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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Withdrawer

LOJ 1/29/2007

File Folder CANADA 1985 (06/10/1985-06/21/1985)

FOIA

F1559

Box Number ~~90904~~ RAC Box 1

ENGLISH

11

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
33172	CABLE	REAGAN TO PM MULRONEY (DRAFT WITH NOTES) R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	3	6/28/1985	B1
33174	REPORT	RE OTTAWA.... PAR 2/22/2016 F1559/1	2	6/18/1985	B1 B3
33175	CABLE	201906Z JUN 85 R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	1	6/20/1985	B1
33177	LETTER	REAGAN TO PM MULRONEY R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	2	ND	B1
33178	LETTER	REAGAN TO PM NAKASONE R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	3	ND	B1
33180	MEMO	COBB TO POINDEXTER, RE MEETING R 2/22/2016 F1559/1	1	6/20/1985	B1
33182	LETTER	REAGAN TO PM MULRONEY (SAME AS 33177) R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	2	6/21/1985	B1
33184	CABLE	SAME TEXT AS 33177 R 3/1/2013 F1559/1	1	6/22/1985	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

TY COBB

June 10, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: NICK ^{Nick} KLISSAS / PETER SOMMER ^{P.S.}

SUBJECT: Ambassador Gotlieb's Request for a Luncheon Appointment

- called
6/17. will
try to get
up in July
- P.S.
- C.M.

Canadian Ambassador Allan Gotlieb's office called this morning inviting you to lunch at the Ambassador's residence any day next week (June 17 - 21). His office did not identify any particular subject Gotlieb wishes to discuss.

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide guidance:

Schedule Lunch _____

Regret

Sorry, let's try
July

IX

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

June 14, 1985

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I hereby transmit the requisite findings and determinations to permit the export of non-Alaskan North Slope crude oil to Canada. These findings and determinations are made pursuant to section 28 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1354), section 28(u) of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act (30 U.S.C. 185(u)), and section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6212).

*File
- CA 10/10/85*

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 14, 1985.

#####

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

TX
Canada

For Immediate Release

June 14, 1985

UNITED STATES-CANADIAN CRUDE OIL TRANSFERS
PRESIDENTIAL FINDINGS

On March 18, 1985, at the Quebec Summit, I joined Prime Minister Mulroney in endorsing a Trade Declaration with the objective of liberalizing energy trade, including crude oil, between the United States and Canada. Both Governments recognized the substantial benefits that would ensue from broadened crude oil transfers and exchanges between these two historic trading partners and allies. These benefits would include the increased availability of reliable energy sources, economic efficiencies, and material enhancements to the energy security of both countries. Following this Declaration, Canada declared that it would permit Canadian crude oil to be freely exported to the United States effective June 1, 1985.

Before crude oil exports to Canada can be authorized, I must make certain findings and determinations under statutes that restrict exports of crude oil. I have decided to make the necessary findings and determinations under the following statutes: Section 103 of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act (42 U.S.C. 6212); section 28 of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920, as amended by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act of 1973 (30 U.S.C. 185); and section 28 of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1354) (crude oil transported over the Trans-Alaska Pipeline or derived from the Naval Petroleum Reserves is excluded).

I hereby find and determine that exports of crude oil under these statutes are in the U.S. national interest, and I further find and determine that such U.S. crude oil exports to Canada --

- o will not diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum available to the United States;
- o will not increase reliance on imported oil;
- o are in accord with provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1979; and
- o are consistent with the purposes of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act.

Therefore, such domestic crude oil may be exported to Canada for consumption or use therein.

These findings and determinations shall be published in the Federal Register. I direct the Secretary of Commerce to take all other necessary and proper action to expeditiously implement this decision.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

June 14, 1985.

#####

WASHFAX RECEIPT
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Charles

RECEIVED
JUL 11 P 2: 42

B

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

PROJECT ROOM
Charlie

Summer

MESSAGE NO 001899

CLASSIFICATION SECRET

No. Pages 3

FROM: James F. Collins
(Officer name)

S/S
(Office symbol)

632-8448
(Extension)

7224NS
(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Telegram to Ottawa, subj: President Reagan Ltr
to PM Mulroney

TO: *(Agency)*

DELIVER TO:

Extension

Room No.

NSC

~~ROBERT PEAPSON~~

395-3044

NSC

SECRETARIAT

Martin

COBB/KOENIG (enclosed in modified)

FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

REMARKS: REQUEST CLEARANCE BY 12:00 NOON FRIDAY, JULY 12, 1985

N.B. MESSAGE PROPOSED AS FOLLOW-UP TO JULY 8 TASKING BY CPPG.

Clearance Entries, North, Covey, *Summer*, etc

Clear all comments through

S/S Officer: *CB-10*

RSP

distributed
7/11 5:30 PM

DRP 7/11

CROSSHATCH

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1559 #33172

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/13

33172

7/10

~~SECRET~~

3233N

M/CTP:ECBAILEY:ECB
06/28/85 EXT. 23451
P:MARMACOST

M/CTP:ROAKLEY
EUR/CAN:SCFROMOWITZ
S/S:
EB/AVP:EVONDENSTEINEN

EUR:RHAASS
NSC:
S/S-0:

M/CTP, M, P, EUR, EUR/CAN, S/S,

IMMEDIATE OTTAWA

IMMEDIATE SECRETARY

TERREP EXCLUSIVE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT REAGAN LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER
-- MULRONEY

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN IS FOR IMMEDIATE DELIVERY TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY.

