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9095	BRIEFING PAPER	RE REYKJAVIK (INCLUDES INDEX) <i>R 6/7/2011 F2005-097/1</i>	35	ND	B1
9099	MEMO	BILL HENKEL/ROD MCDANIEL TO DON REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER RE REYKJAVIK <i>PAR 5/29/2008 F05-097; R 11/30/2016 M08-125/1 #9099</i>	2	ND	B1
9101	MEMO	FRANKLIN LAVIN TO POINDEXTER RE TRIP REPORT <i>PAR 11/21/2007 NLRRF05-097</i>	4	10/5/1986	B7(C)

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PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TRIP TO REYKJAVIK

OCTOBER 10 - 12, 1986

BACKGROUND BOOK

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REGIONAL ISSUES

- 1.
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3. NOT ATTACHED
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BACKGROUND PAPER

1. THE GENEVA NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)

SUMMARY

- o Began 1985. Round VI opened September 18. Experts meetings held August 11-12 (Moscow); September 5-6 (Washington).
- o In Geneva, Soviets tabled some ideas offered during the experts talks, but appear to be "on hold" for moment.
- o START New U.S. proposal tabled September 18. Soviets tabled slight modifications to their START proposal on September 24. Two sides closer on some structural and numerical elements of an agreement:
 - aggregated Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle (SNDV) levels: 1600
 - overall weapons limits: U.S. - 7500; USSR - 8000 (dispute over inclusion of SRAMs, gravity bombs)
 - concept of sublimits on both ballistic missile RVs and ICBM RVs

Major differences remain including: Soviet linkage to Defense and Space proposal for an up to 15-year commitment to ABM Treaty; level of weapons allowed under sublimits (ballistic missile RVs: U.S. - 5500; USSR - 6400-6800; ICBM RVs U.S. - 3300; USSR - 4800); composition of aggregate weapons limits; U.S.-proposed additional ICBM sublimit (1650 RVs on SS-18s, SS-24s, and Peacekeepers) and Soviet refusal to agree to a 50% reduction in Soviet ballistic missile throwweight.

- o INF New U.S. proposal tabled September 18. Soviets formally proposed interim INF accord on September 25.
 - Both sides propose 100 for LRINF missile warhead ceilings in Europe and accept concept of equal global ceilings of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile warheads.
 - Key differences: SS-20s in Asia, SRINF, PII/GLCM mix, duration, verification.
- o Defense and Space
 - Soviets continue to call for a ban on development, testing and deployment of so-called "space strike arms" to make 50 percent reductions of strategic arms "possible."

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- To achieve 30 percent reductions in strategic forces, Soviets proposing an up to 15-year no-withdrawal commitment to the ABM Treaty and clarification of permitted and prohibited activities under the Treaty. (Proposed definitions would restrict activities now permitted by ABM Treaty and are now being undertaken in SDI.)

- U.S. proposing to confine activities permitted by ABM Treaty through 1991 with an option to deploy thereafter, following a mandatory two-year negotiation period and six months' notice of intent.

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COMPARISON OF US AND SOVIET NST POSITIONS

US

Soviet

START (Interim Step)

SNDVs	1600	1600
Heavy Bombers	350	no sublimit specified
Warheads	7500 BM RVs and ALCMs	8000 "charges", incl. gravity bombs and SRAMs
BM RVs	5500	6400-6800
ICBM RVs	3300	4800 on any one leg, i.e. ICBMs, SLBMs or bombers
RVs on ICBMs exc. Fixed Non-Heavies w/6 RVs or Less	1650	no sublimit
Mobile ICBMs	banned, but will consider Soviet verification ideas	allowed within above limits
SLCMs	prepared to consider separate treatment, if Soviets propose verifiable measures	limited separately from other systems; allowed on subs, not on surface ships; limit on types of carriers
Throwweight	50% cut in Soviet level	no limit, but other cuts would reduce Soviet level
New Types	no new heavies	banned or strictly limited
Timing	5-year reduction period	5-6 year reduction period
Conditions	none	up to 15 yr nonwithdrawal commitment; measures banning certain current & future SDI activities

Defense & Space

ABM Treaty	confine activities w/in Treaty limits through 1991; 2 yr negotiations in 1992 or later if either side wants to deploy	up to 15-year nonwithdrawal commitment; new restrictive Treaty definitions
Offensive Weapons in Space	prepared to discuss ways to further ban deployment in space of wps capable of mass destruction	ban space-based weapons capable of striking targets on earth or in atmosphere
ASAT	ban unacceptable; will consider Soviet proposals for specific measures	ban "specially developed" ASATs, devise protection for satellites

INF (Interim Step)

LRINF missile warheads	100 in Europe, up to 100 in Asia/US; other equal levels in Europe if proportionate cut in Asia	100 in Europe, current Soviet level in Asia/US, no missiles in Alaska
PII/GLCM Mix	can discuss, but will not ban Pershing II in Europe	no PIIs in Europe
SRINF msls	constrained concurrently	handled subsequently
Duration	until superseded	temporary, to be replaced by permanent 0-0 in Eur accord

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BACKGROUND PAPER

2. START

I. STATUS

- o Round VI began September 18 and is due to conclude the first week of November.
- o During Round VI, the Soviets formally tabled slight modifications to their June 11 proposal first made during the NST Experts' Meeting held September 5-6 in Washington.
- o The U.S. tabled an "initial step" proposal toward 50% reductions.
- o The Soviets have yet to respond constructively to:
 - The original November 1 U.S. proposal.
 - Elaborations of the November 1 U.S. proposal.
 - The U.S. "initial step" toward 50% reductions tabled in Round VI.
- o The initial Soviet response in Geneva to the latest U.S. START proposal was sharply critical.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Continues to link reductions in START to preconditions in the Defense and Space arena by calling for a total, ban of "space-strike arms" in order to create the conditions for 50% reductions. They link 30% reductions to an up to 15 year commitment to the ABM Treaty, and to new, more restrictive definitions prohibiting certain SDI activity.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Primary goal remains to enhance stability through significant, equitable, and verifiable reductions in nuclear arsenals. Agreements must enhance both U.S. and Allied security, must not detract from nuclear and conventional deterrence, must improve strategic stability, must not compensate Soviets for third country systems, must reduce the risk of war, and must be complied with.
- o In START, our November position remains on the table; our new position builds on approach proposed by the Soviets for 50% reductions. Our position for 50% reductions calls for reductions to 4,500 ballistic missile warheads of which no more than 3,000 would be ICBM warheads. 50% reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight from current Soviet levels. U.S. is prepared to accept limits of 1,250 - 1,450 on ballistic missiles (SLBMs and ICBMs). Heavy bombers limited

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to 350 and ALCMs to 1,500, about 50% fewer ALCMs than planned U.S. levels. Modernization of heavy ICBMs and all mobile missile deployments would be banned.

