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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN C. TUCK

FROM: PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS *WHS*

SUBJECT: Arbatov Information

As requested, attached at Tab A are some of Georgi Arbatov's recent statements on Summit related issues. We hope this will be helpful.

Attachment
Tab A Arbatov information

Arbatov
10 Sept 87

United States & Canada

Reagan Sends Greetings to Book Fair
LD101134 Moscow TASS in English 1121 GMT
10 Sep 87

[quotation marks as received]

[Text] Washington September 10 TASS—U.S. President Ronald Reagan has sent a message of greetings to the Soviet and American book publishers taking part in the 6th international book fair currently under way in Moscow.

The message was read out today by the U.S. ambassador to the USSR, Jack Matlock.

"I am pleased at the opportunities afforded on the occasion of these talks between Soviet and American publishers under the Geneva accords. I know that much planning has been involved for both sides. This is only appropriate, given the importance of books in our world today," the President noted.

"The written word is among the most basic means of human expression, and it has the quality of permanence. The freedom of authors to write and seek publication of their works is essential to modern culture and to historical continuity. Books should be available in rich and abundant variety to everyone, and they should, in their diversity, reflect the full mosaic of the contemporary world, linking the present both to the past and to the future," Reagan's message went on.

"Through the increased exchange of books, the citizens of both our nations might truly come to know each other better. Books are the quiet ambassadors of cultural exchange, and your presence here testifies to our shared belief that they uniquely serve to promote learning and greater self-understanding, as well as mutual understanding. "It is in this spirit that I extend my greetings and best wishes to all of you on this occasion."

Reagan's recent speeches—beginning with his speech to the Town Hall in Los Angeles, addressed at the same time to the Soviet and American delegations at the meeting of the public of the two countries in Chautauqua (New York). These speeches did not introduce any great clarity into the immediate prospects for our two countries' relations, but they did make one think yet again clear about certain long-term and fundamental matters.

Since Reagan's speeches have already been commented on in the Soviet press, there is no need for me to expound their content in detail. I will only recall that they were marked by an anti-Soviet tone of high intensity; of an intensity that, it must be admitted, we have even begun to grow somewhat unaccustomed to recently. On the other hand, even in his state of anti-Soviet fervor President Reagan could not conceal the desire to reach agreement with the USSR about something (in this case, medium-range and operational-tactical missiles), which would make it possible to hold a summit meeting.

There is an amusing paradox here. They are apparently inviting you to visit them, but in terms for which, in olden times, you would have challenged them to a duel, or in a less refined society inflicted "assault and battery" on them. They are apparently assuring you they will continue to be implacably hostile toward you, the devil incarnate, and at the same time they hint: Don't take this "frankness" of ours seriously, we will work toward a treaty and a meeting.

This paradox, these apparent contradictions, provide food for thought, first and foremost about why, for all the depth and firmness of his anti-Soviet convictions, Ronald Reagan so badly needs an American-Soviet summit meeting and some kind of impressive agreement with the Soviet Union.

I will risk putting forward a few ideas on why now, as his Presidency draws to a close, he feels such an acute need for this.

Today, of course, this question makes us think first of all about "Irangate"—the notorious political scandal that did a good deal of damage to the administration's image and undermined the President's personal reputation. But I do not want to say the obvious, especially since it seems to me that Reagan's interest in a meeting and an agreement has other, deeper motives.

In his first years in power he became convinced, in particular, that an open policy of implacable enmity toward the USSR and unbridled militarism would not pass, either within the country or abroad. On the contrary, such a policy, it very soon became clear, could only frighten people and, even worse, evoke resistance in them. It must be said that President Reagan learned his lessons from the experience of growing political protests at that time. Back in 1982 he returned to the negotiating table with the USSR for talks on arms limitation, and gave a pledge (which, unfortunately, he broke 4 years later) to comply with the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).

Arbatov Views Soviet-U.S. Relations
PM101128 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 10 Sep 87
Second Edition p 4

[Academician G. Arbatov article: "The Darkness Before Dawn?"—first edition omits question mark from headline]

[Text] For a long time I have wanted to write about Soviet-American relations, which have indeed entered a complex and highly crucial phase of their development now. But all the time uncertainty stopped me, uncertainty about what is, at the present, a particularly burning issue—the fate of the treaty on medium-range missiles and the summit meeting—which to some degree obscures the more long-term problems and prospects.

I will not say that this uncertainty has been entirely dispelled. But all the same, I have decided not to wait any longer. What made me take up my pen was President

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See Lexis
summary pg 4

Moreover, by all appearances, President Reagan soon became convinced that without talks and some kind of gestures designed to persuade the public of his readiness to reduce armaments, he could not even increase armaments. Certain American observers also draw attention to this internal contradiction in U.S. military policy. Among them is the prominent specialist W. Hyland, editor of the journal *Foreign Affairs* (he formerly held prominent posts in the U.S. Government). In a recently published book, *Deadly Rivals*, he writes: "...To ensure support for a strong defense, which remains the bastion of the anti-Soviet coalition, every administration must look as if it actively seeks peaceful relations with the Soviet Union."

I will not touch on the moral side of this political situation. But it has, unfortunately, become a fact in the United States, talks are often used to step up the arms race and undermine resistance to military preparations (they tell the opposition: The government itself is seeking disarmament, but for the time being, nothing can be signed, it is necessary to arm ourselves). Sometimes they use talks to blackmail the opposition to the arms race—if you do not approve this or that military program, they say, you will be undermining the U.S. position at the conference table. Before Reykjavik, the White House contrived in general to twist Congress' arms, making it renounce any resolutions or amendments that would to some degree moderate military preparations (so as not to "bind the President hand and foot" at the summit meeting). In the United States now, incidentally, they are saying that if an accord is reached on a new summit meeting, the President could repeat that maneuver.

Of course, the possibility cannot be rejected that President Reagan's interest in a Soviet-American summit meeting and an agreement with the USSR can be explained to some degree not in terms of political maneuvers but in terms of more honorable motives. Currently in America, in particular, there is much talk of how R. Reagan would like to go down in history as a great statesman. During his Presidency he has seen that in our day the main indicator of a politician's success, the most important criterion of a political figure's maturity and wisdom is the ability to make a notable contribution to the cause of peace and nuclear arms reduction.

To be frank, I myself had thought that this motive was beginning to play a more significant part in President Reagan's policy and that this would make it possible to be more optimistic in assessing even the immediate prospects for Soviet-American relations. R. Reagan's recent speeches are a major disappointment in this respect.

It is entirely possible that what lies behind them is not only age-old anti-Soviet emotions, but also certain political calculations.

I am not by any means referring only to the President's desire to indulge his critics on the right with his anti-Soviet rhetoric (although the very fact that he reacts so

sensitively to that criticism undermines to some degree the faith that the President will be capable of doing anything significant in the sphere of disarmament and Soviet-American relations). Or only to that widespread human weakness—the reluctance to acknowledge past errors, which makes the President try in every way to prove that he "was always right" in his policy and his statements concerning the USSR and American-Soviet relations.

All these are, I repeat, matters that are not harmless, but are not, perhaps, all that dangerous either. It is something else that is alarming. By placing such emphasis on anti-Sovietism specifically at this highly crucial moment, the President is, so to speak, limiting beforehand the possible changes in U.S. policy and in Soviet-American relations to within a very narrow framework and is basically localizing them to the utmost. A summit meeting—yes. That is not only acceptable, but important to the President. If that meeting means an agreement on medium-range and operational-tactical missiles is needed, then perhaps it will be necessary to agree to that too.

But all this is not to assume that the agreement and meeting would be an important step forward in the process of reducing nuclear (and not only nuclear) arms, or in the normalization of Soviet-American relations. Is not R. Reagan making it clear, through his discourses on Soviet policy and relations with the USSR, that this is precisely what must not be expected or even supposed? Is he not justifying the premise that in principle everything will and should remain as it was in the old days, even after this?

If that is the U.S. President's intention, it is bad, very bad. The Americans have an expression—"self-fulfilling prophecy." That is what they say about predictions when the person making the prediction himself takes care that it comes true. Is not this the American leader's "general plan"? And is he not already preparing certain actions for the period after the meeting (if it takes place), to render it politically harmless? And they are already planning to "balance" the treaty now being elaborated—a treaty that is useful, but modest in comparison with what must be done to eliminate the nuclear threat—with actions of some kind working in the opposite direction. One cannot help wonder: What actions? After Reykjavik, as if in revenge for the accord that was almost reached, the U.S. Administration tore up the SALT II Treaty. Are they perhaps now raising their hands against the last surviving nuclear arms agreement—the ABM Treaty—to remove each and every limitation on the race for both offensive and defensive strategic arms on earth and in space? And for many years to come, also binding their successors, regardless of what party wins the next elections.

Is not the price too high?

People may say: Today, when the question of an agreement on medium-range missiles and a meeting has not yet been decided, it is not worth speculating about

possible future evil U.S. deeds. I would object: How can we not think about it, if today, when the question of measures that could herald a major change for the better in Soviet-American relations is being decided, the U.S. President starts trying to justify the inevitability of tension in these relations and makes crude attacks on the Soviet Union?

President Reagan is trying in vain here to represent lies and slander as "frankness" and even to prove that this "frankness," highly typical of his administration's policy, promotes the "peace process." What does R. Reagan have in mind? The provocations that have marked his Presidency, such as the malicious fabrication about the Soviet Union's using chemical weapons in Indochina and Afghanistan ("yellow rain"), or the vile attempts to cast aspersions on the USSR and Bulgaria in connection with the assassination attempt on the pope (the notorious "Bulgarian connection")? Or the malicious campaign over the tragic loss of the South Korean aircraft, the rhetoric over the "evil empire," and the dissemination of falsified quotations attributed to Lenin and borrowed from Nazi propaganda? Such "frankness" leads to nothing but mutual distrust and enmity.

No, Soviet-American relations cannot develop normally following the logic of R. Reagan's recent speeches.

But I would like to say something else. For all the quarrelsome and even high-handed tone of these speeches, they do not produce an impression of strength of self-confidence. Rather the reverse—they are the speeches of a leader whom events themselves are forcing into a blindly defensive position.

I am not referring only to the well known domestic political unpleasantnesses the administration is experiencing. Something more fundamental, it seems to me, is also happening. In the conditions of changes in the international situation and in the mood of the world public, changes that have speeded up thanks to the restructuring in the USSR and the new Soviet political initiatives, the classical politicians of "cold war" (and R. Reagan is undoubtedly one of their number) are suddenly finding themselves not in their element, in an alien element. They are beginning, metaphorically speaking, to suffocate, like a fish that has lost concentration and finds itself washed up on the sand at low tide.

After all, people of this kind have never had positive policy programs. They have always fought not "for" but "against." It is only when there is a "mortal enemy" that American politicians of this variety have been able to win the reputation of great patriots and make a career. In the late forties and early fifties such careers were built precisely on anticommunism and anti-Sovietism. It was hardest of all for them to adapt to all that we mean by restructuring and the new political thinking. The Soviet Union was and remains necessary to these people, highly

necessary—but exclusively as an enemy. Because without an enemy, the American policy that has been traditional in the postwar years and the American politicians who have become firmly stuck in that policy would prove unnecessary.

That is why today, when, as a result of the renewal and the process of profound changes in the Soviet Union, the "image of the enemy," carefully created over a long period, is being eroded, American politicians of the Reagan type are losing their footing. They are beginning to become nervous. Hence the abuse, hence the strong language.

In his speech at the Town Hall in Los Angeles, R. Reagan, defining the nature of American-Soviet relations, used an expression of President J. Kennedy's concerning the period of particularly acute "cold war"—a "long twilight struggle." Reading President Reagan's speech, I remembered another, far more optimistic expression: "The darkest hour is just before dawn." One would like this to be so in the political problems that this article is devoted to. It is time, high time, that the darkness of prejudices and hostility in Soviet-American relations was replaced by the dawn of realism and common sense.

But when will that dawn come?

China

PRC Envoy Arrives, Biosketch Given

pm101545 [Editorial Report] Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian on 5 September carries on page 4 an untitled TASS report under the "Official Reports" general heading, which reads as follows:

"Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR, arrived in Moscow on 3 September.

"On 4 September Yu Hongliang was received by USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev in connection with his upcoming presentation of credentials."

The same page also carries an unattributed biographical sketch entitled "Regarding Presentation of Credentials," which reads as follows:

"PRC Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Yu Hongliang was born in the Province of Shangdong in 1927. He is a graduate of the Beijing Diplomatic Institute and has held senior posts in the PRC Foreign Ministry.

"He was PRC ambassador to Poland 1983-1985.

"Prior to his appointment to the USSR, he served as PRC ambassador to Romania 1985-1987."

Foreign Ministry Official Hold Talks

LD110508 Moscow TASS in English 1224 GMT
10 Sep 87

[Text] Beijing September 10 TASS—Lev Mendelevich, member of the Collegium of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Oleg Troyanovskiy, the ambassador

Arbatov Interviewed on INF Agreement
OW181735 Tokyo NHK General Television Network
in Japanese 1342 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States of America and Canada Institute, by newscaster Taro Kimura—live via satellite relay with Arbatov in a Moscow studio and Kimura in Tokyo NHK studio; interview conducted in English, with simultaneous Japanese translation by unidentified female interpreters; following is from the English]

[Text] [Kimura] Mr Arbatov, thank you very much for joining us. Mr Arbatov, we remember we were together in Reykjavik and so disappointed just about a year ago. But after 1 year we have this agreement. What do you think made it possible that you and the United States agree this time?

[Arbatov] You know, I would hesitate to say that it was mainly due to our efforts. But I think the facts are on the table and we were very consistent in our, you know, in our attempts to break through those obstacles which stacked up on the way to an agreement. At first we agreed to withdraw this INF issue from the Reykjavik package, then after it we agreed. The Americans made new, you know, also created new obstacles, and we made new, I would say, exercises in flexibility. They introduced the issue of weapons which are of shorter range. We had in mind more the peace and security and disarmament in the Pacific and had in mind our future relations with Japan, China, and other countries of the region. So step after step we cleared the way to the agreement.

I would not say that the Americans did nothing (?in this way); it would not be correct. They also wanted...[changes thought] I think that President Reagan wants very much to have a summit, and for this he understands he has to have an agreement. Therefore he is cooperating together with Secretary Shultz. I think it is very good that President Reagan, who started with a very, I would say, negative disposition toward arms control agreements, arms control negotiations, has come to a conclusion that it is the number one priority and a real statesmanship, and he does not want to go away from political life as the President of the United States without an agreement. [sentence as heard] I think it is very good, very good for America, good for Russia, good for Japan, good for everybody.

[Kimura] Do you think this timing—the United States has elections next year and Mr Reagan has not much time left—do you think this timing helped Mr Reagan to make up his mind?

[Arbatov] You know, I am always concerned as a student of the United States how much the foreign policy of the country is a hostage to their internal policy, and I would be less than honest with you if I would not have this concern at the moment, connected not so much with the presidential election as with the timetable of the Congress. You know, we see an attempt to repeat the

Reykjavik exercise. Before Reykjavik the President of the United States told the people in Congress, please withdraw all your resolutions, all your amendments; otherwise you impede the negotiations. They had no way; they agreed with it and have given much more for the arms race than they would have given otherwise. Today with concern I heard the President speaking about it, answering one of the questions during the press conference, that he also wished the Congress to just take back all the considerations it had about the many problems of disarmament. I think it is bad, but, you know, with the timing you do not have much choice. The President has to be there about 16 months so you have just, (?he has no ways). We did not use it in any way. We honestly want an agreement; we do not want to use this political calendar of the United States and their events, but we also have no options. We have only one President, and this President has to be there 16 months; if he wants, we are ready. We went more than half way to have the agreement.

[Kimura] So, in a way, it was better for the Soviets to make a deal at this time than wait for another President to come out and start from scratch and probably take another 2 or 3 years to come to the same level. Am I correct to say this?

[Arbatov] Yes. You know, I would say that it would be not correct for us to base our foreign policy on American internal developments. We cannot...[changes thought] We have only one President in the United States. We do not elect him; Americans elect him. We have no other President there, and we have to deal with the President who is there. To wait for another President—we do not even know who the President will be—the time is too precious to make such calculations. So what can we do? The only thing we can do is to do as much as possible to have an arms control agreement, improvement of international relations, reduction of the danger of war with the President we have in the United States at a given moment.

[Kimura] Is it because you have dropped your insistence to link SDI to other nuclear reduction treaty—or you dropped the insistence of keeping the Asian INF—is that the main reason why you, how do you say, gave in to the United States in many fields?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, we did not give in to the United States. We gave in to common sense. I think this was how you can characterize our position. But actually all this issue, it is important politically, symbolically; it is also important in terms of military disarmament. [sentence as heard] But you have to keep in mind also that it comprises only less than 5 percent of the nuclear weapons of Soviet Union and the United States. We are really striving for the big agreement, for the big deal. We do want, our final aim is to do away with all nuclear weapons. On the way what we do want to have an agreement on 50-percent cut in nuclear weapons which would be combined of course also with, you know, abstaining from withdrawal or from violation of ABM

Arbatov
18 Sept 87

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treaty. [sentence as heard] This is how we consider it. We never tied an INF treaty to SDI. It was more complicated. It was a package deal because we made important concessions, to balance out our concessions with the yields which could come in the course of disarmament. From an agreement we made it a package at Reykjavik. Then we—it was, I think, a very wise step and a very politically involved step—we have taken out of this package the INF and opened the way for successful negotiations. I think this is manifestation of political wisdom. I heard somebody say that it has proven that you can start with Russians only from a position of strength. This is nonsense. You cannot make it from a position of strength. You must look at it in a different way. It is a position of equality, a position of wisdom. A position of statesmanship is the only way to negotiate with Russians as well as with Japanese or whoever you have.

[Kimura] The Pershing-1A problem was untouched. Do you think you can persuade East Germans or Czechoslovakians, you know, when you are taking away your SS-20 and say, we are taking this out but they may shoot with the shorter range missile?

