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10/12/1986 Trip by President to Reykjavik, Iceland
Box: RAC Box 5

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COBB, TYRUS (NSC): FILES

Withdrawer

SMF 4/10/2009

File Folder BACKGROUND PAPERS FOR OCTOBER 10-12 TRIP BY
PRESIDENT TO REYKJAVIK, ICELAND

FOIA

F06-043/2

Box Number ~~92189~~ RAC Box 5

SAROTTE

19

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
68643 MEMO	MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE REYKJAVIK: QUESTIONS FOR DECISION	3	10/7/1986	B1
68644 PAPER	POLICY SUPPORT GROUP	2	ND	B1
68645 MEMO	HALLENBECK TO DIRECTOR, STRATEGY, PLANS, AND POLICY DEPARTMENT OF ARMY	4	ND	B1
68646 PAPER	SECURITY WITHOUT BALLISTIC MISSILES	19	ND	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

SYSTEM II
90686

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE DIRECTOR UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Goals and Objectives of President's Meeting
with Gorbachev in Iceland

The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on his goals and objectives for his meeting
with General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland.

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


John M. Poindexter

Attachment
NSDD-245

UNCLASSIFIED W/SECRET ATTACHMENT

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.34(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *Amj*, DATE 4/10/09

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~~SECRET~~

SYSTEM II
90686

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

October 7, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 245

REAGAN-GORBACHEV PREPARATORY MEETING (U)

I have agreed to meet with General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, October 11 - 12 in an effort to accelerate progress in resolving issues in our relations with the Soviet Union. I expect the meetings to be very private and plan to take only a minimal support staff with me. The discussions will be serious and business-like and social functions will be conducted at the minimal level appropriate to the occasion. (S)

It is imperative for all U.S. Government officials to adhere totally to the press guidance established by my own statements and those approved by the State Department and the White House. No official is authorized to originate public statements regarding the Reykjavik meeting, or to provide comments in background briefings that go beyond statements made publicly by the White House or Department of State. All written remarks concerning U.S.-Soviet relations must be approved in advance by the White House or the Department of State. Should public statements or background briefings by other U.S. Government officials on particular aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations seem desirable, they may be undertaken only with the specific approval of the White House. Requests should be submitted through the Operations Coordinating Committee of the NSC. (S)

In going to Iceland, the United States demonstrates to the world that we are prepared to exert every effort to establish a constructive and serious dialogue with the Soviet leadership. I wish to stress however, that I do not anticipate signing any agreements in Reykjavik. (S)

Objective

My objective for this meeting is to increase the likelihood that the coming Summit in the United States will be productive by:

- Demonstrating my commitment to solving problems in the U.S.-Soviet relationship, to the degree the Soviets are willing.

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Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *Mr Leary to Weinstein 4/20/05*
+ list 1/29/09
BY *Amf* NARA DATE *4/10/09*

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2

- Identifying issues with reasonable prospects of solution, and accelerating efforts to resolve them. I will press the General Secretary to agree to acceptable approaches to outstanding key issues in order to intensify ongoing negotiations.
- Engaging the Soviets in substantive and serious discussions on the entire range of issues on the US agenda. I will not permit the meeting to focus exclusively or disproportionately on arms control, and I will ensure that regional, bilateral and human rights issues are thoroughly reviewed.
- Demonstrating to our Allies and to the American public that the policy we have pursued toward the Soviet Union -- based upon realism, strength, and dialogue -- has created the potential for effective negotiations with the Soviet Union. I will, of course, continue to avoid preemptive or one-sided concessions and steadfastly resist Soviet pressures and threats. (S)

Ronald Reagan

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

CONFIDENTIAL


System II
90602

October 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM R. GRAHAM
Director
Office of Science and Technology Policy

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (e)

Attached is a copy of National Security Decision Directive 244 which was approved by the President for his Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. NSDDs fall within a special accountability requirement of the NSC. (e)


