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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Ermath, Fritz: Files European and Soviet Affairs Direc. **Archivist:** dlb

**File Folder:** [State Dept. Revised Briefing Book -- Shevardnadze Visit- **Date:** 11/17/94  
September 1987] ~~(3 of 3) Box 92191~~ *RAC Box 2*

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. briefing ppr	Soviet International Economic Initiatives, 2 p.	9/2/87	P1
2. briefing ppr	Trade Legislation of concern to Soviets, 1 p.	9/2/87	P1
3. briefing ppr	Fisheries, 1 p.	9/2/87	P1
4. briefing ppr	Textiles, 1 p.	9/2/87	P1
5. briefing ppr	Resolution of US-USSR Deep Seabed Mine Site Conflicts, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
6. briefing ppr	U.S. Commercial Use of Soviet Satellite Launchers, 1 p.	9/10/87	P1
7. chart	Soviet Military Deliveries, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
8. Bio	2 p.	9/8/87	P1
9. Bio	1 p.	9/8/87	P1
10. Bio	2 p.	9/9/87	P1
11. Bio	1 p.	9/9/87	P1
12. Bio	1 p.	9/8/87	P1
13. Bio	1 p.	9/9/87	P1
14. Bio	1 p.	9/9/87	P1
<del>15. Bio</del>	<del>1 p.</del>	<del>9/9/87</del>	<del>P1</del>
16. Bio	2 p.	9/10/87	P1
17. Bio	1 p.	12/4/86	P1
18. Bio	1 p.	9/8/87	P1

**RESTRICTION CODES**

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].



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## BRIEFING PAPER

US-SOVIET TRADE

9/2/87

- o Never more than 1% of total US trade, has consistently produced US surplus averaging \$1.9 billion recently, but fell to \$700 million in 1986 with drop in grain purchases and increased Soviet domestic economic problems.
- o US exports declined 46% in 1986: significant declines in sales of grain, manufactured goods, crude materials.
- o US imports -- 0.2% of all US imports and 2.8% of Soviet exports to industrialized West -- increased 44% in 1986.
- o Obstacles remain to significant expansion in trade:
  - Soviet hard currency shortage, manufactured goods' low quality;
  - Congressional activity with distinctly anti-Soviet slant, including proposed additional restrictions on bank credits and ban on imports of goods allegedly made by forced labor, failure to drop ban on Soviet fur skins; per Jackson-Vanik, US tariffs on Soviet goods remain high.
  - US export controls on high technology goods.
- o Soviets' bottom line: trade is a two-way street -- lack of possibilities for Soviet exports will "sharply reduce" prospects for purchase of US exports.

TOP 10 US EXPORTS  
TO THE USSR

TOP 10 US IMPORTS  
FROM THE USSR

Jan.-Oct., 1986, in \$ millions

Soybeans	313 (27%)	Gold Bullion	154 (29%)
Corn	281 (24%)	Ammonia	82 (15%)
Fertilizers	222 (19%)	Heavy Fuel Oils	76 (14%)
Press. Sens. Tape	42	Urea	66 (12%)
RR Tractors	38	Palladium	19
Almonds	38	Rhodium	17
Insul/Trans. Oils	16	Aluminum Waste	16
Tallow	15	Ortho-xylene	12
Car/Dsl/Mar. Fuel	15	Vodka	11
Petroleum Coke	14	Sable skins (unf)	9
Total Above	994 (86%)	Total Above	462 (87%)
Total Exports	1,156	Total Imports	530

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Ermath (3 of 3)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

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September 2, 1987

GRAIN TRADE

I. BACKGROUND

- o Now in 4th year (October 1-September 31) of 5-year Long Term Grain Agreement (LTA). In 2nd and 3rd years Soviets failed to honor their commitment on wheat purchases. This year, after receiving an Export Enhancement Program (EEP) subsidy for wheat, they met wheat and corn commitments and probably will meet overall minimum purchase commitment.
- o Wheat price will remain an issue in 5th year of the LTA. USG position was that LTA requires minimum purchases regardless of price. How to handle EEP will be troublesome when/if we decide to extend or renegotiate current LTA when it expires in October 1988.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o The Soviets aim to guarantee foreign grain supplies at minimum cost while trying to improve their own agriculture to the point where import needs become minimal.
- o With the decrease in oil prices in recent years (oil has been the USSR's main hard currency-earning export), the Soviets are carefully allocating their hard currency resources and shopping for good deals.
- o In a buyers market, they are playing off various grain exporting countries against each other to obtain low prices. Soviets repeatedly tell USG officials and grain industry people they see the U.S. as an unreliable source (following the grain embargo); argue that without EEP U.S. wheat prices are not competitive and that they intend to make the U.S. only a residual source of supply. Soviets trying to link purchases of U.S. grain to U.S. willingness to buy Soviet exports.

