

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Linhard, Robert E.: Files
Folder Title: Mrs. Thatcher on SDI/ABM March
1986 [3 of 3]
Box: RAC Box 9

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name LINHARD, ROBERT: FILES

Withdrawer

DLB 7/28/2006

File Folder MRS. THATCHER ON SDI/ABM, MARCH 1986 (3 OF 3)

FOIA

F97-013/3

Box Number 92083

NICK CULL

59

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
27144	CABLE	#072028Z MAR 86 PAR 9/5/2007	6	3/7/1986	B1
		F97-013/3; UPHELD 3/4/2013 M10-337 #27144			
27145	CABLE	#071057Z FEB 86 PAR 9/5/2007	20	2/7/1986	B1
		F97-013/3; UPHELD 3/4/2013 M10-337 #27145			
27146	CABLE	#061202 FEB 86 PAR 9/5/2007	13	2/6/1986	B1
		F97-013/3; UPHELD 3/4/2013 M10-337 #27146			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

27144

~~SECRET~~

NSWHW

PAGE 01
IBM777

LONDON 5055

DTG:072028Z MAR 86 PSN:063558
TOR: 068/0042Z CSN:HCE999

DISTRIBUTION:

NSREL ABM SCC ARMS CONTROL
NSSFK ABM SCC ARMS CONTROL
NSHGS SOVIET ARMS CONTROL
NSHP UK FRENCH
NSRFL SCC ARMS CONTROL
NSJEM SOVIET
NSJL SOVIET
NSNDS SCC
NSWHW SCC
NSWT ARMS CONTROL
NSGMM SDI

WHSR COMMENT:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:

ROUTINE
UTS2636

DE RUEHLD #5055/01 0662028
R 072028Z MAR 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3051
**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 05055

EXDIS

GENEVA ALSO FOR SCC AND CD DEL

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, NST, INF, US, UK, UR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN
- SECRETARY HOWE AND OTHER HMG OFFICIALS,
- MARCH 4, 1986

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:

IN MARCH 4 MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR NITZE, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE EMPHASIZED THE CENTRAL IMPORTANCE OF PRESERVING THE ABM TREATY, AND URGED THE U.S. TO MAINTAIN ITS RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION. IN AN EXCHANGE ON GORBACHEV AND THE SOVIET PARTY CONGRESS, HOWE AGREED WITH NITZE THAT GORBACHEV'S PERFORMANCE TO DATE INDICATED THAT HE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY A TRADITIONAL

~~SECRET~~

FOIA(b)(1)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F97-013/3#27144
By NOJ, NARA, Date 9/5/07

COMMUNIST PARTY APPARATCHIK, BUT WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIET LEADER HAD A GREATER SENSE OF REALISM IN FOREIGN POLICY AND WAS GROPING FOR SOME FORM OF ACCOMMODATION WITH THE WEST.

DISCUSSION AT A LUNCHEON WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY YOUNGER AND OTHER SENIOR HMG OFFICIALS FOCUSED ON INF, WITH EMPHASIS ON THE NEED TO LIMIT SHORTER-RANGE SYSTEMS. YOUNGER EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT, SINCE SOVIET DEMANDS ON UK/FRENCH SYSTEMS DID NOT REFLECT A REAL SECURITY CONCERN, IT WAS POSSIBLE MOSCOW WOULD BACK DOWN ON THIS ISSUE. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING HIS MARCH 3-4 VISIT TO LONDON, AMBASSADOR NITZE HAD A THIRTY-MINUTE MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE AND ATTENDED A LUNCH HOSTED BY AMBASSADOR PRICE WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY GEORGE YOUNGER AND OTHER SENIOR HMG OFFICIALS.

MEETING WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE

4. THE MEETING WITH HOWE OPENED WITH A RECAPITULATION BY NITZE OF HIS ANALYSIS OF GORBACHEV'S PARTY CONGRESS SPEECH AS PRESENTED AT THE WEHRKUNDE CONFERENCE. NITZE NOTED THE HEAVY EMPHASIS ON IDEOLOGY AND SAID THAT THE OVERALL IMPRESSION WAS THAT, ABOVE ALL, GORBACHEV WAS A COMMUNIST PARTY MAN. ON FOREIGN POLICY THERE WAS NOTHING EXTREME BUT NOTHING NEW.

~~CTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

-----RE

~~REDACTED~~

6. NITZE AGREED THAT GORBACHEV WAS A DOER AND NOT SIMPLY AN IDEOLOGUE, AND WOULD TRY TO ACCOMPLISH THE AMBITIOUS TARGETS HE HAD SET FORTH. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~REDACTED~~

-----REDA

NITZE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE MORE EVIDENCE. AT THIS POINT HE WAS SKEPTICAL.

7. HOWE SAID HE AGREED, AND ASKED HOW NITZE INTERPRETED

~~SECRET~~

SOVIET MOVES REGARDING THE NEXT SUMMIT. WAS THEIR REFUSAL TO AGREE ON DATES GAMESMANSHIP? NITZE SAID HE WOULD BE SURPRISED IF GORBACHEV WERE NOT TO AGREE TO A SUMMIT AT ALL. AT ISSUE WAS THE DATE FOR THE MEETING: JUNE WAS BECOMING INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY, THE FALL WAS INCONVENIENT FOR THE U.S., AND SO THE END OF THE YEAR LOOKED MOST REALISTIC.

8. TURNING TO GORBACHEV'S ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS.

~~EDACTED~~

FCO MINISTER OF STATE RENTON ASKED WHETHER NITZE BELIEVED THE SOVIETS HAD A CLEAR GAME PLAN OR WERE REACTING TO WASHINGTON'S MOVES.

9. NITZE REPLIED THAT HE HAD THE IMPRESSION THE SOVIETS
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 05055

EXDIS

GENEVA ALSO FOR SCC AND CD DEL

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, NST, INF, US, UK, UR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN AS A GOVERNMENT WERE HAVING DIFFICULTY IN CALCULATING THEIR ARMS CONTROL MOVES. THEY CERTAINLY HAD MISJUDGED EUROPEAN OPINION WHEN THEY WALKED OUT IN 1983 AND THEY HAD HAD A LOT LESS SUCCESS IN EXPLOITING U.S. DEPLOYMENTS THAN THEY MIGHT HAVE. AS A RESULT, TODAY THERE WERE STRONG DOUBTS IN THE WEST ABOUT ELIMINATING LRINF. THE GORBACHEV JANUARY 15 PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN DESIGNED TO CREATE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND EUROPEAN PRESSURES ON THE U.S. FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS. YET IN ACTUAL FACT, THE PROPOSALS HAVE NOT HAD SUCH A DIVISIVE EFFECT. NONETHELESS, THE SOVIETS LOOKED PERHAPS TO THE LONGER TERM, EVEN THOUGH THEY HAD CALCULATED POORLY IN THE SHORT TERM.

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDA~~

~~REDACTED~~

11. RENTON ASKED ABOUT THE SOVIET FOLLOW-UP ON ON-SITE

~~SECRET~~

INSPECTION. NITZE EXPLAINED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE CAUSE FOR HOPE BASED ON STATEMENTS AT GENEVA; THE SOVIETS CONTINUED TO REFUSE TO DISCUSS SPECIFICS OF VERIFICATION UNTIL THE OBLIGATIONS HAD BEEN FULLY AGREED. THE SAME THING HAD OCCURRED IN THE EARLIER INF TALKS: EVEN THOUGH BOTH SIDES HAD PROPOSED DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES TO BE REDUCED, THE SOVIETS HAD SIDE-STEPPED DISCUSSIONS OF SPECIFIC WAYS TO VERIFY SUCH DESTRUCTION. NONETHELESS, MUCH DETAILED WORK WAS UNDERWAY IN WASHINGTON ON VERIFICATION. WE INTENDED TO CONSULT WITH THE UK AND OTHER ALLIES BEFORE PRESENTING OUR VERIFICATION PROPOSALS IN GENEVA.