[Arbatov] Well, you know, it is not the final agreement which ends all negotiations and all agreements. We have put forward, you know, a proposal to do away with all nuclear weapons. We have also made the proposal for a nuclear-free corridor, a corridor in Europe just along the line dividing NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries, to make it free of all tactical nuclear weapons. If it is agreed upon—it was the Palme commission's proposal initially—if it is agreed upon, then the Germans—West Germans and East Germans—and Czechoslovakians, and everybody will feel safe also from tactical nuclear weapons.

Levin Comments on Negotiations Decision
LD182119 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 18 Sep 87

[Commentary by Viktor Levin]

[Text] It is noted in the joint USSR-U.S. statement that foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosieyevich Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz have agreed to begin full-scale bilateral negotiations on the limitation and ultimately on putting a complete stop to nuclear testing. Here is a news commentary; Viktor Levin is at the microphone:

[Levin] The negotiations, which the leaders of the USSR and the U.S. foreign departments have agreed on, must begin before 1 December. As part of the first step the sides have agreed to work out effective methods of verification which will allow for the ratification of the Soviet-U.S. treaty of 1974 on the limitation of underground testing of nuclear weapons, and the treaty of 1976 on nuclear explosions for peaceful aims.

These treaties are often called threshold treaties, because they determined the maximum yield of 150 kilotons for nuclear explosions. One must say that the principles laid

down in these treaties have played their role. Although through the fault of the United States the treaties have not been ratified, both sides comply with the established limitations. However, this does not mean in the least that the ratification of treaties has lost meaning. Such a precedent does exist.

Following the refusal by the United States to ratify the SALT II Treaty, the treaty on the limitation of strategic weapons, the sides have agreed to observe its provisions. But the present U.S. Administrations cast the treaty aside as soon as it considered the limits for strategic weapons set up by the treaty burdensome. Therefore I repeat that ratification is significant from the viewpoint of principle and practice, and the decision to bring the matter toward this can only be welcomed. Moreover, this must be followed by new intermediate decisions on the path toward the final goal—a complete halt to nuclear tests.

Of course, it would be better if the problem were solved immediately. For example, to put an end to nuclear explosions, and agree on how to bring it about. The Soviet Union proposed exactly this kind of method while it observed a unilateral moratorium for 1 and 1/2 years on all nuclear explosions. The United States turned out to be unprepared for such a radical solution to the problem. They believe that one must go forward step by step. We also agree to this—the important thing is to go forward, and it is especially important to reach a clearly established goal—to put a complete stop to nuclear tests. By doing this we shall not only rid the earth of the nuclear explosions which disfigure it—although this too is also extremely important—but we will end the development of nuclear weapons and we will make a decisive step on the path toward their liquidation.

The goodwill of the Soviet Union and its firm determination to use all opportunities to free mankind from the threat of nuclear destruction has been reflected in its willingness to reach an agreement on a basis of a compromise, and in our approach to the issue of verification, which the U.S. side for a long time used as an argument to justify its negative position. The Soviet Union's willingness for any kind of verification, which has been proven in practice, has negated any excuses. The decision taken at the negotiations in Washington is gratifying. One would very much like to see that the negotiations reach their final goal as soon as possible—an accord on a complete halt to nuclear tests.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Lauds Peace Policy
PM171610 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
17 Sep 87 First Edition p 1

[Editorial: "Following a Course of Peace and Security"]

[Excerpts] In less than 2 months' time Soviet people and all progressive mankind will mark the 70th anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, the revolution that was the greatest event of the 20th century. The revolution laid the foundations for the most profound process of democratization of international relations and

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Arbatov
30 Sept. 87

Arbatov Interview on Disarmament Talks
OWO20858 Tokyo YOMIURI SHIMBUN in Japanese
30 Sep 87 Morning Edition — FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[By reporter Yukihisa Fujita]

[Text] Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences and member of the party Central Committee, is in Japan to attend an international round-table conference entitled "'The American Century' and its Future."

Prior to the opening of the conference he granted an interview to *Yomiuri Shimbun* and expressed his views on the outlook of U.S.-Soviet relations following the accord on the total abolition of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

In the interview Arbatov said that the INF accord should help open the way to further nuclear disarmament, adding that there is a possibility that not only the INF treaty, but also an agreement on a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms could be signed at the U.S.-Soviet summit scheduled for this autumn in Washington. The Soviet Union, he stressed, looks forward to that.

Explaining why an agreement on a 50-percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms is possible, he pointed out that at the Reykjavik summit talks last October, in which he himself took part as one of experts, a basic agreement was reached in negotiations among experts. In connection with this question, differences emerged later over the content and control of nuclear warheads, he said. He added: "However, a rational formula of resolution should be found through negotiation."

Regarding the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), Arbatov emphatically said "We cannot concede any more." He said that this is because the Soviet Union has made "big concessions," having observed the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) limitation treaty for 10 years and established a framework for the control of experiments.

A summary of the interview follows:

1) The agreement in principle on the total abolition of INF is of great significance, but a more important thing is to open the way to the signing of a next disarmament agreement. When the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting is held, the issue of strategic nuclear arms reductions will be given much weight.

2) The observance of the ABM Treaty is prerequisite to a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms, but an agreement is possible. This is due to the basic agreement that was reached at experts' talks during the Reykjavik summit meeting last October, in which I also participated. Later, the U.S. side attached a condition to the content and control of 6,000 warheads in the 50 percent

reduction by limiting the ceiling of all ballistic missile warheads to 4,800. This is not fair because the Soviet Union, which does not possess strategic bombers, will be forced to produce strategic bombers to carry the remaining 1,200 warheads. In addition, it is also open to question in that the U.S. side does not recognize sea-launched cruise missiles (2,000 warheads) as strategic weapons. But these are negotiating tactics (of the U.S. side), and if negotiations are continued it should be possible to find a rational resolution.

3) With respect to SDI, the Soviet Union calls for the observance of the ABM Treaty for 10 years. This is in itself a big concession to the United States, because the treaty is without a time limit in the first place. In the beginning the Soviet Union opposed all SDI experiments, but, complying with the U.S. side's request, it proposed to define those experiments that can be conducted in space and those that should be prohibited. This is also a concession. As far as the SDI issue is concerned, there is no room for any more concessions. We hope that President Reagan will take another look at SDI.

4) The Soviet Union will make the components of its defense outlays clear and in a couple of years bring them to a level where they can be compared with the United States. The cost for assembling tanks and the prices of metals or energy are cheaper in the Soviet Union and, therefore, this entails complicated work to make them comparable. But this is necessary — not only to the world, but also to the Soviet Union.

5) As compared with Soviet relations with Western Europe, China, and the United States, Japanese-Soviet relations have not been improved. Rather they are deteriorating. The Soviet Union hopes that its relations with Japan, a neighbor, will develop toward normalization. It may not be pleasant for Japan to be the only one to be left behind in relations with the Soviet Union.

Gorbachev Backs Editor in Ligachev Dispute
PM011445 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 24 Sep 87 p 4

[Pilar Bonet dispatch: "Gorbachev Rests and 'Perestroika' Suffers"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—The "perestroika" (restructuring) begun by Mikhail Gorbachev is currently experiencing a time of political strain while the top leader is officially resting. Two events of a different nature — the danger of a resignation with grave consequences for the process of "glasnost" (openness) in the Soviet press, and a Russian nationalist demonstration — have marked, in the opinion of Soviet sources, two crucial points in the current political situation.

According to the sources, the top leader had to intervene by telephone in support of Yegor Yakovlev, chief editor of the weekly *Moskovskiy Novosti*, who was reprimanded

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Arbatov Discusses SDI, Disarmament Talks
 OW031431 Tokyo ASAHI SHIMBUN in Japanese
 3 Oct 87 Morning Edition p 2
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[Interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada under the USSR Academy of Sciences by editorial board member Hisaya Shirai—date and place not given]

[Text] Following the basic accord on the total abolition of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) deployed in Europe, U.S.-Soviet relations are about to take a historic first step toward detente, with hopes mounting for the summit meeting to be held in Washington in November, at the earliest.

The next focal point is the fate of U.S.-Soviet talks on reductions of strategic nuclear arms (including ICBM), which have had a stormy voyage. What move will the Soviets make?

Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the United States of America and Canada under the USSR Academy of Sciences, is well-known as the Gorbachev regime's U.S. policy expert. Taking his current visit to Japan as an opportunity, *Asahi Shimbun* has interviewed him on problems and prospects of the U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament talks following the total abolition of INF.

[Shirai] The total abolition of INF is the first phase in U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament, and the second phase calls for curtailing strategic nuclear arms, is that not correct?

[Arbatov] On reducing strategic nuclear arms, U.S.-Soviet talks are underway in Geneva. It is possible to continue talks at the U.S.-Soviet foreign ministers meeting, scheduled for 22 October in Moscow.

[Shirai] Are you not afraid the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which the United States plans to push forward, might be the biggest obstacle to the progress of U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear arms reductions?

[Arbatov] Our stance toward strategic nuclear arms reductions has not changed at all. The observance of the existing Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Limitation Treaty by both the United States and the Soviet Union is a precondition. The treaty must be interpreted traditionally, correctly, and precisely, and both the U.S. Congress and Administration have resolved that the ABM Limitation Treaty needs to be observed.

[Shirai] If the United States carries out SDI to the end, how will the Soviet Union cope with it?

[Arbatov] In that case, it will be an obvious violation of the ABM Limitation Treaty. If the United States should push ahead with SDI to the end, knowing that, no progress would be made in the U.S.-Soviet talks to

reduce strategic nuclear arms. We are planning to reduce strategic nuclear arms by 50% each in the beginning and make further cuts in the future. But if, at the stage where strategic nuclear arms are going to be reduced, SDI should be pushed forward on the grounds that it is a defensive weapons system against strategic nuclear arms, inevitably this means creating a first-strike system against the Soviet Union by the United States in a different sense. In 1972, when the United States and Soviet Union held talks to sign the treaty, the Americans told us that Soviet logic is contradictory. Now the United States is doing that.

[Shirai] In that case, as long as the United States persists in SDI'S promotion, is a rupture of the U.S.-Soviet talks on strategic arms reductions inevitable?

[Arbatov] Exactly. The talks themselves will not materialize. What I want to emphasize here is that the United States can go ahead and feel free to promote SDI in laboratories. Although it costs money, is dangerous, and can never be beneficial, if it remains in that scope, talks on strategic nuclear arms reductions can be brought to a settlement.

[Shirai] But when you take the existence of the enormous military-industrial complex of the United States into consideration, is there any guarantee that SDI will be confined to the bounds of laboratories?

[Arbatov] In that respect, I am a little more optimistic. No matter how gigantic it may be, the U.S. military-industrial complex is by no means omnipotent. U.S. finances are in heavy deficit, and the country itself is a heavy debtor. In addition to these economic problems, there are political factors. There is the influence of public opinion in the United States, and allies of the United States may exert influence to have SDI dropped. It is regrettable that Japan is not active in this regard, but it is true there are factors to keep the military-industrial complexes from scoring a total victory. On the other hand, regarding the Soviet Union, the myth about Soviet threats is falling to pieces little by little. Therefore, I think the factors promoting U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament are quite strong.

[Shirai] Do you mean that when INF are totally abolished, that will become a stimulus to reaching an agreement at the U.S.-Soviet talks on the reduction of strategic nuclear arms— even if SDI remains as an obstacle?

[Arbatov] I am not just optimistic. I want to emphasize that mine is a cautious optimism.

Brazil's Sodre Interviewed on Soviet Ties
 PY030130 Brasilia EBN in Portuguese 1659 GMT
 29 Sep 87—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Text] Brasilia, 29 Sep (EBN)—The following is the text of the interview granted by Brazilian Foreign Minister Roberto de Abreu Sodre to the Soviet news agency, TASS, at the end of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Brazil.

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Urbano
 3 Oct 87

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Arbatov
6 Oct 87

United States & Canada

Arbatov on Summit Prospects, Arms Accords
PM051531 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI
in Russian No 40, 4 Oct 87 (Sign Press 29 Sep 87) p 5

[Article by Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, under the rubric "Viewpoint": "Breakthrough to the Truth. The Logic of Reykjavik"; first three paragraphs are MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI introduction]

[Text] It was a year ago, on 11-12 October, that Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan met in Iceland. In the course of this summit meeting mutual understanding was reached between the USSR and the United States on the possibility of solving the problems of both strategic offensive arms and medium-range missiles. A real prospect emerged for the radical reduction and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. The sides were close to finding a formula on the question of a total ban on nuclear explosions.

But there was no success in reaching agreements because of the U.S. Administration's stubborn unwillingness to create conditions for their implementation by strengthening the ABM Treaty regime. The U.S. side's refusal to limit the SDI program within the framework of laboratory research (without infringing the ABM Treaty) blocked the possibility of reaching accords.

Even so, Reykjavik produced a breakthrough to the truth. Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences United States and Canada Institute, who participated in the meeting, reflects on the importance of the events.

Reykjavik was a logical continuation of M.S. Gorbachev's first meeting with R. Reagan in Geneva in November 1985, when a summit level dialogue was resumed. At that meeting the sides failed to achieve any specific and tangible progress toward agreement in the disarmament sphere. Even so, there was success in finding common starting points: agreement that a nuclear war must not be fought and that there can be no victors in such a war, that any military conflict between the USSR and the United States is impermissible. They got to know each other, and it was agreed that the next meeting would be held in the next year.

Subsequently, an acute struggle developed over the meaning and purpose of that meeting. What happened is, generally speaking, typical of America and the present administration: Whenever something good is taking place or is due to take place in Soviet-U.S. relations, dirty tricks are to be expected. There were more than enough such "goodies" in the wake of Geneva. They included a demonstratively negative response to the extension of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions, a blanket of silence around the Soviet proposals to

eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of the century, an importunate campaign accusing the USSR of violations of the ABM Treaty, statements about the U.S. intention to withdraw from the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty, and much else besides, let alone rhetorical onslaughts along the "empire of evil" lines.

In the time between Geneva and September of last year, it can be said that the situation did not at all develop along the avenue of expanding dialogue. If the truth be told, I do not know how matters would have progressed had it not been for the initiative by the Soviet side, and specifically by M.S. Gorbachev, who sent a letter to R. Reagan offering to meet either in Britain or in Iceland—somewhere halfway between each other. Reagan consented.

So, what was it that happened in Reykjavik that continues to work and operate today? Looking back on events at the time and interpreting the importance of what was achieved, one can clearly perceive the following: Reykjavik not only extended but also broke down the traditional boundaries of talks. That was very bold, decisive, and—I would go as far as to say—stunning for many people. Not in the sense that we would like to stun the Americans—this version of the story was invented in the West in order to somehow whitewash the confusion and lack of initiative displayed by the U.S. delegation in Reykjavik.

It was totally unprepared for the fact that the Soviet Union had come to the talks with very serious proposals. People in the White House probably deceived themselves on this point. Prior to Reykjavik, circles close to the U.S. Administration spoke so much of the difficulties existing in the Soviet Union that they may have talked themselves into believing that M.S. Gorbachev was not in a position to arrive with any serious and far-reaching initiatives. But had they really thoroughly read and analyzed what had been said by the Soviet leadership and—and this is the main point—had they adopted a serious approach to it, they would undoubtedly have drawn a different conclusion: After all, 90 percent of everything that was proposed in Reykjavik had already been said by the Soviet leadership.

The Americans (and others) were stunned by the initiative put forward by the Soviet Union—to translate the idea of a world without nuclear weapons into the language of a specific agreement. They were even more amazed by something else: It became clear in the course of the talks that this was by no means so unbelievably complex, and it was rather difficult even to raise any proper objection to it. There is a kind of implacable logic to the entire situation in the nuclear age: If you say "a," in other words if you recognize that nuclear war must not be waged and there can be no victors in such a war, then you must go on to say "b" and give a clear-cut answer to the question of what is to be done with nuclear weapons, whose stockpiles are already sufficient for 100 cataclysmic wars.

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It is, of course, in this sense that Reykjavik was a great moment of truth. Like a fresh breeze, it blew away all the fig leaves and exposed the private parts of many politicians. The language of reality at the talks turned into the language of honesty.

While on the subject, a few words about honesty in politics. I recently heard the following view expressed: Gorbachev apparently made a mistake in Reykjavik. He should have put his signature to the proposals in the form of a treaty and left it up to Reagan to decide what to do. The whole world would have seen one signature beneath the document and, in the absence of the other, everyone would clearly realize who was in favor of what. But what happened is that influential forces in the United States which seek a return to the pre-Reykjavik positions are distorting what happened in Reykjavik.

I firmly disagreed with this view. Such a step would, more than likely, have been quite good for propaganda purposes. Here is my signature, now it's up to you, partners! In reality, however, this is nothing but an ultimatum: Here are my terms, take it or leave it. This is not a serious conversation in the nuclear age. World public opinion was perfectly capable of interpreting the situation.

What did take place in Reykjavik was indeed an honest and serious conversation. Yes, it did evolve dramatically. I participated in the all-night vigil by experts, when both delegations sat facing each other throughout the night. We produced a text of the draft agreement running to just over two pages, and gave copies of it to our partners. They were taken aback. Marshal Sergey Akhromeyev, heading our delegation of experts, said: "Well, let's talk. How would you like to do it? As an overall concept, by paragraph, by sentence, or by section? Or in an altogether different way, according to some other principles?" The Americans kept silent. They took one time-out, then another. That was understandable—it is not easy to say "no," taking cover behind legal rationalization. After all, honest talks were being held. After the second time-out, our partners came up with something. We still managed to agree on part of the questions, to find some sort of common understanding. I believe that no one can ever be deceived in politics—at any rate, not over a long period of time or on a major issue. This is why I hold that one of the strong features of our policy consists of the fact that it is an open and honest policy. We are not striving to score propaganda points or to bluff our way to winning the pot, as in a poker game.

I would say that, in the wake of Reykjavik, the world as whole entered a new period of its development, at least as regards nuclear weapons. The ideas put forward at that summit meeting proved very powerful. It became clear that disarmament questions could no longer be discussed in the same old way.

