

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Cobb, Tyrus: Files

Folder Title: Background Book: Gorbachev/President's
Meetings - Moscow 05/29/1988-06/02/1988 (1)

Box: RAC Box 5

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. background book <div style="position: absolute; left: -100px; top: 50px; font-size: 2em;"> Folder 1 Folder 2 </div>	for the meetings of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, Moscow, May 29 - June 2, 1988 (76pp)	n.d.	P-1
	DOC 1-4 6P. R 12/9/05 MD3-1470 #1-4	n.d.	P-1
	DOC 5 PAPER RESTART, 3P R 7/6/10 MD3-1470 #5	n.d.	P-1
	DOC 6-32 36P R 12/9/05 MD3-1470 #6-32	n.d.	P-1
	DOC 33 1P PART. 12/9/05 MD3-1470 #33	n.d.	P-1
	DOC 34-56 30P R 12/9/05 MD3-1470 #34-56	n.d.	P-1
COLLECTION: COBB, TYRUS W.: Files			db
FILE FOLDER: Background Book: Gorbachev/Reagan Meetings - Moascow			(1 of 2) RAC Box 5 Box 92189 11/18/94

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR Mo 3-1470 #1

BY WOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

BACKGROUND BOOK
for
THE MEETINGS
of
PRESIDENT REAGAN
and
GENERAL SECRETARY
GORBACHEV

Moscow

May 29 - June 2, 1988

Ty Cobb

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

May 20, 1988

Jy Cobb

MEMORANDUM FOR HOWARD BAKER
KEN DUBERSTEIN
TOM GRISCOM
RHETT DAWSON
MARLIN FITZWATER
PAUL STEVENS
BOB OAKLEY
NELSON LEDSKY
BOB LINHARD
HANK COHEN
PETER RODMAN
RUDY PERINA
STEVE STEINER
MARYBEL BATJER
BOB PERITO
JOHN TUCK

FROM: COLIN L. POWELL *CP*
SUBJECT: Sensitive Distribution and Storage of Briefing Books

Attached is the Background Book prepared for the Moscow Summit. Although we have made distribution to each of you, we are asking you be aware of the severe storage limitations for classified material in Helskinski and Moscow. You are strongly encouraged to review your books prior to departure and leave your copy here. We will have two copies available at the NSC area in Helskinski and Moscow for reference.

The Briefing Books will be distributed Monday and will have limited distribution. We hope you will review the books prior to departure and leave them here. There will be copies available at the NSC area in Moscow for reference.

We cannot emphasize enough the damage which could occur should any of the material contained in the books reach the Soviets, nor can we emphasize enough the severe limitation on storage for classified documents in Moscow.

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED

NLRR MO3-1470#2

BY WST, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

BACKGROUND BOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. ARMS CONTROL

1. Nuclear and Space Talks: INF Treaty, START, Defense and Space Negotiations
2. Nuclear Testing
3. Compliance
4. Nuclear Nonproliferation
5. Chemical Weapons Negotiations
6. Conventional Forces in Europe/CST
7. CDE Implementation
8. Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security (CSIS)

II. HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview of US-Soviet Human Rights Issues
2. List of Cases of Special Interest
3. Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union
4. Emigration and Family Visits
5. Political Dissent in the Soviet Union
6. Religious Rights in the Millennial Year
7. CSCE/Moscow Human Rights Meeting
8. Soviet Human Rights Agenda

III. REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Iran-Iraq War
4. Middle East Peace Process
5. Central America
6. Africa
7. Terrorism
8. The President's Initiative on Berlin
9. East Asia and the Pacific
10. South Asian Nuclear Issue

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470 #3
BY NOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

IV. US-SOVIET BILATERAL ISSUES

1. Summit Bilateral Checklist
2. Cultural and People-to-People Exchanges
3. US-USSR Science and Technology Exchanges
4. Global Climate and Environmental Change Initiative
5. Embassy Management Issues
6. Kiev-New York Consulate Exchange
7. Information and Media Issues - Disinformation
8. Arctic Contacts and Cooperation

V. US-SOVIET ECONOMIC ISSUES

1. Soviet Economic Performance
2. Soviet International Economic Initiatives
3. US-Soviet Trade
4. Agriculture: Long Term Grains Agreement (LTA)
5. Fisheries/Whaling
6. US-USSR Cooperation Against Narcotics Trafficking
7. Soviet Commercial Space Launch Vehicles

VI. SOVIET DEVELOPMENTS

1. Gorbachev's Leadership and the Opposition
2. Prospects for Soviet Economic Reform
3. Soviet Foreign Policy Trends
4. Unrest in the National Republics
5. Soviet Military Doctrine Debate

~~SECRET~~

ARMS CONTROL

1. Nuclear and Space Talks: INF Treaty, START, Defense and Space Negotiations
2. Nuclear Testing
3. Compliance
4. Nuclear Nonproliferation
5. Chemical Weapons Negotiations
6. Conventional Forces in Europe/CST
7. CDE Implementation
8. Comprehensive System of International Peace and Security (CSIS)

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INF TREATY

I. RATIFICATION

- o Senate is considering Treaty thoroughly. Floor debate began May 18.
 - Foreign Relations, Armed Services, and Select Committee on Intelligence held hearings and voted Treaty out of committee by overwhelming majorities (17-2, 18-2, and unanimous, respectively).
 - In addition to testimony, Administration answered over 1300 Senate questions and many letters for the record.
- o Administration worked closely with Senate to clear up questions that arose during ratification process.
 - Quayle and Nunn said Treaty did not clearly ban futuristic weapons (microwaves, lasers, etc.) on INF missiles.
 - o We exchanged diplomatic notes with Soviets to clarify that INF-range missiles carrying futuristic weapons are banned.
 - Some Senators were also concerned about Soviet position on implementation issues.
 - o We pressed Soviets and satisfactorily resolved problems.
 - Some Senators also want a condition preventing Executive Branch reinterpretation of Treaty without prior Senate consent, which we oppose. White House working with key Senators to resolve.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- o US preparations for implementation almost complete. Three rounds of technical talks held with Soviets to work out implementation details.
- o Soviets visited US resident monitoring site in Utah; US delegation visited comparable Soviet site at Votkinsk.
- o US conducted "mock inspections" of INF facilities in US and basing countries to smooth inspection procedures.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR MO3-1470 #4
BY NAI, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #5

START

BY RW NARA DATE 7-6-11

I. WHERE WE STAND

- o We have agreed on the outlines of a START agreement:
 - Deep (roughly 50%) reductions to 6000 warheads on 1600 delivery vehicles (bombers, missiles);
 - 50% cut in Soviet heavy missiles and throwweight;
 - 4900 limit on ballistic missile warheads.
- o But much hard work remains to be done, including:
 - Sublimit of 3000-3300 ICBM warheads to constrain most destabilizing weapon systems;
 - Resolving differences over limits on long-range nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles;
 - Effective ways to verify limits on mobile missiles should they be permitted; and
 - Acceptable counting rules for ALCM-carrying heavy bombers.