QUOTE - DEAR BRIAN:

IN MY LETTER TO YOU OF JUNE 27 REGARDING THE AIR INDIA DISASTER, I PROMISED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH WITH YOU WITH FURTHER THOUGHTS ON HOW WE MIGHT TOGETHER TACKLE THE CRITICAL PROBLEM OF GLOBAL TERRORISM. I KNOW THAT GEORGE SHULTZ AND JOE CLARK ARE ALSO PLANNING TO DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WHEN THEY MEET IN KUALA LUMPUR.

THE TRAGIC INCIDENTS OF THE LAST WEEKS DEMONSTRATE CLEARLY THE VULNERABILITY OF CIVIL AVIATION TO TERRORIST ATTACKS. WHICH ENDANGER SO MANY INNOCENT PERSONS AT ONE TIME WE AND OTHER MAJOR AVIATION NATIONS MUST WORK

1504
RBO
ECB

RH
SF
EVS
PH-
SCF
EVDS
S/S
S/S-0
NSC

~~SECRET~~

1 2

CLOSELY TO INSURE GREATER AND MORE EFFECTIVE COOPERATION TO END THESE TERRIBLE ACTS. THE DEATHS AND INJURIES OF INNOCENT VICTIMS CAUSED BY WHAT VERY MUCH APPEARS TO BE THE HEINOUS BOMBING OF THE AIR INDIA FLIGHT, THE BOMBINGS AT MARITA AND FRANKFURT AIRPORTS, THE RECENT BOMBINGS AT ROME AIRPORT AND AT THE TWA AND BRITISH AIR AND ALIA OFFICES IN MADRID, AS WELL AS THE ABUSES INFLICTED UPON MY COUNTRYMEN ABOARD TWA 847 PRIOR TO THEIR RELEASE ARE UNCONSCIONABLE AND MUST STOP. I KNOW YOU ALSO DEPLORE THE LOSS OF INNOCENT LIVES AND THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES; AND STRONGLY CONDEMN THESE BARBARIC ACTS AND THOSE GROUPS WHICH ARE RESPONSIBLE.

BOTH OF OUR GOVERNMENTS HAVE LONG REGARDED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, PARTICULARLY HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE, AS A SERIOUS AND LONG-TERM PROBLEM WHICH ALL CONCERNED NATIONS MUST UNITE AGAINST IN COLLECTIVE ACTION. ~~ONE FORUM WHERE WE HAVE WORKED TOGETHER IN THIS ENDEAVOUR IS THAT OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM.~~ AS YOU KNOW, LAST MARCH IN BONN OUR REPRESENTATIVES PUT FORWARD AT THE EXPERTS MEETING A NUMBER OF MUTUALLY REINFORCEABLE PROPOSALS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE COLLECTIVE ACTION UNDER THE BONN DECLARATION TO DEAL WITH THESE PROBLEMS.

UNFORTUNATELY, THAT MEETING DID NOT ACHIEVE AGREEMENT FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION AS HAD BEEN HOPED. THUS, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TWA 847 HIJACKING, IT WAS OUR CONSIDERED JUDGMENT THAT OUR OBLIGATION TO PROTECT US CITIZENS AND AIRLINES REQUIRED US TO TAKE UNILATERAL ACTION TO ISSUE A TRAVEL ADVISORY WARNING FOR ATHENS AIRPORT, AND TO ANNOUNCE A COMPLETE SUSPENSION OF AIR SERVICES BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON.

BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN PARTICULAR HAS BEEN CLEARLY IDENTIFIED AS A MAJOR CENTER OF ORGANIZED AIR PIRACY. IT IS A SERIOUS THREAT TO ALL AIRCRAFT AND AIR PASSENGERS IN THE REGION. THE USE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES BY AIR PIRATES IS A SPECIFIC URGENT PROBLEM WHICH REQUIRES OUR COLLECTIVE BEST EFFORT TO RESOLVE.

WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE CANADA'S ACTION TO REFUSE MEA LANDING RIGHTS AND TO DELAY NEGOTIATION OF A BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENT, AND WE WELCOME YOUR TIMELY AND STRONG SUPPORT FOR RECONVENING THE SUMMIT SEVEN AND STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION IN COMBATTING AIR PIRACY. WE ALSO SUPPORT STRONGLY THE UK REQUEST TO THE FRG AS CURRENT CHAIRMAN OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN TO SEEK URGENT ACTION BY ALL

SECRET

3

SEVEN MEMBER GOVERNMENTS TO SUSPEND ALL FLIGHTS TO AND FROM BEIRUT UNDER THE 1978 BONN DECLARATION. WE HOPE YOU WILL RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THE BRITISH INITIATIVE SO THAT A FAVORABLE DECISION CAN BE TAKEN BEFORE THE JULY 24-25 MEETING OF THE SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS ON TERRORISM IN BONN.

THAT MEETING SHOULD CONCERN ITSELF WITH THE BROADER ISSUES OF COMBATTING TERRORISM AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION, AND SHOULD CARRY FORWARD THE DISCUSSION BEGUN BY OUR EXPERTS IN BONN MARCH 12 AND 13 INTO EFFECTIVE ACTION PROPOSALS DEALING WITH THIS BROADER LONG-TERM PROBLEM. AMONG PROPOSALS WHICH WE CONSIDER IMPORTANT, IN ADDITION TO THE SELECTIVE SUSPENSION OF AIR SERVICE FOR FINITE PERIODS, ARE EXTENDING THE BONN DECLARATION TO COVER SABOTAGE AS WELL AS HIJACKING, THE USE OF TRAVEL ADVISORIES, OR OTHER WARNINGS TO OUR TRAVELLING PUBLICS, THE STRENGTHENING OF ICAO, THE PROVISION FOR SANCTIONS IN BILATERAL CIVIL AVIATION AGREEMENTS, AND SUPPORT FOR IMPROVED PHYSICAL SECURITY OF AIRPORTS.

