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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 4/10/2009

File Folder AIR FORCE ONE PRESIDENT'S SUMMIT BRIEFING
BOOK/NSC ACTION ITEMS (4)

FOIA

F06-043/2

Box Number ~~92189~~ RAC Box 5

SAROTTE

18

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
68634	REPORT	GOBRBACHEV'S USSR	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68635	REPORT	SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY UNDER GROBACHEV	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68636	REPORT	USSR KREMLIN POLITICS AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68637	REPORT	USSR ECONOMIC CHANGE AND SOVIET POWER	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68638	REPORT	WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68639	REPORT	GORBACHEV AND SOVIET FORCE DEVELOPMENTS	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68640	REPORT	SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68641	REPORT	STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3
68642	REPORT	SOVIET MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL BASE	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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68636	REPORT USSR KREMLIN POLITICS AND SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3

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68640	REPORT SOVIET MILITARY DOCTRINE	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3

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68641	REPORT STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL AND SOVIET OBJECTIVES	4	5/1/1988	B1 B2 B3

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HUGHES

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 13, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN

FROM: MARION C. BLAKEY ^{MCS}
Special Assistant to the President and
Director of Public Affairs

SUBJECT: Talking Points on the Moscow Summit

Attached for your information and use is a set of White House
Talking Points on the Moscow Summit.

If you have any questions concerning this material, please feel
free to contact the White House Office of Public Affairs at (202)
456-7170.

May 13, 1988

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev will meet in Moscow from May 29-June 2. At this meeting, the fourth between the two leaders, the President will seek to consolidate progress in all aspects of the U.S.- Soviet relationship and prepare the way for further progress. His goal remains a brighter future and a safer world for all people. The Summit is an important event, though only one of a growing number of contacts between our two countries.

During his two terms in office, President Reagan has reshaped the U.S.- Soviet relationship to address a four-part agenda:

- o HUMAN RIGHTS
- o REGIONAL CONFLICTS
- o BILATERAL ISSUES
- o ARMS REDUCTION

This agenda rests on the President's policy of peace through strength, realism, and dialogue. It provides for continued progress in building a solid and lasting foundation for peace, not merely a misleading and temporary improvement in atmosphere.

A Realistic, Consistent, and Comprehensive Policy

President Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union has been successful because it has been realistic, consistent, and comprehensive. With strengthened ties among our allies, this policy has already made U.S.- Soviet relations more stable and has improved prospects for peace.

- o The President is fully aware of the differences which separate the United States and the Soviet Union. Fundamentally opposed political, social, and economic systems limit possibilities of cooperation and interaction.
- o In spite of progress, the promise of Soviet rhetoric remains far from the reality of Soviet behavior.

In Moscow, President Reagan will continue to urge Mr. Gorbachev to adopt ways more compatible with the free exchange of people, ideas, and information. Although governments can do a great deal, the strongest bonds between nations will grow only from the interchange of people free to express their own ideas.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

HUMAN RIGHTS

The basic differences between the U.S. and Soviet systems are graphically illustrated in the ways we approach human rights. Respect for human rights is as important to peace as is arms control. President Reagan believes governments which honor their citizens' human rights are more likely to abide by international agreements and truly respect other nations. A country that represses its population sows mistrust abroad.

President Reagan continues to insist that the Soviet Union take concrete steps toward the freer flow of information, people, and ideas as set out in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. This covenant specifies the fundamental individual liberties enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and calls upon each government to respect these rights.

The U.S.- Soviet dialogue on human rights has come a long way over the past few years. By sitting down and discussing subjects they earlier had refused even to acknowledge, the Soviets show that they are changing both their attitude and approach on human rights.

The Soviet Union's record on human rights has improved somewhat, especially since the end of 1986 -- but Soviet citizens still lack generally accepted international safeguards on human rights.

Progress

- o More than 300 political prisoners have been released from labor camps.
- o Jews in the Soviet Union and long-time refuseniks have been allowed to emigrate in greater numbers over the past year, and larger numbers of new applicants have received exit permits.
- o Many cases of divided families and spouses have been satisfactorily resolved.
- o Arrests under an arbitrary law that was mostly used against dissidents -- whose only crime was to express critical views -- have virtually stopped.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

Repressive Policies Persist

- o Emigration is still restricted and the number of people allowed to emigrate, especially Soviet Jews, remains far below demand. An estimated 10,000 applications by Soviet Jews for emigration are yet to be resolved.
- o Members of unregistered religious sects are still heavily persecuted.
- o Peaceful demonstrations by national minorities, refuseniks, free-press advocates, and others continue to be broken up by police.
- o Unofficial publications -- invariably those that reflect unauthorized political views -- are denied the right to register as official publications.
- o An unknown number of prisoners of conscience and religious dissenters remain interned in Soviet prisons, labor camps and psychiatric institutions. Continued forced commitment of prisoners of conscience and religious dissenters to psychiatric hospitals, and other forms of punishment, is a fundamental breach of human rights.