12. NITZE THEN REVIEWED THE SOVIET STANCE ON SDI AND "SPACE-STRIKE ARMS." HE SAID THAT WITH REGARD TO THE

ABM TREATY, THE SOVIETS WERE ON A STICKY WICKET. FOR OUR PART WE WANTED THE ABM TREATY TO BE HONORED. WITH RESPECT TO POSSIBLE FUTURE SYSTEMS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES, AGREED STATEMENT D MADE IT CLEAR THAT NO DEPLOYMENT COULD TAKE PLACE WITHOUT CONSULTATION AND AMENDMENT PER ARTICLES XIII AND XIV OF THE ABM TREATY. WE WERE ASKING THE SOVIETS TO DISCUSS THE PRINCIPLE OF A JOINTLY-MANAGED TRANSITION BUT THEY HAD REJECTED IT THUS FAR.

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~EDACTED~~

14. NITZE SAID THAT ONE PROBLEM WITH REGARD TO THE TREATY WAS THE FACT THAT WE HADN'T BOTHERED TO LOOK THROUGH THE NEGOTIATING RECORD. WHEN WE DID, WE FOUND THAT OUR RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION HAD NEVER BEEN AGREED TO BY THE SOVIETS. THE SOVIET POSITION IN THE SALT I NEGOTIATIONS WAS THAT THE TREATY SHOULD FOCUS ON HOW TO CONTROL SYSTEMS BASED ON EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES. WE DID SUGGEST A THIRD PARAGRAPH TO ARTICLE V THAT WOULD HAVE PROHIBITED THE DEVELOPMENT OF DEVICES BASED ON NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAPABLE OF SUBSTITUTING FOR ABM'S; BUT THE

SOVIETS REJECTED THIS SINCE WE COULD NOT SPECIFY WHAT KIND OF DEVICES WE HAD IN MIND.

15. AS A RESULT, NITZE CONTINUED, WE ARRIVED AT AGREED STATEMENT D, WHICH PROVIDES THAT IF SYSTEMS BASED ON OTHER PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES ARE CREATED, WE WILL CONSULT ON POSSIBLE LIMITATIONS PER ARTICLE XIII AND AMEND THE TREATY PER ARTICLE XIV. IF WE DID NOT REACH AGREEMENT, WE COULD WITHDRAW FROM THE TREATY. NOW THAT WE HAVE REEXAMINED THE NEGOTIATING RECORD, WE BELIEVE THAT THE

~~SECRET~~

BROAD INTERPRETATION IS CORRECT, BUT WE HAVE ALSO MADE THE DECISION TO STAND BY THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION IN PRACTICE.

** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 05055

EXDIS

GENEVA ALSO FOR SCC AND CD DEL

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, PREL, NST, INF, US, UK, UR

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S DISCUSSIONS WITH FOREIGN

~~REDACTED~~

R

LUNCHEON WITH DEFENCE SECRETARY
YOUNGER AND OTHER OFFICIALS

17. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH HOWE, AMBASSADOR PRICE HOSTED A LUNCH IN HONOR OF NITZE. ATTENDING ON THE BRITISH SIDE WERE DEFENCE SECRETARY YOUNGER, FCO MINISTER OF STATE TIMOTHY RENTON, FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE TIMOTHY DAUNT, FCO ARMS CONTROL DEPARTMENT HEAD MICHAEL PAKENHAM AND CABINET OFFICE SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER MALLABY.

18. A CONSIDERABLE PORTION OF THE DISCUSSION WAS DEVOTED TO SRINF WITH NITZE EXPLAINING THE TWO ALTERNATIVES FOR TREATING SRINF UNDER THE NEW U.S. PROPOSAL. THE BRITISH AGREED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PLACE EFFECTIVE LIMITS ON SRINF TO AVOID CIRCUMVENTION OF REDUCTIONS OR ELIMINATION OF LRINE MISSILES.

19. A DISCUSSION THEN ENSUED OF SOVIET STRATEGY IN THE GENEVA TALKS. ~~DACTED~~

RE

~~REDACTED~~

~~REDACTED~~

~~SECRET~~

~~S E C R E T~~

20. ON THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, NITZE AGREED WITH DAUNT THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT HAVE ANY GENUINE SECURITY CONCERN ABOUT BRITISH OR FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCES, BUT HE SAID THAT THE ISSUE NONETHELESS WAS A STUMBLING BLOCK TO AN AGREEMENT. ~~REDACTED~~

NITZE REPLIED THAT THIS PRESUMED THE SOVIETS WERE, IN FACT, INTERESTED IN REACHING AGREEMENT.

21. THE PARTICIPANTS ALSO EXPRESSED INTEREST IN THE LIKELY IMPACT OF RECENT CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON A CTB. NITZE EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON NUCLEAR TESTING. HE SAID THE U.S. WAS NOT LIKELY TO ALTER ITS VIEW THAT A BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNTIL WE WERE LESS DEPENDENT ON A STRATEGY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE.

SEITZ

** END OF CABLE **

~~S E C R E T~~

7

LONDON 2 HOWE

~~SECRET~~

27145

NSWHW

PAGE 01
IBM320

LONDON 2700

DTG:071057Z FEB 86 PSN:006952
TOR: 038/1445Z CSN:HCE016

DISTRIBUTION:

NSHP LRINF NATO UK
NSMDS ARTIC EUROPE NATO
NSREL LINHARD NATO NUCLEAR
NSWHW LRINF NUCLEAR
NSJEM SOVIET
NSJL SOVIET
NSSFK CTB NUCLEAR TESTING

WHSR COMMENT:

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT:
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS0689
DE RUEHLD #2700/05 0381101
O 071057Z FEB 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1780
**** SECTION BREAK ****
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK
- FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE AND SENIOR
- HMG OFFICIALS, FEBRUARY 6, 1986

1. - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR NITZE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR
LEHMAN, HELD DETAILED DISCUSSION OF PRESIDENT'S THINKING
ON NEXT STEPS IN THE GENEVA TALKS WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY
HOWE AND OTHER SENIOR HMG OFFICIALS ON FEBRUARY 6. FULL
MEMCON BEGINS IN PARA 3; PRINCIPAL UK COMMENTS WERE:

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

FOIA(b) (1)
DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-013/3# 27145
By ASJ, NARA, Date 7/5/07

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

NITZE AND LEHMAN HIGHLIGHTED U.S. PRECONDITIONS FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, AND OUR DECISION TO FOCUS ON NEAR-

TERM BILATERAL STEPS. THEY SOUGHT TO REASSURE THE BRITS ON THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, AND EXPLAINED THE FINE POINTS OF THE PROPOSED U.S. INF INITIATIVE. END SUMMARY

3. AMBASSADOR NITZE MET WITH FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE FOR THIRTY MINUTES MORNING OF FEBRUARY 6, AND HAD ANOTHER ONE-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH SENIOR FCO AND MOD ARMS CONTROL

EXPERTS CHAIRED BY FCO MINISTER OF STATE TIMOTHY RENTON. ACCOMPANYING AMBASSADOR NITZE WERE AMBASSADOR LEHMAN; AMBASSADOR PRICE; EUR DAS THOMAS; S/ARN EXECUTIVE
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NQDIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK ASSISTANT CLYNE; AND EMBASSY OFFICER VERSHBOW (NOTE-TAKER); ON THE UK SIDE WERE MINISTER OF STATE TIMOTHY RENTON; FCO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE DAVID GOODALL; FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE TIMOTHY DAUNT; FCO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT DEPARTMENT HEAD MICHAEL PAKENHAM; MOD DEFENCE ARMS CONTROL UNIT HEAD JOHN HOWE; LEN APPELYARD, PRIVATE SECRETARY TO HOWE; AND FCO DEFENCE DEPARTMENT OFFICER PHILIP THOMAS (NOTETAKER).