II. BASIC CONCEPTS

Destabilizing Weapons:

- o We have tried to convince the Soviets of the need for tight constraints on the most destabilizing weapons -- MIRVed land-based ballistic missiles. In a crisis, there would be incentives for a side to use these fast-flying, non-recallable weapons in a first strike, rather than risk having them destroyed.
- o The Soviets object, in part because they have nearly two-thirds of their warheads on fixed, land-based missiles, and they are deploying new mobile land-based missiles. They assert that mobile land-based missiles are no more dangerous than submarine-based missiles, on which the US relies heavily. They argue that their shift to mobile missiles will make their land-based forces less vulnerable and remove one major source of instability.
- o Mobile land-based missiles pose severe verification problems.
- o The Soviets say that they would accept a sublimit on ICBM warheads only if we accepted an equal sublimit on our SLBM warheads, a condition we cannot accept because it would undermine our efforts to achieve greater strategic stability.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

Verifiability: Numerous unresolved issues, including:

- o Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs): These small, accurate, "slow-flying" missiles are being installed on many US and Soviet naval vessels. For the US, they are carried in several types of launchers that also house weapons not subject to START limits, such as ship-to-ship missiles. Short-range SLCMs threaten US, but not USSR.
 - The Soviets have proposed tight numerical limits designed to constrain US (but not necessarily Soviet) SLCMs, both nuclear and conventional.
 - We will not limit conventional SLCMs. However, we have agreed that if ways can be found to verify ceilings on nuclear SLCMs without constraining our conventional capability, we will do so.
 - After many years of studying the problem, we have not found any way to verify such ceilings so that we could:
 - o Detect with confidence Soviet cheating;
 - o Not compromise sensitive systems; and
 - o Not violate our policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons on a particular ship.
 - The Soviets have suggested intrusive verification schemes involving shipboard inspections and technical approaches that they seem unable to explain in any detail, and none of which has been acceptable to us. They realize that, even with unverifiable limits, the US would be compelled to comply with limits, while they would not be so constrained.
 - We have countered with a proposal for unilateral declarations of SLCM acquisition plans.
 - This remains a serious point of disagreement.
- o Mobile Land-Based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs): These new weapons are mounted on special rail cars or heavy trailer-truck vehicles that can travel over dirt roads or through fields. Their mobility makes them difficult to target -- which could discourage attack during a crisis. But mobility also makes it difficult to monitor their numbers -- potentially raising questions about compliance with agreed limits. They are extremely costly systems, compared to silo-based missiles.

- The Soviets are deploying two types of mobile missiles: about 100 single-warhead, road-mobile SS-25 missiles and a few 10-warhead SS-24 missiles mounted on rail cars, and they will deploy more of each. We have begun to design two similar types: the single-warhead, road-mobile Midgetman and the 10-warhead, rail-mobile Peacekeeper (MX).

- The Soviets want to allow a number of each type and have proposed a variety of verification measures. Our position calls for a ban on mobile missiles, but we would be willing to reconsider if ways could be found to verify limits effectively and deter Soviet cheating. We are currently studying this problem.

~~SECRET~~

DEFENSE AND SPACE NEGOTIATIONS

I. DEVELOPMENTS SINCE LAST SUMMIT

- o January: US tabled separate draft treaty based on Washington Summit Joint Statement.
- o March: US tabled Predictability Protocol to Treaty as a way of building mutual confidence concerning both sides' strategic defense activities.
 - US also suggested removing constraints on space-based sensors.
- o April: Soviets handed over draft agreement preserving key Soviet positions (including blanket ABM Treaty nonwithdrawal pledge).
- o May: After stalling since the Washington Summit, Soviets finally began to participate in drafting a joint treaty text, building on the Summit language, that reflects areas of disagreement as well as agreement.

II. OUR THEMES

- o We have gone the extra mile to meet Soviet concerns:
 - Agreed there can be a period of nonwithdrawal from ABM Treaty in the context of START and Defense and Space treaties which meet our criteria;
 - Proposed predictability measures;
 - Agreed to discuss stability before end of nonwithdrawal period.
- o We will, however, preserve our rights:
 - To conduct SDI research, development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, to establish feasibility of defenses that meet our criteria;
 - To withdraw to protect our supreme interests; and
 - To deploy after the nonwithdrawal period with six months' notice unless the sides agree otherwise.
- o Soviet linkage to START is unacceptable. ABM Treaty was premised on strategic offensive reductions; those reductions should occur without any preconditions.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470#6
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

- o Ironic that Soviets seek a pledge of US adherence to ABM Treaty which they are clearly violating by construction of their illegal radar at Krasnoyarsk, and radars at Gomel.

- Soviets must resolve their ABM violations before any new US commitment to ABM Treaty nonwithdrawal or new strategic arms agreements are possible.

~~SECRET~~BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05NUCLEAR TESTINGI. BACKGROUND

- o Formal negotiations began November, 1987; agreed first priority is improved verification for/ratification of Threshold Test Ban/Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties (TTBT/PNET).
- o Negotiations now proceeding on parallel tracks:
 - Negotiation of verification protocols to Treaties; and
 - Preparation of Joint Verification Experiment (JVE) at US and Soviet test sites.
- o Expect to have ready for signature at summit:
 - Comprehensive JVE plan; and
 - Verification Protocol for PNET.
- o Following conduct of JVE in late summer, will complete TTBT protocol, then submit both Treaties for ratification.