- o If the Soviet Union is unwilling to cut strategic forces by 50% the U.S. is prepared to demonstrate flexibility by considering less sweeping but significant reductions as an interim first step toward the 50% objective. Such initial reductions could have the following major features: each side could have 1,600 SNDVs subject to Soviet acceptance of the U.S. approach to differentiation, a possible mutual subceiling of 350 bombers, allowable mutual deployment of up to 7,500 ballistic missile RVs and long-range deployment of up to 7,500 ballistic missile RVs and long-range ALCMs. Within this total the following subceilings would apply:

- 5,500 ballistic missile RVs;

- 3,300 ICBM RVs;

- No more than a total of 1,650 RVs on all permitted ICBMs except silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six RVs each or less.

- o In conjunction with the presentation of the "initial step" toward 50% reductions outlined above, the U.S. is prepared to elaborate upon the November 1 U.S. proposal for 50% reductions as follows:

- A SNDV ceiling of 1,600, as a first step, subject to Soviet acceptance of the U.S. approach to differentiation.

- One-way freedom-to-mix of 6,000 ballistic missile RVs and long range ALCMs, 4,500 ballistic missile RVs, 3,000 ICBM RVs.

- An ICBM RV subceiling under which no more than a total of 1,500 RVs could be deployed on all permitted ICBMs except those on silo-based light and medium ICBMs with six or fewer RVs.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

3. INF

I. STATUS

- o Round VI began September 18.
- o The Soviet Union has yet to respond to the U.S. proposal of a global ceiling of 200 warheads; 100 in Europe, 100 or fewer in Asia.

II. THE SOVIET POSITION

- o On May 15, during Round V of the INF negotiations in Geneva, the Soviets tabled a draft treaty to implement the Gorbachev offer below.
- o The proposal called for elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles in Europe and a freeze on Soviet LRINF deployments at existing levels in the Soviet Far East. The UK and France would be required to agree to no buildup in their nuclear forces; and no transfer of strategic systems to third countries would be permitted. Shorter Range INF (SRINF) would no longer be a subject of these negotiations, but dealt with subsequently in another forum. The Soviets resisted substantive discussion of verification.
- o During the Experts' Meetings this summer, the Soviets proposed an interim agreement of short duration allowing each side 100 LRINF warheads in Europe. For the U.S., all of these must be GLCMs; Pershing II would be eliminated. They repeated their offer of a freeze on SS-20 deployments in Asia, adding that the U.S. would be allowed a comparable number (unstated) of LRINF warheads in the US, excluding Alaska. They have attempted to convey that compensation for UK/French forces was no longer required; but they retained their insistence on prohibiting transfer of "medium-range" systems to third countries.

III. THE U.S. POSITION

- o On September 18, 1986, the U.S. INF Negotiating Group formally tabled a new U.S. INF proposal, which build upon discussions in the Experts' Meetings this summer. While continuing to prefer the total elimination of LRINF, the U.S. would accept an interim approach to achieve early reductions. The sides would commit themselves to early negotiations to complete the reductions process.

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- o Equal global warhead levels would be the basis for such an interim arrangement. The U.S. proposed a global level of 200 warheads, 100 of which would be allowed in Europe and 100 or less outside of Europe. This offer of equal ceilings in Europe and Asia is not to become a substitute for the principle of proportionate reductions. The U.S. would not allow the complete elimination of Pershing II under such an arrangement, but it would be willing to discuss with the Soviets the mix of U.S. LRINF systems.

- o The U.S. has expressed a willingness to limit its LRINF deployments outside of Europe to U.S. territory, but only if agreed warhead levels are acceptable and if Soviet deployments are restricted to Soviet territory. We have not accepted the Soviet proposal to forego deployments in Alaska. Appropriate constraints on SRINF systems must be applied concurrently with limitations on LRINF; and a rigorous verification regime must be negotiated concurrently with other treaty constraints.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

4. DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS

I. STATUS

- o Round VI began on September 18.
- o From the beginning of the negotiations, the Soviets have proposed a ban on the development (including "scientific research"), testing and deployment of so-called space-strike arms. The Soviets have reiterated this position again this Round, but have now dropped the terms "scientific research."
- o The Soviets' ban on "space-strike arms" is still a precondition for offensive reductions of 50%. New Soviet "interim" START proposal -- for about 30% reductions -- is limited to an up to 15 year U.S. non-withdrawal commitment to the ABM Treaty and acceptance of new, restrictive ABM Treaty definitions.
- o U.S. will formally table Defense and Space portion of the President's recent proposal on October 7.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o The stated Soviet objective in these negotiations has been to "prevent an arms race in space," which they claim can only be accomplished by agreeing to a ban on "space-strike arms."
- o "Space-strike arms" consist of three types of systems: space-based ABM systems; space-based systems for attacking terrestrial targets; and ASAT systems of all basing modes.
- o The Soviets have also called for a "strengthening of the ABM Treaty." In this regard, they specifically proposed on May 29 that the United States and the Soviet Union agree "not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for 15-20 years," since modified as "up to 15 years."
- o Also, in order to ensure "clear and identical understanding of the provisions of the ABM Treaty, particularly with respect to the term "development," the Soviets proposed definitions for the concepts "component," "prototype," "mock-up," and "test model." The new Soviet definitions would have the intended effect of prohibiting some SDI activities. The Soviet-proposed definitions would have the effect of banning at least 10 of the 16 planned SDI technology demonstrations.
- o Soviet statements during Round VI have focused solely on their Round V proposals and have totally ignored the President's new proposals. Indications are that they will continue their efforts to derail the SDI program.