DISCUSSION WITH THE FOREIGN SECRETARY

4. HOWE OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY NOTING THAT THE UK AND U.S. APPRAISALS OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 14 PROPOSALS SEEMED SIMILAR. ON THE QUESTION OF A RESPONSE, WE SEEMED FAIRLY CLOSE. AS THE FOREIGN OFFICE HAD RECEIVED A RUN-DOWN OF THE PRIME MINISTER'S CONVERSATION WITH NITZE, HE ASKED NITZE SIMPLY TO AMPLIFY ON ANY POINTS HE THOUGHT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT.

5. NITZE ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY PARTICULAR PROBLEMS FROM THE UK PERSPECTIVE.

id Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

~~SECRET~~

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

6. NITZE EXPLAINED THAT THE U.S. THINKING WAS TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FIRST STAGE OF THE GORBACHEV PLAN -- THAT IS, BILATERAL STEPS ON WHICH THE U.S. AND USSR COULD AGREE AT THIS TIME. ALL STEPS BEYOND THE FIRST STAGE WOULD REQUIRE THE INVOLVEMENT OF FRANCE, BRITAIN, CHINA AND OTHER STATES. SO WE WOULD WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FIRST STAGE WHILE REAFFIRMING OUR ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN DOING THE LATTER, NITZE ADDED, WE WOULD ALSO SPELL OUT THE PRECONDITIONS WE SEE TO ATTAINMENT OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD, INCLUDING THE NEED FOR A VASTLY IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL BALANCE AND PROGRESS ON REGIONAL ISSUES. AS THE PRESIDENT HAD POINTED OUT, IN HIS LETTER TO THE

PRIME MINISTER, THERE WERE OTHER ISSUES (FOR EXAMPLE, TERRORISM) WHICH ALSO POSED PROBLEMS THAT WOULD NEED TO BE SOLVED BEFORE WE COULD CONCEIVE OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD. IT WAS THE U.S. POSITION AS WELL, NITZE CONTINUED, THAT EVEN IF A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD WERE ACHIEVED, DEFENSES WOULD BE NECESSARY TO HELP MINIMIZE THE DANGER OF CHEATING. AFTER ALL, THE KNOWLEDGE OF HOW TO MAKE NUCLEAR WEAPONS EXISTED AND WE COULD NOT BE CERTAIN THAT THEY WOULD NOT REAPPEAR; GIVEN THE LONG LEAD-TIME INVOLVED, HOWEVER, DEFENSES WOULD PUT YOU IN A MUCH SAFER SITUATION.

7. NITZE ADDED THAT THE PRESIDENT DID TAKE SERIOUSLY THAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD; THE PUBLIC ALSO LOOKED WITH FAVOR UPON THIS OBJECTIVE. Redacted

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

8. NITZE SAID

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

HE PERSONALLY HAD SOME DOUBT ABOUT WHETHER ONE WOULD WANT TO GO NUCLEAR BECAUSE THE OTHER SIDE HAD USED CW. HE THOUGHT CW SHOULD BE LOOKED AT "ON ITS OWN BOTTOM." IN SEEKING A BAN ON CW, THERE WERE REAL PROBLEMS OF VERIFICATION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF CW STOCKPILES.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

~~SECRET~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
NITZE SAID HE AGREED THAT
WE SHOULD WORK HARD ON CW. RECONCILING THE NEED FOR
CONFIDENCE IN VERIFICATION WITH THE ACCEPTABILITY OF
DIFFERENT KINDS OF INSPECTIONS MEASURES WAS A DIFFICULT
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK
TASK.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
NITZE
REPLIED THAT GORBACHEV HAD SAID A LOT ON VERIFICATION,
BUT IN DEALING WITH CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT
ARE ALREADY IN HAND -- IT WOULD BE HARD TO GET THE
MEASURES THAT WE BELIEVE NECESSARY.

10. REGARDING VERIFICATION IN THE NST CONTEXT, NITZE
SAID WE WERE DOING A LOT OF WORK IN WASHINGTON ON THE
SUBJECT. IN INF THE SOVIETS HAD IN THE PAST REFUSED TO
DISCUSS VERIFICATION IN ANY DETAIL, ARGUING THAT
VERIFICATION COULD NOT BE CONSIDERED UNTIL THERE WERE
AN AGREEMENT ON THE OBLIGATIONS TO BE VERIFIED. THE
U.S. HAD REJOINDERED THAT THE SOVIETS' DRAFT INF TREATY
CALLED FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF MISSILES AND LAUNCHERS,
AND THUS IT WAS INCUMBENT UPON THEM TO EXPLAIN THE
CONCRETE MEASURES THEY ENVISAGED TO VERIFY THIS. THE
SOVIETS ULTIMATELY CONCEDED THIS POINT, BUT DID NOT GET
DOWN TO BRASS TACKS. THUS, IN THE PRESENT SITUATION,
WE COULD NOT DRAW ANY CONCLUSIONS WHILE WE WERE STILL
IN THE NEVER-NEVER LAND OF SOVIET RHETORIC ABOUT ON-
SITE INSPECTION, AND HAD NOT MOVED ON TO CONCRETE
MEASURES.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

NITZE AGREED THAT GORBACHEV SEEMED
MORE INTERESTED IN VERIFICATION, AND DID NOT WANT TO BE
SEEN PUBLICLY AS REJECTING ON-SITE INSPECTION. THE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

QUESTION WAS HOW TO REACH AGREEMENT ON CONCRETE OSI MEASURES THAT WOULD ACHIEVE HIGH VERIFICATION CONFIDENCE.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

15. NITZE SAID THE U.S. SHARED THE UK ANALYSIS. WITHOUT COMPARING THE CURRENT AND PREVIOUS SOVIET POSITIONS, HE AGREED THE CURRENT PROPOSAL WAS A NON-STARTER AND THAT COORDINATION AMONG THE U.S., UK AND

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

FRANCE WAS VITAL TO GET THE SOVIETS TO BACK DOWN.
 DAUNT ASKED HOW NITZE EXPLAINED THE SOVIET SWITCH ON
 THIS SUBJECT. DID THE SOVIETS VIEW THE NEW PROPOSAL AS
 MORE DANGEROUS FOR THE UK AND FRANCE? NITZE REPLIED
 THAT HE THOUGHT THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL MIGHT HAVE BEEN
 PUT TOGETHER BY MARSHAL AKHROMEYEV TOGETHER WITH
 PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SPECIALISTS IN THE CENTRAL
 ** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
 SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK
 COMMITTEE. THEY MUST HAVE THOUGHT IT WOULD BE A CLEVER
 PLOY TO DRIVE WEDGES BOTH BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE UK
 AND FRANCE, AND BETWEEN THE UK/FRANCE AND THEIR OTHER
 NATO PARTNERS.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

17. NITZE ASKED WHETHER THE UK DID NOT SEE ADVANTAGE
 IN POINTING OUT IN THE PUBLIC DEBATE THAT THE UK WAS
 NOT INCREASING THE NUMBER OF ITS SUBMARINES OR SLBM
 TUBES, THAT THEY WERE ONLY NOW MODERNIZING THOSE
 SLBM'S, AND THAT THE RUSSIANS HAD ALREADY MODERNIZED
 THEIR SEA-BASED DETERRENT.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

18. NITZE AGREED THAT IN A DEMOCRACY THERE WAS INDEED
 A RISK THAT TALK ABOUT A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD WOULD CAST
 A SHADOW FORWARD, AND IMPAIR NECESSARY DEFENSE
 MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS. ON THE OTHER HAND, NOT TO HOLD
 OUT THE PROSPECT OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS A
 LONG-TERM OBJECTIVE WOULD RISK LOSING THE SUPPORT OF
 THOSE WHO ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE PRESENCE OF THE NUCLEAR
 SWORD OF DAMOCLES OVER MANKIND. WE HAD DEALT WITH THIS
 TENSION IN THE PAST AND SHOULD BE ABLE TO DO SO NOW.

