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MOSCOW SUMMIT

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MOSCOW SUMMIT

INF TREATY: A SUCCESS STORY

DECEMBER 1987

Background:

On December 8 in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the historic INF Treaty. This Treaty eliminates the entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear (INF) missiles. The Treaty is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to achieving real arms reductions, rather than merely limiting increases as in previous treaties. It also is the result of NATO solidarity in responding to the threat posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

What's in the Treaty?

The Treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems in the range of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles) and the elimination or conversion of related facilities within three years after it enters into force. The Treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force. After elimination is completed, the Treaty will ban all facilities for deployment, storage, repair and production of these missile systems.

How can we verify it?

The President has said that it would be better to have no arms control agreements than agreements that cannot be effectively verified. A treaty cannot be based on trust; it must be supported by effective verification. Accordingly, this Treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control. Compliance with it can be effectively verified.

The Treaty meets the objectives the U.S. has established for verification of the Treaty's terms. These objectives are to:

- Ensure confidence in the agreement;
- Deter violation of the Treaty by increasing the likelihood that such violations would be detected; and
- Permit timely detection of violations, so that we can take appropriate steps to protect U.S. and allied security.

Specifically, the verification provisions include:

- An unprecedented exchange of data on the systems limited by the Treaty, including numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of all INF missiles and launchers;
- Inspections at INF sites to confirm the validity of the data exchanged, to help verify elimination of these weapons and related infrastructure, and to help verify that INF activity has ceased;
- Short-notice on-site inspection at INF-related sites during the three-year reduction period and for 10 years afterward;
- Resident inspectors at key missile final assembly facilities; and
- Prohibition on interference with verification by national technical means, which includes satellite imagery.

These provisions will facilitate effective verification of Soviet compliance with the Treaty. We will be able to assess compliance in a timely manner, so that we can compensate for any risk posed to our security or that of our allies if the Soviets violate the accord.

We've strengthened U.S. and allied security:

The INF Treaty is in the security interests of the U.S. and our allies. The Soviet Union will eliminate deployed systems capable of carrying more than 1,500 nuclear warheads; the U.S., almost 400. This establishes the precedent of the Soviets undertaking greater reductions to reach equal levels with us. The Treaty also bans any future deployment of INF missiles, including the newly developed Soviet ground-launched cruise missile. Deployment of these missiles would have seriously complicated NATO air defense. Elimination of Soviet INF missiles will enhance the survivability of NATO forces by eliminating the most effective weapons against key NATO targets. NATO will retain a substantial nuclear capacity sufficient to ensure the continued viability of its strategy of flexible response.

We've achieved U.S. objectives:

The Treaty meets longheld U.S. goals in INF negotiations. When the talks began in 1981, the President proposed the "zero option" for elimination of all longer-range INF missiles (range 1,000-5,500 kilometers or about 600-3,400 miles). In July 1987 the Soviets agreed to eliminate these systems. Similarly, the U.S. has sought to constrain shorter-range INF missiles (range 500-1,000 kilometers or about 300-600 miles) to prevent circumvention of an accord on longer-range missiles by a Soviet buildup of shorter-range missiles. The Treaty satisfies this requirement by eliminating all Soviet and U.S. shorter-range INF missiles. (The U.S. has none of these missiles deployed.) In agreeing to worldwide elimination of these missiles, the Soviets have accepted the U.S. principle that limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent transfer of the threat from Europe to Asia. The Treaty also meets the U.S. demand that U.S.-Soviet agreements cannot limit the forces of our allies.

U.S. and allied perseverance -- a NATO triumph:

The success of these negotiations has been made possible by Western determination to adhere to NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision to respond to Soviet SS-20 deployments through deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles while seeking through negotiations with the Soviets to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level. NATO steadfastness has paid off. Through this Treaty, we achieve elimination of the threat to NATO and Asian security posed by Soviet INF missiles. Furthermore, we and our allies have enhanced the credibility of our deterrent by demonstrating convincingly to the Soviets that we have the unity and political will to make and stand by tough decisions to ensure our security.

A first step toward a safer world:

Having achieved the INF Treaty, the U.S. continues its determined efforts to achieve a safer world, including negotiations for deep reductions in strategic (intercontinental) weapons, greater balance in conventional forces in Europe and an effective global ban on chemical weapons.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

THE INF TREATY: WHAT'S IN IT?

DECEMBER 8, 1987

The INF Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their ground-launched ballistic and cruise missile systems* having a range capability between 500 and 5,500 kilometers (between roughly 300 and 3,400 miles), and gives both sides the right to carry out verification measures to monitor compliance with the Treaty.

The INF Treaty consists of four principal documents setting forth its basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations. These are:

- The Treaty Articles, which obligate the U.S. and U.S.S.R. to eliminate all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and which bans them thereafter, and to accept provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;
- The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which incorporates the data as of November 1, 1987, exchanged between the Parties prior to signature regarding the locations, numbers and characteristics of each side's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems;
- The Inspection Protocol, which sets forth the procedures for conducting agreed on-site inspections, including short-notice inspections and continuous portal monitoring; and
- The Elimination Protocol, which describes the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support facilities, support structures and support equipment covered by the Treaty.

Basic Obligations of the Treaty:

The Treaty provides that the Parties must eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems, and prohibits the Parties from producing them thereafter. It also requires that missile-related facilities be eliminated. The intermediate-range missile systems have to be eliminated in two phases over three years; the shorter-range missile systems must be eliminated within a single 18-month period.

The intermediate-range missile systems named by the Treaty are the U.S. Pershing II and Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) and the Soviet SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5. The shorter-range missile systems named are the U.S. Pershing I-A and the Soviet SS-12 and SS-23. The Memorandum of Understanding on Data breaks these missiles down into two categories: deployed and non-deployed. Each side has provided data as of November 1, 1987, on the

numbers, locations and technical characteristics of their INF missile systems. When the data in the MOU have been updated after the Treaty enters into force, they will be verified by inspection.

In addition to the specifically listed U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems that have to be eliminated, the Treaty also defines this class of systems more generally by range (i.e., 500-5,500 kilometers, which is roughly equivalent to 300-3,400 miles) and obligates each side not to produce or possess such systems for the duration of the Treaty, which is indefinite.

After the INF Treaty enters into force, neither side may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles, or produce their launchers. Moreover, while the sides are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter-range missiles whatsoever, they may however launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles within the first six months of the Treaty for the sole purpose of destroying them. Such launches for destruction purposes cannot be conducted in a manner that could produce useful information for missile development, and these launches are subject to on-site inspection.

The Treaty provides both Parties the right to establish a system of resident inspectors to continuously monitor a missile facility on each other's territory. In the case of the U.S., we will have the right to such an inspection of a Soviet SS-20 facility at Votkinsk, while the Soviets will have the right to such inspection of a U.S. Pershing missile facility at Magna, Utah.

The Three-year Reduction Period:

In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty establishes a number of obligations restricting INF activities during the three-year reduction period. For example:

- Intermediate-range missiles and their launchers can only be located in their designated deployment areas or support facilities, such as storage, repair or elimination facilities, or in specified transit between them. Permitted locations are all named and defined by geographic location and size in the data exchange. If any Treaty-limited item is at a location other than that allowed by the Treaty, it is a violation of the Treaty.

- Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles and all deployed and non-deployed launchers must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-range missiles must be removed to elimination facilities within one year.

- Transit of INF missiles between their permitted locations must be completed within a limited period of time.

The Treaty further requires that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. provide notifications of activities related to the Treaty. These include:

- The origin and destination of missiles and launchers in transit, with information on their location provided for specified intervals;

- The dates for the elimination of deployment areas, bases and support facilities;

- The date, place, number, and type of missiles and launchers to be destroyed at specified elimination sites;

- The date, place, and type of missiles to be destroyed through launch.

After the Treaty enters into force, data will be updated, and then notification of changes to that data at prescribed intervals will be required thereafter.

All of these notifications, as well as those related to data updates and inspections are to be communicated via the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

Elimination Procedures:

-- The Treaty and the Elimination Protocol contain the general guidelines and specific procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, support structures and support equipment. These include:

These include:

- Missile systems are to be reduced in complete organizational units to simplify the verification task;
- Destruction is to be carried out at mutually agreed facilities, and only at those facilities;
- A maximum of 100 intermediate-range missiles can be eliminated by launch in accordance with the provisions discussed above; and
- Key support structures are to be eliminated where they stand.

Verification Obligations:

While the United States will continue to use its national technical means (NTM) as the principal method of monitoring the Treaty, another important means to assist in verification is through the unprecedented on-site inspection rights established by the Treaty. There are several types:

-- Baseline Inspections. To help in verifying the initial exchange of updated data, there is a right to conduct on-site inspections of agreed locations listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, within three months after the Treaty enters into force. This includes facilities and bases located in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet Union has deployed shorter-range missile systems, in addition to locations in the Soviet Union.

-- Close-out Inspections. When bases or missile support facilities are eliminated, the U.S. will have the right to conduct inspections to observe that Treaty-prohibited activities have ceased. We can inspect all such locations for a close-out inspection if we so choose.

-- Elimination Inspections. The U.S. has the right to observe the destruction of missiles and launchers at the elimination sites. The procedures for destroying them are set forth in the Elimination Protocol, and the inspections will allow the U.S. to observe that these procedures are being carried out. This right to observe elimination of missiles and launchers is not restricted by any quota.

-- Short-notice Inspections. For thirteen years after the Treaty enters into force, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. are entitled to conduct a specific number of short-notice inspections per year of agreed locations. Thus, during the first three years of the Treaty, i.e., before all systems have been eliminated, the U.S. has the right to 20 short-notice inspections per year at both currently active bases and facilities, as well as those that will have been eliminated.

For the first five years after the complete elimination of INF missile systems, the U.S. can conduct 15 on-site inspections each year. For the next five years, the U.S. can conduct 10 similar inspections each year.

-- Portal Monitoring of Production. For the special case of the Soviet SS-25 ICBM, which is assembled at a facility where SS-20 missiles formerly were assembled, the Soviet Union has explicitly agreed to allow the U.S. to establish a continuous monitoring system at the SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk near the Ural Mountains, or any other facility that may in the future conduct final assembly of the SS-25.

Detailed procedures for the conduct of all of the inspections listed above are contained in the Inspection Protocol.

-- National Technical Means. In addition to allowing on-site inspections to verify compliance with the INF Treaty, the Parties have undertaken not to interfere with each other's NTM, and to take specific steps to enhance the other side's ability to monitor by NTM.

-- Special Verification Commission. The U.S. and U.S.S.R. have also agreed to establish a Special Verification Commission, which can be convened at the request of either side to resolve problems relating to compliance with the Treaty.

Treaty Ratification and Duration:

All of the Treaty documents, including the MOU on Data, the Inspection Protocol, and the Elimination Protocol are subject to ratification.

The INF Treaty is of unlimited duration. A Party may withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.

* In the INF Treaty, the term "intermediate-range missile" means a missile with a range between 1,000 and 5,500 kilometers (roughly 600 and 3,400 miles), The term "shorter-range missile" means a missile with a range between 500 and 1,000 kilometers (roughly 300 and 600 miles).



MOSCOW SUMMIT

THE INF TREATY: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

On December 8, 1987, in Washington, D.C., President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles. This accord, known as the INF Treaty, is a historic accomplishment because for the first time the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to actual reductions in their nuclear arms, rather than simply placing limits on their growth.

On January 25, 1988, the President formally submitted the INF Treaty to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. The purpose of this pamphlet is to provide the public with answers to frequently asked questions about the Treaty and several related issues.

Question: What weapons are covered by the INF Treaty and what does the Treaty actually do?

Answer: The INF Treaty covers U.S. and Soviet land-based nuclear missiles with ranges from about 300 to 3,400 miles (500 to 5,500 kilometers). The Treaty:

- Bans immediately all production and flight testing of INF missiles the date it goes into effect;
- Eliminates all U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems within three years of the date it goes into effect;
- Eliminates or otherwise removes the threat posed by related INF facilities within that same three-year period; and
- Eliminates all facilities to deploy, store, repair and produce INF missile systems once all U.S. and Soviet INF missile systems are eliminated.

The Treaty is a major foreign policy success for the United States and the NATO alliance. For the first time ever an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles will be eliminated. Thus, the specific threat posed by Soviet deployment of the powerful and dangerous SS-20 INF missile, which is capable of reaching targets throughout Western Europe and Asia, will be permanently eliminated.

Is the INF Treaty in our best interests?

Yes. Through the Treaty we achieve the common objective we and our NATO allies established over eight years ago -- elimination of the threat to Western security posed by Soviet INF missiles, particularly the SS-20. In achieving this objective, the Treaty fulfills long-held U.S. principles, namely:

-- It embodies the principle of unequal reductions to reach equal levels of U.S. and Soviet forces. The Soviets will eliminate deployed systems capable of carrying about four times as many warheads as those eliminated by the United States. These unequal reductions establish an important precedent for other arms control negotiations.

-- It establishes the most stringent and comprehensive verification system in the history of arms control, including several kinds of on-site inspections. This, too, is an important precedent for future arms control treaties.

-- It establishes global limits, so the Soviets cannot transfer the threat from Europe to Asia by moving their missile systems around.

-- It includes only U.S. and Soviet forces and does not limit the forces of our allies.

-- It does not weaken NATO conventional defenses in Europe.

Will we still be able to deter Soviet aggression in Europe after the INF missiles are destroyed?

Yes. The U.S. remains staunchly committed to NATO. After the Treaty is implemented, NATO will still have the capability to deter Soviet aggression.

Other nuclear weapons will remain an essential part of NATO's deterrent. The alliance will continue to have about 4,000 nuclear weapons in Europe -- short-range missiles and nuclear artillery, as well as nuclear-capable aircraft that are able to reach deep into Soviet territory. In addition, a number of ballistic missile warheads on U.S. submarines will remain dedicated to NATO. Finally, U.S. strategic systems -- land-based ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers -- remain as the essential guarantors of allied security.

To maintain credible deterrence, NATO will need to continue to modernize its remaining nuclear weapons and to improve its conventional capability as well.

All of these factors will contribute to NATO's capability to deter or counter aggression at any level and to deny the Soviets confidence that the benefits of any aggression against NATO would outweigh its costs.

Will the removal of INF missiles from Western Europe put our allies at any disadvantage, in view of the East bloc's superior conventional forces?

No. The continuing presence of thousands of nuclear weapons and over 2,000,000 allied troops, including over 325,000 U.S. troops stationed in Europe, will enable us and our allies to deter or counter aggression against Western Europe.

The INF Treaty is a success for NATO's "dual-track" decision calling for both deployments and negotiations, made in 1979 following the initiation of Soviet SS-20 deployments in 1977. The Treaty requires the elimination and destruction of the SS-20s, thus removing the threat they pose.

