

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection: European and Soviet Affairs**  
**Directorate, NSC: Records**  
**Folder Title: Canada 1984 [December 1983]**  
**Box: RAC box 1**

---

To see more digitized collections  
visit: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:  
<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** ~~SOMMER, BEVERLY~~ <sup>European & Soviet Affairs Directorate</sup> NSC: Records

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/6/2005

**File Folder** CANADA 1984 [DECEMBER 1983]

**FOIA**

F00-094

**Box Number** 90552 *RAC Box 1*

MUNTON

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1613	MEMO	TY COBB TO ROBERT MCFARLANE THRU CHARLES TYSON RE BRIEFING PAPERS (ANNOTATED)	1	12/13/1983	B1
1614	CABLE	122248Z <b>R 3/11/2008 F00-094</b>	1	3/12/1984	B1
1615	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO RR RE VISIT OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU <b>R 7/6/2006</b>	3	12/15/1983	B1
1616	TALKING POINTS	FOR MEETING WITH PR TRUDEAU (ATTACHMENT TO DOC #1615) <b>R 7/6/2006</b>	3	ND	B1
1617	TALKING POINTS	CARD VERSIONS OF TALKING POINTS (ATTACHMENT TO ITEM #1615) <b>R 7/6/2006</b>	1	ND	B1
1618	MEMO	KENNETH DAM TO THE PRESIDENT RE YOU MEETING WITH TRUDEAU <b>R 3/11/2008 F00-094</b>	2	12/12/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** ~~SOMMERSET FILES~~ <sup>European & Soviet Affairs Directorate</sup> NSC Records

**Withdrawer**

CAS 1/6/2005

**File Folder** CANADA 1984 [DECEMBER 1983]

**FOIA**

F00-094

**Box Number** 90552

MUNTON

4

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1619	BIO	<b>D 7/6/2006</b>	2	12/9/1983	B1 B3
1813	FORM	RE SCHEDULING (PARTIAL)	1	12/15/1983	B6
1620	CABLE	271932Z <b>R 3/11/2008 F00-094</b>	5	12/27/1983	B1
1621	MEMO	COBB TO MCFARLANE RE AMBASSADOR ROBINSON VISIT <b>R 7/6/2006</b>	1	12/17/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

SOMMER, PETER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

CAS 1/6/2005

*File Folder*

CANADA 1984 [DECEMBER 1983]

*FOIA*

F00-094

MUNTON

*Box Number*

90552

4

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
1613	MEMO  TY COBB TO ROBERT MCFARLANE THRU CHARLES TYSON RE BRIEFING PAPERS (ANNOTATED)	1	12/13/1983	B1

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**

*PS  
File  
Canada*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 01  
EOB010

OTTAWA 1815  
AN007257

DTG: 122248Z MAR 84  
TOR: 072/2340Z

PSN: 035106  
CSN: HCE071

DISTRIBUTION: STEI-01 DOBR-01 RAY-01 KRAM-01 SOMM-01 LINH-01  
ROBN-01 ENC-01 MAT-01 COBB-01 /010 A4

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: PUBS

EOB:

OP IMMED  
STU6333  
DE RUEHOT #1815 07222  
O 122248Z MAR 84  
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6013

INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1403  
USMISSION USNATO 2702

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ OTTAWA 01815

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CA, UR, US  
SUBJECT: SOVIETS REPORTEDLY WARN CRUISE MISSILE TESTING  
RISKS "DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES" FOR CANADA

1. (a - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. CANADIAN PRESS (CP) WIRE SERVICE REPORTED MARCH 12 THAT A TASS RELEASE FROM MOSCOW THE SAME DAY WARNED TESTING OF THE U. S. AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE IN CANADA IS "FRAUGHT WITH DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA AND FOR THE CAUSE OF PEACE AS A WHOLE."
3. THE TASS RELEASE, ACCORDING TO CP, CHARGES THAT THE US HAS "LONG BEEN TRYING TO TURN CANADIAN TERRITORY INTO ITS NUCLEAR RANGE" AND REPORTEDLY ALLUDES TO NEW WEAPONS TESTING PROPOSALS RECENTLY PRESENTED BY THE US, AS WELL AS TO DEMONSTRATIONS HERE PROTESTING THE GOC'S APPROVAL (LAST JULY) OF CRUISE TESTING. TASS REPORTEDLY ALSO WARNED THAT THE "ORGANIZERS OF THESE TESTS SHOULD BEAR IN MIND THAT CANADIAN AND U. S. TERRITORY MIGHT BE IN A SIMILAR SITUATION IF THE MANIACS (SIC) IN WASHINGTON DECIDE TO UNLEASH A NUCLEAR WAR."
4. EXTAFF, WHOM WE ALERTED TO THE ABOVE, HAD NOT SO FAR SEEN THE REPORTED TASS RELEASE BUT REACTED INFORMALLY THAT THEY ARE SURPRISED THAT THE SOVIETS SHOULD ATTEMPT SUCH AN "INEPT" SCARE TACTIC.
5. COMMENT: IF THE CP WIRE SERVICE IS CORRECT, THE TASS RELEASE WOULD BE THE FIRST SIGNIFICANT SOVIET PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AIR LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE TESTING HERE. IF THE SOVIETS ARE GUILTY OF SUCH HEAVY-HANDED BEHAVIOR, WE BELIEVE THREATS OF THIS SORT ARE LIKELY TO BOOMERANG AND PROMPT A STRONG ANTI-SOVIET REACTION IN CANADIAN PUBLIC OPINION AS A WHOLE.  
ROBINSON  
BT

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS FOO-094 # 1614

E, LOS, NARA, DATE 3/11/01

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

9019

~~SECRET~~VISIT OF CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU

DATE: December 15, 1983  
 LOCATION: Oval Office  
 TIME: 11:00 a.m. - 12:00 noon  
 FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

I. PURPOSE: To respond to Trudeau's urgent request to discuss his recent arms control initiatives aimed at reducing international tensions; to listen sympathetically to Trudeau's ideas, but to indicate clearly that several of his proposals pose problems for the Western Alliance; to underscore our feeling that Western economic recovery, cohesiveness on security issues and genuine efforts to secure arms reductions provide a firm foundation for the development of a positive East-West relationship.

