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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** DONLEY, MICHAEL: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 5/25/2007

**File Folder** JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD-250 RE ICBMS (1)

**FOIA**

F00-115

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LETTOW

10

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
36554	MEMO	TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RE INITIAL JCS REPORT ON ELIMINATING BALLISTIC MISSILES (SAME AS 25482) <b>R 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	2	ND	B1
36555	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT (SAME AS 25487) <b>PAR 5/2/2011 NLRRM09-301/1</b>	1	12/5/1986	B1
36556	REPORT	APPENDIX A INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT (SAME AS 25488) <b>PAR 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	20	ND	B1
36557	MEMO	BROOKS/LINHARD TO KEEL (SAME AS 25490) <b>R 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	2	12/10/1986	B1
36558	MEMO	KEEL TO THE PRESIDENT (SAME AS 25491) <b>R 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	2	ND	B1
36559	REPORT	SYNOPSIS OF JCS INITIAL PROGRESS (SAME AS 25484) <b>PAR 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	2	ND	B1
36560	OUTLINE	STRATEGIC FORCES (SAME AS 25485)	2	ND	B1
36562	OUTLINE	NON-STRATEGIC FORCES (SAME AS 25486)	1	ND	B1

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36563	MEMO	WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT (SAME AS 25487)	1	12/5/1986	B1
36564	REPORT	SAME AS 25488 <b>PAR 1/20/2016 M554/1</b>	20	ND	B1
36565	MEMO	TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RE INITIAL JCS REPORT (SAME AS 25492)	2	ND	B1

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SYSTEM II  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles (U)

The President has reviewed the JCS initial progress report responding to NSDD-250 in which the President tasked the JCS, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan that would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. The assumptions and methodology set forth in the initial report are approved. (S)

The President appreciates both the thorough report and the valuable discussion of the subject during his most recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on that report and discussion he wishes to emphasize the following points:

- The President notes the assumption in the initial report that the Soviets will retain their hard-target kill ICBMs as long as possible. If the year-by-year approach of the analysis indicates that unacceptable risk would therefore result in one or more of the transition years, recommendations should be provided on arms control measures which would result in a safer phasing of reductions. (S)
- The initial report notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in seeking to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, intend to measure the capability of forces proposed in the plan against those of SIOP Revision 6C. The adequacy of deterrence in a world without ballistic missiles may be far more a matter of subjective military judgment than of quantitative measures, especially since the most critical factors may not be analytically quantifiable using today's tools. Thus the President reemphasizes the great value he will place on the personal military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparing such a plan for ballistic missile free world. (TS)

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BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/16

- The President notes the views of the Joints Chiefs of Staff that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the guidance provided in NSDD-13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. The analysis the Joints Chiefs of Staff are conducting should provide an excellent basis for such a reevaluation. The President looks forward to receiving any recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on this subject. (TS)
  
- The President took note that the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the fiscal guidance derived from the Fiscal Year 1988 FYDP is overly optimistic. He agrees and suggests the fiscal constraints approved for the Fiscal Year 1988-1989 Budget be used in lieu of the levels in the interim report. (C)
  
- The President notes that sea-launched cruise missiles figure heavily in the JCS approach to devising future strategic forces. The President agrees with the need for diversity in our strategic forces and, if sea-launched cruise missiles are to be retained, with their employment in a strategic role as part of a transition to a world without ballistic missiles. The President notes, however, that we have agreed with the Soviets to seek an arms control solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles. Additionally we should fully evaluate the contribution to our security that could be made by limiting Soviet capabilities in this same area. Thus, in devising future forces, the JCS should be explicit in noting what arms control constraints on sea-launched cruise missiles will or will not be advantageous from a military standpoint. (S)

The January 31, 1987 date for submission of the baseline plan is approved. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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36555	MEMO  WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT (SAME AS 25487)	1	12/5/1986	B1

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As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(5)(6)

APPENDIX A  
INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M554#36556  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/16

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## I. Introduction

This initial progress report is required by NSDD-250 as part of the process of developing a plan which would permit the United States to safely transition to the arms reductions proposed in 1991 and from there to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. It addresses the following:

- A description of the initial basic planning assumptions that will be made concerning friendly forces available during the period in question, corresponding hostile forces, critical missions to be accomplished, and the general number and characteristics of the targets associated with these missions.
- Initial recommendations, if any, with respect to national policy guidance and strategy for the employment of nuclear and nonnuclear forces that should be considered in the development of such a plan.
- An explanation of the analytic methodology planned for evaluating risk and force effectiveness in support of the development of the plan, recognizing that military expertise and judgment will play a critically important role in accomplishing the overall task.
- A method for appropriately folding into this planning process the contribution of highly compartmented programs while maintaining their security.
- An estimate, submitted for Presidential approval, of the date upon which this plan will be available for final Presidential review.

The report is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the remaining five sections correspond to the five areas listed above.

## II. Basic Planning Assumptions

Many of the basic planning assumptions to be used to develop the plan are specified in NSDD-250 and, therefore, are not reiterated in this report. Assumptions as to strategy and policy are explained in section III and those relating to analytic methodology in section IV. Assumptions as to



hostile forces were made on the basis of possible (and judgments of likely) Soviet reaction to projected friendly force modernization and mission changes that may take place in a zero offensive ballistic missile environment. For purposes of the baseline analysis, the study will assume an arms control outcome based upon US proposals currently on the table. Assumptions as to forces available, both friendly and hostile, and their critical missions and associated target base, are discussed below.

Friendly Forces Available. Since the major purpose of the plan is to propose the programmatic and nonprogrammatic changes to US forces that would be required if an agreement was negotiated to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, it would be premature to state what US forces should be available until after the appropriate analysis has been accomplished. It is important to note, however, that NSDD-250 does place restrictions upon the resources available to develop US forces, limiting them not to exceed current planning levels, with a rate of growth thereafter not to exceed 3 percent in real terms.

This restriction has been interpreted to mean the 1987 appropriation level followed by the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) FYDP for 1988 to 1992. The inflation factors for FY 1988-1992 are 3.52, 3.34, 3.0, 2.8, and 2.8. Real growth projected through the FYDP reflects DOD (less DOE) budget requirements of the following: FY 1988, 10.3; FY 1989, 2.4; FY 1990, 5.5; FY 1991, 2.5; FY 1992, 3.6. For the period of FY 1993-1996, a 3 percent real growth and a 2.88 percent inflation factor are used. It is important to note that although the resulting TOA reflects current fiscal guidance contained in NSDD-250, it is extremely optimistic to believe that these levels will survive the scrutiny of the budget process. Use of these unrealistically high TOAs will significantly bias the analysis towards favorable results:

FY	87	88	89	90	91
BASE	281.3	322.5	341.2	370.9	391.0
FY	92	93	94	95	96
BASE	416.4	441.0	467.6	495.5	525.0

This study assumes that the potential agreement is bilateral, and therefore does not formally affect US and Soviet allies. Moreover, while not prejudging issues of negotiability, this study assumes that offensive ballistic missiles of both non-US NATO and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would not play a part in the baseline analysis after 1996.

Overall, with a zero offensive ballistic missile pact, it is expected that the serious military deficiencies identified in NATO's Conventional Defense Improvement program are not likely to be remedied in full, and the disparity between

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NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces will remain through 1996.

The allies will have to address more realistically the Warsaw Pact's distinct advantage in nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional warfare capabilities. Considerable resources may have to be expended on the acquisition of protective equipment. NATO would be forced to

Alliance accord is highly improbable on this controversial issue. Alliance members may have to continue increasing war reserve stockpiles, at great expense, to ensure sustainability. The Alliance's lack of an adequate surge capability for rapid increases in the production of essential equipment will remain a critical shortcoming.

Hostile Forces. Although it is difficult to prioritize Soviet war aims or objectives in absolute terms, the primary Soviet war aim will continue to be victory. The Soviets would strive:

- To ensure survival and continuity of control by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the Party organization, the Soviet government, and the military establishment.
- Through that control, to ensure continuity in performance of the functions and activities necessary to win the war by the Party-Government apparatus, the military establishment, and economy.
- To defeat and occupy European NATO countries, using their surviving economic assets to assist Soviet recovery.
- To neutralize the United States (and the PRC under certain scenarios) as a politico-military competitor through destruction of its warfighting capabilities and war-supporting infrastructure.
- To minimize damage to the leadership, military establishment, economy, and population of the Soviet Union from enemy attacks.
- To dominate the post-war world, which is expected to adopt eventually some form of Soviet socialism or at least to submit to Soviet domination.

The Soviets view the capability to preempt enemy use of nuclear weapons as the highest goal. The means for accomplishing this would be greatly affected by a zero offensive ballistic missile force.

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The time required to employ bombers may seriously hinder Soviet capability to preempt (and certainty of preempting) a US strategic strike. Force reposturing (such as placing SLCMs off the US shores) may solve part of the Soviet problem, but may not achieve their damage limitation requirements or provide timely enough response or reliable C3 connectivity with the level of certainty now specified in Soviet war plans.