Reykjavik had its own logic. Of course, we did help to reinforce it through our subsequent flexibility, especially by the fact that we "pulled out" of the Reykjavik package the question of medium-range missiles and later agreed to the elimination of operational-tactical missiles. The new feature of the situation today is, I suppose, the fact that when we are talking about a world without nuclear weapons and about avoiding a nuclear war, we cannot, we refuse to, accept a "No" from the United States and its NATO partners, while they were for a long time incapable of accepting our "Yes" as an answer. But this could not have continued. The policy of refusal begins to shake the positions of those who constantly insisted on "No," contrary to the demands of changing life and common sense. Different positions begin to emerge and strengthen; there are growing signs of an awareness of global interdependence and common responsibility for the fate of civilization.

This new emerging quality of international life is highlighted in M.S. Gorbachev's article "The Reality and Guarantees of a Secure World," published a few days ago by *Pravda*. This entire article looks forward to the future and, at the same time, reflects the contemporary requirements of the world community. It demonstrates not only the level and scale of our new thinking but also the results already produced by our policy. And these results do exist.

I recall in this context certain events which took place 2 years ago. In October 1985, while on an official visit to France, the Soviet leader addressed the Republic's National Assembly. He spoke there of the tragic ability of human awareness to lag behind swiftly developing realities, and of the fact that we wish to bring our views in line with these realities, including those in the military and foreign policy spheres. He promised to do this, and he did it. A few months later came the statement proposing to eliminate nuclear and chemical weapons by the end of the century. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions was extended several times. That was followed by the concept of an all-embracing system of international security. Now, yet another step: Concretization of this actual concept and its "docking" with the UN Charter and UN activity.

I do not wish to be misunderstood: The work is far from completed. No, it is only just beginning. But the results can already be seen, they are already emerging. Accords are becoming reality, there are changes in the situation and in people's attitudes toward the urgent problems of our time.

We made a most serious contribution toward this, including by means of substantial changes in our policy. We have learned not only to speak and to explain ourselves better. We have also learned to listen better, to take notice of other people's concerns, of what our neighbors on the planet think, what perturbs them, what they fear. We are prepared to discuss all questions: the

economic situation of "Third World" countries, conventional weapons, West European concerns. And, of course, human rights, which we no longer place within inverted commas and which we no longer qualify as "so-called." This readiness for dialogue and openness imparts considerable strength to our positions because they are the positions of people striving to understand the realities of the other side, not to impose their own solution, but to find something that would suit both partners.

I would like to mention another important point. Today, in the wake of Reykjavik, people have started listening to us better. Because of the flexibility of our policy, because of what is happening in our country, because of the restructuring and the glasnost which are dissolving the image of an enemy.

Much is being said and written now about the possibility of a third summit meeting. This talk is evidently fueled by the fact that there has been substantial progress in the solution of the question of eliminating medium-range and operational-tactical missiles, especially as a result of the talks between E.A. Shevardnadze and G. Shultz. It is clear to everyone that this meeting is desirable. But I would not like to speak of it as a fait accompli. An agreement could be elaborated before the year's end. But there is still work to be done before this, as they say; let's wait and see. Let's not queer the pitch. Nor do I believe that at the meeting, if it did take place, the leaders of the two great powers would limit themselves simply to signing something that is already prepared. Other important questions will also be discussed, "tomorrow's agenda," so to speak.

This agenda is already visible in basic outline: A radical 50% reduction of nuclear potential (and we are prepared to go even further—in the aforementioned article in *Pravda* M.S. Gorbachev also mentioned the 95% mark, and our ultimate goal of 100% elimination of nuclear weapons); and major decisions on conventional arms reductions. Incidentally, judging by the reaction to this article, many people in the West have seized upon anything concerning strategic offensive arms but kept silent about something else—their reduction and elimination are possible on condition of the strict observance of the ABM Treaty.

The logic of events and the prospect of reducing the nuclear potential could lead to a situation whereby the USSR and the United States, together with their allies, may finally advance toward the solution of the conventional arms problem. The West has been pontificating about its alleged superiority in this sphere for 40 years now. They use this to justify the existence of military alliances and the buildup of the nuclear potential. They use this fabricated pretext to justify everything.

But this must not continue. We say to the other side: "Tell us what worries you. Are you afraid of the possibility of surprise attack? Let's rule it out. Are there arms

imbalances? Let's eliminate them by getting down to the lower level. Let's create a nuclear-free corridor in central Europe, as the Palme Commission proposed, let's think of 'defensive strategy,' let's determine together what constitutes 'reasonable sufficiency' of force for defense purposes." All these are also subjects for talks.

We are prepared to discuss all questions, to jointly seek ways to solve them. Of course, we have no reasons for complacency. The forces applying the brakes on detente are still in existence. Much still remains to be done. Every step toward disarmament, be it nuclear or in the sphere of conventional arms, will be gained as a result of acute struggle and at the cost of great efforts. But the situation has nevertheless changed. The initial results of the logic of Reykjavik are in evidence.

Gorbachev Replies to Physicians Group
LD052208 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1749 GMT 5 Oct 87

[Text] Moscow, 5 Oct (TASS)—Bernard Lown, the U.S. cochairman of the movement "International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War" has sent a telegram of greetings on behalf of the movement to Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in connection with the Soviet-U.S. accord regarding the scrapping of medium-range missiles and operational and tactical missiles.

"We in the movement" he says to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "know first hand of your profound understanding of the nuclear threat and your exceptional contribution to the cause of universal security".

"Now the world is once again at an historic crossroads: Will the U.S.-Soviet agreement banning medium-range and operational and tactical missiles become a breakthrough in the arms race, or will it merely be a symbolic gesture?"

Having pointed out that previous agreements could not prevent the building up of weapons systems, B. Lown expresses the hope that the present accord can be viewed as "the first surgical operation designed to remove a malignant tumor. As the next substantial step we once again appeal for the immediate conclusion of an agreement on an all-embracing ban on tests, which would put an end to nuclear explosions for all time".

"The present agreement," the U.S. scientist concludes, "would be impossible without the tireless work of the millions involved in the struggle to destroy nuclear weapons. If we want to achieve further progress we must enlighten and draw even more people into this struggle, so that they consider it their moral duty".

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weapons to begin the deeper and more substantial process of removing the universal nuclear danger. It is also from these positions that the Soviet leadership is approaching the assessment of the significance of a forthcoming meeting with the U.S. President.

Arbatov Interviewed on Summit Talks

OW271337 Tokyo NHK General Television Network
in Japanese 1214 GMT 27 Oct 87

[From "News Center 9" program — interview with Georgiy Arbatov, director of the United States of America and Canada Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondent Kobayashi in Moscow; date not indicated—recorded; interview conducted in Russian with Japanese translations provided in subtitles; following is from the Russian]

[Text] [Kobayashi] Why did the USSR tie the question of medium range missiles to SDI?

[Arbatov] I say that we are ready to sign the agreement. It is not the agreement that is in question. As soon as the technical details are solved, we will be ready to sign it. At any given moment, without awaiting the solution to any other question. This is an entirely different question. The question that is arising now deals with the summit. Can Gorbachev attend the summit without some breakthrough on the question of strategic arms and the ABM Treaty? This has nothing to do with the medium-range missile agreement. On this, only details remain—questions on verifications, and several others—but these, in the estimate of Comrade Shevardnadze—will take about three weeks. After this, it will be ready for signing. We make no further conditions regarding this. It is not related to the ABM Treaty or anything else. It is an important first step. But note that it is only the first step. Here we do have definite differences in attitudes about which I have written in a September issue of *Pravda*, shortly before the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting.

You know, one gets the impression that the Americans are only interested in the summit, so that it would look good on television, so that the President looks good. However, we are not seeking a show. We are looking at the crux of the matter. The Americans have much to think about. The meeting in Moscow provided much food for thought. The meeting was worthwhile, interesting, and important, and in my opinion it should have convinced the Americans of the following: that their previous position, their stand for breaking the ABM Treaty will not lead to anything. It will not lead to an agreement with us.

[Kobayashi] Everyone was waiting for a definite summit date.

[Arbatov] President Reagan expected it more than anyone else. The Americans did well to spread this around the world—that ostensibly only this was what they were

waiting for. We say, lets go ahead. We can make arrangements for tomorrow if necessary. But let us agree on the points. What will be the program, the agenda of this meeting? We did not cancel the meeting. If the U.S. side will take this seriously, then the summit is possible even this year.

[Kobayashi] Are you waiting for the next President?

[Arbatov] No. I think that what has transpired in Moscow shows that we would like to solve these questions with the present President. Gorbachev's intention is to sign the medium-range missiles agreement this year, to agree this year on a framework for an agreement on strategic arms and adherence to the ABM Treaty so that next year another agreement could be signed with Reagan.

Zholkver: U.S. 'Hypocritical' Over Summit

LD272208 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 27 Oct 87

[Text] The Pentagon has officially announced that a new series of tests of the U.S. air-launched cruise missiles are beginning today over northern areas of Canada. Here is a "Latest News" commentary. At the microphone is our political observer, Aleksandr Zholkver:

[Zolkver] The Pentagon's announcement is noteworthy in my view for two circumstances. Firstly, the announcement does not conceal the fact that the Canadian north has been chosen as the test site because its contours are reminiscent of the northern areas of the USSR. So the aim of this action is quite obvious. Secondly, no less odious is the time chosen for the missile tests. Everyone knows that the Soviet-U.S. talks on the elimination of medium-range and operational-tactical missiles have now entered their concluding phase. During the recent talks at Moscow with Secretary of State Shultz, Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev put forward a new proposal on reducing strategic offensive weapons, including air-launched cruise missiles. How does the United States answer this? With missile tests in an area reminiscent of the territory of our country?

Not only that—there was an official announcement recently about the forthcoming deployment of new squadrons of U.S. cruise missiles in the Netherlands and England.

At the same time, in the FRG, where over 100 U.S. Pershings are located, they have begun to be removed from one end of the country to the other. I am not even saying that such missile maneuvers, which involve about 1,500 special vehicles, are fraught with dangerous accidents which have occurred more than once in the FRG. Besides that, are such maneuvers really not a deliberate demonstration staged at the very moment when the talks on the elimination of these Pershings are coming to an end?

[Unidentified correspondent] *Al-Watan* newspaper, Kuwait. My question is for Mr Falin. What is your assessment, please, of the role of Europe, both West and East Europe, in creating the conditions for destroying medium-and shorter-range missiles in Europe (?in the near future).

[Falin] Since it's a matter of destroying weapons, the main body of which is today deployed in Europe and which theoretically, in the event of an unfavorable conjunction of circumstances, might be used precisely in that region, the significance and weight of what Europeans are capable of saying, and are saying, cannot be underestimated. The Europeans—I have in mind Western Europeans in this instance—played, at one stage, a considerable role in NATO's adoption of what is known as the two-track decision, that is, in creating the whole problem, or at least a part of that problem. The Europeans should probably have their say today, too, in the course of the debate when discussing such aspects as the elimination of nuclear weapons on the European continent, or at least in a part, [pauses] on a part of the European Continent, such aspects as the creation of nuclear-free zones or zones with a rarefied quantity of weapons, with fewer than today. At the moment, on average, Europe has 20 times more of all kinds of weapons than any other part of the world, with all that ensues from this. If the Europeans display consistency and approve not merely in words—there are a quite a few approving voices at the moment—the result achieved at the Soviet-U.S. talks, and if they desire to develop and supplement this result with other accords such as, in particular, a reduction in the number of conventional weapons situated here, or of nuclear weapons of a tactical nature which are situated here in abundance, then naturally the European situation will become much better than it is today.

[Unidentified journalist] *The Los Angeles Times*: What is the Soviet Union's attitude to the ABM Treaty, to its narrow and broad interpretations? [end recording]

[Charikov] Yevgeny Viktorovich Batenin answers:

[Begin Recording] [Batenin] The Soviet Union is adhering to the interpretation that the United States also adhered to, evidently right up to last year. That's how I understand it...Congress is now adhering to it. In general, there are many supporters of that treaty, and I would say that the opponents are fewer in number; that is, there are fewer broad interpreters of that treaty, even among the administration, than those who interpret the treaty the proper way. Of course there are nuances, there are nuances in defining what is meant by to create [sozdavat], but in my view, it's all clear now. As soon as you get as far as testing, leave the laboratory, create a scale model and try to put it into space, you have violated the treaty. In addition, there are still very many restrictive provisions in that treaty that, on the whole, are now recognized by both sides. Therefore,

our stance is a very simple one, as is that of sober-minded Americans: One must hold on to the treaty on condition that it will ensure a 50% reduction of strategic offensive arms. [end recording]

[Charikov] The meeting lasted 1 and 1/2 hours. The participants spoke not only about Soviet-U.S. relations and matters connected with the elimination of two classes of missiles and strategic offensive arms limitation. They also discussed many other problems which today worry the world public!

Arbatov: Accord 'Modest Step' See Lexis
LD261804 Moscow TASS in English 1726 GMT summary Pg
26 Nov 87

[Text] Moscow November 26 TASS—By a TASS diplomatic correspondent:

The Soviet Union takes great pride in being the first to put forward the programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons before the end of this century. Academician Georgiy Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, told a briefing at the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry today. The draft treaty on the elimination of Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range missiles, which is to be signed at the summit meeting in Washington, is the first step from arms control to nuclear disarmament. It is a modest step, yet it may prove to be highly significant, the Soviet expert said.

The Soviet-American accords in the field of disarmament are indisputably of top priority significance. Yet other countries and peoples cannot stand aloof in the resolution of such global problems. Two classes of nuclear weapons deployed in the territories of nine countries are to be scrapped. Major General Geliy Batenin, military expert of the CPSU Central Committee, stressed that the missiles deployed in the territory of Czechoslovakia and the GDR would be scrapped within the terms envisaged by the Soviet-American agreement.

Today Europe has roughly 20 times as many weapons as any other part of the world, said Valentin Falin, chairman of the APN board, another participant in the briefing. If the Europeans display consistency and approve not only by word of mouth the results achieved at the Soviet-American talks and complement them with decisions on a cut in the conventional weapons and battlefield nuclear weapons, the situation in Europe will considerably improve. Therefore it must be remembered that the treaty on medium- and shorter range missiles has to be ratified in two terms: Legally — at the U.S. congress, and politically — in the European countries.

Answering the question whether the Soviet Union has its own "hawks" of the Caspar Weinberger type, Georgiy Arbatov noted: There is genuine unanimity in the USSR on the issue of the foreign policy aimed at nuclear disarmament, and our American partners can rest

assured about that. Yet there are doubts of a different kind, Valentin Falin emphasized, how much can one believe the signature put in the USA under the agreement prior to its sealing in a ratification act in Congress? Moreover can the USA be believed after the treaty is ratified? Will speculation on a broader interpretation of the treaty or something of that kind start? And, at last, whether the agreement on medium- and shorter-range missiles will be followed by efforts to reduce nuclear weapons? Will that agreement be a single act, which was signed not because of the conviction that it is necessary to reach agreement, but just because this looked a paying business today.

Touching upon the problem of anti-Soviet actions by various Zionist and right-wing groups in the USA on the eve of the visit, Academician Arbatov said: There is big-time politics concerned with matters of history-making significance and politicking. Once Sazonov, the foreign minister of czarist Russia, said about Montenegro Prince Nikita, that he was prepared to kindle a world conflagration to fry eggs on it. And now that significant events are taking place in the Soviet-American relations, they are received in some circles of the USA as a signal for doing their own little business, preventing a Soviet-American rapprochement, albeit the point at issue is humanity's survival in this nuclear age.

As a result of the preparations for the summit meeting in Washington, the participants in the briefing noted, the sides have indisputably departed from a fresh relapse of Cold war. Moreover, numerous Soviet-American contacts of recent years and especially of recent months have demonstrated that given good will on both sides, most intricate, most difficult problems can be resolved, while the principle of equality and reciprocity is becoming a good pointer on the way towards accord.

NOVOSTI's Falin Attends Media Briefing

Notes U.S. Right-Wing Threat

LD261457 Moscow TASS in English 1454 GMT
26 Nov 87

[Text] Moscow November 26 TASS—The intensification of the Zionist lobby in the USA should be viewed in the context of the overall intensification of the activities of the U.S. right-wing forces in connection with the forthcoming signing of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the elimination of medium- and shorter-range missiles, said chairman of the Board of the Novosti press agency Valentin Falin. He spoke today in the press-centre of the USSR foreign ministry at a briefing for Soviet and Foreign journalists.

Having not yet read the text of the treaty, the U.S. right-wing forces condemned it as being, allegedly, incompatible with traditional American values and declared that it, therefore, should not be signed. This is not an objection to the treaty as such, Valentin Falin emphasized. This is a manifestation of a disagreement

with the arrangement in principle between the United States and the Soviet Union, between the West and the East. And actions of the U.S. right-wing forces mean a vote for the continued confrontation.

As far as the Zionist organizations are concerned, the merging of the interests of the pro-military circles and other reactionary circles which are striving to create the atmosphere that would interfere with the present arrangement becoming an initial stage of an extensive, serious and consistent normalization of the relations between the two countries is clearly seen against this background. Statements of the right-wing circles mean an attempt to bring pressure not so much on the Soviet Union as on the U.S. Administration in order to poison the climate in which the third summit meeting extremely important for the destinies of peace is to be held, Valentin Falin said.

Discusses 'Afghan Problem'

LD261438 Moscow TASS in English 1436 GMT
26 Nov 87

[Text] Moscow November 26 TASS—The solution of the "Afghan problem" largely depends on the extent to which the United States is prepared today and will be prepared tomorrow to facilitate, rather than hinder this process, Valentin Falin, chairman of the board of the Novosti press agency, told newsmen here today.

Replying to questions at a briefing at the USSR Foreign Ministry's Press Centre, he said: "If the United States displays minimum, not to mention maximum, good will, the 'Afghan problem' will yield to far quicker, fuller and more effective solution."

The Soviet Union, Falin said, did not pursue any objectives in Afghanistan that could be viewed by any member of the international community as incompatible with international law, principles and goals of the U.N. Charter.

"We have lived with Afghanistan for decades in peace, as good neighbours. We did not provoke developments around Afghanistan. It is our ultimate objective to restore the normal, good neighbourly climate which is, in our view, the only sensible and possible one in settling the problem relating to Afghanistan," Falin said.