JUST AS WE MUST STRENGTHEN AND MAKE PRACTICABLE THE BONN DECLARATION, WE MUST ALSO WORK TOGETHER IMPROVE COOPERATION AMONG OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT AND COUNTER-TERRORIST INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITIES, AND COORDINATE POLITICAL ACTION TO ISOLATE THOSE STATES WHICH SUPPORT TERRORISM. IN OUR JUDGMENT, COLLECTIVE OR COOPERATIVE ACTION BY THE SEVEN, WHICH HAVE SUCH GREAT POLITICAL AND MORAL INFLUENCE, CONSTITUTES THE CORE AROUND WHICH PARALLEL ACTIONS BY OTHER GOVERNMENTS CAN CLUSTER. SUCH COOPERATIVE ACTIONS ARE ALSO THE BEST ENERGIZING MECHANISM FOR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS ICAO.

WE MIGHT ALSO USEFULLY SEEK TO EXPAND BEYOND THE SUMMIT SEVEN FRAMEWORK TO INCLUDE OTHER CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS. IF SIX, OR EVEN FOUR OR FIVE OF THE SEVEN CAN AGREE AMONG THEMSELVES ON AN INDEPENDENT BASIS, THIS CORE GROUP OF GOVERNMENTS COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE LIKE-MINDED GOVERNMENTS FROM ASIA AND AFRICA REPRESENTING MAJOR AVIATION NATIONS WHICH WOULD AGREE ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS TO TAKE COOPERATIVE ACTION TO COMBAT AVIATION TERRORISM.

SINCERELY YOURS, RON. UNQUOTE.YYY

I look forward, Ron, to hearing your thoughts on these critical problems.

(COSS:)

3835

— Canada

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


June 17, 1985

Dear Mr. Minister:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your letter of April 19, 1985, expressing your support for a free trade agreement between the United States and Canada.

As you know, the Government of Canada has issued a discussion paper on securing market access for Canadian exports. Among the policy options being considered is a proposal for a comprehensive free trade arrangement with the United States. Freer trade between our two countries is a worthy goal. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney took steps in this direction at their meeting in Quebec City this spring. There they agreed to give the highest priority to finding mutually acceptable means to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade.

Again, thank you for writing. Your words of support for this goal are deeply appreciated.

Sincerely,

Robert C. McFarlane

The Honorable Garde B. Gardom, Q.C.
Minister, Intergovernmental Relations
Province of British Columbia
Parliament Buildings
Victoria, British Columbia V8V 1X4
Canada

REFERRAL

DATE: 17 JUN 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION: TO: GARDOM, GARDE B

SOURCE: MCFARLANE

DATE: 17 JUN 85

KEYWORDS: CANADA INTL TRADE

SUBJ: MCFARLANE RESPONSE TO GARDOM 19 APR LTR TO PRES / FREE TRADE

REQUIRED ACTION: FOR DISPATCH

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:


FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: NICK KLISSAS / TY COBB *Mike TC*SUBJECT: Letter to Garde Gardom Regarding Free Trade with
Canada

Mr. Garde Gardom, British Columbia's Minister of Inter-governmental Relations, wrote the President a letter advocating the establishment of total free trade between our two countries.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the self-explanatory letter to Minister Gardom at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Letter to Gardom
Tab II Incoming, with background papers



Province of
British Columbia

Ministry of
Intergovernmental
Relations

302227
Parliament Buildings
Victoria
British Columbia
V8V 1X4

8513

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER

8513828

April 19, 1985

The President,
The White House,
Washington, D.C.
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

Re: Free Trade - Canada & the United States

I am writing to you concerning the subject issue - my first ever letter to a President of our good neighbour to the South! Well do I know that the address for Canada is Ottawa, and the address for the United States is Washington D.C., but we in British Columbia are, as with your pacific coast states, an awful long way from the central levers of power, hence I wish to record firsthand my views.

Worldwide free trade may be a nirvana, but if it ever becomes a reality surely it could become the best source for world peace anyone has ever known. That would be probably the biggest step ever for mankind. Surely every inch toward that would, in my judgement, be of inestimable value.

For Canada, and for the United States what better place to start than between ourselves. We enjoy, and indeed are blessed with, similar democratic principles, customs and commercial activity plus the capacity to co-exist pragmatically, peacefully, and without fear or favour between ourselves.

I enclose two short talks wherein I have more fully expressed my views. I am sure that you will not have an opportunity to read them, but perhaps one of your staff could highlight a point or two, because this is how a lot of us are thinking this side of the Rockies.


.../2

It was with regret that I read that Mr. William Brock was relieved of your country's responsibility in this area. I never met him, but I read much of what he had to say. To me he was a breath of spring! I certainly hope that Mr. Clayton Yuetter will be of the same fervor and under similar instruction.

True, there is resistance in our country to across-the-board free trade with the United States, as there is in your country with us. I say that is too bad, because in my view it could happen - it should happen - and for me tomorrow would be just fine!

