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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** ERMATH, FRITZ: FILES

**Withdrawer**

CAS 3/19/2009

**File Folder** [STATE DEPARTMENT REVISED BRIEFING BOOK - SHEVARDNADZE VISIT - SEPTEMBER 1987] (1)

**FOIA**

M08-125/5

**Box Number** RAC BOX 2

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71

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
67331	BRIEFING PAPER	RE NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67332	BRIEFING PAPER	RE START <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67333	BRIEFING PAPER	RE INF <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67334	BRIEFING PAPER	RE DEFENSE AND SPACE <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67335	BRIEFING PAPER	FACT SHEET: NUCLEAR TESTING <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	2	ND	B1
67336	BRIEFING PAPER	RE COMPLIANCE ISSUES <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67337	BRIEFING PAPER	RE ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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67338	BRIEFING PAPER	RE NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67339	BRIEFING PAPER	RE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67341	BRIEFING PAPER	FACT SHEET: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) TREATY <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1
67343	BRIEFING PAPER	FACT SHEET: CW PROLIFERATION <i>R 6/10/2010 M125/5</i>	1	ND	B1

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REVISED BACKGROUND BOOK  
FOR THE  
VISIT OF SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER SHEVARDNADZE

September 15-17, 1987  
Washington

MR. CARLUCCI

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TABLE OF CONTENTS  
Visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze  
September 15-17, 1987  
Washington

SCHEDULE

FACT SHEETS

A. ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

1. Nuclear And Space Talks (NST)
2. Nuclear Testing
3. Compliance Issues
4. ABM Treaty Interpretation
5. Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers
6. Nuclear Non-Proliferation
7. Chemical Weapons (CW) Treaty
8. CW Proliferation
9. Conventional Stability In Europe
10. Verification
11. Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting
12. CDE Implementation
13. The President's Initiative On Berlin

B. REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Middle East Peace Process
4. Iran/Iraq And The Gulf War
5. Southern Africa
6. Central America
7. East Asia And The Pacific
8. Terrorism
9. Pakistan's Nuclear Program

C. HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview - Soviet Human Rights
2. Political Dissent In The Soviet Union
3. Human Rights Representation Lists
4. Soviet Jewry And Emigration
5. Free Flow Of Information (FFOI)
6. Religion In The Soviet Union
7. Moscow Human Rights Conference

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D. US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

1. Embassy Moscow Security
2. Embassy Living/Working Conditions
3. Kiev Consulate
4. SMUN Reductions/Secondment Of Soviet Nationals To The UN Secretariat
5. Exchanges
6. US-USSR Cooperation In Energy
7. US-USSR Cooperation In Basic Sciences
8. Transportation Agreement
9. Agricultural Cooperation Agreement
10. US-USSR Cooperation In Fusion
11. Coast Guard Issues
12. US-Soviet Maritime Boundary
13. Maritime Agreement
14. Lawsuits/Bonds Claims
15. Narcotics
16. AIDS Disinformation

E. SOVIET DOMESTIC ISSUES

1. Soviet Internal Developments

F. US-SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. Soviet Economic Performance
2. Domestic Economic Reforms
3. Soviet International Economic Initiatives
4. US-Soviet Trade
5. Grain Trade
6. Fisheries
7. Textiles
8. Resolution Of US-USSR Deep Seabed Mining Site Conflicts
9. US Commercial Use of Soviet Satellite Launchers