II. BACKGROUND: Trudeau's "peace initiatives" have proven to be enormously popular in Canada and have provided the Prime Minister with a vehicle to raise his earlier low domestic standing (27% approval). His proposals have not generated enthusiasm abroad or increased his global stature. Our European Allies, Japan and China have responded with skepticism or subdued interest; still through a carefully orchestrated media campaign, Trudeau has portrayed himself domestically as a major player in international politics whose views on global security questions are widely solicited and respected. We will want to steer a careful course in our response, neither demonstrating enthusiasm for his initiatives nor denigrating them, either of which could enhance his domestic political standing.

His peace initiatives, however, have grown out of Trudeau's sincere concern about negative trends in East-West relations. While we have troubles with many aspects of his proposals, we should indicate support of his intention to find ways to achieve progress and reduce global tensions. We do not want him to assume the role of mediator, middleman or negotiator between the superpowers or to adopt a posture of assigning equal blame for global security disputes to the U.S. and USSR. We expect that Trudeau will spend most of the hour presenting details of his proposals and discussing the reactions he received abroad. We recommend that you demonstrate interest, show a willingness to explore these issues further with your principal advisers and consult with our NATO Allies, China and Japan on the practical realization of his initiatives. You should, however, stop substantially short of endorsing them.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-094#1615

RV

LWS

NARA DATE 7/16/86

The attached paper from George Shultz outlines Trudeau's major proposals and our position on his initiatives. George and Cap will have strong opinions on each of the proposals and will be prepared to address them in detail. In addition to George's specific points, I think you may wish to remind Trudeau about several basic aspects of our dealings with the Soviet Union:

-- The Eastern Bloc has shown little willingness to respond to the numerous initiatives we have proposed in coordination with NATO and Canada in the various arms control fora. You may wish to ask if convening a five-power conference, for example, will simplify the unresolved issues or merely channel what little progress we have made into an unwieldy forum. Our problem is with substance, not form.

-- The Soviets continue to show intransigence at the negotiating tables. Apparently they believe they can influence next year's elections by their unwillingness to move forward on arms control. They are mistaken, but this approach does help explain the Soviet walkout from INF, their refusal to set a date for the resumption of the START talks, and their threat of not returning to the next MBFR round.

-- It is presently particularly difficult to deal with the Soviet leadership. The uniformed military which plays a key role in their national-security decision-making process, demands "absolute security" for the USSR and is profoundly suspicious of the arms control process. You may wish to ask if his special emissary, who recently visited Moscow, received any indication that the Soviets are prepared to negotiate seriously on the basis of reductions, equality, verification, and compliance.

Your talking points are attached. The departure statement is at Tab A. George Shultz's comprehensive memo and Trudeau's bio are attached at Tab B.

### III. PARTICIPANTS

11:00 a.m. - 11:50 a.m. - Meeting, Oval Office

#### U.S.

The President  
Vice President  
Secretary of State George Shultz  
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs  
Paul H. Robinson, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to Canada  
Jack Matlock, NSC  
Meese, Baker, Deaver will attend at their discretion

Canada

Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau  
Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister  
Allan E. Gotlieb, Canadian Ambassador to the U.S.  
Robert Fowler, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister

IV. PRESS PLAN

Photo opportunity at beginning of Oval Office meeting.

V. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

11:00 a.m. - 11:05 a.m. Photo opportunity  
11:05 a.m. - 11:50 a.m. Meeting in Oval Office  
11:50 a.m. - 12:00 noon Move to Colonnade and delivery of  
departure statements

Tab A Departure remarks  
Tab B Shultz memo and bio

Prepared by:  
Tyrus W. Cobb



TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU

-- Warm welcome to Washington. I see that you have been all across Europe and to the Orient discussing your security initiatives. You have raised several provocative and stimulating proposals.

-- I would be interested in hearing the reaction you have received from other capitals. Have you had any specific suggestions as to how your initiatives might be implemented?

-- This Administration has negotiated seriously with the Soviets in several arms control negotiations. Still, we continue to face Soviet intransigence and unwillingness to address fundamental Allied security concerns. Unless we persuade Moscow to treat these negotiations as other than a propaganda forum the chances for progress are limited. This is the fundamental issue -- not whether or not two powers or five join a conference or whether we should have heads of state attendance at the sessions.

-- Five-Power Nuclear Conference: As I wrote to you last month, we have no fundamental objection. However, we note considerable reluctance on the part of China, France and Britain to convene such a conference. Further, how would adding this very complex agenda help progress in arms control?

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED  
NLS F00-094#1666  
BY LDS, NARA, DATE 7/6/06

-- Verification, ASAT and ICBM Mobility: If, as you suggest, we should only have strategic arms agreements that are verifiable by national technical means (NTM), how can we be sure that NTM can perform the verification adequately? We should not engage in ASAT negotiations now given the considerable Soviet advantages in capabilities and R&D. Banning or restricting the mobility of ICBMS seems to run counter to the advice we are getting from arms control advocates who emphasize survivability.

-- Strengthen Non-Proliferation: We strongly support efforts to restrict the proliferation of nuclear weapons (horizontal proliferation) as well as the expansion of existing arsenals (vertical proliferation). But this is a two-way street. (If asked) The U.S. has taken the lead in pushing for a comprehensive nuclear safeguards initiative and in convening a meeting of supplier states.

-- CDE and MBFR: On the urgings of our Allies we raised the issue at the NATO Ministerials and will be represented by George Shultz. I note that Gromyko does not seem to be enthusiastic about going there. I personally place a lot of hope in this conference -- we need to agree on Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) with the East in order to reduce the possibility of accidental nuclear war. The question is whether or not the Soviets will treat this as a propaganda forum or be prepared to negotiate real CBMs. We are reviewing our MBFR options and will discuss with our Allies. See no need for ministerial representation now.

-- Enhanced NATO Conventional Defense: We strongly support. Efforts must be made to reduce reliance on nuclear retaliation to provide an effective deterrent. Do you have any specific suggestions as to how the Alliance could enhance its conventional forces?

-- I wish you success in your endeavors. Please keep me informed of developments on your initiatives.

-- WELCOME. SEE THAT YOU HAVE BEEN IN EUROPE, JAPAN AND CHINA FOR DISCUSSIONS. YOU HAVE RAISED SEVERAL PROVOCATIVE PROPOSALS.