I have written you directly because I feel that you belong within the same camp and also with the fervent hope that all of those who are of similar mind will overcome the opposition.

Yours sincerely,

A large, stylized handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Garde B. Gardom'. The signature is written over a faint, circular stamp or watermark.

Garde B. Gardom, Q.C.,
Minister,
Intergovernmental Relations.

UNCLASSIFIED

3835

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8513628

Date MAY 19 1985

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:

To: President Reagan From: Garde Gardom

Date: April 19 1985 Subject: Views regarding Free Trade
Canada and the United States

WH Referral Dated: May 2, 1985 NSC ID# 302224
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- xx A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason
cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the
proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

Tom Collins
for Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED

(Classification)

Dear Mr. Gardom:

The President has asked me to reply to your letter of April 19 expressing your support for a free trade agreement between the United States and Canada.

As you know the Government of Canada has issued a discussion paper on securing market access for Canadian exports. Among the policy options being considered is ~~for the GOC to~~ propose ^{to} a comprehensive free trade arrangement with the United States. President Reagan and Prime Minister Mulroney agreed at their meeting in Quebec City this spring to give the highest priority to finding mutually acceptable means to reduce and eliminate existing barriers to trade.

I appreciate your letter and will pass your views on to other concerned officials in the U.S. government.

Mr. Garde B. Gardom, Q.C.,
Minister,
Intergovernmental Relations,
Province of British Columbia,
British Columbia.

8513628

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E

REFERRAL

MAY 2, 1985

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:

DRAFT REPLY FOR SIGNATURE OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMBER

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 302224

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED APRIL 19, 1985

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: THE HONORABLE GARDE B. GARDOM
MINISTER
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
PROVINCE OF BRITISH COLUMBIA
PARLIAMENT BUILDINGS
VICTORIA BRITISH COLUMBIA V8V 1X4

SUBJECT: VIEWS REGARDING FREE TRADE - CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: APRIL 30, 1985

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE GARDE B. GARDOM

SUBJECT: VIEWS REGARDING FREE TRADE - CANADA AND
THE UNITED STATES

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY (STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
	ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE	ORG	85/04/30		C 85/05/01 TR
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>✓ DOS</i>		<i>D 85 05/02</i>		<i>C 85 05/21</i>
REFERRAL NOTE: <i>NSMC Farlane</i>		<i>a 85/05/22</i>		<i>1 1</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>1 1</i>		<i>1 1</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>1 1</i>		<i>1 1</i>
REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>1 1</i>		<i>1 1</i>
COMMENTS: <i>State recommendation re draft reply</i>				
ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS:	MEDIA: L INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____			
MI MAIL	USER CODES: (A) _____		(B) _____ (C) _____	

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*****
*ACTION CODES:          *DISPOSITION CODES:      *OUTGOING          *
*                       *                                     *CORRESPONDENCE:  *
*A-APPROPRIATE ACTION  *A-ANSWERED                *TYPE RESP=INITIALS *
*C-COMMENT/RECOM       *B-NON-SPEC-REFERRAL      *                   *
*D-DRAFT RESPONSE      *C-COMPLETED              *OF SIGNER         *
*F-FURNISH FACT SHEET  *S-SUSPENDED               *CODE = A          *
*I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC*                                     *COMPLETED = DATE OF *
*R-DIRECT REPLY W/COPY *                                     *OUTGOING          *
*S-FOR-SIGNATURE       *                                     *                   *
*X-INTERIM REPLY       *                                     *                   *
*****

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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT. 2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

5/21
→ Bob Pearson
for appropriate action

May 21, 1985

~~Bill~~ ~~Mark~~ ~~for~~ ~~the~~ ~~NSC~~ ~~staff~~ ~~to~~ ~~review~~ ~~and~~ ~~concur~~ ~~with~~ ~~the~~ ~~State~~ ~~drafted~~ ~~letter~~ ~~to~~ ~~Garde~~ ~~Gardom~~ ~~re~~ ~~Free~~ ~~Trade~~ ~~with~~ ~~Canada~~
The NSC staff has reviewed and concurs with the State-drafted letter to Garde Gardom, as amended.

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *HRP for*
SUBJECT: Letter to Garde Gardom re Free Trade with Canada

for review by
general
TX

The NSC staff has reviewed and concurs with the State-drafted letter to Garde Gardom, as amended.

a

Attachment
Tab A - Incoming Correspondence

33174 6

Ty Cobb

[Handwritten signature]

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS # 1559 # 33174
By LDJ, NARA, Date 2/22/16

SECRET NOFORN
Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

18 June 1985

JM/PS
- File

Ottawa to Step Up Pressure on Orlikow Case (S/NF) *CUNNINGHAM*

*Eo 13526
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)*

Recent remarks about the Orlikow Case¹ by Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA) officials indicate that Ottawa is growing increasingly concerned about the issue. According to the US Embassy, the DEA says that Ottawa recognizes that there was substantial Canadian-funding in the psychiatric treatments in question, but believes it does not reduce US culpability. The Canadian Government currently is preparing a "private" study to determine the extent of Canadian involvement. The DEA also points out that Ottawa is putting more prominent emphasis on its claims that the CIA was involved in "cross-border activities" without the knowledge or permission of the Canadian Government, and that these activities constituted an infringement of Canada's sovereignty. DEA officials indicate that several Cabinet ministers believe that the case is a political liability for the Mulroney government [REDACTED] (S/NF)