II. US POSITION

- o For effective verification, require right to use CORRTEX (hydrodynamic method) on all nuclear tests over 50 kilotons. (Seismic method is too imprecise for effective verification.)
- o We don't need JVE, agreed to it to satisfy Soviet concerns about CORRTEX.
- o Following ratification of TTBT/PNET, US is prepared to discuss ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program of intermediate limitations, in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons.
- o Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB) remains long-term goal, but only when we no longer depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security/stability.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Verification preference is seismic; will accept use of CORRTEX with restrictive quota on its use as way to "calibrate" or improve seismic.
- o Insist JVE is necessary to prove effectiveness, non-intrusiveness of CORRTEX before completing TTBT.
- o Continue to press for further testing limitations (yield and number per year) and near-term CTB.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

NLRR M63-1470 #72

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

COMPLIANCE

I. ABM TREATY REVIEW

- o Treaty requires a Review at each five-year anniversary of the entry into force, which must begin by October 2, 1988.
- o This will be first review conducted since Soviets charged with ABM Treaty violations.
- o Soviets eager to conduct review. They propose sides limit themselves to reaffirming commitment to the goals and objectives of the Treaty as signed in 1972.
- o Until recently, Soviets denied their violations. At February Ministerial, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said Soviets would be willing to dismantle the Krasnoyarsk radar, but at subsequent meetings the Soviets showed no willingness to correct their violations.
- o Preparations for the Review have begun; no decisions have been made on the timing, forum, and venue.
- o Key issues for US will be resolution of Soviet violations or appropriate US response if Soviets refuse to correct them.

II. SOVIET ABM TREATY VIOLATIONS

- o President's December 1987 Noncompliance Report reaffirmed previous findings:
 - That the large phased-array radar under construction near Krasnoyarsk in Siberia is a clear violation of ABM Treaty.
 - A new violation this year involved the deployment of ABM radars from a missile test range to an electronics plant at Gomel.

III. COMPLIANCE AND TREATY RATIFICATION

- o In committee hearings on the INF Treaty, key Senators have said that Soviet noncompliance, especially the radar at Krasnoyarsk, will be given careful scrutiny before the Senate will agree to a START or Defense and Space Treaty.

IV. US POLICY

- o Soviet non-compliance with existing treaties must be corrected. In the case of Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty, the US will not conclude either a START or Defense and Space Treaty unless our concerns about the violations are resolved.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

I. BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS

- o US and USSR interests very similar -- both countries strongly oppose proliferation of nuclear weapons.
- o US and USSR have completed 10 rounds of semiannual consultations since early 1980's.
- o Next round scheduled for June 13-15 in Vienna, Austria.
- o These talks have been increasingly informative.

II. COMMON INTERESTS

- o Strengthening the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. This is the 20th anniversary of the Treaty's signature.
- o Strong support for the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) as lynchpin of the nonproliferation regime.
- o Maintenance of strong IAEA safeguards on civil nuclear facilities.

III. KEY ISSUE

- o Critical problem remains containing nuclear proliferation in India and Pakistan.
- o We want the Soviets to urge India to participate in constructive dialogue with Pakistan and agree not to test nuclear explosive device.
- o US has expressed concern about Soviet agreement to sell nuclear reactors to India without requiring safeguards on all India's nuclear facilities.

IV. NUCLEAR COOPERATION

- o In late April, the US and USSR signed an agreement to exchange technical and safety data on civilian power reactors.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470 #8
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

NLRR

MO3-1470 #9

BY

WJS

, NARA, DATE

12/9/05

CHEMICAL WEAPONS NEGOTIATIONSI. BACKGROUND

- o 1925 Geneva Protocol bans the use of chemical weapons, but does not restrict possession, transfer, or production.
- o In 1984, following Secretary of State's statement at Stockholm Conference, Vice President Bush tabled US draft treaty at 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, to be a basis for negotiation of a global ban.
- o US draft Treaty tabled with understanding that we would develop procedures for effective verification; US draft Treaty remains essentially unverifiable.
- o At Geneva summit, agreed to intensify bilateral talks with Soviet Union to facilitate multilateral global ban negotiations.
- o Have conducted exchange of visits to US, Soviet chemical weapons facility, respectively, as confidence-building measure.
- o US modernization program proceeding on schedule; assembly of binary weapons (155 mm artillery) began December 16, 1987. Production would be completed, on present schedule, by 2004.

II. US POSITION

- o Pursue effectively verifiable, truly global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons.
- o Prompt, mandatory challenge inspection with no right of refusal essential for all suspect sites.
- o US continues to have verification concerns regarding undeclared stocks/facilities, novel agents; solutions not yet in sight.
- o Will not ratify ban until all CW-capable states are party.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Have publicly acknowledged possession; announced production moratorium, alleged size of stockpile (50,000 tons).
- o Now accept most of US draft treaty in principle, including challenge inspection with no right of refusal and prior data exchange. Details still unknown.
- o Pushing for early signature of treaty; accuse US of stalling to acquire binaries.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~SECRET~~

CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION/PROLIFERATION

I. CHEMICAL WEAPONS VERIFICATION

- o US recognizes extreme difficulty of verification in CW field.
- o Studying problem, unable to solve.
- o Proliferation compounds difficulties: all CW-capable states not members of 40-nation Conference on Disarmament.

II. CHEMICAL WEAPONS PROLIFERATION

- o The number of states possessing chemical weapons has grown. At least 15 states now possess CW; several more actively seek capability.
- o Proliferation particularly acute in Middle East and South Asia.

III. US EFFORTS TO PREVENT PROLIFERATION

- o Technical measures, such as export controls, to slow proliferation by drying up supply, raising cost.
- o Direct political action to discourage acquisition.
- o Support for international investigations to deter illegal use.

IV. US-SOVIET DISCUSSIONS

- o At Geneva summit, agreed to initiate dialogue with Soviets on problem of chemical weapons proliferation.
- o Three rounds of bilateral discussions have identified considerable common ground: Soviets accept concept of US three-part approach, have imposed export controls, support investigation of use.
- o However, no evidence Soviets have applied political pressure to prevent spread, use of CW. Indeed, Warsaw Pact contributed to CW proliferation.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #10

BY HDS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE/CST

I. BACKGROUND

- o Progress in nuclear arms reductions renews attention to conventional imbalance.
- o NATO Summit statement of March 2 set initial priority for future conventional stability talks (CST) on ground forces.
- o Deliberations with East on CST mandate, and with Allies on CST proposal, continue to show progress.