Gremitskikh Rejects Military Insinuations

PM251241 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 47, 22 Nov 87 p 6

[Unattributed report: "At the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Centre" — passages in boldface as published]

[Text] The Report published by the Spanish newspaper Ya, alleging that there are Soviet missiles aimed at certain targets in Spain, is a fabrication and the map it published, ostensibly received from the British intelligence, is a forgery.

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5 Nov. 87
3 items²

Chernyshev Comments on NATO Planning Session
LD051623 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT
5 Nov 87

[Text] Moscow November 5 TASS—By TASS Military Writer Vladimir Chernyshev:

The NATO Nuclear Planning Group just concluded a two-day meeting at the level of defence ministers in Monterey, California. In its communique, the NATO group expressed the hope for rapid progress in the sphere of Soviet-American talks on a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive arms. Such a statement, it would seem, should only be welcomed. But are there grounds for this? Is this expression of "hope" corroborated in the communique and by practical actions of NATO countries?

First of all, there should be awareness on both sides of the Atlantic that the possibility of substantial cuts in strategic offensive arms is linked directly with the consolidation of the Soviet-American treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems. The obligations for keeping within the treaty for a definite term and its observance in the form in which it was signed and ratified is the necessary foundation for strategic stability in conditions of a 50-per cent cut in strategic offensive arms. But there is no mention of this in the communique of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group. NATO defence ministers ignore the objective relationship between strategic offensive arms and defensive arms. The "hope for rapid progress" is nothing more than diplomatic politeness or, simply speaking, empty verbiage.

Moreover, NATO Countries' support for the U.S. SDI programme and direct involvement of some of them in the work under the programme makes them immediate participants of the erosion of the ABM treaty. For those who are striving to destroy that foundation of the process of disarmament, statements about the "adherence" to the reduction of strategic offensive arms, might only mean the wish to ease demands on SDI, to enhance its effectiveness, to ensure in simpler ways the achievement of the strategic advantage for the side which will be deploying space strike arms.

Another thesis in the communique merits attention: the NATO countries emphasized the importance of a comprehensive and consistent approach to all the elements of arms control. This declarative statement obviously hangs in mid-air and shows the lack of logic since the ministers of the NATO bloc, as was proven earlier, have no comprehensive approach. But then they are quite "consistent": they declare again and again that NATO's strategy of "flexible reacting" remains unchanged, that the NATO bloc is determined to upgrade nuclear forces so as to ensure "impressive deterrence". Such pronouncements leave no room for the wish to advance to a world without nuclear arms. In this connection it would not be amiss to recall that quite recently London and Paris openly expressed their negative attitude to a world without nuclear arms and confirmed their adherence to a

different thing: the programmes of building up their nuclear arsenals. They have long-range plans for "consolidation" the Anglo-French system of "nuclear deterrence", up to the year 2020.

The question arises how some West European NATO countries visualize their role in the process of the reduction of nuclear arsenals. Apparently, they try in advance to ensure for themselves the role of detached observers who give "advice" to the USSR and the US and have not the slightest wish to become participants in the disarmament process. And it is only by joint efforts of all the countries that the road to a stable and secure world can be paved, and this objective truth should be realized in the capitals of the North Atlantic Alliance.

Arbatov, Primakov, Falin Host News Conference
LD060327 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1841 GMT 5 Nov 87

[Text] We now offer for your attention a report on the press conference devoted to the topic "The realities of peace and the new political thinking," which took place at the Press Center of the Great October Socialist Revolution 70th anniversary.

[Begin recording] [Unidentified report] Numerous questions by Soviet and foreign journalists — and the hall was full — were answered today by Soviet scientists: Academician Arbatov, director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Academician Primakov, director of the Institute of World Economics and International Relations, and Doctor of History Falin, chairman of the Board of the *Novosti* news agency. These questions covered virtually the entire spectrum of problems of present-day international life, politics—from the state and prospects for Soviet-U.S. relations, to problems of ecology, those present showed great interest in the ideas and thoughts voiced by Comrade Gorbachev in his report in the Kremlin and at the meeting with the representatives of parties and movements, which threw light on new, major facets of world politics.

[Nestra] Czechoslovak Television, Vlastimil Nestrta. Yesterday, at the meeting of representatives of parties and movements Mikhail Gorbachev said that perestrojka eliminates the fear of the Soviet threat, but at the same time one can hear the view that perestrojka represents a danger to the countries of the West because the Soviet Union will become stronger and, in this context, more dangerous. Can you comment on this?

[Reporter] This question is answered by Academician Arbatov.

[Arbatov] You see, this is indeed already taking place. This is not simply, so to speak, something which lies in the future. Perestrojka does not exist because we have such an aim: We started perestrojka for other reasons because we believe this to be necessary for ourselves. Perestrojka fairly effectively demolishes the stereotypes

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RESEARCH STAFF FILE

that have taken shape, taken shape not by accident, and which, to be precise, have been formulated for a long time about the Soviet Union and the Soviet threat.

For the post-war period this became an indispensable part of the basis of the West's general policies, of its military alliances, of its large military economy, and even of its internal affairs and its internal sense of well-being as it were. After all, you only feel yourself to be "the good empire" when there is "an evil empire" somewhere. This is now being destroyed by virtue of what is being done inside the Soviet Union, because of the highly effective Soviet initiatives already taken and which, of course, will be undertaken also in future.

I think that this means the West needs to restructure, too. Will this represent a threat to the West? I think that it will, for certain people in the West. In the West there are those who deeply linked — and whose prosperity, influence, and revenue, everything — are linked with a definite foreign policy and with definite prejudices and foundations. This will, nevertheless, have to be done; and it will have to be done even though this now appears very improbable to many.

[Reporter] Bulgarian correspondents put two questions simultaneously to Dr. Falin: How did the concept of "new thinking" arise; and a question connected with the shift in the West's position regarding the West German Pershing-1A missiles. In reply it was stated that the new thinking was long and painfully thought out, the result of an objective analysis of the processes taking place. It is the courageous conclusion from the premises that required us to courageously renounce dogmas, to review many of the ideas which have been making themselves felt for decades. At the same time, it was particularly stressed, we regard the new thinking not as a one-time thing, but as a long-term process; at the same time we do not claim to be the final authority on the truth.

[Falin] Concerning your second question about the Pershing-1A's, I would put it this way: If one considers the movement on this question on the part of the West, this is not so much the result of any new thinking but the result of necessity and of the circumstances that have arisen, and which did not leave some of our Western counterparts any choice other than to agree with the quite realistic and objective position, with our objective demands that these systems — here we are talking about U.S. warheads on West German Pershing-1A missiles — should be taken into appropriate consideration and that their solution should be included in the elimination of medium and shorter-range missiles.

Therefore, it is still too early to draw too great conclusions about the future from this shift, which is, nonetheless, highly assessed by the Soviet side as a contribution by the FRG Government, in particular, to the achievement of an accord.

[Reporter] The question about the West German Pershing-1A logically turned the attention of those present at the press centre towards the means of delivering nuclear weapons and towards the nuclear arsenals of certain other West European countries, in particular to those of Britain and France. In this connection, Academician Primakov explained why the USSR had so far left these weapons outside the framework of the talks.

[Primakov] To begin with, at the present stage we thought it possible to concentrate mainly on bilateral, Soviet-U.S. talks, on arms reduction. That is natural because according to various assessments, our two countries have on their hands from 93 to 97% of nuclear missile systems. At some stage, naturally, the inclusion of Britain and France will be essential, as well as the other nuclear powers.

If one is talking about the exclusion of British and France — that is, not taking into account British and French missiles in the medium-range and operational-tactical missile system — I can say here directly that our position is that France and Britain can hardly wage a war against us independently, without the United States. However, if Britain and France were to wage war together with the United States against us, then obviously means exist to insure our security.

[Unidentified reporter] A question from *The London Times*: A recent opinion poll carried out by the French and your Academy of Sciences came to the conclusion that 44% of people here are in favor of removing the Berlin wall, which is 10% more than those who want to keep it. When will you resolve this question, and will there be any change in your position on this?

[Falin] To tell the truth, I do not know the details of the poll you mentioned or what sort of poll it was. Moreover, any questions, especially if they are narrow, give only relatively valuable results. You are asking this question not about the poll, naturally, but in connection with the particular views and interests which you represent. In this connection, I would like to say, quite clearly and definitively, the following:

The real architects of what you call the Berlin Wall were not the USSR and the GDR but the three Western Powers, the FRG, and certain forces in West Berlin. They built this wall for which the GDR had to pay more than 150 billion marks — that's what was stolen through West Berlin. Consequently, when you say the existing system of maintaining order on the frontier should undergo certain changes, changes for the better, obviously one must see that the prerequisites for such changes are created in the West.

For the rest, I would like to remind you of the statements by the GDR leadership on this question, primarily by Erich Honecker, general secretary of the SED Central Committee, who said that the GDR would continue its efforts to normalize relations, including its relations with

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the FRG and West Berlin; and within the framework of these efforts, if there is sufficient understanding and response from the Western side, there could be positive changes.

[Reporter] At the press conference, considerable attention was devoted to the upcoming Soviet-USSR summit. In this regard, a question was asked about the visit of U.S. Secretary of State Shultz to Moscow and the trip by Comrade Shevardnadze, the Soviet minister of foreign affairs, to Washington prior to the reaching of an accord about the visit by Comrade Gorbachev to the United States. A Western reporter formulated it as follows: Did changes take place in the Soviet stance on the eve of the accord on a summit meeting?

[Arbatov] I can't quite see what you are getting at when you speak about the changes which took place in the Soviet stance after the talks, after Shultz' visit to Moscow. During Shultz' visit to Moscow, many outstanding questions on the treaty on medium- and shorter-range missiles were tackled and resolved. A discussion took place on a number of other questions connected with Soviet-U.S. relations and the summit meeting. The Soviet side was looking for an opportunity to bring the positions closer together, but I don't see any other radical changes in the Soviet stance. Strictly speaking, the foundations for all this had already been laid beforehand.

[Falin] I would to more precisely describe what took place after Shultz' visit to Moscow: A rapprochement of the positions of the two sides has taken place. Thanks to this rapprochement, at the basis of which lay mutual efforts, agreement was reached on the agenda of the summit meeting, and some other questions were resolved which gave the go ahead for such a meeting. I repeat: The efforts were mutual, not one-sided it is accordingly quite hard to speak of changes only on the Soviet side.

[Primakov] May I say a few words? Let's reconstruct the chain of events. A month ago Minister of Foreign Affairs Shevardnadze was in Washington. He made two proposals that, from our point of view, would promote the resolution of the question of a 50% reduction in strategic offensive forces in conjunction with the preservation of the ABM treaty. The first is a definite specification of the laboratories where tests can be carried out. The second is the proposal of a list, apart from which everything can be tested in space. This was received positively by the U.S. side, judging from Shultz' first reaction. It is natural that when Shultz arrived here...it is quite clear that it was this topic that we wished to push ahead with; and it was advanced, in that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev made new proposals in the direction of posing and resolving this question in the future, and a definite schedule for resolving this question was outlined.

[Reporter] In the replies to the press conference participants it was stressed that the Soviet Union does not intend to reduce the scope of its foreign policy to

relations with only the United States. What takes place in them today is undoubtedly extremely important. This is of importance to the entire world. But given this, Soviet policy will not lose sight of the relations with other countries, especially with neighboring ones. It was on the same note that relations with countries of the Third World were examined. Academician Primakov said that radical solutions are required to eliminate neocolonialism. We must finally end the absolutely abnormal conditions in international trade resulting from the activities of multinational monopolies. Our country is entirely in favor of resolving this question, which is connected with the huge foreign debt accumulated by these states. The Soviet Union has always supported the just demands of the developing countries.

A few Western journalists raised the role of the U.S. military-industrial complex, and its influence on Washington's foreign policy; they claimed that its influence is not very great, that the military-industrial conglomerate is allegedly no longer an obstacle to Soviet-U.S. talks.

[Unidentified woman reporter] I have a question for all three of you: The traditional Soviet viewpoint is that the military-industrial complex determines the policy of the White House, and that the military-industrial complex in the United States is not only hostile and suspicious toward the Soviet Union, but is also trying to obstruct agreements. We are now on the brink of an agreement on intermediate armaments. What has changed in the United States? Has the military-industrial complex lost its significance?

[Arbatov] The term "military-industrial complex" was not invented by Marxists or Communists. It was first used by President Eisenhower, a conservative Republican; in his farewell speech when he was leaving the presidency, he warned of the danger of the military-industrial complex. So, if you don't like the term, you must blame the Republicans, since President Eisenhower is no longer with us. As for the fact that it has an influence on U.S. foreign policy, I don't think any serious American doubts this, and I think the person who asked this question also knows it perfectly well. The military-industrial complex has official lobbyists registered in the United States; it has its representatives in the administration, one of whom is about to retire — but I imagine his successor will also have good contacts with the military-industrial complex. That influence is a fact, but Gorbachev also has said — and this is our point of view — that the military-industrial complex is not omnipotent, and the policy of the United States is determined by quite a number of often contradictory factors. We see that even the policy of a very ideologically-inclined administration — I would say the most ideological of the postwar U.S. administrations — is also subject to the influence of these changes. We see what the U.S. politicians are going to have to take into account, but whether this situation will continue, how long it will go on — that is a question that is difficult to answer as

In this connection it was noted at the press conference that developing countries have to spend on armaments a considerable part of their gross national product, which is meagre as it is. This leads to dire economic consequences. Poor countries are thus involved in the arms race.

It was emphasised at the press conference that the Soviet Union does not view new thinking as a temporary process. It regards new thinking as collective wisdom of humanity. We do not claim the ultimate truth. The Soviet Union is interested in widening and deepening contacts, in more vigorous exchange of opinions on all the most important problems of the present: of the prevention of war and of disarmament, the ecological problem and other problems on which the future civilisation and life on earth depend, and the Soviet Union openly states this interest.

see "Lexis"
summary Pg 3

Accuse Weinberger on Missiles

LD051628 Moscow World Service in English
1600 GMT 5 Nov 87

[Text] Dr Georgiy Arbatov, a member of the USSR Academy of Sciences, has described the American Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger's recent statement as an attempt to poison the atmosphere on the eve of the Soviet-American summit. In that statement Mr Weinberger favored the deployment of cruise missiles in Western Europe. At a press conference in Moscow Dr Arbatov voiced the hope that common sense would prevail in the American political circles, especially in the Senate, and that the Soviet proposals to stop the deployment of more intermediate range missiles even before the agreement on scrapping those missiles is signed would be accepted.

USSR Circulates Letter on Human Rights at UN

LD052222 Moscow TASS in English 1953 GMT
5 Nov 87

[Text] New York November 5 TASS—"The Soviet Union actively comes out in favour of developing and strengthening international cooperation in the humanitarian field, including the elaboration of new effective measures within the U.N. framework for the exercise of human rights and basic freedoms", says the USSR's letter which is included in the U.N. secretary-general's report entitled "International Conditions and Human Rights" and circulated at the Third Committee (social, humanitarian and cultural) of the 42nd session of the United Nations General Assembly.

"The Soviet Union's proposal to convene in Moscow a widely representative conference of the states, which participated in the All-European Conference on Security

and Cooperation in Europe, on the entire range of humanitarian issues became an important step in tackling global problems common to mankind", the letter points out.

"The implementation of the proposal would become an important factor in building confidence in relations between states and peoples and in the attainment of the lofty goals of the United Nations".

"The Soviet side proceeds from the assumption that every state has possibilities for raising the level of ensuring human rights and freedoms and that everyone should begin with oneself. Respect for others in conjunction with an objective, self-critical view of one's own society is the real basis for developing and strengthening cooperation in the name of increasingly full exercise of human rights and freedoms", the letter emphasizes.

"The Soviet Union shows through concrete acts its commitment to this principle, engaging in active work to democratise all aspects of social life, to strengthen legality and order on the basis of broader openness and strict observance of the principle of social justice".

The document conveys a proposal to strengthen the treaty basis of international cooperation in the exercise of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights of man.

PRAVDA Reports Issyk-kul Forum Swiss Meeting

PM051159 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 31 Oct 87
Second Edition p 6

[Report by A. Zolotov: "With Faith in the Future"]

[Text] The small town of Wengen in Switzerland provided the name for the second meeting of participants in the "Issyk-kul forum" held in Kirghizia a year ago. Nearly all the participants in the first Issyk-kul meeting came to Switzerland.

"The renewal of thought in rapidly flowing reality—that is our aim. It is essential to return to ideals, it is essential to understand and eliminate all obstacles on the path of new thinking, it is essential to liberate ourselves from the concept of the enemy—the most stagnant phenomenon in present-day spiritual life." Peter Ustinov said. His opinion was shared by all those who gathered in Wengen, including eminent figures of modern culture—the forum's president, C. Aytmatov, the American writer A. Miller, the Hungarian sculptor I. Varga, the French architect Roger Taillibert. All agreed that only a creative approach to problems of the present day, only the revelation of all the potential of the human individual can unite mankind on the paths of a new awareness of the reality of today and tomorrow.

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LEXIS

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1ST STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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TASS

November 26, 1987, Thursday

LENGTH: 245 words

HEADLINE: ACADEMICIAN ARBATOV ON NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

DATELINE: MOSCOW, NOVEMBER 26

BODY:

AS NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE BEING STOCKPILED, IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THE SPHERE OF THE USE OF THE FORCE OF ARMS IN POLITICS IS STEADILY ON THE DECLINE, WHILE POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ARE COMING TO THE FOREGROUND. THIS WAS STATED TODAY AT A BRIEFING FOR SOVIET AND FOREIGN JOURNALISTS BY DIRECTOR OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE U.S. AND CANADIAN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES ACADEMICIAN GEORGY ARBATOV.

THE WAY TO REALIZING THIS FACT HAS BEEN LONG, SAID GEORGY ARBATOV. IN THE RECENT YEARS WE ARE WITNESSING THE ARMS RACE HAVING REACHED AN ABSURD POINT: THE QUANTITY OF THE MEANS OF DESTRUCTION HAS COME TO EXCEED MANY TIMES THE QUANTITY NEEDED TO DESTROY ALL LIVING ON EARTH. THE HORRIBLE "NUCLEAR WINTER" EFFECT AND THE PERNICIOUS MEDICAL AFTERMATH OF THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAVE BECOME CLEAR. A MIGHTY WAVE OF ANTI-NUCLEAR ACTIONS HAS REACHED VERY BROAD PROPORTIONS. AND, AT LONG LAST, REALISATION OF THIS FACT HAS FOUND REFLECTION IN POLITICS.