The Treaty also will enhance the survivability of NATO's conventional military forces. The INF missiles the Soviets will eliminate are capable of hitting vital NATO targets, such as airfields, ports and air defense sites, which support allied conventional defenses and are crucial to our ability to send reinforcements to Europe in a crisis.

Furthermore, we and our allies have enhanced the credibility of our deterrent by demonstrating persuasively to the Soviets that we have the unity and political will to make and stand by tough decisions to ensure our security.

Apart from the INF Treaty, NATO has had under way for some time a broad program for modernizing and upgrading its nuclear and conventional military forces. There is agreement

within NATO on the alliance's most serious deficiencies in its nuclear and conventional forces; we are determined to resolve them in a timely manner.

How will the Treaty's provisions be verified?

This agreement has the most stringent and comprehensive verification provisions in the history of arms control. It contains the following specific elements:

-- Comprehensive exchange of data, with updates, about the missiles and support facilities subject to the Treaty, including numbers, locations, and technical characteristics of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles and launchers;

-- An initial inspection at all INF sites listed in this exchange to help confirm the validity of the data provided by the other side;

-- During the three-year elimination period, designation of where INF missiles may be and may not be, coupled with notification of transit between agreed locations;

-- On-site inspection of the elimination procedures to ensure that missiles, launchers and other items subject to the Treaty are destroyed according to agreed procedures;

-- On-site close-out inspections to confirm that all INF-related items at each facility have been either eliminated or modified according to agreed procedures;

-- On-site short-notice inspections at INF-related sites during the three-year reductions period and extending 10 years after all INF systems are eliminated;

-- Resident American on-site inspectors who will continually monitor a key Soviet missile assembly facility at Votkinsk for up to 10 years after the three-year period in which all INF systems are eliminated; and

-- Provision for enhancing verification by "national technical means," including reconnaissance satellites.

How can we tell if the Soviets are complying with the Treaty and not secretly producing banned weapons?

No arms control monitoring system can ever provide 100 percent certainty that no violation has occurred. This Treaty is no exception. The relevant test of our ability to verify effectively is whether we can deter cheating and take necessary action early enough to protect our security and that of our allies.

The INF Treaty meets this test. Through the combination of data exchange, national technical means, and on-site inspections, we can monitor key Treaty provisions, such as the immediate ban on flight testing, destruction of launchers and missiles, and the potentially illegal deployment of INF missiles and launchers at declared facilities.

The effect of these measures taken together would be to make it extremely difficult and costly for the Soviets to maintain a militarily significant covert INF missile force. The risks of detection and consequences should serve as an effective deterrent.

Can we trust the Soviets to comply with this new arms control agreement?

An arms control treaty cannot be based on trust. The President has repeatedly stated that he would not sign any arms control treaty with the Soviets that did not contain provisions for effective verification. Accordingly, this Treaty contains the most stringent verification provisions in the history of arms control. Compliance with it can be effectively verified. Our ability to verify compliance with this Treaty does not rely on trust. It relies on a combination of verification measures which link together to deter possible Soviet cheating by making it costly and difficult for them to evade Treaty obligations and which increase the likelihood of detection if the Soviets did try to cheat. These measures include national technical means, such as reconnaissance

satellites, on-site inspections by qualified U.S. officials, and an immediate flight test ban. The verification provisions require the Soviets to provide, before the Treaty goes into effect, data of unprecedented scope and detail on the Soviet missile systems the Treaty covers. This data can then be monitored by our national technical means and by on-site inspections, both during the Treaty's implementation and thereafter.

What happens if we think the Soviets are cheating?

Should we suspect a Soviet violation, the United States would have available a number of options. We could raise our concerns through diplomatic channels and through the Special Verification Commission (SVC) established by the Treaty to deal with compliance questions. If we are not satisfied with the Soviet response, we could take a number of steps on our own to protect U.S. and allied security. Decisions to take such action would be made on a case-by-case basis, after taking into account all aspects of the situation, including the Soviet response to our concerns.

In weighing the costs and benefits of violating the Treaty, the Soviets will have to consider our determination to hold them accountable. The Soviets know that we have the ability to detect -- in a timely way and through a variety of means -- violations of the Treaty. They also know that we will not ignore any failure on their part to comply fully with their arms control commitments.

Will the agreement strengthen NATO solidarity and Western defenses?

Successful completion of the negotiation of the INF Treaty is itself clear evidence of the strength of allied solidarity and cohesiveness, as well as U.S. firmness at the negotiating table. It was based firmly on a common decision, and U.S. positions in negotiating the Treaty were formulated in close and continuous consultation with, and had the firm support of, the allies. The successful outcome of the negotiations has strengthened NATO, and the elimination of the Soviet INF missile threat will enhance Western security. The effect of these accomplishments can only have a positive effect on NATO cohesion and security.

The U.S. commitment to Europe remains steadfast. President Reagan has reaffirmed repeatedly our strong tie to Europe. Nothing in the Treaty changes that. In addition to the nuclear and conventional weapons dedicated to the defense of Europe, we have over 325,000 servicemen stationed in Europe. These are the tangible military and human reflections of the deep political, historical and cultural ties which bind the nations of the alliance together.

The strength of the U.S. relationship with its European allies does not depend ultimately on the deployment of specific weapons systems. Perceptions of the U.S. commitment to Europe depend on more fundamental factors such as our shared democratic values and political traditions, the cohesion and solidarity of the alliance, and the willingness of the United States and our allies to accept the risks and share the burdens of collective defense.

What are we doing about reducing intercontinental nuclear weapons, of which there are many thousands, and which are as threatening as INF missiles?

The United States places a high priority on our efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for deep and stabilizing reductions of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms, particularly heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple warheads.

Progress has been made in these negotiations, known as START. General Secretary Gorbachev has agreed in principle, for example, to our proposal for a 50 percent cut in U.S. and Soviet strategic arms, and on a number of other important elements of such an agreement.

Despite the progress we have made, important differences remain, including such issues as mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles, and the details of an effective verification system.

The United States believes that a Treaty reducing offensive strategic nuclear weapons could be achieved this year, providing the Soviets are committed to that objective and negotiate with equal seriousness.

Why doesn't the President use the Strategic Defense Initiative as a "bargaining chip" to get a 50 percent reduction in offensive strategic nuclear arms?

The President is committed to the Strategic Defense Initiative because it provides the potential for a safer world, where we would keep the peace increasingly through defenses that threaten no one. That is why he has repeatedly said that our Strategic Defense Initiative is not -- and cannot be -- a bargaining chip. Giving up this initiative, with the promise it holds for us and our allies, is too high a price to pay for any agreement. Furthermore, reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive nuclear arms are long overdue and stand on their own merits.

The Soviet Union has waged an extensive propaganda campaign against our strategic defense program. At the same time, as they have recently admitted, the Soviets have long been working -- and continue to work -- aggressively to develop their own defensive system. They have concentrated the energy and talent of thousands of their brightest scientific minds on this project. In the interests of maintaining world peace and Western security, we cannot afford to concede a monopoly in this vital area to our chief adversary.

Now that we have the INF Treaty, can we make additional contributions to peace, such as agreeing to "no-first-use" of nuclear weapons or a ban on testing nuclear weapons?

Our goals of reducing the risk of war and increasing international stability cannot be achieved by self-limiting and unverifiable declarations or by absolute prohibitions against testing the weapons we need to keep the peace.

NATO is strictly a defensive alliance and is pledged not to be the first to use force. If attacked however NATO must reserve the right to use whatever force is necessary in its defense. A "no-first-use" commitment would undermine that strategy of "flexible response," raise serious allied concerns about the U.S. commitment to defend Western Europe, and -- however mistakenly -- leave the Soviets as well to question that commitment.

Regarding nuclear testing, as long as the United States and its allies must depend on nuclear weapons for their security, they must ensure that those weapons are safe, reliable, effective and survivable -- in short, that our deterrent remains credible. This requires some underground testing, as permitted by existing treaties.

Nevertheless, the United States is negotiating with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations, with our priority being to establish the needed verification improvements in two existing but unratified treaties. These negotiations are taking place in Geneva.

In addition to the INF Treaty, are we making progress on other outstanding issues between the United States and the Soviet Union?

Arms reduction is only one element -- although an important element -- of overall U.S.-Soviet relations, which also include our concern about respect for human rights, resolution of regional disputes and bilateral issues. The President is deeply committed to progress in each of these areas.

Respect for human rights is essential if we are to establish genuine peace. The Soviet Union has made limited improvements in human rights performance, including resolution of some prominent individual cases, but much more needs to be done. We would like to see freedom

of emigration, speech, assembly, press and conscience become legalized and institutionalized in the Soviet Union. We expect the Soviets -- and all other signatories of the Helsinki accords -- to abide by its terms and other international agreements guaranteeing human rights.

Finding peaceful ways to resolve regional disputes is also essential to genuine and lasting peace. We have discussed regional disputes with the Soviets, but little real progress has been made. Soviet intervention in regional conflicts -- either direct or by proxy -- works against substantial improvement in our relations. First and foremost is the need for the Soviets to end their war in and occupation of Afghanistan. If the Soviets are serious about withdrawing from Afghanistan, the United States is willing to be helpful. In addition, ending Soviet military support for governments in Angola, Ethiopia, Cambodia and Nicaragua would help to reduce tensions. If the Soviets are serious about helping to end the Iran-Iraq war they should join us and other U.N. Security Council members in a second, enforcement resolution aimed at ending the war.

Expanding direct people-to-people cultural and scientific exchanges can help to reduce misunderstanding and lay the groundwork for greater mutual trust. These programs are expanding, but more can be done. The exchange programs are based on reciprocity, mutual benefit and protection of sensitive American technology and information.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES INF CHRONOLOGY 1977-1987

1977

EARLY 1977

Soviet Union begins deployment of the SS-20 intermediate-range nuclear missile in the European U.S.S.R. The SS-20 is a modern, mobile ballistic missile with three independently targetable warheads and a range covering all of Western Europe from bases well inside the U.S.S.R.

OCTOBER 28, 1977

West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt brings the Soviet SS-20 threat to the forefront of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO's) attention in a speech at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London. He warns that strategic nuclear parity between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. means "magnification of the significance of the disparities between East and West as regards tactical and conventional weapons," and cites deployment of the SS-20 as increasing such disparity between NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

LATE 1977

NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) directs that a High Level Group (HLG) be established to study Alliance long-term INF modernization needs, consistent with its doctrine of flexible response.

There are two categories of INF missiles: longer-range (LRINF) and shorter-range (SRINF).

1979

SPRING 1979

A NATO Special Group on Arms Control and Related Matters (SG) is established to formulate guiding principles for future arms control efforts involving INF. (The SG was renamed the Special Consultative Group, or SCG, following the NATO decision of December 1979.)

SUMMER 1979

The work of NATO's High Level Group and Special Group converge in the Integrated Decision Document, which sets forth the basic aims of Alliance INF policy as "deterrence and stability based upon a triad of forces, the coupling between these forces, and the important political principle of the strategic unity of the Alliance." The Document calls for complementary supporting programs of force modernization and arms control.

OCTOBER 6, 1979

Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev proposes a freeze on Soviet SS-20 deployments if NATO deploys no counterpart systems because "a balance now exists."

One hundred thirty SS-20s, with 390 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

DECEMBER 12, 1979

NATO unanimously adopts a "dual track" strategy to counter Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles.

One track calls for arms control negotiations with the U.S.S.R. to restore the balance in INF at the lowest possible level.

In the absence of an arms control agreement, NATO's second track is to modernize its INF with the deployment in Western Europe of 464 single-warhead U.S. ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) and 108 single-warhead U.S. Pershing II ballistic missiles, beginning in December 1983.

1980

EARLY 1980

The U.S. offers -- but the Soviets refuse -- to negotiate on INF.

JULY 1980

During Chancellor Schmidt's visit to Moscow, the Soviets announce agreement in principle to participate in INF negotiations with the U.S.

OCTOBER 1980

The Soviet Union claims "a balance now exists" in INF missiles.

Approximately 200 Soviet SS-20s, with 600 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

OCTOBER-NOVEMBER 1980

No agreement is reached in preliminary discussions on what the focus should be in INF talks between U.S. and Soviet negotiators.

1981

JANUARY 1981

The Reagan Administration takes office, and begins a review of U.S. arms control policy.

SPRING 1981

At a meeting of NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC), foreign ministers reaffirm the 1979 "dual track" decision, and allied consultations proceed in preparation for negotiations later in the year.

NOVEMBER 18, 1981

In a major policy address calling for a framework of negotiations on reductions in all types of arms, President Reagan proposes the "zero option," agreeing to the cancellation of planned U.S. INF missile deployments, if the Soviet Union agrees to eliminate all its SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missiles.

NOVEMBER 30, 1981

Formal negotiations on INF begin in Geneva. The U.S. seeks global elimination of U.S. and Soviet LRINF missiles and collateral constraints on SRINF missiles.

DECEMBER 11, 1981

The U.S. formally presents the "zero option" proposal to the Soviets in Geneva.

DECEMBER 1981

The Soviets propose an agreement that would establish an eventual ceiling of 300 "medium-range" missiles and nuclear-capable aircraft in Europe for each side, and that would include British and French independent nuclear forces in the U.S. count.

1982

MARCH 1982

The Soviets announce a "moratorium" on their SS-20 deployments in the European U.S.S.R. Soviet deployments, however, continue as missile sites under construction in the European U.S.S.R. are finished and activated, and new sites are begun in the Asian U.S.S.R. from which missiles can reach NATO targets.

JUNE 1982

U.S. and Soviet negotiators develop an informal package of elements to be included in a possible INF agreement.

This so-called "Walk in the Woods" proposal would:

1. Set equal levels of INF missile launchers in Europe.
2. Preclude deployment of U.S. Pershing IIs.
3. Freeze Soviet SS-20 deployments in the Asian part of the U.S.S.R.

Moscow subsequently rejects the package.

AUGUST 1982

Soviet Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov states: "Approximate parity of forces...continues to exist today."

Over 300 Soviet SS-20s, with more than 900 warheads, are now deployed.

No U.S. INF missiles are deployed.

DECEMBER 1982

The U.S.S.R. publicly proposes an INF missile sub-ceiling in Europe, tied explicitly to the level of British and French missiles and designed to preclude U.S. INF missile deployments in Europe.

The Soviet demand to include the independent nuclear deterrent forces of the United Kingdom and France would grant the U.S.S.R. a legally sanctioned "right" to have nuclear forces equal to those of all other nuclear powers combined. This is tantamount to a Soviet demand for global military superiority and political hegemony.

The U.S.S.R. also mounts a propaganda campaign centered on an alleged "moratorium" on its SS-20 deployments in the European region of the Soviet Union. The Soviet proposal would permit unlimited SS-20 deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R.

1983

JANUARY 31, 1983

Vice President George Bush, in Berlin, reads an "open letter" to Europe from President Reagan proposing to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov that they meet and sign an agreement banning U.S. and Soviet land-based INF missiles from the face of the earth.

