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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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2. briefing ppr	Pakistan's Nuclear Program, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
3. briefing ppr	Political Dissent in the Soviet Union, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
4. briefing ppr	Human Rights Representation Lists, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
5. briefing ppr	Soviet Jewry and Emigration, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
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17. briefing ppr	Transportation Agreement, 1 p.	n.d.	P1
18. briefing ppr	Agricultural Cooperation Agreement, 1 p.	n.d.	P1

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HUMAN RIGHTS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

BRIEFING PAPER

OVERVIEW - SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS

- o Several significant developments in human rights during the past several months. Much more remains to be done, however.
- o Appears to have been a loss of momentum in last few months: emigration has leveled off, prisoner releases petered out, only one new divided-spouse case resolved.
- o Since February, over 150 political prisoners released. Religious prisoners underrepresented, however. Believed to be thousands more political prisoners.
- o Amnesty in honor of 70th anniversary of the revolution will for the first time include those convicted of political crimes. As yet, we can confirm no specific names.
- o Political dissidents continue to be confined to psychiatric hospitals. We have talked with the Soviets about reciprocal visits to psychiatric hospitals, handled on U.S. side by American Psychiatric Association. Soviets want to deal in context of bilateral health agreement. We contend this is not a health issue.
- o In a few instances, limited political expression permitted. In March, refuseniks allowed to demonstrate in Moscow. Tatars' demonstration in July initially tolerated and meeting with Soviet officials arranged, but Tatar leaders finally expelled from Moscow. Dissident publication Glasnost allowed to be published, although editor harassed and journal forced to remain unofficial.
- o Jewish emigration has leveled off at about 800 per month, compared with 914 during all of 1986. Below levels in the seventies, however, which averaged over 2,000 per month.
- o Those leaving mostly pre-1987 refuseniks. Reports of others being turned away. Concern over what will happen when pool of old refuseniks exhausted. Also concern over requirement that applicants have a close relative abroad, use of "knowledge of state secrets" to deny exit, and necessity to have permission of family members.
- o Soviet German emigration now at over 1,000 per month, comparable to averages in the seventies. Armenian emigration around 300 in June and in July, compared with 247 for year of 1986. (Armenian figures for seventies varied extremely widely; reached peak of 14,000 in 1980.)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. REPRESSION OF DISSENT BUILT INTO SOVIET SYSTEM

- o Gorbachev inherited a highly repressive domestic policy toward political dissenters. Most of the repression remains in force.

II. LIMITED LIBERALIZATION TAKING PLACE

- o Some significant changes have taken place. All have clearly defined limits, however, and none challenges the supremacy of the Communist Party or its internal leadership:
 - Some tolerance of demonstrations, including those by environmental activists, Jewish refuseniks and Latvian, Tatar and Russian nationalists. Several such protests, however, were broken up by force.
 - Release of more than 150 political prisoners. The releases have slowed to a trickle, however, and many of those released have been harassed as they attempted to re-enter society.
 - Announced review of Criminal Code provisions on political dissent. Although an amnesty for the first time covered those convicted of some political offenses, few changes in the Criminal Code have been officially proposed or enacted.
 - Tolerance of political dissent journal "Glasnost", published by former political prisoners. Journal organizers were not prevented from disseminating the unofficial journal, but the work has been attacked in the official press and the editor harassed.
 - Reduction in the number of arrests and convictions of political dissidents.
- o As curbs on expression have eased, some of the opinions aired, such as those of the Russian nationalist, anti-Semitic group "Pamyat", are disturbing to observers within and without the USSR.

III. LIMITS ON LIBERALIZATION DIVIDES DISSIDENTS

- o Some dissidents advocate support of Gorbachev's efforts. Others insist that the fundamentally repressive nature of the system must yet be changed .
- o Soviet leaders debate how to handle political dissent, but they seem to agree that tolerance of dissent ends where criticism of the Communist Party begins.