Ongoing Dialogue

- o Round table seminars on human rights between U.S. and Soviet officials and experts from the private sector began in March 1988.
- o The Reagan Administration will continue to urge the Soviet Union to make changes in laws and practices in order to institutionalize human rights reform. Unless changes are institutionalized, there is a danger of backsliding, or a return to a much more repressive environment.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Regional conflicts cause suffering, can dangerously escalate, and threaten international peace. Soviet conduct contributes to many of these conflicts and is itself a source of tension. Improvement in these areas is important for improvement in overall U.S.- Soviet relations.

The Soviet Union, or its surrogates, continue to encourage or maintain repressive Marxist/Leninist regimes in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Angola, Ethiopia and Nicaragua.

President Reagan has consistently made it clear to Moscow that failure to move forward on key regional problems will affect the climate of U.S.- Soviet relations, including the prospects for further arms reductions.

Afghanistan

- o The goal of the Reagan Administration remains a genuinely independent, non-aligned Afghanistan. The key to resolving the Afghan conflict remains Soviet fulfillment of their commitment to withdraw rapidly and completely their forces and allow self-determination for all the Afghan people.
- o The Soviet Union has agreed to begin withdrawal of all troops from Afghanistan on May 15. The withdrawal is to be completed within one year. The United States stands ready to play a constructive role. It is hoped that Soviet readiness to reach a solution in Afghanistan will open the way to cooperation on other regional conflicts.

Persian Gulf

- o The U.S. is deeply concerned about Soviet behavior in the Persian Gulf. After cooperating with us last July to pass U.N. Security Council Resolution 598 calling for an end to the Gulf War, Soviet policy has become uncooperative and a cover for Iranian belligerence.
- o It is long past due for Moscow to prove its good intentions in the Gulf by moving with the U.S. in the U.N. Security Council toward an enforcement resolution in response to Iran's refusal to accept Resolution 598. Soviet reluctance to do so injures their claim that they desire the U.N. Security Council to play a major role in settling regional conflicts.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

Arab-Israeli Peace Process

- o The U.S. is determined to pursue peace between Israel and the Arab states. We are prepared to explore different avenues for facilitating bilateral and direct negotiations, including the possibility of a properly structured international conference.
- o The Soviet Union is not taking the necessary steps to help advance the prospects for peace in the region. Such steps would include:
 - Adopting a more realistic approach to an international conference, one which facilitates bilateral negotiations rather than supplants them;
 - Establishing diplomatic relations with Israel; and
 - Using their influence to stop efforts by the Syrians and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to block the U.S. initiative.

Central America

- o The Soviet Union continues to provide \$650 million a year in military assistance to Nicaragua, even as the Sandinistas and the Democratic Resistance pursue peace under the Guatemala Agreement and despite the cutoff of U.S. military assistance to the freedom fighters.
- o Soviet assistance stiffens Sandinista reluctance to take steps toward democratization and real compromise with the Democratic Resistance, and increases Sandinista military power to the point of posing a threat to Nicaragua's neighboring democracies.
- o Moscow should halt the flow of arms through Cuba and Nicaragua to the guerrillas in El Salvador.

Cambodia

- o A political settlement in Cambodia depends on prompt withdrawal of Vietnamese troops. Afghanistan provides an example of what Vietnam should do. The U.S. seeks to have the Soviet Union, a provider of arms and aid to Hanoi, make constructive efforts to facilitate Vietnamese withdrawal.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

Angola

- o The Soviets continue to pour in massive quantities of arms to Angola, which supports the Cuban expeditionary force. The U.S. calls for a political, negotiated solution based on Cuban troop withdrawal, independence for Namibia under U.N. Security Council Resolution 435, and reconciliation between the Angolan regime and the UNITA freedom fighters.