-- WOULD BE INTERESTED IN HEARING OF THE REACTION YOU RECEIVED. WERE THERE ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS FROM OUR ALLIES?

-- WE HAVE NEGOTIATED SERIOUSLY WITH SOVIETS IN SEVERAL ARMS CONTROL FORA. WE STILL SEE SOVIET INTRANSIGENCE: REFUSAL TO DEAL WITH OUR SECURITY CONCERNS.

-- 5-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE: NO FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTION, BUT NOTE CHINA, FRANCE & BRITAIN ARE UNENTHUSIASTIC. WILL THIS COMPLEX CONFERENCE HELP ARMS CONTROL?

TRUDEAU

2

-- VERIFICATION, ASAT & ICBM MOBILITY: HOW WILL ARMS AGREEMENTS BE VERIFIED? WE CAN'T HAVE ASAT NEGOTIATIONS GIVEN SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND R&D LEAD. ICBM MOBILITY RESTRICTIONS HAMPERS SURVIVABILITY, A KEY ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE.

-- NON-PROLIFERATION: ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT. WE HAVE TAKEN THE LEAD, ESPECIALLY ON COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR SAFEGUARDS AND FOR A MEETING OF SUPPLIER STATES.

-- CDE & MBFR: GEORGE SHULTZ WILL ATTEND CDE. WILL SOVIETS TREAT THIS AS PROPAGANDA FORUM? WE PUSH GENUINE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. WE ARE CONSIDERING MBFR INITIATIVE, BUT SOVIETS STILL HAVE NOT ADDRESSED VERIFICATION AND DATA

TRUDEAU

3

PROBLEMS.

-- ENHANCED CONVENTIONAL DEFENSE: ENTHUSIASTICALLY SUPPORT. REDUCE RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ANY SPECIFIC SUGGESTIONS?

DECLASSIFIED / REVERSED

NLS FOO-094 #1617

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 7/6/06

DEPARTURE STATEMENT

TO BE PROVIDED

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLS FOO-094#1618

December 12, 1983

BY LSJ, NARA, DATE 3/11/08

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
S/S#8338119

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Kenneth W. Dam, Acting Secretary *KWD*

SUBJECT: Your Meeting With Pierre Elliott Trudeau,  
Prime Minister of Canada, December 15, 1983

I. OBJECTIVES

1. To listen sympathetically to Trudeau's ideas and his account of his meetings with other leaders.
2. To convey our confidence that Western economic recovery, defense modernization and arms control efforts are laying a firm basis for a constructive East-West relationship, and that current East-West difficulties reflect Soviet unhappiness at having to adjust to a revitalized West.
3. To indicate clearly to Trudeau, without appearing to denigrate Trudeau's initiative, the problems several of his proposals pose for us and to register muted support for those ideas that might prove useful.
4. To underscore that the arms control impasses which trouble Trudeau are the result largely of Soviet tactics and cannot be blamed equally on both superpowers.

II. SETTING

Trudeau's purpose in asking to see you now is to discuss his "peace initiative" and to seek US support for it. The perceived success or failure of his initiative will have a direct impact on Canadian domestic politics and Trudeau's political future. Your reactions to his proposals may well determine whether and how he pursues his initiative in the future.

Trudeau has written you twice and telephoned you once about his initiative. His meeting with you follows similar sessions with leaders in Western Europe, Japan and China, which produced mainly polite, non-committal expressions of general support but little concrete results. Trudeau evidently hopes to visit Andropov later on, perhaps early in 1984, but it isn't clear what further steps he may undertake to pursue his fading initiative.

III. ISSUES

Trudeau has proposed the following steps under his initiative:

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL. / OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

-2-

1. A Five-Power Conference of Nuclear Weapons States

One goal would be to set fixed ratios of the participants' nuclear forces as a prelude to arms reductions. These ratios would be subject to negotiation but would reflect "superpower de jure equality." In your November 14 letter, you told Trudeau that we have no fundamental objections to such a conference but noted the reluctance of others and our own concerns about timing.

2. Verification, ASAT and ICBM Mobility Proposals

The five-power conference would agree that future strategic systems be verifiable by National Technical Means (NTM), ban the testing and deployment of high-altitude anti-satellite systems and place constraints on the basing modes for mobile ICBM's. The first two give us real problems as it is highly unlikely that NTM will be sufficient for verification purposes and we are not prepared to begin negotiations on banning ASAT in view of the Soviets' existing capabilities and technological research lead in this field. On the third proposal, the most we could agree to would be that mobile ICBM's be deployed in such a way as to permit verification.

3. Strengthening the NPT

Trudeau calls for the accession of additional non-nuclear weapons states to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) but also implies that the nuclear states -- including the US -- should do more to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The US strongly supports the NPT, but reduction of nuclear arsenals is obviously a two-way street. We have taken our NPT responsibilities seriously.

4. CDE and MBFR

Trudeau talks about giving a "jolt" of high-level political energy to the CDE (as well as MBFR) by raising our participation to ministerial level. Secretary Shultz and other NATO foreign ministers have agreed to attend the CDE opening. We do not agree with Trudeau's idea of a CDE summit, and he now seems not to be pursuing this idea seriously. On MBFR, Trudeau suggests that the West make a new move next year and highlight it with a ministerial-level meeting in Vienna. George Shultz told Minister MacEachen in Brussels that we are opposed to an MBFR ministerial.