~~SECRET~~

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

20. NITZE NOTED THAT AFTER THE GORBACHEV JANUARY 14 PROPOSAL, A NUMBER OF PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN CRITICAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S POLICY ON NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTION BEGAN TO RECOGNIZE THE DANGERS INVOLVED IN ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND WERE WRITING ARTICLES ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR U.S. AND ALLIED SECURITY. EVEN SOME LIBERAL DEMOCRATS HAD REVERSED THEMSELVES!

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE REPLIED THAT WASHINGTON WAS PRESENTLY FOCUSING ON RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV, NOT ON THE RSVP REPORT.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

FURTHER EXCHANGES WITH SENIOR FCO EXPERTS

24. LEHMAN, BEGINNING A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE OF ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SAID THAT THE PREVIOUS AFTERNOON'S MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER INDICATED THAT THE U.S. AND UK WERE ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH. WE COULD NOT SAY WE HAD CHANGED OUR MINDS ABOUT THIS LONG-TERM GOAL OR THAT WE REJECTED A U.S. LAW IN FORCE SINCE 1963, NOW THAT GORBACHEV HAD BEGUN TO ADVOCATE A NON-NUCLEAR WORLD. ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS AN OBJECTIVE ON WHICH WE HAD TO AGREE WITH

THE SOVIETS, BUT IT WAS ALSO NECESSARY TO REMIND EVERYONE ABOUT OUR CONDITIONS; THIS WOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD WAS NOT CLOSE AT HAND. IF WE ARE TO MAKE ANY PROGRESS, WE NEED TO CONCENTRATE ON THE FIRST STEPS.

** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ LEHMAN

REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CONDITIONS FOR A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD STRESSED THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN OUR CURRENT POLITICAL/SECURITY CIRCUMSTANCES.

27. DAUNT THEN RAISED SOME QUESTIONS ABOUT THE DETAILS OF THE PROPOSED U.S. INITIATIVE IN INF. TO FACILITATE THE DISCUSSION NITZE PROVIDED COPIES OF THE TALKING POINTS HE HAD USED WITH THE PRIME MINISTER IN EXPLAINING THE U.S. APPROACH. HE EXPLAINED TO DAUNT THAT THE U.S. PROPOSAL WAS INDEED FOR ZERO LRINF MISSILES WEST OF NOVOSIBIRSK. THERE WERE CONDITIONS, HOWEVER: A FIFTY PERCENT CUT IN SS-20'S EAST OF NOVOSIBIRSK; A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE THESE SYSTEMS EVENTUALLY TO ZERO; A U.S. RIGHT TO MATCH ASIAN SS-20'S; CONSTRAINTS ON SRINF; AND A RIGHT TO CONVERT P-II TO THE P-1B. LEHMAN STRESSED THAT WE WERE STILL

INSISTING ON AN EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING, BUT WITH ZERO-ZERO IN EUROPE.

28. REGARDING THE IMPLICATIONS FOR DETERRENCE OF A ZERO-ZERO OUTCOME, DAUNT SAID THAT THIS QUESTION DATED BACK MANY YEARS. NITZE SAID IT WENT BACK TO OCTOBER 1981, WHEN THE ZERO-ZERO OPTION BECAME OUR BASIC POSITION. DAUNT SAID WE HAD ALL ENDORSED THAT POSITION, ADDING THAT THIS HAD BEEN WITH VARYING DEGREES OF ENTHUSIASM.

29. LEHMAN EXPLAINED THAT OUR ZERO-ZERO SOLUTION WAS NOT THE SAME AS THE SOVIETS'. WE UNDERSTOOD THE SECURITY IMPLICATIONS AND WERE VERY SENSITIVE TO THE ASIAN PROBLEM. FOR THAT REASON AMBASSADOR ROWNY AND ROBERT LINHARD OF THE NSC WERE IN ASIA TO CONSULT WITH THE JAPANESE, KOREANS, CHINESE AND AUSTRALIANS. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION FROM DAUNT, LEHMAN EXPLAINED THAT WE NEVER SAID ASIAN SYSTEMS WERE NOT A THREAT TO EUROPE; IF MOVED, THEIR TARGET COVERAGE COULD INCREASE. WE HOPED, HOWEVER, THAT EFFECTIVE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS WOULD GIVE US SOME HANDLE ON THE MOBILITY PROBLEM.

30. NITZE SAID THE GORBACHEV JANUARY 14 POSITION INCLUDED NO CONSTRAINTS ON ASIAN SS-20'S. IT WOULD APPEAR TO PERMIT THE TRANSFER OF EUROPEAN SS-20'S TO ASIA. IN GENEVA, HOWEVER, THE SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY ENVISAGED DISMANTLEMENT OR DESTRUCTION OF EUROPEAN SS-20'S. IT WAS TRUE, NITZE CONTINUED, THAT THE SOVIETS HAD A NEED FOR SOME WEAPONS IN ASIA VIS-A-VIS THE CHINESE (WHOSE FORCES ARE LIKELY TO GROW IN THE COMING YEARS), AND IT WAS UNLIKELY THEY WOULD MOVE ASIAN SYSTEMS TO EUROPE, PARTICULARLY IF REDUCED BY FIFTY PERCENT. THEREFORE, THE POSSIBLE CONTRIBUTION OF

REMAINING SS-20'S IN ASIA TO THE THREAT AGAINST EUROPE -- PARTICULARLY GIVEN THE EXISTENCE OF SRINF AND SS-25'S WHICH CAN TARGET EUROPE -- WOULD NOT BE SUBSTANTIAL.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE SAID FOR

THIS REASON IT WAS IMPORTANT TO ARRIVE AT THE RIGHT DEFINITION FOR SRINF. THIS HAD BEEN THE SUBJECT OF EXTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN NATO AND IT HAD BEEN ULTIMATELY DECIDED TO MAKE THE CUTOFF 500 KILOMETERS, THEREBY CATCHING THE SS-12/22 AND SS-23, BUT NOT THE SS-21. ONLY A THIRD OF THE SS-21S PROBABLY CARRIED NUCLEAR WARHEADS IN ANY CASE. THE SOVIET POSITION, HOWEVER,

WAS THAT THE SS-23 HAD A RANGE LESS THAN 500 KILOMETERS.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE REPLIED

THAT WITH THE RIGHT TO CONVERT P-II'S TO P-1B'S IT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE. IN FACT, HE ADDED, SOME IN THE U.S. MILITARY WOULD ACTUALLY PREFER P-1B OVER P-II. DAUNT SAID HE WONDERED WHETHER THIS OPINION WAS SHARED IN THE FRG. NITZE REPLIED THAT SRINF WERE VERY IMPORTANT TO THE GERMANS; THEY NOW APPEARED TO BE CONCERNED BY THE SS-21.

33. RENTON ASKED WHAT HAD HAPPENED TO INF AIRCRAFT. WOULD THESE BE RELEGATED TO A FUTURE STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS? NITZE REPLIED THAT THE U.S. PREFERENCE WAS NOT TO INCLUDE AIRCRAFT; DEFINING WHICH AIRCRAFT WOULD BE LIMITED AND WHICH WOULD NOT WAS EXCEEDINGLY COMPLICATED. BUT IF THE SOVIETS WERE TO PROPOSE AN APPROACH SIMILAR TO THE U.S. POSITION AT THE END OF 1983 -- TO LIMIT ONLY CERTAIN CATEGORIES OF LRINF AIRCRAFT (ON THE U.S. SIDE, THE F-111; ON THE SOVIET SIDE, BADGER, BLINDER, AND, IN THE SOVIET COUNT, BACKFIRE) WE COULD CONSIDER IT. WE WOULD WANT TO EXCLUDE AIRCRAFT WITH A RANGE LESS THAN THAT OF THE F-111, HOWEVER. THE SOVIETS HAD SUCH A PREPONDERANCE OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT WE SAW NO JUSTIFICATION FOR THEM TO DEMAND INCLUSION OF U.S. AIRCRAFT.

