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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** ERMATH, FRITZ: FILES

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CAS 3/19/2009

**File Folder** [STATE DEPARTMENT REVISED BRIEFING BOOK - SHEVARDNADZE VISIT - SEPTEMBER 1987](2)

**FOIA**

M08-125/5

**Box Number** RAC BOX 2

CHARLES

171

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67344	BRIEFING PAPER	RE CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1
67345	BRIEFING PAPER	RE VERIFICATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1
67346	BRIEFING PAPER	RE VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING <i>R 12/9/2005 NLRRM03-1472 #17</i>	1	ND	B1
67347	BRIEFING PAPER	RE CDE IMPLEMENTATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67348	BRIEFING PAPER	RE THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67349	BRIEFING PAPER	RE REGIONAL DIALOGUE <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1
67350	BRIEFING PAPER	RE AFGHANISTAN <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67351	BRIEFING PAPER	RE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS <b>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</b>	1	ND	B1
67352	BRIEFING PAPER	RE IRAN/IRAQ AND THE GULF WAR <b>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</b>	3	ND	B1
67353	BRIEFING PAPER	RE SOUTHERN AFRICA <b>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</b>	1	ND	B1
67354	BRIEFING PAPER	RE CENTRAL AMERICA <b>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</b>	1	ND	B1
67355	BRIEFING PAPER	FACT SHEET RE EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC <b>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</b>	4	ND	B1

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CONVENTIONAL STABILITY IN EUROPE

I. BACKGROUND

- o With increased prospect of nuclear cuts, West needs credible conventional arms control forum; MBFR exhausted.
- o NATO and WTO publicly committed to renewed efforts in conventional arms control, including reductions in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.
- o NATO tabled July 10 its CSCE military-security proposal for two distinct negotiations: 1) more CSBM work by all 35 CSCE members within CSCE, and 2) force-level (stability) talks among only the 23 NATO and WTO nations that would be associated with the CSCE process but not directed by it.
- o Warsaw Pact has proposed single CSCE subordinate conference on CSBMs and reductions involving all 35 CSCE states.
- o NATO tabled draft stability mandate July 27 in separate East/West mandate discussions, which resume September 28; Ambassador-designate Stephen Ledogar, U.S. Rep to MBFR and stability talks, consulted in Moscow September 3-4.

II. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Soviets seek to include tactical nuclear weapons and NNA in new talks and all Turkey, Iceland, and other Atlantic islands in zone; also want to discuss "military doctrine."
- o Soviets deny conventional superiority; propose equal NATO/WTO reductions of 100,000-150,000 troops within two years, followed by further cuts in ground and tactical air forces to 25% below current levels by 1990's.
- o Soviets admit to some unspecified military disparities; would redress by asymmetric cuts to lower level.

III. US VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o Main threat to stability in Europe is substantial Eastern conventional superiority stemming from 30 Soviet ground force divisions forward-deployed in Eastern Europe and capacity to rapidly deploy up to 30 more from western USSR.
- o We seek: more openness in military activities; verifiable agreement on stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels; exclusion of nuclear systems and naval forces; elimination of destabilizing disparities and Warsaw Pact capability for surprise attack and sustained offensive operations.

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IV. MBFR

- o MBFR negotiations stalemated despite West's December 1985 proposal which dropped requirement for pre-reductions data agreement and adopted basic Eastern framework, e.g., initial troop reductions (5,000 U.S., 11,500 USSR) within one year, followed by 3-year no-increase commitment. Western proposal also called for on-site inspection, information exchange and permanent exit/entry points.
- o East's February 1986 draft agreement repeated earlier proposals and did not respond to Western proposal. Even apparent Eastern acceptance of elements of Western approach is misleading: 1) Eastern acceptance of entry/exit points does not cover Soviet semi-annual troop rotations; 2) Eastern information proposal calls for gross national figures for ground and air personnel, which are useless for verification; 3) Eastern OSI provision gives inspected party right to refuse.
- o We continue pressing East in MBFR for constructive response to NATO's December 1985 proposal. However, new stability talks will likely replace MBFR.