III. U.S. VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o The U.S. goal is twofold: To hold the Soviets to honoring their commitments under the LTA, and to promote maximum U.S. grain exports.

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ECONOMIC DATA SHEET

(Revised 7/10/88)


ECONOMIC DATA CHART -- USSR

	<u>1982</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u>	<u>1985</u>	<u>1986*</u>
<b>1. ECONOMIC INDICATORS:</b>					
1a. Population (mid-year, million)	270.0	272.5	275.0	277.5	280.1
1b. Gross National Product (billion 1986 \$)	2,106	2,177	2,208	2,232	2,326
1c. GNP Per Capita (1986 \$)	7,800	7,990	8,030	8,040	8,300
1d. Real GNP (% change based on ruble value)	2.5	3.4	1.4	1.1	4.2
1e. Investment/GNP ratio (% , 1982 rubles)	30	30	30	30	31
1f. Defense/GNP ratio (% , 1982 rubles)	15	15	15	15	15
<b>2. AGRICULTURE (July - June Marketing Year)</b>					
2a. Grain Harvest (million metric tons)	187	192	173	192	210
2b. Grain Imports (mmt)	34	32	56	30	31
2c. Grain Imports from US (mmt)	6	14	19	7	5
<b>3. ENERGY</b>					
3a. Oil Production (million bbls/day)	12.25	12.33	12.22	11.90	12.30
3b. Oil Exports (mbd)	3.39	3.67	3.67	3.37	3.70
3c. Oil Exports to Non-Communist C. (mbd)	1.56	1.81	1.81	1.53	1.75
3d. Natural Gas Production (mil. cu. met./d)	1,372	1,468	1,604	1,762	1,880
3e. Natural Gas Exports (mcm/d)	166	176	188	208	214
3f. Natural Gas Exports to W. Eur. (mcm/d)	76	78	88	95	99
<b>4. FOREIGN TRADE AND BALANCE OF PAYMENTS</b>					
4a. Total Exports (million \$)	87,168	91,652	91,491	86,470	97,047
4b. Exports to US (million \$)	214	446	376	388	444
4c. Total Imports (million \$)	77,847	80,445	80,353	82,620	88,875
4d. Imports from US (million \$)	2,882	2,119	3,480	2,829	1,627
4e. Hard Currency Exports (mil \$, ex. arms)	26,447	26,418	26,038	21,941	18,882
4f. Hard Currency Imports (mil \$, ex. arms)	27,501	27,707	27,409	25,653	22,988
4g. Trade Balance (mil \$, excluding arms)	-1,054	-1,289	-1,371	-3,712	-4,106
4h. Current Account Balance (million \$)	4,333	4,663	4,484	81	983
<b>5. EXTERNAL HARD CURRENCY DEBT</b>					
5a. Gross Debt (billion \$)	20.0	20.5	20.2	28.2	36.7
5b. Net Debt (billion \$)	10.0	10.9	10.4	14.9	21.7
5c. Debt-Service Ratio (%)	16	17	18	22	25

\* Estimated

CHARTS AND GRAPHS


# USSR: Hard Currency Imports and Exports, 1970-86



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
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# USSR: Planned and Actual GNP Growth



This graphic is unclassified.

# USSR: Estimated Hard Currency Liabilities and Assets





## MAJOR SOVIET EQUIPMENT DELIVERED TO THE THIRD WORLD 1981-1986

	NEAR EAST and SOUTH ASIA	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	LATIN AMERICAN	EAST ASIA and PACIFIC	TOTAL
Tanks/Self-Propelled Guns	3,720	585	500	660	5,465
Light Armor	6,975	1,050	200	660	8,885
Artillery	3,350	1,825	800	530	6,505
Major Surface Combatants	22	4	4	4	34
Minor Surface Combatants	28	18	39	37	122
Submarines	9	0	1	0	10
Missile Attack Boats	10	8	6	2	26
Supersonic Aircraft	1,060	325	110	210	1,705
Subsonic Aircraft	110	5	0	5	120
Helicopters	635	185	130	75	1,025
Other Combat Aircraft	235	70	50	90	445
Surface-to-Air Missiles	11,300	2,300	1,300	375	15,275