34. LEHMAN SAID THERE WERE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE SOVIETS WERE LESS INTERESTED IN LIMITING INF AIRCRAFT NOW, ALTHOUGH THIS COULD CHANGE. VERSHBOW NOTED THAT THEY WERE NOT PRESSING THE ISSUE IN INF AT THIS TIME, SINCE THEY WERE TRYING TO CAPTURE ALL U.S. "FORWARD-BASED SYSTEMS" IN START WHILE EXCLUDING THEIR OWN INF AIRCRAFT.

35. RETURNING TO THE QUESTION OF THIRD-COUNTRY SYSTEMS, GOODALL FOCUSED ON A POINT IN NITZE'S TALKING POINTS IN WHICH IT WAS STATED:

. WHEN THESE BILATERAL FIRST STEPS HAVE BEEN
 . COMPLETED -- THAT IS, THE FORCES OF THE US AND
 . USSR HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND DISCUSSIONS FOR
 . ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS ARE UNDERWAY -- WE CAN
 . ENVISION SUBSEQUENT STEPS WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE
 . UK, FRANCE AND CHINA, SO THAT ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO
 . NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

37. NITZE EXPLAINED THAT IN REFERRING TO BILATERAL FIRST STEPS, WE ENCOMPASSED START AS WELL AS INF. OUR VIEW WAS THAT WHEN THESE BILATERAL FIRST STEPS WERE COMPLETED RPT COMPLETED -- I.E., WHEN WE AND THE SOVIETS HAD REDUCED TO 4500 BALLISTIC MISSILE WARHEADS -- WE COULD THEN AND ONLY THEN ENVISAGE THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE UK AND FRANCE MIGHT BECOME BECOME INVOLVED.

38. LEHMAN SAID THIS WAS INDEED A VERY IMPORTANT QUESTION, AND IT WAS VITAL THAT WE BE IN SYNCH ON WHAT WE WERE SAYING IN PUBLIC AND IN PRIVATE. THE GORBACHEV PACKAGE HAD SEVERAL PROBLEMS: ITS THREE PHASES WERE DESIGNED TO REINFORCE THE SOVIET UNION'S GEOPOLITICAL POSITION, BUT ALSO TO CREATE NEW LINKAGES AND OPPORTUNITIES TO DIVIDE THE WEST. IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT WE DECIDED NOT TO BE DRAWN INTO A NEGOTIATION OVER WHAT SORT OF FUTURE WE WERE SEEKING, BUT SIMPLY TO SAY THAT WE AGREED ON THE ULTIMATE GOAL -- ELIMINATING

** END OF CABLE **

~~SECRET~~

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 07 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK
NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- AND WANTED TO FOCUS ON THE IMMEDIATE
STEPS IN ARMS REDUCTIONS THAT WERE NECESSARY. IT WAS
OUR PREFERENCE NOT TO TALK AT ALL ABOUT "PHASES," SINCE
THIS IMPLIED THAT THERE WERE OTHER WELL-DEFINED PHASES
TO FOLLOW. WE WANT A FORMULATION THAT WILL GET US BACK
TO WHERE WE WERE AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE NOVEMBER
SUMMIT, WITH A FOCUS ON AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT AND
FIFTY PERCENT REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS. WE WANTED
TO DE-LINK THESE QUESTIONS AS MUCH AS POSSIBLE FROM A
FRAMEWORK FOR THE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS,
LEHMAN EXPLAINED.

39. LEHMAN ADDED THAT HE WANTED TO STRESS ONCE MORE
THAT WE WERE TALKING ABOUT BILATERAL FIRST STEPS AND
INTENDED TO KEEP THEM BILATERAL. OUR FORMULATION WAS
DESIGNED TO BREAK UP THE LINKAGES BEING SOUGHT BY THE
SOVIETS IN THE FIRST STAGE AND PUT THE FOCUS BACK ON
OUR OWN BILATERAL PRIORITIES.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~SECRET~~

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

44. LEHMAN REPLIED THAT THIS DISCUSSION HAD BEEN VERY USEFUL. IT WAS NOT OUR INTENTION THAT THE SENTENCE REFERRING TO THE POSSIBILITY THAT "ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS" BE DIVORCED FROM THE CONDITIONS LISTED BELOW REGARDING TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (CORRECTING CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES; FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AND FUTURE TREATY

OBLIGATIONS; PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE; AND A DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO PEACEFUL COMPETITION). NOR WAS THERE ANY INTENTION ON OUR PART TO FORCE UPON THE UK A POSITION THAT CREATED PROBLEMS WITH REGARD TO HMG'S ESTABLISHED CONDITIONS.

45. LEHMAN ADDED, SPEAKING CANDIDLY, THAT THE UK CONDITION REGARDING NO INCREASE IN STRATEGIC DEFENSES WAS A DELICATE ONE GIVEN ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S.

AND SDI.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
 Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

LEHMAN SUGGESTED THEY DEBATE THIS POINT ON ANOTHER OCCASION.

** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 08 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

47. NITZE EXPLAINED THE U.S. POSITION ON TESTING: AS LONG AS IT IS NECESSARY TO RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OUR ULTIMATE DEFENSE AND UNTIL WE CAN VISUALIZE HOW NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL BE ELIMINATED, WE HAVE TO MAINTAIN THE RELIABILITY, EFFECTIVENESS AND MODERNIZATION OF OUR NUCLEAR STOCKPILE; THIS MEANT CONTINUED TESTING. A HOPE FOR THE EVENTUAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS NOT ENOUGH OF A BASIS ON WHICH TO STOP TESTING.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
NITZE SAID THAT WE WANTED TO MOVE FORWARD ON VERIFICATION OF THE TTBT BUT NOT TO MOVE FORWARD ON A CTB. WE CANNOT LIVE WITH A BAN ON ALL TESTING.
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE REPLIED THAT SOME IN CONGRESS MAY ARGUE ALONG THESE LINES, BUT IT WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE THE MAJORITY VIEW. LEHMAN SAID HE CONCURRED; BUT WE UNDERSTOOD UK CONCERNS, AND WOULD BE EMPHASIZING THE CONDITIONS THAT HAVE TO BE MET FOR ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO BE SERIOUSLY CONSIDERED. WE WANTED TO MAKE CLEAR THAT ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS WAS NOT A NEAR-TERM PROPOSITION BUT WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR CHANGES IN THE WORLD: HENCE OUR EMPHASIS ON NEAR-TERM BILATERAL STEPS. BUT IF THE U.S. WERE TO APPEAR TO REPUDIATE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS AN ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE (WHICH MIGHT NOT BE DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT), IT WOULD BE DOMESTICALLY DIFFICULT.

~~SECRET~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

52. NITZE ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH EXPECTED KARPOV TO RAISE CTB WHEN HE CAME TO LONDON FOR TALKS IN MARCH.

RENTON SAID THERE WAS NO DOUBT ABOUT THIS. ~~ted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

54. NITZE RECALLED THE HISTORY OF THE ISSUE IN SALT AND HOW THE U.S. HAD CONVERTED THE NON-CIRCUMVENTION CLAUSE INTO SOMETHING WE COULD LIVE WITH. THE NON-TFERSFER ISSUE BEEN REVIVED AGAIN IN START AND INF. WE DID NOT WANT TO GRAPPLE WITH THIS AT PRESENT, BUT FIRST DEAL WITH THE CENTRAL LIMITATIONS. DAUNT
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 09 OF 10 LONDON 02700
NODIS
STATE PASS NSC

~~SECRET~~

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE

REPLIED THAT THE JANUARY 14 GORBACHEV STATEMENT LINKED CTB TO THE ENTIRE PACKAGE. SUBSEQUENT CONVERSATIONS SUGGESTED THAT THE LINKAGE MIGHT NOT BE AS FIRM WITH REGARD TO INF. BUT GIVEN HOW MANY DIFFERENT VOICES WE WERE HEARING FROM THE SOVIETS, WE SHOULD RELY UPON THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT PENDING A CHANGE AT A SIMILAR LEVEL OF AUTHORITY.