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BRIEFING PAPER

HUMAN RIGHTS REPRESENTATION LISTS

I. DIVIDED SPOUSES/BLOCKED MARRIAGES

- o Currently 11 cases on rep list. Few new cases arising, but we are very concerned at lack of progress on existing cases.
- o Only one resolution of a rep list spouse case has been announced in 1987, although some spouses arrived in the U.S. in January and February whose cases had been announced as resolved in late 1986.
- o Many cases of very long standing; average over 7 years. Michelson has not seen his family for 30 years.
- o As in other Soviet human rights cases, "knowledge of state secrets" used in an illogical and arbitrary manner to deny exit permission.
- o New "blocked marriage" rep list created in November 1986 to emphasize our interest in this problem. One case has since been resolved; 4 remain.
- o May be changes in Soviet procedures on binational marriage: Soviets have claimed separate trips will no longer be required to register for marriage and for the wedding ceremony. Although only one visa needed, may be more difficult to get.

II. DIVIDED FAMILIES

- o At least one-fourth of the approximately 125 families on the list as of January 1 received exit permission.
- o As of September 1, divided families list stands at 100. (However, we expect the list to increase by up to 50 percent before the Shevardnadze meeting, as we bring it up to date.)
- o 13 "problem cases" still remain unresolved -- cases which were among the 95 which the Soviets promised in 1986 to resolve.

III. DUAL NATIONALS

- o Since the beginning of 1987, 4 of 21 cases have been resolved. In addition, dual national Vytautas Skuodis, imprisoned for his activities on behalf of Lithuania but freed in February, is expected to arrive in the U.S. this month.
- o Soviet Embassy told Armand Hammer in May that the Stolar dual national case was resolved; has been no progress, however.
- o We have raised with Soviets fact that dual nationals should not have to present invitations from close relatives abroad -- which many lack -- when they apply for exit permission.

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SOVIET JEWRY AND EMIGRATION

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I. EMIGRATION

- o Larger numbers of exit permits began to be issued in January 1987. In April, emigration figures leveled off at around 800 per month.
- o As of August 31, 4,699 Soviet Jews had emigrated, compared with 914 for 1986. However, is far less than levels in the seventies, which averaged over 2,000 per month.
- o Most of those leaving are pre-1987 refuseniks. Unclear what will happen when this pool of "old refuseniks" is exhausted.
- o Reports of new applicants being turned away, either because they do not have invitations from close relatives abroad required by regulations which came into effect January 1, or for no good reason.
- o Concern that once 11,000 Soviet Jews have departed -- a widely-used estimate of the number of refuseniks -- Soviets will declare that no other Jews wish to leave.
- o "Knowledge of state secrets" continues to be used to deny exit permission, even in some cases in which it had not previously been a factor.

II. OTHER SOVIET JEWRY ISSUES

- o 19 Jewish cultural activists arrested between 1984 and 1986. All have now finished sentences or been released early except Aleksey Magarik, scheduled for release in September.
- o Morris Abram and other American Jewish leaders told by Soviets this spring there would be improvements in Jewish religious life in the Soviet Union -- more synagogues, etc. So far no noticeable improvement.
- o Jewish leaders also told Soviets would not object to establishment of "direct channel" for Soviet Jews to Israel via Romania. Small number of volunteers have recently flown this route. We do not know when route might go into large-scale operation, or whether it will be mandatory.
- o Are reports that Soviets might permit "direct flights" of Jewish emigrants to Israel via Romania. Appears that those who land in Israel would be ineligible for U.S. refugee status.
- o Rising concern over unofficial Soviet organization "Pamyat." Promotes conservation and historical preservation, but is Russian nationalist and virulently anti-Semitic. May have protectors in high places, but has also been criticized in official press, including criticism of its anti-Semitism.

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BRIEFING PAPER

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September 2, 1987

FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION (FFOI)

I. BACKGROUND

- o In Reykjavik, Gorbachev and Yakovlev raised possibility of "trading" end to Soviet jamming of VOA in exchange for access to US medium wave stations. President agreed to "look into matter"; Wick denies agreeing to "trade", turned discussion to broad range of FFOI issues.
- o Wick and Yakovlev have exchanged letters, met in Moscow in June. Wick proposed formal talks on full range of FFOI issues. Yakovlev responded individual Soviet ministries would respond to Wick's specific proposals, but to date only GOSKINO (film industry) has done so.
- o May 23, Soviets ceased jamming most VOA broadcasts, but continue jamming some VOA languages as well as RFE/RL.
- o At same time, they began broadcasting from transmitter in Cuba on the AM band, interfering with some US domestic stations.
- o We have made demarches both to Soviets and Cubans on the harmful interference, and taken matter to International Telecommunication Union (ITU). Soviet response has been that it is a US-Cuban issue.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets seek to expand further their already considerable access to our public, with minimum reciprocity on their part.
- o As part of PR campaign, hope to portray USSR as increasingly open while maximizing propaganda benefits from real or alleged USG restrictions on access to our public.