THE SOVIET SIDE TAKES PRIDE IN THE FACT THAT IT IS EXACTLY THE SOVIET UNION THAT HAS BEEN THE FIRST TO INITIATE THE PROGRAM OF FULL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS TILL THE END OF THE CENTURY. THE DRAFT TREATY ON ELIMINATION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN MEDIUM- AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES, WHICH IS TO BE SIGNED AT A SUMMIT MEETING IN WASHINGTON, IS THE FIRST STEP FROM CONTROL OVER ARMAMENTS TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT. IT IS A MODEST STEP, BUT IT MIGHT PROVE TO BE SIGNIFICANT, GEORGY ARBATOV UNDERLINED.

3RD STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

The Xinhua General Overseas News Service

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NOVEMBER 5, 1987, THURSDAY

LENGTH: 197 words

HEADLINE: ~~weinberger accused of spoiling atmosphere before soviet-u.s summit~~

DATELINE: moscow, november 5; ITEM NO: 1105163

BODY:

a senior soviet official thursday accused u.s. defense secretary caspar weinberger of spoiling the upcoming soviet-u.s. summit by his insistence on deploying land-based missiles in europe until the ratification of the soviet-u.s. inf accord by the u.s. senate. weinberger has recently said that the united states and its allies will continue to deploy their land-based missiles in europe until the senate approves the agreement on eliminating the intermediate nuclear forces (inf). commenting on weinberg's remarks, director of the institute for u.s. and canada study at the soviet academy of sciences, georgy arbatov, told a press conference tuesday that "this is not the first time that weinberger is spoiling the atmosphere on the eve of a summit." "of course, he is not the only one," arbatov said, adding that there are other people in the u.s. administration against the agreement. he hoped that "the senate will ratify the agreement," arbatov said. soviet leader mikhail gorbachev will meet u.s. president ronald reagan in washington on december 7 to sign an agreement on scraping the two superpowers' medium-and shorter-range missiles.

4TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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The Reuter Library Report

September 10, 1987, Thursday, PM cycle

LENGTH: 302 words

HEADLINE: REAGAN SPEECHES SUGGEST LACK OF STRENGTH, SOVIET EXPERT SAYS

DATELINE: MOSCOW, Sept 10

KEYWORD: SOVIET-REAGAN

BODY:

A Soviet expert on U.S. affairs said on Thursday President Reagan's recent statements on superpower relations suggested he lacked strength and self-assurance.

"Despite all the brashness, even the impudence of these statements, they do not convey the impression of strength and confidence in himself," Georgy Arbatov, who heads the Soviet Union's USA and Canada Institute, said.

"The opposite is more likely: these are the speeches of a leader who has been compelled to go on the defensive by events themselves," Arbatov wrote in the Communist Party daily Pravda.

Arbatov's article followed Soviet media attacks on a speech about East-West affairs that Reagan gave in Los Angeles on August 26 and in a subsequent presidential radio address.

Press commentaries poured scorn on Reagan's call for Moscow to give public details of its military budget, and criticised him for suggesting the Soviet Union should tear down the Berlin Wall and encourage Western-style elections in Eastern Europe.

Arbatov said the tone of Reagan's statements could not conceal his desire for an accord on medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles that would permit a summit with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

"Why does he need it so badly now, at the end of his presidency? The president was able to realise even in the first years of his tenure that an open policy of irreconcilable enmity to the Soviet Union and runaway militarism is out of favour both at home and abroad," Arbatov said.

"It should not be ruled out that President Reagan has become aware that the ability to make a noticeable contribution to the cause of peace and nuclear arms cuts has nowadays become the most important yardstick of a politician's wisdom.

"But the president's latest speeches have been disappointing in this respect," Arbatov added.

SUBJECT: DIPLOMATIC; COMMUNISM, COMMUNISTS

9TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

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FEBRUARY 18, 1987, WEDNESDAY, AM CYCLE

LENGTH: 150 words

KEYWORD: DISSIDENT-BEGUN

BODY:

"I THINK THIS IS ONE OF THE EXAMPLES OF THE NEW TREND OF LIBERALISATION."

THE SOVIET UNION HAS SAID 150 DISSIDENTS HAVE BEEN FREED THIS MONTH FROM LABOUR CAMPS, JAIL OR EXILE AND A FURTHER 140 CASES WERE UNDER REVIEW.

FOREIGN MINISTRY SPOKESMAN GENNADY GERASIMOV SAID TODAY THAT BEGUN'S CASE WAS LIKELY TO BE RESOLVED "IN A POSITIVE WAY."

BEGUN, A 56-YEAR-OLD MATHEMATICIAN AND HEBREW TEACHER, WAS SENTENCED IN OCTOBER 1983 TO SEVEN YEARS IN A STRICT REGIME LABOUR CAMP AND FIVE YEARS INTERNAL EXILE FOR PUBLISHING AND DISTRIBUTING LITERATURE OFFICIALLY CONSIDERED ANTI-SOVIET.

BEGUN'S RELEASE WAS REPORTED IN AN INTERVIEW ON U.S. TELEVISION ON SUNDAY BY GEORGY ARBATOV, HEAD OF THE USA AND CANADA INSTITUTE AND A COMMUNIST PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER.

TODAY BEGUN'S SON BORIS TOLD REPORTERS IN MOSCOW HE HAD SPOKEN TO ARBATOV WHO SAID HE HAD MISINTERPRETED A REMARK BY ANOTHER OFFICIAL.

17TH STORY of Level 1 printed in FULL format.

Proprietary to the United Press International 1987

February 17, 1987, Tuesday, PM cycle

SECTION: International

LENGTH: 606 words

BYLINE: By ANNA CHRISTENSEN

DATELINE: MOSCOW

KEYWORD: Begun

BODY:

The son of imprisoned Hebrew teacher Yosif Begun, saying he feared his father would not be freed, announced today he would go on a hunger strike until the dissident returned home.

The dissident's wife, Inna, who Monday expressed fears the government and the KGB secret police had not coordinated their actions in the case, telephoned officials to find out if her husband would be freed.

'I wait,' she said. 'There is nothing left to do but continue to call the MVD' -- the Ministry of Internal Affairs, which oversees the penal system.

After a week of protest for the release of the Hebrew teacher, sentenced in 1983 to 12 years in prison and exile for anti-Soviet agitation, Soviet Central Committee member Georgy Arbatov told CBS News Sunday that Begun 'is now free.'

But the family said today that Begun apparently was still at Chistopol prison, about 500 miles east of Moscow.

'I see that Arbatov's statement wasn't true,' said the dissident's son, Boris. 'I will be on a hunger strike in prison until he is home.'

The younger Begun delivered the comment at a protest by Jewish dissidents Feodor and Lilya Finkel in front of KGB headquarters. The brother and sister are pressing for their family's right to emigrate to Israel. Finkel's wife, Svetlana Mayatnikova, suffers from ovarian cancer.

'I don't know what to think,' Inna Begun said Monday. 'The problem seems to be that Arbatov is a representative of the government and my husband is in the hands of the KGB' -- the Soviet secret police.

Boris Begun said Internal Affairs Ministry official Vladimir Bychkov told him 'my father is at Chistopol (prison) and that they have not received any directives about freeing him.'

'I hope that this is just a bureaucratic problem,' Boris Begun said. 'It just cannot be possible that Arbatov would tell the world he is now free if he is not.'

Proprietary to the United Press International, February 17, 1987

Instead of meeting trains arriving from the Tatar region, where Chistopol is located, Mrs. Begun said she went Monday to the procurator's office to appeal for a pardon for her husband -- a move Soviet officials suggested last week.

"It's as though nothing has happened," she said.

In his interview on the CBS program "Face The Nation," Arbatov claimed Begun's case "was in the process of reassessment" when the demonstrations began and contended the protests only delayed his release.

But his comments conflicted with earlier statements by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov, who said Begun's case was not under review because he had not applied for a pardon.

Adding to the confusion was a Tass news agency report Friday that Begun's release is "in principle a closed case," wording that could be interpreted either way.

Inmates released in a recent pardon of political prisoners, an action widely seen as an attempt by Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev to relax policies on dissent, said Begun's health had deteriorated after his food and exercise privileges were reduced by officials at the prison, 500 miles east of Moscow.

Five days of silent demonstrations calling for the release of Begun and easier emigration for Soviet Jews ended Friday in an attack by police agents who kicked and beat both demonstrators and Western reporters.

Boris Begun was among those arrested and ordered to turn themselves in Wednesday to serve a 15-day sentence for "hooliganism."

"I do not intend to go to the station on Wednesday. Their sentence is not fair," he said Monday. "But the KGB has been following me night and day, and I'm sure they will solve the question for me."

"Really, I cannot understand what is going on any more," he said.

Is the Real Aim The Status Quo?

A SOVIET ANALYSIS OF REAGAN'S MOTIVES

ПРАВДА

By GEORGI ARBATOV

Soviet-American relations have entered a complex and crucial stage. President Reagan's recent speeches have been marked by an intensely anti-Soviet tone — the kind to which we had begun to become disaccustomed. On the other hand, even during an anti-Soviet tirade, Reagan cannot conceal his desire to reach an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on something (in this case, medium-range and tactical missiles) that would make it possible to hold a summit meeting.

An amusing paradox emerges. The U.S. seems to be extending an invitation, but in terminology once used to issue challenges to duels. The Americans seem to be assuring us that they will continue to be implacably hostile, but at the same time they are hinting: Do not take our attitude too seriously; we intend to work toward a treaty and a meeting.

These obvious contradictions provide food for thought. Above all, why does Ronald Reagan, despite the steadfastness of his anti-Soviet convictions, so badly need a summit meeting and an impressive agreement with the Soviet Union in the twilight of his presidency? One thinks primarily of Irangate, the political scandal that undermined the president's reputation, but I perceive other, deeper motives.

During his first years in office, Reagan decided that implacable hostility toward the U.S.S.R. and unbridled militarism were not working either at home or abroad. Those policies frightened the American people and generated opposition. Reacting to the mounting political protests, in 1982 Reagan returned to the negotiating table with the U.S.S.R. to discuss arms control and gave a pledge (which he broke four years later) to honor the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II). He was convinced that he could not carry out a military buildup in the absence of some gesture designed to persuade the public of his readiness to reduce arms.

Unfortunately, the U.S. often uses negotiations to accelerate the arms race and to undermine resistance to military

preparations. The opposition is told, "We are striving for disarmament, but until there is something to sign, we have to arm ourselves." Before Reykjavik, the White House persuaded Congress — in order not to tie the President's hands at the summit meeting — to drop resolutions that modified military preparations. There is now talk in the U.S. that the President may repeat this maneuver.

One cannot reject the possibility that President Reagan's interest in a Soviet-American summit meeting and an arms agreement is based to some extent on honest motives. It is said that Reagan would like to go down in history as a great statesman, and that he believes that the most important criterion of political leadership is the ability to make a notable contribution to peace and to a reduction in nuclear arms. In this context, Reagan's latest speeches have been a harsh disappointment, because they embody not only the old anti-Soviet emotions but also certain political calculations.

What I have in mind is not simply the president's wish to butter up his critics on the right with his anti-Soviet rhetoric, nor a common human weakness — a reluctance to admit old mistakes — that compels the president to prove that he was always right in his policy and statements about the U.S.S.R. These things are not innocuous, but they probably are not dangerous, either. What is disturbing is that in placing such emphasis on anti-Sovietism precisely at this crucial point, the president seems to be confining future policy changes in Soviet-American relations to a narrow framework. A summit meeting? Yes. And if such a meeting requires an arms agreement, then maybe that will be necessary as well.

None of this is supposed to allow a summit meeting to become an important step forward in reducing arms or in détente. Isn't Reagan justifying the premise that in principle everything will and should remain as it was? The Americans have an expression — "self-fulfilling prophecy" — to describe predictions when the person making them is also intent on making them come true. Isn't that the plan of the American leader?

After Reykjavik, as if in revenge for the nearly reached agreement, Washington tore up SALT II. Are the Americans now taking aim at the last surviving agreement on nuclear arms, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, in order to remove all restrictions from the strategic arms race, both on Earth and in space?

President Reagan has begun to justify the tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations by making rude attacks on the Soviet Union. He calls this "candor" and says it contributes to the peace process. His presidency has been marked by provocations such as the malicious fabrication about the Soviet Union's use of chemical weapons in Indochina and Afghanistan ("yellow rain"), the attempt to cast a shadow on the U.S.S.R. and Bulgaria in connection with the assassination attempt on the Pope (the infamous "Bulgarian trail"), and the campaign in connection with the tragic demise of the South Korean plane. Such "candor" engenders nothing but mutual distrust and enmity.

From the Communist Party daily "Pravda" of Moscow. Georgi Arbatov is director of the Institute for the Study of the U.S. and Canada.

The contentiousness and effrontery of Reagan's latest speeches do not convey strength or self-confidence. Rather the opposite, these speeches portray a leader who has been forced by events to become defensive. With the changes in world attitudes that have accelerated thanks to new Soviet political initiatives, the politicians of the cold war suddenly find themselves languishing — like fish stranded on the sand during an ebb tide.

Leaders of this ilk have never had positive programs. They have always fought not for but against. Only with the existence of a "mortal enemy" have they been able to pass for great patriots. In the late 1940s and early 1950s, their careers were built on anti-communism and anti-Sovietism. It is difficult for them to adapt to everything that is meant in our country by *perestroika* (restructuring) and new political thinking, because they need the Soviet Union as an enemy.

Now that the old image of "the enemy" is being eroded as a result of profound changes in the Soviet Union, American politicians of the Reagan type are losing their foothold. They are beginning to get nervous. Hence the abuse; hence the strong language.

With the likelihood of arms negotiations in the near future, it is time for the darkness of prejudice and hostility in Soviet-American relations to give way to a dawn of realism and common sense. But when will that dawn come? ■

Caution and Doubt In Europe

ASSESSING GORBACHEV'S INTENTIONS

THE INDEPENDENT

By LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Western Europeans are sounding notes of caution following the announcement that the long-awaited intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty is almost ready for signature. We must not get euphoric, they insist. Relations with the East may be improving, but there is still a long way to go. Only a fraction of the world's nuclear arsenals will be removed through this agreement. The missiles to be scrapped will make a disproportionate dent in NATO strategy.

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher argues that there can be no more nuclear disarmament in Europe until the imbalance in conventional forces is corrected and something is done about chemical weapons. Her foreign secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, describes the deal as "the beginning of the beginning." It is hard to be more cautious than that.

Yet Western leaders are aware of a mounting excitement that it might be possible to put East-West relations on a new footing. Few can doubt that the atmosphere has improved dramatically, but there remains great uncertainty as to how far the improvement can go. What underlies this caution is the fact that the West has yet to make up its mind about the Gorbachev phenomenon.

Since Mrs. Thatcher pronounced Mikhail Gorbachev to be someone she could "do business with," his competence and intelligence have never been in doubt. He appears to be a reformer, a pragmatist rather than an ideologue, anxious to open Soviet society, divert resources from military to civilian sectors, and relax international tensions. But doubts and suspicions still remain.

Doubt one: Gorbachev is not a reformer. Those suspicious of Gorbachev argue that he was chosen to represent the acceptable face of communism. He may be a stylish phrase-maker, able to hold his own with the Western media, but the prime Soviet objective is still to undermine liberal democracy and the Atlantic alliance. Furthermore, his domestic initiatives hardly amount to a reform of the system. For every dissident released, there are plenty still in prison.

From the daily "Independent" of London.



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NBC News

M E E T T H E P R E S S

Sunday, April 19, 1987

GUESTS:

RICHARD N. PERLE
Assistant Secretary of State for
International Security Policy

REPRESENTATIVE JIM WRIGHT (D., Tex.)
Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives

DR. GEORGI A. ARBATOV
Director, U.S.A. and Canada Institute
of the U.S.S.R.

MODERATOR:

Marvin Kalb - NBC News

PANEL:

Ann Garrels - NBC News
Robert Kaiser - The Washington Post

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Mr. Kalb (on tape): "The issue for everyone these days is U.S.-Soviet relations, the chances of an arms control agreement, signed, sealed and delivered at another summit meeting later this year, the key spade work done in Moscow within recent days by Secretary of State George Shultz in his meetings with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and by House Speaker Jim Wright in his meetings with top Kremlin leaders. Everyone knows any agreement of this sort must have Congressional support. Our guests today play major roles in this diplomatic drama: From Moscow, Dr. Georgi Arbatov, Director of the Institute on the USA and Canada, a member of the Supreme Soviet and a close advisor to Gorbachev; from West Berlin, the speaker of the House, Congressman Jim Wright of Texas, fresh from meetings with Gorbachev in Moscow; and, from Washington, the assistant secretary of defense, Richard Perle, one of the principal architects of this administration's policy on arms control. He was in Moscow this week. They are our guests today on 'Meet the Press,' Sunday, April 19th, 1987."

MR. KALB: Hello, and welcome once again. I'm Marvin Kalb. President Reagan has been in office now almost six and a half years, a very rocky road in U.S.-Soviet relations. But in the last 18 months he has met twice with Soviet leader Gorbachev and a third summit between them later this year now seems a distinct possibility, a summit to sign a new arms control agreement. Despite many ongoing problems in the super power relationship, the mood in both capitals is decidedly upbeat.

Joining me for our interviews today are two of my colleagues: Ann Garrels, who covered Secretary Shultz's mission to Moscow this week, NBC's State Department correspondent; and, Robert Kaiser, an assistant managing editor of The Washington Post and a student of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Dr. Arbatov, let's begin. I'd like to get your judgment, sir, of the mood in Moscow. Do you, yourself, feel that there is going to be a summit later this year and there will be a new arms control agreement signed?