Ethiopia

- o Moscow continues to support a repressive regime in Ethiopia with substantial military and other assistance. The Soviet Union should press the regime to abandon its expulsion of foreign relief workers in northern Ethiopia, where at least two million people face starvation because the Ethiopian government has made its war needs a higher priority than the survival of innocent civilians.

Korea

- o The Soviet Union should use its influence so that North Korean leader Kim Il-song will take the steps necessary to reduce tension on the Korean peninsula and to assure an uninterrupted 1988 summer Olympic Games.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

BILATERAL ISSUES

President Reagan believes strongly that prospects for peace are enhanced by measures that help open up the Soviet system and lower artificial barriers to interaction between our peoples. The U.S. favors a broad array of educational, cultural, scientific, commercial, and people-to-people contacts which promote this objective.

The President favors bilateral exchanges that promote mutual understanding and mutual benefit. However, we must be alert for Soviet efforts to obtain high technology that would enhance their military capability.

Educational and Cultural Exchanges

- o An agreement was signed at the Geneva Summit in 1985, reinstating touring exhibits and other educational and cultural exchanges between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Over the past two years, there has been a great expansion of such exchanges.
- o Under the President's Exchange Initiative, the U.S. has encouraged a series of people-to-people activities, including school exchanges, citizens' public meetings, and joint television broadcasts.
- o The U.S. is seeking agreement for a new three-year cultural exchange program which will redress several inequities in the conduct of cultural exchanges. The U.S. is particularly interested in a significant expansion of U.S.- Soviet youth exchanges, especially those involving high school and undergraduate college students.
- o The U.S. encourages expanded media exchange activities based on reciprocity. Soviet spokesmen, for example, appear regularly on U.S. television and have free access to our media. U.S. spokesmen should have the same opportunities to explain American policies to the people of the Soviet Union.

Science and Technology

- o The U.S. favors mutually beneficial bilateral exchanges in matters of basic science where there is no risk of transferring sensitive technology.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o The U.S. recently signed a protocol of understanding with the Soviet Union on civilian nuclear reactor safety. Both governments will work under this program to make their civilian nuclear power programs as safe as possible.
- o In the area of basic sciences, the two sides are actively discussing an agreement covering U.S.- proposed joint programs in geology, chemistry, mathematics, theoretical physics, life sciences, arctic studies, engineering sciences, and science policy.
- o The U.S. is insisting that this agreement provide American access to the best Soviet scientists, contain provisions for the protection of intellectual property rights, and not be used as a way of achieving Soviet access to militarily useful technology.
- o Two new U.S.- Soviet agreements have recently been concluded -- one on maritime search and rescue assistance, the other on radio navigation. These agreements provide increased protection for the ships and planes of both countries.
- o The U.S., U.S.S.R., Japan, and the European Community, under the sponsorship of the International Atomic Energy Agency, began work in April on a conceptual design for a fusion test reactor. This work has long-term prospects for creating a new source of safe and efficient energy to meet the world's ever-increasing power needs.

Trade and Other Economic Issues

- o Increased bilateral trade can be of benefit to both countries. However, national security and human rights concerns constitute two major boundaries to the potential for expanding trade with the Soviet Union.
- o President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev have expressed strong support for expansion of mutually beneficial trade relations. Their trade ministers met in April and agreed on concrete steps for trade expansion which will lead to improvements in market access for U.S. companies.
- o The two countries have agreed to discuss the future of the U.S.- Soviet long-term grain agreement.
- o Now that the Soviet Union has ceased commercial whaling in accordance with the moratorium agreed to by the International Whaling Commission, the U.S. looks forward with renewed interest to a comprehensive fisheries agreement with the Soviet Union.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o For national security reasons, the U.S. will continue to restrict strategic trade with the Soviet Union. All U.S.-Soviet trade must comply fully with U.S. and multilateral (COCOM) regulations.
- o The 1974 Jackson-Vanik Amendment continues to guide U.S. policy. This amendment ties Most Favored Nation trade status and government-backed credits to Soviet emigration policies. No changes are under consideration regarding U.S. policies on export controls or the relationship between human rights and trade.
- o Under Mr. Gorbachev, the U.S.S.R. has begun a drive for greater autonomy for economic and trade enterprises, using economic modernization and greater participation in the international economic system to aid that process.
- o The U.S. opposes Soviet membership or participation in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and in other international economic institutions because the Soviet economic system is not compatible with free world economies.