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VERIFICATION

I. CURRENT STATUS OF NEGOTIATIONS

- o General: Soviets have accepted some types of on-site inspection (OSI) in several fora -- CDE, NST (INF and START), CD (CW and Outer Space). Soviets now trying to seize the initiative 1) to convince Western publics they are as serious about verification as we are; and 2) to force us to reject intrusive Soviet verification proposals.
- o INF:
  - U.S. tabled draft Treaty with extensive verification provisions, data exchange MOU and protocol on elimination of systems. IG is reviewing new double global zero (DGZ) treaty text. USDel has outlined simplified verification under DGZ. Tabling of inspection protocol held up pending U.S.-basing country agreement on exchange of notes between Basing Countries and USSR ensuring Allied sovereignty is protected.
  - Soviets tabled INF documents which agree with some portions of U.S. drafts, e.g., initial data exchange, OSI, including inspections in declared deployment areas and support facilities, and of destruction and dismantlement processes. Soviets are opposed to US position that there should be no suspect-site inspections in 3rd countries.
- o START: US tabled a draft treaty with extensive verification provisions that closely parallel INF missile counting provisions in 0/100 proposal. Soviet draft treaty incorporates OSI (but fails to mention OSI of suspect sites) and cooperative measures.
- o D&S: The new Soviet draft agreement contains verification provisions only for their proposed list of devices to be prohibited from being put into space.
- o Nuclear Testing: U.S. and USSR discussing joint US/USSR experiments at test sites of both sides to improve verification of TTBT/PNET. Soviets recently went public with Soviet position; indicated they could accept any verification system including CORTEX and exchange of nuclear test explosions on each other's territory. Soviet Academy and NRDC signed a new seismic monitoring agreement.
- o CW: Shevardnadze August 6 speech indicated acceptance of mandatory challenge inspection without right of refusal of any facility or location, irrespective of form of ownership; stated intention to go beyond US position (Article X, US draft treaty) by allowing all treaty signatories right of direct challenge inspection.

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- o CDE: At CDE, Soviets for the first time accepted mandatory air and ground inspection of military exercises on Soviet territory. US carried out the first such inspection (Aug 28-30); expect Soviets to request inspection of a US exercise in the FRG.
- o MBFR: Soviets stonewalled Western 1985 offer, including verification provisions, e.g., OSI, exit-entry points and information exchange.

## II. US VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o INF: Trying to table new US DGZ treaty text and inspection protocol as soon as possible; pushing Soviets to do the same.
- o START: Many of the verification tasks still unclear because of gaps in the US position. Most significant gap is whether to propose a numerical limit on non-deployed ballistic missiles (would require extensive and intrusive verification measures). No U.S. decisions yet on ALCM and ballistic missile RV counting rules, ALCM definition or treatment of SLCMs. If mobile ICBMs are ultimately permitted, additional verification demands will have to be addressed.
- o D&S: USG concerned about verification of provisions of the current US proposal, and US ability to monitor ABM Treaty compliance during non-withdrawal period.
- o Nuclear Testing: Resolution of US TTBT/PNET verification concerns must be first step in testing negotiations. Talks stalled due to impasse over joint statement.
- o CW: There are verification difficulties which USG may not be able to solve. US negotiating in deliberate manner while attempting to develop adequate provisions and ensure continuation of US modernization program.

## III. SOVIET VIEWS AND OBJECTIVES

- o INF: Soviets want to see our DGZ treaty language. We expect they will table their DGZ language and Inspection Protocol after they have seen ours. In the meantime, rather than reject suspect site inspection, the Soviets are insisting on the right to inspect any U.S. military base or manufacturing plant, public or private, in the world.
- o D&S: Soviet position calls for pre-launch inspection of certain payloads. In CD, Soviets have proposed international inspectors to monitor payloads before launching, thereby monitoring a ban on space weapons. Shevardnadze (Aug. 6, at CD) proposed "a permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all space launch sites" and he stated that, in the context of a space weapon ban, the Soviets "would be willing to extend inspections to storage facilities, industrial plants, laboratories, testing centers, etc."





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VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

I. BACKGROUND

- o Vienna is third follow-up meeting to Helsinki Final Act. Opened November 1986.
- o Recessed July 31 with East and West nowhere near agreement; real negotiation likely to begin after meeting resumes September 22.
- o Progress depends on Soviet human rights movement; NATO tabled military security proposal July 10 calling for negotiations with all 35 CSCE states on confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) and for autonomous conventional forces talks with the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact states.

II. SOVIET OBJECTIVES

- o Enlarge security component of CSCE through disarmament negotiations involving all 35.
- o Deflect criticism for human rights abuses by showcasing limited steps, alleging Western human rights violations (racism, unemployment, homelessness), and hosting a post-Vienna meeting on humanitarian issues.
- o Improve economic performance and access to Western technology through CSCE cooperation.