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III. U.S. POSITION

- o The U.S. negotiating approach in the Defense and Space Talks reflects our view of the relationship between offensive and defensive strategic systems.
- o We are trying now to lay the foundation for a broad change in the existing strategic order to an order primarily based on defenses, provided effective defenses prove feasible. We seek a Soviet commitment to explore with us how a cooperative transition to greater reliance on defenses could be accomplished. We also seek to reverse Soviet violation of the ABM Treaty.
- o In addition to our comprehensive proposals discussed above, the primary objectives for the Defense and Space negotiating group in Round VI are to present to the Soviets the substance of the President's July letter to General Secretary Gorbachev. In that regard we would like to conclude an agreement now incorporating the following:
 - Both sides confine themselves to a strategic defense program consistent with the ABM Treaty through 1991. In context of this agreement, the parties would have the right to observe each other's tests per mutually agreed procedures.
 - Following the above period, should either side wish to proceed to deploy advanced strategic defenses, it would be required to offer a plan to share the benefits of strategic defense and to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides. This plan would be the subject of negotiations for no more than two years.
 - If after this period there is no agreement on such a plan, either side would be free to deploy defenses unilaterally after six months notification.
 - U.S. is prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that desires to proceed to deploy advanced strategic defenses to offer a plan for sharing the benefits of strategic defense with the other providing there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides.
 - In the context of the approach outlined above, we are willing to discuss additional assurances that would further ban deployment in space of advanced weapons capable of inflicting mass destruction on the surface of the earth if the Soviets identify specific concerns.

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- These commitments would make sense only in conjunction with radical, verifiable and stabilizing reductions in the offensive nuclear arsenals of the U.S. and the USSR.

- U.S. open laboratories proposal for reciprocal briefings and site visits to strategic defense research facilities still stands.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

5. NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- o So long as U.S. deterrent is dependent on nuclear weapons, U.S. needs some testing. Therefore, a moratorium is unacceptable, and a comprehensive test ban is a long term objective.
- o U.S. priority is to improve verification of existing agreement. U.S. has, since 1983, proposed U.S.-Soviet discussions on essential verification improvements to (unratified) Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). The President proposed invitations to Soviet experts to hold discussions, be briefed on CORRTEX and measure the yield of a U.S. test, bringing with them any equipment they deemed necessary for this purpose.
- o Two rounds of experts discussions have been held in Geneva (July 25-August 1, September 4-18). A third session has been scheduled for November 13.
- o U.S. delegation has explained CORRTEX on-site yield measurement system and made clear we are prepared to move forward on ratification of the TTBT/PNET if the Soviets agree to improved verification through the use of direct measurement techniques such as CORRTEX.
- o In early September, Soviet seismologists from Soviet Academy of Sciences (a part of the Soviet Government) applied for visas to survey potential U.S. monitoring sites for a comprehensive test ban under terms of an agreement with the private U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council. We have offered to approve the full Soviet itinerary if they come in an official capacity and accept the President's offer to observe a U.S. nuclear test and receive a CORRTEX briefing or measure the yield of the test with their own instruments. Otherwise, a restricted visa not allowing CTB site surveys would be issued.
- o No official Soviet response so far, although Soviet press has contrasted our restrictions with their allowing U.S. scientists to set up seismic CTB monitoring stations in the USSR.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o The USSR is conducting a vigorous propaganda campaign aimed at our Allies, public and Congress to force the U.S. into joining a testing moratorium.

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- o During his Washington visit, Shevardnadze stressed the importance of a testing halt (moratorium), and indicated the Soviets see a connection between continued U.S. testing and SDI. He emphasized that Gorbachev intends to give the issue continued prominence on the arms control agenda.
- o The Soviets in Geneva experts' meetings have indicated they would not accept the President's invitation to visit the Nevada Test Site to examine CORTEX and monitor a U.S. test while the Soviet moratorium was in effect. To do so would "legitimize" the U.S. testing program.
- o Gorbachev has accepted the August 7 offer of the "New Delhi Six" heads of state to assist in verification of a CTB (but not of the TTBT or PNET).

III. U.S. VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o CTB is a long term goal for the U.S., but only if we have achieved:
 - broad, deep and verifiable reductions
 - substantially improved verification
 - greater balance in conventional forces, and
 - enhanced confidence building measures
 - most importantly when we no longer need to depend on nuclear deterrence for international security and stability.
- o We must begin by taking practical steps within reach now, i.e., improve the verification provisions of the TTBT/PNET. We have proposed use of CORTEX as the best way to enhance verification. We can then move forward on ratification.
- o The President made clear in his September 22 UNGA speech that, upon ratification of these treaties -- and in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- we are prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.
- o The President on September 20 declined the "New Delhi Six" offer, noting among other things that a test ban was a long term objective and that we should focus on enhancing verification of existing treaties and on reducing nuclear forces.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

6. INTERIM RESTRAINT AND COMPLIANCE

I. PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 DECISION

- o Replaced increasingly obsolete, inequitable, and repeatedly violated agreements. Soviet strategic ballistic missile warheads went from 5,000 to over 9,000 under SALT II and quadrupled since SALT I.
- o U.S. will base future force posture decisions on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet forces, and on the need to maintain a credible deterrent.
- o Assuming no significant change in the threat, U.S. will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or more strategic ballistic missile warheads than the USSR.
- o Decision cited need for full funding of strategic modernization program, and programs such as advanced cruise missiles.
- o Called on USSR to "join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint."
- o Interim restraint no substitute for new strategic arms reductions agreement.

II. SPECIAL SCC SESSION

- o At Soviet request, special session of SCC held in July.
- o Soviets engaged in polemics; rejected President's May 27 suggestion to join in regime of truly mutual restraint.
- o No progress on Soviet noncompliance issues.

III. CURRENT STATUS

- o U.S. remains in technical observance with SALT limits until deployment of 131st ALCM carrier.
- o At August NST experts talks Soviets sought clarification of President's mutual restraint offer; U.S. suggested further discussion, but Soviets did not return to subject at September talks, or during Shevardnadze's U.S. visit.
- o Shevardnadze interested in technical discussions about Krasnoyarsk. Claimed U.S. upgrade of Fylingdales and Thule inconsistent with ABM Treaty. Suggested mothballing Krasnoyarsk and Thule; cancellation of Fylingdales.

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- o House has attempted to enact legislation committing the U.S. to abide by SALT II's subceilings.
- o In near-term, Soviets not likely to exceed SALT II subceilings, even if U.S. does, due to differences in forces and high SALT limits.