Campaign of Disinformation

- o Soviet media continue to publish lies about U.S. actions as part of a widespread campaign of disinformation. Lurid stories have alleged, for example, that the U.S. created the AIDS virus in a germ warfare laboratory, and that unscrupulous American businessmen are obtaining children in Central America to sell their body organs for transplant operations.
- o We have strongly objected to this disinformation campaign. It undermines efforts to improve communications and build better understanding between our two countries. The Soviet press, unlike ours, is controlled by the government. We are encouraged that some aspects of this campaign have recently diminished, and we hope it will continue.

Embassy Espionage

- o The U.S. uncovered a massive Soviet espionage program directed against our Embassy and personnel in Moscow. The President has decided that we will not occupy the new Embassy office building until it is safe and secure, and that the U.S.S.R. will not be allowed to occupy its new chancery in Washington until a simultaneous move is possible. Our first priority is to make our Moscow Embassy safe and secure. Extensive renovations are underway.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

ARMS REDUCTION

Arms reduction negotiations are not an end in themselves, but a central element in President Reagan's strategy to ensure the future security of the U.S. and its allies. The President seeks to enhance strategic stability at lower levels of military forces and thus reduce the risk of war. Arms reductions should establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility and help us build a safer world for all people.

After six years of negotiation and discussion, during which President Reagan held firm in the face of extreme Soviet political pressure, the United States and the Soviet Union signed the INF Treaty last December. This historic agreement eliminates an entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles.

The INF agreement is a step toward a more secure peace, but only a first step. In the continuing effort to achieve a safer world, the Reagan Administration, with support from our allies, has engaged the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states on a wide range of arms reduction issues.

Among arms reduction issues to be discussed at the Summit, the two leaders will emphasize strategic nuclear arms. Defense and space, conventional forces, chemical weapons, and nuclear testing will also be addressed.

Strategic Nuclear Arms (START)

- o President Reagan places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms (START).
- o Deep reductions do not, in and of themselves, guarantee enhanced stability or reduce the risk of war. Some weapons are more dangerous and destabilizing than others because they are better suited for first-strike missions. The key, therefore, to reducing the risk of war is to ensure that strategic reductions result in force structures that reduce incentives to strike first.
- o For this reason, since the beginning of the START talks in 1982, the President has insisted on negotiating sublimits (specific limits on particular weapons within the overall reductions) on the most threatening categories of strategic weapons -- especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads; the weapons most suitable for a first-strike.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o At the 1985 Geneva Summit, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in principle to a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. At Iceland in 1986, the two leaders reached major new areas of agreement on the nature of a strategic reduction regime. However, Soviet insistence on linking strategic arms reductions to measures that would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) prevented an agreement.
- o On May 8, 1987, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the START negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland and provides for roughly 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arsenals to equal levels for both sides.
- o At the December 1987 Washington Summit, both sides agreed to a sublimit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads within a total of 6,000 nuclear warheads. This was a very important step because it meets a longstanding Reagan Administration requirement for strict limits on these systems.
- o At Ministerial meetings this year, the two sides have agreed to press forward on treaty verification, which is fundamental to successful conclusion of a treaty. Negotiators are currently working to complete joint draft verification protocols and the Memorandum of Understanding on data.
- o President Reagan believes a START agreement could be reached this year, but only if the Soviet Union drops its insistence that we accept measures which would kill or cripple the SDI program.
- The President has made it clear that because of the importance of SDI to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, the program must move forward.
- o In the process of negotiating a START agreement, President Reagan, above all, remains firm in his position that no agreement is better than a bad agreement. He will refuse to sign a START agreement, or any other agreement, unless it is in the best security interests of the United States and our allies.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

Defense and Space

- o At the Defense and Space talks, the U.S. has endeavored to discuss with the Soviet Union how, should effective strategic defenses prove feasible, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons.
- o At the Washington Summit, President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to instruct their negotiators "to work out an agreement that would commit the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the Treaty, and not to withdraw from the Treaty for a specified period of time."
- o In March 1988, the two sides agreed to work on a joint draft text of a separate Defense and Space agreement, based on the agreement reached at the Washington Summit. The Soviet Union has only recently begun to carry out their agreement to do this.
- o In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviet Union on Defense and Space, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals, including a proposed predictability package providing for exchange of data and other measures to enhance confidence in the nature, pace, and scope of the strategic defense activities undertaken by each side. It is important to note that the U.S.S.R. has long been actively engaged in its own strategic defense programs.
- o Many differences continue to separate the two sides, however, including Soviet efforts to place restrictions on the SDI program. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on SDI beyond those actually agreed to in the ABM treaty.