Soviet forces in transition to (and under) a zero offensive ballistic missile regime will be governed by their overarching war aims that likely would remain unchanged, but bounded by the counting rules and the interim agreements of the proposed agreement. To that end, the Soviets will most likely attempt to retain the maximum hard target kill capability represented by ICBMs as long as possible. Through 1991, they probably will retain the maximum ICBM force possible, governed by the counting rules and the interim limits and sublimits, and consistent with production pace required to position a strong intercontinental bomber capability by 1996.

SLCM deployment in a zero ballistic missile environment could be approximately 1,750 missiles by 1996. Reaching this level would require devotion of substantial shipyard resources to SSBN conversion and construction of new SSCNs, and adaption of some existing SSNs as deployment platforms. The Soviets probably will dismantle/convert SSBNs at a steady pace (somewhere below maximum rate) over the entire period, retaining TYPHOON and DELTA-III/IV boats as SSBNs as long as possible. A good number of these will eventually be converted to SLCM platforms. The Soviets could maintain a continual deployment of upwards of 200 SLCMs off the US coasts by the early 1990s. At least one new SLCM submarine production line could be initiated. SLCMs could also be put on several classes of existing SSNs and surface ships. The Soviets will likely develop a long-range cruise missile to put on some of these platforms. Whether this can be in place by 1996 is an open question. However, the Soviets would regard such a forward-deployed force as vulnerable and not a first-strike force.

SLCM assets would likely be employed in three ways. First, a sizable number would probably be continually deployed off US coasts and targeted against CONUS. Second, many units would be deployed in contiguous waters against theater targets in Eurasia. Finally, some assets would probably be kept in strategic reserve, for use in protracted nuclear war, with some deployed in bastion areas and/or under the ice.

Although the elimination of SLBMs would reduce the Soviet need for strategic submarine bastions, the Soviet requirement for echeloned defense in depth at sea would increase to counter heightened enemy SLCM/ALCM threats. Thus, many general-purpose naval forces,

released from defense of SSBNs, could shift to anti-SLCM/ALCM roles in expanded sea control, sea denial areas, and full open ocean deployment. Since current and near-term SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons range, the Soviet strategic ASW problem would contract from forward areas to primarily the Norwegian Sea and northwest Pacific. It is expected the Soviets will deploy SLCM-equipped units for theater use as an additional means to provide a deep-strike capability, particularly in light of losing SRBMs.

In a zero offensive ballistic missile environment, the Soviet intercontinental bomber force could be expanded to about 450-500 bombers by 1996. Ultimately, the Soviets could deploy up to 750 bombers, depending on the extent to which the Soviets take advantage of the counting rules that leave most bombs non-accountable. If they take full advantage of the counting rules, the Soviets could field about 7,400 actual bomber weapons even though they ostensibly would deploy only 6,000 accountable weapons.

The intelligence community believes the Soviets expect war to begin following a period of increased tension and crisis, during which time the Soviets generate their armed forces. Also, the Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it occurs, would be most likely to arise out of a conventional conflict. Further, the Soviets see little likelihood that the US or NATO would launch a surprise or sudden attack from a normal peacetime footing without providing warning. As a result, it is not expected that the Soviets will adopt a large-scale day-to-day strip alert posture for their intercontinental bomber force. However, it would make sense for the Soviets to expand their peacetime patrols from the BEAR-H force, but this would still be limited to only a few aircraft at a time. The Soviets could modify their current practices to enable them to quickly generate their bomber force. This would be a quick response force as opposed to an actual strip alert posture.

The Soviets will place increased emphasis on air defenses, depending on their judgment of US force capabilities and their calculation of optimum offense/defense force ratios. Likely steps they would take include optimizing some current over-the-horizon (OTH) radars for aircraft detection and building additional OTH radars, specifically designed for aircraft detection, to cover anticipated approach routes; extending atmospheric defenses farther beyond the Soviet periphery with AWACS and advanced lookdown-shutdown fighters; and deploying long-range SAMs, long-range interceptors, and shipboard SAMs. The Soviets would put more emphasis on their air forces--and probably develop short-range ground-launched cruise missiles--to perform the operational role

now assigned to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). It will be difficult to predict the timeframe for accomplishing the complete package. It will probably be achieved in a gradual and rational fashion, no matter how long it takes, rather than an uneconomical and accelerated pace within 10 years.

The military strategy of the Soviet Union is driven by its national strategy. In the Soviet view, dominance of the geostrategic Eurasian landmass is of primary importance. The Soviet Union seeks to be the prime arbiter on the Eurasian continent by reducing the ability of the United States to be a decisive military factor. Altering the composition of the nuclear balance will not change the basic Eurasian-oriented strategy of the Soviet Union. Theater forces are a fundamental element of Soviet strategy and the requirements for these forces derive from this fundamental geostrategic approach.

It is not anticipated that the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles will cause a radical departure in Soviet ground force equipment modernization or force structure trends. The Soviet strategy for employing those forces and the traditionally large role played by ground forces in combined arms operations is expected to remain largely unchanged. To the extent the Soviets believe NATO will react to an offensive-ballistic-missile-free environment by increasing tactical air forces, they will undertake a program to increase the number and technical capabilities of their already well developed air defense assets.

The role currently played by SRBMs in the Soviet operational planning cannot be readily fulfilled by any other existing ground forces weapon system. Large-caliber multiple-rocket launchers and cannons might be able to assume certain close-in nuclear fire support missions, but their restricted range of less than 40 kilometers would limit such a substitution scheme. One obvious candidate to compensate for the loss of offensive ballistic missiles would be short-range ground-launched cruise missiles; and, it is believed the Soviets would place more emphasis on cruise missile development responding to that pressure.

Elimination of SRBMs would increase considerably the operational responsibility of the already strained Soviet air forces. A larger portion of the air forces would have to be withheld in readiness for nuclear operations. The air forces would have to assume the entire burden of conventional strikes beyond the range of cannons, multiple-rocket launchers, and attack helicopters.

Although the elimination of US and NATO offensive ballistic missiles would relieve the air forces of many high priority targets, this probably would be offset by the requirement to attack heavily defended targets currently assigned to SRBMs. In response to expanded operational requirements, the Soviets could increase

the overall size of the force by keeping older aircraft in the inventory longer and by increasing the production of newer aircraft.

Associated Targets. The principal change in the Soviet target base resulting from the proposed agreement would be a reduced number of hard targets such as silo-based ICBMs. The ban on mobile ICBMs, together with the elimination of some ICBM support elements and short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, could effect the size of the relocatable target set. However, mobile/relocatable forces/elements will continue to constitute an important part of the target base. The ability to locate and attack them will remain an important element of deterrence. The reduction in number of ballistic-missile-associated targets will be offset to some extent by projected growth in air defenses. The target sets for leadership and for the industrial/economic sector will not be affected by the agreement. In particular, the United States will face at least dozens of deep underground facilities in which key wartime leaders can relocate in time of crisis.

### III. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY TO 1996 AND BEYOND

It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the national security strategy of the United States will remain essentially as outlined in NSDD-238 (Basic National Security Strategy). The success of this strategy depends today, as well as in 1996 and beyond, on the maintenance of a strong nuclear and conventional deterrent, dynamic alliances, forward-deployed forces, and the ability to project military power abroad in defense of US interests. Our most fundamental national security objective will continue to be deterrence of direct attack, and particularly nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies, and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail. Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, although smaller than today and of a different composition, would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring US and allied security. While eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, the United States will not abandon the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence. In keeping with the precepts of NSDD-238, our goal should be to reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation; by strengthening conventional air, land, and naval forces; by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements; and by pursuing technologies for strategic defense.

To support these objectives in the face of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, it will continue to be in our best interest to defend the

United States as far from North America as possible. Thus, United States must, in coalition with its allies, continue to maintain in peacetime major forward deployments for land, naval, and air forces in Europe, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, as well as other areas in the Western Hemisphere. Where these forces can deter Soviet aggression, the deterrent value of US strategic nuclear forces is optimized.

United States Forces. As long as both sides possess nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a nuclear balance with the Soviet Union to deter Soviet escalation to nuclear conflict to achieve their war aims. However, nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a low-cost alternative to conventional forces. US forces must continue to be forward deployed and capable of rapid deployment to deter wider crises or conflicts, and capable of expanding the scope and intensity of conflict as appropriate should deterrence fail.

General-purpose forces support US national security policy in peacetime by deterring aggression; by demonstrating US interests, concern, and commitment; by assisting the forces of other friendly nations; and by providing a basis to move rapidly from peace to war. In wartime, these conventional forces would be employed to achieve US political objectives and to secure early war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies, preferably without the use of nuclear weapons.

Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur, the United States must be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets or any other adversary would be denied their political and military objectives. To do this, our nuclear forces (both strategic and theater), in conjunction with general-purpose forces, must have the capability to hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies. We must also improve our chemical weapons to deter chemical attack. To preserve a credible conventional deterrent, we must attain an appropriate level of combat readiness and sustainability and a robust logistics infrastructure. To support the US strategy of forward deployment and rapid reinforcement, using CONUS-based active and reserve formations, we must attain adequate airlift, sealift, and tanker support to transport and sustain forces abroad.


This strategy also recognizes that we must build and modernize forces sufficient to retain maritime superiority. For general-purpose forces, modernization should exploit opportunities created by the application of high-leverage advanced technologies.

Maintenance of Deterrence. Ultimately, deterrence is based on Soviet perceptions. The Soviets have likely been

deterred in the past because they apparently perceived risks, in excess of any potential gains, to initiating conflict with the West. Today's offensive ballistic missile capability provides the means of nearly instantaneous retaliation against Soviet forces, a capability that may be diminished with forces that do not include offensive ballistic missiles. We must ensure that our reconfigured forces continue to provide a high-confidence capability to retaliate against Warsaw Pact aggression and assure denial of their objectives at all levels of conflict. This certainty in our ability to retaliate at any level of conflict is a key element of deterrence. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes so uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.

Arms Control Negotiations. The United States participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on arms control to protect US and allied security interests, build global stability, and promote favorable international relationships. These negotiations are an integral part of the US national security strategy. As we plan for a world free of offensive ballistic missiles, we may find that additional arms control initiatives are needed. One requirement, for example, will be to determine whether limits on sea-launched cruise missiles would be of military benefit to the United States and, if so, what form such limits would take. Another requirement is to develop a phased drawdown to zero ballistic missiles that maintains military sufficiency throughout the 10-year reductions period. Whatever the case, equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements and related negotiations can contribute to security at reduced force levels. Arms control cannot, however, substitute for necessary force modernization; both efforts are mutually reinforcing elements of US national security and contribute significantly to the enhancement of stability and deterrence.

Assumptions. In developing the policy and strategy guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made several assumptions. In addition to the baseline factors regarding forces and strategy provided in NSDD-250, we assumed that



Prior to 1996, the United States will have begun to deploy a more effective air defense system which is capable against bombers and cruise missiles. After 1996, the United States



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will deploy an effective advanced strategic defense system to protect against possible Soviet cheating and Third World nuclear coercion.

Change in US Operational Capabilities. The elimination of ballistic missiles would significantly alter the military environment. At a minimum, the United States (like the Soviet Union) would lose the unique capabilities of ballistic missiles, in particular their promptness and the high alert rates provided by ICBMs. But the impact of the changes in operational capabilities on strategy and force composition will not be identical, owing to political, economic, technological, and geographic asymmetries.

[REDACTED]

The reduction of the prompt threat from the Soviet Union would largely offset the loss of ballistic missile capabilities. Nevertheless, certain critical roles and missions which currently take advantage of their unique capabilities will have to be reallocated. Currently, ICBMs and SLBMs contribute to bomber effectiveness by suppressing defenses that the bombers would have to overfly as they penetrate enemy airspace. Without ballistic missiles, other means (tactics, technology, and weapons) would have to be developed to avoid or suppress air defenses.

Ballistic missiles have also allowed the United States to plan discrete escalation control options. Escalation control options are intended to convey a political message of strong US resolve while limiting the nature and scope of the conflict to enhance the probability of early war termination. In the absence of ballistic missiles, such options may be more difficult to plan;

[REDACTED]

(It should be noted, of course, that the Soviets would suffer a similar loss of capability.) Compensation must be made to perform these missions.

Employment Policy. Employment flexibility to control escalation and to allow appropriate responses to any level of aggression will remain a significant objective. Escalation control requires enhanced capabilities for force

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projection, successful conventional defense, and a favorable altering of the military balance should nuclear deterrence fail. These enhanced capabilities must be developed in close coordination with the contemplated reductions in ballistic missiles. We must leave the Soviet planner uncertain as to US response to warning of a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack, but certain of our intent to retaliate effectively. In addition, the United States must continue to limit nonobjective collateral damage, consistent with effective accomplishment of US defense, retaliatory, and escalation control objectives.

The United States must emphasize improvements for assured strategic warning, effective retaliation, force endurance, and basing survivability. In addition, it is essential that US nuclear forces continue to consist of a multiplicity of systems with different weapons carriers and capabilities (e.g., bombers, ALCMs, and SLCMs deployed on a variety of naval platforms). Multiple and mutually complementary US components require the Soviets to solve a number of varying technological and tactical problems in their efforts to overcome them. In turn, the Soviets would be forced to make choices which would reduce effectiveness against one component in order to attack another. Diversity also prevents the Soviets from concentrating on the solution to any single problem. Day-to-day alert levels for these forces should be maintained at the highest achievable standards commensurate with operational and fiscal considerations. The effectiveness of US retaliatory attack and the survivability of reserve forces in the unlikely event of a Soviet surprise attack must be preserved.

Pre-planned nuclear attack options and sub-options incorporating the capability to withhold from execution (1) national-level political and military leadership, (2) the Soviet industrial and economic base, and (3) countries, are still appropriate but obviously the new circumstances will require new thinking on this subject. There will be a persisting need for large, planned, strategic nuclear attacks against the Soviet leadership, nuclear forces, conventional forces, and the economic-industrial base.

However, the guidance provided in NSDD-13 which assigns the general priority that should be used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. Regardless of priorities, the nuclear weapon allocation process should be guided by the need for a weighted, balanced effort among the relative priorities assigned.

The requirement to develop ad hoc nuclear options, in addition to pre-planned options, will remain. In the context of the elimination of all Soviet ballistic missiles, the majority of which are in fixed locations, it will be important for US strategic forces to have the capability to hold at risk key mobile and relocatable assets of the Soviet Union. As directed in NSDD-178, the United States is developing programs to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with US strategic forces. Depending on their location, some of these targets (e.g., Soviet ground forces approaching the front) may be more appropriately held at risk by theater-based conventional and nuclear systems.

In the absence of new SLCM technology, SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons release range.


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Control of Atlantic and Pacific open-ocean maritime areas is also critical due to the logistical requirements of supporting our allies and obtaining raw materials for US industrial mobilization.


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Defense Policy. Defensive systems will become an integral part of weapon employment policy. Therefore, defensive systems, as well as supporting C<sup>3</sup>I systems, must be configured to ensure the requisite flexibility, endurance, and effectiveness to provide the NCA with the sustained capability of employing weapons in a controlled manner throughout a conflict. Effective defensive systems could provide a significant increase in our capability to deny the Soviet war aim of neutralizing the United States, thereby strengthening deterrence and stability. Although difficult

to quantify, the introduction of such defensive systems will have an impact on US offensive employment policy and on weapon system requirements. The interrelationships between offensive and defensive systems is complex and must be kept under continuous review. Careful integration of these capabilities would provide the best means to meet US objectives and deny Soviet objectives. An effective strategic ballistic missile defense will be required to hedge against Soviet cheating and to protect the United States and its allies from potential third-country nuclear ballistic threats.



Integration. There are always uncertainties associated with major shifts in force composition. The United States should seek to minimize these risks by effective integration of all military capabilities to make certain that its ability to deny the Soviet Union a military victory at any level of conflict remains intact. An effective warfighting capability, employing defensive systems to blunt an enemy attack, coordinated conventional and nuclear theater attacks to control escalation, and global strategic strikes to place the enemy's homeland at risk, should deter an aggressor and place the United States and its allies in the best possible position to prevail should deterrence fail.



NATO Strategy. NATO's strategy, as embodied in MC 14/3, is essentially one of deterrence and defense, and depends in large measure on the "NATO TRIAD" of conventional forces, nonstrategic nuclear forces, and strategic forces. While the reductions in strategic systems and the elimination of all offensive ballistic and European LRINF missiles will affect the manner in which the US contribution to the "NATO TRIAD" is fulfilled, the essential goal of denying Soviet war aims must remain as an essential part of the US strategy of forward-deployed dual-capable forces.

Other Regional Strategies. While current US strategy for combating conflict in other parts of the world does not preclude planning for the use of nuclear weapons, even in conflicts not involving the Soviet Union, the impact of the loss of LRINF and other ballistic missiles, both nuclear and conventional, is seen to be far less dramatic than in NATO. However, enhancements in nuclear and conventional force strength and mobility may be required to forestall escalation of regional conflicts and prevent the use of the nuclear option in defense of regional alliances. Thus, regional strategies in areas outside of NATO rely on a flexible strategy that requires effective conventional forces for deterrence and defense.

Transition Period. The transition from the current force posture to one without offensive ballistic missiles must be managed carefully so that there is no real or perceived loss in our ability to deter aggression and deny the Soviets their war aims in the interim period. Integrated planning should begin early so that strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and general purpose forces, and defensive systems will be an effective package when the transition is complete. Additionally, the transition period should:

- Provide for annual evaluation of the new components of US force posture, in particular defensive systems and cruise missiles, and the potential for technological breakthroughs that might shift the balance.
- Monitor carefully Soviet compliance with the phased drawdown of ballistic missiles. Provide/design a hedge in the event verification shows cheating.
- Provide for politico-military coordination with US allies, including an evaluation of the impact of the elimination of long-range intermediate nuclear forces before the transition period begins.