III. U.S. OBJECTIVES

- o Keep focus on Eastern failures to honor commitments on human rights and human contacts; note progress; insist on much more; press for procedural and legal changes to institutionalize progress.
- o Stress Western conditions of exemplary performance, access and openness when Soviets raise possibility of a Moscow meeting.
- o Build on Stockholm result with follow-on negotiations among the 35 on CSBMs; assure that conventional forces negotiations among the 23 retain substantive and procedural autonomy "within the CSCE framework."
- o Protect free market principles and Western security while exploring possibilities for greater East-West economic interaction in CSCE.

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CDE IMPLEMENTATION

- o NATO, Warsaw Pact and NNA states are generally making an honest effort to implement Stockholm confidence and security building measures (CSBMs) which include:
  - prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops, or 300 tanks);
  - exchange of annual calendars of notifiable activities;
  - mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops;
  - on-site inspection as means of verification.
- o However, some procedural and interpretative problems experienced by all in start-up; NATO now has procedures to foster common Alliance approach.

I. NOTIFICATION:

- o Soviets have notified 18 activities, including 2 in the new part of the CDE zone of application. The East has taken a narrow interpretation of ambiguous areas in the Document, but no clear instances of non-compliance. We have approached the USSR, Poland and Bulgaria on these issues.
- o The U.S. has notified all 5 of its activities for 1987.

II. OBSERVATION:

- o The USSR, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Poland have hosted observers. Eastern activities largely set pieces, possibly organized to demonstrate compliance; little real training observed; difficult to assess actual scope of exercises.
- o U.S. forces will conduct extensive observation programs for the "Autumn Forge" series of exercises this month.

III. INSPECTION:

- o U.S. conducted first on-site inspection of a Soviet exercise near Minsk August 28-30. Soviets complied fully in granting inspectors' rights and privileges.
- o We can expect Soviets will want to conduct their own inspection on NATO, possibly in the FRG this month.

IV. NEXT STEPS

- o We have forwarded for Allied consideration at NATO a package of CSBMs proposals for a resumed CDE. U.S. package emphasizes openness and transparency of military activities.
- o We expect Eastern proposals to seek to expand the zone westward, capture U.S./NATO independent air and naval activities, tactical nuclear weapons, and impose constraints on NATO exercises.

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67348  
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THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN

I. THE PRESIDENT'S JUNE 12 PROPOSALS DELIVERED IN BERLIN

- o The four allies should work to expand air access to and from Berlin.
- o Berlin should serve as the venue for more international meetings.
- o Youth exchange between East and West Berlin should be fostered.
- o Both parts of Berlin should host the Olympic Games at some point in the future.

II. THE CURRENT STATE OF PLAY

- o No interagency agreement exists as yet on taking formal action to pursue negotiations with the Soviets on these points.
- o The three Western Allies and the FRG are informally discussing in Bonn what the parameters might be of possible negotiations with the Soviets on the President's proposals and other steps to improve the situation in Berlin.
- o In conversations with Allied officials in Berlin, the Soviets have taken note of the President's remarks and indicated they are waiting for concrete proposals.

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REGIONAL DIALOGUE

PRESIDENT'S OCTOBER 1985 INITIATIVE

- President's UNGA initiative of October, 1985, outlines framework for constructive U.S.-Soviet engagement on Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, Ethiopia and Cambodia:
  - 1) Negotiations among warring parties to end violence, withdrawal of foreign forces and national reconciliation;
  - 2) Once first step underway, U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks to support the process, arrange superpower disengagement;
  - 3) Economic reintergration, aid.

SOVIET ACTIVITIES

- Soviets sharply criticize the "Reagan Doctrine" and American "neoglobalism", and clearly worry about strategic implications of U.S. challenge to weak Soviet clients.
- Have never formally responded to President's initiative; over time, however, they have tried to adopt, at least rhetorically, some of the concepts -- e.g. national reconciliation. They also now emphasize the importance of regional affairs in East-West relations.
- Gorbachev attempting to reorient Soviet regional diplomacy to larger, more "legitimate" states, emphasizing normal state-to-state relations, improved political, economic ties.
- Soviets very active diplomatically -- Afghanistan, Middle East peace process, Iran-Iraq War, overtures to PRC and other Asian states. But no slackening of Soviet determination to undermine U.S. influence wherever possible or to hold onto their gains of the 1970s.