FEBRUARY 1983

The U.S. reiterates criteria, set forth in November 1981 after consultation with and approval by the allies, for reaching agreement with the Soviets in INF negotiations:

1. Equality of rights and limits between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
2. Exclusion of independent third country, i.e. British and French, nuclear deterrent forces from any agreement.
3. Agreed-upon limits must be applied on a global basis; no shift of Soviet longer-range INF missiles from the European U.S.S.R. to the Asian U.S.S.R.
4. No weakening of NATO's conventional deterrent forces.
5. Effective verification measures.

MARCH 29, 1983

The U.S. formally presents an interim agreement proposal at the INF talks in Geneva.

MARCH 30, 1983

President Reagan announces publicly that the U.S. and the allies are prepared to accept an interim agreement on INF missiles that would establish equal global levels of U.S. and Soviet warheads on INF missile launchers at the lowest possible number, with zero still the ultimate goal.

APRIL 1983

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko terms the U.S. "interim solution" unacceptable. He reiterates the Soviet position that there must be no U.S. deployments, and that Soviet deployments be tied to the number of British and French strategic systems.

MAY 3, 1983

General Secretary Andropov indicates willingness to count INF warheads as well as missiles at INF talks. He reiterates that the number of Soviet SS-20s in the European U.S.S.R. would be keyed to a Soviet count of British and French strategic systems. He refuses to address Soviet deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R., where Soviet missiles withdrawn from the European U.S.S.R. could be moved, threatening U.S. friends and allies in Asia and Europe. Mobile SS-20s in the Asian U.S.S.R. would also have the potential for a quick return to the European U.S.S.R.

MAY 19, 1983

The U.S. tables a draft treaty embodying the interim agreement proposal of March 29.

AUGUST 1983

General Secretary Andropov proposes to reduce INF missiles and launchers to the Soviet count of British and French levels, provided the U.S. cancels deployment of its Pershing II and cruise missiles.

SEPTEMBER 22, 1983

At the Geneva negotiations, the U.S. offers three new elements to its proposed interim agreement:

1. The U.S. would entertain the idea of not offsetting all Soviet global INF deployments by U.S. deployments in Europe. The U.S. would keep the right, however, to deploy elsewhere to reach an equal global ceiling.
2. The U.S. is prepared to apportion its reductions of Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in an appropriate manner.
3. The U.S. is prepared to consider proposals involving land-based aircraft.

SEPTEMBER 26, 1983

President Reagan reiterates the three new elements of his proposed interim agreement in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly.

OCTOBER 1983

General Secretary Andropov proposes a modified version of his December 1982 proposal, by announcing that the "U.S.S.R. is willing to reduce the number of its SS-20s in the European U.S.S.R. to 140, with 420 warheads, to match the Soviet count of British and French warheads."

General Secretary Andropov offers to freeze the number of Soviet SS-20s deployed in the Asian U.S.S.R., once an INF agreement limiting European-based systems is implemented -- as long as the U.S. deploys no similar weapons in that region. Andropov also announces "additional flexibility" on the issue of counting intermediate-range nuclear aircraft, although details are not provided.

Andropov announces that the start of deployment of U.S. INF missiles "will make it impossible to continue the INF talks."

The Soviet Defense Ministry states that the U.S.S.R. is preparing to deploy "operational-tactical" missiles in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia as part of "planned countermeasures" to U.S. deployments.

The U.S. states that the Andropov proposal contains shortcomings because it still insists that the U.S.S.R. be compensated for British and French strategic forces through its INF deployments and that there be no U.S. deployments.

The Soviet proposal to freeze INF deployments in the Asian U.S.S.R. appears to recognize the U.S. view that INF missiles must be treated on a global basis. The U.S. seeks details of the Soviet proposal on aircraft.

The U.S. notes that the Soviet threat to end negotiations if the U.S. deploys missiles in Europe is unjustified because the U.S. has negotiated for two years while Soviet SS-20 levels rose dramatically.

OCTOBER 27, 1983

At Montebello, Canada, the U.S. and the allies agree to maintain NATO's nuclear capability at the lowest level consistent with security and deterrence. This would include withdrawing 1,400 U.S. nuclear warheads from Europe over a period of several years. This is in addition to the 1,000 warheads withdrawn following NATO's December 1979 "dual track" decision.

NOVEMBER 15, 1983

While reaffirming its preference for the "zero option," the U.S. proposes that both sides agree to an equal global ceiling of 420 warheads on INF missiles.

NOVEMBER 23, 1983

Deliveries of the first U.S. ground-launched cruise missile components begin in Great Britain and West Germany. This begins implementation of INF deployment in accordance with the second track of NATO's 1979 decision.

The Soviet delegation walks out of the INF negotiations.

The U.S. offers to resume the talks whenever the Soviets are willing to return.

NOVEMBER 30, 1983

Three hundred sixty Soviet SS-20s, with 1,080 warheads, are now deployed.

NOVEMBER 1983 - JANUARY 1985

Formal INF negotiations remain suspended in the absence of the Soviet delegation.

NUCLEAR AND SPACE TALKS

1984

NOVEMBER 24, 1984

President Reagan announces on Thanksgiving Day that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed to enter into new negotiations, known as the Nuclear and Space Talks (NST), concerning nuclear offensive arms and defense and space issues.

1985

JANUARY 7-8, 1985

Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko meet in Geneva to set an agenda for new comprehensive arms control negotiations, covering strategic nuclear arms (START), INF, and Defense and Space.

MARCH 12, 1985

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. begin the NST Talks in Geneva. The U.S. seeks the elimination or reduction of INF to the lowest possible number, with equal global limits.

MARCH-APRIL 1985

At the beginning of the new INF talks, the U.S. reaffirms its approach and its draft treaties of 1982 on the global elimination of INF missiles, and of 1983 for an interim agreement on equal INF limits at the lowest possible number.

In the new NST talks, the U.S.S.R. maintains its 1983 position, opposing U.S. INF deployment, and insisting on linkage of Soviet SS-20s with British and French strategic forces.

The Soviet delegation tables a proposal for a bilateral moratorium on INF deployments and a proposal for subsequent "reductions" that would result in zero U.S. INF missiles, but allow Soviet INF missiles at levels equivalent to British and French strategic forces.

General Secretary Gorbachev also announces a unilateral Soviet moratorium on INF missile deployments in the U.S.S.R. Soviet deployments nonetheless continue at sites already under construction.

MAY-JULY 1985

The U.S. continues its effort to engage the Soviet Union substantively and constructively, indicating flexibility on any outcome that achieves equal U.S.-Soviet global INF limits.

The U.S.S.R. continues to demand a halt to, and withdrawal of, U.S. INF deployments, and insists that INF limits on Soviet forces take into account British and French strategic forces.

OCTOBER 3, 1985

During a visit to Paris, General Secretary Gorbachev announces elements of a counterproposal to the U.S. proposals of March 1985 in the NST. He calls for a freeze in U.S. and Soviet INF missile deployments, followed by the "deepest possible" reductions, and he announces that Soviet SS-4s are being phased out and some SS-20s are being removed from combat status.

OCTOBER 31, 1985

President Reagan announces that the U.S. is presenting a new arms control proposal at the Geneva talks. This proposal includes INF and builds on "positive elements" of the Soviet counterproposal of October 3, 1985, e.g., the possibility of a separate INF agreement independent of strategic or defense and space issues.

NOVEMBER 1, 1985

The U.S. response to the Soviet counterproposal contains the following points on INF:

1. While preferring the total elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF, the U.S. proposes -- as an interim step -- limiting U.S. INF missile launcher deployments in Europe to 140 Pershing IIs and ground-launched cruise missiles. (Each GLCM launcher has four missiles.) This is the number to be deployed by December 31, 1985. This proposal also calls for reductions in the Soviet force of SS-20 missile launchers within range of NATO Europe to 140. (Each SS-20 missile has three warheads.)
2. Within that launcher limit, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. could have an agreed equal number of between 420 and 450 warheads in Europe.
3. To achieve equal global U.S. and Soviet INF warhead limits, the Soviets must reduce SS-20 launchers in Asia (that are outside the range of NATO Europe) by the same proportion as the reduction of launchers within the range of NATO Europe.
4. Appropriate constraints on shorter-range INF (SRINF) should be agreed, so that the Soviets cannot circumvent an agreement on longer-range INF (LRINF) with a buildup of their SRINF.

NOVEMBER 21, 1985

At the Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agree to focus on several issues in arms control, including the "idea of an interim INF agreement."

1986

JANUARY 15, 1986

General Secretary Gorbachev sends a letter to President Reagan containing an arms control proposal which, in the context of completely eliminating nuclear weapons over a 15-year period, includes the call to eliminate U.S. and Soviet LRINF in Europe over the next 5-to-8 years.

The Gorbachev letter proposes that British and French nuclear forces not be counted against U.S. LRINF in Europe, but that they be frozen at present levels, and that U.S. transfers of nuclear systems to third parties be barred. The Soviet proposal to dismantle its SS-20s deployed in Europe does not address Soviet LRINF missiles stationed east of the Ural Mountains nor constraints on Soviet SRINF.

FEBRUARY 24, 1986

President Reagan issues a statement making it known that certain aspects of the Soviet January 1986 arms control proposal are not appropriate at this time. One area in which he hopes "immediate progress" will be made is in the INF negotiations. The President notes that the U.S. already has on the table in Geneva a concrete plan calling for the elimination of U.S. Pershing IIs and GLCMs, as well as Soviet SS-20 missiles, not only in Europe but also in Asia.

MARCH 2, 1986

U.S. Arms Control Adviser Paul Nitze publicly criticizes and rejects Soviet proposals to include limits on British and French independent nuclear forces in a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. He reiterates the main elements of the U.S. proposal for equal global limits on LRINF and collateral constraints on SRINF.

SEPTEMBER 30, 1986

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. announce that President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will meet at Reykjavik, Iceland, on October 11-12.

OCTOBER 11-12, 1986

At Reykjavik, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agree to equal global ceilings of 100 LRINF missile warheads for each side, with none in Europe.

The Soviets also offer to freeze their SRINF missile systems, pending negotiation of reductions, but they would require U.S. SRINF missile systems to be "frozen" at the current level of zero. They also agree in principle to some key verification elements. However, the Soviets link an INF agreement to U.S. acceptance of constraints on its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). These constraints go beyond those of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

OCTOBER 23, 1986

The U.S. tables a proposal reflecting the areas of agreement reached at Reykjavik.

NOVEMBER 7, 1986

The U.S.S.R. presents a new INF proposal which backtracks from the 1985 Geneva Summit commitment to conclude a separate interim agreement on INF. It also refuses to accept the Reykjavik understandings on INF as separate from those on strategic arms control issues. The Soviets also maintain linkage between an INF agreement and constraints on SDI.

NOVEMBER 15-16, 1986

President Reagan and Prime Minister Thatcher of Great Britain agree at Camp David that priority should be given, with effective verification, to an INF agreement with constraints on SRINF.

1987

JANUARY 15, 1987

The U.S. proposes at the INF talks in Geneva:

1. Phased reduction of LRINF warheads to a global ceiling of 100 LRINF warheads for each side by the end of 1991, with remaining Soviet LRINF warheads permitted in Soviet Asia, and U.S. LRINF warheads permitted in U.S. territory, including Alaska.
2. Reduction of U.S. and Soviet LRINF warheads in Europe to zero by the end of 1991.
3. Agreement on INF reductions not contingent on the resolution of other issues outside of the INF negotiations, as agreed at the November 1985 Geneva Summit.

4. Global constraints limiting U.S. and Soviet SRINF within the range band of the Soviet SS-23 to SS-12 (Scaleboard) missiles to the current Soviet global level.
5. Ban on development and deployment of SRINF missiles in the range between the U.S. Pershing II (the shortest-range LRINF missile) and the Soviet Scaleboard (the longest-range SRINF missile).
6. Subsequent negotiations on additional SRINF constraints or reductions would begin within six months after an initial INF agreement is reached.
7. Exchange of data before and after reductions take place.
8. On-site observation of elimination of weapons and an effective monitoring arrangement for facilities, including on-site inspection, following elimination of weapons.
9. Negotiations on the details of verification to take place in parallel with negotiations on reduction of weapons.

FEBRUARY 28, 1987

General Secretary Gorbachev announces Soviet willingness to sign a separate agreement to eliminate Soviet and U.S. INF missiles in Europe within five years, dropping once again Soviet insistence that these missiles be considered part of a comprehensive arms control package.

These Soviet terms appear nearly identical to those agreed to at Reykjavik. Each side would be permitted to keep only 100 warheads outside of Europe -- the Soviet Union in Soviet Asia and the United States within its territory.

MARCH 3, 1987

President Reagan says that Gorbachev's February 28th statement indicating Soviet willingness to conclude an agreement on INF missile reductions separately from agreements in the two other areas of NST negotiations "removes a serious obstacle to progress toward INF reductions."

He adds that: "To seize this new opportunity, I have instructed our negotiators to begin the presentation of our draft INF treaty text in Geneva tomorrow. I hope that the Soviet Union will then proceed with us to serious discussion of the details which are essential to translate areas of agreement in principle into a concrete agreement. And I want to stress that of the important issues which remain to be resolved, none is more important than verification. Because we are committed to genuine and lasting arms reductions and to ensuring full compliance, we will continue to insist that any agreement must be effectively verifiable."

MARCH 4, 1987

The United States presents its draft U.S.-Soviet INF treaty, which provides for the reduction of LRINF missile warheads on each side to 100 globally, with zero in Europe, as agreed to by U.S. and Soviet leaders at Reykjavik. The U.S. makes clear, however, that global elimination of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles remains its preference.

MARCH 12, 1987

At the INF negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. presents a treaty article providing for a comprehensive approach to verification of an INF agreement. The basic elements of the U.S. approach to verification are:

1. Provision for the use of and non-interference with National Technical Means (NTM), a requirement for the broadcast of engineering measurements on missile flights, a ban on encryption and a ban on concealment measures that impede verification.
2. Specification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited systems must be located and prohibition against having them elsewhere.
3. Reciprocal exchange of a specified comprehensive set of data on related treaty-limited systems and their support facilities and equipment.
4. Reciprocal updating of this data.
5. Specialized procedures for destruction, dismantlement and conversion of LRINF systems, including on-site inspection.
6. On-site inspection and monitoring initially when the treaty goes into effect, and subsequently to ensure compliance with the treaty limitations.

MARCH 26, 1987

The extended session of the U.S.-Soviet NST negotiations concludes. The U.S. objects to a Soviet proposal to separate the negotiations on SRINF from an initial INF agreement, saying it is a step backward from agreements reached in principle during the U.S.-Soviet INF negotiations of 1981-1983 and reaffirmed at Reykjavik. The Soviet proposal would allow the U.S.S.R. a virtual monopoly of these systems and leave the Soviets free to increase their existing SRINF missile force, thereby circumventing any agreement on LRINF.