Rodney B. McDaniel
Executive Secretary

Attachment
NSDD 244

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *anf*, DATE *4/10/09*

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify on: OADR

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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October 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (e)

The President has approved the attached National Security Decision Directive on Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev. (C)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Attachment
NSDD-244


John M. Poindexter

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA *mf*, DATE *4/10/09*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
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SYSTEM II
90602

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 3, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 244

SUBJECT: Meetings with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev (C)

In order to prepare for my meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev, it is important to set out clearly the plan for coordinating the preparation by the White House in conjunction with the Secretary of State and other U.S. government agencies. (C)

Senior Level:

The Senior Planning Group, co-chaired by Chief of Staff Donald T. Regan and National Security Adviser John M. Poindexter shall be the senior coordinating body for the preparation of the meetings. This group shall receive regular reports on preparation for the meetings and shall convene the White House Working Group as necessary to review planning. (C)

NSC/White House Level:

The White House Working Group co-chaired by Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Alton G. Keel and Assistant to the President W. Dennis Thomas shall be responsible for the coordination between the White House staff and the National Security Council for planning and preparation. Its membership, selected by the co-chairmen, shall consist of senior White House and NSC officers with direct responsibilities for preparations for the Summit. (C)

Interagency Level:

The Senior Policy Committee (SPC) chaired by Dr. Alton Keel, shall be responsible for policy initiatives concerning the Summit, except in the area of arms control negotiations. (C)

The Arms Control Support Group (ACSG) shall be chaired by Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Robert E. Linhard and shall be responsible for interagency coordination and policy development of arms control policy positions in preparation for the Summit. The Arms Control Support Group shall meet as appropriate on issues relating to the meeting preparations. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

Authority H. Leary to Weinstein 4/20/05 4/1st
1/29/09

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BY Amf NARA DATE 4/10/09

The Policy Support Group (PSG) chaired by Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Jack F. Matlock shall be responsible for interagency coordination of policy issues in support of the efforts of the SPC. The Policy Support Group shall meet as appropriate on issues relating to meeting preparations. (C)

The Operations Coordinating Committee (OCC) shall be co-chaired by NSC Director for Soviet and European Affairs Tyrus Cobb and NSC Deputy Executive Secretary (Coordination) Franklin L. Lavin. The OCC shall be responsible for the day-to-day coordination for preparation for the meetings and for providing guidance to and feedback from concerned White House offices. (C)

This definition of responsibilities is in support of the consideration of all those issues under negotiation with the Soviet Union, issues which will continue to be staffed in the normal interagency process, including meetings of the National Security Council as appropriate. (C)

Ronald Reagan



**WH Senior
Planning Group**
CH: Regan & Poindexter


**WH Working
Group**
CH: Keel / Thomas

**Senior
Policy Committee**
CH: Keel

**Operations
Committee**
CH: Cobb / Lavin

**Policy
Support
Group**
CH: Matlock

**Arms Control
Support
Group**
CH: Linhard



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68643 MEMO

3 10/7/1986 B1

MATLOCK TO POINDEXTER RE REYKJAVIK:
QUESTIONS FOR DECISION

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II. Broad Political Points:

We should place public emphasis upon the following broad political points, putting arms control specifics in this context:

--President has emphasized that four key areas must be addressed in seeking a safer, more stable world:

1. Sharp reductions in offensive nuclear arms and, when and if feasible, moving to non-nuclear defense.
2. Cessation of using and threatening force to solve international disputes; peaceful resolution of conflicts in Asia, Africa and Central America so peoples there can freely determine their own destiny without outside interference.
3. Improving the US/Soviet working relationship, including compliance with commitments, past and future, and expanding contacts and communications.
4. Adherence to international commitments to respect human rights. This is important to peace, as it limits in practice the ability of governments to pursue aggressive policies.

--Negotiating processes are well underway in several fora. Focus should be there, and details should be presented there. We always look seriously at details presented by Soviets, but they are still not very encouraging.