REGIONAL DIALOGUE

- Soviets now appear to see experts meetings as important part of US-Soviet dialogue, occasionally take initiative in proposing talks.
- 1987 cycle of regional meetings almost complete: Armacost-Vorontsov in March; Middle East and southern Africa in July; East Asia/Pacific and Afghanistan in September; Soviets owe dates for Central America/Caribbean.

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Fact Sheet: Regional Dialogue

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AFGHANISTAN

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I. PROSPECTS FOR SETTLEMENT

- o Efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement in Afghanistan appear to be at an important stage:
  - The resistance is in a particularly strong military position and its successes seem to be having an impact in Moscow.
  - The Soviet Union is at least grappling with the key political issues, namely a withdrawal timetable and national reconciliation, but its intentions remain unclear.
- o KEY POINT: Bottom line for US, GOP, and resistance remains that Moscow must commit itself to a short withdrawal timetable and permit the Afghan people to decide their own political future.

II. SOVIET POLICY

- o The Soviets still appear to be seeking a way to leave behind a secure, pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. They may decide not to compromise further as long as there is a chance that US aid to Pakistan will be cut off over nuclear issues.
- o In private discussions, however, the Soviets have hinted that they could agree to the PDPA playing a minority role; Cordovez believes that Moscow may be willing to agree to this.
- o In the meantime, the Soviets are assessing the effect of the recent broadening of Najib's reconciliation offer and the DRA's continuing efforts to improve its image on international public opinion, as reflected in possible erosion of this year's UNGA vote on Afghanistan.
- o Moscow continues efforts to intimidate Pakistan by generating domestic political tensions through stepped-up terrorist bombings against civilian targets.
  - Frequency of cross-border attacks has diminished in recent months.

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### III. UN NEGOTIATIONS

- o Geneva talks will resume September 7; final issue to be resolved is timeframe for Soviet troop withdrawal. At last session in March, Kabul offered an 18-month timeframe and Pakistan countered with 7 months; no further sessions are scheduled.

-- UN negotiator Cordovez foresees no further progress absent agreement among the parties on national reconciliation.

- o The upcoming Geneva round will show whether Moscow is prepared to come down on a withdrawal timetable. Vorontsov told Kampelman in July that he personally favored a one-year timetable.

### IV. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION

- o Pakistanis, and Cordovez, favor a role for ex-king Zahir in a post-withdrawal interim government; Gorbachev has also hinted at a Zahir role.
- o Resistance leadership remains divided over a formula for national reconciliation, particularly on what role, if any, Zahir Shah should play. Although GOP has intensified its dialogue with the resistance leaders and urged them to forge a unified position, no quick solution is likely.





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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- o The exchanges in Geneva July 6-7 between Ambassadors Murphy and Polyakov were businesslike and useful, although no definite understandings were reached.
- o While Soviets engaged in serious exchanges on most aspects of a conference and negotiations, major differences remain to be resolved:
  - Nature of Palestinian representation: U.S. and regional parties agree to a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation acceptable to all parties; Soviets supported separate PLO representation but indicated they might agree if the PLO accepted another formula.
  - Role of the International Conference: U.S. and regional parties regard as essential that the conference cannot impose solutions or veto agreements reached by parties in bilateral negotiations; Soviets did not disagree but argued that conference must be "authoritative", without defining the term.
  - Land for Peace/Palestinian rights: Soviets pressed for agreement in advance on meaning of UNSC resolution 242 and legitimate rights of the Palestinians; U.S. stressed that meaning of 242/Palestinian rights are what negotiations are all about and cannot be interpreted in advance.
  - Preparatory conference: U.S. stressed that a prepcom was problematic because it would deal with the same issues as the conference itself; however, we will consider suggestion that Soviets work with the PLO and Syria while we work with Jordan, Egypt and Israel.
  - Soviet-Israeli relations: Soviet consular delegation in Israel but, as a practical matter, the USSR must further improve relations with Israel if Israel is to accept a role for them.
- o KEY POINT: We remain cautious in our approach to an international conference, and with the firm view that its purpose must be to lead promptly to direct, bilateral negotiations; if Soviets want to participate in the process, they must demonstrate through their actions that they can play a positive role.