APRIL 15, 1987

Secretary of State George Shultz concludes three days of meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Moscow.

Shultz says that, with hard negotiations, the prospect of reaching an agreement on INF is close at hand: "The basic structure of that agreement would be, first, the Reykjavik formula of 100 LRINF warheads on each side to be deployed on the Soviet side in Asia and on the U.S. side in the United States."

The two sides agree that the INF missile reductions should be accomplished in approximately four-to-five years and that an agreement "must contain provisions for very strict and intrusive verification."

On SRINF missiles, Shultz says the two sides agree that there should be global limits, and that the U.S. believes any constraints must be set up on "the principle of equality."

Shultz notes that the Soviets say they intend, upon signing an INF agreement, to withdraw and destroy the SRINF they now have stationed in the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and that, in negotiations over remaining missiles, the U.S.S.R. will propose that SRINF be reduced to zero within one year.

APRIL 23, 1987

President Reagan calls on the Soviet Union to speed progress in the INF negotiations by responding to U.S. verification proposals. The President says that Soviet agreement to eliminate INF systems altogether would facilitate verification of compliance with the proposed pact.

The two sides currently agree to reduce land-based LRINF systems to 100 warheads on each side with none in Europe. Reagan says "a zero LRINF outcome -- the elimination of this entire class of missiles" remains the preferred solution for the United States and its allies.

APRIL 27, 1987

The Soviet Union presents a draft INF treaty, which reflects basic agreements on land-based LRINF missiles reached at Reykjavik.

The Soviet proposal would reduce each side's LRINF in Europe to zero by the end of five years, and would limit Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Soviet Asia to 100 warheads deployed beyond a striking distance of the United States. It also would limit U.S. LRINF missile warheads in U.S. territory to 100 missile warheads deployed beyond a striking distance of the Soviet Union, thus precluding deployments in Alaska.

JUNE 12, 1987

In a communique issued following a meeting in Reykjavik of NATO's North Atlantic Council, the foreign ministers express support for global and effectively verifiable elimination of all U.S. and Soviet land-based SRINF missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 km as an integral part of an INF agreement.

The communique calls on the Soviet Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 capability and reiterates the wish to see all U.S. and Soviet longer-range, land-based INF missiles eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective.

The ministers say an INF agreement would be an important element in a coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament which, while consistent with NATO's doctrine of flexible response, would include:

1. A 50 percent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, to be achieved during current Geneva negotiations.
2. The global elimination of chemical weapons.
3. The establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces by eliminating disparities in the whole of Europe.
4. In conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of U.S. and Soviet land-based, short-range nuclear missile systems, leading to equal ceilings.

JUNE 16, 1987

The United States formally presents its position on SRINF missile systems at the INF talks in Geneva. The position calls for the global elimination of all U.S. and Soviet SRINF missile systems.

JULY 23, 1987

Secretary General Gorbachev announces a change in the Soviet position on INF. The Soviets essentially accept the "double global zero" proposal, indicating:

1. Readiness, as part of an agreement with the U.S., to eliminate all "medium-range missiles" in Soviet Asia, including the 100 LRINF warheads on such missiles, provided the U.S. also gives up all such missiles and warheads.
2. Readiness to eliminate "operational and tactical missiles" (SRINF), if the U.S. does the same.

JULY 28, 1987

In response to the Soviet announcement that the U.S.S.R. is willing to accept the global zero proposal for INF missiles, originally tabled by the U.S., President Reagan says:

"The proposal put forward today (by our negotiators in Geneva) would make provision for strict and effective verification measures and reject the transfer of existing U.S. and Soviet INF missiles and launchers to a third country. Two vital new elements are also included: the destruction of missiles and launchers covered by the treaty and no conversion of these systems and launchers to other types of weapons."

AUGUST 3, 1987

Soviet arms negotiator Aleksei A. Obukhov says the U.S.S.R. will consider a compromise to resolve U.S.-Soviet differences over West Germany's Pershing 1A missiles. The Soviets had called the missiles "the main barrier" to an INF agreement and had demanded elimination of these missiles.

U.S. arms negotiator Max Kampelman says: "We will not, in a bilateral relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, have a provision in that agreement which affects our allies."

AUGUST 7, 1987

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, in a speech to the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament, accuses the U.S. and West Germany of blocking an INF agreement by using a "legal sham" to justify excluding 72 Pershing 1A nuclear warheads from such an agreement.

AUGUST 26, 1987

With Soviet acceptance of the U.S. proposal that both countries eliminate all their ground-based LRINF and SRINF missiles, U.S. negotiators in Geneva offer a revised proposal for verification of an INF agreement.

The new American plan differs from the older plan:

1. It drops a provision that inspectors be based outside missile production and assembly sites to count the missiles that leave the factory. This provision is no longer needed because production, flight testing and modernization would be banned under "double global zero."
2. The new plan also limits challenge inspections to facilities where medium- and shorter-range missiles are kept to make sure that they are being eliminated, as required.
3. There could also be suspect-site inspections at facilities in the United States and Soviet Union that are used for long-range, ground-based ballistic missiles to ensure that no medium-range or shorter-range missiles are hidden there.

AUGUST 26, 1987

Chancellor Kohl of the Federal Republic of Germany announces that West Germany will dismantle its 72 shorter-range INF Pershing 1A missiles, and will not replace them with more modern weapons, if the United States and the Soviet Union:

1. Eliminate all of their own LRINF and SRINF missiles as foreseen under the proposed INF treaty.
2. Adhere to whatever schedule is agreed to for eliminating their missiles.
3. Comply with the terms of the treaty.

AUGUST 27, 1987

The Soviet Union welcomes Chancellor Kohl's statement. A spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry says the possibility of concluding a new superpower arms agreement is now "realistic," and he welcomes the latest American proposal on verifying such a treaty. He adds that the Soviet Union now sees "no problems" in assuring that both sides comply.

SEPTEMBER 14, 1987

At the INF negotiations in Geneva, the U.S. presents an Inspection Protocol detailing the procedures it considers necessary to effectively verify compliance with an INF treaty that provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

The new U.S. proposals call for the most stringent verification regime in arms control history. Key elements of the proposal include:

1. The requirement that all INF missiles and launchers be geographically fixed in agreed areas or in announced transit between such areas during the reductions period.
2. A detailed exchange of data, updated as necessary, on the location of missile support facilities and missile operating bases, the number of missiles and launchers at those facilities and bases, and technical parameters of those missile systems.
3. Notification of movement of missiles and launchers between declared facilities.
4. A baseline on-site inspection to verify the number of missiles and launchers at declared missile support facilities and missile operating bases prior to elimination.
5. On-site inspection to verify the destruction of missiles and launchers.
6. Follow-on, short-notice inspection of declared facilities during the reductions period to verify residual levels until all missiles are eliminated.
7. Short-notice, mandatory challenge inspection of certain facilities in the U.S. and U.S.S.R. at which banned missile activity could be carried out.
8. A requirement for a separate "close out" inspection to ensure that when a site is deactivated and removed from the list of declared facilities, it has indeed ended INF-associated activity.

SEPTEMBER 18, 1987

Following a meeting in Washington, Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze announce that the U.S. and the Soviet Union have reached agreement in principle to conclude an INF treaty.

The U.S. and Soviet Geneva delegations are instructed to work intensively to resolve remaining technical issues and to complete promptly a draft INF treaty text.

It is announced that -- in order to sign a treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and to cover the full range of issues in the relationship between the two countries -- a summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will be held in the fall of 1987. Exact dates are to be determined during talks in October.

OCTOBER 22-24, 1987

At a meeting in Moscow between senior U.S. and Soviet officials, progress is made on concluding an INF treaty. General Secretary Gorbachev refuses to set a date for a U.S.-Soviet summit.

OCTOBER 29, 1987

Reversing its position, the Soviet Union announces that it has agreed with the U.S. on the terms of a summit meeting to take place before the end of the year.

Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze arrives in Washington for talks with President Reagan and Secretary of State Shultz.

OCTOBER 30, 1987

During meetings between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the United States and the Soviet Union agree that General Secretary Gorbachev will visit Washington beginning December 7, 1987, and that he and President Reagan will sign a treaty which would eliminate an entire class of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles.

Shultz and Shevardnadze also agree to keep in close touch with their respective delegations in Geneva to ensure rapid progress toward completion of the INF treaty.

OCTOBER 31, 1987

President Reagan announces that General Secretary Gorbachev has accepted his invitation to come to Washington for a summit, beginning on December 7. At that time, the U.S. and the Soviet Union expect to sign an agreement eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet ground launched intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

NOVEMBER 3, 1987

NATO defense ministers, meeting at Monterey, California, give strong support for U.S. INF treaty proposals.

NOVEMBER 24, 1987

The U.S. and the Soviet Union announce that they have resolved their remaining differences over the INF treaty. "We have now completed agreement on all outstanding INF issues," Secretary of State Shultz says.

DECEMBER 8, 1987

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev sign the INF Treaty at a White House ceremony. The President calls the Treaty "historic both for its objective -- the complete elimination of an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms -- and for the innovative character and scope of its verification provisions...." The President also says "the Treaty is a vital contribution to greater stability."

1988

JANUARY 25, 1988

President Reagan transmits the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Hearings begin before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

A STRONGER, SAFER, MORALLY PREFERABLE BASIS FOR DETERRENCE

*Presidential Statement Marking
the Fifth Anniversary
of the Strategic Defense Initiative
Washington, D.C.
March 23, 1988*

Today marks the fifth anniversary of a program vital to our future security. On March 23, 1983, in announcing our Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI -- I put forward the vision of a safer and more secure future for our children and our grandchildren, a future free from the threat of the most dangerous weapon mankind has invented: fast-flying ballistic missiles.

It was on that date that I challenged our best and brightest scientific minds to undertake a rigorous program of research, development and testing to find a way to keep the peace through defensive systems which threaten no one. If we can accomplish this, and I am more and more convinced that we can, we will no longer have to face a future that relies on the threat of nuclear retaliation to ensure our security.

The Soviets not only are ahead of us in ballistic missiles, but also are deeply engaged in their own SDI-like program. If they are allowed to keep their near monopoly in defenses, we will be left without an effective means to protect our cherished freedoms in the future. But with our own investigation of defenses well underway, we have been able to propose to the Soviets at our arms negotiations in Geneva that both of us protect our nations through increasingly effective defenses, even as we cut back deeply our strategic offensive arms.

SDI, in fact, provided a valuable incentive for the Soviets to return to the bargaining table and to negotiate seriously over strategic arms reductions. And as we move toward lower levels of offense, it will be all the more important to have an effective defense.

The SDI program is progressing technologically even faster than we expected. We have demonstrated the feasibility of intercepting an attacker's ballistic missiles. We have made rapid progress on sensors, the eyes and ears of a future defensive system. And our research has produced useful spinoffs for conventional defenses and for medicine, air traffic control and high speed computing.

The problems we face now are largely political. Every year, Congress has cut back the SDI budget. We are now one to two years behind schedule. Some of our critics question SDI because they believe we are going too fast and doing too much, while others say we should move now to deploy limited defenses -- perhaps to protect our own missiles. While such a defense may initially strengthen today's uneasy balance, SDI's goal is to create a stronger, safer and morally preferable basis for deterrence by making ballistic missiles obsolete. Thus, we seek to establish truly comprehensive defenses, defenses which will protect the American people and our allies.

The American people can never be satisfied with a strategic situation where, to keep the peace, we rely on a threat of vengeance. And we must recognize that we live in an imperfect, often violent world, one in which ballistic missile technology is proliferating despite our efforts to prevent this. We would be doing a grave and dangerous disservice to future generations if we assumed that national leaders everywhere, for all time, will be both peaceful and rational.

The challenge before us is of course difficult. But, with SDI, we are showing already that we have the technological know-how, the courage and the patience to change the course of human history.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

"What is totally unacceptable is the Soviet tactic of holding...reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative.... We won't bargain away SDI."

President Reagan
November 4, 1987

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers our best hope of a safer world -- where our security and that of our allies would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

The Reagan Administration has had a well-defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

This strategy has three key elements:

- Modernization of our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;
- Pursuit of deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms; and
- The search, through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, for a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance our security.

SDI is a research and technology program to demonstrate, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight -- boost, mid-course, and terminal.

-- Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."

SDI serves a number of vital purposes:

- Through SDI, we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression based on systems protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.
- SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late-1983 walkout.

-- SDI underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.

-- SDI provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to the President's proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.

Even if 50 percent strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further.

-- Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic threats -- nuclear, conventional, or chemical -- from outlaw countries.

-- The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about \$12,000 million, or approximately \$13.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs.

-- In contrast to our own far more modest expenditures, the Soviets have spent roughly \$200,000 million on their strategic defense programs over the last 10 years, roughly the same as they have spent on their strategic offensive forces.

The Soviets' programs include:

-- The world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses, surrounding Moscow, which the Soviets are steadily improving;

-- Construction of a large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and

-- Research, development, and testing, including a \$1,000 million annual program on laser weapons employing some 10,000 skilled scientists and engineers.

We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses. Possessed by both sides, strategic defense systems can be stabilizing and reduce the threat of war. Possessed by the Soviets alone, such systems would threaten peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent. This would be devastating to Western security.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC ARMS: START NEGOTIATIONS

APRIL 1988

Background:

The U.S. places high priority on reaching an agreement to achieve -- for the first time in history -- deep reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. Such an agreement is possible this year if the Soviets share our constructive approach to negotiations.

Following an in-depth review in 1981 of U.S. security and arms control policies, President Reagan decided to seek significant reductions in strategic forces rather than mere limitations on future growth, which had been the result of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT). To this end, the U.S. proposed the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START), which began in Geneva in June 1982.

U.S. objective:

Our basic goal in these talks has remained unchanged. We seek an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement that enhances stability and reduces the risk of war through deep reductions in strategic nuclear arsenals and reduced reliance on those systems that are most destabilizing -- ballistic missiles, especially heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.

Early negotiations (1982-1983):

Our initial proposal called for the reduction of deployed strategic ballistic missile warheads to 5,000 for each side, with sublimits on land-based ICBM warheads, deployed strategic ballistic missiles and heavy ICBMs. We also called for substantial reductions in ballistic missile throw-weight, equal ceilings on heavy bombers and limits on other strategic systems. In July 1983 we presented a draft treaty reflecting our initial proposal while taking into consideration several Soviet concerns -- for example, we adjusted the limit on deployed ballistic missiles.

The Soviet response was disappointing. While reducing the number of strategic delivery vehicles, the Soviet approach permitted substantial growth in the number of ballistic missile warheads. It made no distinction between fast, accurate ballistic missiles and slow-flying systems such as bombers that, in the case of the U.S., face unconstrained Soviet defenses.