56. PHILIP THOMAS ASKED WHETHER THE U.S., THEN, DISCOUNTED KVITSINSKIY'S COMMENTS IN BONN WHICH APPEARED TO DE-LINK INF AND CTB. NITZE SAID WE DID NOT DISMISS THESE COMMENTS, BUT WE HAD TO RELY UPON GORBACHEV'S OWN WORDS, WHICH HE HAD NOT YET CHANGED.

57. LEHMAN MUSED THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN ESTABLISHING PRECISELY WHERE THE SOVIETS HAD ESTABLISHED LINKAGES. IN THEIR CONVERSATIONS WITH OUR THREE GENEVA AMBASSADORS, THE SOVIETS HAVE MAINTAINED CERTAIN AMBIGUITIES. THIS WAS NOT UNUSUAL FOR THE SOVIETS. AS FOR THEIR EUROPEAN ZERO OPTION, IT WAS AMBIGUOUS WHETHER THIS WAS POSSIBLE AS A SEPARATE INTERIM AGREEMENT OR ONLY AS PART OF A LARGER PACKAGE. LEHMAN ADDED THAT IN THE PAST WE HAVE TRIED TO POCKET THOSE SOVIET STATEMENTS WE LIKED THE BEST, BUT WE THE SOVIETS DID NOT ALWAYS LET US GET AWAY WITH THIS.

58. NITZE COMMENTED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STILL SAYING THAT A SEPARATE INF AGREEMENT WAS ACCEPTABLE BUT ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THEIR EARLIER MORATORIUM PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD LEAD TO ELIMINATION OF U.S. LRINF AND SOVIET RETENTION OF SS-20S AS COMPENSATION FOR UK-FRENCH FORCES; ANYTHING OTHER THAN THIS OPTION WAS LINKED TO OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE PACKAGE.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE SAID THIS WAS A VERY IMPORTANT FACTOR IN OUR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION. THE PRESIDENT HAD COMPLAINED SEVERAL TIMES TO GORBACHEV DURING THE SUMMIT AND SHULTZ HAD ALSO DONE SO IN THE PREPARATORY

MEETINGS TO THE SUMMIT. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

60. LEHMAN SAID ONE OF OUR GOALS WAS TO GET BEYOND THE GRANDIOSE SOVIET STATEMENTS AND FORCE THEM TO GIVE CONCRETE INDICATIONS OF WHAT THEY ARE PREPARED TO ACCEPT IN AREAS LIKE MBR. ON NUCLEAR TESTING, FOR EXAMPLE, WE WERE PRESSING THEM TO TAKE UP OUR SIMPLE OFFER FOR AN EXCHANGE AMONG EXPERTS ON VERIFICATION.

LEHMAN SAID THAT WE SHOULD USE GORBACHEV'S POSITIVE STATEMENTS ON VERIFICATION EITHER AS LEVERAGE TO GET THE NECESSARY MEASURES WE SEEK, OR TO PROVE CONCLUSIVELY THAT IT WAS SIMPLY RHETORIC ALL ALONG.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 10 OF 10 LONDON 02700

NODIS

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, INF, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH UK

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

64. NITZE SAID THAT IT WAS OUR VIEW THAT THE THREAT OF SO-CALLED SUITCASE BOMBS WAS IN A DIFFERENT CATEGORY. WITH REGARD TO THE BOMBER PROBLEM, IT IS OUR POSITION THAT SDI, WHICH IS DEVOTED TO DEFENSE AGAINST BALLISTIC MISSILES, SHOULD BE ACCOMPANIED BY IMPROVED AIR DEFENSES TO COUNTER THE AIR BREATHING THREAT. THUS, WE WERE WORKING HARD ON AIR DEFENSES AS WELL.

65. LEHMAN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT NOT TO GET BOGGED DOWN IN THE PRECISE NATURE OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD -- A WORLD RADICALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE WE LIVE IN TODAY. WE WERE SENSITIVE TO THE IMPACT OF RISING EXPECTATIONS OF A NUCLEAR-FREE WORLD ON PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS. BUT OUR RESPONSE IS THAT WE HAVE HERE-AND-NOW PROBLEMS, AND THAT WE SHOULD FOCUS

ON THESE, ALBEIT WITHOUT FORGETTING OUR ULTIMATE GOAL.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

67. NITZE SAID THAT HMG WAS AWARE OF OUR POLICY, WHICH WAS NOT TO DO ANYTHING IRREVERSIBLY INCONSISTENT WITH EXISTING AGREEMENTS. BUT THIS POLICY WAS BASED ON THREE CONDITIONS: 1) THAT THE SOVIETS THEMSELVES ABIDE BY EXISTING AGREEMENTS; 2) INSOFAR AS THE SOVIETS HAVE GONE BEYOND THE SALT LIMITS, THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE

~~SECRET~~

FREE TO TAKE APPROPRIATE AND PROPORTIONATE ACTIONS; AND
3) THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY ON
DEEP AND STABILIZING NUCLEAR ARMS REDUCTIONS.

68. THE SOVIETS, NITZE CONTINUED, WERE SATISFYING
CONDITION THREE, BUT PROBLEMS AROSE WITH REGARDS TO THE
OTHER TWO. THE PRESIDENT HAD ASKED DOD FOR A REPORT ON
SOVIET VIOLATIONS AND ON POSSIBLE PROPORTIONATE
RESPONSES THE U.S. COULD TAKE. THE REPORT HAS BEEN
SUBMITTED, BUT IT HAS BEEN PUT ASIDE UNTIL WE HAVE
DECIDED ON A RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV. THIS WAS INDEED A
COMPLICATED PROBLEM. FOR EXAMPLE, WE JUDGED THAT THE
SOVIETS HAVE DEPLOYED TWO NEW TYPES OF ICBMS AND THERE
IS NO DOUBT THAT THIS IS A CONCRETE VIOLATION OF SALT
II. THIS WOULD ENTITLE US TO GO AHEAD WITH A NEW TYPE
OF ICBM, ALTHOUGH WE ARE STILL PONDERING OVER WHETHER
TO PROCEED WITH THE MIDGETMAN IN LIGHT OF THE HIGH
COST. AND THIS IS APART FROM THE QUESTION OF PROPOR-
TIONATE RESPONSES TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS IN OTHER AREAS.

69. RENTON SAID THAT HE ONLY WANTED TO MAKE THE
POLITICAL POINT. NITZE SAID THAT THE U.S. ALSO HAD TO
CONSIDER POLITICAL FACTORS IN THE DOMESTIC CONTEXT.