We do not believe that Ottawa is yet ready to launch a public campaign to extract higher US indemnities for the litigants, but the Mulroney government does seem prepared to increase behind-the-scenes pressure. The "private" study, in our opinion, almost certainly is a contingency document designed to allow Ottawa to explain its role if Washington responds to

1.) The "Orlikow Case" involves allegations by several individuals that they were subjected, without their approval, to debilitating psychiatric treatment which was partially funded by the CIA. The alleged treatment is purported to have occurred during the late 1950s and early 1960s in the Royal Victoria Hospital in Montreal under the supervision of Dr. Ewan Cameron, then the preeminent psychiatrist in North America. At no time did the United States Government or the CIA direct or control the research or treatment program in question. The litigants currently are seeking financial redress from the United States Government. The Canadian government appears to have provided funds for the treatment in question in amounts far greater than those allegedly contributed by the CIA. (S/NF)

SECRET NOFORN

pressure by publicizing a description of Canadian involvement -- which, in terms of funding, was much higher than that of the CIA. We believe, furthermore, that Ottawa's current focus on the alleged violation of Canadian sovereignty by "CIA cross-border activities" probably is an indication of the public approach that the Mulroney government would take if the case is not settled discreetly.

EO 13526
SER. 3.3(b)(1)



Several factors are motivating Mulroney to increase pressure at this time.

- NDP leader Broadbent -- Orlikow's husband is an NDP MP -- focused media attention on the matter by questioning External Affairs Minister Clark in Parliament this spring. Clark's responded by pledging that Ottawa will insist that Washington pay higher reparations to the litigants.
- The Tories have been under constant attack from the media and the opposition for making excessive concessions to the United States on such matters as foreign investment and acid rain.
- Mulroney himself is more vulnerable on all bilateral issues than was Trudeau because he lacks a reputation for being hard-nosed in dealing with Washington.

With decisions approaching on SDI, the renewal of NORAD, and the possible initiation of a campaign for liberalized bilateral trade -- all likely to involve even closer US-Canada ties -- we think that Mulroney probably believes that he must establish his credibility as a nationalist by ensuring that the Canadian side prevails in the Orlikow dispute. (S/NF)



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~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

- Canada

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NSC FOR DR. TYRUS COBB

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PTER, LE, CA
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER'S MESSAGE TO THE PRESIDENT ON
- U. S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON

REF: OTTAWA 4729

1. ENTIRE TEXT.
2. DR. J. A. (FRED) DOUCET, SENIOR ADVISER TO PRIME MINISTER MULRONEY, CALLED THE EMBASSY AT 2:10 P. M. JUNE 20. IN TEMPORARY ABSENCE OF THE AMBASSADOR, HE ASKED TO TALK TO POLITICAL COUNSELOR AND THEN CONVEYED THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE.
3. DR. DOUCET SAID HE WOULD LIKE THE RECORD TO SHOW, IN CASE THE PRIME MINISTER IS ASKED DURING QUESTION PERIOD WHETHER HE HAS COMMUNICATED WITH THE PRESIDENT CONCERNING THE U. S. HOSTAGES IN LEBANON, THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAS COMMUNICATED HIS VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT THROUGH THE EMBASSY. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL NOTE THAT HE IS IN THE PROCESS OF WRITING A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT POINTING OUT THAT HE SUPPORTS THE ACTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT IN THIS MATTER AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE OF ALL CANADIANS THAT THE HOSTAGES WILL NOT SUFFER. THE PRIME MINISTER WILL STRESS THAT HE IS FULLY SUPPORTIVE OF THE PRESIDENT AND ALSO SAY THAT CANADA IS NOT ABOUT TO "INTERFERE" IN THIS AFFAIR, PARTICULARLY SINCE SUCH AN "INTRUSION" COULD HAVE AN UNFORTUNATE IMPACT ON THE CONCLUSION OF THE MATTER.
4. POL COUNSELOR THANKED DR. DOUCET FOR THIS MESSAGE AND ASSURED HIM IT WOULD BE CONVEYED IMMEDIATELY TO THE WHITE HOUSE THROUGH THE PROPER CHANNELS.
5. AMBASSADOR AND EUR/CAN HAVE ALREADY BEEN INFORMED OF DR. DOUCET'S MESSAGE.
ROBINSON
BT

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1559 #33175

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/03

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

July 9, 1985

For Immediate Release

The President today announced his intention to nominate Thomas Michael Toliver Niles, of the District of Columbia, a Career Member of the Senior Foreign Service, Class of Minister-Counselor, as Ambassador of the United States of America to Canada. He would succeed Paul Heron Robinson, Jr.

Mr. Niles entered on duty in the Department of State in 1962. He served at the American Embassy in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1963-1965. In 1965 he became an Economic Officer in Soviet Affairs in the Department, and from there took Russian language training. In 1968 he went to Moscow as an Economic Officer where he served until 1971 when he was assigned as a Political Officer at the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Brussels, Belgium. He returned to Moscow in 1973 as Director for Commercial Affairs where he served until 1976 when he became a student at the National War College. In 1977-1979 Mr. Niles served in the United Nations Office in the Bureau of International Organization Affairs. He then became Director of Central European Affairs in the Department until 1981 when he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs.

Mr. Niles was born September 22, 1939 in Lexington, Kentucky. He received his B.A. in 1960 from Harvard University and his M.A. in 1962 from the University of Kentucky. His foreign languages are Serbo-Croatian, German, Russian and French. He is married to the former Carroll Ehringhaus and they have two children.