Conventional Forces and Chemical Weapons

- o At their Iceland meeting in June 1987, NATO foreign ministers set as a priority the effort to redress the serious imbalances in conventional forces and chemical weapons favoring the Warsaw Pact.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o Western security has long been threatened by Warsaw Pact conventional superiority -- based primarily on massive, forward-deployed, offensively configured Soviet armored forces in Eastern Europe and in western U.S.S.R. The conventional imbalance derives not only from Eastern numerical superiority in key categories of combat capability, but also from geographic and other non-quantitative advantages.
- o Today, as a result of the unilateral restraint exercised by the U.S. and the intensive Soviet chemical weapons modernization program, there is a serious East-West imbalance in these weapons. The Soviet Union possesses a formidable, modern arsenal including what is by far the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, while the U.S. capability -- largely unusable and dating, in part, from the 1940s and 1950s -- has lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons.
- o The Reagan Administration is addressing these concerns by seeking U.S. and NATO force improvements; pursuing the East-West Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna seeking Warsaw Pact agreement on a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations covering, for the first time, the entire area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains; and by pursuing an effective, verifiable, and global ban on chemical weapons.
- o The United States and the Soviet Union have both agreed to work with their respective allies to move forward with dispatch in the Vienna talks on the mandate for new conventional stability negotiations.
- o The U.S. decision to begin restoring our chemical deterrent by producing binary chemical munitions has clearly spurred the Soviet Union to negotiate seriously on chemical weapons. Substantial progress has been made on U.S.- Soviet bilateral chemical weapons data exchange. Both sides have recognized the goal of a global ban, but serious difficulties remain, especially in the vital area of verification.

Nuclear Testing

- o President Reagan is committed to seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations which could strengthen security for all nations.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o In September 1987, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze issued a statement agreeing to begin full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing before December 1, 1987. The first round of these negotiations was held in Geneva from November 9-20, 1987.
- o As a first step in these negotiations, the two sides will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible for the U.S. Senate to ratify the U.S.- Soviet Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Explosions Treaty of 1976. These treaties would limit underground explosions for military and peaceful purposes, respectively, to 150 kilotons. Negotiators are currently working on draft texts of verification protocols for these treaties.
- o At the Washington Summit, the two sides also agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) to facilitate agreement on verification provisions for these treaties. The JVE will be conducted this summer at our Nevada test site and at the Semipacatinsk test site in the Soviet Union.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR *Marykeel Batjer*
THROUGH: JAMES L. HOOLE *JLH*
FROM: JOANNE HILDEBRAND
SUBJECT: TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE MOSCOW SUMMIT, MAY 25-
JUNE 3, 1988

For your use and planning purposes, the attached is an outline schedule for the Trip of the President to the Moscow Summit from Wednesday, May 25-Friday, June 3, 1988. Please note that the events that are in parentheses are currently not Presidential events, but rather events for staff participation only. This outline schedule will be amended daily as the Advance Teams in each of the countries makes logistical adjustments. If you have any questions, please call Joanne Hildebrand in the Advance Office on 456-7565.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

- 2 Jun
- MRS ROOSEVELT / POWELL
- SIM MIDDLETON

16-NA TO AAB
- FINLAND
USSR

PROPOSED OUTLINE SCHEDULE OF THE TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT

TO

TP

THE MOSCOW SUMMIT

WEDNESDAY MAY 25-FRIDAY, JUNE 3, 1988

- NO GATE
- WEST LOBBY

9:20
9:30

DAY ONE (Wednesday, May 25, 1988)

Departure Statement on South Lawn (9:50 am)
Marine One departs South Lawn en route Andrews AFB (10:00 am)
Marine One arrives Andrews AFB (10:10 am)
Air Force One departs Andrews AFB en route Helsinki, Finland (10:15 am - Flight Time: 8 hrs. 25 mins, Time Change: +7 hrs.)
Air Force One arrives Vantaa Airport, Helsinki, Finland (1:40 am/6:40 pm EDT).
* Informal Arrival Greeting with President and Mrs. Koivisto at VIP Lounge
Depart Vantaa Airport en route Government Guest House (1:55 am)
Arrive Government Guest House (2:15 am/7:15 pm EDT)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Government Guest House
Helsinki, Finland

DAY TWO (Thursday, May 26, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Entire day) (NOTE: No Daily Operations Meeting.)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Government Guest House
Helsinki, Finland