IV. CONTEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MAY 27 DECISION

- o In 1982, the President committed the U.S. not to undercut the flawed SALT agreement so long as the USSR exercised equal restraint.
- o The U.S. fully kept our part of the bargain. Regrettably, the USSR did not. Instead, it violated important elements of existing arms control agreements.
- o The U.S. repeatedly raised our serious concerns with the USSR in diplomatic channels, including the SCC, over several years. The USSR neither provided satisfactory explanations nor undertook corrective actions. Instead, Soviet violations expanded as Soviet forces were modernized.
- o The President decided in June 1985 to go the extra mile, and give the USSR additional time to correct its noncompliance, reverse its unwarranted and unparalleled military buildup, and negotiate seriously in Geneva. He stated clearly that future U.S. decisions would be taken in light of Soviet actions in these areas, and that the U.S. could not accept a double standard of unilateral U.S. compliance coupled with Soviet noncompliance.
- o One year later, the pattern of Soviet noncompliance continued, largely uncorrected. The USSR had made military gains in a number of areas through its noncompliance. There was no progress by the USSR in meeting the most serious U.S. concerns.
 - Deployments of the illegal SS-25 ICBM continued; telemetry encryption continued to impede verification; the Krasnoyarsk radar remained a clear violation; the Soviet strategic force buildup was unabated; and the USSR failed to follow up on its commitments on arms control at the Geneva Summit.

V. IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE

- o To be serious about arms control is to be serious about compliance.
- o Soviet violations raise fundamental questions about the Soviet commitment to genuine arms control.

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- o Some violations are of significant military importance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly affects our national security.
- o Violations undercut the integrity and viability of arms control as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future world.

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Unambiguous Soviet Violations of Arms Control Agreements

ABM Treaty

- 1. Krasnoyarsk Radar Violation

SALT II Treaty

- 1. SS-25 Violation
- 2. Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicle Limit Violation
- 3. Encryption of Telemetry Violation
- 4. Concealment of the Association Between a Missile and its Launcher Violation

SALT I Treaty

- 1. Use of "Remaining Facilities" at Former SS-7 Sites Violation

Biological Weapons Convention and Geneva Protocol

- 1. Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons Violation

Limited Test Ban Treaty

- 1. Underground Nuclear Test Venting Violation

Helsinki Final Act

- 1. Notification of Military Exercises Violation

Qualified Soviet Violations and Ambiguous Activities Related to Arms Control Agreements

ABM Treaty

- 1. Mobility of ABM Systems Components Potential Violation
- 2. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components Probable Violation
- 3. ABM Capabilities of Modern SAM Systems Evidence Insufficient to Assess/Ambiguous
- 4. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers Ambiguous/Serious Concern
- 5. ABM Territorial Defense May Be Preparing Defense

SALT II Treaty

- 1. SS-16 ICBM Deployment Probable Violation; Indication of Removal
- 2. Backfire Bomber Intercontinental Operating Capability Inconsistent With Political Commitment
- 3. Backfire Bomber Production Rate Ambiguous/Slightly Above 30 Through 1983; Decreased to Below 30 Since Then

Threshold Test Ban Treaty

- 1. Nuclear Testing and the 150 Kiloton Limit Likely Violation

BACKGROUND PAPER

8. SHARING THE BENEFITS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE

I. STATUS

- o President's July 25, 1986 letter to Gorbachev contained the offer that under specified circumstances the U.S. would be willing to share the benefits of strategic defenses.
- o Soviets have not directly responded on the issue.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviet Union seeks "continued adherence" to ABM Treaty, making issue of sharing moot.
- o U.S. proposal addresses expressed Soviet concerns that deployment of strategic defenses would shift the strategic balance, create instability, or provide additional offensive capabilities.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o In accordance with the overall U.S. proposal, we would be prepared to sign a treaty now which would require the party that decides to proceed to deploy advanced strategic defenses to share the benefits of strategic defense with the other, provided there is mutual agreement to eliminate the offensive ballistic missiles of both sides.
- o U.S. seeks to assure the Soviet Union that it is not attempting to gain unilateral strategic advantage through the introduction of strategic defense.

BACKGROUND PAPER

9. Verification

I. STATUS

- o U.S. seeks effectively verifiable arms reduction treaties; the concern is heightened by pattern of Soviet arms control noncompliance.
- o Any new agreements will require effective verification measures. Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty are not effectively verifiable and, therefore, will require improved verification measures before the US can move forward on ratification.
- o Gorbachev agreed at the November 1985 summit that measures for effective verification will be negotiated concurrently with other treaty provisions. He has said publicly that verification will not be a stumbling block to future arms control accords and that the Soviets are willing to accept whatever measures of verification are "necessary," including on-site inspection.
- o Soviets have appeared somewhat more forthcoming, but on whole, their actions have not matched their words:
 - START: Refusal to address our concerns in any but the most general way. Soviet approach to verifying mobiles, for example, is inadequate.
 - INF: Refusal to discuss verification issue until we agree on basic numerical limitations. Refusal to establish verification working group.
 - CDE: Soviets rejected neutrals proposal for neutral aircraft and crews, but for first time, Soviets accepted on-site inspection of Soviet military activities in Soviet Union.
 - CW: Some movement on inspection of declared production facilities and of destruction of stocks. However, refusal to accept an effective "mandatory" challenge inspection provision, thereby making it impossible to have confidence in deterring noncompliance.
 - MBFR: Refusal to agree to required verification measures or to provide the basic data necessary to reconcile major discrepancies in NATO-Warsaw Pact calculations of ground force size.