#

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Tab A
~~_____~~
CANADA

ACTION

June 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: *Steve* STEVEN E. STEINER/*SES* TYRUS COBB

SUBJECT: SDI: Letters to Mulroney and Nakasone

In addition to the letters to five European Allies which we have sent to you, we believe SDI messages to Mulroney and Nakasone would also be useful. The basic text of these messages (Tab A) is similar to those prepared for the other five leaders, but we have added some personal touches for Mulroney and Nakasone.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the letters to Mulroney and Nakasone for the President's signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

SES { Bill Wright and Gaston Sigur concur.

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to the President

Tab A Pres Ltrs to Mulroney and Nakasone

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Letters to Prime Ministers Mulroney and
Nakasone

Issue

To sign the letters to Prime Ministers Mulroney and Nakasone.

Facts

We have already sent you recommended private messages on your new SDI directive (NSDD 172) to Chancellor Kohl and Prime Ministers Thatcher, Lubbers, Craxi and Martens. At Tab A are similar letters to Prime Ministers Mulroney and Nakasone, which stress that your new policy directive reflects, to a great extent, our close consultations with our Allies. Without making a direct request, these letters should hopefully help to spur positive Canadian and Japanese decisions on participation in SDI research.

RecommendationOKNo

_____ That you sign the letters to Prime Ministers
Mulroney and Nakasone.

Attachment

Tab A - Presidential Letters

Prepared by:
Tyrus W. Cobb
Steven E. Steiner

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Brian:

It was good to see you in Bonn and have a chance to review some of the major issues before the democracies. I always enjoy and benefit from discussing with you developments in our bilateral relationship and in the international arena.

At Quebec, we pledged to consult fully, frankly and regularly on arms control matters. I wish to emphasize how much I appreciate Canadian support for our efforts to achieve meaningful and significant arms reductions in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Alliance solidarity, as you have demonstrated, is key if we are to convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously. I have indicated my willingness to go that extra mile in pursuit of real arms reductions. It is clearly time for the Soviets to reciprocate.

I would also like to provide you with further background on our Strategic Defense Initiative which, as you know, continues to attract wide attention. I firmly believe that exploratory research into the future potential of strategic defense is critical to ensuring Western security over the long term. In addition to holding open the possibility of a more stable and reliable strategic balance, simple prudence dictates that we pursue such research in light of the vigorous activities of the Soviet Union in strategic defense -- including advanced research.

In the long term, the strategic challenges that we will collectively face over the coming years are such that we cannot allow ourselves as an Alliance to delay the exploration of possible new alternatives. Allow me, however, to underline that we have made no decision to go beyond research. I also wish to assure you that the United States will not seek to pursue solutions to strategic problems without reference to the concerns of our Allies.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F1559 #33177

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/13

We fully recognize that, given the scope and complexity of our research into new defensive technologies, building and sustaining an Alliance consensus will require both great care and patience. With this in mind, I recently issued a new National Security Decision Directive that sets forth a more detailed and definitive presentation of our rationale and strategy in pursuing our SDI research program. In doing so, I have drawn upon helpful Allied comments and advice about how to address SDI, both within the Alliance and publicly.

As part of our effort to make clear to our own and Allied publics our SDI policy and the strategic context in which that policy has been developed, we have released a very detailed public summary of my policy directive. This "Fact Sheet" has been made available to your government, and I am asking Ambassador Robinson to ensure that you personally receive a copy. I would, of course, welcome your views on it.

I understand that SDI remains a sensitive issue in Canada, and I know that it has come under repeated scrutiny in the House of Commons and in the press. Thus, I particularly appreciate both your steadfast endorsement of the prudence of our research program and your thoughtful consideration of possible Canadian participation. I also want you to know that our officials were pleased to have had the opportunity to meet with Arthur Kroeger and his colleagues, and to provide them with technical information on our SDI research program.

Thank you again for your steadfastness on these issues of common concern. I look forward to continuing our close consultations.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

The Right Honorable
Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Yasu:

In Bonn you and I had the opportunity to discuss a number of major issues between our two countries. I consider it of fundamental importance to continue our pattern of consultations with Japan and our other close friends and Allies.

In this respect, I especially appreciate your personal support for my efforts to achieve meaningful and significant arms reductions in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Firmness, unity and patience among the democracies is key if we are to convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously. As you know, I have stated my willingness to go the extra mile in pursuit of real arms reductions. It is clearly time for the Soviets to reciprocate.

I also want to continue our close consultations with you and our other friends and Allies on the United States Strategic Defense Initiative, which continues to attract much attention. I firmly believe, as you know from our discussions, that exploratory research into the future potential of strategic defense is critical to ensuring our common security over the long term. In addition to holding open the possibility of a more stable and reliable strategic balance, simple prudence dictates

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NLRRF 1559 #33178

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/13

that we pursue such research in light of the vigorous activities of the Soviet Union in strategic defense -- including advanced research.

In the long term, the strategic challenges that the democracies will collectively face over the coming years are such that we cannot delay the exploration of possible new alternatives. Allow me to underline that we have made no decision to go beyond research. I assure you that the United States will not seek to pursue solutions to strategic problems without reference to the special concerns of our friends and Allies.

We fully recognize that, given the scope and complexity of our research into new defensive technologies, building and sustaining a consensus among the democracies will require both great care and patience. With this in mind, I recently issued a new National Security Decision Directive that sets forth a more detailed and definitive presentation of our rationale and strategy in pursuing the SDI research program. In doing so, I have drawn directly upon helpful comments and advice from our friends and Allies about how to address SDI, both diplomatically and publicly.