DR. ARBATOV: It looks more possible, but I'm tremendously cautious. You know, the whole story of trying to reach an arms control agreement shows a major political asymmetry. All the time we don't take the American offer -- an answer -- and the Americans all the time don't take Soviet yes for an answer. And we balance up and then it looks better and then somebody throws in a monkey wrench and then it goes worse, so I am cautious. But I would say there was never such a chance given to any president of the United States as now to have really important steps in normalization of Soviet-American relations and putting an end to arms race. How it will be used, it's up to the United States.

MR. KAISER: Dr. Arbatov, there's a certain amount of confusion in Washington about the Soviet position. You seemed to have flip-flopped twice now in the last year. First, the INF European agreement was delinked from space weapons and strategic weapons. Then it got linked again in Reykjavik. Now, you've delinked again and said it's okay to have a separate European agreement. Why is the Soviet position bouncing back and forth this way?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, this is Robert Kaiser, I think.

MR. KAISER: That's right.

DR. ARBATOV: Yes. You know, you put it in a very wrong way, I think. I don't call it flip-flop, I call it real flexibility and attempt to untie the knot and really to open the way for the agreement. And the Americans made an opposite real flip-flop. We accept their proposal and then they say, no, they need something else. We say, okay, it's okay with something else, in this case, the smaller range weapons. And then another problem is there. Is not yet there. I hope it won't be there. But the usual way of this is such -- and this is just what I started with. We see, you know, the third participant in our talk today, Mr. Perle, I would call him not the principal architect of arms control policy. He is the principal monkey wrench thrower in the arms control machine. And there are a lot of such people.

I am always cautious. They invent something. They have

tremendous ingenuity in derailing arms control attempts and somehow freezing the atmosphere. They hope that the moment really comes when we'll have it.

MS. GARRELS: Mr. Arbatov, you've talked about flexibility. You've now proposed zero shorter range missiles. House Speaker Jim Wright suggests that you're willing to compromise this. Are you willing to allow the Europeans to match some of those shorter range missiles and not have zero, but at least a few?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, actually -- actually, from the beginning it was your proposal. Your people said that the European complaint -- Europeans complained that you cannot do away with INF missiles in Europe, because Soviet Union -- that I remember Mrs. Margaret Thatcher very much -- how eloquent she was. You cannot do it because there is one to nine superiority -- nine to one superiority in favor of Soviet Union in the smaller range missiles. And we said, okay, let's do away with them. Now, they have a second thought.

MS. GARRELS: Well, what about that second thought?

DR. ARBATOV: Well, we don't have it at the table. I am absolutely sure by the way it is handled that there will be some hooks hidden in it which will simply derail it. Why not to do away with all of them? You know, you call it arms control. United States will have to create an absolutely new and very expensive weapons system in order to reach the ceiling and the Soviet Union proposes to do away in a very short period, after one year, with all its shorter range missiles so that United States of America will not be in need of creating this new weapons system. What is unfair here? It's not arms control what you propose. It's, you know, lowering the ceiling of Soviet weapons and creating new American weapons.

MS. GARRELS: So, Mr. Wright was wrong when he thought a compromise was in the wind?

DR. ARBATOV: I don't know what Mr. Wright thought. I think our position was reasonable. It was explained in presence

of Mr. Wright by Mr. Gorbachev. And he said that this is just unreasonable, if we propose to do away with the whole class of this weapons, to strive for creating some and please -- trying to perceive the Soviet don't do away with all of them, please keep them.

MR. KAISER: Mr. Gorbachev created a bit of a sensation here with his suggestion that the United States should create separate areas for blacks and other minorities. Is that what he really meant or did we misunderstand him?

DR. ARBATOV: Oh, no, no, it was somebody's invention. He doesn't interfere into your internal affairs. It's your habit to interfere in ours.

MR. KALB: Dr. Arbatov, I'm sorry, but our time is up for this particular segment. Thanks very much for being our guest today. In a moment, from West Berlin, the speaker of the House Jim Wright who followed Secretary Shultz into Gorbachev's office this week. "Meet the Press" returns right after these messages.

(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: We are back on "Meet the Press" with the speaker of the House, Congressman Jim Wright of Texas, who comes to us from West Berlin, and who met this week in Moscow with Gorbachev and other top Kremlin leaders. Mr. Speaker, you are quoted as saying at a news conference just before you left Moscow that this is the best opportunity since World War II to make real peace between the two super powers. What did you mean by real peace?

REP. WRIGHT: I think peace is not just the absence of armed conflict, but a condition of understanding and an effort on the part of both to try to accommodate the other. If I am any judge of things, this is the best opportunity we've had since World War II. Always before the leaders in the Kremlin were military men who believed in military spending as the be all and end all of their existence and they wanted to bury us with military spending.

I think now we have a new group, not just one man, but a group, urbane and sophisticated and articulate with some understanding

of our processes and some respect for our processes, men with a sense of humor, people who are willing to answer our questions very directly and to let us see all those things we asked to see, including Chernobyl. So, I think there is a better chance than there has been. I don't want to be a roseate in my predictions. We still have a long way to go. But I do discern a flexibility that hasn't been there before.

MR. KAISER: Are you suggesting, Mr. Speaker, that there's been really a fundamental change in the political culture of the Soviet Union that -- a system that used to depend entirely for much of legitimacy in strength on military power -- has suddenly changed its stripes and doesn't care about that any more?

REP. WRIGHT: Oh, no, I don't think we can say that the Soviet Union measures up to our standards of human rights. It surely doesn't. It never has. There's been some movement. We talked with Mr. Ligachev, the second in command and the director of party affairs, as I understand their system. I believe he told us that they are going to insist this year that there are a number of candidates for each office and not just one. They're attempting to create a greater degree of flexibility at the local level and plant management. They're trying to create some almost capitalistic systems of incentives for workers to improve their productivity and they're granting more freedom to writers. They have said that they have released thirteen hundred more people for immigration out of their country in the first three months of this year than they did in the first three months of last year.

All that's movement in the right direction, but it's like looking at a glacier. The Soviet Union is a huge ponderous thing. Any movement at all, I think, is significant.

MS. GARRELS: Mr. Wright, are you not concerned, though, with all this enthusiasm for an agreement with the Soviets that the pressure might be such that the U.S. will agree to an arms control agreement that is less than adequate, for instance, where verification is not what the U.S. originally wanted?

REP. WRIGHT: Well, I think there are people, of course, who do not want an arms control agreement. There are those who want to continue the cold war and the arms race. But we've reached a point where it's to our advantage, it seems to me, to get a legitimate arms control agreement, one that is mutual and is verifiable because then we can begin to make some dent in these huge deficits. We're spending \$300 billion this year on military weaponry and things of military might because we're afraid of what the Soviets would do to us if we didn't. They're spending a like amount, because I suppose in one sense they're afraid of what we'd do to them if they didn't and it's really insane isn't it? The world has enough explosives and enough nuclear weapons to blow all of us to kingdom come several times over and so it would just seem to make sense from our standpoint to try to get a little bit of a lessening in the demand for ever more military spending to keep up with the Soviet Union.

MR. KAISER: Mr. Speaker, some people here seem to get the impression that Gorbachev is sort of desperate to help Ronald Reagan, that he keeps changing his position in order to make a deal and help Reagan when he's down. What's your reading on Gorbachev's motivation?

REP. WRIGHT: Well, I don't think -- I don't think it's a personal matter. I think he's trying to move the peace process forward. There are reasons in his country why that makes sense to them, just as there are reasons in our country why it makes sense to us. Rather than each trying to spend the other into bankruptcy, I think it makes a lot of sense that we can divert some to letting kids go to college. You know, there are a lot of kids that are not going to get to go to college in the United States this year because we're spending so much on military weapons that we don't have enough money for student loans and grants. There are people going sick, that are not getting medical treatment, because we don't have enough for that. And I think they have the same problem that we do. And, so, if there is a more sensible reasonable

constructive approach on both sides where we can slowly build down our weapons so that they're still is a balance and there's safety for us, then it surely is to our advantage. I don't think we ought to leap at just any kind of an arrangement. We have to make sure that it's a good arrangement from our point of view, but I think the chances are better than they've ever been.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to try to clear something up. It is -- Gorbachev is quoted as having told you and other members of the Congress that he thinks that the United States ought to separate states for blacks, Puerto Ricans and Polish Americans.

REP. WRIGHT: No, that's ridiculous.

MR. KALB: Now, Dr. Arbatov said that that's pure fiction. Is it?

REP. WRIGHT: No, no. No, he didn't say anything like that. He's got more sense than that. After all, he's not foolish. He was talking in terms of what they are trying to do to create more integrity for their ethnic minorities in their country. He wasn't suggesting anything of the kind for us. He's got more sense than that. He made it clear that he understands that we have problems that are quite distinct and different from his and that he respects our system. He understands that Congress cannot negotiate and that we are in a supportive role for those in the administrative branch who negotiate. That we legislation and we appropriate. He has a good understanding of our system.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, I'd like to ask you, finally, what are the major roadblocks, as you see it now, toward an agreement that would bring down to zero medium range and even the smaller shorter range?

REP. WRIGHT: I'm not sure there are major roadblocks. I think it depends upon the agreement of our Western allies. We're not going to abandon them. But I have been reading statements today here in West Berlin, this bastion of freedom. Many of our Western allies are very enthusiastic about the idea. Mr. Gorbachev indicated to us that he would be willing to consider either a

global zero-zero option or one that applied only to Europe or something in between and that he was flexible enough that he'd be willing to consider whatever ideas might be in the minds of our Western allies. So, it sounds to me as though there is at least a decent possibility that we can find that elusive thing called peace and it's a wonderful thing to contemplate on this Easter Sunday.

MR. KALB: Mr. Speaker, thanks very much for sharing your time with us on this Easter Sunday. Thanks very much, indeed. In a moment, joining us here in Washington, the assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle. "Meet the Press" will be back right after these messages.

(Announcements.)

MR. KALB: We are back on "Meet the Press" with the assistant secretary of defense Richard Perle who was in Moscow with Secretary Shultz this week and who is the key architect of this administration's policy on arms control. Mr. Secretary, welcome. Dr. Arbatov called you the principal monkey wrench thrower in this administration, so in that spirit, let me ask you what are the obstacles that you see toward reaching this kind of medium range agreement with the Soviet Union.

MR. PERLE: Well, there are some issues that we haven't closed on yet. One of them, and a very important issue, is verification. The Soviets have indicated in general terms that they are prepared to accept our verification proposals, but we don't have anything in writing yet. We don't have the details. And in negotiations of this sort, details are fundamental and until you have them, until the black and white is there and the "i's" are dotted and the "t's" are crossed you can't be sure that you've concluded a successful agreement.

MR. KALB: And what else?

MR. PERLE: We have to settle this question of how to treat shorter range missiles. The Soviets presently have a significant number of them and the United States has none deployed in Europe. The Soviets have responded to our proposals by suggesting that

they're prepared to eliminate theirs, even on a global basis, and this is now a matter for discussion with our allies. We don't impose our own views on our allies. We consult with them and that process of consultation has begun and should be concluded fairly rapidly.

MR. KAISER: A lot of skeptics around town, Mr. Perle-- who say there must be something funny going on if Richard Perle is cheering for arms control agreement. Why is this proposal that's on the table more acceptable to you than many of the predecessors that you've criticized?

MR. PERLE: Well, I think there are a lot of funny skeptics. This proposal to eliminate medium range missiles is one that this administration has supported from the very beginning, from November of 1981. The Soviets now make it appear as though this is a Soviet initiative. It was a Ronald Reagan initiative and it took a lot of people by surprise at the time and as I recall, one of the persistent criticisms at the time was that asking the Soviets to give up medium range missiles in Europe was so demanding that we knew they wouldn't agree and we had, therefore, advanced this proposal disingenuously. I think what has been demonstrated is that with perseverance and persistence, the Soviets can be brought to change their position.

MR. KAISER: Yeah, but when you proposed that, Mr. Secretary, there were no American medium range missiles in Europe. You were proposing an American zero for a lot of Soviet missiles.

MR. PERLE: Well, I don't think we could have achieved the outcome that is now in sight if we hadn't proceeded with that deployment.

MR. KAISER: I was just wondering who was being disingenuous in that description.

MR. PERLE: I think we set a very steady course back in 1981 and if an agreement results from this activity, we will have brought to fruition a proposal that a lot of people have said was impossible, non-negotiable.

MR. KAISER: But also a proposal which doesn't dramatically change the nuclear world. Will this sort of agreement, in your own mind, redeem the Reagan Administration policies in this field if after eight years the only thing you've done is restore a kind of pre 1965 balance in Europe? Is that a big accomplishment?

MR. PERLE: Well, I would happily contrast the Reagan administration management of our national security with previous administrations who permitted our defenses to deteriorate and concluded agreements not like the one we're looking at that would eliminate a category of weapons, but agreements that permitted significant increases in the numbers of weapons. So, I think we'll have a very solid record of accomplishment to leave to the next administration.

MS. GARRELS: But in terms of arms control, this is just one very small part. And the Soviets are still left with strategic weapons which can hit Europe. So, does this really make any difference. Is this just a political victory or does this really mean anything for arms control?

MR. PERLE: I think it makes a difference. It has to be seen in conjunction with other proposals, including the American proposal to reduce by 50 percent the number of strategic weapons.

MS. GARRELS: But those proposals, I gather, went really nowhere during your talks in Moscow, neither on SDI nor on strategic weapons. I mean, there's still just huge blocks left.

MR. PERLE: I think it's clear that the Soviets did not want seriously to discuss the 50 percent reductions and that ought to make us cautious. This isn't the millennium. The Soviets are not laying down their arms, peace isn't going to break out and contrary to Speaker Wright, we're not going to save vast sums of money by eliminating intermediate nuclear weapons in Europe.

On the contrary, in order to provide a more effective conventional military capability, because the Soviets have enormous advantages there, we may actually have to spend more rather than less in order to maintain a reasonable level of security there.

MR. KALB: Mr. Secretary, did Mr. Gorbachev present any new definitions of what acceptable research might be on strategic defense?

MR. PERLE: Well, they have offered a number of definitions that all have the same very dangerous bottom line. It would prevent the United States from continuing with the program of research and development and strategic defense. The Soviets believe in strategic defenses. They have defenses deployed now. They're busy at work on future defenses. They support all forms of defense except our program. And, so, while there are variations from one definition to the next, the bottom line is always the same, we would be compelled to terminate our SDI program.

MR. KAISER: Are you really saying that they're making proposals that would allow them to continue and us not to continue?

MR. PERLE: Oh, absolutely, because the proposals they're making are utterly unverifiable. We wouldn't know whether they were complying or not. And past history -- and we're not going to sweep past history away because the mood is a little more optimistic now. Suggests that when the Soviets find it in their advantage to violate agreements, they will go ahead and do so and I think we would have to anticipate that, particularly in an area as sensitive as what kind of research you can and cannot do.

MS. GARRELS: What about nuclear testing? This amazing idea that seems to have come out of the Soviet Union, that they would actually come here with their own nuclear device and detonate it in a Nevada desert and we would, in turn, go to the Soviet Union with a U.S. device. What would this prove? How would this advance the issue?

MR. PERLE: Well, if each of us tested one weapon, it would help us to calibrate seismic instruments with respect to other tests conducted at precisely the same site. It's not adequate. It's a first step. In order to get real verification of the present limit on nuclear testing, we need to be able to send teams to the Soviet Union and they have to send teams to the United States who

will stand by and measure the yield of those tests when they take place. That's the American proposal. If there is anything real to this Soviet notion of openness, they ought to accept that proposal, because there's no way it could do them any harm and it would give confidence that we knew the yield of their nuclear tests.

MR. KAISER: On a scale of one to ten, what's the odds of a summit and a deal in the next year?

MR. PERLE: Well, I would think the chances are quite good for a summit provided -- I think we have to be very careful in the end game -- because in the end game the details can go horribly wrong -- provided we settled the issue of verification and provided we get a satisfactory solution to the short range missile problem.

MR. KALB: Mr. Secretary, thanks very much. Our time is up. Thanks for being our guest today on "Meet the Press." We have certainly heard a good bit today about U.S. Soviet relations and the possibility of a new arms control agreement and at the moment things do look much better. But that is it for now. Thank you all for joining us. And we'll see you next Sunday.

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TRANSCRIPT

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FACE THE NATION

Sunday, February 15, 1987

CBS Television Network, 10:30 AM - 11:00 AM, ET
and the
CBS Radio Network, 12:30 PM - 1:00 PM, ET

MODERATOR: Lesley Stahl - CBS News National Affairs Correspondent

GUESTS: GEORGI ARBATOV
Soviet Central Committee

REP. DANTE B. FASCELL (D-Florida)
Chairman, House Foreign Affairs Committee

SENATOR RICHARD LUGAR (R-Indiana)
Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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MS. STAHL: Welcome to FACE THE NATION, I'm Lesley Stahl. The Kremlin is releasing political dissidents from Soviet jails. At the same time, peaceful demonstrators in Moscow were being flogged and kicked by plainclothesmen. Soviet leader Gorbachev's new policy of openness appears to be here one minute, gone the next.

GENNADI GERASIMOV/TRANSLATOR: We are looking into softening the law so that fewer people are behind bars and behind barbed wire.

MS. STAHL: Sergei Gorgoriont and 140 other Russian dissidents were released from Soviet jails this week after pledging not to resume their political activities. And there were more signs of openness. Boris Pasternak's novel "Dr. Zhivago" will be published in the Soviet Union for the first time, and Gorbachev called for a more honest approach to Soviet history, including a re-evaluation of the rule of Joseph Stalin.

Now you see openness, now you don't. When foreign reporters tried to cover a demonstration this week in Moscow, plainclothesmen brutally attacked the protesters, as correspondent Wyatt Andrews reported on the CBS Evening News.

WYATT ANDREWS: The worst of the violence was suffered by Jewish "refusenik" Natasha Beckman, who was thrown to the ground and kicked, part of the time in full view of the uniformed militia, who took no action to stop the violence. As in previous days, much of the organized harassment was directed at Western reporters. The violence is subtle, usually kicks to the legs and punches to the kidneys.

MS. STAHL: The mixed signals continue. Andrei Sakharov gave what was described as a fearless speech to a group of visiting Americans in which he criticized human rights policies in his own country. Gorbachev seemed to be winning the global public relations war. As he was releasing dissidents this week, the news in Washington was that President Reagan was leaning toward a new interpretation of the ABM treaty that would allow the U.S. to go forward with SDI, or the Star Wars program.