DAY THREE (Friday, May 27, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)
(Daily Operations Meeting at 9:30 am in Special Meeting Room.)
Private Lunch with Mrs. Reagan at Government Guest House
Depart Government Guest House with Mrs. Reagan en route Presidential Palace (1:25 pm)
Arrive Presidential Palace for Official Events with President and Mrs. Koivisto (1:35 pm)
* Arrival Ceremony (1:40-1:50 pm)
* Official Photo/Toast with President and Mrs. Koivisto (1:55-2:00 pm)
* Private Meeting with President Koivisto (2:00-2:15 pm)
* Tea with President and Mrs. Koivisto (2:15-2:30 pm)

DAY THREE (Friday, May 27, 1988), contd.

Depart Presidential Palace with Mrs. Reagan en route Finlandia Hall
(2:35 pm)

Arrive Finlandia Hall (2:40 pm)

* View Helsinki Accords/VIP Greeting/Guest Book Signing (2:40-
2:55 pm)

* Address (3:05-3:30 pm)

Depart Finlandia Hall en route Government Guest House (3:40 pm)

Arrive Government Guest House (3:50 pm)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Remainder of day)

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Government Guest House
Helsinki, Finland

DAY FOUR (Saturday, May 28, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)

(Daily Operations Meeting at 10:00 am in Special Meeting Room.)

Private Lunch with Mrs. Reagan at Government Guest House

Briefing with Senior Advisors in Special Meeting Room (1:30-3:00 pm)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Remainder of day)

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Government Guest House
Helsinki, Finland

DAY FIVE (Sunday, May 29, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)

(Daily Operations Meeting at 9:00 am in Special Meeting Room.)

Depart Government Guest House en route Vantaa Airport (10:50 am)

Arrive Vantaa Airport (11:10 am)

* Informal Departure Greeting with President and Mrs. Koivisto at
VIP Lounge

* Event with Embassy Personnel (Brief Informal Remarks)

Air Force One departs Finland, Helsinki en route Moscow, U.S.S.R.
(11:30 am - Flight Time: 1 hr. 30 mins. (w/o interchange), Time
Change: +1 hr.)

Air Force One arrives Vnukovo Airport, Moscow, U.S.S.R. (2:00 pm/
6:00 am EDT)

* Official Arrival Ceremony with President Gromyko at Vnukovo
Airport

Depart Vnukovo Airport with Mrs. Reagan en route Grand Kremlin
Palace (2:20 pm)

Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace (2:40 pm)

Greeting with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev at St. George's
Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (2:45-3:00 pm)

* Brief Remarks

PRIVATE HOLD TIME (15 mins.)

1st Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at St. Catherine's
Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (3:15-4:00 pm)

DAY FIVE (Sunday, May 29, 1988), contd.

Depart Grand Kremlin Palace (with Mrs. Reagan???) en route Spaso House (4:05 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (4:15 pm)
Briefing with Senior Advisors in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House (4:30-5:00 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Remainder of Day)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Spaso House
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DAY SIX (Monday, May 30, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)
(Shultz/Carlucci/Baker/Powell Meeting in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House - 8:15-8:45 am)
Staff Time in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House (9:00-9:30 am)
Depart Spaso House en route Grand Kremlin Palace (9:45 am)
Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace (9:55 am)
2nd Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (10:00-11:30 am)
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace en route Spaso House (11:35 am)
Arrive Spaso House (11:45 am)
(Senior Advisors' Meeting in Special Meeting room at Spaso House - 11:50 am-12:20 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (1 hr.)
Private Lunch with Mrs. Reagan at Spaso House (12:45 pm-1:30 pm)
Depart Spaso House with Mrs. Reagan en route Danilov Monastery (1:35 pm)
Arrive Danilov Monastery (1:55 pm) {30 MIN TOTAL EVENT}
* View Restoration of Icons (2:00-2:10 pm)
* Meeting with Priests (2:15-2:35 pm)
Depart Danilov Monastery en route Grand Kremlin Palace (2:30 pm)
Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace (2:55 pm) (2:45 pm)
3rd Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (3:00-4:00 pm) (3:00 - 4:15 pm)
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace en route Spaso House (4:05 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (4:15 pm)
PRIVATE TIME (15 mins.)
Meeting with Mrs. Reagan, with Selected Soviet Citizens at Spaso House (4:30-5:30 pm) (4:45 - 5:15 pm) NO PRIVATE MTG/ ONLY TABLE MTG
PRIVATE TIME (1 hr. 45 mins.)
Depart Spaso House with Mrs. Reagan en route Grand Kremlin Palace (7:15 pm)
Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace for Official Dinner with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev (7:25 pm) (DINNER 7:30 - 9:30 pm)
* Receiving Line
* Dinner
* Toast Remarks
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace with Mrs. Reagan en route Spaso House (9:30 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (9:45 pm)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Spaso House
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

05/18/88 9:00 p.m.