69. THIS MESSAGE WAS CLEARED BY AMBASSADOR NITZE.

SEITZ

** END OF CABLE **

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

27146

NSREL

PAGE 01
IBM004

LONDON 2619

DTG:061202Z FEB 86 PSN:004647
TOR: 037/1409Z CSN:HCE484

DISTRIBUTION:

- NSREL ABM SDI ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT NUCLEAR
- NSSFK ABM CW ARMS CONTROL DISARMAMENT MBFR
- NSHP CW INF BRITISH FRENCH
- NSWHW INF SDI DISARMAMENT NUCLEAR
- NSJL CW EASTERN EUROPE SOVIET
- NSGMM SDI SPACE SHUTTLE
- NSNDS CW EUROPE
- NSGVE NODIS
- NSJD ABM
- NSJEM SOVIET
- NSWRP NODIS

WHSR COMMENT: OTHER SECTIONS AVAILABLE ON REQUEST

WHTS ASSIGNED DISTRIBUTION:

SIT: VP SIT
EOB:

OP IMMED
UTS7804
DE RUEHLD #2619/01 0371203
O 061202Z FEB 86
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1708
**** SECTION BREAK ****
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 LONDON 02619

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR NITZE

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL -
- AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FEBRUARY 5

1. A - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: IN A CORDIAL FEBRUARY 5 MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, AMBASSADOR NITZE GAVE THE UNITED STATES' CAUTIOUS ASSESSMENT OF GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 14 PROPOSAL, AND OUTLINED THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON NEXT STEPS IN THE GENEVA ARMS TALKS. NITZE'S PRESENTATION OF US IDEAS WAS PRECEDED, HOWEVER, BY A LENGTHY STATEMENT BY MRS. THATCHER, IN WHICH:

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-013/3 #27146
By LOI, NARA, Date 9/5/07

FOIA(b) (1)

~~SECRET~~

3. AMBASSADOR NITZE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR LEHMAN AND AMBASSADOR PRICE, MET WITH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AFTERNOON OF FEBRUARY 5 TO BRIEF HER ON THE PRESIDENT'S CURRENT THINKING ON A RESPONSE TO SOVIET GENERAL

SECRETARY GORBACHEV'S JANUARY 14 ARMS CONTROL PROPOSAL.

INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS

4. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ NITZE REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT THOUGHT IT NEEDED AN IMMEDIATE REPLY AND HAD WELCOMED THE STATEMENT, WHILE ALSO NOTING THAT IT HAD SOME "HOOKERS." SINCE THEN, THE US GOVERNMENT HAS BEEN TRYING TO DETERMINE HOW MUCH IS PROPAGANDA AND HOW
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 LONDON 02619

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR NITZE

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL -
- AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FEBRUARY 5

MUCH IS SERIOUS. TO A LARGE DEGREE, IT IS HEAVY ON PROPAGANDA.

5. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
NITZE SAID THAT IT REMINDED HIM OF THE BARUCH PLAN AND THE SOVIET RESPONSE TO IT. THE SOVIETS RESPONDED IN 6 DAYS, CALLING UPON THE US TO ELIMINATE ALL OF ITS NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THREE MONTHS, AND THEN EXPRESSING A WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIALS AT SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN ABOUT 6 MONTHS.

6. THAT 1946 SOVIET PROPOSAL, NITZE SAID, WAS LIKE THE CURRENT PROPOSAL: IT WAS FRONT-LOADED IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIET UNION. IN THE FIRST PHASE, THE SOVIETS WOULD GET WHAT THEY WANT, WITH THE PROMISE THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD WOULD GET WHAT IT WANTS IN SOME SECOND PHASE.

THE ONLY REALLY NEW SUBSTANCE WAS IN INF, BUT EVEN THERE ONE HAD TO READ THE FINE PRINT. THE PROPOSAL WAS TIED TO THE NON-TRANSFER OF MISSILES TO OUR ALLIES -- CLEARLY AIMED AT THE BRITISH TRIDENT PROGRAM -- TO A "FREEZE" ON UK/FRENCH MODERNIZATION, TO DECLARATIONS BY BRITAIN AND FRANCE THAT THEY WOULD AGREE TO THE FUTURE TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A SECOND PHASE, AND TO NO REDUCTIONS OF SS-20S IN ASIA.

7. NITZE, CONTINUING, SAID WE WERE HEARING EIGHT DIFFERENT VOICES FROM THE SOVIETS, BUT HAD TO ASSUME THAT THEIR REAL POSITION IS THE JANUARY 14 GORBACHEV PROPOSAL. IN START THEIR POSITION WAS UNCHANGED. THEY WERE CONTINUING TO PRESS FOR THEIR OBJECTIONABLE

DEFINITION OF STRATEGIC SYSTEMS, AND TO EXCLUDE COMPARABLE SYSTEMS ON THE SOVIET SIDE.

8. IN THE DEFENSE AND SPACE AREA, IT ORIGINALLY LOOKED AS IF THERE MIGHT BE SOME PROGRESS. THE SOVIETS DID NOT INCLUDE LIMITS ON RESEARCH IN THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THE GORBACHEV STATEMENT, BUT IN THE RUSSIAN THEY USED THE WORD "SOZDANIYE" ("CREATION") AS THE EQUIVALENT OF "DEVELOPMENT," WHICH THEIR NEGOTIATORS SAY IN GENEVA INCLUDES "PURPOSEFUL RESEARCH." THUS, THERE HAD BEEN NO CHANGE IN THEIR POSITION.

9. IN ADDITION, EVERYTHING APPEARED TO BE LINKED TO A CTB AS WELL. SO LONG AS WE RELY ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR OUR DETERRENT, WE HAVE TO ENSURE THEIR EFFECTIVENESS; THIS REQUIRES TESTING.

10. TURNING TO THE QUESTION OF NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, NITZE EXPLAINED THAT THE PRESIDENT WANTED TO SHARE HIS THINKING WITH KEY ALLIES BEFORE FIRING UP HIS POSITION. AT THIS POINT, THE PRIME MINISTER INTERJECTED WITH A LENGTHY STATEMENT SETTING FORTH HER PERSPECTIVE ON THE GORBACHEV PROPOSAL AND HOW WE SHOULD APPROACH THE NEGOTIATIONS.

PRIME MINISTER THATCHER'S PRESENTATION

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

~~SECRET~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

21. AT THIS POINT, AMBASSADOR NITZE INTERJECTED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SIMILAR VIEWS. THE PRIME MINISTER REPLIED THAT EACH MUST SAY IT IN THEIR OWN WAY. NITZE SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT AGREED THAT THE WORLD WOULD BE MUCH SAFER IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WERE ELIMINATED AND THERE
 ** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 06 LONDON 02619

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR NITZE

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PARM, NST, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
 SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL -
 - AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH
 - PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FEBRUARY 5
 EXISTED A NON-NUCLEAR DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR WEAPONS
 THAT MIGHT COME INTO THE HANDS OF PEOPLE LIKE QADHAFI.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

NITZE PRESENTATION ON NEXT STEPS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS

~~SECRET~~

23. AMBASSADOR NITZE THEN SAID HE WANTED TO EXPLAIN THE PRESIDENT'S THINKING ON POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS ON THE NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS. HE SAID THAT, IN RESPONDING TO GORBACHEV'S PROPOSAL, THE PRESIDENT'S FOCUS WAS ON THE FIRST PHASE, THE BILATERAL PHASE.

24. IN HIS PRESENTATION, NITZE DREW UPON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS DESCRIBING THE CONCEPTUAL BASIS OF THE US APPROACH:

. -- US PLEASED THAT SOVIET UNION HAS AGREED WITH OUR GOAL OF ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

. -- THIS CONTINUES TO BE OUR GOAL -- WHEN IT BECOMES POSSIBLE IN A MANNER CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY OF US AND ALLIES.

. -- TO ACCOMPLISH THIS GOAL, WE HAVE PROPOSED AND CONTINUE TO ADVOCATE FIRST STEPS BY US AND USSR BILATERALLY, SPECIFICALLY BY IMPLEMENTING THE PRINCIPLE OF 50 PERCENT REDUCTIONS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, APPLIED APPROPRIATELY TO LIKE WEAPONS, AND BY PROMPTLY REACHING AN INTERIM INF AGREEMENT.

. -- WHEN THESE BILATERAL FIRST STEPS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED -- THAT IS, THE FORCES OF THE US AND USSR HAVE BEEN REDUCED, AND DISCUSSIONS FOR ADDITIONAL REDUCTIONS ARE UNDERWAY -- WE CAN ENVISION SUBSEQUENT STEPS WHICH COULD INVOLVE THE UK, FRANCE AND CHINA, SO THAT ALL CAN MOVE TO ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN A BALANCED AND STABLE MANNER.