II. US AND NATO POLICY

- o Objective is to eliminate conventional disparities and Soviet capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations.
- o Allies agree to use equal ceilings in much of Europe to force large Eastern reductions.
- o Adoption of a CST mandate must be part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, including progress on human rights.
- o Continuing Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks in Vienna until establishment of an acceptable new forum.

III. SOVIET VIEWS

- o Moscow has called for the elimination of military disparities, but denied its overall conventional superiority.
- o In Sofia response to NATO Summit statement, Soviets continued to seek inclusion of dual-capable (read theater nuclear) systems in CST.
- o Soviets also proposed immediate bilateral exchange of conventional force data; we oppose this attempt to leapfrog a measured discussion within the context of established negotiations.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470 #11

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

BY MS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CDE IMPLEMENTATION

I. BACKGROUND

- o 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (CDE) agreed on a set of military measures in September, 1986, which include:
 - Prior notification of military activities (above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks);
 - Exchange of annual forecasts of notifiable activities;
 - Mandatory observation of exercises above 17,000 troops; and
 - On-site inspection as means of verification.

II. IMPLEMENTATION

- o Soviet and Warsaw Pact implementation in the first 15 months generally encouraging.
- o In general, both NATO and Warsaw Pact countries have properly forecast, notified, and invited observers to their exercises.
- o Ten on-site inspections have been conducted; Warsaw Pact countries generally have met requirements for receiving Western inspectors.
- o Five inspections so far this year, including two by the US on a Warsaw Pact exercise in Hungary and a non-notified Soviet exercise in the GDR. The Soviet Union has inspected a NATO exercise in Norway. Compliance appears to date to be satisfactory.

III. NEXT STEPS

- o At the Vienna CSCE meeting, NATO has proposed further negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures among all 35 CSCE states to build on results of Stockholm, provided a balanced outcome can be achieved during Vienna meeting.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #12

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY (CSIS)

I. BACKGROUND

- o CSIS has been the centerpiece of Moscow's approach to the UN since 1986. Gorbachev personally associated himself with CSIS in his September, 1987, Pravda article.
- o This initiative signifies new Soviet emphasis on the UN as an instrument for advancing its geopolitical goals and as a propaganda tool for promoting "new political thinking."
- o CSIS is a broad multilateral action program, with many proposals inimical to the West. For example, it seeks to:
 - Undermine SDI through creation of a "world space organization."
 - Erode deterrence through negotiation of a treaty on non-first-use of nuclear weapons and creation of additional nuclear-weapon-free zones.
 - Complicate US-Soviet nuclear testing talks through immediate multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

II. US POSITION

- o US strongly opposes CSIS as long-term threat to UN Charter and system. Its adoption could lead to:
 - Redefinition of UN Charter;
 - Creation of new, redundant international organizations; and
 - Further politicization of UN system.
- o Though prepared to deal with individual proposals on their merits, we do not accept premise that the world community needs a new "comprehensive system" for peace and security.
- o Soviets suffered major setback at last fall's UNGA; over half of UN states withheld support from CSIS resolution.
- o Nonetheless, Soviets seem intent on promoting CSIS and its component elements. US will continue to resist.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR Mo3-1470 #13
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

HUMAN RIGHTS

1. Overview of US-Soviet Human Rights Issues
2. List of Cases of Special Interest
3. Political Prisoners in the Soviet Union
4. Emigration and Family Visits
5. Political Dissent in the Soviet Union
6. Religious Rights in the Millennial Year
7. CSCE/Moscow Human Rights Meeting
8. Soviet Human Rights Agenda

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470 #14
BY LS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLRR MO3-1470 #15

BY. WJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

OVERVIEW OF US-SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

- o There have been positive developments in Soviet human rights performance under Gorbachev, but much more needs to be done.
- o "Unofficial" organizations have been tolerated, even some devoted to political issues, but their members have often been harassed.
- o Some public demonstrations have been allowed to take place in the past few years, but beginning in the fall of 1987 Soviet policy became more restrictive.
- o Legal and institutional reforms are necessary, if there are to be lasting improvements.
- o A review of the legal system is under way, but it has so far produced little in the way of concrete results.
- o About 350 political prisoners have been released since February 1987.
 - We have the names of over 300 remaining political prisoners, however, and there may be many others whose names we don't know.
- o In this year of the Millennium, it remains difficult for many and almost impossible for some believers to practice their faith.
 - At least half the political prisoners we know of are in prison because they attempted to practice their religion.
 - Religious education outside the home is forbidden.
 - There are not enough places of worship, not enough clergy, not enough religious literature. Importation and dissemination of religious literature remains controlled.
 - The Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains forcibly incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church is still banned.
- o Emigration levels began rising in 1987 for the three groups permitted to emigrate: Germans, Armenians, and Jews.
 - But barriers to emigration remain: requirement for an invitation from a close relative, requirement that adult applicants have parental permission, arbitrary use of "state security restriction."

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

LISTS OF CASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST

I. US SHORT LIST

- o Almost all the cases on the "short list" of "cases of special interest," first presented in September 1986, were resolved.
 - In February, Secretary Shultz presented a new list of 17 cases to Shevardnadze. You presented the list in March, and the Secretary presented it again in April.
 - To date, there has been little concrete progress on the 17 cases. Refusenik Igor Tufeld arrived in the U.S. May 13, and Baptist Vitaliy Varavin reportedly has received exit permission.
 - Soviet officials have given hints that other cases might be resolved, but these hints have not yet materialized.

II. REPRESENTATION LISTS

- o The Department of State also maintains representation lists of divided spouses, blocked marriages, dual nationals, and divided families (those applying to join close relatives in the US).
- o A significant number of cases have been resolved in the past year, but too many remain.
- o Several marriage cases were resolved last fall, including the 31-year Michelson case and the Braun and Balovlenkov cases.
 - There are currently three divided-spouse cases: Vileshina/Pakenas, Johnson/Petrov, and Goscilo/Kostin. (The last two couples have become divorced; the Soviets may not be aware of this.)
 - There are now 5 blocked marriages: Bohonovsky/Grigorishin, Petrone/Alexandrovich, Nudel/Shteynberg, Guillet/Peregudova, and Gureckas/Paulionis.