--Soviet proposals, especially those pressed in public, have clear political purposes. These include: dividing us from allies, and allies from each other (e.g., Europe/Asia); stopping SDI; retaining Soviet areas of advantage, including in strategic defense; making the next Summit arms control-oriented and establishing it as a deadline for agreements, thus putting pressure on US to make concessions. Realism and caution in order. West must stay strong, patient, united.

--The Soviet tactic of holding progress in one negotiating area hostage to resolution of issues in other areas is unacceptable and inconsistent with Summit agreement to emphasize and build upon areas of common ground.

--Moving to a nuclear free world can only be accomplished on basis of significant prior progress in nuclear reductions, as well as redressing the conventional imbalance, achieving a CW ban, strengthening the NPT regime, and reducing regional tensions. No artificial deadlines. Can't discuss specifics of later steps or set target dates when first practical steps not even agreed. Such practical steps have been proposed by US, and constructive Soviet responses are needed.

--Equitable, verifiable agreements calling for deep reductions in US and Soviet offensive nuclear forces are needed now, as well as correction of imbalances in conventional forces. If SDI research bears fruit, defense would enhance this long term process.

--Soviet compliance with existing agreements also required. Verification and compliance are at the heart of the arms control process and are therefore a mutual concern of the parties. In this context, it is essential that political trust in verification and compliance be rebuilt.

--Existence of nuclear weapons must be seen in political context--symptom, not cause, of East/West tensions. Until we have better way to deter and until conventional imbalances are corrected, safety of West depends on them. Seeking better way to deter now, but don't have all the answers yet.

--Deterrence rests on overall balance. Conventional and chemical force levels are a crucial element which must be taken into account as nuclear reductions are addressed.

III. Constructive Elements of Gorbachev Proposals:

The following could be cited publicly as elements of the Soviet proposals which could potentially be constructive, while emphasizing that the Soviets need to show their seriousness by doing their part to bring specific progress at the negotiating tables:

--In INF, apparent acceptance in principle of zero US/Soviet LRINF as goal, although initially only in Europe. Agreement in principle on destruction as means to achieve reductions. Apparent delink from SDI.

--Agreement on ultimate goal of eliminating nuclear weapons. We have long advocated this, while stressing that the focus now must be on achieving equitable, verifiable agreements calling for deep and stabilizing reductions in offensive nuclear forces, as well as on correcting the conditions which give rise to the need for reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence.

--Expressed interest in verification, an element of arms control that US has long recognized as essential. Onus on Soviets to agree on specific measures tailored to limitations agreed upon

and to respond meaningfully to US and Western verification concerns and proposals in various negotiations. Soviet public statements can't be evaluated without such specifics.

IV. Problems with Soviet Positions:

The following should be stressed in pointing out aspects of Soviet NST positions which remain unacceptable and some of which, if left unchanged, would present serious obstacles to any agreements:

--Grandiose public concept for eliminating nuclear weapons, but initial reductions under Soviet concept would in fact perpetuate Soviet advantages and create dangerous imbalances.

--Holding hostage progress in one negotiating area to resolution of differences in others. This goes against Summit agreement to accelerate NST and work for early progress in areas of common ground.

--Soviet definition of "strategic." Clearly drawn for political purpose of dividing the democracies. (Gorbachev even said publicly that "Europe would have a special mission. . . .") This approach would lock in clear Soviet superiority in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear forces, and was rejected by US in both SALT I and II.

--In INF, third country forces would still be constrained, which we cannot accept. And, Asian security is still not adequately addressed.

--Continued Soviet insistence on banning of US SDI research, despite its potential for enhancing stability and deterrence, and despite the inability to verify limits on research.

It should be noted in this connection that the Soviets still have not responded at the negotiating table to our concrete NST proposals of November 1. Overall, they still seem to be placing their emphasis more on public posturing rather than on negotiating. Getting down to specifics at the confidential negotiating table would be a mark of Soviet seriousness.

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