How genuine is Gorbachev's campaign of democratization? We'll ask Georgi Arbatov, member of the Soviet Central Committee, and, in the U.S., Democrat Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and Republican Richard Lugar of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Russia's new openness, how will it affect U.S.-Soviet relations?--an issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, FACE THE NATION, with CBS News National Affairs Correspondent Lesley Stahl.

This portion of FACE THE NATION is sponsored by the financial professionals at Paine Webber.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Joining us now from Moscow, CBS News Moscow correspondent Wyatt Andrews. Wyatt, could you try to put some context into what has been happening in the Soviet Union? In the past week the Kremlin releases 140 dissidents. In the same week they send plainclothesmen in to brutally put down what appeared to be a peaceful demonstration. You were at that demonstration. How do you explain in your own mind the conflicting signals?

MR. ANDREWS: Lesley, there really is no way to explain it simply, because there's no -- because the process that the Soviets are seeing their country undergoing now is not a simple one. In fact, after the two reports we put on the evening news this week detailing how the plainclothesmen seemed to have some sort of authorization, we were even chided by some of the Jewish intellectual community here for not pointing out that -- what this evidenced; that is, the dissidents being released in the beginning of the week and the protesters and the newsmen being kicked at the end of the week -- how that was evidence that Mr. Corbachev is not in complete control of the KGB. I just don't have the evidence on that either way.

What we are seeing clearly -- and your summation at the beginning of this broadcast summed it up very well--we are seeing a snapshot in the history of the development of openness in the Soviet Union. This is the tale of two countries. Both of these

images of the Soviet Union are genuine and true.

And I think whether or not Mr. Gorbachev ordered the crackdown on the protest this week, whether or not it was ordered at some level lower than that, almost misses the point. There is genuine democratization going on in the Soviet Union; I think we should all be impressed. At the same time we should be impressed with the fact that this is a process; he can't legislate it, no one can legislate it here overnight. And it is a process that will be glacial.

MS. STAHL: Wyatt, you were at the demonstration. I understand that our CBS crew was detained. Can you tell us exactly what happened? Were newsmen really hurt? Were the demonstrators, some of them women -- most of them women actually -- really hurt? What happened?

MR. ANDREWS: I'm not really sure, I'm not a good judge of that. I think that one of the Jewish women was hurt, I mean suffered bruises. It seemed to be the intent of the thugs that were out there not to hurt us; in fact, our sound man related an incident to me in which one of the thugs reared back with his fist and then held off with the obvious intent being that they were brutally and physically serious about us not taking pictures, but stopped short of actually inflicting physical harm, the kicks to the back and the kicks to the kidneys that our crew suffered were not serious enough to go to the hospital or anything like that. The intent was to stop us from taking pictures, again not to put us in any physical danger.

MS. STAHL: Wyatt, do you have any qualms about being completely honest right now in your reporting? Do you feel any limitation on what you can say as you report back from the Soviet Union?

MR. ANDREWS: None, absolutely none. There is no censorship of our reports from here. If Soviet television, for example, is not on board, if you will, with the report that we are about to put on the air, they have on occasion denied us the use of these

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very facilities that I'm using right now, so there's indirect censorship in that sense. But once I get to these facilities I am under no pressure to say it their way.

MS. STAHL: Okay, thank you very much, Wyatt Andrews from Moscow. We will be back with a Soviet official in a moment.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: We go back to Moscow now to Georgi Arbatov, member of the Soviet Central Committee and a senior advisor to Mikhail Gorbachev on East-West relations. Mr. Arbatov, everyone in this country has been impressed with your policy of "glasnost," or openness, but we are now confused when we see television pictures of official plainclothesmen beating up peaceful demonstrators. How can you explain to us how these two incidents can happen in one week, brutal crackdown and release of 140 dissidents? What does it mean?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you have to put into proportion everything. A process is going on and Mr. Andrews, I think, grasped it in a correct way, it is a real process of democratization intended not at all to impress you -- we don't care too much about this, though we care, of course, to some degree. It's what we need, it's our problems, we have to sort them out. And so it's regarded here. On the other side, you had, you know, very strange things which many people here accept as a provocation just to make things more difficult. You know, Mr. Begune, because of whom all the demonstrations started, his case was in the process, you know, of re-assessment, and he would have been free several days ago wouldn't it be for this demonstration. He is free now, I can tell you--well, the resolution ---

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MS. STAHL: He is?

MR. ARBATOV: Yes, it's already done.

MS. STAHL: Let's explain who he is.

MR. ARBATOV: I think it is correctly done.

MS. STAHL: Let's explain, if we can, who he is.

MR. ARBATOV: That despite this provocation, we did it.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, let's explain who Mr. Begune is. He is one of the Jewish dissidents who was in jail, one of the few who was not released.

MR. ARBATOV: I'm not a specialist in this, I don't know much. Only one thing, I made a telephone call just now before it -- and I got the news that his case was resolved. And what happened there, you know, it's really like provocation. The first thing, these are guesses about plainclothesmen -- were they plainclothesmen or not? Maybe were, maybe not. Then, you know, you take this case, demonstration, were there were, the last demonstration, seventeen demonstrators, forty-two foreign correspondents, six people from the embassies. And look what you had in Nevada? You have arrested more than 400 people. It goes very well that the most democratic society, nobody raises hell about it. Now here something happened, something happened and I don't think these people behaved in a correct way. We have certain rulings and laws you have to apply for the right to demonstrate, et cetera, and they could be hooligans who attacked them, I don't know.

But, you see, I think this provocation, it really achieved the goal. We speak now about what, not about process of democratization, which is close to millions and millions; we speak about this one lady who had bruises and a couple of American newsmen, who I'm sorry for them, who got some beating.

MS. STAHL: Well, that's the point. Why did you allow that to happen? Mr. Arbatov, that's the point.

MR. ARBATOV: You know, our correspondents get ---

MS. STAHL: Let me ask you a question. That's the point, we in the United States wonder why you allowed pictures of such a brutal attack on women to be broadcast when you were establishing so much good will through your openness policy and democratization, as you call it. Does this show that Mr. Gorbachev is not in control of the KGB? Explain to us how it could have happened?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, it's a game, part of this attempt just to interfere with the normal process of development

in our country, to make such conclusions.

MS. STAHL: Will you explain it to us?

MR. ARBATOV: You know, you had in Philadelphia a very bad case when you bombed a house, the police bombed a house and it led to tremendous fire -- you remember it. Can we out of it draw a conclusion that all your officials are terrorists and the President can do nothing with the terrorists and all your authorities cannot? Some things happen, and our Izvestia correspondent in Washington is harassed for a long time; our TV correspondent in London was beaten up, his camera was destroyed, because he wanted to film the strikers at Murdoch's press empire. And there were no excuses even.

MS. STAHL: Will those people be disciplined? Did they do something they shouldn't have done?

MR. ARBATOV: Excuse me?

MS. STAHL: Were the people who beat up the American newsmen, will they be disciplined, did they do something they should not have done?

MR. ARBATOV: You know, I don't know who these people were. I can imagine they could have been hooligans.

MS. STAHL: Well --

MR. ARBATOV: Because -- yes, well.

MS. STAHL: Well --

MR. ARBATOV: This demonstration went on for one day after another -- don't laugh, Lesley. I can assure you that in Moscow you can find several dozens of people when they hear that something is happening somewhere, they will be there and try to interfere.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, can we change the subject for a second, because we are very interested in "glasnost" in this country, and I think a lot of people who have been there have come back and said they are impressed with the process. Let me ask you a question before I invite ---

MR. ARBATOV: Speak slowly, I hear very bad.

MS. STAHL: I will speak slowly. Can you tell us exactly

what the new emigration policy is? Will Jewish "refuseniks" now be allowed to emigrate to Israel or anywhere else? And how many will you allow to do that?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, it is again an individual case, it is not a mass action when we kick out a certain number of people. The individual cases are being resolved, and they will be resolved. And this is part of the policy. And there are quite a number of cases which were resolved lately. Well, the whole process, you know -- there are great changes here in internal policy which cover all the field of economic policy, social policy, what we call "glasnost," and it has become already an international word, democratization of the country, et cetera. And I would prefer not to interfere with it, and not to make such provocation. I, by the way, would recommend you to read the latest, last edition from 9th of February of TIME magazine and an article by Yevtushenko, who just remembers how the late Senator Robert Kennedy told him that -- you remember maybe in the sixties we had the political process of Sinyovski and Daniel. Under pen names they published in the West some articles which were regarded slanderous here and they were put to trial. So Senator Kennedy told to Yevtushenko how it happened. He said that our -- it means American secret police -- has given it to the Soviet secret police the real names of Sinyovsky and Daniel. And he says here in the magazine that he has not yet -- he cannot yet tell the whole story. And why they did it? Just because they wanted to focus the attention of the public on this fabricated case.

MS. STAHL: Okay, Mr. Arbatov, we have two members of Congress who would like to join us in this discussion. Joining us from Indianapolis is Senator Richard Lugar, a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and here in Washington, Representative Dante Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

Congressman Fascell, let me ask you your impression of the openness that we are observing in the Soviet Union, including the attack that took place on the demonstrators, and ask how you

think this will affect U.S.-Soviet relations, if it will at all.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I think our approach is cautious optimism. The General Secretary has certainly gone beyond rhetoric and he deserves a great deal of credit for doing what he's done. But, again, as Mr. Arbatov says, we have got to put it in perspective; and, as Wyatt said, we saw both faces of the Soviet Union in the same week -- and that's not going to go away. This is an evolving matter and I agree with that and I think it's going to take some time before we can really decide what is happening.

MS. STAHL: All right, Senator Lugar, in Indianapolis, what are your impressions of what's going on and how do you think it's going to affect U.S.-Soviet relations?

SENATOR LUGAR: Lesley, I've made two points. I think that the Soviets have decided that democracy works and that economic progress is unlikely without democracy. The problem is how to open the door just a crack without it blowing open, and it appears to me that the Soviets are doing just that, they are opening it a crack. They have very heavy controls to make sure it doesn't get away from them. But the admission that they've got to go the democratic route, even if merely an internal thing at present.

MS. STAHL: All right, gentlemen, why don't we take a short break and we will all come back, Mr. Arbatov, in Moscow, Senator Lugar, and Congressman Fascell, when we return.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Continuing our discussion with Congressman Fascell, Senator Lugar, and Georgi Arbatov.

Congressman Fascell, we've been talking about how openness in the Soviet Union might affect U.S. relations, but let me ask you about how you think President Reagan's policy on the ABM treaty, trying to interpret it, have a broader approach to it, might affect arms control, and what your views of the president's policy are.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I'm not for a unilateral

broadening of the interpretation of the ABM treaty along with an early decision with regard to deployment of SDI. I think that's a mistake. I think a proper position is one we've already taken, which is that two countries have appointed a task force to at least discuss the problem. I just don't want to see us get so far out in front that we force the Soviets into some retaliatory position.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about SDI? Do you think it's something that we should attempt to continue? Should we try to readjust the ABM treaty in some way so that we can go forward with that program?

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, I've certainly supported research and the majority of the Congress in both parties have supported research. The problem starts with the re-interpretation of the ABM treaty which leads to testing and development that goes beyond the normal interpretation or the interpretation that we've had of the ABM treaty up till now and coupled with the decision for early deployment of an SDI system.

MS. STAHL: Well, let me ask Senator Lugar, can we go forward with SDI if we don't in some way change the ABM treaty? And, if that's true, why not just withdraw from the treaty if we want to go forward with SDI?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, I'm certain that we need to develop the SDI, and eventually that would require, it seems to me, some re-interpretation of the ABM treaty. I think the debating on that issue of first negotiations leads to ambiguous results; we ought to have consultation with Congress and with our allies, and obviously visit with the Soviets about this. But we need to proceed with the SDI. I think the Soviets will proceed with theirs. And we are going to enter into a new era beyond the balance of terror by getting into defensive weapons. And I think that requires re-interpretation of the ABM treaty.

MS. STAHL: Well, why not just withdraw then?

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, because we are attempting to negotiate with the Soviets at several different levels. We are

attempting to observe treaty obligations and I think we are being faithful in that regard. We are simply just reviewing the negotiating record back in 1972 and elsewhere in which it was the Soviets who apparently wanted a broader interpretation at that point while we wanted a narrower one. Things seem to have changed a bit at this point, and I think a full consultation with everybody may result at least in a satisfying arrangement.

MS. STAHL: All right, let's go back to Moscow and bring Mr. Arbatov in. Apparently Mr. Gorbachev is going to be giving a major speech tomorrow on Moscow television, Mr. Arbatov. Western observers say since it will be televised it will be a major speech with some new initiatives. Can you give us a little preview?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, I can hardly hear you. I have to make my guess about what you asked me. You asked me about tomorrow, Gorbachev's speech, as I understand.

MS. STAHL: Yes.

MR. ARBATOV: He will have a speech tomorrow.

MS. STAHL: What will he say? Will he have any new proposals, any new arms control proposals, that you can tell us about?

MR. ARBATOV: You have to wait till tomorrow. I don't think we should introduce new proposals. You have not answered to our latest proposals, and the ball is in the American garden. As to interpretation, you know, I'm astonished that people in your country use such a euphemism. You want to, you know, tear the treaty, to break it, and you use the word "interpretation." As to what Senator Lugar has said, it is not true, there is a forum on security and disarmament in Moscow at this moment; many Americans take part, including some who negotiated the ABM treaty. It was the commentary proven that this interpretation is the historic one, and the Russians didn't interpret it in a different way. It is proven fact and these are again some fantasies which are being circulated there.

I wanted also to comment -- one of the comments of Senator Lugar who spoke about open society being in the United

States, as I heard it, and closed society being here. I think during the "Irangate" discussion, it is not very persuasive that you are such an open society.

MS. STAHL: All right, Senator Lugar, can you respond, particularly on the broadening of the ABM treaty, because I think that is going to be a major issue between our two countries.

SENATOR LUGAR: Well, it is a major issue, and at the Reykjavik summit we discussed SDI obviously, and this entire situation. It just occurs to me that our position in the United States is to try to encourage Soviet friends to think in terms of defensive weaponry as opposed to preoccupation with offensive weaponry, and that is going to require some development and testing of our defensive mechanisms. I think the Soviets will require that, too. I do not see this as a block, but it seems to me clearly we are headed eventually toward testing. We ought to do so with eyes wide open and with full consultations. But I think the ABM treaty gives us that opportunity, at least that is the assertion that we ought to make.

MS. STAHL: All right, let me explain to our viewers, if I can, that our satellite to Moscow has gone down. It was not something that the Soviet Union did. Apparently there was some mix-up on the times that we asked for this satellite, so Mr. Arbatov is no longer with us. So let me turn to Congressman Fascell.

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: That's too bad.

MS. STAHL: It is too bad -- and ask you if we, as a country -- and has Congress decided that we do want to go forward with SDI -- and if that doesn't, in fact, mean that we are going to have to either negotiate a change in the ABM treaty or withdraw from it? I mean, isn't that simple logic?

REPRESENTATIVE FASCELL: Well, certainly if we go ahead with testing and development, it flies in the face of the former interpretation of the ABM treaty. We have a problem as to whether or not we are in it or out of it. The debate still goes on as to what the interpretation is. And, again, when you couple that with

the decision -- and, frankly, I don't know why the decision was made to state that we are going to compress the time for deployment at a time when we can't begin to deploy -- I don't know why we are saying now we are going to step up the time for deployment when deployment will be some time after this administration, and we have no idea what the deployment's about or what kind of system it will be.

MS. STAHL: Senator, why are we engaged in this problem right now? Why can't we wait two or three years before we try to broaden the treaty?


SENATOR LUGAR: Well, we may. I don't think that there is any necessary compression here. Clearly there are persons within the administration who believe that we ought to have testing and deployment sooner rather than later, perhaps to ensure that the SDI continues. Maybe there is fear that there is now sufficient bipartisan cooperation to have sustaining power. I would hope that we would work to make sure there is that kind of bipartisan cooperation, because we need the SDI, and perhaps we need to negotiate among ourselves a little bit more to make certain we've got that kind of consensus.

MS. STAHL: Okay, thank you very much, Senator Lugar, Congressman Fascell. Our cartoon this week is from Pat Oliphant of Universal Press Syndicate. President Reagan seeks out his predecessor. "What is the answer," he asks.

I'm Lesley Stahl, have a good week.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of FACE THE NATION was sponsored by the financial professionals at Paine Webber and by Apple Computer, personal computers that give you the power to be your best.

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MODERATOR: Lesley Stahl - CBS News National Affairs Correspondent

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MS. STAHL: Welcome to FACE THE NATION. I'm Lesley Stahl. The Reagan White House is trying to disprove that old adage that first impressions are the ones that last. The first impressions of the Iceland summit, grim faces, dashed hopes, collapse.

GEORGE SHULTZ (Secretary of State): There is a great sense of disappointment, at least at this meeting. A tremendous amount of headway was made, but, in the end, we couldn't quite make it. We are deeply disappointed at this outcome.

MS. STAHL: But the President and his men drew up a plan to erase that sense of failure. They decided upon some heavy-duty damage control, a media blitz with a positive spin on what had happened in that haunted house in Reykjavik.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: We are no longer talking about arms control; we are talking about arms reductions, possibly even the complete elimination of ballistic missiles from the face of the earth.

MS. STAHL: Only a few Democrats spoke out.

REPRESENTATIVE THOMAS DOWNEY (D.-N.Y.): The President came within a whisper of getting an agreement and held it all up because he wanted to pursue his dream of "Star Wars."

MS. STAHL: But the polls showed overwhelming backing of the President in his refusal to give up "Star Wars," so now Mr. Reagan is using that as a campaign weapon.

PRESIDENT REAGAN: SDI is the key to a world free of nuclear blackmail. Don't let liberals in Congress throw it away.

MS. STAHL: Yet Senator Sam Nunn worried that the President put the U. S. at a military disadvantage by agreeing to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

Did he? We'll ask his chief of staff, Donald Regan. And we will talk with Soviet spokesman, Georgi Arbatov, about the Kremlin's new willingness to allow dissidents to emigrate and about the future of the arms control talks.