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67352

Iran/Iraq and the Gulf War

BACKGROUND:

- o American interests in the Persian Gulf are readily defined:
  - We have a vital economic stake in seeing that the region's supply of oil to the Free World continues unimpeded.
  - We have a strategic interest in denying the Soviet Union either direct control or increased influence over the region or any of its states.
  - We have major political interests in the non-belligerent Gulf states, both in their own right and because of their influence within the Gulf and beyond.

INTERESTS ARE THREATENED BY IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- o Stability of Gulf Arabs threatened:
  - Iran instigated July riots in Mecca and has called for overthrow of King Fahd
  - Since last fall, Iran targeted oil tankers to Kuwait for attack and has been behind acts of sabotage, internal subversion in Kuwait
  - Iran has questioned legitimacy of all Gulf Arab rulers
- o Silkworms at Strait of Hormuz could sharply disrupt oil traffic. Iranian attacks against Kuwaiti tankers, if expanded, could have potentially affected flow of oil.
- o Iran stopped/searched Soviet arms carrier last fall: this led to introduction of Soviet naval presence in Gulf for first time. The Soviets were prepared to protect all Kuwaiti oil tankers had U.S. declined.

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UNSC RESOLUTION

- o Primarily at our instigation, on July 20 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to approve a mandatory cease-fire/withdrawal resolution. We are now consulting with other members of the Security Council on the need for enforcement measures against whichever party refuses to abide by the cease-fire call.
  - Iraq agreed to accept the resolution, on the grounds that Iran do so too. Iran has promised a formal, authoritative response, but it is still unclear what this response will be. Secretary General is ready to press mediation efforts if both sides are willing to talk with him.
  - Frustrated with Iranian equivocation on the resolution and feeling that the moratorium of Gulf attacks worked to Iran's advantage, Iraq resumed attacks in the Gulf on August 29.
  - We deplore the resumption of attacks, which will inevitably lead to a re-escalation of tensions, but feel we must continue working through the UNSC to bring Iran to the negotiating table.
- o The U.S. also supports initiatives by the Arab League, the Non-Aligned Movement, and Organization of the Islamic Conference.

OPERATION STAUNCH

- o We actively pursue our Operation Staunch efforts. This complicates, delays, and makes Iranian arms procurement more expensive.
- o Progress at the UNSC adds credibility to Operation Staunch. We hope we will be able to internationalize our effort through enforcement measures associated with the UN cease-fire resolution. Thus, the mandatory UNSC resolution, backed by enforcement measures, discussions which were held at Venice, and Staunch are intimately connected and reinforcing.



THE U.S. PROTECTIVE REGIME

- o Iranian public reaction to our escort plans for reflagged Kuwaiti oil tankers has been shrill and -- on the surface -- threatening. Iranians have announced special maneuvers -- the "Martyrdom exercises" -- beginning 4 August.
- We have informed the Iranians that our actions are not meant to be detrimental to Iran, or provocative -- but that we will defend our interests.
- Risk of Iranian reaction remains. The reflagged tanker "Bridgeton" was damaged by a mine on July 24. Terrorist attacks against U.S. -- and friendly Gulf Arab states like Kuwait -- also possible. Iran has very tricky games to play -- wants to influence U.S. public opinion to cause withdrawal of U.S. navy forces from Gulf, while not stimulating heavy U.S. military strike against Iran.

U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS

- o We have clearly communicated our policy on the U.S. protective regime to the Iranian government.
- We have publicly stated that we do not intend being provocative; however, we are making it clear as well that we will defend American-flag vessels and our general interests in the region.
- Because of the country's location, size and strength, Iranian actions have a direct impact on our strategic, political and economic goals in the Gulf. We have a stake in eventual better relations with Iran, but our interests are directly threatened by the Iranian government's pursuit of its bellicose policies and its support for terrorism and subversion.
- Iran has blamed U.S. for rioting and deaths in Mecca, and Iranian Government is trying to whip up anti-U.S. feeling. Attacks on Kuwaiti and Saudi embassies (identified as serving U.S. interests) in Tehran have complicated issue.



67353

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

SOUTHERN AFRICA

I. SOUTH AFRICA

- o Prospects are remote for beginning of negotiations between SAG and black opposition in near term. State of Emergency has controlled black unrest and white voters gave SAG a new mandate in the May 6 elections.
- o U.S. continues to challenge all South African parties to move away from violence and toward negotiations that are the only hope for peaceful, fundamental change in South Africa.
- o Adamishin said little on South Africa in July 2 consultations with Crocker. Soviets acknowledge SAG strength/determination and do not anticipate early change in South Africa's fundamental political equation.