- Monitor and evaluate third-country nuclear capability trends.
- Monitor and evaluate the conventional force levels in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- Consider a stepped, phased approach to changes in US force structure which considers the elements of stability, deterrent value, risk, and time so that older, proven systems are not eliminated until the feasibility of their replacements can be demonstrated.

#### IV. Analytical Methodology

The analysis will be conducted to provide decisionmakers the information necessary to evaluate the military levels of risk associated with implementing the plan. The capability of strategic offensive and defensive, nonstrategic nuclear, and conventional forces to carry out their roles in a continued strategy of deterrence will be addressed. It is clearly recognized that the assumptions concerning arms reduction levels, weapons-counting rules, allied reactions, time tables, and fiscal constraints during the reduction period are especially relevant to the analysis. Therefore, following analysis of a baseline plan, analyses of whatever excursions are deemed most pertinent will be accomplished.

In all cases, the best available military experience and judgment, along with mathematical modeling, will form the basis of the analysis. The goal will be to develop a plan, within the arms control and fiscal constraints prescribed in NSDD-250, which results in a force mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities that maximizes force effectiveness and minimizes risk. The study will also evaluate existing and potential arms control initiatives and will recommend those which would contribute to achievement of the overall goal.

Strategic Forces. It is recognized that US strategic offensive capability and defensive capability are inextricably related. For analytical purposes, however, strategic offensive nuclear force effectiveness will be evaluated using static measure comparisons (e.g., numbers of weapons, weapons-to-target ratios, etc.) and two-sided dynamic force exchanges. All measures will use results of US POM/EPA versus NIE 11-3/8-86 Soviet expanded low-force comparisons and exchanges as the base case. To comply with instructions to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, using today's levels as the departure point, the

[REDACTED]

conducted to examine the impact of policy and strategy changes as well as force structure and capability changes needed to correct shortfalls identified during the initial phases of the analysis. Likewise, if the 10-year time period proves unduly taxing, other time periods will be examined in the excursions.

The baseline analysis of offensive strategic systems will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies that follow:

- Force exchanges will be conducted in accordance with current national policy stated in NSDD-13.

- [REDACTED]
- Notional capabilities will be used as provided by the Services for the analyses of highly compartmentalized programs to protect the programs' security.
  - The overall defensive effectiveness will be analyzed parametrically by degrading probability to penetrate the defensive forces of each country.

- A year-by-year (1987-1996) dynamic force-exchange analysis will be accomplished with several excursions and force mixtures to examine the damage expectancies achieved by fully generated and day-to-day alert forces.
- Other factors to be examined are the incentives for a Soviet day-to-day precursor sea-launched cruise missile attack and a day-to-day hidden intercontinental ballistic missile attack scenario (e.g., SS-24s and SS-25s).

Strategic defense force effectiveness will be evaluated parametrically, using best high and low effectiveness estimates against projected Soviet offensive forces. These estimates will bound the contribution of defenses in the baseline two-sided dynamic force-exchange modeling. The effectiveness estimates, themselves, will be based on a combination of Service and SDIO projections of the technology availability, achievable defensive force structure improvements, and threat-driven requirements.


Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF). POM-EPA and treaty constrained force levels will be developed through 1996 based on current projections. The capability of these forces will be evaluated through force-on-force computer model analyses. Target bases will be adjusted to reflect both reduced ballistic-missile-associated targets and changes to US and Soviet Union warfighting strategies. The results will then be used to identify SACEUR NSNF requirements. Cost-benefit analysis will then be used to determine the most effective NSNF mix in a constrained budget environment.

The baseline analysis will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies listed below. Because it was deemed unwise to base a plan on any allied capability that might logically disappear as a result of a bilateral agreement to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, all assumptions are based on that premise.

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union commit to a yearly net capability drawdown rate. A linear drawdown rate will be used as a point of departure.



- Soviet nuclear warheads for all NSWP nuclear capable ballistic missile weapon systems are considered for analysis until 1996.



- For longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, it is assumed a separate LRINF treaty is in effect with the provision that LRINF missiles draw down to a 100-weapon limit by 1991. These weapons are restricted to the United States and Soviet Asia for the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. LRINF offensive ballistic missiles will be drawn to zero by 1996.
- For the shorter range INF (SRINF) missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union are limited to a level of approximately 130 weapons. The United States is allowed to convert PERSHING II to PERSHING 1b missiles, but must reduce them to zero by 1996. The Soviets must reduce SS-12/22 (SCALEBOARD) and SS-23 missiles to zero by 1996. Ground-launched cruise missiles with less than 925 km range could be deployed up to a limit of 130 SRINF weapons.
- Conventional and short-range nuclear forces (SNF) offensive ballistic missiles must also be drawn to zero by 1996. The US Lance, Follow-On-Lance, and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Soviet SS-1 (SCUD), SS-21, and FROG, are all affected in the baseline case.
- The United States will continue to commit some nuclear-capable forces to the CINCs.

Conventional Forces. Conventional force requirements and effectiveness will be evaluated in a joint, integrated context. As NSDD-250 directs, the goal will be to provide a net assessment of all considerations involved. Conventional capability will be evaluated in specific theaters as analytical capability allows. For example, as a minimum,

conventional offensive and defensive capabilities and the requirements for modernization will be assessed relative to the Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact, and relative to the evolving threat in Southwest Asia. Other areas of the world (e.g. Latin America, Africa, SEA, and NEA) cannot be overlooked. In addition to drawing on force-on-force analysis as available, static-measure comparisons (e.g., numbers of weapons, manpower ratios, etc.) will also be evaluated as appropriate. Finally, subjective evaluation, based on expert military judgment, will be an essential element of the conventional analysis.

#### V. Compartmented Programs

To maintain the security of highly compartmented programs, each Service will provide notional capabilities and costs for weapon systems which should be incorporated into the plan. Each Service will be responsible for determining which compartmented programs under its supervision should be included. Actual weapon system capabilities and costs will be detailed in a compartmented annex, where the impact of the actual data upon the noncompartmented version of the plan will be summarized. One individual from the Joint Staff will require administrative clearance into the compartmented programs to consolidate Service inputs into a single annex.

#### VI. Submittal Date

A baseline plan which continues the strategic policy and targeting priorities of NSDD-13 and holds overall levels of risk generally constant--using today's risk levels as a departure point--will be submitted for Presidential review 31 January 1987. Excursions and alternative solutions, as appropriate, will be submitted subsequently.

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SYSTEM II  
90821

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

December 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: LINTON BROOKS/BOB <sup>LB</sup> LINHARD

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles

We have reviewed the initial JCS report on eliminating ballistic missiles (Tab B). The report primarily covers the assumptions and methodology JCS will use and establishes a January 31 date for submission for the final product. We believe January 31 to be realistic and acceptable.

The report raises three issues requiring your conscious addressal, two of which we believe should result in additional guidance. The issues are:

- The JCS have used the approved FYDP as a guide to future budgets. The Chiefs note, correctly, that although this reflects the fiscal guidance of NSDD-250, it is extremely optimistic to believe such levels will survive the scrutiny of the budget process. The Chiefs believe that using these unrealistically high TOAs will significantly bias the analysis toward favorable results. While the Chiefs are almost certainly correct, we recommend no action be taken on this point. We should not, acting in the President's name, provide formal sanction to a view that the President's out year fiscal predictions are unrealistic. While fiscal considerations may bias the analysis in a favorable direction, that will only serve to counteract the unfavorable bias introduced by the preconceptions of many of the working level analysts that eliminating ballistic missiles is "too hard."
  
- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of the guidance in NSDD-250 not to increase risks to the United States. They have chosen to define this guidance as requiring the same quantitative damage be inflicted on the Soviet Union by our strategic offensive forces in the future as can be inflicted under SIOP 6C. Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit. Such numerical measures are important aides to judgment, but must not be allowed to replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to insure that the analysis does not overlook the great improvements in deterrence which will be achieved by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they can conduct a successful attack.

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M554 # 36557

BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/16

-- The preliminary JCS report indicates a heavy dependence on sea-launched cruise missiles to replace some of the capability lost through the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. This is entirely appropriate. Given this, it will be important for the final JCS report to include considerations of what arms control restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles are acceptable and may be in our net interest (considering the benefit of denying comparable capability to the Soviets) as part of the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; it will be important to understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

In view of both the intrinsic importance of the subject and the political importance of the President being seen as interested in the JCS recommendations, we believe a short synopsis of the initial report should be provided to the President. Tab I has been drafted for this purpose. Sending this to the President will also help prepare him for his December 19 meeting with the JCS, where we understand this report will be discussed. After that meeting we believe it would be appropriate for you to send a memorandum to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense making the points on SLCM and military judgment noted above. A suggested memorandum for this purpose is at Tab II; the memorandum to the President at Tab I seeks his approval for this course of action.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the initial JCS input and a synopsis thereof to the President for his review.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That after Presidential review, and unless the December 19 reveals any reason to reconsider, you sign the memorandum at Tab II approving the JCS approach but noting the importance of military judgment (as opposed to pure operations analysis) and of dealing with arms control aspects of the SLCM problem.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
  - Tab A Key Points from Report
  - Tab B Initial JCS Report
  - Tab II Memorandum to CJCS/Secretary of Defense
- Bill Cocke <sup>hc</sup>, John Douglass and Mike <sup>cut for</sup> ~~W~~ley concur.