5. Enhanced NATO Conventional Defense

MacEachen last week told us that Trudeau will broach this idea and his desire to raise the nuclear threshold in Europe. The US supports the strengthening of NATO's conventional defense. Properly presented, Trudeau's endorsement would add to ongoing Alliance efforts, but it seems clear that he ignores the costs involved.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

SOMMER, PETER: FILES

*Withdrawer*

CAS 1/6/2005

*File Folder*

CANADA 1984 [DECEMBER 1983]

*FOIA*

F00-094

MUNTON

*Box Number*

90552

4

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
1619	BIO	2	12/9/1983	B1 B3

---

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

**B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]**

**B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]**

**B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]**

**B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]**

**B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]**

**B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]**

**B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]**

**B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]**

**C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.**



REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENTS

To: Officer-in-charge  
Appointments Center  
Room 060, OEOP

Please admit the following appointments on Thursday, December 15, 1983

for The President of \_\_\_\_\_:  
(NAME OF PERSON TO BE VISITED) (AGENCY)

The President  
Vice President

The White House  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Edwin Meese  
James Baker  
Michael Deaver

State Department  
Secretary George Shultz  
Richard Burt, DOB: 2/3/47 SSN: [REDACTED]  
Paul Robinson DOB: 6/22/30 SSN: [REDACTED]

*bp*

Defense Department  
Secretary Caspar Weinberger

NSC  
Jack F. Matlock

Canadian Delegation

Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau  
Allan J. MacEachen, Deputy Prime Minister  
Allan E. Gottlieb, Canadian Amb. to the U.S.  
Robert Fowler, Foreign Policy Adviser to the Prime Minister

**MEETING LOCATION**

Building West Wing

Requested by Terry Wanbaugh

Room No. Oval Office

Room No. 361 Telephone 5732

Time of Meeting 11:00 a .m.

Date of request 12/13/83

Additions and/or changes made by telephone should be limited to three (3) names or less.

APPOINTMENTS CENTER: SIG/OEOP - 395-6046 or WHITE HOUSE - 456-6742

Sunday, December 18, 1983

# Trudeau's Peace Mission Key to His Future Plans

## Initiative Puts Canadian Leader in Spotlight

By James Rusk

Special to The Washington Post

OTTAWA—Despite a lukewarm reception in Washington and capitals in Europe and Asia, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau is not ready to quit his quixotic peace mission.

Early next month, Trudeau is likely to accept an invitation to go to the Soviet Union that was delivered earlier this year by Politburo member Mikhail Gorbachev. The major problem in arranging the Soviet visit is whom Trudeau might see if Soviet President Yuri Andropov remains too ill to receive him.

Trudeau may be using up the diplomatic capital he has built during 14 years as the longest-serving leader

### NEWS ANALYSIS

currently heading any western country, but in pursuing his peace mission, he is displaying a peculiar combination of idealism and guile that has characterized his political leadership.

Trudeau says he is deeply concerned that an escalating arms race and growing tensions between Washington and Moscow have left the

world tottering close to the brink of nuclear war.

On trips to London, Paris, Peking and, last week, Washington, Trudeau has proposed a conference of the world's five nuclear powers to limit their strategic arsenals. His initiative also includes a ban on weapons that could attack high-altitude communications and surveillance satellites, an agreement to limit the mobility of any new strategic missiles and other specific goals.

Trudeau says he would rather try to reduce tensions and fail, than fail to try. He has been urged on in these efforts by old friends, such as former West German chancellor Helmut Schmidt and other former leaders.

But Trudeau is also exploiting what may be nothing more than a political opportunity. Recent polls have shown that Canadians, who usually ignore international affairs, have become deeply troubled about the world situation.

Those sentiments have given Trudeau an opening. His government, which will go to the polls sometime in 1984, is in deep trouble with the electorate. The latest Gallup poll, released two weeks ago, has his governing Liberal Party trailing the op-

See TRUDEAU, A25, Col. 1



Associated

Trudeau meets in Tokyo with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone on Nov



Associated Press

Trudeau and Reagan pose for photographers after meeting in Washington last week.

## Trudeau Sells Peace Mission At Home, Around the World

TRUDEAU, From A21

position Conservatives under their new leader Ryan Mulroney by 29 percentage points. Given that collapse in his support, Trudeau would be fortunate if half his caucus wins reelection.

Throughout his career, Trudeau has shown that when he is consumed with an issue, it can capture his attention to the exclusion of all else. He displayed the same single-mindedness in 1979, when he ran a losing campaign on the issue of constitutional reform in Canada, and in 1980 on the eve of a worldwide recession, when he championed improved relations between developing and developed nations, making that the dominant issue of the Montebello, Quebec, economic summit.

The concept of the peace mission, which has taken almost all of Trudeau's time since late October, is not new. For more than a year, both he and Canada's External Affairs Minister Allan MacEachen have felt that the Reagan administration was not vigorous enough in its pursuit of arms control agreements with Moscow. When Trudeau agreed almost a year ago to test the cruise missile, one reason was to make certain that Canada would have a role at NATO councils where it could press for an accommodation with the Soviets.

By putting himself in the international spotlight and getting front-page coverage in the Canadian

media for his peace pilgrimage, Trudeau is using the one issue that puts the most advantageous distance between himself and Mulroney.

Even so, it does not appear that Trudeau is trying to turn the peace crusade into a platform for reelection since most political observers agree he would be hard-pressed to keep up the momentum until a spring election day. Rather most Liberals say he will try to reap some quick political advantage from the campaign so that he can leave office with the party's fortunes on the upswing.

And having made what he sees as an important personal statement about the future of the world, they say he can march off the international stage with the dignity of a statesman, a man whose reputation has transcended the country he led.

The frenetic pace and the urgency with which he is trying to get to Moscow support this view. If the Liberals are to have an orderly transfer of power to a new leader, they must have a leadership convention late this spring to give Trudeau's successor time to prepare for a fall election.

A leadership convention takes about four months to mount, a constriction in the Canadian political timetable that would give Trudeau until the end of January to make his visit to Moscow and then announce his retirement.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 OF 05  
EOB022

SECSTATE WASHDC 5387  
AN010919

DTG: 271932Z DEC 83  
TOR: 362/0402Z

PSN: 024698  
CSN: HCE026

DISTRIBUTION: FORT-01 SOMM-01 MAT-01 COBB-01 /004 A1

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:  
SIT: JP VP SIT EOB  
EOB:

PRIORITY  
DE RUEHC #5387 3611953  
P 271932Z DEC 83  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA PRIORITY 0000

~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 365387

NODIS  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, PARM, CA  
SUBJECT: MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE  
PRESIDENT AND CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU,  
DECEMBER 15

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THERE FOLLOWS CLEARED TEXT OF MEMORANDUM OF  
CONVERSATION PREPARED BY NSC ON THE PRESIDENT'S  
DECEMBER 15 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER TRUDEAU.

3. PARTICIPANTS:

US - THE PRESIDENT; VICE PRESIDENT; SECRETARY OF STATE  
GEORGE SHULTZ; SECRETARY OF DEFENSE CASPAR WEINBERGER;  
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER ROBERT C. MCFARLANE,  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EUROPEAN AFFAIRS  
RICHARD BURT; AMBASSADOR PAUL H. ROBINSON; TYRUS W.  
COBB, NSC.