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- Nuclear Testing: Failure to provide detailed information necessary to evaluate Soviet assertions that current verification measures are adequate. Refusal to fix defective verification provisions in Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets seek to defer discussion of verification until other basic treaty provisions have been agreed and seek to increase domestic and allied pressure on USG to compromise on verification in the interests of "agreement."
- o Soviet objective is to minimize intrusiveness of any verification regime and their obligations. They seek to maximize the available "wiggle room" to exploit or circumvent treaty provisions, maximize the possibilities for undetected cheating and minimize U.S. opportunities to acquire definitive proof.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o U.S. seeks verification provisions that will: maximize ability to assess Soviet compliance or noncompliance in a timely manner so that safeguards and/or responses can be implemented; deter violations by increasing the risk of detection and the complexity of any evasion; and build public confidence in the viability of agreements.
- o Toward this goal, we are seeking to supplement use of national technical means with comprehensive exchanges of information; effective on-site inspection procedures; effective collateral constraints, counting rules, etc.; a ban on telemetry encryption and other forms of denial of information.
- o A robust response to Soviet noncompliance is necessary to convince the Soviets that there are real costs associated with noncompliance and to provide an incentive to compliance with future agreements.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

10. NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS (NRRCs)

I. BACKGROUND

- o At September 19-20 meeting, Shevardnadze agreed to begin negotiations. Earlier, at second expert-level meeting August 25 in Geneva, Soviets had accepted most of U.S. proposal.
- o U.S. proposed to begin talks on October 2; Soviets asked for delay for "administrative reasons", presumably preparations for Iceland.
- o NRRCs would entail new direct communications link below head-of-state level to be used initially for notifications of ballistic missile launches and military exercises. More extensive functions suggested by Congress were not part of Administration's proposal to Soviets.
- o Soviets were initially concerned that U.S. wants to use NRRCs to create "illusion" of progress in arms control, but now appear to want a possible modest agreement in hand.
- o Senators Warner, Nunn are enthusiastic proponents of NRRCs.

II. CURRENT SITUATION

- o We seek negotiations aimed at concluding agreement in time for a summit. Date for negotiations remains to be set, presumably will begin late October or early November.
- o U.S. is preparing a draft agreement text that reflects understandings reached with Soviets at expert-level talks in anticipation of October/November negotiations.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

11. NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

I. BACKGROUND

- o U.S. and U.S.S.R. have completed seven rounds of non-proliferation consultations. Latest round was held in Moscow in late July. Next round will be held in Washington in early December.
- o Consultations remain businesslike and constructive with Soviets expressing continued interest in improving IAEA safeguards, strengthening export controls, and pursuing a multilateral nuclear suppliers meeting.
- o Latest round also discussed Chernobyl accident and safety features of Soviet reactors being built in Cuba.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets are preoccupied with international response to Chernobyl. Soviets were relatively forthcoming in post-accident review meeting in Vienna (8/25-29). Signed international conventions on nuclear accident reporting and emergency assistance at recent IAEA Special General Conference (9/24-26).
- o In addition to fusion initiative (under review by USG), Soviets pushing for cooperation on new nuclear power reactor designs and enhanced safety features.
- o Soviets support universal NPT adherence, press hard for test ban, and seek nuclear suppliers meeting.

III. U.S. VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Vienna meeting on Chernobyl useful. U.S. made sure that Soviets could not redirect focus to Three Mile Island accident. U.S. supported and signed reporting/emergency assistance conventions and has supported expanded nuclear safety program in IAEA.
- o DOE in process of deciding whether research directed at new reactor designs is desirable. DOE is concerned that research on enhanced safety features might raise doubts about safety of U.S. designs.

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- o On nuclear suppliers meeting, U.S. has told Soviets we are inclined to attend meeting if all other major suppliers do so, if it is scheduled after PUNE meeting in March, 1987, and if agenda is carefully prepared.
- o U.S. continues to make clear that CTB is a long-term goal. U.S. also seeks new NPT adherents.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

12. VIENNA CSCE MEETING

I. STATUS

- o Third Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) Review Conference (RevCon) meets in Vienna beginning November 4 to review implementation of previous Helsinki and Madrid CSCE agreements and to review results of various experts meetings.
- o Soviets have violated human rights and military provisions of Helsinki Final Act.
- o Product of Vienna Review Conference will be a concluding document which sets mandates for further work in each of the Helsinki baskets (security, economics, human rights and fundamental freedoms). Major issue will concern mandate for the next CDE session.
- o Preparatory conference for the Vienna Review Conference was held September 23-October 6 (and succeeded in setting an agenda for the RevCon).

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Downplay review of human rights and focus as much as possible on security issues, especially Warsaw Pact's "Budapest Appeal" of last June proposing conventional arms reductions from the "Atlantic to the Urals" for negotiation of European reductions in one of three fora: a follow-on CDE, MBFR, or a new forum, with preference for CDE. They will also link progress on human rights to achieving their objectives in other areas.
- o Press for expanding the provision in the economics sphere (Basket II) in order to increase access to Western credit, markets and technology.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o We seek to improve compliance with existing commitments rather than undertake new ones.
- o Focus on improved compliance and cooperation in the human dimension, and draw attention to poor Soviet record in this regard.
- o Revitalize the CSCE process by narrowing the gulf between promises and deeds.
- o Set time limit of one year for the Vienna RevCon (with a deadline of August 1, 1987) and establish additional follow-on experts meetings in each CSCE field.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

13. CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

I. STATUS

- o NATO and the Warsaw Pact have conducted conventional arms control negotiations since 1973 at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna. No agreement has been reached.
- o Since 1984 the U.S., Canada, USSR and all European nations except Albania have negotiated confidence- and security-building measures at the Conference on Disarmament in Europe (CDE). Consensus was reached on the Stockholm Document on September 22. The CDE has not dealt with conventional force reductions per se. It is under consideration by the Soviets and some NATO Allies, however, as one of three possible fora for future conventional force reductions negotiations.

EASTERN POSITION

- o While the Eastern position on substance at MBFR has remained stagnant, the visibility of conventional arms control has been raised by the recent Soviet propaganda campaign. The USSR sees conventional arms control as a way to: 1) legitimize the presence of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe; 2) split the U.S. from its European Allies; and 3) increase the Soviet role in European security affairs.
- o The Soviets most recent gambit was last June's Budapest Appeal: a general proposal to reduce personnel and armaments significantly "from the Atlantic to the Urals." Their preferred forum for these talks is CSCE/CDE since it emphasizes individual states rather than alliances, but they have also indicated a separate forum or MBFR as possible alternatives.

ALLIED POSITION

- o The Allies are ambivalent. They want an active process to appease domestic demands. They are not, however, anxious to restrict their armed forces or open their territory to Eastern inspectors. They would like in some way to take Gorbachev up on his Atlantic-to-the-Urals offer.
- o The Gorbachev proposal/Budapest Appeal provided the impetus for the Halifax Mandate: the NATO conventional forces arms control task force (CTF) will make a report to the NAC in December. The question of the format for conventional arms control (alliance-to-alliance as in MBFR vice CDE II with 35 sovereign nations and potential alliance sub-groups) is a main issue occupying the CTF.

