focus Development of Briefing Material

- o A "Private" meeting between the two heads of state
 - Small delegation
 - Ample time for one-on-one
 - Minimal social functions
 - Press blackout

- o Desired outcome
 - No "agreements" per se
 - To get specific date for next milestone
 - Substantive discussion that clarifies summit issues
 - Identify issues where there is a reasonable chance to achieve progress by accelerating our efforts.
 - Joint press statement
 - Report to the Nation on President's return

- o Areas for Presidential decision
 - Topics for one-on-one:
 - What do Soviets want from summit?
 - What do we want?
 - Arms control approach
 - Approach on regional, bilateral, and human rights concerns
 - Tactics:
 - How to put pressure on Soviets -- possible issues:
 - Spies?
 - Afghanistan?
 - Jewish emigration?
 - Sharing SDI?
 - Interim restraint?

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F05-097 #9120

BY CW NARA DATE 11/21/07

RECEIVED 04 OCT 86 14

TO DOLAN, T

FROM PEARSON

DOCDATE 03 OCT 86

KEYWORDS: REYKJAVIK

ICELAND

USSR

SUBJECT: TALKING POINTS RE ICELAND

ACTION: PEARSON SGD MEMO

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

RODMAN

SESTANOVICH

COCKELL

COBB

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COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

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(C)

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

7218
~~6807~~

October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR TONY DOLAN

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL *Bob for*
SUBJECT: Iceland Themes

Attached is a paper we prepared for Admiral Poindexter to use in a recent backgrounder. We thought you might enjoy having it as we work public remarks on the Reykjavik meeting.

Attachment

Tab A Talking points

TALKING POINTS

- President agreed to Reykjavik meeting because:
 - It can be helpful in preparing for a productive summit.
 - Obstacle of Daniloff case has been removed.
- Meeting is in no sense substitute or surrogate for a summit.
 - Essentially a private meeting between the two leaders.
 - Anticipate no substantive agreements per se.
 - Presents an opportunity for communication between the two leaders regarding the issues, their respective views, and divergences currently impeding agreement in major areas.
 - Further guidance to respective negotiating teams a plausible outcome of the discussions.
- Format:
 - Minimal staffs.
 - Very private discussions.
 - Businesslike and serious tone.

- Will propose to Soviets a press blackout during meetings.

- Scope:
 - Arms control a prominent but by no means exclusive topic.

 - President's agenda will include all four pillars of the relationship: arms control, regional, bilateral, and human rights issues.

 - Issues affecting mutual trust and confidence will also be addressed, in frank and forthright manner.

- Of utmost importance that President go to Reykjavik as leader of a unified and supportive people.
 - House actions to bind his hands on key negotiating issues are most unhelpful.

 - Hope good sense will prevail and Congress send signal of full support for President as he prepares to meet with Gorbachev.

- Bottom line:
 - Meeting has potential to improve the prospects for a successful summit.

- While specific outcome obviously cannot be foreseen, stakes involved make it an appropriate investment of Presidential time.

- We should avoid overblown expectations; but opportunity for some progress appears to exist.

Ham Wed

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO REYKJAVIK

OCTOBER 10 - 12, 1986

O V E R A L L B R I E F I N G B O O K

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Morning Session (Arms Control and Wrap-Up)

V. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY THEMES

VI. BIOGRAPHIC MATERIALS

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

SENSITIVE

NLRR 9121
FOS-097 #9299

BY AK NARA DATE 11/21/07

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM:

JOHNATHAN S. MILLER *JSM*

SUBJECT:

Request for Special Air Mission Aircraft for
Secretary Shultz -- October 12-13

Given the fact that the Secretary will be giving our NATO allies a readout of the President's meeting with Gorbachev, it seems entirely appropriate that the Secretary be provided with a Special Air Mission Aircraft and on a non-reimbursable basis.

APPROVE

JGR 10-8-96

DISAPPROVE

COMMENT

cc: Richard P. Riley
John M. Poindexter

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

7223

October 6, 1986

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER *MPM*
SUBJECT: Request for Special Air Missions Aircraft for
Secretary Shultz -- October 12-13

Immediately following the meetings in Reykjavik, Secretary Shultz will travel to Brussels to brief the NATO allies on the President's discussions with Secretary Gorbachev. As you know, Alliance solidarity is one of the keys to progress.