III. DUAL NATIONS

- o There are currently 16 "dual-nationals," US citizens who are not allowed to leave the Soviet Union because they are also considered Soviet citizens.
 - The Stolar dual-national case remains unresolved, despite Soviets' December invitation to Abe Stolar's daughter-in-law to reapply; she was since refused again.

DECLASSIFIED

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470 #16
BY WAS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- o Total for divided families list is about 50. Still 6 cases remaining which were promised resolution in 1986 in Washington and Bern.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. HOW MANY PRISONERS REMAIN

- o After denying for many years that they held any political prisoners, in 1986 the Soviet Union began to release such prisoners. Since that time, more than 350 people have been released.
- o More than 300 individuals remain incarcerated, however, merely for freely expressing themselves, publishing their views or practising their faith.
- o At the request of Shevardnadze, we presented a detailed list of these cases. Although he committed himself to review each case, he has yet to respond in detail.

II. SIGNIFICANT ISSUE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS AND AS SYMBOL

- o We have stressed to Soviets the importance of freeing those who have suffered unjustly and the signal it would send:
 - Soviet people will not speak and write freely until those who have been punished in the past for this are released. Andrei Sakharov has placed the highest priority on this issue.
 - Western observers will remain skeptical of Soviet reform until all prisoners are released. This is one of our conditions for considering the proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference.
 - One activist who helped publicize the demonstrations in Armenia, Paruyr Ayrikyan, was arrested on a political charge on March 25. First such arrest in more than a year and a half.

III. US AGENDA

- o Release of all political prisoners. We express particular concern for the former Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. Continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of the reported review of his case in 1986.
- o Rehabilitation of the released prisoners and an end to harassment and discrimination in employment.
- o Repeal of the laws that put these prisoners behind bars merely for exercising their rights.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR MO3-1470 #17
BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~BY WJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05EMIGRATION AND FAMILY VISITSI. EMMIGRATION LEVELS

- o Since early 1987, Soviet emigration levels have been rising.
 - In 1986, 914 Soviet Jews emigrated. Total for 1987 was 8,115. Levels rose slightly at start of 1988; about 1,000 a month now getting exit permission.
 - In 1986, 247 Soviet Armenians emigrated. In 1987, estimated that about 8,000 received exit permission. About 1,000 now emigrating each month.
 - 1987 was a record year for the only other group ever permitted to emigrate in large numbers, ethnic Germans. 14,488 emigrated to the FRG, compared with 783 in 1986.
- o Many long-time refuseniks still denied permission to emigrate. There are still divided families, and US-Soviet dual nationals who cannot leave.

II. LEGAL BARRIERS

- o Legal and procedural barriers to emigration remain:
 - Arbitrary use of "state security" to deny emigration, even when the applicant had no contact with sensitive information, or had contact many years before.
 - Adult applicants must have parents' permission to emigrate.
 - Applicant must have an invitation from an immediate relative who lives abroad. Soviets have been willing to be flexible on this, but it remains on the books and is a deterrent to new applications.

III. TRAVEL

- o Visits by Soviets to relatives in the US have increased five-fold since 1986 to approximately 1,000 per month, and Soviet emigres may now return to the Soviet Union on visits. Problems remain, however:
 - Some Soviets still denied family visits to US
 - US visitors to the Soviet Union cannot stay with relatives, and are barred from "sensitive" cities.
 - Although Soviet regulations provide for visa issuance within 72 hours in case of family illness or death, Soviets frequently fail to comply.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

-- There are also legal and artificial barriers to sending packages and placing phone calls to relatives inside the USSR.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

POLITICAL DISSENT IN THE SOVIET UNION

I. EASING UNDER GORBACHEV OF TRADITIONAL REPRESSION OF DISSENT

- o Repression of dissent has been a traditional feature of Soviet system.
- o Under Gorbachev, there has been a liberalization, albeit one that is tightly controlled.
 - Some tolerance of demonstrations and unofficial publications, which include articles on controversial topics.
 - Tolerance of "unofficial" groups. Soviet officials estimate that 30,000 groups meeting around the country on issues ranging from environment to nationalism.
 - Release of more than 350 political prisoners. Releases seem to have ended, however, and most had to sign statements of guilt or repudiate their activities.
 - Announced Criminal Code review that may include repeal of articles used against political dissenters. Thus far, no changes announced.

II. HARDENING OF APPROACH ON DISSENT SINCE LAST SUMMER

- o Most active dissidents consistently harassed - detained, phones are disconnected etc.
- o In March, first arrest (of Paruyr Ayrikyah) on a political charge ("anti-Soviet slander") in almost 2 years.
- o Demonstrations have been forcibly broken up and the participants subsequently harassed. Several organizers of new Democratic Union party arrested in May.

III. US AGENDA

- o We should press the Soviets to release all remaining political prisoners, known to be at least 350, especially the 14 Helsinki monitors who remain incarcerated. We should also continue to urge the Soviets to account for honorary American citizen Raoul Wallenberg and to release the results of last year's reported review of his case.
- o We should express our concern about the March arrest of Paruyr Ayrikyan on political charges.
- o We should press the Soviets to repeal the laws that facilitate the suppression of political dissent.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470 #79

BY WES, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN THE MILLENNIAL YEAR

I. SOVIET REGIME HOSTILE TO RELIGION

- o The Soviet Union is an atheist state which has long subjected religious believers to the harshest forms of persecution.
- o The Soviet Constitution guarantees the freedom to practice one's religion, but religious groups are required by law to register with the state and teaching is forbidden.
- o Repression continues against religious groups which have not been allowed to register, such as Ukrainian Catholics, and denominations that consider it against their beliefs to register with the state.
- o Believers suffer discrimination in employment and education.

II. SOFTENING OF RHETORIC IN MILLENNIAL YEAR

- o In April, Gorbachev said that past Soviet regimes had mistaken policies on religion and promised new laws.
- o Soviet officials suggest opportunities for adult religious education will be expanded and that laws on import of religious books will be more flexible.
- o Reports of recent encouragement of "charitable" church activities, such as hospital service, or building homes for the aged.

III. ACTUAL PERFORMANCE IN THIS AREA IS MIXED

- o More than 100 religious prisoners have been released, but at least 150 are still incarcerated.
- o Laws impeding religious practice remain on the books although there have been virtually no arrests on such charges in more than a year.
- o Soviets have given public assurances at home, but they reject further commitments at Vienna CSCE Meeting.