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USG POSITION

- o The USG favors alliance-to-alliance negotiations outside the CDE/CSCE framework based on binding instructions from NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC) in Brussels. We face some difficulty within the Alliance largely because the French, who also object to MBFR, prefer a CSCE/CDE forum where all nations speak as "equals." We believe that both the Allies and the Soviets will accept our alliance-to-alliance approach because of our firm convictions.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

14. MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTION

I. STATUS

- o With fortieth MBFR round underway (September 25 - December 4), East still has not responded constructively to NATO's December 5, 1985 proposal.
- o Ambassador Blackwill held two bilateral experts meetings in August/September. No progress achieved.
- o During these talks, Soviets proposed a patently unacceptable "symbolic" agreement to provide a "dignified" end to MBFR. Familiar defects from the East's February 20 draft agreement; even less verification. Rejected by NATO
- o MBFR perhaps terminally deadlocked but still useful, at least until something better takes its place.
- o Soviets clearly wish to end MBFR with token agreement and move reductions negotiations to CDE (phase II) or possible new forum.
- o East on defensive. Eager to "escape forward" from MBFR. West well-positioned to press its position in Vienna, especially on verification.
- o Some Allies, notably FRG, show signs of restlessness with current Western holding pattern in MBFR.

II. NATO POSITION

- o NATO. NATO proposal (December 5) provides for a limited, first phase agreement involving reductions of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground troops; subsequent no-increase commitment on remaining U.S.-Soviet and NATO-Warsaw pact ground/air troops.
- o Western verification package includes, inter alia, 30 on-site inspections per year.

III. WARSAW PACT POSITION. Eastern proposal (February 20) calls for reductions of 6,500 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet ground troops.

- o On verification, East would subject on-site inspections to veto by the inspected side. Permanent entry/exit points (EEPs) exclude Soviet semi-annual troop rotation (over 200,000 men).

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BACKGROUND PAPER

15. CDE

I. BACKGROUND

- o The 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) adjourned September 22 with the adoption of a set of concrete measures.
- o CDE, created by Madrid CSCE follow-up Meeting in 1983, is an integral part of the Helsinki (CSCE) process, which encompasses political, economic, cultural and human rights, as well as security affairs.

II. MEASURES AGREED IN STOCKHOLM

- o CDE accord is first major East-West security agreement since 1979; first to include limited on-site inspection of Soviet military forces in USSR. Soviets rejected neutrals' proposal for neutral aircraft and crews for inspections. U.S. has made clear that CDE verification measures, while acceptable for confidence- building measures, are not adequate for arms reductions or limitations.
- o Covers Atlantic to the Urals.
- o Accord measures include:
 - Notification: 42 days prior notification of all military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks.
 - Observation: Mandatory invitation of observers for military activities above threshold of 17,000.
 - Forecasts: Exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities; large scale activities to be forecast two years in advance.
 - Inspection: On-site air/ground inspection. However, East rejected neutrals' proposal for use of neutral aircraft and crews.

III. FUTURE OF CDE

- o The Vienna CSCE Follow-Up meeting in November will review CDE results and address follow-on.
- o The East is advocating a CDE Phase II on disarmament, but also indicates consideration of new forum or MBFR.

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- o NATO Conventional Arms Control Task Force considering Alliance position on future of CDE and conventional arms reductions.
- o U.S. seeks to ensure that the CDE agreement is being complied with before entering into new agreements, and that the CSCE process, with its important human rights provisions, is not overwhelmed by security issues.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

16. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) TREATY

I. NEGOTIATIONS BACKGROUND

- o U.S.-Soviet negotiations on comprehensive CW ban begun in 1977; lapsed in 1980. Negotiations shifted to the 40 nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
- o In April 1984, U.S. gave impetus to CD talks when Vice President Bush presented draft treaty for global CW ban.
- o Geneva Summit Statement called for intensified bilateral discussions on a CW treaty.
- o Third round of bilateral discussions (July 1-18) made some progress; centered on CW production facilities.
- o Fall bilaterals (in New York); multilateral talks in Geneva.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets assert "no verification problems" and that conclusion of treaty possible by 1987; may intend political push with Europeans downplaying serious verification issues.
- o Recent Soviet flexibility at CD permitted progress on verification of declared stockpile destruction, elimination of declared production facilities and chemical industry monitoring. However, Soviets continue to block any mandatory challenge inspections at undeclared, or suspect sites.
- o In our latest discussions, Soviets expressed interest in bilateral inspection arrangements.

III. U.S. POSITION

- o Key outstanding issue is challenge inspection to include undeclared or suspect sites or activities. Our position calls for mandatory challenge inspection provision for such sites and activities, since even small illegal chemical weapon stockpile would have very serious military implications.
- o Soviets have recently hinted at accepting challenge inspection in some limited cases.
 - In Washington, Shevardnadze noted interest in new UK inspection provision (which gives inspected state right of refusal) and is therefore unacceptable to U.S. Soviets have probed intensively with British. UK provision would not provide effective verification.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

17. CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) NONPROLIFERATION

I. STATUS

- o At the November Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to initiate a dialogue on preventing CW proliferation. Two rounds of talks have been held in Bern.
- o In January, the Soviets announced export controls on some chemicals listed in the U.S. draft treaty; however, the Soviet list does not include all items controlled by the U.S.
- o FM Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz agreed in September that CW nonproliferation efforts should be explored further at the Deputy Foreign Minister level.
- o The U.S. is also participating in an Australian-led effort to coordinate chemical export controls among Western countries.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Initially, the Soviets seemed more interested in a show of superpower cooperation, than in the CW proliferation problem itself. However, some believe Soviet concern about the spread of CW now seems to be growing. Soviets also seek to block CW development by NATO Allies, and U.S. CW deployment in NATO.
- o The Soviets have accepted "in principle" the following points:
 - CW proliferation poses a threat that should be combatted both by export controls and political efforts in urgent situations.
 - The U.S. and the Soviet Union should record opposition to CW proliferation in a high-level statement.
 - The sides should consider establishing regular meetings to discuss CW proliferation.
- o The Soviets rejected proposed U.S. points on condemnation of use of CW (as by Soviets in Afghanistan) and on support for international investigations of such use.
- o With such a Soviet attitude, we should not join in any general agreement or joint statement with the Soviets, who would thereby gain respectability in an area where they deserve little if any.