ECONOMIC DATA SHEET

CHARTS AND GRAPHS

BIOGRAPHIC MATERIAL

SCHEDULE

September 11, 1987

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE

SHEVARDNADZE VISIT: SEPTEMBER 15-17, 1987

DAY ONE: TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 15

- 0800 Ambassador Ridgway meets Shevardnadze at C Street and escorts him up to your office.
- 0800-1100 Private Meeting in your office (photo op)
- Possible brief plenary meeting of core delegations in the Madison Room following one-on-one meeting (timing depends on length of one-on-one). Until then, core delegations will wait in the Monroe Room.
- 1115-1200 Secretary's Pre-Brief for the President in the Oval Office
- 1200-1205 Brief Meeting between Shevardnadze and the President in the Oval Office for photo op
- 1205-1220 White House Signing Ceremony for the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center Agreement; Brief Remarks by the President (press coverage)
- 1220-1255 Shevardnadze Meeting with the President in the Cabinet Room
- 1255-1300 Possible one-on-one in the Oval Office
- 1300-1400 Lunch at the White House in the State Dining Room
- 1410-1430 Secretary's Press Briefing in the White House Press Room
- 1500/1530\*-1730 First Plenary in the Madison Room (photo op)
- 1745-1815 Secretary's Speech to Public Diplomacy group in the Loy Henderson Room
- 1835-2130 U.S.-hosted dinner on CNO's barge (with spouses) (press photo at dockside)

\*Ministers to decide.



DAY TWO: WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 16

0900 Ambassador Ridgway meets Shevardnadze at C Street and escorts to the Madison Room.

0900-1100 Second Plenary Meeting in the Madison Room (photo op)

1100 President arrives at the Department to address Public Diplomacy Group in the Loy Henderson Room. You will meet him, introduce him, remain with him throughout his remarks and escort him out.

1115-1130 President's remarks

1130 President departs State Department

1230-1400 Lunch at Soviet Embassy (with spouses) (photo op)

1500-1730 Third Plenary Meeting in the Madison Room

1930 U.S.-hosted dinner in the Jefferson Room (with spouses) (press coverage of receiving line/toasts at the beginning of the meal)

DAY THREE: THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 17

0930 Ambassador Ridgway meets Shevardnadze at C Street and escorts him to the Madison Room

0930-1200 Final plenary in the Madison Room (possible one-on-one) (photo op)

1200-1210 Brief remarks to the Press by you and Shevardnadze in the C Street lobby

1210 You escort Shevardnadze to his car

1210-1230 Short break while press assembles in the Press Briefing Room

1230-1300 Press conference in the Press Briefing Room

FACT SHEETS





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DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
BRIEFING PAPER

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS (NST)

SUMMARY

- o Round VIII began April 23 in INF, May 5 in START and D&S -- negotiations will continue uninterrupted; possible break to be discussed either during or after Ministerial.
- o Draft START Treaty tabled by U.S., May 8; Soviets, July 31. Soviets also tabled draft Defense & Space agreement, July 29.
- o Soviets accepted global double zero, July 23; U.S. agreed to forego conversion, July 28.
- o Shevardnadze urged Kampelman, August 7, to prepare "options" for discussion at September Ministerial on FRG Pershings, Defense & Space (permitted/prohibited activities).
- o Also acknowledged need to reach START agreement by March 1988, but tried to blame U.S. for lack of progress.
- o Bessmertnykh reiterated Soviet concerns about U.S. "backward steps" on Backfire, ALCM definition during 8/27 meeting with EUR DAS Simons in Moscow.

INF

- o Aside from schedule of reductions and continued Soviet insistence on elimination of U.S. warheads on FRG Pershings, remaining differences mostly involve verification. Soviet "suspect site" inspection provision broader than ours, encompassing any U.S. military base or manufacturing plant, public or private, anywhere in the world.

START

- o Long-standing differences unchanged by Soviet draft Treaty -- mobiles, sublimits, SLCMs, throw-weight, linkage to D&S.
- o Soviets questioning U.S. positions on ALCM definition and Backfire; lack of U.S. positions on counting rules, SLCMs.

DEFENSE & SPACE

- o Soviet draft agreement restated their position, including "narrower than narrow" interpretation. Provides first details of proposed list of prohibited space devices, definition for permitted research activities.
- o U.S. continues to call for nonwithdrawal for the purpose of deploying operational strategic defenses through 1994, followed by right to deploy unless otherwise agreed. Data exchange, Open Laboratories, and observation of strategic defense tests proposed to provide desired predictability.