IV. US AGENDA

- o Unconditional release of all remaining religious prisoners and repeal of religious control laws.
- o Legalization of unregistered churches, including the Ukrainian Catholic Church, importation of religious books and materials and increased contacts with West.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #20

BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- o Legalization of the teaching of religion to children, including the Hebrew language.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CSCE/Moscow Human Rights Meeting

I. VIENNA CSCE FOLLOW-UP MEETING

- o Third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna in Nov. 1986; 35 East, West, and neutral/non-aligned participating states reviewing implementation of 1975 Helsinki Final Act and considering improvements to compliance in human, security, and economic dimensions.
- o Key issues for the US are:
 - keeping the new conventional stability talks among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact autonomous (but within the framework of the CSCE process); some neutral/non-aligned states and France seek unacceptable link to CSCE.
 - balance between security and human rights results, including: improved Eastern human rights practices; strengthening of previous CSCE commitments; and significant human rights follow-on activity.
- o Soviets are stonewalling on human rights.
- o Vital to convince Soviets that West is ready to stay as long as it takes to get satisfactory result.

II. Proposed Moscow Human Rights Conference

- o At opening of Vienna Meeting, Shevardnadze proposed a human rights meeting for Moscow; Soviets seeking Western endorsement of glasnost.
- o NATO has said neither yes nor no; US has made clear that Soviets must meet two criteria:
 - guarantees of openness and access to anyone who wants to attend (e.g., Helsinki Monitors, the media, and non-governmental organizations).
 - Significantly improved human rights situation, including: increased Jewish emigration; release of political/religious prisoners; resolution of bilateral family reunification cases; cessation of all jamming; institutionalization of human rights reforms (e.g., permit religious teaching, regularize emigration procedures, repeal "political/religious" articles in criminal code).

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470 #21

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

- o Current Soviet human rights record not sufficient to warrant consideration of their proposal.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOVIET HUMAN RIGHTS AGENDA

I. SOVIET PROPOSALS FOR "COOPERATION" IN HUMAN RIGHTS

- o Soviets have urged that we move from "confrontation" to "cooperation" in our human rights dialogue.
- o Their principal goal seems to be to get us to stop raising specific human rights issues and cases with them.
- o We have made it clear that we are not going to stop talking about the specific problems of concern to us. But, in response to their suggestions, we have said we are willing to engage in "cooperative talks" with them in addition.
- o We held such talks in March and April on how we deal with specific issues, such as capital punishment, involuntary commitments to psychiatric hospitals, religious freedom, etc., in our respective countries.

II. SOVIET ALLEGATIONS OF US HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSE

- o They usually raise a host of US "violations", from persecution of anti-war activists to the plight of the homeless, which do not seem genuinely to concern them.
- o They often raise specific issues, such as war criminal investigations, technology transfer and our human rights activities in the Soviet Union, about which they are genuinely concerned.
- o They frequently raise social and economic problems, such as unemployment, but do not seem serious about seeking resolution.

III. SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR MOSCOW HUMANITARIAN CONFERENCE

- o Soviets no longer seem to be pressing us to accept their proposal for a CSCE conference on human rights in Moscow.
- o We have continued to say neither yes or no, linking our consideration of the proposal to improved Soviet performance on human rights and credible guarantees of openness and access.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M03-1470 #22
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Regional Dialogue
2. Afghanistan
3. Iran-Iraq War
4. Middle East Peace Process
5. Central America
6. Africa
7. Terrorism
8. The President's Initiative on Berlin
9. East Asia and the Pacific
10. South Asian Nuclear Issue

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470#23

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGIONAL DIALOGUE

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Improving dialogue since 1985; latest cycle of experts talks completed in March-April. Recent exchanges on Africa, Middle East peace process particularly vigorous.
- o Afghan settlement tangible proof US-Soviet dialogue can contribute to conflict resolution. US plans to push for similar progress in other areas.
- o But key to progress is not dialogue with Soviets. It is firmness in backing freedom fighters and other friends, and creatively securing political solutions.

II. US POSITION

- o President's October, 1985 speech laid out framework based on national reconciliation, direct talks between regional parties, US-Soviet dialogue to contribute to process.
- o Soviets have increasingly borrowed rhetoric of this plan, without acknowledging source.
- o In ongoing regional dialogue with Moscow, US seeks practical solutions to regional conflicts based on withdrawal of foreign troops, genuine self-determination.

III. SOVIET POSITION

- o Gorbachev and others have pointed to Afghan settlement as "model" for Middle East, southern Africa, Cambodia, Central America.
- o Practical meaning of this analogy still unclear; the Soviets have offered no concrete steps.
- o Four elements in recent Soviet rhetoric about regional conflict resolution:
 - National reconciliation between warring parties;
 - Greater role for UN, international organizations;
 - More involvement by regional organizations, i.e. OAS, OAU, ASEAN, Arab League;
 - US-Soviet cooperation can facilitate conflict resolution by political means.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #24
BY , NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AFGHANISTAN

I. SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

- o Soviets are committed to removing half of their 120,000 troops by August 15 and remainder by February 15, 1989.
 - Soviets hinted they may remove up to 20,000 by Summit; also indications withdrawal would be completed in 1988.
 - Fifty-man UN observer force to be deployed. We will rely primarily on national technical means to monitor withdrawal.
 - Four regime/Soviet garrisons have fallen in recent weeks; may herald beginning of regime's collapse.
- o Soviets agreed to symmetry in military aid; MFA privately repudiated spokesman's allegation of US violation; some indications Moscow may stop arms aid to Kabul after May 15.

II. INTERIM GOVERNMENT

- o UN mediator has agreed to pursue interim arrangements with all Afghan factions; but no initiatives yet.
 - Will be very difficult. Resistance refuses to share power with Kabul regime, criticizes Geneva settlement, but now seems reconciled to it.
 - We estimate Kabul regime will fall within months. Resistance may set up provisional government inside Afghanistan.

III. AFGHAN RELIEF

- o Needs for resettling up to 5 million refugees will be great. UN plans to name relief coordinator.
 - We are urging potential donor countries to contribute generously to multilateral, UN-led effort.
 - To be effective and credible with refugees and to avoid bolstering discredited government, aid must not be channeled through the Kabul regime.
 - Key UN agencies have indicated they will deal with de facto authorities in resistance-controlled areas.