CANADA - PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU; DEPUTY PRIME  
MINISTER ALLAN J. MACEACHEN; AMBASSADOR ALLAN GOTLIEB;  
ROBERT FOWLER, FOREIGN POLICY ADVISER TO THE PRIME  
MINISTER.

4. BEGIN TEXT: THE PRESIDENT WELCOMED CANADIAN PRIME  
MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU TO WASHINGTON AND COMMENTED  
THAT HE WAS VERY PLEASED THAT THEIR BUSY SCHEDULES  
FINALLY PERMITTED THEM TO GET TOGETHER. HE NOTED THAT  
HE WAS FOLLOWING CLOSELY THE INITIATIVES THAT THE  
PRIME MINISTER HAD UNDERTAKEN TO REDUCE TENSIONS IN  
EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND TO PROMOTE A MORE DURABLE  
PEACE.

5. THE PRIME MINISTER THANKED THE PRESIDENT FOR HIS  
WARM WELCOME AND FOR HIS INTEREST IN THESE  
INITIATIVES. TRUDEAU EMPHASIZED THAT HE DID NOT SEE  
HIMSELF AS AN INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN EAST AND WEST, NOR  
WAS HE THERE TO DISCUSS NUCLEAR STRATEGY. HIS PURPOSE  
WAS TO FIND WAYS TO "MAKE MORE EFFICIENT" THE QUEST  
FOR PEACE THAT OUR PEOPLES HAVE EXPRESSED. HE NOTED  
THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD RECENTLY SENT STRONG SIGNALS TO  
THE EAST THAT WE ARE IN AN EXCELLENT POSITION FROM

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F00-094#1620

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 3/11/08

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 05

SECSTATE WASHDC 5387

DTG: 271932Z DEC 83

PSN: 024698

WHICH TO NEGOTIATE: THE AMERICAN ECONOMY IS STRONG AND VITAL, IN FULL RECOVERY; US MILITARY MIGHT IS BEING STRENGTHENED AND AREAS OF SOVIET ADVANTAGE WERE BEING ERASED; THE SUCCESSFUL INF DEPLOYMENT SENT A FIRM MESSAGE TO THE SOVIETS THAT THEY COULD NOT DISRUPT THE COHESION OF THE WESTERN ALLIANCE.

6. HOWEVER, THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT OTHER SIGNALS THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS SENT HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED SO WELL OR HAVE BEEN IMPROPERLY UNDERSTOOD. TRUDEAU PRAISED THE PRESIDENT'S SPEECH TO THE JAPANESE DIET, PARTICULARLY THE PRESIDENT'S VIEW THAT NUCLEAR WAR COULD NOT BE WON AND MUST NOT BE FOUGHT. FURTHER, THE CLEAR STATEMENT THAT THE UNITED STATES DOES NOT-SEEK SUPERIORITY AND IS WILLING TO ENTER INTO-NEGOTIATIONS TO FIND EQUITABLE SOLUTIONS IS COMMENDABLE. MORE RECENTLY, THE COMMUNIQUE ISSUED FROM THE NATO MINISTERIALS WAS VERY POSITIVE IN THAT, ALONG WITH A REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED FOR STRENGTH AND ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY, IT INDICATED THAT WE ARE OPEN TO AND ENCOURAGE A GENUINE DIALOGUE WITH THE EAST.

7. THE PRIME MINISTER WONDERED WHY THEN WAS "REAGANISM" PERCEIVED SO POORLY IN THE WORLD ARENA? THESE RECENT SIGNALS HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY RECEIVED LARGELY BECAUSE THEY TEND TO COUNTER EARLIER AMERICAN STATEMENTS THAT UNDULY AGITATED MANY CONCERNED INDIVIDUALS, PARTICULARLY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TALKING OF ACHIEVING SUPERIORITY AND ACTUALLY FIGHTING A NUCLEAR WAR. TRUDEAU INDICATED THAT HE FELT A NEED TO GO OVER TO THE SOVIET UNION AND EMPHASIZE THAT THE

PRESIDENT'S REMARKS IN TOKYO AND THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE MORE ACCURATELY REFLECTED THE THINKING OF THIS ADMINISTRATION AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS. WE MUST SHOW, HE SAID, THAT IT IS NOT ONLY THE PEOPLE, BUT THE GOVERNMENTS, TOO, WHO DESIRE PEACE. WE MUST COUNTER THE PREVAILING IDEA THAT ALL NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BOGGED DOWN. HE NOTED THAT IN THE PRESIDENT'S RECENT LETTER TO HIM (TRUDEAU) THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN INDICATED THAT THE US IS CURRENTLY CONSIDERING A NEW MBFR PROPOSAL. THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT THIS WOULD BE A VERY POSITIVE STEP FORWARD.

8. THE PRESIDENT REAFFIRMED THE THRUST OF HIS TOKYO SPEECH AND ENCOURAGED TRUDEAU TO EMPHASIZE IN HIS FUTURE MEETINGS THAT THIS CLEARLY REFLECTS THE POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION. HE NOTED THAT MANY OF THE PROPOSALS WE HAD FORWARDED WERE DESIGNED TO BRING A STABLE AND LASTING PEACE AND PROVIDED THE STARTING POINT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MUTUALLY PRODUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE USSR. THE PRESIDENT POINTED OUT THAT WE HAVE CONSISTENTLY CALLED FOR NOT ONLY ARMS LIMITATIONS, BUT REDUCTIONS, INCLUDING A "ZERO/ZERO" OPTION IN THE INF TALKS THAT WOULD ELIMINATE A WHOLE CLASS OF WEAPONS. THE PRESIDENT EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT THAT SOVIET PROPAGANDA HAD SUCCEEDED IN DISTORTING OUR POSITIONS AND THAT THEIR DISINFORMATION EFFORTS HAD GOTTEN MORE ATTENTION THAN OUR GENUINE PROPOSALS. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE PRESS OFTEN ASSUMES AN ADVERSARY ROLE AND ONCE HAVING ADOPTED THIS POSTURE SIMPLY WILL NOT REPORT FAIRLY NEWS THAT THEY DO NOT WANT TO HEAR.