TAB I

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36558

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SYSTEM II  
90821

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALTON G. KEEL

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles

Issue

To respond to the initial input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts

In NSDD-250 you tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan which would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballastic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets prove willing to join us in such an agreement. The initial JCS report has been received; a final report will be provided by January 31, 1987. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the subject at their planned December 19 meeting with you.

Discussion

The initial JCS report (Tab B) covers the assumptions and methodology to be used in the final report. The initial report makes no recommendations. A synopsis of the key points raised by the JCS is at Tab A.

Generally the JCS report is a sound approach to a complex issue. There are, however, two areas of possible concern:

- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of your guidance in NSDD-250 not to increase risks to the United States. They have chosen to define this guidance as requiring the same quantitative damage be inflicted on the Soviet Union by our strategic offensive forces in the future as can be inflicted today. Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit. While such numerical measures are important aides to judgment, they must not replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to insure that the analysis does not overlook

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Declassify on: OADR

NLRR M554 # 36558

BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/10

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the great improvements in deterrence which will be achieved by increasing Soviet uncertainty that they can conduct a successful attack.

- The preliminary JCS report indicates a heavy dependence on sea-launched cruise missiles to replace some of the capability lost through the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. This is entirely appropriate. Given this, it will be important for the final JCS report to consider what arms control restrictions on sea-launched cruise missiles are acceptable as part of the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles. We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; we must understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

Once you have reviewed the synopsis at Tab A and heard the JCS discussion on December 19, I will, in your name, provide a respond to the JCS initial report, making the two points above.

Recommendation

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That you review the synopsis at Tab A and skim the report at Tab B.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That after you meet with the JCS, you authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the two comments noted above.

Attachments

Tab A      Key Points from Report

Tab B      Initial JCS Report

Copy to: Vice President  
Mr. Regan

TAB A



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36559

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13526  
E.O. 12958  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(5)(6)(g)

SYNOPSIS OF JCS INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT

Basic Planning Assumptions. The basic purpose of the study is to determine those U.S. military forces which will permit a safe transition to a world without U.S. or Soviet ballistic missiles. The study makes the following general assumptions:

- U.S. arms control proposals presently on the table are accepted.
- The currently projected real growth in DOD spending actually occurs. The JCS note that this is overly optimistic and will bias the study toward favorable results.
- Soviet war aims remain unchanged. To meet their strategic nuclear war aims the Soviets will retain ICBMs as long as possible. In addition, by 1996 the Soviets could have 450-500 bombers, up to 1750 sea-launched cruise missiles, and improved air defense.
- Soviet military strategy (which views domination of the Eurasian land mass as central) will not change. Eliminating ballistic missiles will stress Soviet air forces; there is no easy substitute for Soviet short range ballistic missiles.

X

-- [REDACTED]

United States National Strategy to 1996 and Beyond. The study assumes the U.S. National Security Strategy will remain as set forth in NSDD-238. The initial report summarizes and restates the importance of deterrence and the need to maintain strong military forces. It makes the following assumptions and observations:

-- [REDACTED]

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M554 #36559  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/16

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-- The need to employ sea-launched cruise missiles near the USSR could alter naval strategy.

-- Effective defensive systems will be essential and must themselves be defended.

--

-- The period of transition to a ballistic missile-free world will require especial care.

Analytical Methodology. The analysis will use military judgement along with mathematical modeling. To comply with instructions in NSDD-250 to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, the

Completion. A baseline analysis will be submitted on 31 January. This will continue the current targeting policy set forth in NSDD-13 and will hold overall risk levels constant. Excursions and alternatives will be submitted subsequently if required.

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JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD-250 RE ICBMS (1)

*FOIA*

F00-115

LETTOW

*Box Number*

91729

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
36560	OUTLINE  STRATEGIC FORCES (SAME AS 25485)	2	ND	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD-250 RE ICBMS (1)

*FOIA*

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36562	OUTLINE NON-STRATEGIC FORCES (SAME AS 25486)	1	ND	B1

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TAB B

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
36563	MEMO  WEINBERGER TO THE PRESIDENT (SAME AS 25487)	1	12/5/1986	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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13526  
E. O. ~~12958~~  
As Amended  
Sec. 3.3 b(5)(c)

APPENDIX A  
INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT (U)

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR M554 # 36564  
BY RW NARA DATE 1/20/16

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NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

## I. Introduction

This initial progress report is required by NSDD-250 as part of the process of developing a plan which would permit the United States to safely transition to the arms reductions proposed in 1991 and from there to the elimination of all offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. It addresses the following:

- A description of the initial basic planning assumptions that will be made concerning friendly forces available during the period in question, corresponding hostile forces, critical missions to be accomplished, and the general number and characteristics of the targets associated with these missions.
- Initial recommendations, if any, with respect to national policy guidance and strategy for the employment of nuclear and nonnuclear forces that should be considered in the development of such a plan.
- An explanation of the analytic methodology planned for evaluating risk and force effectiveness in support of the development of the plan, recognizing that military expertise and judgment will play a critically important role in accomplishing the overall task.
- A method for appropriately folding into this planning process the contribution of highly compartmented programs while maintaining their security.
- An estimate, submitted for Presidential approval, of the date upon which this plan will be available for final Presidential review.

The report is divided into six sections. After the introduction, the remaining five sections correspond to the five areas listed above.

## II. Basic Planning Assumptions

Many of the basic planning assumptions to be used to develop the plan are specified in NSDD-250 and, therefore, are not reiterated in this report. Assumptions as to strategy and policy are explained in section III and those relating to analytic methodology in section IV. Assumptions as to



hostile forces were made on the basis of possible (and judgments of likely) Soviet reaction to projected friendly force modernization and mission changes that may take place in a zero offensive ballistic missile environment. For purposes of the baseline analysis, the study will assume an arms control outcome based upon US proposals currently on the table. Assumptions as to forces available, both friendly and hostile, and their critical missions and associated target base, are discussed below.

Friendly Forces Available. Since the major purpose of the plan is to propose the programmatic and nonprogrammatic changes to US forces that would be required if an agreement was negotiated to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, it would be premature to state what US forces should be available until after the appropriate analysis has been accomplished. It is important to note, however, that NSDD-250 does place restrictions upon the resources available to develop US forces, limiting them not to exceed current planning levels, with a rate of growth thereafter not to exceed 3 percent in real terms.

This restriction has been interpreted to mean the 1987 appropriation level followed by the Budget Estimate Submission (BES) FYDP for 1988 to 1992. The inflation factors for FY 1988-1992 are 3.52, 3.34, 3.0, 2.8, and 2.8. Real growth projected through the FYDP reflects DOD (less DOE) budget requirements of the following: FY 1988, 10.3; FY 1989, 2.4; FY 1990, 5.5; FY 1991, 2.5; FY 1992, 3.6. For the period of FY 1993-1996, a 3 percent real growth and a 2.88 percent inflation factor are used. It is important to note that although the resulting TOA reflects current fiscal guidance contained in NSDD-250, it is extremely optimistic to believe that these levels will survive the scrutiny of the budget process. Use of these unrealistically high TOAs will significantly bias the analysis towards favorable results:

FY	87	88	89	90	91
BASE	281.3	322.5	341.2	370.9	391.0
FY	92	93	94	95	96
BASE	416.4	441.0	467.6	495.5	525.0

This study assumes that the potential agreement is bilateral, and therefore does not formally affect US and Soviet allies. Moreover, while not prejudging issues of negotiability, this study assumes that offensive ballistic missiles of both non-US NATO and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces would not play a part in the baseline analysis after 1996.

Overall, with a zero offensive ballistic missile pact, it is expected that the serious military deficiencies identified in NATO's Conventional Defense Improvement program are not likely to be remedied in full, and the disparity between

NATO and Warsaw Pact conventional forces will remain through 1996.

The allies will have to address more realistically the Warsaw Pact's distinct advantage in nuclear, biological, chemical, and conventional warfare capabilities. Considerable resources may have to be expended on the acquisition of protective equipment. NATO would be forced to

Alliance accord is highly improbable on this controversial issue. Alliance members may have to continue increasing war reserve stockpiles, at great expense, to ensure sustainability. The Alliance's lack of an adequate surge capability for rapid increases in the production of essential equipment will remain a critical shortcoming.