IV. PRESSURE ON PAKISTAN

- o Najibullah and Soviet pressure on Pakistan continues -- goal is to stop arms flow to resistance. Includes terrorist bombings in Pakistan, violation of Pak border.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #25

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

I. THE UN PROCESS

- o Fundamental US goal is to end the war through diplomacy. Represents major cause of instability in region.
- o United Nations Security Council action on second resolution -- e.g., arms embargo against Iran -- long overdue.
- o US fully supports UN Secretary General's mediation efforts but Iranian intransigence stymies progress.

II. THE US AND IRAN

- o Deliberate mining of the Gulf by Iran, causing damage to US vessel, led to limited, proportionate US response April 18 against Iran.
- o US also extending assistance to some neutral ships in distress in the Persian Gulf; further demonstrates our willingness to uphold freedom of navigation.

III. THE SITUATION FACING IRAN

- o Tehran currently on defensive along several fronts:
 - In Lebanon, Iran's agent, Hizballah, routed in south -- victorious in Beirut.
 - Iraq scored major victory in recovering Faw Peninsula.
 - Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities with modified Soviet missiles; Moscow unwilling/unable to force Iraqis to stop.
 - Evidence of Iranian complicity in Kuwaiti plane hijacking has further blackened Iran's image.

IV. THE SOVIETS AND THE WAR

- o Following support for Resolution 598 last July, Moscow has dragged feet on follow-up action in New York.
- o Soviets reluctant to anger Iran in view of possible Iranian spoiler role in Afghan settlement. Soviets claim cannot support follow-up action so long as troops withdrawing from Afghanistan. Effectively means no action this year.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470 #26

BY WOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

I. US PLAN

- o US goal is comprehensive peace ensuring security of all states in region, legitimate rights of Palestinians.
- o Key elements of plan:
 - International conference gives framework for bilateral negotiations between Israel and its neighbors;
 - Palestinian representation as part of joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation;
 - All parties accept UNSC Resolution 242/338, renounce terrorism and violence.
 - Integrated package; cannot be significantly changed.

II. SOVIET POSITION

- o Despite some encouraging signs -- e.g., Gorbachev statement to Arafat on need to respect Israeli security concerns -- Soviets remain reluctant to use influence with Syria, PLO to urge constructive approach.
- o Soviet support for Syrian-PLO rapprochement, which required hardening of PLO position and worsened prospects for our initiative.
- o Major differences remain in our approaches to process, e.g., on role of conference, Palestinian representation.
 - Soviets still envision conference with authority to impose solutions; unacceptable to us, Israel.
 - Moscow also argues for PLO role in process as equal partner, but doesn't completely reject Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.
- o Absence of relations with Israel a further block to increased Soviet role.
- o While interested in dialogue with us, Soviets reluctant to take concrete actions to facilitate our initiative which would damage their interests with Arab radicals.

~~SECRET~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO 3 - 1470 #27
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

III. STATE OF PLAY

- o During Secretary's most recent trip to the region, all parties urged him to continue his efforts.
- o We intend to remain active: the Secretary is going to the region following the Summit.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CENTRAL AMERICA

I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

- o Sandinista/Resistance Cease-Fire Talks: Talks continuing; truce in effect until June 1.
 - Sandinistas hope to divide the Resistance, block humanitarian resupply of Resistance forces in Nicaragua.
 - Resistance outside Nicaragua receiving humanitarian aid through US-administered program, monitored by Honduran Catholic Church.
 - Sandinistas refuse to democratize before Resistance disarms.
 - Central American foreign ministers review compliance monthly.
- o Arms Shipments: Soviets have shipped \$200 million in arms to Nicaragua since peace agreement signed in August. Rate of supply dropped off in March, not clear whether this reflects shift in Soviet policy, or merely availability of transport.
- o US Actions: First shipments of Congressionally-approved humanitarian aid delivered to Resistance in Honduras. US trade embargo against Nicaragua extended through October 1988.

II. CONDITIONS INSIDE NICARAGUA

- o Despite nominal end to state of emergency and reopening of La Prensa, Sandinistas retain firm control over society.
- o Opposition parties subject to continuous harassment.
- o Economy in shambles due to mismanagment, and effects of war.
- o Widespread labor unrest including work stoppages, hunger strike, and two major anti-Sandinista May Day demonstrations.

III. US POSITION

- o US supports regional efforts for peace and democracy.
- o US prepared to engage in regional negotiations -- which could include Sandinistas -- at the appropriate time.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO3-1470#28
BY hds, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

- We do not contemplate bilateral talks with Sandinistas. We will do nothing to undermine the Resistance.
- o We have called on the Soviets to end arms shipments to the Sandinistas, as we have done to the Resistance. We have told them their demand that US stop all aid to region in exchange for an end to their military aid to Sandinistas is unacceptable.
- Costa Rican President Arias, other democratic leaders, have joined us in calling for Soviets to halt military aid.

~~SECRET~~

AFRICA

I. ETHIOPIA FAMINE RELIEF EFFORTS

- o Ethiopia's Marxist government engaged in bitter, decades-long war with secessionist groups that are also generally Marxist.
- o War, and misguided government policies have devastated the economy; hindered agricultural activity; displaced millions of people, invited famine and disrupted relief efforts.
- o Government has forced most foreign relief workers out of contested areas; turned their food and equipment (trucks, fuel, etc.) over to local relief agencies.
- o There is no shortage of food. US has donated 271,000 tons; USSR 250,000 tons. Problem is getting the food to the people.
- o We want Soviets to pressure Ethiopian government to help, not hinder, movements of food convoys and to allow relief workers to return to hardest-hit regions.
- o Soviets have said they are sensitive to the humanitarian issue, but claim US is exaggerating the problem. They believe pressure could hurt their relations with Ethiopia.
- o With war going poorly for the regime, Soviets showing more interest in internal Ethiopian settlement. Neighboring Somalia and Sudan (both pro-US) may find opportunities opening to reduce tensions with Ethiopia.

II. SOUTHERN AFRICA

- o US goal is to get South African and Cuban troops (now 46,000) out of Marxist Angola; and while troops are pulling back, begin to implement UN plan for independence of neighboring Namibia (UN Security Council resolution 435) which South Africa now controls in defiance of UN demands.
- o Angolan regime has fought 13-year war with UNITA forces under Jonas Savimbi. His troops control about 40% of territory; receive backing from South Africa, other western sources. Recently, African leaders have quietly urged Angolan regime to come to terms with Savimbi.
- o US has insisted that independence for Namibia be linked to Cuban withdrawal. This has now been accepted by all parties.

DECLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR Mo 3-1470 #29
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

- o On May 3-4, US mediated historic talks involving Cuba, Angola and South Africa. Little substantive progress, but tone was constructive, professional. All agreed to meet again. Soviets not a participant but are meeting with US, Angolans and Cubans separately and claim to want to play a constructive role.

- o While praising US diplomacy, Soviets reluctant to take specific measures to advance negotiations.

~~SECRET~~

TERRORISM

I. STATE OF PLAY

- o Recent Soviet performance on terrorism mixed but has shown some improvement in past two years.
- o On the pro side:
 - Moscow has publicly condemned international terrorism since Gorbachev February 1986 speech at party congress.
 - The Soviet Foreign Ministry "strongly and resolutely condemned" the recent hijacking of a Kuwaiti airliner.
 - Soviets have supported new legal instruments to facilitate prosecution of terrorists who attack airports or shipping.
- o On the negative side:
 - The Soviets shielded North Korea from UN condemnation over Korean airline bombing, publicly repeated countercharges that US engaged in "state terrorism."
 - Moscow is presumably privy to East European tolerance of Middle East terrorist groups.

II. FUTURE MOVES

- o US will continue to urge Soviet opposition to terrorism by Middle East states, Afghan terrorism in Pakistan.
- o Bilaterally, US would like to focus on practical matters:
 - Restricting movement and activities of known terrorists, especially in Eastern Europe;
 - Exchanging information on specific terrorist threats.
 - The ball, however, is in the Soviet court.
- o Multilaterally, we will work with allies to oppose Soviet attempts to politicize debate on terrorism.
 - We will continue to oppose Soviet bilateral or multilateral proposals requiring mandatory extradition of hijackers. We prefer to "extradite or prosecute."

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M03-1470 #30
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE PRESIDENT'S INITIATIVE ON BERLIN

I. ORIGINS OF THE INITIATIVE

- o During your speech at the Brandenburg Gate on June 12, 1987, you called on General Secretary Gorbachev to back up his talk of "openness" with deeds by working with the US, UK and France to improve the situation in Berlin by:
 - expanding air access to and from Berlin;
 - bringing more international conferences to the city;
 - fostering East/West Berlin youth exchanges;
 - staging more major sports events in both East and West Berlin, including an Olympics.

II. SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

- Following your speech, US, British, French and West German experts in the Bonn Group worked out a "Concept Paper" further refining your proposals. This Concept Paper was endorsed by our four Foreign Ministers at their NATO ministerial last December.
- At your December Summit, you urged General Secretary Gorbachev to consider improvements in the Berlin situation. You indicated our specific proposals would be put forward soon.
- US, British and French representatives in Moscow formally presented your proposals to the Soviets on December 29.

III. CURRENT STATUS

- The Soviets consulted the East Germans immediately and continue to consider our Berlin proposals. The Soviets have now publicly stated they hope to respond to your Initiative by summer.
- The US, British, French and West German representatives in the Bonn Group continue their work to refine tactics and Allied positions on specific aspects of the Initiative in advance of possible talks with the Soviets.
- Public and political reaction in West Berlin has been highly favorable; Governing Mayor Diepgen underlined this support during his meeting with you on April 28.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MO 3-1470 #31
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

I. OVERVIEW

- Primary focus of our dialogue with Soviets has been on Cambodia, Korea, Asian security situation.
- Despite Soviet hints that Afghan settlement would facilitate progress in these areas, little new has emerged.
- The Soviets continue to push asymmetrical proposals aimed at limiting US military activity, particularly naval, in Pacific. We're not interested.

II. CAMBODIA

- Vietnamese troop withdrawal, direct negotiations are key to settlement; Moscow should push Vietnam toward these steps.
- Recent Soviet reference to Afghan "model" lacks specifics; Moscow remains unwilling to twist Vietnam's arm to settle.
- Hanoi nervous about Soviet references to Afghan analogy, reluctant to talk directly with Prince Sihanouk.
- Limited convergence of US-Soviet policies: need for political settlement, central role for Prince Sihanouk.

III. KOREAN PENINSULA

- Our concern over possible North Korean disruption of Olympics heightened by Korean airplane bombing.
- Limited indications Soviets too are concerned over their ally's dangerous and unpredictable policies.
- But Moscow determined to maintain good relations with Pyongyang, despite going to Seoul for Olympics.
 - o Both US and Soviets agree on need to resume North-South dialogue. President Roh likely to have new proposals once he settles in; North's proposals continue to be unrealistic.

DECLASSIFIED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

NLRR MO3-1470 #32
BY LOT, NARA, DATE 12/9/05

~~SECRET~~

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE

I. CAPABILITIES AND CURRENT ACTIVITY

- o India tested a nuclear device in 1974; has capability for an active nuclear explosives program. Gandhi seems not to want to proceed forward.
 - India has stockpiled unsafeguarded plutonium, has rejected Pakistan's non-proliferation proposals.
 - Opposes equation with Pakistan, citing its concerns about Chinese/superpower nuclear capabilities.
- o Pakistan has an unsafeguarded uranium enrichment facility.
 - [REDACTED] This appears to be a political decision.
 - US pressure has helped, as has uncertainty about Indian reaction.
 - Pakistan has proposed comprehensive non-proliferation measures on a reciprocal basis with India.
- o Under US law (the Symington and Solarz amendments), Pakistan's nuclear activities preclude most US assistance.
 - January 15, 1988 the President waived these sanctions for Pakistan on national security grounds. The Symington waiver runs until mid-1990.

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 1.4(d)

II. US GOALS

- o US-Soviet arms control progress, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan create a positive environment for mutual restraint in nuclear development.
- o We want to urge adoption of confidence-building measures by both India and Pakistan to bolster restraint and stability.
- o US assistance to Pakistan plays a key role in deterring Pakistan from making the decision to produce nuclear arms.
- o We want to explore ways to overcome the regional parties' mutually exclusive preconditions, possibly by creating a negotiating process that includes China and the superpowers.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS M03-1470#33

By 1985, NARA, Date 12/9/05