II. ANGOLA/NAMIBIA

- o Angolans were stung by our criticism of their failure to table new proposal on CTW during July 14-15 negotiations in Luanda.
- o Following Dos Santos visit to Havana, Angolans gave us a new proposal on August 6. Proposal contains some positive aspects (e.g. reduction of proposed withdrawal of some 20,000 Cubans from three years to two years), as well as some new negative elements (e.g. suggestion of Cuban participation in the Angola/Namibia negotiations).
- o We have proposed to the Angolans another round of negotiations to clarify their proposal. Angolans have said they will soon propose date and venue for next round.
- o In July 2 discussions, Adamishin claimed that Angola/Namibia negotiations were at an impasse and proposed an unspecified new international mechanism for the negotiations. Crocker responded that we did not see need for a new mechanism, especially in light of resumption of serious U.S.-Angolan contacts.

III. Zimbabwe

- o In July 2 consultations with Adamishin, Crocker underlined risks of escalation and unpredictable consequences for East/West relations of possible Soviet sale of MIG aircraft to Zimbabwe.
- o Adamishin claimed that Soviet offer was legitimate response to Zimbabwean requests for assistance in deterring South African attacks.

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67354

CENTRAL AMERICA

I. REGIONAL

- o President Reagan and Speaker Wright unveiled a bipartisan plan for peace in Nicaragua on August 5.
- o The five Central American presidents signed a regional peace agreement on August 7 in Guatemala City.
  - Agreement calls for simultaneous implementation at 90 days (52 days after Shevardnadze meeting) of democratization, amnesty, cease-fire, cessation of aid to irregular forces (e.g., Nicaraguan Resistance), and non-use of territory to attack other states.
- o On August 15 the Sandinistas broke up two peaceful demonstrations with force, incarcerating two opposition leaders.
- o The Central American foreign ministers met in San Salvador August 19-20, met with the Contadora/Support Groups foreign ministers and OAS/UN SYG representatives in Caracas August 22, and will meet again in Managua September 17-19.
- o The Sandinistas have announced the membership of their National Reconciliation Commission, stacked in their favor but including Cardinal Obando Y Bravo.
- o The Sandinistas appear determined to adhere to the letter of the agreement while ducking its fundamental commitment to democracy.

II. SOVIET INFLUENCE IN CENTRAL AMERICA

- o The Soviets, capitalizing on the emergence of democratic governments in the region, are seeking to expand their diplomatic and economic ties in the region.
  - They have emphasized orthodox diplomatic means in dealing with most of the region's governments.
- o If a Reagan-Gorbachev summit is held in the fall, Gorbachev may visit Latin America following the meeting; Cuba, Mexico, and possibly Argentina are likely countries to be visited.
- o Soviet 1986 military deliveries to Nicaragua reached a record high; the pace of deliveries has accelerated in 1987. The USSR maintains about 200 military, intelligence, and security advisors in Nicaragua.
- o The Soviets have expressed support for the Guatemala Agreement while attacking us for supporting the Resistance; they have indicated a willingness to reassess their military aid to Nicaragua.

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FACT SHEET: EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

I. OVERALL

- o Soviet's East Asian policy remains based on military power, but Gorbachev actively pursuing improved political, economic ties, including security proposals such as restrictions on naval operations, South Pacific nuclear-free zone.
- o Sigur-Rogachev talks scheduled for September 10-11 in Moscow.

II. CHINA

- o Chinese leaders maintain emphasis on economic reforms and continuation of "open door" policy. Only time will tell whether these policies endure.
- o China still rules out fundamental improvement in Sino-Soviet political relations, but there has been considerable movement in other areas: economic ties, scientific and technical contacts, and increased Sino-Soviet political dialogue.
- o After nine-year hiatus, Sino-Soviet border talks resumed in February. The atmosphere at both rounds was positive, but contentious issues remain on the agenda. A second round was held in August.
- o Hu Yaobang's forced resignation unlikely to lead to a reassessment of Beijing's Soviet policy. Beijing does not see its strategic interests parallel with Moscow's.