DAY SEVEN (Tuesday, May 31, 1988) (RR WILL NOT ATTEND OR PARTICIPATE IN BILATS SIGNING CRMY)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)
(Shultz/Carlucci/Baker/Powell Meeting in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House - 8:15-8:45 am)
Staff Time in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House (9:00-9:30 am)
PRIVATE TIME (15 mins.)
Depart Spaso House en route Kremlin/USSR Government Building (9:45 am)
Arrive Kremlin/USSR Government Building (9:55 am)
4th Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at Kremlin (10:00-11:30 am)
* Brief Private Meeting in General Secretary's Private Office of USSR Government Building
* Walk through Kremlin Grounds
* Plenary Meeting in St. Catherine's Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace en route House of Writers (11:35 am)
Arrive House of Writers for Event with Cultural and Art Community (11:45 am)
* VIP Greeting (11:45-11:50 am)
* Lunch (11:55 am-12:30 pm)
* View Presentations/Remarks by Participants (12:30-12:45 pm)
* Remarks (12:45-1:00 pm)
Depart House of Writers en route Spaso House (1:05 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (1:15 pm)
(Senior Advisors' Meeting in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House - 1:20-2:00 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (2 hrs. 15 mins.) (NOTE: Time available for Daily Operations Meeting if desired.)
Depart Spaso House en route Moscow State University (3:30 pm)
Arrive Moscow State University (3:45 pm)
* VIP Greeting (3:45-3:55 pm)
* Address to Students/Faculty (4:05-4:30 pm)
* Question and Answer Period (4:30-4:45 pm)
* Greeting with American Students (4:50-5:00 pm)
Depart Moscow State University en route Spaso House (5:05 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (5:20 pm)
PRIVATE TIME (2 hrs. 40 mins.) (NOTE: Time available for Daily Operations Meeting if desired.)
Reciprocal Dinner with Mrs. Reagan at Spaso House for General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev hosted by U.S. (8:00 pm-???)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Spaso House
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DAY EIGHT (Wednesday, June 1, 1988)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)
(Shultz/Carlucci/Baker/Powell Meeting in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House - 8:15-8:45 am)
Staff Time in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House (9:00-9:30 am)
PRIVATE TIME (15 mins.)
Depart Spaso House en route Grand Kremlin Palace (9:45 am)

05/18/88 9:00 p.m.

DAY EIGHT (Wednesday, June 1, 1988), contd.

Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace (9:55 am)
5th Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at St. Catherine's
Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (10:00-11:00 am)
Possible Signing Ceremony in St. Vladimir Room, Grand Kremlin Palace
(~~11:30 am-12:00 Noon~~) (11:00 - 11:30 am)
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace en route Spaso House (12:05 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (12:15 pm)
PRIVATE TIME (15 mins.)
Lunch with Senior Advisors/Pre-Press Conference Briefing in Special
Meeting Room at Spaso House (12:30-1:30 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (2 hrs. 30 mins.) (NOTE: Time available
for Daily Operations Meeting if desired.)
Press Conference in Ballroom at Spaso House (4:00-4:30 pm)
PRIVATE TIME (1 hr. 15 mins.) (NOTE: Time available for Daily
Operations Meeting if desired.)
Depart Spaso House with Mrs. Reagan en route Bolshoi Theatre
(5:45 pm)
Arrive Bolshoi Theatre (5:55 pm)
* Attend Ballet Performance with General Secretary and Mrs.
Gorbachev (6:00-7:20 pm)
Depart Bolshoi Theatre with Mrs. Reagan en route Private Dacha
outside Moscow (7:25 pm)
Arrive Private Dacha outside Moscow for Private Dinner with General
Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev (7:55 pm)
* Dinner
* Mix and Mingle
Depart Private Dacha outside Moscow with Mrs. Reagan en route Spaso
House (10:35 pm???) (10:00 pm)
Arrive Spaso House (11:05 pm???)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Spaso House
Moscow, U.S.S.R.