9. SECRETARY SHULTZ ADDED THAT AT THE PRESENT TIME WE HAVE THE FEELING THAT THE SOVIETS JUST DON'T WANT TO LISTEN. HE WAS NOT SURE WHY, BUT SPECULATED THAT THEIR FAILURE TO PRECLUDE OUR INF DEPLOYMENTS, A MAJOR

~~SECRET~~

NOV-83

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 03 OF 05 SECSTATE WASHDC 5387 DTG: 271932Z DEC 83 PSN: 024698

OBJECTIVE, HAS CAUSED THEM TO RETRENCH. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT THEY TRIED TO BULLY OTHER NATIONS, TO SCARE PEOPLE, AND TO INTIMIDATE US, AS THEY DID IN TRYING UNSUCCESSFULLY TO BREAK UP THE WILLIAMSBURG MEETING. SECRETARY SHULTZ INDICATED THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE SOVIETS WILL GO TO STOCKHOLM WITH HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATION, BUT MIGHT CONTINUE THEIR INTRASIGENT POSE. THEY HAVE A MIND-SET THAT THEY CAN GAIN A SUPERIOR POSITION THROUGH INTIMIDATION. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIET LACK OF RESPONSE MAY ALSO BE CAUSED, IN PART, BY ANDROPOV'S FAILING HEALTH AND THE ASCENDING ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN MOSCOW

DECISION-MAKING.

10. THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT, IN THE INF TALKS, WE PLACED THE ZERO/ZERO OPTION ON THE TABLE AND FURTHER INDICATED THAT WE WERE WILLING TO ENTERTAIN BALANCED DEPLOYMENTS AT OTHER LEVELS, BUT WE RECEIVED NO SATISFACTORY RESPONSES FROM THE SOVIETS.

11. SECRETARY WEINBERGER INDICATED THAT OUR SINCERE DESIRES TO REACH A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT WERE NOT FAIRLY REPORTED IN THE PRESS. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS OUR POLICY THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR, THAT IT CAN'T BE WON AND THAT IT SHOULDN'T BE FOUGHT. HE ADDED THAT WE WERE NOT PLANNING TO CONDUCT A PROTRACTED NUCLEAR CONFLICT, DESPITE PRESS STORIES TO THE CONTRARY. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SOVIET UNION, THROUGH ITS PREPARATIONS FOR CIVIL DEFENSE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A REFIRE CAPABILITY FOR ITS MISSILES, APPEARS TO BE PURSUING PREPARATIONS TO GIVE THEM THE CAPABILITY TO FIGHT A NUCLEAR WAR.

12. THE PRESIDENT NOTED THAT THE PRESS HAD BUILT AN IMAGE OF HIM THEY REFUSED TO MODIFY; THEY TAILOR THE FACTS TO FIT THIS PRECONCEIVED IMAGE AND WON'T ADMIT THEY ARE WRONG.

13. THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED AND NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT CAME INTO OFFICE AND INHERITED A NUMBER OF POLICIES WITH WHICH HE IS NOW IDENTIFIED -- THE 1979 "DUAL-TRACK DECISION," THE HARMEL REPORT OF 1967, AND THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION. HE NOTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS WISELY SOUGHT TO CORRECT AMERICAN MILITARY DEFICIENCIES WITH RESPECT TO THE USSR AND, FURTHER, TO OVERCOME A SENSE OF FRUSTRATION THAT DEVELOPED FOLLOWING THE HOSTAGE CRISIS IN TEHRAN AND THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN. THUS, HE ADDED, THE PRESIDENT HAD "BEEN DEALT A TOUGH HAND." HOWEVER, AS THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WANTED, THE PRESIDENT EXHIBITED STRENGTH AND RESOLVE AND DID NOT BACK DOWN. TO A GREAT EXTENT THIS EXPLAINS WHY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP DOES NOT LIKE THIS ADMINISTRATION.

14. STILL, THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED, THE SOVIETS ARE GENUINELY AFRAID NOW. AS MUCH AS THEY WOULD LIKE TO SPREAD THEIR IDEOLOGY, THEY DO NOT WANT WAR. THEY HAVE A SENSE OF INFERIORITY. IT IS IMPERATIVE NOW THAT WE SHOW THE WORLD JUST WHO ARE THE DEFENDERS OF FREEDOM, WHO REALLY WANTS PEACE. WE MUST DEMONSTRATE THAT WE SINCERELY DESIRE DETENTE AND MODERATION IN GLOBAL POLITICS. IN DOING SO THE SOVIETS WILL HAVE DIFFICULTY IN PRESSING AN IMAGE OF THEM AS PEACELOVERS. THE PRIME MINISTER NOTED THAT IF HE GOES TO THE USSR HE WILL STRESS THAT THEY SHOULD READ

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 04 OF 05 SECSTATE WASHDC 5387

DTG: 271932Z DEC 83 PSN: 024698

PRESIDENT REAGAN'S TOKYO SPEECH CAREFULLY, THT THEY SHOULD COME BACK TO THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS AND APPEAR IN STOCKHOLM READY TO DO BUSINESS. THEY HAVE LOST THE PROPAGANDA BATTLE.

15. THE VICE PRESIDENT REQUESTED THAT THE PRESIDENT EXPLAIN TO TRUDEAU THE DEPTHS OF HIS REAL-FEELINGS ON THESE ISSUES.

16. IN EXPRESSING AGREEMENT WITH TRUDEAU'S ANALYSIS, THE PRESIDENT REITERATED THAT THE TOKYO SPEECH - REFLECTED ADMINISTRATION POLICY. THE PRESIDENT THEN PRESENTED A SPIRITED DEFENSE OF HIS STRATEGIC DEFENSE PROGRAM, WHERE, HE EXPLAINED, WE HOPE TO SHIFT WAY-FROM OUR RELIANCE ON THREATENING TO DESTROY AN ADVERSARY'S SOCIETY OR FORCES AND, INSTEAD, TO BUILD A DEFENSIVE SYSTEM THAT PREVENTS INCOMING -MISSILES FROM STRIKING TARGETS. AT THIS POINT WE COULD; ENTERTAIN THE POSSIBILITY OF DESTROYING OFFENSIVE-MISSILES AND MOVE OUR PEOPLE AWAY FROM A DEPENDENCE-ON THE-TYRANNY OF THESE NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