These talks ended in December 1983 with Soviet refusal to set a date for resumption because of "a change in the strategic situation" -- NATO deployment of intermediate-range nuclear (INF) missiles in response to Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles, which threatened Western security. In March 1985, the START talks resumed in Geneva as part of the Nuclear and Space Talks, which also included INF and defense and space issues.

Continuing negotiations (1985-present):

After the talks resumed, progress was slowed by Soviet insistence on placing unacceptable limits on the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as a precondition to progress in the strategic arms area. Nevertheless, the Soviets did accept for the first time the principle, long advocated by the U.S., of deep reductions in strategic weapons. At the November 1985 Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to build on common ground in the talks, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in strategic nuclear weapons.

In October 1986, the U.S. presented a new proposal in Geneva that incorporated areas of agreement reached by the two leaders at the Reykjavik Summit earlier that month, including reductions in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles to 1,600 for each side, with no more than 6,000 warheads on these vehicles. A Soviet proposal in November only partially reflected the headway made at Reykjavik. In May 1987, the U.S. presented a draft treaty that, building on the progress at Reykjavik, called for a 50 percent reduction of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. The subsequent Soviet draft treaty also called for 50 percent reductions, but important differences remained.

At the December 1987 Washington Summit, the two leaders agreed to instruct their negotiators to work toward completion of a treaty at the earliest possible date. They told the negotiators to build on those areas of agreement that already exist, specifically: 50 percent reductions to ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles; 6,000 warheads on these delivery vehicles; 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ballistic missiles; the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament; and reduction of throw-weight to a level not to exceed 50 percent of the current Soviet level. The leaders made further progress, agreeing on a 4,900 sublimit for the total number of ballistic missile warheads, declaration of the number of warheads on existing ballistic missiles, and -- drawing from the unprecedented verification system of the just-signed INF Treaty -- guidelines for effective verification.

Current U.S. START proposal:

The U.S. draft treaty before the negotiators includes the following elements:

- 50 percent reductions to 6,000 warheads on 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles;
- Sublimit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads;
- Sublimit of 3,000-3,300 warheads on ICBMs;
- Limit of 1,540 warheads on heavy ICBMs with a ban on further production, modernization, or flight testing of these missiles;
- Reduction of Soviet throw-weight by 50 percent to a new level applicable to both sides;
- Ban on mobile ICBMs;
- Protocols detailing effective verification procedures; and
- Memorandum of Understanding for detailed data exchange.

Prospects:

Several important differences between the sides remain, including such issues as mobile ICBMs, a warhead sublimit on ICBMs, sea-launched cruise missiles and the details of an effective verification system. Also, the Soviets continue to link agreement on strategic arms reductions to U.S. acceptance of measures that would cripple SDI. The U.S. has repeatedly told the Soviets that such linkage is unacceptable.

A START treaty can be concluded this year, but not without much hard work and constructive negotiating. We will continue to do our part to achieve an equitable and effectively verifiable treaty for deep cuts in strategic nuclear arms.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

THE CASE FOR START SUBLIMITS

MAY 13, 1988

In the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) the U.S. and the Soviet Union are negotiating deep reductions in their strategic offensive arsenals. The U.S. objective is to achieve reductions that reduce the risk of war by enhancing strategic stability in an effectively verifiable way.

BACKGROUND

The broad outline of a START agreement has been clear for some time. During the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to 50 percent cuts in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms to levels not to exceed 6,000 nuclear warheads on 1,600 deployed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers.

Deep reductions in themselves do not guarantee enhanced stability or a reduction in the risk of war. Some weapons are more dangerous and destabilizing than others. Ballistic missiles, in particular, are better suited for first-strike missions than slower-flying cruise missiles and bombers because they combine accuracy with very short flight times. Fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles are of special concern. They not only have the accuracy and speed necessary to attack hardened targets, such as missile silos, but are themselves vulnerable to attack. This vulnerability could lead military planners to use their land-based systems in a preemptive strike, rather than lose them to an anticipated enemy first-strike. This vulnerability also distinguishes ICBMs from SLBMs, which are more survivable and, therefore, more stabilizing. "Heavy" ICBMs, which carry or have the potential to carry many warheads, are our greatest concern from the standpoint of stability. The Soviet SS-18 has more than double the throw-weight of the largest U.S. ICBM, the Peacekeeper.

PROGRESS ON SUBLIMITS

We have tried to ensure that strategic reductions result in force structures better suited for retaliatory rather than first-strike capability. The key to achieving this objective is to establish sublimits on the most destabilizing strategic systems -- those that pose the most severe threat to the deterrent forces of the other side. Properly formulated, such sublimits can ensure that strategic reductions and the resulting force ceilings increase strategic stability.

Since the beginning of the START talks in 1982, the U.S. has pressed for sublimits on the more destabilizing categories of strategic weaponry. While progress has been slow, we have

made headway. At the Washington Summit in December 1987, both sides agreed to limit their ballistic missile warheads to 4,900 within the aggregate of 6,000 nuclear warheads on their 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. This was a very important step; it ensures that deployed submarine-launched and land-based ballistic missile warheads will be strictly limited in a START agreement. And it provides that the remainder of the 6,000 warheads allowed after reductions could be carried only on heavy bombers, which are slower than missiles. Because strategic bombers are inherently retaliatory systems, ill-suited for first-strike missions, they help to stability.

Both sides have also agreed to a sublimit of 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs. This sublimit would require the Soviets to reduce their heavy ICBM force of SS-18s, missiles capable of carrying 10 or more warheads each, by 50 percent. This reduction is particularly important because of the serious first-strike capability posed by Soviet heavy ICBMs: the U.S. has no comparable system. The agreed sublimit contributes to stability by reducing the number of warheads on these missiles.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

Beyond these two sublimits, there remain major differences. Because land-based ICBMs are particularly destabilizing, the U.S. has proposed a sublimit of 3,000-3,300 warheads on land-based ICBMs. The U.S. prefers the level be set at 3,000, but offers the compromise proposal of 3,300 warheads. The ICBM warhead sublimit reflects our goal to constrain the most destabilizing systems.

The Soviet Union has not agreed to the U.S. approach. Instead, the Soviets have proposed warhead sublimits of 3,300 on both ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as a sublimit of 1,100 on bomber-carried weapons.

These new Soviet proposals reflect an approach that is fundamentally different from our own. The U.S. approach includes the concept of permitting evolution toward more stabilizing systems. For example, under the U.S. proposal, a side could have a maximum of 3,000-3,300 ICBM warheads, but would be permitted to have fewer, substituting more stabilizing bomber weapons or SLBM warheads for ICBM warheads. Thus, the U.S. approach allows for a gradual shift away from the current excessive Soviet reliance on dangerous and destabilizing systems. By contrast, the Soviet position permits no such flexibility on this issue. The U.S. continues to believe that a sublimit on ICBM warheads of 3,000-3,300 is critical to achieving the goal of a safer, more stable strategic balance that meets the security interests of both sides. We believe there is no reason the Soviets cannot agree to this limit and will continue to pursue this issue at the negotiating table in Geneva.

Soviet Noncompliance With Arms Control Agreements



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

December 2, 1987

Following is the President's unclassified report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements along with his letter of transmittal to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and to the President of the Senate on December 2, 1987.

Transmittal Letter

Dear Mr. Speaker (Dear Mr. President):

In response to congressional requests as set forth in Public Law 99-145, I am forwarding herewith classified and unclassified versions of the Administration's report to the Congress on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. (Detailed classified briefings will be available to the Congress in the near future.)

The information contained in this report, in addition to that provided in our previous reports, is essential to understanding the problems we face in seeking to achieve sound, equitable and verifiable agreements for arms reductions that will strengthen our security and that of our allies.

The Soviet Union to date has not corrected its noncompliance activities. Indeed, since the last report, there has been an additional case of Soviet violation of the ABM [Anti-Ballistic Missile] Treaty in the deployment of an ABM radar at Gomel, and other violations are continuing.

No violation of a treaty can be considered to be a minor matter, nor can there be confidence in agreements if a country can pick and choose which provisions of an agreement it will comply with. The Gomel violation can be quickly corrected by the Soviet Union if it so chooses. We are urging them to take the actions needed to do so, and to resolve other longstanding violations, especially that of their radar

located at Krasnoyarsk. Correcting their violations will be a true test of Soviet willingness to enter a more constructive relationship and broaden the basis for cooperation between our two countries on security matters.

I am confident the Congress fully shares my concern about Soviet noncompliance. Congressional support and consensus on this issue is an essential element of our efforts to secure corrective actions, and pursue the kind of arms reductions agreements that will best serve the interests of the United States and the world.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

Unclassified Report

At the request of Congress, I am submitting this report on Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements. This report represents another in a series of reports to Congress by this Administration regarding this serious issue. The series includes reports dated January 1984, February and December 1985, March 1987, and the 1984 report on Soviet noncompliance prepared for me by the independent General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. Each of these reports has enumerated and documented, in detail, issues of Soviet noncompliance and our attempts to resolve the issues. Likewise, this report addresses questions of Soviet noncompliance with existing

arms control agreements, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT). Now that we have put the SALT I [strategic arms limitation talks] Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty behind us, Soviet activities with respect to those agreements are not treated in this report. I will report on the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) at a later date. The provisions of the Helsinki Final Act that relate to military security and confidence-building have been superseded by the Stockholm Document, a development that is treated later in this introduction. When taken as a whole, this series of reports provides a clear picture of continuing Soviet violations and forms the basis for our concern that future agreements must be effectively verifiable and complied with.

In the December 23, 1985, report, I stated:

The Administration's most recent studies support its conclusion that there is a pattern of Soviet noncompliance. As documented in this and previous reports, the Soviet Union has violated its legal obligation under or political commitment to the SALT I ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement, the SALT II Agreement, the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, and the Helsinki Final Act. In addition, the U.S.S.R. has likely violated provisions of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.

I further stated:

At the same time as the Administration has reported its concerns and findings

to the Congress, the United States has had extensive exchanges with the Soviet Union on Soviet noncompliance in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where SALT-related issues (including ABM issues) are discussed, and through other appropriate diplomatic channels.

The compliance concerns enumerated in this report are not unfamiliar to the Soviet Union. I expressed my personal interest in these issues directly to General Secretary Gorbachev during my meetings with him, both in 1985 in Geneva and then again in Reykjavik in October 1986. In addition, the Standing Consultative Commission discusses compliance concerns in detail during its biannual sessions. The classified report includes detailed summaries of this SCC dialogue. Most recently, Secretary of State Shultz raised U.S. concerns about Soviet noncompliance during his October 1987 visit to Moscow.

Additional time has passed and, despite these continuing intensive efforts and the critical stage we have entered in the negotiation of arms reductions of historic proportion, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliant activities; neither have they provided explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns on other compliance issues. Indeed, recent Soviet activities at an electronics facility at Gomel have raised an additional compliance issue with regard to the ABM Treaty.

Compliance with treaty obligations is a cornerstone of international law; States are to observe and comply with obligations they have freely undertaken. In fact, in December 1985, the General Assembly of the United Nations recognized the importance of treaty compliance for future arms control, when, by a vote of 131-0 (with 16 abstentions), it passed a resolution that:

- Urges all parties to arms limitation and disarmament agreements to comply with their provisions;
- Calls upon those parties to consider the implications of noncompliance for international security and stability and for the prospects for further progress in the field of disarmament; and
- Appeals to all UN members to support efforts to resolve non-compliance questions "with a view toward encouraging strict observance of the provisions subscribed to and maintaining or restoring the integrity of arms limitation or disarmament agreements."

Congress has made clear its concern about Soviet noncompliance with

arms control agreements. In February 1987, the Senate passed a resolution (S. Res. 94), by a vote of 93 to 2, which:

...declares that an important obstacle to the achievement of acceptable arms control agreements with the Soviet Union has been its violations of existing agreements, and calls upon it to take steps to rectify its violation of such agreements and, in particular, to dismantle the newly-constructed radar site at Krasnoyarsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, since it is a clear violation of the terms of the Anti-Ballistic Treaty....

The Senate repeated its call for dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar in a resolution dated September 16, 1987. For its part, the House of Representatives, on May 6, 1987, voted 418 to 0 in support of a resolution (an amend to H.R. 1748) recognizing that by constructing the Krasnoyarsk radar, the Soviet Union was in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty.

Compliance with arms control commitments remains an essential element of my arms control policy. As I have stated before:

In order for arms control to have meaning and credibly contribute to national security...it is essential that all parties to agreements fully comply with them. Strict compliance with all provisions of arms control agreements is fundamental, and this Administration will not accept anything less.

I have also said that:

Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter. It calls into question important security benefits from arms control, and could create new security risks. It undermines the confidence essential to an effective arms control process in the future....The United States Government has vigorously pressed, and will continue to press, these compliance issues with the Soviet Union through diplomatic channels.

Despite these continuous efforts, I regret to report that during the period since my last report, the Soviet Union has failed to correct its noncompliance activity or to provide explanations sufficient to alleviate our concerns. Soviet explanations and actions are fully described in the report. The report presents and distinguishes between both violations and possibly noncompliant actions which are historical in nature and instances of ongoing and new non-compliant behavior.

The ABM Treaty

We continue to have deep concerns about Soviet noncompliance with the ABM Treaty. One of our principal con-

cerns is with the Krasnoyarsk radar, which is a clear violation of the Treaty. The radar demonstrates that the Soviets were designing and programming a prospective violation of the ABM Treaty even while they were negotiating a new agreement on strategic offensive weapons with the United States.

The only permitted functions for a large, phased-array radar (LPA) with a location and orientation such as that of the Krasnoyarsk radar would be space-tracking and national technical means (NTM) of verification. Based on conclusive evidence, however, we judge that this radar is primarily designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking, not for space-tracking and NTM as the Soviets claim. Moreover, the coverage of the Krasnoyarsk radar closes a major gap in the coverage of the Soviet ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking screen. Its location allows it to provide warning of a ballistic missile attack, to acquire attack characterization data that will enable the Soviet strategic forces to respond in a timely manner and that could aid in planning the battle for Soviet defensive forces.

All LPAs, such as the Krasnoyarsk radar, have the inherent capability to track large numbers of objects accurately. Thus, they not only could perform as ballistic missile detection, warning, and tracking radars, but also have an inherent technical potential, depending on location and orientation, of contributing to ABM battle management.