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III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o U.S. objectives include:
 - preventing further erosion of the legal and moral norm against the use of chemical weapons by pressing U.S. concerns about CW use including past use by Soviet clients in Afghanistan, SE Asia;
 - curbing the spread of CW capabilities in areas of tension, such as the Middle East;
 - forestalling developments which could make the achievement of an effective global CW ban more difficult;
 - enlisting the political support of influential countries.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

18. DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK (HOTLINE) UPGRADE

I. STATUS

- o 1984 agreement provides for three secure circuits using satellites and submarine cable.
- o INTELSAT and submarine cable circuits activated September 1 and working well.
- o December implementation of Soviet satellite circuit, other technical issues discussed at September 2-5 experts meeting. Goal of 99.99% reliability established.
- o U.S. provided terminals, microprocessors and other equipment, at cost, to Soviets. Transfer of microprocessors required an exception to COCOM restrictions.
- o Next experts meeting set for first half of 1987 in Washington.

II. NEXT STEPS

- o Testing to begin November 20 on Soviet STATIONAR satellite circuit, in preparation for December 20 activation.
- o Full implementation of 1984 upgrade agreement will be achieved December 20, 1986.

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BACKGROUND PAPER

19. BIOLOGICAL AND TOXIN WEAPONS CONVENTION (BWC)

I. STATUS

- o The Second Review Conference (RevCon) of the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) was held September 8-26 in Geneva.
- o The U.S. outlined concerns about adverse impact of technical developments; Soviet involvement in production, transfer and hostile use of mycotoxins in Laos, Kampuchea and Afghanistan; inadequate response to questions on 1979 antrax outbreak at Sverdlovsk; maintenance of an offensive BW program.
- o Seeking to rebut charges, Soviets participated in Q and A session on Sverdlovsk with some NNA/Western experts. They provided more detail than in past on their "bad meat" explanation (which is inconsistent with U.S. findings). At conclusion, UK expert stated that many questions remained and the session had not allayed concerns.
- o Soviet expert opined that their Sverdlovsk report might be available through diplomatic channels. U.S. is considering follow-up action.
- o Technical experts will meet in Spring 1987 to work out implementation of informal measures; next RevCon scheduled for no later than 1991.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Probable Soviet objective was to "get through" RevCon, create some mischief for U.S. without damaging U.S.-Soviet relations, and gain some credit for themselves.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o U.S. sought serious review of operation and effectiveness of the Convention, recognition of legitimacy of U.S. concerns about Soviet violations and of parties obligations to address and investigate allegations of noncompliance.
- o BWC lacks verification provisions and adequate compliance provisions; but U.S. does not want amendment of BWC, given belief that technological advances exacerbate verification difficulties and development of such provisions for BWC now would undermine efforts toward such regimes in our CW ban negotiations at Conference on Disarmament. Instead, U.S. desires informal measures to increase transparency through data exchange.

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- o U.S. objectives achieved. Final RevCon declaration noted grave concerns of some parties about compliance, with no call for negotiation of verification protocol, despite desire by most RevCon participants (and vague tactical proposal by Soviets). Several measures were agreed to. Compliance concerns were not resolved, however, and Soviets still need pressure to deal with the problem.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20508

Jack signed for you last night.

October 6, 1986

Peter

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: PETER R. SOMMER *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: US Presence in Reykjavik

Working with Bill Henkel, we have developed recommendations for the Admiral and Don Regan on total US presence in Reykjavik. Bill Henkel has signed the memo.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Tab I McDaniel/Henkel memo to Poindexter and Regan:

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

[Signature] Jack Mathrock, *[Signature]* Bob Linbeck, and *[Signature]* Frank Lavin concur.

Attachment
Tab I Memo to Regan/Poindexter

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR DON REGAN/JOHN POINDEXTER

FROM: BILL HENKEL/ROD MCDANIEL

SUBJECT: US Presence in Reykjavik

Despite our enjoinders that the President wishes the American presence in Reykjavik to reflect his desire for a small and intimate setting, a number of Agencies have had difficulty in breaking old habits. Consequently, we face decisions both on total numbers present in Reykjavik and the composition of some Agencies' parties.

To give you a flavor of the problem, Agencies plus the White House (this includes Secret Service and WHCA) had originally asked for over 200 more spots than the number of hotel rooms available. We also have a basic philosophical consideration that our recommendations, which follow, reflect -- we want this to be a White House "event." Taking these factors into consideration, there follows an outline of the problems by agency and our recommended solutions.

STATE

State has originally asked for over 100. They have now cut down to 62. This includes SY and communications. We recommend that State be allocated their reduced number of 62, as we squeezed them down another 10 in a meeting this afternoon.

Approve _____ Alternative number _____

We have no problems with State's proposed policy-level presence This is limited to: Shultz, Ridgway, Nitze and Ambassador Hartman. We would have problems if State proposes adding to their policy-level list.

USIA

USIA has originally proposed sending 34 people to Reykjavik. USIA has not cleared up the confusion over their real needs, but they apparently are now seeking 22 spots. This cut from 34 to 22 reflects agreement not to send their WORLDNET people, but we felt all along they were not needed because of the news blackout. Despite the travel freeze to Iceland, USIA continues to push

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BY RW NARA DATE 11/30/16

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for special exceptions and reportedly has 13 people already in Reykjavik. Nonetheless, we recommend that USIA only be allocated a total of 11 spots. This includes Wick, plus the four people he was promised he could bring along; plus an additional 6 people to assist the White House press operations. A few more USIA people (e.g., VOA) will go as part of the press contingent and another 4 (outside the 11) will apparently go and stay at the PAO's house. You should expect loud reclamation, but we strongly recommend that you hold to 11 for USIA. (Under this formula USIA's real number will be about 18.)

Approve _____

Alternative number _____

DEFENSE

Defense has asked for a total of seven spaces to include three policy-level officials: Ikle, Perle, and Gaffney. We only need one policy-level official. The Defense list also includes two communicators who would apparently be there to send messages to Secretary Weinberger. We believe WHCA can handle this for Defense. Therefore, we recommend one for Defense: Perle

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

ACDA

ACDA has asked for three spaces but they are all policy level officials. (Adelman, Guhin and Mobbs). Again in keeping with the President's desire, we recommend that ACDA be allocated two spots: Adelman and Rowny, both of whom we understand you have already agreed to.