As part of our efforts to make clear to U.S. and Allied publics our SDI policy and the strategic context in which that policy has been developed, we have released a very detailed public summary of my policy directive. This "Fact Sheet" has been made available to your government, and I am asking Ambassador Mansfield to ensure that you personally receive a copy. I would, of course, welcome your views on it.

I remain convinced that quiet and candid dialogue represents the best means of consensus-building among allies. I continue to place very high value on your

thoughtful counsel, and I look forward to maintaining our close contacts.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Yasuhiro Nakasone
Prime Minister of Japan
Tokyo

CONFIDENTIAL

Cobb 33180
4954 14

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Canada

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ACTION

June 20, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: TYRUS W. COBB *TWC*

SUBJECT: Drop-By for Meeting with Gordon Smith

Gordon Smith, roughly Mike Armacost's equivalent in the Canadian Ministry of External Affairs, will be here next week for a series of meetings on foreign policy and defense issues. Smith, at 45 one of the youngest career officers to serve in this senior position, has general responsibility for the development of Canadian foreign policy; has particular expertise in defense and NATO issues; and is regarded as a key player in the U.S.-Canada bilateral relationship.

Jack Matlock, Bill Wright and I will be meeting with him in the Sit Room on Friday, June 28, from 3:00-3:45 p.m. It would be very useful if you could do a drop-by and provide some background on our Interim Restraints decision. As you know, some of the gloss of the Quebec Summit has worn off recently -- the failure to alert them to the SDI letter at the NPG, new trade irritants, etc. -- and a stroking exercise such as this with senior career officials will help us keep things on track.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to do a drop-by with Gordon Smith on Friday, June 28.

Approve *JM*

Disapprove

Jack Matlock and Bill Wright concur.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Declassify: OADR

CONFIDENTIAL

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F1559 #33180
BY *LOT* NARA DATE 2/22/16

SECRET

Coff

33182

15

- CANADA

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 21, 1985

Dear Brian:

It was good to see you in Bonn and have a chance to review some of the major issues before the democracies. I always enjoy and benefit from discussing with you developments in our bilateral relationship and in the international arena.

At Quebec, we pledged to consult fully, frankly and regularly on arms control matters. I wish to emphasize how much I appreciate Canadian support for our efforts to achieve meaningful and significant arms reductions in the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Alliance solidarity, as you have demonstrated, is key if we are to convince the Soviets to negotiate seriously. I have indicated my willingness to go that extra mile in pursuit of real arms reductions. It is clearly time for the Soviets to reciprocate.

I would also like to provide you with further background on our Strategic Defense Initiative which, as you know, continues to attract wide attention. I firmly believe that exploratory research into the future potential of strategic defense is critical to ensuring Western security over the long term. In addition to holding open the possibility of a more stable and reliable strategic balance, simple prudence dictates that we pursue such research in light of the vigorous activities of the Soviet Union in strategic defense -- including advanced research.

In the long term, the strategic challenges that we will collectively face over the coming years are such that we cannot allow ourselves as an Alliance to delay the exploration of possible new alternatives. Allow me, however, to underline that we have made no decision to go beyond research. I also wish to assure you that the United States will not seek to pursue solutions to strategic problems without reference to the concerns of our Allies.

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NLRR F1559# 33182

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/13

We fully recognize that, given the scope and complexity of our research into new defensive technologies, building and sustaining an Alliance consensus will require both great care and patience. With this in mind, I recently issued a new National Security Decision Directive that sets forth a more detailed and definitive presentation of our rationale and strategy in pursuing our SDI research program. In doing so, I have drawn upon helpful Allied comments and advice about how to address SDI, both within the Alliance and publicly.

As part of our effort to make clear to our own and Allied publics our SDI policy and the strategic context in which that policy has been developed, we have released a very detailed public summary of my policy directive. This "Fact Sheet" has been made available to your government, and I am asking Ambassador Robinson to ensure that you personally receive a copy. I would, of course, welcome your views on it.

I understand that SDI remains a sensitive issue in Canada, and I know that it has come under repeated scrutiny in the House of Commons and in the press. Thus, I particularly appreciate both your steadfast endorsement of the prudence of our research program and your thoughtful consideration of possible Canadian participation. I also want you to know that our officials were pleased to have had the opportunity to meet with Arthur Kroeger and his colleagues, and to provide them with technical information on our SDI research program.

Thank you again for your steadfastness on these issues of common concern. I look forward to continuing our close consultations.

Warmest regards.

Sincerely,

Ra

The Right Honorable
Brian Mulroney, P.C., M.P.
Prime Minister of Canada
Ottawa



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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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VIGOROUS ACTIVITIES OF THE SOVIET UNION IN STRATEGIC
DEFENSE - INCLUDING ADVANCED RESEARCH.

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EOB:

IN THE LONG TERM, THE STRATEGIC CHALLENGES THAT WE WILL
COLLECTIVELY FACE OVER THE COMING YEARS ARE SUCH THAT
WE CANNOT ALLOW OURSELVES AS AN ALLIANCE TO DELAY THE
EXPLORATION OF POSSIBLE NEW ALTERNATIVES' ALLOW ME,
HOWEVER, TO UNDERLINE THAT WE HAVE MADE NO DECISION TO
GO BEYOND RESEARCH. I ALSO WISH TO ASSURE YOU THAT THE
UNITED STATES WILL NOT SEEK TO PURSUE SOLUTIONS TO
STRATEGIC PROBLEMS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO THE CONCERNS OF
OUR ALLIES.