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START

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SOVIET vs. U.S. DRAFT TREATY

- o Soviet draft tabled July 31. Structure similar to U.S. May 8 draft, facilitating work in Geneva on joint bracketed text; but Soviets unresponsive to U.S. questions about their draft text.
- o Includes Reykjavik understanding -- bomber weapon counting rule and 6000 warheads/1600 SNDVs; sides differ on SNDV definition.
- o Offers little or no movement on most key issues -- mobiles, sublimits, throw-weight, SLCMs, linkage to D&S agreement.
- o Permits mobiles (U.S. - ban on stability/verification grounds.)
- o On sublimits, includes 50% cut of heavy ICBM launchers to 154; beyond this, each side free to determine structure of remaining forces. (U.S.- 4800 ballistic missile warheads; up to 3300 on ICBMs and 1650 on heavy/highly-fractionated ICBMs.)
- o Makes no reference to reductions in throw-weight, nor any obligation not to increase throw-weight after reductions. (U.S.- limit on throw-weight at 50% of current Soviet level.)
- o Includes earlier Soviet proposal to limit each side to 400 SLCMs on two types of submarines, none on surface ships; verification of SLCMs based on functional observable differences and OSI. (U.S.- no proposals tabled at Geneva; at Reykjavik, we suggested possibility of unilateral statements on SLCM program plans.)
- o START agreement linked to reaching agreement in D&S. If a side develops/deploys ABM defenses beyond those permitted under ABM Treaty, START agreement would automatically terminate. (U.S.- non-withdrawal from ABM Treaty linked to START reductions)
- o Extends limits on non-deployed systems beyond ICBMs/SLBMs (U.S. position) to launchers, ALCMs and heavy bombers.
- o Proposes cooperative verification; some OSI (not suspect sites).
- o Bans "new kinds" of strategic weapons (other than ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, cruise missiles); allows new types, modernization. (U.S.- permits new types, "new kinds" and modernization.)
- o Provides for follow-on negotiations on further reductions (U.S.- no explicit commitment).

SOVIETS MAY RAISE

- o Post-Reykjavik "obstacles" introduced by U.S.:
  - five-year period of reductions, extended to seven years.
  - U.S. backing away from SALT-era 600 km. ALCM range threshold.
  - "reintroduction" of Backfire bomber into START.
- o Absence from U.S. draft text of RV and ALCM counting rules.

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67333

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES (INF)

I. GENEVA ROUND VIII

- o INF Round VIII began April 23, no end date scheduled.
- o Soviets have accepted double global zero -- LRINF and SRINF. Kohl's decision not to modernize FRG Pershing Ias if INF agreement is implemented has removed last Soviet pretext for delay.
  - Soviets continue to insist that U.S. warheads for FRG Pershings must be "destroyed" not just "eliminated".
  - U.S. will not include FRG Pershings, or warheads for them, in bilateral treaty; we refuse to negotiate on established pattern of cooperation with ally.
- o Both sides still need to table complete treaty language for double global zero. Despite progress, much remains to be done on verification, as well as phasing of reductions.

II. PHASING

- o Soviets propose five year regime, rendering missiles inoperable within first year by removing warheads.
- o U.S. wants three-year drawdown, with systems remaining operable; finds Soviet approach unverifiable.

III. VERIFICATION

- o Although both sides have tabled Memorandum of Understanding on Data and Protocol on Elimination, Soviet approach is reactive -- not offering details until they see ours. They will probably want to examine our on-site inspection protocol (not yet tabled) before tabling their own.
- o Soviets appear to accept on-site inspection of baseline data and elimination. Rather than reject suspect-site inspection outright, they propose that criteria be developed for inspecting any U.S. military base or manufacturing plant, public or private, in the world.
- o U.S. has recently detailed simplified verification regime under double global zero -- including forgoing tagging (any INF missile or launcher would be illegal), eliminating encryption ban and perimeter-portal monitoring if there are flight-test and production bans, and limiting suspect-site inspection to certain number of years in certain categories of facilities in US and USSR.

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67334

DEFENSE AND SPACE

I. D&S Round Eight

- o Round VIII began on May 5; no date set for conclusion.
- o Our latest proposal, including commitment not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty through 1994, remains on table.
- o Little new substantively from Soviets. On July 29, they tabled a draft agreement reflecting their continuing effort to impose constraints on SDI beyond those in ABM Treaty.