Approve _____

Other _____

CIA AND JCS

The CIA has asked for one spot. The JCS has not yet made a specific request. But, we do have in mind, as noted above, having a very small Arms Control Support Group available in Reykjavik. If you approve of this concept, we propose allocating CIA and JCS one spot each in Reykjavik.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

NEED FOR EARLY DECISION

We would greatly appreciate an early decision on these questions so we can communicate your decision directly to Agencies today, October 6.

Amb Matlock

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October 5, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: FRANKLIN L. LAVIN *Franklin L. Lavin*

SUBJECT: Trip Report: Iceland Pre-Advance

Having just returned from four days in Reykjavik on the pre-advance, allow me to review logistical issues which are likely to be discussed on Monday, as well as pass on a brief schedule for the President.

A. Confirmation from Moscow

Despite our repeated entreaties to the Soviets, both in Reykjavik and through our embassy in Moscow, they have not been able to confirm: (1) whether they agree to our proposal to have one meeting site as opposed to alternate meeting sites; (2) whether they accept our proposal of the Hofdi as the central meeting site; (3) whether Gorbachev will be accompanied by his wife; (4) where he will be residing; (5) what Gorbachev's travel plans beyond the fact that he will be arriving Friday evening; and (6) whether they will agree to our proposals for a press black-out.

Although unable to answer any of these questions, the Soviet advance team was receptive to the questions when we put them forward.

B. The United States Official and Accompanying Parties

All departments and agencies have been asked to inform us of the number and type of personnel they would like to send to Reykjavik. As of now, there are approximately 280 people who will be in Reykjavik in advance of the President's arrival and an additional 375 people coming with the travelling party. These 655 people roughly can be broken down as follows:


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BY CW NARA DATE 11/21/07

White House Press Corps	270
USIA	29
State	119
WHCA	52
Secret Service	
DOD	7
Misc WH (Advance, Stewards, Photo)	30
NSC	12
Misc	5
Air Crew	30
Immediate Travelling Party (PPD, DTR, Other West Wing, Secretary Shultz)	69

B7C

These numbers present two problems: logistical and policy. In terms of logistics, we only have 400 beds at our disposal (although more might free up as the arrival of Soviet cruise ships reduces their needs for hotel rooms; we have an additional 200 beds at Keflavik Base some 40 minutes away.)

In terms of policy, these large numbers work against our goals of conducting the bilaterals in an intimate, private atmosphere.

Finally, although I have noted the NSC as being represented by 12 people, this should be viewed as the maximum NSC presence. We should also make an effort to keep our numbers as low as possible.

C. Press Plan

Per your guidance, we have been making arrangements as follows:

There will be a USG press black-out during the entire series of meeting, meaning that no official will brief the press on any aspect of the meetings.

However, there are four points during the weekend at which limited press coverage might be appropriate:

- (1) The President's arrival at Keflavik and the arrival ceremony;
- (2) The President's meeting with GOI officials;
- (3) A photo op at the start of the first session;
- (4) The President's departure from Iceland.

If any ancillary functions are arranged (point D, below), an appropriate press plan can be devised.

Although no press functions are anticipated in conjunction with the end of the meetings (i.e., a joint statement,

press conference, or appearance) we have advanced a site for such a function should plans be changed.

D. Ancillary Functions

Suggestions have been made for two different functions to be added to the current schedule, neither of which are directly related to the bilaterals. The first would be a social function(s), either tripartite or simply US-USSR. Needless to say, the GOI is keen on the idea of hosting a tripartite function, preferably a dinner on Saturday night, and have informally approached the other two delegations on this point. The US and the Soviets have both responded to the GOI by thanking them for their hospitality but deferring any response until this coming week. The Soviets and the Americans agreed among themselves that one side would not unilaterally accept an Icelandic invitation without conferring first with the other side.

The second suggested function would be Presidential remarks or a dropby for the US personnel at Keflavik. The argument for this is that it could be easily arranged around the President's departure. The arguments against this are that

- It is not relevant to the President's trip to Iceland;
- It would be insulting to the GOI for us to spend time with our troops but not to attend their social function;
- The President's presence at the base might heighten anti-base sentiment or otherwise inject issues into our meeting with the Soviets.

E. Accommodations and Facilities

The President will reside at Ambassador Ruwe's residence immediately adjacent to the US Embassy. Current plans are for you and Don Regan to reside in the UK Ambassador's residence one block away. Fifty yards from either residence will be the offices -- your's, Regan's, the NSC Staff's, the White House Staff's, State's, Advance's, and the Communications Center. Beyond our office building, perhaps one-hundred yards from the Embassy residence is the Holt Hotel where George Shultz and some 60 other Americans will stay.

Your office and the NSC Staff office will have clear voice and secure voice phone lines, Displaywriters, printers, grids, and other supplies. I can pass precise details on to you if you would like.

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Attachment

Tab A The President's tentative schedule

cc: Alton G. Keel
Paul B. Thompson
Rodney B. McDaniel
W. Robert Pearson
Jack F. Matlock
Peter R. Sommer

Tyrus W. Cobb
Robert E. Linhard
Douglas C. Doan
Elizabeth A. Penniman

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President's Trip to Iceland
October 9 - 12, 1986

Tentative Schedule

Thursday, October 9

9:30 a.m. President departs White House
7:00 p.m. Arrive Iceland (Brief Arrival Ceremony)
(local time)
8:00 p.m. Arrive Residence (U.S. Ambassador's House)

Friday, October 10

Morning - Adjust to time change, briefings and
Afternoon consultations
5:00 p.m.- Courtesy meetings with GOI President,
5:30 p.m. Prime Minister and Foreign Minister

Saturday, October 11

10:30 a.m.- First Session
12:30 p.m.
1:00 p.m.- Private Luncheon at Residence
2:00 p.m. (Participants TBD)
3:30 p.m.- Second Session
5:30 p.m.
Evening Open, to allow for continued bilaterals,
private time, or social function

Sunday, October 12

11:00 a.m.- Third Session
1:00 p.m.
1:00 p.m.- Private Luncheon at Residence
2:00 p.m. (Participants TBD)
3:00 p.m. Depart Iceland
5:30 p.m. Arrive back at White House

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DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By 1277 NARA, Date 4/25/05

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