LPAs have always been considered to be the long lead-time element of a possible territorial defense. Taken together, the Krasnoyarsk radar and other Soviet ABM-related activities give us concern that the Soviet Union may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory. Some of the activities, such as the construction of new LPAs on the periphery of the Soviet Union and the upgrade of the Moscow ABM system, appear to be consistent with the ABM Treaty. The redundancy in coverage provided by these new radars and the disposition of these radars closely resembles the design of the U.S. Safeguard ABM program. The construction of the radar near Krasnoyarsk and the deployment of a Flat Twin and a Pawn Shop outside a permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test range are violations of the ABM Treaty. Other Soviet ABM-related activities involve potential or probable Soviet violations or other ambiguous activity. These

other issues, discussed fully in the body of the report, are:

- The testing and development of components required for an ABM system that could be deployed to a site in months rather than years and the movement of parts of Flat Twin and Pawn Shop to a new location;
- The concurrent operation of air defense components and ABM components;
- The development of modern air defense systems that may have some ABM capabilities;
- The demonstration of an ability to reload ABM launchers in a period of time short enough to cause us concern as to Soviet capabilities and intent; and
- The locating of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop at a location that is neither a permitted ABM deployment area nor an agreed test range.

Soviet activities during the past year have contributed to our concerns. Construction is continuing on three additional LPARs similar to the Krasnoyarsk radar. These new radars are located near the periphery of the western U.S.S.R. and oriented consistent with the ABM Treaty's provisions on ballistic missile early warning radars (if they are for early warning). The primary mission of these radars is ballistic missile detection and tracking.

The Soviets have sought recently to convey the impression that they are addressing our concerns in a responsible fashion, but have not taken any actions which, in fact, redress our concerns regarding their possible preparation of a territorial defense. For example, on September 5, 1987, a U.S. congressional delegation was permitted to visit the Krasnoyarsk radar. Although the Soviet invitation represented a departure from the long Soviet history of secrecy in such matters, the observations of the congressional delegation regarding the stage of construction, the quality of construction, and other features of the radar in no way change the assessment that the radar is designed for ballistic missile detection and tracking. The radar is unquestionably an LPAR, whose location and orientation are inconsistent with the ABM Treaty.

In recent years, we have gathered an increased amount of evidence on activities that could be associated with Soviet concurrent operations. This may or may not indicate an increase in Soviet concurrent operations. Also of significant concern is the initial deployment in the western U.S.S.R. to Soviet ground forces of the SA-12 defensive system, a variant of which has been tested against tactical ballistic missiles and may have some ABM capability.

Our continuing reexamination of Soviet ABM-related activities demonstrates that the Soviets have not corrected their outstanding violation, the Krasnoyarsk radar. With regard to Krasnoyarsk, on October 23, General Secretary Gorbachev told Secretary of State Shultz that the Soviets were imposing a 1-year construction moratorium on Krasnoyarsk. Although activities at Krasnoyarsk continue to be noted, the remaining work needed on the radar is interior work, so that it would be difficult to ascertain whether the Soviets have, indeed, ceased construction at the site.

The absence of Soviet dismantlement of the Krasnoyarsk radar, the new violation in the deployment of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop observed at Gomel, and the totality of Soviet ABM-related activities in 1987 and previous years suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

The Soviet Union clearly continues to increase its capability to deploy an ABM defense. The Soviet programs involved a much greater investment of plant space, capital, and manpower than comparable U.S. programs. As I said in the December 1985 report, a unilateral Soviet ABM defense:

... would have profound implications for... the vital East-West... balance. A unilateral Soviet territorial ABM capability acquired in violation of the ABM Treaty could erode our deterrent and leave doubts about its credibility.

Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

The integrity of the arms control process is also hurt by Soviet violations of the 1925 Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Information obtained in 1987 does nothing to allay our concern about Soviet noncompliance with these important agreements. Progress toward an agreement banning chemical weapons is affected by Soviet noncompliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. Because of the record of Soviet noncompliance with past agreements, we believe verification provisions are a matter of unprecedented importance in our efforts to rid the world of these heinous weapons—weapons of mass destruction under international law.

The United States has determined that the Soviet Union has maintained an active offensive biological warfare

(BW) program and capability. Until recently, the Soviet Union has never acknowledged that it conducted even permitted BW-related activities, other than to say that it had been in compliance with its obligations under the BWC.

As a result of the 1986 BWC Review Conference, states party to the Convention agreed to exchange information on facilities built for high-risk (high-containment) biological experiments and facilities engaged in other activities relating to the Convention. The Soviet submission is an unprecedented public declaration of permitted Soviet BW-related facilities and is a welcome step.

An example of the discrepancy between Soviet public and private arms control diplomacy is the recent Soviet treatment of our concerns regarding an outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk in 1979. The United States has evidence that the outbreak occurred as a result of an accidental release of large quantities of anthrax spores from a prohibited BW facility, contributing to our concerns about the Soviet BW program. We have raised the issue repeatedly with the Soviets as early as March 1980 and have been told that the outbreak stemmed from the consumption of contaminated meat.

Since the 1986 BWC Review Conference, the Soviets have provided additional details regarding the incident in various informal public fora. However, the Soviet account is inconsistent with information available to us and, in many aspects, is not consistent with a contaminated meat explanation.

Again, while we welcome the provision of new information and the opportunity to discuss these issues, our concerns regarding the Soviet biological warfare program and capability are unassuaged. The Soviets have maintained a prohibited offensive biological warfare capability. It may include advanced biological agents about which we have little knowledge and against which we have no defense. The Soviets continue to expand their chemical and toxin warfare capabilities, contrary to their public claims. Neither NATO retaliatory nor defensive programs can begin to match the Soviet effort. And, even though there have been no confirmed reports of attacks with lethal chemical, biological or toxin agents since 1984, previous activities have provided the Soviets with valuable testing, development, and operational experience.

Nuclear Testing

The record of Soviet noncompliance with the treaties on nuclear testing is

of legal and military concern. Since the Limited Test Ban Treaty came into force over 20 years ago, the Soviet Union has conducted its nuclear weapons test program in a manner incompatible with the aims of the Treaty. That conduct regularly resulted in the release of nuclear debris into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. When the Soviets ended their unilateral nuclear testing moratorium on February 26, 1987, they resumed their pattern of noncompliance with treaties on nuclear testing by conducting the test in a way which resulted in the release of radioactive matter into the atmosphere beyond the borders of the U.S.S.R. Even though the material from these Soviet tests does not pose calculable health, safety or environmental risks, and these infractions have no apparent military significance, our repeated attempts to discuss these occurrences with Soviet authorities have been rebuffed. The United States presented demarches to the Soviets on two separate occasions of unambiguous venting in 1987 and received completely unacceptable explanations. Soviet refusal to discuss this matter calls into question their sincerity on the whole range of arms control agreements.

During their 1985-86 moratorium, the Soviets undoubtedly maintained their test sites because they quickly resumed testing and have since conducted a series of tests. One of these tests raised sufficient concern about Soviet compliance with the 150 kt limit of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty that the United States raised the issue with the Soviets.

In the March 1987 report we reaffirmed the December 1985 U.S. Government judgment that, "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." We also reported that the finding would stand until a number of studies, which had been initiated in an attempt to provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing Soviet compliance, could be completed. While significant progress has been made on those technically difficult issues, we do not expect to provide an update until next spring.

The United States and the Soviet Union have met several times at the experts level to discuss the broad range of issues relating to nuclear testing. In a joint statement issued at the time of the September 1987 meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, the two sides indicated their intention to

design and conduct joint verification experiments at each other's test sites. On November 9, 1987, the United States and Soviet Union began full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations in which the first step is to agree on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.-U.S.S.R. TTBT and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET). As a result of this first round of discussions, arrangements are being made for preliminary visits to each side's test sites.

The Helsinki Final Act

The accord reached at the 1986 Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures [and Disarmament in Europe], containing new standards for notification, observation, and verification of military activities, including onsite inspection, went into effect January 1, 1987. To date, Soviet military activity forecasts, subsequent notifications, and the acceptance of requests for two inspections have been consistent with their obligations under the new agreement. The Soviets have provided the minimum information required and have, therefore, remained within the scope of their obligations. In view of this and without any new evidence, this compliance issue will not be treated in this report. However, we have exercised our prerogative for onsite inspection and will be carefully monitoring Soviet compliance with these new standards. While this accord appears to be a step in the right direction, we must continue to seek further confidence- and security-building measures.

Compliance and Arms Control

A consistent and fundamental priority of my Administration has been achieving deep and equitable reductions in the nuclear offensive arsenals of the United States and U.S.S.R. That goal is closer to reality than it has ever been in the history of mankind, but it will be achieved only if effective verification and total compliance are integral elements of the process, both with respect to existing arms control agreements and possible new ones.

We must insist on effective verification of the provisions of these new agreements, respond appropriately to any Soviet noncompliance, and continue to make our strategic decisions based on the nature and magnitude of the So-

viet threat. A double standard of compliance with arms control obligations is unacceptable.

I look forward to continued close consultations with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

The findings on Soviet non-compliance with arms control agreements follow.

THE FINDINGS

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

Treaty Status

The 1972 ABM Treaty and its Protocol ban deployment of ABM systems except that each Party is permitted to deploy one ABM system around its national capital area or, alternatively, at a single ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] deployment area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in accord with the ABM Treaty are, therefore, violations of a legal obligation.

1. The Krasnoyarsk Radar

• **Obligation:** To preclude the development of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial ABM defense, the ABM Treaty provides that radars for early warning of ballistic missile attack may be deployed only at locations along the periphery of the national territory of each Party and that they be oriented outward. The Treaty permits deployment (without regard to location or orientation) of large phased-array radars for purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification of compliance with arms control agreements.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined the issue of whether the Krasnoyarsk radar meets the provisions of the ABM Treaty governing phased-array radars. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the conclusion in the March 1987 report that the new large phased-array radar under construction at Krasnoyarsk constitutes a violation of legal obligations under the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in that in its associated siting, orientation, and capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty. Construction continued in 1987. The absence of credible alternative explanations has reinforced our assess-

ment of its purpose. Despite U.S. requests, no corrective action has been taken. This and other ABM-related activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

2. Mobility of ABM System Components

• **Obligation:** Paragraph 1 of Article V of the ABM Treaty prohibits the development, testing, or deployment of mobile land-based ABM systems or components.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed a mobile land-based ABM system, or components for such a system, in violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue and considered the impact of the Soviet actions at Gomel.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 report that the evidence on Soviet actions with respect to ABM component mobility is ambiguous, but that the U.S.S.R.'s development and testing of components of an ABM system, which apparently are designed to be deployable at sites requiring relatively limited special-purpose site preparation, represent a potential violation of its legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. The recent movement of parts of a Flat Twin and Pawn Shop reinforces our concerns about ABM system component mobility. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

3. Concurrent Testing of ABM and Air Defense Components

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and its Protocol limit the Parties to one ABM deployment area. In addition to the ABM systems and components at that one deployment area, the Parties may have ABM systems and components for development and testing purposes so long as they are located at agreed test ranges. The Treaty also prohibits giving components, other than ABM system components, the capability "to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory" and prohibits the Parties from testing them "in an ABM mode." The Parties agreed that the concurrent testing of SAM [surface-to-air missile] and ABM system components is prohibited.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has concurrently tested SAM and ABM sys-

tem components in violation of its legal obligation since 1978 not to do so. It was the purpose of that obligation to further constrain testing of air defense systems in an ABM mode. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to concurrent operations is insufficient fully to assess compliance with Soviet obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, the Soviet Union has conducted tests that have involved air defense radars in ABM-related activities. The large number, and consistency over time, of incidents of concurrent operation of ABM and SAM components, plus Soviet failure to accommodate fully U.S. concerns, indicate the U.S.S.R. probably has violated the prohibition on testing SAM components in an ABM mode. In several cases this may be highly probable. This and other ABM-related activities suggest the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

4. ABM Capability of Modern SAM Systems

• **Obligation:** Under subparagraph (a) of Article VI of the ABM Treaty, each Party undertakes not to give non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars "capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, and not to test them in an ABM mode...."

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has tested a SAM system or component in an ABM mode or given it the capability to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory in violation of their legal obligation under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the evidence of Soviet actions with respect to SAM upgrade is insufficient to assess compliance with the Soviet Union's obligations under the ABM Treaty. However, this and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

5. Rapid Reload of ABM Launchers

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty limits to 100 the number of deployed ABM

interceptor launchers and deployed interceptor missiles at launch sites. It does not limit the number of interceptor missiles that can be built and stockpiled. Paragraph 2, Article V, of the Treaty prohibits the development, testing or deployment of "automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload" of the permitted launchers.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviet Union has developed, tested, or deployed automatic, semi-automatic, or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers in violation of its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that, on the basis of the evidence available, the U.S.S.R.'s actions with respect to the rapid reload of ABM launchers constitute an ambiguous situation as concerns its legal obligations under the ABM Treaty not to develop systems for rapid reload. The Soviet Union's reload capabilities are a serious concern. These and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

6. ABM Components at Gomel

• **Obligation:** To preclude the deployment of a territorial defense or providing the base for a territorial defense, the ABM Treaty provides that ABM components cannot be deployed outside of the one permitted ABM system deployment area or designated ABM test ranges for any purpose.

• **Issue:** In March 1987, the U.S. Government observed the appearance of major parts of the original Flat Twin radar, including all of the modular sections of the radar body, and a Pawn Shop van at an electronics plant in Gomel, about 550 kilometers southwest of Moscow. The timing of the arrival of parts of the Flat Twin and Pawn Shop indicates that they came from the radars that were removed from the Sary Shagan Missile Test Center where, by January 1987, the Soviets were observed disassembling a number of these ABM components. U.S. concern regarding the issue of mobile ABM components previously raised with the Soviets could be exacerbated by this Soviet action.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government finds that the U.S.S.R.'s activities with respect to moving a Flat Twin ABM radar and a Pawn Shop van, a component of an ABM system, from a test

range and initiating deployment at a location outside of an ABM deployment area or ABM test range constitute a violation of the ABM Treaty. While it is not likely that the actions at Gomel are to support an ABM defense at that locality, deployment of such radars at Gomel to carry out any function is inconsistent with ABM Treaty obligations. This and other ABM-related Soviet activities suggest that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

7. ABM Territorial Defense

• **Obligation:** The ABM Treaty and Protocol allow each Party a single deployment area, explicitly permit modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components, and explicitly recognize the existence of ABM test ranges for the development and testing of ABM components. The ABM Treaty prohibits, however, the deployment of an ABM system for defense of the national territory of the Parties and prohibits the Parties from providing a base for such a defense.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviets have deployed an ABM system for the defense of their territory or provided a base for such a defense. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment of the March 1987 report that the aggregate of the Soviet Union's ABM and ABM-related actions (e.g., radar construction, concurrent testing, SAM upgrade, ABM rapid reload, ABM mobility, and deployment of ABM components to Gomel) suggests that the U.S.S.R. may be preparing an ABM defense of its national territory.

Biological Weapons Convention and 1925 Geneva Protocol

Chemical, Biological and Toxin Weapons

• **Treaty Status:** The 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral treaties to which both the United States and the Soviet Union are Parties. Soviet action not in accord with these treaties and customary interna-

tional law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol are violations of legal obligations.