Hostile Forces. Although it is difficult to prioritize Soviet war aims or objectives in absolute terms, the primary Soviet war aim will continue to be victory. The Soviets would strive:

- To ensure survival and continuity of control by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union over the Party organization, the Soviet government, and the military establishment.
- Through that control, to ensure continuity in performance of the functions and activities necessary to win the war by the Party-Government apparatus, the military establishment, and economy.
- To defeat and occupy European NATO countries, using their surviving economic assets to assist Soviet recovery.
- To neutralize the United States (and the PRC under certain scenarios) as a politico-military competitor through destruction of its warfighting capabilities and war-supporting infrastructure.
- To minimize damage to the leadership, military establishment, economy, and population of the Soviet Union from enemy attacks.
- To dominate the post-war world, which is expected to adopt eventually some form of Soviet socialism or at least to submit to Soviet domination.

The Soviets view the capability to preempt enemy use of nuclear weapons as the highest goal. The means for accomplishing this would be greatly affected by a zero offensive ballistic missile force.

The time required to employ bombers may seriously hinder Soviet capability to preempt (and certainty of preempting) a US strategic strike. Force reposturing (such as placing SLCMs off the US shores) may solve part of the Soviet problem, but may not achieve their damage limitation requirements or provide timely enough response or reliable C3 connectivity with the level of certainty now specified in Soviet war plans.

Soviet forces in transition to (and under) a zero offensive ballistic missile regime will be governed by their overarching war aims that likely would remain unchanged, but bounded by the counting rules and the interim agreements of the proposed agreement. To that end, the Soviets will most likely attempt to retain the maximum hard target kill capability represented by ICBMs as long as possible. Through 1991, they probably will retain the maximum ICBM force possible, governed by the counting rules and the interim limits and sublimits, and consistent with production pace required to position a strong intercontinental bomber capability by 1996.

SLCM deployment in a zero ballistic missile environment could be approximately 1,750 missiles by 1996. Reaching this level would require devotion of substantial shipyard resources to SSBN conversion and construction of new SSCNs, and adaption of some existing SSNs as deployment platforms. The Soviets probably will dismantle/convert SSBNs at a steady pace (somewhere below maximum rate) over the entire period, retaining TYPHOON and DELTA-III/IV boats as SSBNs as long as possible. A good number of these will eventually be converted to SLCM platforms. The Soviets could maintain a continual deployment of upwards of 200 SLCMs off the US coasts by the early 1990s. At least one new SLCM submarine production line could be initiated. SLCMs could also be put on several classes of existing SSNs and surface ships. The Soviets will likely develop a long-range cruise missile to put on some of these platforms. Whether this can be in place by 1996 is an open question. However, the Soviets would regard such a forward-deployed force as vulnerable and not a first-strike force.

SLCM assets would likely be employed in three ways. First, a sizable number would probably be continually deployed off US coasts and targeted against CONUS. Second, many units would be deployed in contiguous waters against theater targets in Eurasia. Finally, some assets would probably be kept in strategic reserve, for use in protracted nuclear war, with some deployed in bastion areas and/or under the ice.

Although the elimination of SLBMs would reduce the Soviet need for strategic submarine bastions, the Soviet requirement for echeloned defense in depth at sea would increase to counter heightened enemy SLCM/ALCM threats. Thus, many general-purpose naval forces,

released from defense of SSBNs, could shift to anti-SLCM/ALCM roles in expanded sea control, sea denial areas, and full open ocean deployment. Since current and near-term SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons range, the Soviet strategic ASW problem would contract from forward areas to primarily the Norwegian Sea and northwest Pacific. It is expected the Soviets will deploy SLCM-equipped units for theater use as an additional means to provide a deep-strike capability, particularly in light of losing SRBMs.

In a zero offensive ballistic missile environment, the Soviet intercontinental bomber force could be expanded to about 450-500 bombers by 1996. Ultimately, the Soviets could deploy up to 750 bombers, depending on the extent to which the Soviets take advantage of the counting rules that leave most bombs non-accountable. If they take full advantage of the counting rules, the Soviets could field about 7,400 actual bomber weapons even though they ostensibly would deploy only 6,000 accountable weapons.

The intelligence community believes the Soviets expect war to begin following a period of increased tension and crisis, during which time the Soviets generate their armed forces. Also, the Soviets apparently believe that a major nuclear conflict, if it occurs, would be most likely to arise out of a conventional conflict. Further, the Soviets see little likelihood that the US or NATO would launch a surprise or sudden attack from a normal peacetime footing without providing warning. As a result, it is not expected that the Soviets will adopt a large-scale day-to-day strip alert posture for their intercontinental bomber force. However, it would make sense for the Soviets to expand their peacetime patrols from the BEAR-H force, but this would still be limited to only a few aircraft at a time. The Soviets could modify their current practices to enable them to quickly generate their bomber force. This would be a quick response force as opposed to an actual strip alert posture.

The Soviets will place increased emphasis on air defenses, depending on their judgment of US force capabilities and their calculation of optimum offense/defense force ratios. Likely steps they would take include optimizing some current over-the-horizon (OTH) radars for aircraft detection and building additional OTH radars, specifically designed for aircraft detection, to cover anticipated approach routes; extending atmospheric defenses farther beyond the Soviet periphery with AWACS and advanced lookout-shutdown fighters; and deploying long-range SAMs, long-range interceptors, and shipboard SAMs. The Soviets would put more emphasis on their air forces--and probably develop short-range ground-launched cruise missiles--to perform the operational role

now assigned to short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs). It will be difficult to predict the timeframe for accomplishing the complete package. It will probably be achieved in a gradual and rational fashion, no matter how long it takes, rather than an uneconomical and accelerated pace within 10 years.

The military strategy of the Soviet Union is driven by its national strategy. In the Soviet view, dominance of the geostrategic Eurasian landmass is of primary importance. The Soviet Union seeks to be the prime arbiter on the Eurasian continent by reducing the ability of the United States to be a decisive military factor. Altering the composition of the nuclear balance will not change the basic Eurasian-oriented strategy of the Soviet Union. Theater forces are a fundamental element of Soviet strategy and the requirements for these forces derive from this fundamental geostrategic approach.

It is not anticipated that the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles will cause a radical departure in Soviet ground force equipment modernization or force structure trends. The Soviet strategy for employing those forces and the traditionally large role played by ground forces in combined arms operations is expected to remain largely unchanged. To the extent the Soviets believe NATO will react to an offensive-ballistic-missile-free environment by increasing tactical air forces, they will undertake a program to increase the number and technical capabilities of their already well developed air defense assets.

The role currently played by SRBMs in the Soviet operational planning cannot be readily fulfilled by any other existing ground forces weapon system. Large-caliber multiple-rocket launchers and cannons might be able to assume certain close-in nuclear fire support missions, but their restricted range of less than 40 kilometers would limit such a substitution scheme. One obvious candidate to compensate for the loss of offensive ballistic missiles would be short-range ground-launched cruise missiles; and, it is believed the Soviets would place more emphasis on cruise missile development responding to that pressure.

Elimination of SRBMs would increase considerably the operational responsibility of the already strained Soviet air forces. A larger portion of the air forces would have to be withheld in readiness for nuclear operations. The air forces would have to assume the entire burden of conventional strikes beyond the range of cannons, multiple-rocket launchers, and attack helicopters.

Although the elimination of US and NATO offensive ballistic missiles would relieve the air forces of many high priority targets, this probably would be offset by the requirement to attack heavily defended targets currently assigned to SRBMs. In response to expanded operational requirements, the Soviets could increase

the overall size of the force by keeping older aircraft in the inventory longer and by increasing the production of newer aircraft.

Associated Targets. The principal change in the Soviet target base resulting from the proposed agreement would be a reduced number of hard targets such as silo-based ICBMs. The ban on mobile ICBMs, together with the elimination of some ICBM support elements and short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, could effect the size of the relocatable target set. However, mobile/relocatable forces/elements will continue to constitute an important part of the target base. The ability to locate and attack them will remain an important element of deterrence. The reduction in number of ballistic-missile-associated targets will be offset to some extent by projected growth in air defenses. The target sets for leadership and for the industrial/economic sector will not be affected by the agreement. In particular, the United States will face at least dozens of deep underground facilities in which key wartime leaders can relocate in time of crisis.

### III. NATIONAL STRATEGY AND POLICY TO 1996 AND BEYOND

It is the judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the national security strategy of the United States will remain essentially as outlined in NSDD-238 (Basic National Security Strategy). The success of this strategy depends today, as well as in 1996 and beyond, on the maintenance of a strong nuclear and conventional deterrent, dynamic alliances, forward-deployed forces, and the ability to project military power abroad in defense of US interests. Our most fundamental national security objective will continue to be deterrence of direct attack, and particularly nuclear attack, on the United States and its allies, and to defeat such attack should deterrence fail. Strategic nuclear retaliatory forces, although smaller than today and of a different composition, would remain and would retain their essential role in ensuring US and allied security. While eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, the United States will not abandon the concept of strategic nuclear deterrence. In keeping with the precepts of NSDD-238, our goal should be to reduce over the long term our reliance on nuclear weapons and nuclear retaliation; by strengthening conventional air, land, and naval forces; by pursuing equitable and verifiable arms control agreements; and by pursuing technologies for strategic defense.