The superpowers after Iceland, where do we go from here--an issue facing the nation.

ANNOUNCER: From CBS News, Washington, FACE THE NATION, with National Affairs Correspondent Lesley Stahl.

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(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Joining us, our guest, White House chief of staff, Donald Regan.

Mr. Regan, a report has just come over the wires that the Soviets have expelled five American diplomats from the U. S. embassy in Moscow; they've accused them of being spies.

What can you tell us about it?

MR. REGAN: Well, I've just heard the same reports myself. I understand we have been notified that our embassy in Washington--in Moscow--that they are going to expel these five people. I'm disappointed to see that. I thought that after Reykjavik relationships would have improved somewhat. Nevertheless, we are now going to have to consider taking appropriate action.

MS. STAHL: What do you mean by that?

MR. REGAN: Well, we'll have to consider what our alternatives are.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Regan, they are responding to our expelling twenty-five of their people from the U. N. Is this now going to escalate?

MR. REGAN: Well, remember that we told them back in March that we were going to cut down the size of their U. N. mission, because they have too many spies there. We want every six months so many of them to come out, and we are going to pursue that, in addition to whatever else we have to do as a result of this action.

MS. STAHL: Well, first we had the summit, and everybody thought it was a failure. Now, this week, they are trying to tell us that it was a success, but now we are going back and we are going to have expulsions and retaliation and counter-expulsions. Where does this put U.S.-Soviet relations at this point?

MR. REGAN: Well, you've got to remember that U.S.-Soviet relations are not a smooth road; they always will be rocky, because we don't see things exactly alike. And we'll try to reach agreements with them, but we certainly are not just going to give in because

they want something or they threaten us.

MS. STAHL: Let me understand this. They have expelled five, you said in six months we are going to expel more from the U. N. But are you saying that something in addition, some additional retaliation, will be required because of the five they've expelled today?

MR. REGAN: Well, since this report has just come in, we haven't had time to sit down to think through exactly what we should do. All I'll say is we will think it through and come up with an appropriate reply.

MS. STAHL: Now there are reports that perhaps the Soviets are willing to rethink their demand at the Reykjavik summit that the United States can only test SDI in the laboratory. Was this transmitted to the President in a letter from Mr. Gorbachev? How is this being transmitted, and what is the U. S. response to these new feelers?

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, there's been no letter from Mr. Gorbachev to the President since Iceland and the Reykjavik meeting. There have been hints delivered to some of our negotiators that perhaps they could discuss further the SDI and its testing. I think what this means is that they want to explore the meaning of the ABM treaty. I think that what has happened here is in Reykjavik they came up with a new interpretation where they didn't want any deployment under the ABM treaty, which is certainly something that, with due notice, is allowed now. And they seemed to be insisting upon a very narrow interpretation of that 1972 treaty.

So at this point I think what each side has to explore is just what do you mean by the ABM treaty.

MS. STAHL: Well, is there any possibility that you misunderstood Mr. Gorbachev and he didn't really mean to suggest it could only be tested within the confines of a laboratory, and perhaps did you all make a mistake in not pursuing this line a little further over there?

MR. REGAN: No. As we understood it--and, remember, the President and the Secretary of State were there with him--neither

one of them thinks that they misunderstood exactly what he was saying. They got the impression that he was going much further in wanting to kill off our strategic defense against nuclear missiles--and it is a strong need for that if we are going to do away with all of the missiles, because it leaves us defenseless if neither side has missiles against either cheating by the other side or by a third country having a missile with a nuclear tip on it. What do we do in that case if we have no missiles to reply?

MS. STAHL: Well, I want to talk to you about all these proposals to reduce missiles, but let's stay with SDI testing for one minute.

Is it possible that the two sides could agree to just abide strictly by the ABM treaty as it was written and that a deal could be worked out along those lines? Is that what our negotiators are discussing at Geneva? And if that's agreed to, is everything else that was discussed at Reykjavik on paper? Are we ready to have a summit?

MR. REGAN: The final proposal that President Reagan put on the table said exactly that, Lesley. What it said was that we would observe the ABM treaty for ten years, and that we would proceed with the things that that treaty allows us to do in the area of research, in the area of development, in the area of testing of a system, and that, at the end of the ten years, we would discuss with them, before we deploy, whether or not they wish to share it.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about testing? Do you see some room for compromise over the definition of a laboratory?

MR. REGAN: Well, we believe that the ABM treaty allows us to test, that it has never been in that treaty that you cannot test except in a laboratory.

MS. STAHL: But could you redefine "laboratory," make it a broader definition, and then satisfy the U. S. side?

MR. REGAN: Well, this has got to be a subject of discussion in Geneva.

MS. STAHL: You mentioned sharing. Armand Hammer, as

you know, just went to the Soviet Union and brought the dissident David Goldfarb out. He is making a proposal that President Reagan offer to share SDI not after we've developed it but immediately, to propose that U. S. and Russian scientists work together to develop SDI. 60

Is that at all a possibility?

MR. REGAN: Well, we've already suggested that. We suggested that in the testing phase, as soon as we were ready to test, that we would ask them to come over, observe our tests, participate in our tests, and there they could see exactly what we have and what we're doing. And that certainly would come before the deployment.

MS. STAHL: Well, what about letting them come into the laboratory?

MR. REGAN: Well, that's a matter of negotiation. They've been going on now for seven years in their research into some type of strategic defense against missiles, and what's happened? They haven't shared that with us.

MS. STAHL: Let's talk about the reduction of nuclear weapons. Apparently Mr. Reagan inadvertently agreed at some point during these talks to eliminate all strategic nuclear weapons on both sides.

Is that where we left it with Mr. Gorbachev?

MR. REGAN: Well, let's get that point clear, because there is no inadvertent agreement. What happened was that after we put our final proposal on the table, they said why ballistic missiles? That's what Mr. Gorbachev said. And he said why not everything? And the President said, well, exactly what do you mean by that? And he said let's have everything. And the President said, well, if that's what you want to talk about, all right, but--and at that point they launched into a discussion of SDI and the proposals to kill it. So they never went back to that. So it just came up momentarily, wasn't thrashed out, there is no meeting of the minds on it or anything of that nature, and the subject was dropped because they came to the impasse on the strategic defense.

MS. STAHL: Well, if you did eliminate everything, the Soviets would have an advantage of conventional weapons, so ---

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, I wouldn't agree with that, because, while they might have some numerical superiority, I do think our troops and many of our weapons are superior to theirs. Secondly, we would have ten years, if we had to live in that type of atmosphere, without nuclear weapons.

But doesn't it startle you that now we have people who have been for getting rid of nuclear weapons suddenly worried that we might indeed get rid of nuclear weapons? Just think of what they called Reagan when he first came in, the bomb-thrower and all this. Here's the man now--so far the people say, whoa, back up. Hasn't that really changed thinking?

MS. STAHL: Ronald Reagan the "peacenik," huh?

MR. REGAN: You got it.

MS. STAHL: But people are saying you didn't think it through, that you went there, that Mr. Gorbachev surprised you, that you were trapped and ensnared, got you talking about all these issues that you really weren't ready for--and you all admit you were surprised by it. And in fact there have been some pieces written today that say thank goodness it fell through because you were all going down a path that would have hurt the United States and put us at a military disadvantage.

MR. REGAN: Well, first of all, that really startles me that people would write that, because isn't it better to have a nuclear-free world than a world with nuclear weapons? And this is what Reagan wanted.

MS. STAHL: Well, not if we are at a disadvantage actually.

MR. REGAN: Just a minute. Before ---

MS. STAHL: But answer that. If we are at a disadvantage, why is it worth ---

MR. REGAN: Well, we won't be at a disadvantage--just listen to me for a minute. What has happened is we would have at least ten years, and probably longer than that, in which to build up our conventional weapons to at least have equality, which is

what we would want. So that we don't have to think of ourselves as being at the moment at a disadvantage, yes--but this wouldn't happen tomorrow; this is going to happen for years to come, and by that time our Joint Chiefs and others will think through our battle strategy, if indeed we ever have to use it.

MS. STAHL: All right, but we have to spend massive amounts of money. Conventional forces are much more expensive than nuclear. And what about the idea that you haven't thought it through? You are saying now we should have our Joint Chiefs and other people brought in; you didn't bring them in before you even began discussing it.

MR. REGAN: Well, there, again, Ronald Reagan has been expounding this theme since 1976, and certainly in the 1980 campaign he brought it out.

MS. STAHL: But no one has taken him seriously.

MR. REGAN: They don't, but they should take this man seriously. He is serious, he is a man of peace, he is a man who wants to see a nuclear-free world.

Now perhaps we didn't go through every "i" and every "t" on that, but there is certainly plenty of time to do that over the next decade or longer.

MS. STAHL: Okay, we don't have a lot of time, and I do have some other questions.

SALT--are we going to go over the limits of SALT?

MR. REGAN: Well, we haven't yet, and we'll see what happens.

MS. STAHL: We are not going to go over the limits of SALT.

MR. REGAN: Well, let's see what happens.

MS. STAHL: Was that discussed at all?

MR. REGAN: Well, we first of all don't recognize SALT as a treaty. It was never passed by the Senate, it is not a treaty, it is not in existence. And even it had been passed by the Senate, it would have expired at the end of last year.

So why do you insist that we keep in with a treaty that doesn't exist?

MS. STAHL: Well, I'm not insisting on anything; I'm

trying to find out if you agreed with Mr. Gorbachev not to go over the limits, and if you are going to abide by that. 63

MR. REGAN: Well, all we've said is we don't recognize SALT II, we will not be bound by those limits. But at the current moment we are in compliance.

MS. STAHL: And it probably will stay there?

MR. REGAN: Well, let's see what happens.

MS. STAHL: All right, what about a summit?

MR. REGAN: I think there's a possibility of a summit. Probably now the time has slipped as far as having one in '86, but I think that so much progress was made in Reykjavik that we now need to narrow these final differences and then see what we can actually agree upon, what sort of papers could be signed at a summit, since this is apparently what Mr. Gorbachev wants, and then proceed with it.

MS. STAHL: This is what--Mr. Gorbachev wants a summit.

MR. REGAN: Well, I think so; that's what he said, he hasn't denied it, and he also said, however, that he wanted the differences narrowed and he wanted some papers to sign. I think the differences have been narrowed.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Shultz said, right after the Reykjavik meeting, that a summit was not in the cards. You are saying it is now.

MR. REGAN: Well, he was talking about in the short term. I agree with him, it wasn't for the short term.

MS. STAHL: What about April?

MR. REGAN: Well, we haven't set any date, we haven't discussed anything of that nature. But, you know, what I'm saying is I think it's a possibility that there can be a summit.

MS. STAHL: Have you heard anything from the Soviets that suggests that Mr. Gorbachev wants to put that whole idea back on track?

MR. REGAN: I think that the Soviets have come into Geneva with a willingness to talk, so, if they want to talk and reach agreements, we can do it.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Regan, thank you very, very much. We will be back with Georgi Arbatov in a moment.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: With us now from Moscow, Georgi Arbatov, a member of the Soviet Central Committee.

Good morning, Mr. Arbatov.

MR. ARBATOV: Good morning.

MS. STAHL: Now we have reports that the Kremlin has expelled five Americans from the U. S. embassy there in Moscow. Mr. Regan says the U. S. will have to consider retaliation.

What kind of a path is this leading us down, sir?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, I think that the Americans will--Mr. Gorbachev is a very forthcoming man, if he has good partners. But if you behave in such a way, he becomes very tough; it can cool down to zero in both countries, if you go this way of retaliation after retaliation. You started a very bad thing. Mr. Reagan has justified the nature of it, but it was contrary to the agreements the United States has with United Nations, just to declare how many people each country can have in its United Nations mission.

MS. STAHL: So these five are being expelled in retaliation for the twenty-five at the U. N. being expelled, is that what you are saying?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't know, I don't know. They were--well, the situation looks as the situation looks. But, you know, if the Americans say they think there are too many spies in our United Nations mission, we can say that in our opinion there are too many spies in American embassy in Moscow.

MS. STAHL: Mr. Arbatov, how would you describe the state of U.S.-Soviet relations right now? After Reykjavik things looked pretty dismal. Both your side and the United States side has been talking more optimistically, but now we are talking about expulsions and retaliation.

How would you describe the state?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, expulsions are really a small thing,

small thing. What we are concerned about is the whole stance of America, of United States Administration, especially after Reykjavik. You know, this attempt to sacrifice, you know, really big issues and national interest to petty politicking, to electoral considerations--the whole campaign, public relations campaign, very slick public relations campaign with which the Administration tries to make up for very bad statesmanship in Reykjavik--it makes us concerned; it shows that Americans are not serious.

MS. STAHL: Well, but I also hear now that Mr. Gorbachev is willing to talk about a different proposal on SDI testing, that perhaps he's not as strict about ---

MR. ARBATOV: I have not heard a thing about it. I think all of this, you know, is a bit irrational, what you do with SDI, as if you have something. You actually have nothing and will have nothing. The President talks about SDI as if it is on his shelf, but it won't be there for decades. And when President says that he cannot sacrifice the security of American people and America's allies from nuclear attack, he just talks many strange things, because ---

MS. STAHL: Clear this up for us. We had several reports over the last two days that your country has sent signals that you are willing to talk about the definition of laboratory testing for SDI, that you are willing now to have a broader definition than presented in Reykjavik. Is that not true?

MR. ARBATOV: I don't know; I think about product definition--we are ready to talk about it; we have not cut off our dialogue. But I think, after all the proposals we made--by the way, Mr. Regan was not quite accurate, you know. It was so soothing to hear him describing Mr. Reagan as a "peacenik." But it just doesn't correspond with our impression that we got in Reykjavik, because there was not a single proposal coming from American side--and this is, excuse me, not true: there were no proposals from American side, the Americans have come to Reykjavik emptyhanded with empty pockets, and all the proposals were ours.

And we have still to decide what actually was there.

Was it just that the SDI idea was so dear to the President, or SDI was a pretext? I can of course understand that it is dear to the President. I think Benjamin Franklin said once that old boys have their playthings as well as young ones, the difference is only in price. The price of SDI might be three trillion dollars.

MS. STAHL: It's wonderful that you're quoting Benjamin Franklin, sir. But let's get to what's happening ---

MR. ARBATOV: We have great respect to the gentleman, to your founding fathers in general.

MS. STAHL: Well, hats off to you for reading about our great statesmen of the past, but let me ask you about the future and what's coming up in Geneva.

Is there a possibility, in your view, that there can be some compromise on the SDI question, the testing question, the laboratory question, and that this whole negotiation--what was agreed to, what was conceded, what the two leaders came down to--can be back on track and that Mr. Gorbachev can accept an invitation to come to the United States for a summit perhaps in April?

MR. ARBATOV: I think we have compromised--well, you can never say that everything, you know--who knows, it depends on other issues--but pretty much like everything what we could on SDI, because if we discuss how to get rid of all nuclear weapons, what do we need the SDI for?

MS. STAHL: Was there an agreement to get rid of all nuclear weapons? As far as I understand, there was no agreement on that.

MR. ARBATOV: There was no agreement. There was what we proposed actually--there were no agreements. We proposed in written form--here I have this documents, "Directive for Ministers of Foreign Affairs"--you know, your public, I think, got a lot of polls, but never, never real explanation of the facts.

MS. STAHL: Well, tell us.

MR. ARBATOV: So they asked what is your opinion; your public doesn't know what's going about. What we proposed actually was to cut all strategic weapons by 50 percents in five years, and

then go on with the negotiations. And here, I think, in the discussion the question has arisen, because Gorbachev has proposed already in January to get rid of all nuclear weapons till the end of the century. And I think what has really happened, they decided that maybe we can do it with strategic weapons at least, maybe also with INF and some other weapons--we can get rid of them in ten years.

And then your side said we will have SDI nevertheless. I don't know, why do you need SDI if you have nothing to defend yourself from? This, you know--is it nonsense about madman or about hiding something, because SDI--would it even succeed, which is highly improbable. Can save you only from ballistic missiles, not from cruise missiles, not from airplanes. And a madman would most probably not have an IBM.

MS. STAHL: Let me ask you once more about a possibility of an understanding between the two governments on the question of SDI testing, if there can be, in your view, some kind of a negotiation, a compromise, and an agreement on what kind of testing would be allowed in ten years ---

MR. ARBATOV: Well, you know, if the President needs some face-saving device, we could provide him with some, I think.

MS. STAHL: What would you provide?

MR. ARBATOV: We tried already--that he can have laboratory, not only research but testing. But, you know, here we have to be clear in essence, because what we understand why the Americans insist so much on SDI is because they do want a new round of arms race. You cannot have both, get rid of your nuclear weapons and invest billions and tens of billions in a new weapons race.

MS. STAHL: We are fast running out of time. Very quickly, do you see any compromise, any wiggle room, on the question of what a laboratory is?

MR. ARBATOV: Well, it can be clarification--and, well, you know, I think ---

MS. STAHL: There's hope on that front?

MR. ARBATOV: --- the treaty is tremendously strict and

clear on that.

MS. STAHL: Okay.

MR. ARBATOV: You cannot put anything in outer space of ABM.

MS. STAHL: Okay, Mr. Arbatov, thank you--sadly, we have run out of time. We will return with a final word.

(Announcements.)

MS. STAHL: Our cartoon this week is from Wayne Stayskal of the Tampa Tribune, who visits the Oval Office. The Russians are still miffed because you wouldn't give up SDI. They want Daniloff back.

I'm Lesley Stahl, have a good week.

ANNOUNCER: This portion of FACE THE NATION was sponsored by the men and women of the General Motors Corporation. GM, mark of excellence.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

December 3, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR PAUL SCHOTT STEVENS

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH

SUBJECT: Research on Arbatov

Attached at Tab I, is a memo from you to John Tuck forwarding background information on Georgi Arbatov (Tab A). The Chief of Staff will appear with Arbatov on "Meet the Press" Sunday. In preparation, John requested that we compile Arbatov's recent statements on Summit related issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you forward the attached memo and information.

Approve WR Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to Tuck
- Tab A Arbatov Information

Prepared by:
Joan R. Vail JRV