• **Obligation:** The BWC bans the development, production, stockpiling or possession, and transfer of microbial or other biological toxins except for a small quantity for prophylactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes. It imposes the same obligations in relation to weapons, equipment, and means of delivery of agents or toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and related rules of customary international law prohibit the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases and of all analogous liquids, materials, or devices and prohibits use of bacteriological methods of warfare.

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the Soviets are in violation of provisions that ban the development, production, transfer, possession, and use of biological and toxin weapons and whether they have been responsible for the use of lethal chemicals. We have reexamined this issue.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government judges that continued activity during 1987 at suspect biological and toxin weapon facilities in the Soviet Union, and reports that a Soviet BW program may now include investigation of new classes of BW agents, confirm the conclusion of the March 1987 report that the Soviet Union has maintained an offensive biological warfare program and capability in violation of its legal obligation under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

There have been no confirmed attacks with lethal chemicals or toxins in Cambodia, Laos, or Afghanistan in 1987 according to our strict standards of evidence. Nonetheless, there is no basis for amending the March 1987 conclusion that, prior to this time, the Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer, and use of trichothecene mycotoxins for hostile purposes in Laos, Cambodia, and Afghanistan in violation of its legal obligation under international law as codified in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention of 1972.

Limited Test Ban Treaty

Underground Nuclear Test Venting

• **Treaty Status:** The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (Limited Test Ban Treaty) is a multilateral treaty that entered into force for the United States and the Soviet Union in 1963. Soviet actions not in accord with this Treaty are violations of a legal obligation.

• **Obligation:** The LTBT specifically prohibits nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits nuclear explosions in any other environment "if such explosions cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosion is conducted."

• **Issue:** The March 1987 report examined whether the U.S.S.R.'s underground nuclear tests have caused radioactive debris to be present outside of its territorial limits. We have reexamined this issue including evidence obtained since the Soviets resumed nuclear underground testing in February 1987.

• **Finding:** The U.S. Government reaffirms the judgment made in the March 1987 report that the Soviet Union's underground nuclear test practices resulted in the venting of radioactive matter on numerous occasions and caused radioactive matter to be present outside the Soviet Union's territorial limits in violation of its legal obligation under the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The Soviet Union failed to take the precautions necessary to minimize the contamination of man's environment by radioactive substances despite numerous U.S. demarches and requests for corrective action. This practice has continued. Since the resumption of Soviet underground testing in February 1987, the United States has presented demarches to the Soviet Union on two separate occasions when unambiguously attributable venting has occurred. ■

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MOSCOW SUMMIT

DEFENSE AND SPACE TALKS

APRIL 14, 1988

In the December 10, 1987, Joint Summit Statement after the Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev instructed their negotiators in Geneva to work toward a Defense and Space agreement that would commit the sides to:

- Observe the ABM Treaty, as signed in 1972, while conducting research, development, and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, for a specified period of time.

- Begin intensive discussions on strategic stability not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its course of action.

- Discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the U.S.-Soviet strategic relationship under conditions of strategic stability in order to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

- Record the agreement in a mutually satisfactory manner. Such an agreement must have the same legal status as the treaty on Strategic Offensive Arms, the ABM treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements.

On January 15, 1988, the Soviets tabled their version of a proposed Defense and Space agreement in the form of a protocol to the START Treaty. This document was inconsistent with the Washington Joint Summit Statement and included previously held Soviet positions that remain unacceptable. Also the protocol embodied the longstanding Soviet linkage of reductions in strategic offensive arms to unacceptable limits on development and testing in the U.S. SDI program.

Such Soviet positions are clearly intended to cripple the U.S. SDI program while the Soviets press ahead with a strategic defense program of their own. On the eve of the Summit, General Secretary Gorbachev said, "Practically, the Soviet Union is doing all that the United States is doing, and I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which relates to these aspects which are covered by the SDI of the United States." Thus, Gorbachev finally confirmed that the Soviets have research programs on advanced strategic defense technologies that are similar to the U.S. SDI program -- a fact the Soviets had been denying for years. The United States will continue to reject Soviet attempts to restrict U.S. rights to conduct SDI research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM treaty.

On January 22, 1988, the United States tabled a draft Defense and Space Treaty which included the language in the Joint Summit Statement and sought to build on those elements of agreement reached in Washington. The draft treaty would help to provide a jointly managed, predictable, and stable basis for the development and testing of advanced defenses against strategic ballistic missiles, and for deployment of such defenses if they prove feasible. Our draft treaty would help both sides move toward a safer and more stable world -- one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missile attack.

At present, the U.S. has four areas of substantive disagreement with the Soviets in the Defense and Space Talks:

-- First, the U.S. believes that an agreement for reductions in strategic arsenals should stand on its own merits, and not be linked to unacceptable limits on SDI research, development and testing. The Soviets seek treaty text, unacceptable to the U.S., which would permit them to suspend implementation of negotiated START reductions -- and even begin increasing their strategic offensive forces -- if the United States were to take actions to move toward deploying strategic defenses. Indeed, the Soviet Union continues to object even to certain types of research.

-- Second, and closely related, we disagree with the Soviets about activities permitted during the nonwithdrawal period. Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. has consistently sought to preserve its full research, development and testing rights under the ABM treaty. The phrase "research, development and testing as required, as permitted by the ABM Treaty" in the Washington Joint Summit Statement is consistent with the longstanding U.S. position that the "broad interpretation" of the ABM Treaty is fully justified. Based on their official statements in Washington, Geneva and Moscow, the Soviets have demonstrated they clearly understand how the U.S. interprets the language agreed to in the Joint Summit Statement. Indeed, they had consistently rejected such language prior to the Washington Summit.

-- Third, the sides have not resolved the issue of what occurs at the end of the nonwithdrawal period. At the Summit, the President and General Secretary agreed that each side had the right to choose its own course of action including the right to deploy strategic defenses after the nonwithdrawal period. The context of their Summit discussions makes clear this right would permit the sides to deploy defenses without further reference to the ABM Treaty after the nonwithdrawal period. However, the Soviets have subsequently taken the position that the agreement embodying this right expires at the end of the nonwithdrawal period, i.e. at the very time it could be exercised.

-- Fourth, the Joint Summit Statement instructs the negotiators to work toward an agreement that would commit the sides not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. The Soviets favor a blanket nonwithdrawal commitment. The U.S. views the nonwithdrawal commitment differently -- that neither side would withdraw to deploy or to acquire capabilities for strategic defenses.

The U.S. insists that we must retain certain internationally recognized withdrawal rights in the event that a side's supreme interests are jeopardized, and termination and suspension rights in the event the treaty is materially breached. Such supreme interest clauses have been a part of every bilateral U.S./U.S.S.R. treaty.

There is no reason why a Defense and Space Treaty Joint Draft Text cannot be developed in Geneva as both sides have been directed to do. The next step is to merge the U.S. and Soviet draft texts into a single joint draft text as was done during the INF negotiations and as is being done now in the START negotiations. Such a joint draft text would form the basis for intensive negotiations on unresolved issues over the next months, both in Geneva and in the Shultz-Shevardnadze ministerials. Nonetheless, the Soviets continue to stonewall completing a joint draft text despite the agreement by Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze to direct the negotiators to do so.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING POLICY

APRIL 1988

Background:

The U.S. views the nuclear testing issue in the broad context of national security. For the past four decades, a strong nuclear deterrent has ensured U.S. security and helped preserve the freedom of our allies and friends. As long as we must rely on nuclear weapons, we must continue to test to ensure their safety, security, reliability, effectiveness and survivability. In this context, the U.S. seeks effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that would strengthen security for all nations. President Reagan has long advocated a constructive and practical approach to negotiating such limitations. His initiatives over the past several years have led to step-by-step nuclear testing negotiations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Nuclear testing talks:

Formal negotiations began at Geneva in November 1987. We and the Soviets agreed as a first step to negotiate effective verification measures for two existing but unratified treaties -- the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (1974) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (1976). The treaties prohibit nuclear explosions -- for testing nuclear weapons or for peaceful purposes -- having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons (150,000 tons of TNT). Neither treaty can be verified effectively in its present form. The negotiations have been productive, and we are making progress toward effective verification.

Once our verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States will propose that we and the Soviet Union immediately enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear arms -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing. The verification measures that we are currently negotiating will, as appropriate, be used in nuclear testing limitation agreements that may be reached subsequently.

Joint verification experiment:

During the December 1987 Washington Summit, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to design and conduct a joint verification experiment that would facilitate agreement on verification provisions for these treaties. The joint experiment, which will consist of one nuclear

explosion at each side's test site, will provide opportunities to measure the yield of nuclear explosions using techniques proposed by each side. Through this experiment, we hope to provide the Soviet Union with the information they need to accept U.S. use of CORRTEX -- the most accurate yield-measurement technique we have identified for verification. In April 1988 Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the experiment and an agreement on its conduct, and instructed the negotiators to complete an annex to the agreement that would contain technical details of the experiment.

Familiarization visits:

In January 1988, experts from each side visited the other's nuclear test site to gain familiarity with site conditions and operations, including the various stages in conducting nuclear tests. These unprecedented visits -- which build on an idea the President first proposed in September 1984 -- took place in a cooperative atmosphere. The visits will be helpful in preparing for the joint verification experiment.

Draft verification protocols:

During their meetings in February and March 1988, Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze agreed to accelerate work on verification protocols for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. The U.S. put draft verification protocols for both treaties on the negotiating table in March and is prepared to make rapid progress toward agreement on the protocols. At their April 1988 meeting, the two ministers instructed their negotiators to complete work on a verification protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty for signature at the Moscow Summit. The Soviets, however, have insisted that, in the case of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, the verification experiment is necessary before the protocol can be finalized. The negotiators are now focusing on arrangements for conducting the experiment as soon as possible, and at the same time continuing to work on the protocols. We hope the Soviets will continue to work with the U.S. toward agreement on effective verification measures that would permit these treaties to be ratified -- a longtime goal of the Administration.

Comprehensive test ban:

A ban on nuclear testing must be linked to an effective disarmament process that includes, as its first priority, the goal of reducing nuclear arms. Accordingly, a comprehensive test ban is a long-term U.S. objective. It must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability, and when we have achieved:

- Broad, deep, and verifiable arms reductions;
- Substantially improved verification capabilities;
- Expanded confidence-building measures; and
- Greater balance in conventional forces.

U.S. requirement for nuclear testing:

Continued underground nuclear testing as permitted by existing treaties enhances the credibility of the U.S. deterrent by ensuring that our nuclear weapons are:

- Effective. Testing enables us to modernize our weapons in the face of improvements and growth in Soviet military capability.
- Reliable. Testing is needed to detect deterioration or other potentially serious problems that may arise in stockpiled weapons.
- Survivable. Testing allows us to ensure that our military and command and control equipment can survive the effects of a nuclear detonation.
- Safe. Testing permits us to improve the safety and security features that prevent accidental detonation or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING

JUNE 1987

Background:

For the past four decades a strong nuclear deterrent has ensured the security of the United States and helped to preserve the freedom of its allies and friends. As long as the U.S. must depend on nuclear weapons for its security, it must ensure that those weapons are safe, secure, reliable, effective and survivable -- in other words, that the U.S. nuclear deterrent is credible. This requires some underground nuclear testing, as permitted by existing treaties.

U.S. requirements:

Specifically, the U.S. tests to:

- Ensure effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent. Testing enables continuation of our weapons modernization program, required because of the continuing expansion and improvement of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive systems, and the fact that older U.S. strategic weapons are reaching the end of their effective life.

- Maintain reliability. Nuclear testing is needed to detect deterioration or other problems that may occur with stockpiled weapons. For example, testing enabled the U.S. to correct problems with the warhead on the Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missile that, if left uncorrected, could have neutralized our sea-based deterrent.

- Stockpile testing helps to confirm that the weapons we are depending on to keep the peace remain a reliable and credible deterrent.

- Ensure survivability. Nuclear testing allows the U.S. to subject our military and command and control equipment to actual nuclear effects. This enables the U.S. to improve the survivability of our equipment, thus enhancing the credibility of our deterrent.

- Improve safety and security. Nuclear tests enable us to improve further the safety and security features that prevent accidental detonation or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. For example, nuclear testing has contributed to designs that incorporate advanced features against terrorists and prevent scattering of radioactive material in the unlikely event of an accident.

Differing U.S. and Soviet requirements for testing:

Significant differences exist between the approaches used by the United States and the Soviet Union to develop and maintain nuclear forces. These differences have a crucial bearing on the ability of the U.S. to forego testing:

-- Reliance on nuclear deterrent. Under present circumstances, the West is uniquely dependent on nuclear weapons for deterrence. Soviet advantages in conventional as well as chemical warfare capabilities could be used to intimidate the West, if confidence in the U.S. nuclear deterrent were to deteriorate.

-- Development strategy. Traditionally, the United States has relied on high technology to develop small, accurate weapons, a strategy that requires a steady nuclear testing program. The Soviet Union has, we believe, pursued less complex and larger weapons, enabling it to abstain from testing for a longer period.

-- Safety standards. U.S. safety standards for nuclear weapons are undoubtedly higher than those of the Soviet Union. Our greater reliance on advanced safety devices, which are an integral part of nuclear weapons designs, translates into a greater U.S. need for nuclear testing.

-- Infrastructure. Experience with nuclear testing moratoriums has demonstrated that the United States cannot keep laboratories on a standby basis or prevent skilled personnel from leaving the field during extended cessations of nuclear testing. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, can keep its nuclear weapons testing infrastructure intact, as it has in the past, and maintain a ready capability to resume testing.

U.S. policy on nuclear testing limitations:

The United States is committed to seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviet Union on nuclear testing limitations that could strengthen security for all nations. To this end, the President has proposed a practical, step-by-step process. He has proposed that the U.S. and the Soviet Union immediately begin negotiations on nuclear testing -- first to solve verification problems with two existing, but unratified nuclear testing treaties, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would immediately engage in negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

NOVEMBER 1987

Background:

The U.S. has long sought agreements with the Soviet Union that would increase confidence between the two countries, thus making for a more stable and secure world. Since the early 1960s, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. have agreed on a number of measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war arising from misunderstanding or miscalculation. For example, in 1963 they established the "hotline," a direct communications link between their leaders. This system has been upgraded on several occasions, most recently in 1986. In addition, in 1971 the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concluded an "Accidents Measures" Agreement that requires notifications in the event of certain nuclear-related incidents. Obligations under this agreement were clarified when the two countries signed a "common understanding" in 1985.

As the result of a U.S. initiative based on ideas originally advocated by Senators Sam Nunn and John Warner, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed at the November 1985 Geneva Summit to have experts study the question of establishing centers to reduce the risk of nuclear war. U.S. and Soviet experts held informal meetings in May and August 1986.