II. U.S. Position

- o Commitment through 1994 not to withdraw from ABM Treaty in order to deploy operational systems other than those permitted by Treaty (contingent on 50% START reductions); research, development and testing, which are permitted by ABM Treaty, may continue.
- o Right to deploy advanced strategic defenses after 1994 without reference to ABM Treaty, unless otherwise agreed.
- o "Predictability package" including programmatic data exchange, Open Labs, and reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.
- o We oppose restrictions on development and testing beyond those in ABM Treaty; no constraints on research.

III. Soviet Position

- o Draft agreement limits research to laboratories (inside/outside) on Earth and prohibits putting the following "devices" into space: missiles, mass accelerators, lasers, particle beam generators, energy-relay devices, SHF (super high frequency) generators, and ABM targetting components. Technical criteria to be agreed upon.
- o If either party "proceeds with practical development of an ABM system" (including testing mobile ABM systems or components), all bets off in START.
- o Soviets still apparently seeking to impose constraints on SDI far beyond those in the ABM Treaty; cripple SDI.
- o Also still apparently refuse to agree on offensive force reductions unless U.S. accepts these additional constraints on SDI.

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FACT SHEET: NUCLEAR TESTING

I. BACKGROUND

- o Gorbachev has pushed testing halt since 1985. In June 1987, called for immediate interim agreement on one kiloton threshold and 2-3 test per year quota.
- o Soviets observed testing moratorium from August 6, 1985 to February 26, 1987.
- o Since end of moratorium, Soviets have conducted 15 tests, U.S. 12.
- o Soviets seem to recognize early CTB not in the cards; but have not agreed to defer CTB to the long term.
- o Sides agreed in principle at Reykjavik to open testing negotiations. Differences on sequential approach, conditions for start of negotiations, characterization of negotiations have prevented agreement on an agenda.
- o Last testing experts meeting July 13-20 in Geneva focused on technical issues. Soviets gave comprehensive explanation of their Joint Verification Experiments (JVEs) proposal, U.S. elicited details.
- o Since Moscow ministerial, Adelman has held discussions with Soviet Embassy (Sokolov) to develop a joint statement on a negotiating agenda. Several drafts exchanged but on September 4 Soviets broke off discussions, citing U.S. unwillingness to compromise.
- o In Congress, there is a threat that testing limitations such as 1 KT threshold may be attached to spending bills; TTBT/PNET ratification remains stalled.
- o Soviets and private Natural Resources Defense Council renewed their verification agreement in June; will now focus on 1 KT test ban; Americans will no longer man sites in USSR.
- o June 9 Soviets launched multilateral test ban initiative in Geneva CD calling for multilateral CTB negotiations, international seismic treaty monitoring.

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II. US POSITION

- o US wants step-by-step approach beginning with TTBT/PNET improvements and ratification. President has publicly committed US to follow-on talks on further limits, in parallel with weapons cuts. Effectively verifiable CTB is ultimate goal in parallel with elimination of nuclear weapons, improved verification, balance in conventional forces, enhanced CBMs.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Soviets claim US will pocket TTBT/PNET agreement, stall on further movement. They press for simultaneous negotiations in which all issues including CTB would be addressed, claim US sequential approach could be partially implemented in this framework. Have not accepted linkage between testing limits, arms reductions.



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67336

COMPLIANCE ISSUES

I. ABM Treaty Review

- o Review of the treaty must be held during the year following the 15th anniversary of treaty signing (Oct 87 - Sept 88).
- o US has told Soviets that the review should be held; date and venue to be determined later through diplomatic channels.