To support these objectives in the face of the Soviet/Warsaw Pact threat, it will continue to be in our best interest to defend the

United States as far from North America as possible. Thus, United States must, in coalition with its allies, continue to maintain in peacetime major forward deployments for land, naval, and air forces in Europe, the Pacific, the Indian Ocean, as well as other areas in the Western Hemisphere. Where these forces can deter Soviet aggression, the deterrent value of US strategic nuclear forces is optimized.

United States Forces. As long as both sides possess nuclear weapons, the United States must maintain a nuclear balance with the Soviet Union to deter Soviet escalation to nuclear conflict to achieve their war aims. However, nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a low-cost alternative to conventional forces. US forces must continue to be forward deployed and capable of rapid deployment to deter wider crises or conflicts, and capable of expanding the scope and intensity of conflict as appropriate should deterrence fail.

General-purpose forces support US national security policy in peacetime by deterring aggression; by demonstrating US interests, concern, and commitment; by assisting the forces of other friendly nations; and by providing a basis to move rapidly from peace to war. In wartime, these conventional forces would be employed to achieve US political objectives and to secure early war termination on terms favorable to the United States and its allies, preferably without the use of nuclear weapons.

Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur, the United States must be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that the Soviets or any other adversary would be denied their political and military objectives. To do this, our nuclear forces (both strategic and theater), in conjunction with general-purpose forces, must have the capability to hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that threaten the United States and its allies. We must also improve our chemical weapons to deter chemical attack. To preserve a credible conventional deterrent, we must attain an appropriate level of combat readiness and sustainability and a robust logistics infrastructure. To support the US strategy of forward deployment and rapid reinforcement, using CONUS-based active and reserve formations, we must attain adequate airlift, sealift, and tanker support to transport and sustain forces abroad.


This strategy also recognizes that we must build and modernize forces sufficient to retain maritime superiority. For general-purpose forces, modernization should exploit opportunities created by the application of high-leverage advanced technologies.

Maintenance of Deterrence. Ultimately, deterrence is based on Soviet perceptions. The Soviets have likely been

deterred in the past because they apparently perceived risks, in excess of any potential gains, to initiating conflict with the West. Today's offensive ballistic missile capability provides the means of nearly instantaneous retaliation against Soviet forces, a capability that may be diminished with forces that do not include offensive ballistic missiles. We must ensure that our reconfigured forces continue to provide a high-confidence capability to retaliate against Warsaw Pact aggression and assure denial of their objectives at all levels of conflict. This certainty in our ability to retaliate at any level of conflict is a key element of deterrence. Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessments of war outcomes so uncertain as to remove any incentive for initiating attack.

Arms Control Negotiations. The United States participates in bilateral and multilateral negotiations on arms control to protect US and allied security interests, build global stability, and promote favorable international relationships. These negotiations are an integral part of the US national security strategy. As we plan for a world free of offensive ballistic missiles, we may find that additional arms control initiatives are needed. One requirement, for example, will be to determine whether limits on sea-launched cruise missiles would be of military benefit to the United States and, if so, what form such limits would take. Another requirement is to develop a phased drawdown to zero ballistic missiles that maintains military sufficiency throughout the 10-year reductions period. Whatever the case, equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements and related negotiations can contribute to security at reduced force levels. Arms control cannot, however, substitute for necessary force modernization; both efforts are mutually reinforcing elements of US national security and contribute significantly to the enhancement of stability and deterrence.

Assumptions. In developing the policy and strategy guidelines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff made several assumptions. In addition to the baseline factors regarding forces and strategy provided in NSDD-250, we assumed that

 Prior to 1996, the United States will have begun to deploy a more effective air defense system which is capable against bombers and cruise missiles. After 1996, the United States



will deploy an effective advanced strategic defense system to protect against possible Soviet cheating and Third World nuclear coercion.

Change in US Operational Capabilities. The elimination of ballistic missiles would significantly alter the military environment. At a minimum, the United States (like the Soviet Union) would lose the unique capabilities of ballistic missiles, in particular their promptness and the high alert rates provided by ICBMs. But the impact of the changes in operational capabilities on strategy and force composition will not be identical, owing to political, economic, technological, and geographic asymmetries.

The reduction of the prompt threat from the Soviet Union would largely offset the loss of ballistic missile capabilities. Nevertheless, certain critical roles and missions which currently take advantage of their unique capabilities will have to be reallocated. Currently, ICBMs and SLBMs contribute to bomber effectiveness by suppressing defenses that the bombers would have to overfly as they penetrate enemy airspace. Without ballistic missiles, other means (tactics, technology, and weapons) would have to be developed to avoid or suppress air defenses.

Ballistic missiles have also allowed the United States to plan discrete escalation control options. Escalation control options are intended to convey a political message of strong US resolve while limiting the nature and scope of the conflict to enhance the probability of early war termination. In the absence of ballistic missiles, such options may be more difficult to plan;

(It should be noted, of course, that the Soviets would suffer a similar loss of capability.) Compensation must be made to perform these missions.

Employment Policy. Employment flexibility to control escalation and to allow appropriate responses to any level of aggression will remain a significant objective. Escalation control requires enhanced capabilities for force

projection, successful conventional defense, and a favorable altering of the military balance should nuclear deterrence fail. These enhanced capabilities must be developed in close coordination with the contemplated reductions in ballistic missiles. We must leave the Soviet planner uncertain as to US response to warning of a Soviet conventional or nuclear attack, but certain of our intent to retaliate effectively. In addition, the United States must continue to limit nonobjective collateral damage, consistent with effective accomplishment of US defense, retaliatory, and escalation control objectives.

The United States must emphasize improvements for assured strategic warning, effective retaliation, force endurance, and basing survivability. In addition, it is essential that US nuclear forces continue to consist of a multiplicity of systems with different weapons carriers and capabilities (e.g., bombers, ALCMs, and SLCMs deployed on a variety of naval platforms). Multiple and mutually complementary US components require the Soviets to solve a number of varying technological and tactical problems in their efforts to overcome them. In turn, the Soviets would be forced to make choices which would reduce effectiveness against one component in order to attack another. Diversity also prevents the Soviets from concentrating on the solution to any single problem. Day-to-day alert levels for these forces should be maintained at the highest achievable standards commensurate with operational and fiscal considerations. The effectiveness of US retaliatory attack and the survivability of reserve forces in the unlikely event of a Soviet surprise attack must be preserved.

Pre-planned nuclear attack options and sub-options incorporating the capability to withhold from execution (1) national-level political and military leadership, (2) the Soviet industrial and economic base, and (3) countries, are still appropriate but obviously the new circumstances will require new thinking on this subject. There will be a persisting need for large, planned, strategic nuclear attacks against the Soviet leadership, nuclear forces, conventional forces, and the economic-industrial base.

However, the guidance provided in NSDD-13 which assigns the general priority that should be used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. Regardless of priorities, the nuclear weapon allocation process should be guided by the need for a weighted, balanced effort among the relative priorities assigned.


The requirement to develop ad hoc nuclear options, in addition to pre-planned options, will remain. In the context of the elimination of all Soviet ballistic missiles, the majority of which are in fixed locations, it will be important for US strategic forces to have the capability to hold at risk key mobile and relocatable assets of the Soviet Union. As directed in NSDD-178, the United States is developing programs to provide a capability to attack relocatable targets with US strategic forces. Depending on their location, some of these targets (e.g., Soviet ground forces approaching the front) may be more appropriately held at risk by theater-based conventional and nuclear systems.

In the absence of new SLCM technology, SLCM submarines must approach their targets more closely than SSBNs to be within effective weapons release range.


Control of Atlantic and Pacific open-ocean maritime areas is also critical due to the logistical requirements of supporting our allies and obtaining raw materials for US industrial mobilization.

Defense Policy. Defensive systems will become an integral part of weapon employment policy. Therefore, defensive systems, as well as supporting C<sup>3</sup>I systems, must be configured to ensure the requisite flexibility, endurance, and effectiveness to provide the NCA with the sustained capability of employing weapons in a controlled manner throughout a conflict. Effective defensive systems could provide a significant increase in our capability to deny the Soviet war aim of neutralizing the United States, thereby strengthening deterrence and stability. Although difficult

to quantify, the introduction of such defensive systems will have an impact on US offensive employment policy and on weapon system requirements. The interrelationships between offensive and defensive systems is complex and must be kept under continuous review. Careful integration of these capabilities would provide the best means to meet US objectives and deny Soviet objectives. An effective strategic ballistic missile defense will be required to hedge against Soviet cheating and to protect the United States and its allies from potential third-country nuclear ballistic threats.