State has requested the use of a Special Air Missions aircraft to transport the Secretary and staff from Reykjavik to Brussels on October 12 and back to Washington on October 13. We understand informally from the White House Military Office that an aircraft is available. I recommend that you approve State's request.

Attachment
Tab A State's Request

cc: Richard Riley
Johnathan Miller

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By *MPM* NARA, Date *4/25/05*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED/RE/ASE

NLRR FOS-097 #9/22

BY CIS NARA DATE 11/21/07

REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING

First Day
October 12, 1986

Setting and Goals

Morning Session

Since Gorbachev hosted your last meeting, you will be the "host" at this meeting. Following the photo op, you will probably wish to engage Gorbachev in a private conversation long enough to make your initial points and for him to make his -- perhaps an hour -- after which you might wish for Secretary Shultz and Shevardnadze to join you for a more detailed discussion of the initial points.

Your goals in this first meeting should be: (1) to indicate to Gorbachev that you are serious about planning a successful visit to the United States for him; (2) to make clear that a "successful meeting" will require more than an agreement or two on approaches to arms control; (3) to cover a couple of the more delicate of these issues; (4) to stress that, so far as arms control is concerned, strategic arms reduction remains our first priority -- and should be his; and (5) to get across the idea (indirectly) that you really do not need the meeting just for its own sake and will not pay a price just to get it.

Afternoon Session

With respect to arms control, our objective is to move the discussion to our agenda. During the first day's session, you will want to lay out the rationale for our positions on START, INF and, especially, for your proposal with respect to the mutual movement to advanced strategic defenses.

- Regarding START, we want to make it clear that our priority is on immediate reductions in existing levels of strategic systems, and that a common framework for such reductions is now close at hand.
- Regarding INF, we wish to press for Soviet movement with respect to reductions of Soviet SS-20s in Asia, limitations on Soviet shorter-range INF missiles, and on the duration of an interim INF agreement so that we can reach such an agreement promptly.
- Regarding the Defense and Space area, we would like to hear Gorbachev's views of your proposal so that if there are additional concerns, you can return to this subject and show how Gorbachev's concerns can be met within the context of your proposal -- and do this during the second day's meetings.

You also have points to make regarding nuclear testing, risk reduction, and verification and compliance. You have contingency points to use if Gorbachev raises other subject like ASAT, US interim restraint policy, chemical weapons, or conventional arms control.

Talking Points: Private Meeting

- Glad you proposed meeting. Important to make sure your visit to the U.S. is as productive as possible.
- Note he seems to feel U.S. has been dragging feet since Geneva. Not the case -- actually we have the same feeling re USSR. (Took you until June to make a concrete proposal on offensive weapons reduction -- the area we agreed at Geneva to concentrate on.)
- Important thing here, however, is to look ahead, and to find practical solutions to problems.
- Suggest that we alternate private sessions and sessions with foreign ministers [or with other advisers if seems appropriate].
- Ask what he thinks. [He presumably will agree.]
- Ask which issues he feels you should concentrate on. [He will presumably name INF, Space Arms (ABM Treaty), and nuclear testing.]
- Ask if he has any new proposals to make in these areas.
- These are very important issues, and we certainly need to discuss them in detail. However, there are others that are equally crucial to a successful meeting.
- Some may not be suited to formal agreements -- actions on these are more important than words.
- For example, unless there is a substantial improvement on issues such as family reunification and emigration, your visit cannot be as successful as we both want it to be.
- An example in another area is Afghanistan. Realistic movement toward Soviet withdrawal would make all the other issues much easier.
- And, of course, if you don't scale back on your military involvement in Nicaragua and distance yourself from that crazy man Qadhafi, some incident could make our meeting very difficult.
- Now, when it comes to arms control, it is no secret that our highest priority is reducing the level of strategic nuclear weapons. We both agreed at Geneva that we should aim for a 50% reduction, but you seem to be backing away -- and always finding other issues to distract us.
- Is there anything you can tell me now about your approach to these issues in general?