II. President's Noncompliance Report

- o 1986 Report to Congress on Soviet Non-compliance almost identical to last two reports, except that it does not address any SALT issues. Findings were as follows:
  - Krasnoyarsk: The LPAR under construction in Siberia is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty provisions concerning the siting, orientation and capability of such radars.
  - ABM component mobility: A potential violation involving development of prohibited mobile ABM radars.
  - Concurrent testing of air defense and ABM components: A probable violation.
  - SAM Upgrade: Insufficient evidence to assess compliance with ban on giving non-ABM components (e.g., SA-12 system) capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles.
  - Rapid reload of ABM launchers: Soviet actions present an "ambiguous situation" and are cause for serious concern.
  - ABM Territorial Defense: All the above, along with construction of new LPARs, suggest that the USSR may be preparing a prohibited nation-wide ABM defense.
  - Report reaffirmed findings of Soviet violations of the Biological/Toxin Weapons Convention; Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons; Limited Test Ban Treaty (recent venting of radioactive materials); and Helsinki Final Act. Numerous Soviet nuclear tests also were likely violations of yield limits in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

III. Standing Consultative Commission (SCC)

- o The US-USSR Standing Consultative Commission met in Geneva March 18 - April 27. US component raised our compliance concerns (see above); no movement from Soviet side. Soviets charged U.S. with violations relating to SDI and U.S. BMEWS modernization. Next SCC session begins September 16.

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ABM TREATY INTERPRETATION

67337

I. Background

- o SDI program is compliant with narrow interpretation. In 1985, after analysis of Treaty text and negotiating record, USG concluded "broad" interpretation fully justified but, as a matter of policy, President decided not to restructure SDI program at that time.
- o Legal analyses of the negotiating record and ratification proceedings have been released. Subsequent practices study will soon be submitted to Senate. Studies conclude that broad interpretation is fully justified.
- o President will study legal analyses, programmatic and cost implications of restructuring, and consult with Congress, Allies before deciding whether to restructure SDI program.

II. US Position

- o Treaty poses no limitations on performance of ABM-related research, regardless of where such research takes place.
- o It poses no limitations on activities up to field testing of a prototype of an ABM component (defined in Article II).
- o For OPP systems and components regardless of basing mode, the Treaty bans deployment, but not development and testing.
- o Soviet-proposed constraints on SDI would amend the Treaty; are more restrictive than the "narrow" interpretation.
- o US decision to deploy strategic defenses would be subject of consultations with our Allies and negotiations with Soviets, as envisioned under ABM Treaty, or as specified in new treaty.

III. Soviet Position

- o Soviets contend SDI is inconsistent with Article I of ABM Treaty ("base for territorial defense") and Article V (ban on development/testing of mobile ABM systems/components).
- o Soviets claim ABM Treaty must be "strengthened."
- o In D&S, Soviets have proposed:
  - Research on space-based ABM defenses would occur only in "labs" on earth -- at institutes, ABM test ranges, plants. Also seek agreement on list of devices prohibited from being put into space. Soviet proposals do not address other mobile basing modes.
  - Soviets seek definitions of non-treaty terms they claim are relevant to treaty interpretation; US rejects this.

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67338

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

- o Negotiations culminated in "ad ref" agreement, May 4. Same principals throughout: Perle/Linhard - Obukhov.
- o Agreement text approved. Signing planned for Ministerial.
- o Technical issues regarding transfer of U.S.-made equipment and Soviet payment need to be resolved in follow-up talks with Soviets. U.S. experts set to begin discussions on these issues, possibly in connection with DCL ("Hotline") experts meeting in late September/early October.
- o U.S. needs to decide where U.S. NRRC will be located. Issue at White House for decision.
- o Goal for bringing the system into operation is 12 months from signature. Much depends on Soviet cooperation -- U.S. intends to use DCL ("Hotline") software and hardware, Soviets may seek modifications; enhancements.