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #2299 1732057
O 222055Z JUN 85
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

WE FULLY RECOGNIZE THAT, GIVEN THE SCOPE AND COMPLEXITY
OF OUR RESEARCH INTO NEW DEFENSIVE TECHNOLOGIES,
BUILDING AND SUSTAINING AN ALLIANCE CONSENSUS WILL
REQUIRE BOTH GREAT CARE AND PATIENCE. WITH THIS IN
MIND, I RECENTLY ISSUED A NEW NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE THAT SETS FORTH A MORE DETAILED AND
DEFINITIVE PRESENTATION OF OUR RATIONALE AND STRATEGY
IN PURSUING OUR SDI RESEARCH PROGRAM. IN DOING SO, I
HAVE DRAWN UPON HELPFUL ALLIED COMMENTS AND ADVICE
ABOUT HOW TO ADDRESS SDI' BOTH WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND
PUBLICLY.

TO AMEMBASSY OTTAWA IMMEDIATE 1333

~~SECRET~~ STATE 192299

AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE CLEAR TO OUR OWN AND
ALLIED PUBLICS OUR SDI POLICY AND THE STRATEGIC CONTEXT
IN WHICH THAT POLICY HAS BEEN DEVELOPED, WE HAVE
RELEASED A VERY DETAILED PUBLIC SUMMARY OF MY POLICY
DIRECTIVE. THIS "FACT SHEET" HAS BEEN MADE AVAILABLE
TO YOUR GOVERNMENT, AND I AM ASKING AMBASSADOR ROBINSON
TO ENSURE THAT YOU PERSONALLY RECEIVE A COPY. I WOULD,

FOR AMBASSADOR ROBINSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER
MULRONEY (S/S NO. 8518427)

OF COURSE, WELCOME YOUR VIEWS ON IT
I UNDERSTAND THAT SDI REMAINS A SENSITIVE ISSUE IN
CANADA' AND I KNOW THAT IT HAS COME UNDER REPEATED
SCRUTINY IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS AND IN THE PRESS.
THUS, I PARTICULARLY APPRECIATE BOTH YOUR STEADFAST
ENDORSEMENT OF THE PRUDENCE OF OUR RESEARCH PROGRAM AND
YOUR THOUGHTFUL CONSIDERATION OF POSSIBLE CANADIAN
PARTICIPATION. I ALSO WANT YOU TO KNOW THAT OUR
OFFICIALS WERE PLEASED TO HAVE HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO
MEET WITH ARTHUR KROEGER AND HIS COLLEAGUES, AND TO
PROVIDE THEM WITH TECHNICAL INFORMATION ON OUR SDI
RESEARCH PROGRAM.

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. AMBASSADOR SHOULD DELIVER FOLLOWING LETTER, DATED
JUNE 21, TO PRIME MINISTER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE,
PREFERABLY ON MONDAY, JUNE 24. SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL
FOLLOW.

THANK YOU AGAIN FOR YOUR STEADFASTNESS ON THESE ISSUES
OF COMMON CONCERN I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING OUR
CLOSE CONSULTATIONS.

3. BEGIN TEXT'

DEAR BRIAN:

WARMEST REGARDS. SINCERELY, RON /S/.

IT WAS GOOD TO SEE YOU IN BONN AND HAVE A CHANCE TO
REVIEW SOME OF THE MAJOR ISSUES BEFORE THE
DEMOCRACIES. I ALWAYS ENJOY AND BENEFIT FROM
DISCUSSING WITH YOU DEVELOPMENTS IN OUR BILATERAL
RELATIONSHIP AND IN THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA.

END TEXT. SHULTZ
BT

AT QUEBEC, WE PLEDGED TO CONSULT FULLY, FRANKLY AND
REGULARLY ON ARMS CONTROL MATTERS. I WISH TO EMPHASIZE
HOW MUCH I APPRECIATE CANADIAN SUPPORT FOR OUR EFFORTS

TO ACHIEVE MEANINGFUL AND SIGNIFICANT ARMS REDUCTIONS
IN THE ONGOING GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS' ALLIANCE
SOLIDARITY, AS YOU HAVE DEMONSTRATED, IS KEY IF WE ARE
TO CONVINCE THE SOVIETS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. I HAVE
INDICATED MY WILLINGNESS TO GO THAT EXTRA MILE IN
PURSUIT OF REAL ARMS REDUCTIONS. IT IS CLEARLY TIME
FOR THE SOVIETS TO RECIPROCATATE.

I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO PROVIDE YOU WITH FURTHER
BACKGROUND ON OUR STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE WHICH,
AS YOU KNOW, CONTINUES TO ATTRACT WIDE ATTENTION. I
FIRMLY BELIEVE THAT EXPLORATORY RESEARCH INTO THE
FUTURE POTENTIAL OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE IS CRITICAL TO
ENSURING WESTERN SECURITY OVER THE LONG TERM. IN
ADDITION TO HOLDING OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF A MORE
STABLE AND RELIABLE STRATEGIC BALANCE, SIMPLE PRUDENCE
DICTATES THAT WE PURSUE SUCH RESEARCH IN LIGHT OF THE

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NLR REF 1559 # 33184

BY RW NARA DATE 3/1/13

SECRET