DAY NINE (Thursday, June 2, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME: Morning
(Shultz/Carlucci/Baker/Powell Meeting in Special Meeting Room at
Spaso House - 8:00-8:30 am)
Staff Time in Special Meeting Room at Spaso House (8:45-9:00 am)
Event with Embassy Personnel and Families at Spaso House (9:05-
9:40 am)
* Remarks
Depart Spaso House with Mrs. Reagan en route Grand Kremlin Palace
(9:45 am)
Arrive Grand Kremlin Palace (9:55 am)
Farewell with General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev in St. George's
Hall, Grand Kremlin Palace (10:00-10:15 am)
* Brief Remarks??
Depart Grand Kremlin Palace with Mrs. Reagan en route Vnukovo
Airport (10:20 am)

05/18/88 9:00 p.m.

DAY NINE (Thursday, June 2, 1988), contd.

Arrive Vnukovo Airport (10:40 am)

- * Official Departure Ceremony with President Gromyko at Vnukovo Airport (10:40-10:55 am)

Air Force One departs Moscow, U.S.S.R. en route London, England (11:00 am - Flight Time: 3 hrs. 35 mins. (w/o interchange), Time Change: -3 hrs.)

Air Force One arrives Heathrow Airport, London, England (11:35 am)

- * Informal Arrival

Marine One departs Heathrow Airport en route Winfield House (11:40 am)

Marine One arrives Winfield House (12:00 Noon)

PRIVATE TIME (15 mins.)

Private Lunch at Winfield House (12:15-1:15 pm??)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (3 hrs. 25 mins.)

Depart Winfield House with Mrs. Reagan en route Buckingham Palace (4:40 pm)

Arrive Buckingham Palace (4:55 pm)

- * Tea with Queen Elizabeth II (5:00-5:50 pm)

Depart Buckingham Palace en route FCO Quadrangle (5:55 pm)

Arrive FCO Quadrangle (6:00 pm)

- * Review Honor Guard

Depart FCO Quadrangle en route #10 Downing Street

Arrive #10 Downing Street (6:15 pm)

- * Tete-a-Tete with Prime Minister Thatcher (6:15-7:00)
- * Pre-Dinner Reception with Mrs. Reagan with Prime Minister Thatcher (7:00-7:30 pm)
- * Dinner with Mrs. Reagan with Prime Minister Thatcher (7:30-9:45 pm)
- * View Beating the Retreat (9:45-10:00 pm)

Depart #10 Downing Street with Mrs. Reagan en route Winfield House (10:00 pm)

Arrive Winfield House (10:15 pm)

REMAIN OVERNIGHT: Winfield House
London, England

DAY TEN (Friday, June 3, 1988)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (Morning)

(Daily Operations Meeting at 8:30 am in Churchill Hotel.)

Staff Time at Winfield House (9:30-10:00 am)

Pre-Brief for Bilateral Meeting at Winfield House (10:00-10:20 am)

PRIVATE TIME (10 mins.)

Bilateral Meeting with Prime Minister Takeshita of Japan at Winfield House (10:30-11:00 am)

PRIVATE TIME (20 mins.)

Depart Winfield House with Mrs. Reagan en route Guildhall (11:20 am)

Arrive Guildhall (11:35 am)

- * VIP Greeting (11:40-11:55 am)
- * Address (12:05-12:30 pm)
- * View Prime Minister's Thatcher's Remarks (12:30-12:40 pm)

DAY TEN (Friday, June 3, 1988), contd.

Depart Guildhall with Mrs. Reagan en route Winfield House (12:45 pm)

Arrive Winfield House (1:00 pm)

PRIVATE TIME (10 mins.)

Event with U.S. Embassy Personnel at Winfield House (1:10-1:20 pm)

Marine One departs Winfield House en route Heathrow Airport
(1:25 pm)

Marine One arrives Heathrow Airport (1:45 pm)

* Informal Departure

Air Force One departs London, England en route Andrews Air Force
Base (1:50 pm - Flight Time: 7 hrs. 40 mins. (w/o interchange),
Time Change: -5 hrs.)

* Lunch on board??

Air Force One arrives Andrews AFB (4:30 pm)

* Arrival Ceremony

* Pre-Program

* Remarks

Marine One departs Andrews AFB en route the White House (4:50 pm)

Marine One arrives South Lawn (5:00 pm)

NOTE: All times are tentative and subject to change.

05/18/88 9:00 p.m.