. -- OUR IMMEDIATE FOCUS SHOULD REMAIN ON BILATERAL FIRST STEPS TOWARD THE PROMPT ACCOMPLISHMENT OF THE 50 PERCENT REDUCTION AND INTERIM INF AGREEMENT.

. -- SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES EXIST BETWEEN THE US AND THE SOVIETS ON THE ELEMENTS THAT WOULD CONSTITUTE AN EQUITABLE AGREEMENT.

. -- IN KEEPING WITH THE NOVEMBER SUMMIT JOINT STATEMENT, WE INTEND TO ACCELERATE OUR EFFORTS TO FIND COMMON GROUND WITH THE SOVIETS.

. -- WE ARE PLEASED THAT THE SOVIETS RECOGNIZE OUR LONG-HELD POSITION THAT VERIFICATION OF NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS IS CRITICAL.

. -- WE INTEND TO PURSUE MR. GORBACHEV'S OVERTURE ON VERIFICATION.

~~SECRET~~

. -- WE CANNOT AGREE WITH SPECIFIC DETAILS IN THE PHASED SOVIET PLAN, PARTICULARLY THE SUBSEQUENT PHASES. AMONG OTHER THINGS, IT WOULD DIVERT EFFORTS FROM AND CREATE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE CRITICAL BILATERAL WORK. MOREOVER, IT WOULD IMMEDIATELY INVOLVE OTHER SOVEREIGN NATIONS AND WOULD STILL DEPEND UPON THE RESULTS OF FIRST STEPS NOW IN PROCESS IN GENEVA.

. -- FOR THIS REASON, WE SEE NO PROFIT IN NEGOTIATING ON A FRAMEWORK GOING BEYOND THE BILATERAL FIRST STEPS.

. -- WHILE THE GOAL OF TOTAL ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMAINS, SUCH ELIMINATION REQUIRES CONDITIONS THAT INCLUDE:

- . - CORRECTING CONVENTIONAL AND OTHER FORCE IMBALANCES,
- . - FULL COMPLIANCE WITH EXISTING AND FUTURE TREATY OBLIGATIONS,
- . - PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF REGIONAL CONFLICTS IN WAYS THAT ALLOW FREE CHOICE WITHOUT OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE, AND

** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 05 OF 06 LONDON 02619

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR NITZE

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PARM, NST, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL -

- AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FEBRUARY 5
- . - A DEMONSTRATED COMMITMENT BY SOVIET LEADERSHIP TO PEACEFUL COMPETITION.

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

. -- IT IS ALSO OUR VIEW THAT ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD NOT OBIVATE THE NEED FOR DEFENSES AGAINST SUCH WEAPONS TO PROTECT AGAINST CHEATING OR BREAKOUT.

~~SECRET~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

25. AMBASSADOR NITZE THEN TURNED TO US THINKING ON THE CONCRETE ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE NST NEGOTIATIONS, MAKING THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

. -- WE ARE NOT INCLINED TO CHANGE OUR PROPOSALS OF LAST NOVEMBER IN THOSE AREAS WHERE THE SOVIETS HAVE SHOWN NO MOTION, NOR EVEN ADDRESSED MEANINGFULLY THOSE PROPOSALS.

. -- ACCORDINGLY, WE INTEND NO NEW INITIATIVES IN EITHER START OR DEFENSE AND SPACE AT THIS TIME.

. -- WE ARE CONSIDERING NEW INITIATIVES IN THE INF AREA FOR AN INTERIM AGREEMENT ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

. . -- ELIMINATION OF ALL US AND SOVIET LRINF MISSILES WEST OF NOVOSIBIRSK (AND BARNAUL) COUPLED TO INITIAL REDUCTIONS IN SS-20S IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN USSR OF AT LEAST 50 PERCENT; WE WOULD ALSO SEEK A COMMITMENT TO REDUCE SUBSEQUENTLY TO ZERO.

. -- ASSOCIATED WITH THIS, THE US WOULD PROPOSE A GLOBAL LRINF WARHEAD CEILING UNDER WHICH WE WOULD RETAIN THE RIGHT TO MATCH ANY SS-20 WARHEADS REMAINING OUTSIDE EUROPE WITH SYSTEMS IN THE US OR ELSEWHERE OUTSIDE OF EUROPE. IN THIS REGARD, SOVIET SYSTEMS WHICH ARE REDUCED WOULD BE DESTROYED; US SYSTEMS COULD BE WITHDRAWN TO THE US UNLESS, OR UNTIL, THEY WERE IN EXCESS OF THE EQUAL GLOBAL CEILING (WE WOULD ALSO RETAIN THE RIGHT TO CONVERT THE P11 TO P1-B).

. -- ALSO ASSOCIATED WITH LRINF, WE WOULD PROPOSE AN EQUAL SRINF CEILING AT CURRENT SOVIET LEVELS OR TO FREEZE SRINF AT THE LEVELS OF THE SIDES AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1982.

. -- FINALLY, THE US WOULD INTRODUCE THE BASIS FOR MUTUAL EXPLORATION OF A VERIFICATION REGIME AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THIS PROPOSAL.

SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~SECRET~~

27. AMBASSADOR NITZE REMINDED THE PRIME MINISTER THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD LAID OUT PRECONDITIONS FOR THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING

RESOLUTION OF HOTSPOTS AROUND THE WORLD. ~~tacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
(A CONVERSATION THEN ENSUED ON SOUTHERN AFRICA
- SEE BELOW, PARAS 34-35.)

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

29. NITZE SAID THE PRESIDENT BELIEVED IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR GORBACHEV AND OTHER RUSSIANS TO SEE THE WEST. THE

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

30. NITZE NOTED THAT (SOVIET CHIEF OF THE GENERAL STAFF) AKHROMEYEV WAS VERY INTELLIGENT, AND MAY BE THE ** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 06 OF 06 LONDON 02619

NODIS

FROM AMBASSADOR NITZE

STATE PASS NSC

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PARM, NST, UK, OVIP (NITZE, PAUL H)
SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL -
- AMBASSADOR NITZE'S MEETING WITH
- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FEBRUARY 5

CO-AUTHOR OF THE JANUARY 14 ARMS CONTROL PACKAGE, ADDING THAT HE WAS NOT CERTAIN THAT THE NEW GENERATION WAS MORE COMPETENT THAN THE OLD. IT APPEARED THAT SOME OF THEIR BEST PEOPLE WENT INTO THE MILITARY SO AS TO AVOID CONFLICTS WITH THE PARTY.

31. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
AMBASSADOR

~~SECRET~~

LEHMAN REPLIED THAT VERIFICATION WAS INDEED VERY IMPORTANT, AND THAT MONITORING THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WOULD BE NEARLY IMPOSSIBLE. THIS WAS WHY THE US HAS EMPHASIZED A CHALLENGE INSPECTION REGIME, AS A MEANS OF ENSURING THAT THERE WERE AN EFFECTIVE DETERRENT TO VIOLATIONS. LEHMAN ADDED THAT SUCH A MECHANISM WOULD ALSO SERVE TO DETER INSPECTION ABUSE.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

LEHMAN RESPONDED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD RECENTLY MOVED ON THE NUMBERS FOR INITIAL US AND SOVIET WITHDRAWALS; THEIR STRATEGY MIGHT WELL BE TO GET AGREEMENT ON SUBSTANCE AND THEN TRY TO STALL WHILE OUR VERIFICATION POSITION ERODES

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE NOTED THAT BY THE

YEAR 2000, THE PRC MIGHT BECOME A MAJOR POWER AND MRS.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

SIDE CONVERSATION ON SOUTHERN AFRICA, ETC. (CF. PARA 27)

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

NITZE REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD, IN FACT, DONE

SO.

Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted
Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted Redacted

~~SECRET~~



PRICE

** END OF CABLE **

~~SECRET~~

0