III. US VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o US will not "trade" for an end Soviet jamming of foreign broadcasts; it must end because it is illegal.
- o We seek to broaden our discussions with the Soviets to cover the full range of FFOI issues, emphasizing substantial imbalance in our current access to the Soviet public compared to Soviet access to ours.
- o US does not object in principle to Soviet broadcasts here from Cuba. Broadcasts that interfere with existing US domestic stations, however, contravene the ITU Convention and Radio Regulations and are counter to aim of improved communication between our peoples.

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RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION

- o Soviet constitution speaks of right to "conduct religious worship or atheist propaganda." This formula makes illegal religious "propaganda," i.e., engaging in public discussion.
- o Religious education outside the home is forbidden. Religious groups are required by law to register with the state, a mechanism to limit and control them.
- o Council for Religious Affairs, headed by Konstantin Kharchev, closely supervises religious groups, approving personnel and censoring publications and sermons.
- o Believers subject to discrimination in employment and education, and especially harsh sentences for any crime.
- o Has been estimated that at least one-third of all political prisoners are religious activists. Religious dissidents underrepresented in releases of political prisoners this year. Estimated that between 150 and 300 believers still in prison.
- o Russian Orthodox Church, a large and state-dominated church which absorbed the Ukrainian Catholic Church in 1946, organizing Moscow-based celebration of the 1988 Millenium of Christianity in Kievan Rus'. Soviets hope to use occasion to demonstrate supposed freedom of religion.
- o Appears to be an increasing interest in religion -- particularly among the young -- among Christians, Moslems, and Jews. Some religious groups in the Soviet Union:
 - Ukrainian Catholic (Uniate). Refused absorption. Perhaps as many as 3-4 million. Unregistered and heavily persecuted. Identified with Ukrainian national aspirations.
 - Roman Catholic Church of Lithuania. Registered. Represents majority of population of Lithuania. Many church activists also identified with Lithuanian nationalist movement.
 - Jews. Officially considered a nationality. 1.8 million listed; are probably more who do not identify themselves as Jews because of anti-Semitism.
 - Islam. Number unknown, but easily in the several millions, especially in Central Asia. Number of "unofficial" mullans growing, since not enough of others to serve population.
 - Unregistered Protestants. Heavily persecuted. Include Reform Baptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Unregistered Pentecostals (30,000 of whom are believed to have applied to emigrate,) and Jehovah's Witnesses.
 - Hare Krishna. One adherent says there are 10,000, of whom 200 are active. Especially heavily persecuted.

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MOSCOW HUMAN RIGHTS CONFERENCE

I. SOVIET PROPOSAL

- o Shevardnadze proposed Moscow conference on humanitarian cooperation at November 1986 opening of Vienna CSCE Meeting. Soviets see conference as providing Western endorsement of glasnost.
- o Fuzzy agenda on cooperation between CSCE states on human rights, human contacts, cultural exchanges -- equates civil and political rights with economic and social ones; makes unilateral respect for rights a function of bilateral relations.
- o Unspecific assertion that CSCE precedents of access and openness (for NGOs, press, individuals) will apply.

II. WESTERN RESPONSE

- o Meeting cannot substitute for real progress.
- o U.S. most explicit about necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for Moscow as a CSCE site: exemplary record of performance; credible guarantees of access and openness (e.g., visas for human rights activists, attendance of Helsinki Monitors, visitor contact with Soviet citizens, VOA and RFE/RL accreditation).

III. PROSPECTS

- o Serves Western interests to remain noncommittal and to keep pressing; some EC Allies willing to soften stance; France wants to host own human rights meeting.
- o Doubtful that Soviets can meet both criteria; reject U.S. questions on access/openness as ultimatum.
- o Best counter is West's proposal for phased post-Vienna activities on human rights/human contacts issues:
 - mechanisms for improving compliance (answer private inquiries, consult bilaterally on problems, attend snap CSCE meetings on unresolved issues);
 - preparatory meeting of experts to evaluate progress;
 - conference to elaborate new steps.
- o West has not specified date or venue for preparatory meeting or conference.

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US-SOVIET
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