III. JAPAN

- o Japan's Soviet policy follows closely U.S. lead.
- o GOJ supports SDI and U.S. arms controls initiatives including INF.
- o Northern Territories remain major bilateral issue with no resolution likely.
- o Gorbachev visit, tentatively planned for January, 1987, put off. Could be rescheduled, but sides disagree on how Northern Territories, other contentious issues would have to be handled.

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IV. NORTH KOREA

- o Tilt toward Soviet Union continues, but recent signs of inching back toward China -- Kim's May visit to Beijing, reaffirmation of support for China's Cambodia policy, etc.
- o On August 28, North Korea called for a bilateral vice-ministers meeting in Panmunjom as a prelude to the South's earlier proposal for a meeting of both sides' Foreign Ministers at the UNGA.
- o The North continues to seek USG attendance at these meetings.
- o On September 8, Seoul reiterated publicly that a foreign ministers meeting must be strictly bilateral.
- o U.S. fully supports high level, open agenda North-South talks and hopes a mutually acceptable forum can be found.
- o Even though Olympic boycott by Soviet client states unlikely, desirable for all nations -- including DPRK -- to attend.
- o ROKG has agreed to DPRK hosting of some athletic events (3 full events, 2 partial events).
- o In a positive move, DPRK recently modified its earlier insistence on hosting 8 full events; instead North Korea now would be satisfied with hosting 5 full events and 1 partial event. However, DPRK still pressing for joint hosting of symbolic events -- opening and closing ceremonies -- and for joint host logo.

V. SOUTH KOREA

- o Koreans want democracy to match vibrant economy. On August 31, political parties agreed on constitutional revisions.
- o Labor unrest continues. Settlements reached on major strikes (Hyundai and Daewoo Shipyards). First half 1987 GNP growth over 15%. Momentum carrying economy through disruptions so far.
- o Anyone -- violence prone student radicals or military men too ready to confuse dissent with subversion -- who stands in the way of political progress will earn popular enmity.



VI. VIETNAM

- o Soviet installations at Cam Ranh are strategically significant, permit projection of power in South China Sea, support for naval forces in transit.
- o Soviets have provided \$7 billion in economic aid since 1978, \$5 billion in arms aid from 1978-1985; Soviets pledged to double aid at 6th Party Congress.
- o Soviets assert support for Cambodian settlement, but are unwilling to use the influence provided by their aid to pressure Hanoi to negotiate seriously.
- o U.S. places highest priority on resolution of POW/MIA issue; nevertheless, Vessey visit represents no change in policy on normalization of foreign aid.

VII. CAMBODIA

- o Peace possible only when Hanoi agrees to withdraw troops and to enter serious negotiations.
- o U.S. fully supports ASEAN efforts to achieve Cambodian settlement, including economic/diplomatic isolation of Vietnam to force withdrawal and serious negotiation.
- o ASEAN Foreign Ministers welcomed Mochtar "cocktail party," provided Vietnam joins immediately after Cambodians begin meeting. Vietnam rejected proposal.
- o SRV diplomatic offensive may be aimed at undercutting support for ASEAN UNGA resolution; we are working with ASEAN to ensure SRV occupation remains UNGA focus.
- o Moscow active diplomatically on Cambodia: endorsed Phnom Penh's reconciliation plan; supports SRV efforts to project more flexible image on Cambodia.
- o US opposes Khmer Rouge return to power in Cambodia and supports safeguards to prevent this from happening, including internationally-supervised elections.



VIII. PHILIPPINES

- o The U.S. Government supports the Aquino government:
- o --Many accomplishments of her government: restoration of democracy, economic growth of 5%,
- o --recent coup attempt shows problems remain but government is working to resolve civil-military tensions.
- o Insurgent activity on the upswing following poor showing by leftist candidates in Congressional elections and proliferation of anti-communist citizen defense groups in the provinces.
- o While willing to accept foreign assistance, Communist insurgents do not now appear to be receiving Soviet military aid.

IX. PACIFIC ISLANDS/MICRONESIA

- o Economically weak mini-states present targets of opportunity for Soviets and Libyans. Moscow's efforts to buy into region with fisheries agreements have had only limited success, and islanders remain suspicious of Soviets. Libyans have had limited success in Vanuatu, i.e. established diplomatic relations in July 1987.
- o New status for Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Northern Marianas implemented; Palau Compact will be implemented when domestic process completed.
- o We have satisfied all obligations under Trust, and believe it terminated; Soviets claim only UNSC has jurisdiction and may seek opportunity to assert veto over Trust termination.