17. THE PRIME MINISTER UNDERSTOOD THE PRESIDENT'S SINCERE DESIRES, BUT WONDERED IF SUCH -A SYSTEM WOULD BE DESTABILIZING. HE ADDED THAT THE WORLD IS MORE INTERESTED IN KNOWING NOW WHY WE CANNOT ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "NO FIRST USE," ALTHOUGH HE THOUGHT IT-WOULD BE A SERIOUS MISTAKE TO DO SO. -THEY ALSO CANNOT UNDERSTAND WHY SO LITTLE PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE AT MBFR. WE NEED TO FIND WAYS TO EQUALIZE-THE MILITARY BALANCE IN EUROPE, TO IMPROVE OUR CONVENTIONAL-FORCES TO THE EXTENT THAT WE CAN SAY, "NUCLEAR WEAPONS CANNOT BE USED."

18. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT WE WERE READY TO GO DOWN THE ROAD OF NEGOTIATIONS WHEREVER IT ; MIGHT BE;

FRUITFUL. HE NOTED THAT IN THE POST-WAR YEARS WHEN WE WERE THE ONLY COUNTRY TO POSSESS NUCLEAR WEPONS, -WE - OFFERED TO GIVE THEM UP, BUT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT - ACCEPT THIS TRULY BENEFICIAL SCHEME. -THE PRESIDENT ADDED THAT HE AGREED THAT THE SOVIETS FEARED-WAR-TODY AND THAT ALTHOUGH EVERY LEADER HAS AT ONE TIME OR ANOTHER REAFFIRMED THAT THE SOVIET GOAL REMAINED THE SPREAD OF A COMMUNIST REVOLUTION -WORLDWIDE, THE SOVIET PEOPLE DO NOT WANT WAR. THEY HAVE BEEN REPEATEDLY - INVADED AND THREATENED IN THEIR PAST, -BY THE MONGOLS, BY NAPOLEON WHO REACHED MOSCOW, AND TWICE BY THE GERMANS IN THIS CENTURY. THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE HAVE EXPERIENCED THE HORRORS OF WAR AND DO NOT WANT TO HAVE THAT EXPERIENCE AGAIN. HOWEVER, HE ADDED THAT IT IS DISTURBING THAT MILITARY LEADERS SEEM TO HAVE TAKEN SO PROMINENT A ROLE IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. IT MAY BE THAT THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, BECAUSE OF THEIR SENSE OF INFERIORITY AND PREOCCUPATION WITH SECURITY CONCERNS, HAVE CREATED A FRANKENSTEIN WITH THEIR LARGE MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT. THEY HAVE PLACED SO MUCH EMPHASIS ON DEFENSE THAT THE MILITARY HAS TOO MUCH AUTHORITY.

19. THE PRIME MINISTER STRONGLY AGREED, BUT SUGGESTED THAT NOW WAS THE TIME TO TEST THEM. WE SHOULD NOW REAFFIRM THE MESSAGE OF THE PRESIDENT'S DIET SPEECH IN TOKYO, SHOW A WILLINGNESS TO GO THE EXTRA MILE TO REACH AGREEMENTS, TO ARDENTLY PURSUE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES, TO PLACE LESS EMPHASIS ON OFFENSIVE MISSILES, AND TO TRY TO FIND AREAS OF

SECRET

N  
O  
O  
N  
S  
  
N  
O  
O  
N  
S  
  
N  
O  
O  
N  
S

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 05 OF 05 SECSTATE WASHDC 5387

DTG: 271932Z DEC 83 PSN: 024698

AGREEMENT INSTEAD OF DIFFERENCES. OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE WOULD BE A DEMONSTRATION OF A WILLINGNESS TO MEET WITH ANDROPOV, PERHAPS AT A SUMMIT, BUT NOT NECESSARILY. SUCH A SUMMIT NEED NOT BE THE OCCASION OF SIGNING A MAJOR AGREEMENT, BUT CAN BE USEFUL AS A GET-ACQUAINTED SESSION. THE PRIME MINISTER THOUGHT SUCH AN OVERTURE COULD GO A LONG WAY IN CHANGING THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE PRESIDENT. HE ADDED THAT SUMMITS CAN BUILD FALSE EXPECTATIONS, BUT, IF PROPERLY HANDLED, COULD BE USEFUL. THIS COULD PUT POLITICAL ENERGY INTO THE NEGOTIATING PROCESS. THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED THAT AT SUCH A MEETING BOTH LEADERS COULD REAFFIRM STATEMENTS THAT THEY HAVE MADE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, NUCLEAR WAR IS NOT WINNABLE. THIS WOULD BE AN EXCELLENT WAY OF PUTTING PRESSURE ON MOSCOW.

20. THE PRESIDENT INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO SUMMITS, BUT THEY SHOULD NOT BE SUCH THAT THEY

CREATE FALSE EXPECTATIONS. IN THE PAST WE HAVE MADE NUMEROUS EFFORTS TO KEEP THE POLITICAL DIALOGUE OPEN, TO FIND NEW CHANNELS OF COMMUNICATION. WE HAVE TRIED TO STRESS THAT NO ONE IN THIS COUNTRY WANTS WAR AND THAT THE SEARCH FOR A DURABLE, GENUINE PEACE IS AT THE TOP OF OUR AGENDA. WE HAVE TRIED TO KEEP MUCH OF OUR EFFORT OUT OF THE PUBLIC EYE AND NOT TRY TO CONDUCT THE DIALOGUE THROUGH THE WORLD PRESS. THE PRESIDENT STRESSED THAT HE WAS READY TO DO MORE, IF THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED ITSELF, TO MOVE IF THERE WAS ANY CHANCE OF MOVEMENT. WE WILL KEEP TRYING TO REDUCE TENSIONS AND TO BUILD A SOUND DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS.

21. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT HE WAS GRATEFUL TO THE PRESIDENT FOR THE TIME HE HAS TAKEN TO ADDRESS THE PEACE INITIATIVES. TRUDEAU INDICATED THAT HE KNEW THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CHANCE FOR SUCCESS FOR MANY OF THESE, PARTICULARLY THE FIVE-POWER NUCLEAR CONFERENCE WHICH WAS NOT RECEIVED ENTHUSIASTICALLY ABROAD. HE ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT HAVING HIGH-LEVEL REPRESENTATION AT THE CDE WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE RECENT SIGNALS THE PRESIDENT HAD SENT, INCLUDING THE DECISION TO SEND HIS FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE CDE, THE VERY POSITIVE SPEECH HE GAVE IN TOKYO, THE NATO MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE AND THIS MEETING, WILL ALL CONTRIBUTE TO A POSITIVE REVISION OF THE PRESIDENT'S IMAGE. MOST FOREIGN LEADERS HAVE AN ERRONEOUS IMPRESSION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN AND TRUDEAU INDICATED HE WOULD STRIVE TO SEE THAT THIS FALSE IMAGE WAS CORRECTED.

22. THE PRESIDENT THANKED THE PRIME MINISTER FOR HIS EFFORTS TO SECURE GLOBAL PEACE AND A REDUCTION OF TENSIONS AND WISHED HIM WELL ON HIS FUTURE ENDEAVORS.  
END TEXT. DAM  
BT

~~SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Peter  
COBB  
F. J. Conway*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

9032  
Add On

~~INFORMATION~~

December 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

RCM HAS SEEN

FROM:

TY COBB *TC*

**NOTED**

SUBJECT:

Ambassador Robinson Visit

Our Ambassador to Canada, Paul Robinson, stopped by this morning to pass on a few comments on the PM's visit:

-- Trudeau was extremely pleased with the meeting with the President and came away with a much greater feeling regarding the President's commitment to arms control and to the reduction of E-W tensions;

-- The PM will probably not stand in next year's elections; the Conservatives under Brian Mulroney have an excellent shot. Ironically, they could be hurt by too close an identification with the US (the Canadian elections may occur at the same time as do ours). Robinson will push to get Mulroney a Presidential meeting soon (we agree; this was part of the assumptions underlying our agreement to bring Trudeau in early).

-- Acid Rain is the major issue between the US and Canada. Very important that Ruckelshaus get some sort of agreement soon.

-- Defense trends in Canada are depressing, but should turn upwards next year no matter who wins election.

-- Amb Robinson wanted to see you; schedule too tight. Will see Judge Clark today -- I think he has his sights set on a position at the Pentagon (Navy). He indicated he would like to have a "working" visit with you in February.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS FOO-094#1621

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 7/6/06

EAGLEBURGER-CANADA

Ty Cobb

WASHINGTON (AP) -- THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAS REFUSED TO COMMENT ON A REPORTED REMARK BY LAWRENCE EAGLEBURGER, ITS THIRD-RANKING OFFICIAL, THAT LIKENED CANADIAN PRIME MINISTER PIERRE TRUDEAU'S CURRENT PEACE EFFORTS TO THE MARIJUANA-PROMPTED ACTIONS OF AN ERRATIC LEFTIST.

"WE HAVE NO COMMENT ON THE STATEMENT PURPORTED TO HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE UNDERSECRETARY OF STATE AT AN OFF-THE-RECORD MEETING," THE DEPARTMENT SAID IN A STATEMENT WEDNESDAY.

THE U.S. EMBASSY IN OTTAWA, HOWEVER, ISSUED A BRIEF STATEMENT SAYING AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR TRUDEAU'S PEACE INITIATIVE IS WELL KNOWN.

IN OTTAWA, CANADIAN EXTERNAL AFFAIRS MINISTER ALLAN MACEACHEN SAID IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS THAT "I WOULD WANT TO HEAR THAT FROM MR. EAGLEBURGER HIMSELF BEFORE I'D PROTEST."

THERE WAS NO IMMEDIATE COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO CALLS TO EAGLEBURGER'S OFFICE.

THE CANADIAN PRESS REPORTED THE INCIDENT, SAYING IT CONFIRMED THAT EAGLEBURGER, THE UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DELIVERED WHAT SOME SOURCES DESCRIBED AS AN INSULT TO TRUDEAU AT A PRIVATE DINNER THREE WEEKS AGO. AT THE TIME, IT WAS REPORTED AS A COMMENT BY A SENIOR OFFICIAL IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION.

THE REPORT BY CANADIAN PRESS WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT CARL MOLLINS SAID EAGLEBURGER'S COMMENTS, MADE DURING AN OFF-THE-RECORD QUESTION SESSION AT A PRIVATE DINNER, SUGGESTED TRUDEAU WAS BEHAVING AS IF HE WERE HIGH ON MARIJUANA IF HE BELIEVED ANYONE WOULD TAKE HIS PEACE INITIATIVE SERIOUSLY.

THE IMPLICATION THAT TRUDEAU WAS A LEFTIST CAME IN RESPONSE TO A FOLLOW-UP QUESTION, CANADIAN PRESS QUOTED SOURCES WHO WERE PRESENT AS SAYING. THE REPORT QUOTED ONE PERSON PRESENT AS SAYING EAGLEBURGER THEN APPEARED TO TRY TO SOFTEN THE REMARK, SAYING THAT, PERHAPS, EVEN CONSERVATIVES CAN BEHAVE LIKE POT-SMOKERS.

MACEACHEN SAID HE SAT NEXT TO EAGLEBURGER AT ANOTHER WASHINGTON LUNCH MEETING LAST THURSDAY BETWEEN TOP U.S. AND CANADIAN OFFICIALS AND "I WOULD BE SURPRISED IF HE MADE SUCH A COMMENT."

CANADIAN PRESS SAID CONFIRMATION OF EAGLEBURGER'S REMARK CAME PRIVATELY AND INDEPENDENTLY FROM PEOPLE WHO HEARD IT AT A CLOSED DISCUSSION FOR SOME 100 GOVERNMENT, ACADEMIC AND NEWS MEDIA FOREIGN-AFFAIRS SPECIALISTS. IT WAS ONE OF A SERIES OF MEETINGS ORGANIZED BY THE CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE.

AFTER CONFERRING WITH TRUDEAU LAST WEEK, PRESIDENT REAGAN SAID, "WE FULLY SHARE THE CONCERNS FOR PEACE WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER HAS EXPRESSED." REAGAN WISHED TRUDEAU "GODSPEED" IN HIS EFFORTS.

AP-WX-12-22-83 1120EST