- I must be frank and say that progress in these other areas is going to have some effect on how far we can go on the arms control issues.
- Suggest we break for a few minutes: I'd like to consult my advisors on your proposals. Why don't we reconvene with our foreign ministers for a look at the issues outside the arms control area. We can take up arms control in more detail this afternoon.

Break for five or ten minutes to brief Secretary Shultz and John Poindexter on Gorbachev's proposals, then reconvene with Secretary Shultz for more detailed discussion of human rights and regional issues.

Continuation of Morning Meeting with Secretary Shultz

Regional Issues

Afghanistan:

- Most important case. You said "bleeding wound" but long timetables, tiny (maybe phony) withdrawals won't end war.
- Key: short timetable plus self-determination. Told this to resistance delegation that visited me.
- We won't exploit Soviet decision to get out, (e.g., no bases). Non-aligned Afghanistan can protect both sides' interests.
- Until then freedom fighters will have all support they need. And Pakistan will have help in protecting self.

Nicaragua:

- Two crucial points: 1) we won't accept Soviet beachhead in Central American, 2) real democracy taking root in the region.
- These mean our policy has support of Central American governments and of American people and Congress.
- Your involvement (and especially upgrading military presence or equipment) will bring you no gain.

Libya:

- Qadhafi has launched a war against us. That's why we acted in April. And now have increasing European cooperation against him.
- He continues to act. We'll use force again if needed.

- Since you don't seem willing to restrain, your support only exposes you to risk.

Middle East (If raised by MSG):

- Promising trends in peace process: Israel-Morocco, Israel-Egypt summits; moderate Palestinian leadership emerging.
- We don't rule out international conference, but skeptical: might deepen paralysis, delay direct talks.
- Look for constructive signs from you: relations with Israel, increased emigration. Stop supporting those whose actions block peace (Syria, Libya, radical Palestinians).

Human Rights

- Last several months have shown that we can narrow differences and resolve some problems. Record in human rights area, however, has been deeply disappointing.
- We noted and welcomed new willingness on part of Soviet Union to consider human rights legitimate topic of discussion.
- Americans care about this issue at a very profound level. The strong American reaction to Daniloff should tell you something about the importance we attach to individual rights and the lengths we are prepared to go to when individual rights are violated.
- The Daniloff affair seriously damaged our relations. I am concerned that if there is not early and substantial improvement in human rights, particularly emigration, reunification of divided families, and better treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov, we could be moving toward the same result.
- In Geneva you made a commitment to resolve humanitarian cases in a spirit of cooperation and consistent with Soviet law. Resolution of a large number of our divided family cases this year reflects that spirit, and we welcomed it, and other steps.
- But this represents a small fraction of the problem: it is important to resolve the remainder of these American divided family cases now, especially separated husbands and wives.
- Emigration is today at a 20-year low, and Soviet Jewish activists subjected to increased persecution. There is growing domestic political pressure to do something about it. Influential American groups and many members of Congress have been asking us how we can sign agreements with you on cultural and scientific cooperation while this situation continues.

- On the positive side, if emigration rises to levels of 1978-79 -- and is sustained -- this would open the way to increased U.S.-Soviet cooperation in many areas. Prompt resolution of several hundred "long-term" refusenik cases would remove a major irritant. There will be strong public and Congressional support for more normal economic relations if emigration returns to the levels of the late 1970's and harassment ends.
- Improve treatment of prominent human rights activists such as Sakharov and others would also go a long way toward improving atmosphere.
- I urge you to act now. The sooner we can resolve these issues, the easier it will be for us to create the most propitious atmosphere for your visit.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING

Second Day
October 12, 1986

Setting and Goals

The principal objective of your final meeting with Gorbachev will be to sum up agreed elements of the discussion from the first day, approve any "joint instructions" to negotiators which may be appropriate, and to settle on dates for Gorbachev's visit to the United States.

In addition, it is important for you to set out a strong marker with Gorbachev regarding Soviet misuse of United Nations installations for intelligence purposes. This should be done with him in private, in order to stress the importance of the issue and to minimize Gorbachev's temptation to argue the point.

Talking Points

Talking points on most issues must be developed in light of the first day's discussions.