source: SOVIET MILITARY POWER

# EFFECTS OF SUBLIMITS ON U.S. AND SOVIET FORCES

SUBLIMIT: 4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

## CURRENT SOVIET FORCE LEVELS:

<u>ICBMs:</u>	<u>LAUNCHERS</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-11	448	448
SS-13	60	60
SS-17	150	600
SS-18	308	3080
SS-19	360	2160
SS-24	0	0
SS-25	99	99
TOTAL:		<u>6447</u>
<u>SLBMs:</u>		
SS-N-6	272	272
SS-N-8	292	292
SS-N-17	12	12
SS-N 18	224	1568
SS-N-20	80	800
SS-N-23	48	192
TOTAL:		<u>3136</u>

TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS -- 9583

SUBLIMIT: 4800 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS

CURRENT U.S. FORCE LEVELS

<u>ICBMs:</u>	<u>LAUNCHERS</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
TITAN II	4	4
MINUTEMAN II	450	450
MINUTEMAN III	550	1650
PEACEKEEPER	10	100
TOTAL:		<u>2204</u>

<u>SLBMs:</u>		
POSEIDON C-3	256	2560*
POSEIDON C-4	192	1536
TRIDENT C-4	192	<u>1536</u>
TOTAL:		<u>5632</u>

TOTAL BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS -- 7836

\* POSEIDON C-3 ACCOUNTABLE UNDER SALT II AT 14 WARHEADS, BUT DEPLOYED WITH 10. SALT II WARHEAD COUNT = 3584.

SUBLIMIT: 3300 ICBM WARHEADS

ICBMs:

<u>SOVIET</u>	<u>LAUNCHERS</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SS-11	448	448
SS-13	60	60
SS-17	150	600
SS-18	308	3080
SS-19	360	2160
SS-24	0	0
SS-25	99	99
TOTAL		<u>6447</u>

ICBMs:

U.S.

TITAN II	4	4
MINUTEMAN II	450	450
MINUTEMAN III	550	1650
PEACEKEEPER	10	100
TOTAL		<u>2204</u>

SUBLIMIT: 1650 HEAVY/HIGHLY FRACTIONED ICBM WARHEADS

	<u>LAUNCHERS</u>	<u>WARHEADS</u>
SOVIET SS-18	308	3080
U.S. PEACEKEEPER	10	100

# US/USSR COMPARISON OF PRESENCE IN HOST COUNTRIES

	Soviet Presence <u>in US</u>	American Presence <u>in USSR</u>
<u>BILATERAL:</u>		
Embassy	219 *	190 *
Consulate General	25 *	26 *
Subtotal:	<u>244</u>	<u>216</u>
Journalists	38 **	39 **
Commercial	60	23
Subtotal:	<u>98</u>	<u>62</u>
<u>Total:</u>	<u>342</u>	<u>278</u>
 <u>MULTILATERAL:</u>		
Soviet UN Mission	185 ***	
Belorussian UN Mission	12 ***	
Ukrainian UN Mission	12 ***	
Subtotal:	<u>209</u>	
UN Secretariat	227	
UN Total:	<u>436</u>	
<u>Total presence:</u>	<u>778</u>	<u>278</u>

**Notes:**

All figures are current as of April 1, 1987.

\* Embassies and consulates are currently operating under equal ceilings of 225 and 26 respectively.


\*\* We have insisted on rough equality in the number of journalists assigned to each country.

\*\*\* The Soviet UN Missions are currently staffed at the maximum level permitted. On April 1, 1987, we placed a ceiling of 195 on SMUN and 13 each for the Belorussian and Ukrainian UN Missions.

# Soviet Arms Exports

## Leading Recipients 1985-1986


Recipients




Delivery value in constant '86 US\$

# USSR Economic & Military Aid Non-Communist LDCs: Extensions/Drawings

Billions (US \$)



# Jewish Emigration from the USSR




1987 figures for Jan 1 - Mar 31



# USSR Trade



## Industrial Non-Communist Countries



# Ballistic Missile Warhead Sublimits

4800 Ballistic Missile Warheads

3300 ICBM Warheads



Warheads on Heavy/Highly  
Fractionated ICBMs

# USSR Economic Growth

## Planned and Actual