Integration. There are always uncertainties associated with major shifts in force composition. The United States should seek to minimize these risks by effective integration of all military capabilities to make certain that its ability to deny the Soviet Union a military victory at any level of conflict remains intact. An effective warfighting capability, employing defensive systems to blunt an enemy attack, coordinated conventional and nuclear theater attacks to control escalation, and global strategic strikes to place the enemy's homeland at risk, should deter an aggressor and place the United States and its allies in the best possible position to prevail should deterrence fail.



NATO Strategy. NATO's strategy, as embodied in MC 14/3, is essentially one of deterrence and defense, and depends in large measure on the "NATO TRIAD" of conventional forces, nonstrategic nuclear forces, and strategic forces. While the reductions in strategic systems and the elimination of all offensive ballistic and European LRINF missiles will affect the manner in which the US contribution to the "NATO TRIAD" is fulfilled, the essential goal of denying Soviet war aims must remain as an essential part of the US strategy of forward-deployed dual-capable forces.

Other Regional Strategies. While current US strategy for combating conflict in other parts of the world does not preclude planning for the use of nuclear weapons, even in conflicts not involving the Soviet Union, the impact of the loss of LRINF and other ballistic missiles, both nuclear and conventional, is seen to be far less dramatic than in NATO. However, enhancements in nuclear and conventional force strength and mobility may be required to forestall escalation of regional conflicts and prevent the use of the nuclear option in defense of regional alliances. Thus, regional strategies in areas outside of NATO rely on a flexible strategy that requires effective conventional forces for deterrence and defense.

Transition Period. The transition from the current force posture to one without offensive ballistic missiles must be managed carefully so that there is no real or perceived loss in our ability to deter aggression and deny the Soviets their war aims in the interim period. Integrated planning should begin early so that strategic nuclear, theater nuclear, and general purpose forces, and defensive systems will be an effective package when the transition is complete. Additionally, the transition period should:

- Provide for annual evaluation of the new components of US force posture, in particular defensive systems and cruise missiles, and the potential for technological breakthroughs that might shift the balance.
- Monitor carefully Soviet compliance with the phased drawdown of ballistic missiles. Provide/design a hedge in the event verification shows cheating.
- Provide for politico-military coordination with US allies, including an evaluation of the impact of the elimination of long-range intermediate nuclear forces before the transition period begins.

- Monitor and evaluate third-country nuclear capability trends.
- Monitor and evaluate the conventional force levels in NATO and the Warsaw Pact.
- Consider a stepped, phased approach to changes in US force structure which considers the elements of stability, deterrent value, risk, and time so that older, proven systems are not eliminated until the feasibility of their replacements can be demonstrated.

#### IV. Analytical Methodology

The analysis will be conducted to provide decisionmakers the information necessary to evaluate the military levels of risk associated with implementing the plan. The capability of strategic offensive and defensive, nonstrategic nuclear, and conventional forces to carry out their roles in a continued strategy of deterrence will be addressed. It is clearly recognized that the assumptions concerning arms reduction levels, weapons-counting rules, allied reactions, time tables, and fiscal constraints during the reduction period are especially relevant to the analysis. Therefore, following analysis of a baseline plan, analyses of whatever excursions are deemed most pertinent will be accomplished.

In all cases, the best available military experience and judgment, along with mathematical modeling, will form the basis of the analysis. The goal will be to develop a plan, within the arms control and fiscal constraints prescribed in NSDD-250, which results in a force mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities that maximizes force effectiveness and minimizes risk. The study will also evaluate existing and potential arms control initiatives and will recommend those which would contribute to achievement of the overall goal.

Strategic Forces. It is recognized that US strategic offensive capability and defensive capability are inextricably related. For analytical purposes, however, strategic offensive nuclear force effectiveness will be evaluated using static measure comparisons (e.g., numbers of weapons, weapons-to-target ratios, etc.) and two-sided dynamic force exchanges. All measures will use results of US POM/EPA versus NIE 11-3/8-86 Soviet expanded low-force comparisons and exchanges as the base case. To comply with instructions to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, using today's levels as the departure point, the

[REDACTED]

conducted to examine the impact of policy and strategy changes as well as force structure and capability changes needed to correct shortfalls identified during the initial phases of the analysis. Likewise, if the 10-year time period proves unduly taxing, other time periods will be examined in the excursions.

The baseline analysis of offensive strategic systems will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies that follow:

- Force exchanges will be conducted in accordance with current national policy stated in NSDD-13.

- [REDACTED]
- Notional capabilities will be used as provided by the Services for the analyses of highly compartmentalized programs to protect the programs' security.
  - The overall defensive effectiveness will be analyzed parametrically by degrading probability to penetrate the defensive forces of each country.

- A year-by-year (1987-1996) dynamic force-exchange analysis will be accomplished with several excursions and force mixtures to examine the damage expectancies achieved by fully generated and day-to-day alert forces.
- Other factors to be examined are the incentives for a Soviet day-to-day precursor sea-launched cruise missile attack and a day-to-day hidden intercontinental ballistic missile attack scenario (e.g., SS-24s and SS-25s).

Strategic defense force effectiveness will be evaluated parametrically, using best high and low effectiveness estimates against projected Soviet offensive forces. These estimates will bound the contribution of defenses in the baseline two-sided dynamic force-exchange modeling. The effectiveness estimates, themselves, will be based on a combination of Service and SDIO projections of the technology availability, achievable defensive force structure improvements, and threat-driven requirements.


Non-Strategic Nuclear Forces (NSNF). POM-EPA and treaty constrained force levels will be developed through 1996 based on current projections. The capability of these forces will be evaluated through force-on-force computer model analyses. Target bases will be adjusted to reflect both reduced ballistic-missile-associated targets and changes to US and Soviet Union warfighting strategies. The results will then be used to identify SACEUR NSNF requirements. Cost-benefit analysis will then be used to determine the most effective NSNF mix in a constrained budget environment.

The baseline analysis will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies listed below. Because it was deemed unwise to base a plan on any allied capability that might logically disappear as a result of a bilateral agreement to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, all assumptions are based on that premise.

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union commit to a yearly net capability drawdown rate. A linear drawdown rate will be used as a point of departure.



- Soviet nuclear warheads for all NSWP nuclear capable ballistic missile weapon systems are considered for analysis until 1996.



- For longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, it is assumed a separate LRINF treaty is in effect with the provision that LRINF missiles draw down to a 100-weapon limit by 1991. These weapons are restricted to the United States and Soviet Asia for the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. LRINF offensive ballistic missiles will be drawn to zero by 1996.
- For the shorter range INF (SRINF) missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union are limited to a level of approximately 130 weapons. The United States is allowed to convert PERSHING II to PERSHING 1b missiles, but must reduce them to zero by 1996. The Soviets must reduce SS-12/22 (SCALEBOARD) and SS-23 missiles to zero by 1996. Ground-launched cruise missiles with less than 925 km range could be deployed up to a limit of 130 SRINF weapons.
- Conventional and short-range nuclear forces (SNF) offensive ballistic missiles must also be drawn to zero by 1996. The US Lance, Follow-On-Lance, and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Soviet SS-1 (SCUD), SS-21, and FROG, are all affected in the baseline case.
- The United States will continue to commit some nuclear-capable forces to the CINCs.

Conventional Forces. Conventional force requirements and effectiveness will be evaluated in a joint, integrated context. As NSDD-250 directs, the goal will be to provide a net assessment of all considerations involved. Conventional capability will be evaluated in specific theaters as analytical capability allows. For example, as a minimum,

conventional offensive and defensive capabilities and the requirements for modernization will be assessed relative to the Soviet Union-Warsaw Pact, and relative to the evolving threat in Southwest Asia. Other areas of the world (e.g. Latin America, Africa, SEA, and NEA) cannot be overlooked. In addition to drawing on force-on-force analysis as available, static-measure comparisons (e.g., numbers of weapons, manpower ratios, etc.) will also be evaluated as appropriate. Finally, subjective evaluation, based on expert military judgment, will be an essential element of the conventional analysis.

#### V. Compartmented Programs

To maintain the security of highly compartmented programs, each Service will provide notional capabilities and costs for weapon systems which should be incorporated into the plan. Each Service will be responsible for determining which compartmented programs under its supervision should be included. Actual weapon system capabilities and costs will be detailed in a compartmented annex, where the impact of the actual data upon the noncompartmented version of the plan will be summarized. One individual from the Joint Staff will require administrative clearance into the compartmented programs to consolidate Service inputs into a single annex.

#### VI. Submittal Date

A baseline plan which continues the strategic policy and targeting priorities of NSDD-13 and holds overall levels of risk generally constant--using today's risk levels as a departure point--will be submitted for Presidential review 31 January 1987. Excursions and alternative solutions, as appropriate, will be submitted subsequently.

TAB II

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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*Withdrawer*

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JCS RESPONSE TO NSDD-250 RE ICBMS (1)

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36565	MEMO  TO SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, RE INITIAL JCS REPORT (SAME AS 25492)	2	ND	B1

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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