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION

67339

I. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

- o Ninth round of non-proliferation consultations held in Moscow (July 27-30). Next round planned for November in Washington. Consultations remain constructive.
- o Soviets expressed continued interest in improving IAEA safeguards, strengthening export controls, and pursuing multilateral non-proliferation meetings.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

- o South Africa: Soviets supported G-77 move at June IAEA Board of Governors meeting to recommend suspension of South Africa's membership rights and privileges by the September IAEA General Conference.
- o U.S. strongly supports principle of universality of membership in international organizations. In Moscow, we urged Soviets to rethink their position in light of harm to universality principle and possible effect on safeguards application in South Africa.
- o Pakistan: Pervez case may prompt usual Soviet complaint over U.S. aid program to Pakistan and ineffectiveness of U.S. efforts to stop Pakistan's nuclear weapons program.
- o U.S. aid program increases Pak security and decreases Pakistan's motivation for seeking nuclear capability.
- o India: Soviets reportedly prepared to sell nuclear power reactor to India without requiring India to place its other nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards.
- o In Secretary Shultz's demarche to Dubinin here, in Kennedy's meetings in Moscow, and in Secretary Shultz's letter to Shevardnadze we have strongly opposed sale of Soviet nuclear power reactor to India without full-scope safeguards as an erosion of the NPT.

III. NUCLEAR SAFETY COOPERATION

- o Soviets and U.S. pursue increased nuclear safety cooperation bilaterally and through IAEA. NRC and DOE establishing cooperative safety arrangements with USSR and we encourage Soviet/U.S. industry contacts.

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FACT SHEET: CHEMICAL WEAPONS (CW) TREATY

I. BACKGROUND

- o US/Soviet negotiations began 1977, lapsed 1980; shifted to Conference on Disarmament (CD). US tabled draft treaty April 1984 at CD.
- o Six rounds of intensified US-Soviet bilateral CW treaty discussions on margins of CD since agreed at 1985 Geneva Summit. Next round not yet scheduled.
- o Key remaining bilateral issues: details of verification regime; timing, verification of early bilateral data exchange; monitoring of chemical industry; non-signatory CW possessor states.
- o At April ministerial, agreed to exchange visits to CW destruction facilities. US proposed visit to US site Nov 19-20; Soviets proposed CD visit Oct 3-4 to Shikhany CW site. Soviets announced location of destruction facility at Chapayevsk.
- o U.S. CW modernization proceeding. Presidential certification for binary funding due to Congress October 1. Final assembly due to begin December 1.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o Pursue an effective and verifiable global ban on chemical weapons in a deliberate manner.
- o Prompt mandatory challenge inspection is essential at all relevant facilities.
- o Detailed U.S.-Soviet bilateral data exchange and verification thereof must occur prior to treaty signature.
- o Studying whether to retain and maintain security stockpile.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have announced CW possession, production moratorium, destruction facility construction.
- o Claim to accept challenge inspection with no right of refusal for all facilities (fine print still unknown).
- o Tabled draft MOU on bilateral data exchange in two stages: general data before treaty signature; more detailed data following signature. Verification only after treaty entry into force.
- o Pushing for year-round negotiations, complete most drafting this year--aim to stop US binary production.

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BRIEFING PAPER

67543

FACT SHEET: CW PROLIFERATION

I. BACKGROUND

- o Geneva Summit Joint Statement called for initiation of U.S.-Soviet dialogue on preventing CW proliferation.
- o Meetings in March, September 1986 produced general understanding, including informal list of agreed points, on need for international steps to curb CW proliferation.
- o U.S. in both meetings pressed Soviets on their past use of CW and toxins in Afghanistan and SE Asia.
- o At September 1986 ministerial, agreed that additional bilateral should be held.
- o U.S. proposed third bilateral for October, 1987.

II. U.S. POSITION

- o Pending agreement on a complete ban on CW in Geneva and to complement efforts to achieve that goal, curb the worldwide proliferation of chemical weapons.
- o Seeks in this dialogue to:
  - Strengthen the international norm against CW use and build norm against dangerous spread of CW;
  - Complement U.S. and Allied efforts to ban CW and control CW-related commerce, especially to problem areas;
  - Encourage the Soviets to take concrete steps, including direct political measures with their clients and allies, to stem CW proliferation.
  - Establish continuing dialogue with Soviets to attain above objectives.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have imposed export controls on precursors which will be subject to eventual CW treaty monitoring; GDR has matched Soviet controls.
- o Reluctant to exert influence to stop CW use in Gulf War or dissuade allies (e.g., Syria) from developing CW.

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