Talking points on Soviet misuse of the UN are attached.

DECLASSIFIED/RE/CLASSIFIED

NLRR 05-097 #9123

BY CN NARA DATE 11/21/07

DECLASSIFIED (RELEASED)

NLRR FOI-097 #9/24

BY CP NARA DATE 11/21/07

Allied Consult

Dear :

I wanted to write on the eve of my departure to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik. My objective in Reykjavik is to increase the likelihood that the coming summit in the United States will be productive. I expect our meetings to be very private and business-like with a minimum of social functions. I do not anticipate any formal agreements. To enhance the atmosphere for serious dialogue, we have suggested a press blackout during the actual meetings.

First, allow me to emphasize my commitment to managing differences in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, to the degree the Soviets are willing. I hope to identify issues with reasonable prospects of solutions and accelerate our efforts to resolve them. I will engage the Soviets in substantive discussions on all four parts of the U.S. agenda: human rights, arms reductions, regional issues and bilateral matters.

Continuing Western solidarity is essential toward achieving further progress. In this regard, I place great stock in consultations and have asked Assistant Secretary Ridgway and Ambassador Nitze to meet with the North Atlantic Council on October 9th. As you may know, Secretary Shultz will brief NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels on October 13th, following the Reykjavik meetings.

The Daniloff affair demonstrated once again that fundamental human rights and the freedom of the individual remain a barrier to improvements to East-West relations. In my view, the Soviets could make it possible for human rights improvements at little or no cost to them. I will make it abundantly clear to the General Secretary that progress on human rights is obviously lagging and hope that you will make this same point at every opportunity.

In the last few months some progress has been made on arms control and I hope to build on this. As you may recall, my letter to General Secretary Gorbachev of July 25 spelled out my views on the relationship between strategic offense and defense. The U.S. seeks, as a matter of highest priority, significant and stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive weapons, and we have also proposed a way to move to greater future reliance, for deterrence on strategic defense, rather than offense, if our research is successful.

U.S.-Soviet discussions on INF have made headway in some areas, but several significant issues remain. As you know, the Soviets recently have emphasized INF as an area for near-term progress. My objective at Reykjavik is to test whether the Soviets are ready to work constructively toward our mutually agreed goal of an interim agreement. I remain actively aware of your special interest in this area.

The Daniloff Case: Insights into Soviet Psychology

Aside from providing another clear example of the way a totalitarian regime can act with reckless disregard for truth, justice and the rights of individuals, the Soviet decision to arrest Nick Daniloff, and the Soviet handling of the matter after his arrest illustrates some important differences in Soviet and Western attitudes on a number of fundamental issues.

Soviet View of the Key Issues

1. The question of Daniloff's guilt or innocence was fundamentally irrelevant to the Soviet decision to arrest him, and to their subsequent handling of the case -- except in the sense that "evidence" of his "guilt" was useful for their public presentation. This is in diametric contrast to the American approach: Zakharov would not have been arrested -- and could not have been successfully prosecuted -- if he had not committed a criminal act.
2. Although it doubtless had some form of high-level political sanction, the Daniloff arrest was probably intended as a limited action, to achieve a limited goal of the KGB: to force the release of Zakharov. Although it doubtless also had secondary goals (to intimidate foreign journalists and Soviet citizens in contact with them), the first was probably controlling.
3. The apparent failure of the Soviet political leadership to anticipate the vigorous public reaction in the United States and Western Europe, illustrates a persistent Soviet inability to understand fully the Western mindset -- and therefore to predict accurately the consequences of their actions.
4. The Soviet attempt to exact a precise parity of treatment between Zakharov and Daniloff illustrates their penchant for trying to create an apparent parallelism where none exists -- when it is to their tactical advantage to do so. (We see the same phenomema when they claim that invasion of another country is only the pursuit of collective security -- support for allies who have sought their assistance.)
5. One or both of two factors must be present to induce them to draw back, once they have started on a particular course:
 - (a) Realization that they stand to lose more than to gain from the perpetuation of the action; and/or
 - (b) Clear evidence that failure to resolve the problem can result in tangible damage to matters of greater importance to them.

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BY CIS NARA DATE 11/21/07