U.S.-Soviet agreement:

At their October 1986 meeting at Reykjavik, the President and Mr. Gorbachev expressed satisfaction with the progress made at the experts' meetings and agreed to begin formal negotiations to establish Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. These negotiations -- held in January and May 1987 -- resulted in an agreement to establish centers in Washington and Moscow. Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze signed this agreement on September 15, 1987, in Washington.

Purpose:

The purpose of the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers is to reduce the risk of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. conflict -- particularly nuclear conflict -- that might result from accident, misinterpretation, or miscalculation. The centers are not intended to supplant existing channels of communication or to have a crisis management role.

The centers will exchange information and notifications required under certain existing -- and possible future -- arms control and confidence-building measures agreements. Additional functions for the centers could be added later, as agreed by the two sides.

Operation:

Under the agreement, each side will set up a Nuclear Risk Reduction Center in its capital. The U.S. center will be staffed by Americans, the Soviet center by Soviets. Decisions about where the centers will be housed and the composition of the staff will be made at each country's discretion. The centers will communicate at the government-to-government level by means of direct satellite links similar to, but separate from, the hotline, which is reserved for use by heads of government. The communication links between the centers will be capable of rapid transmission of text and graphics.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

JOINT VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT

MAY 11, 1988

Background:

During the December 1987 Washington Summit, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to design and conduct a "Joint Verification Experiment" (JVE) to facilitate agreement on effective verification measures for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) of 1974 and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976. The JVE will provide opportunities to measure the yield of one nuclear explosion at each site using techniques preferred by each side. The U.S. method is direct, hydrodynamic yield measurement (CORRTEX), the most accurate technique we have identified for verification of these treaties. Through the JVE, the U.S. hopes to provide the Soviet Union with the information they need to accept routine U.S. use of CORRTEX.

In April 1988, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the JVE as well as an agreement on its conduct, and instructed the negotiators to complete an annex to the agreement which would contain technical details of the experiment.

JVE Process:

-- The JVE will consist of one nuclear explosion at each side's test site -- the Nevada Test Site in the U.S. and the Semipalatinsk Test Site in the Soviet Union.

-- The Soviet Union will provide the explosive device for the experiment at Semipalatinsk. The U.S. will provide the explosive device for the experiment at the Nevada Test Site.

-- Both sides have agreed that the planned yield of the explosion at each test site will not be less than 100 kilotons and will approach the TTBT limit of 150 kilotons.

-- The type of nuclear device to be detonated will be classified, as is the case with all nuclear tests.

-- Each JVE test requires a device emplacement hole and an adjacent satellite hole (about 36 feet apart). The satellite hole will be used for the hydrodynamic CORRTEX sensors (the method required by the U.S. for effective verification of the TTBT and PNET), and for the hydrodynamic technique used by the Soviet side.

-- Geological and geophysical properties of the earth will be predetermined at the device detonation point.

-- For the JVE, hydrodynamic sensors of each side are installed in the satellite and emplacement holes. Downhole CORRTEX cables are then connected to CORRTEX trailers on the surface. The Soviets will perform similar operations with their hydrodynamic equipment.

-- The JVE holes are back-filled with various materials in preparation for detonation. Each side will record the explosion using its own hydrodynamic and other techniques and will exchange its data recordings with the other side.

-- The current estimated schedule for conduct of the JVE at the Nevada Test Site and the Semipalatinsk Test Site is midsummer 1988, with a separation of several weeks between each experiment.

-- At the conclusion of the JVE process, which will include analysis by each side and an exchange of data, the U.S. hopes that the Soviets will be in a position to accept routine U.S. use of CORRTEX as an appropriate method of verification. This would be an important step toward agreement on effective verification measures that would permit ratification of the TTBT and PNET -- a long-time goal of the Reagan Administration.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE

BACKGROUND

The Warsaw Pact's substantial superiority in conventional forces in Europe threatens international security and stability. The U.S. and NATO seek to redress this conventional arms imbalance by improving NATO's conventional defenses and by reducing the threat through arms control negotiations.

CONVENTIONAL IMBALANCE IN EUROPE

The Warsaw Pact maintains in Eastern Europe and the western U.S.S.R. a large standing army, comprised of massive Soviet-armored forces organized and equipped for rapid, large-scale offensive operations. In the region from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains, the Warsaw Pact maintains a substantial advantage over NATO in virtually every category of conventional force comparison. It has a more than two-to-one advantage in tanks, artillery and armored infantry fighting vehicles. This is compounded by a clear geographic advantage over NATO in terms of territorial contiguity, depth, and uninterrupted transportation routes and interior lines of communication.

NATO'S FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY

Flexible response is NATO's longstanding strategy to deter war. It requires the maintenance of an adequate mix of both conventional and nuclear forces in Europe. NATO heads of state and government who met in Brussels March 2-3, 1988, declared: "For the foreseeable future, there is no alternative to (this) Alliance strategy for the prevention of war," and they reaffirmed NATO's commitment to keep its nuclear and conventional forces up to date. The INF Treaty will enhance NATO's security by eliminating deployed Soviet missiles capable of carrying four times as many nuclear warheads as the deployed missiles the U.S. will eliminate. The Treaty will enhance the survivability of NATO's forces by eliminating Soviet weapons capable of carrying conventional, nuclear or chemical warheads which could strike airfields, ports, command and control facilities, and air defense sites that are essential to NATO's conventional defense plans, both as operating bases and as reinforcement facilities. Nevertheless, the Warsaw Pact's advantages in conventional forces persist, making it necessary for NATO to redress this imbalance by vigorously pursuing conventional defense improvements, and, where possible, arms reductions.

IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL DEFENSES

In December 1985, NATO defense ministers approved the Conventional Defense Improvement (CDI) program, a comprehensive plan to remedy critical deficiencies in the Alliance's conventional defenses. The Alliance is devoting special attention to such needs as increased ammunition stockpiles and other war reserves, improved facilities to receive and protect allied aircraft reinforcing Europe, enhanced capability to neutralize Eastern follow-on forces, and modernized air defenses and maritime capabilities.

CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL

One of the Alliance's top arms control priorities is to revitalize conventional arms control. The objective is to establish a more stable balance of conventional forces at lower and equal levels in Europe. For 14 years, the West has pursued conventional arms control in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks, which focus on central Europe. The West offered a significant new proposal in December 1985, which provides a way to set aside the longstanding data question. But the East has yet to respond constructively. More recently, NATO has called for two separate negotiations on conventional security which would cover the region from the Atlantic to the Urals. NATO seeks to begin these negotiations this year, if possible. One negotiation, among all 35 members of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), would continue the work of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures (CSBMs). The other, the Conventional Stability Talks (CST), would be a separate set of talks in the framework of the CSCE process and would be limited to the 23 countries of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Its aim would be to enhance conventional stability through force reductions and other measures.

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS (CST)

At the March 2-3, 1988 NATO summit in Brussels, Alliance leaders enunciated the following objectives for the proposed CST:

- Establishment of a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels;
- Elimination of disparities prejudicial to stability and security; and
- As a matter of high priority, elimination of the capability for launching surprise attack and for initiating large-scale offensive action.

Accordingly, NATO will focus first on reductions of those weapons systems, such as tanks and artillery, which are particularly adapted for seizing and holding territory. Given current discrepancies between East and West, highly asymmetric reductions by the East will be required to establish a more stable balance of conventional forces in Europe.

In informal talks begun in Vienna in February 1987 between the countries belonging to the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, good progress has been made toward a negotiating mandate for the CST. Round Five of the stability mandate consultations began April 20. However, problems remain. The Soviets continue to probe for ways to expand the CST mandate beyond conventional forces in order to include short-range nuclear forces, and they have been seeking to dilute the alliance-to-alliance character of negotiations. The West opposes these attempts to divert attention from the real threat in Europe -- the Warsaw Pact's conventional superiority. Our ability to proceed with the Conventional Stability Talks, as well as the negotiations on confidence-building measures, also depends on reaching a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-Up Meeting, which includes human rights.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

SOVIET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH THE THRESHOLD TEST BAN TREATY

NUCLEAR TESTING AND THE 150-KILOTON LIMIT

TREATY STATUS

The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) was signed in 1974. The Treaty has not been ratified by either Party but neither Party has indicated an intention not to ratify. Therefore, both Parties are subject to the obligation under customary international law to refrain from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT. Actions that would defeat the object and purpose of the TTBT are therefore violations of legal obligations. The United States is seeking to negotiate improved verification measures for the Treaty. Both Parties have separately stated that they would observe the 150-kiloton threshold of the TTBT.

OBLIGATION

Beginning March 31, 1976, the Treaty prohibits any underground nuclear weapon tests having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place under the jurisdiction or control of the Parties. In view of the technical uncertainties associated with estimating the precise yield of nuclear weapon tests, the sides agreed that one or two slight, unintended breaches per year would not be considered a violation.

ISSUE

The March 1987 Report examined whether the Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in excess of 150 kilotons. We have reexamined this issue.

FINDING

In the March 1987 Report, the U.S. reaffirmed the conclusion from previous Reports that, "Soviet nuclear testing activities for a number of tests constitute a likely violation of legal obligations under the Threshold Test Ban Treaty." That Report also indicated that the finding would stand until a number of studies, which had been initiated in an attempt to provide a somewhat improved basis for assessing Soviet compliance, could be completed. Those studies have now been completed.

The studies produced no definitive evidence supporting a change which would diminish the previous finding of "likely violation." The totality of evidence strengthens the previous findings, and the U.S. continues to find that the Soviet Union has likely violated its legal obligations under the TTBT.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

NEGOTIATIONS ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS

MAY 13, 1988

The United States has long sought a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons.

At the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the United States has offered a number of initiatives toward this end. In 1984 the U.S. presented a draft treaty that provides for a worldwide ban on the development, acquisition, production, stockpiling, transfer and use of chemical weapons. This draft remains the basis for the continuing negotiations. The U.S. has sought to address the formidable verification problems that would be posed by a ban on such weapons, and to promote the open dissemination of information necessary to achieve a ban.

In 1983, for example, the U.S. sponsored a workshop for the CD on verification of chemical weapons destruction at Tooele Army Depot in Utah. In August 1987, the U.S.S.R., which had refused to attend the 1983 Tooele workshop, accepted the long-standing U.S. invitation to visit the Army Depot. At that visit in November 1987, the Soviet delegation was shown samples of all chemical munitions in the U.S. inventory to include a prototype of a 155mm binary artillery projectile. They were also given detailed briefings on the characteristics of chemical agents in the U.S. inventory, the chemical munitions destruction program, and a tour through the Chemical Agents Munitions Disposal System (CAMDS) facility where the most advanced technology in the world for the destruction of chemical weapons was demonstrated. In 1986, the U.S. presented to the Conference on Disarmament extensive information on the composition and location of U.S. chemical weapons (CW) stockpiles and urged other nations to follow suit.

There have been numerous violations of the 1925 Geneva Convention prohibiting the use of CW. The Soviet Union has been involved in the production, transfer and use of toxins and other chemical warfare agents in Laos, Cambodia and Afghanistan. Chemical weapons also have been used repeatedly in the Iran-Iraq war since January 1981. The present number of states with actual or potential chemical weapons capability is large and growing. The U.S. government condemns any and all illegal use of chemical weapons and supports rapid investigation of reports of CW use, along with diplomatic and political actions aimed at ensuring respect for the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The U.S. meets periodically with a group of Western nations and bilaterally with the Soviet Union to discuss and coordinate ways to stem the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

To discuss specific bilateral issues in an attempt to facilitate multilateral negotiations and to focus specifically on U.S.-Soviet differences, the U.S. in 1984 initiated bilateral CW discussions with the U.S.S.R. In November 1985 the Reagan-Gorbachev summit statement called for intensifying bilateral discussions on a chemical weapons treaty. We began such talks on the margins of the CD and have held eight rounds since then. We anticipate more talks to be held in the summer of 1988.

In March 1987 the Soviets, for the first time, admitted they possessed chemical weapons and claimed they had ceased production. Also in 1987, the Soviets hosted a CD visit to their chemical weapons facility at Shikhany, accepted the principle of challenge inspection without a right of refusal, and announced an ambiguous stockpile figure.

In 1988, the Soviets have continued their active propaganda campaign aimed at undermining the U.S. program to modernize our own CW deterrent. They denounced this modernization program as an obstacle to conclusion of a treaty while ignoring that the U.S. negotiated with them for years while they produced chemical weapons. The Soviets have publicly pressed for rapid conclusion of a ban. However, their experts have not followed up in the negotiations with detailed proposals on how to resolve outstanding issues. As many followers of the CW talks have noted, the "devil is in the details." Unfortunately, it is in the details where the Soviets have been least productive.

While the Soviet initiatives to demonstrate greater openness are welcomed, they have raised more questions than they have answered. The Soviets have not matched the specific data provided by the U.S. on stockpile composition; locations; past, present and planned destruction programs; and technology. The declared stockpile figure of "no more than 50,000 tons of chemical warfare agents" gives no information on composition in terms of filled munitions versus bulk.

Despite the progress achieved thus far at the Conference on Disarmament, many critical issues remain unresolved. The Conference members still must negotiate detailed provisions that will assure reliable verification, provide undiminished security for all parties to the agreement during the period of stockpile destruction, monitor the civil chemical industries to ensure they are not producing chemical weapons, and deal with the risk that some states posing a chemical weapons threat may not become party to a CW convention. Moreover, the structure, operation, staffing and funding of the international body that would implement and monitor the convention have yet to be developed and agreed upon.

A worldwide ban on chemical weapons would be difficult to verify and we do not yet have solutions for many critical verification problems which remain, including:

- A militarily significant stockpile could be concealed in a small area.
- The fact that many chemicals and equipment used in chemical weapons are also used for industrial and agricultural purposes.
- The ease and speed with which chemical weapons could be produced clandestinely using new emerging technologies.

While pursuing negotiations to address these problems, the United States is modernizing its largely obsolete stockpile, both to deter CW attack on U.S. forces and allies worldwide and to preserve the incentive for the U.S.S.R. to negotiate seriously toward a ban. The U.S. unilaterally ceased production of chemical weapons in 1969. Since then, however, the Soviet Union has upgraded its CW capabilities. Accordingly, the U.S. has had to pursue a dual track approach.

Today, as a result of the unilateral restraint exercised by the U.S. and the intensive Soviet chemical weapons modernization program, there is a serious East-West imbalance in these weapons. The U.S.S.R. possesses a formidable, modern CW arsenal considered to be by far the world's largest stockpile, while the U.S. capability -- largely unusable and some dating from the 1940s and 1950s -- has lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons. It is essential, therefore, that we restore the credibility of the Western CW deterrent while negotiations continue toward a worldwide ban. The U.S. is committed by law to destroy unitary stocks regardless of the outcome of treaty talks.

A comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global chemical weapons ban would be a significant achievement and remains a goal of the U.S. However, a ban that is not comprehensive or verifiable would simply strip the democratic states of the capacity to deter use of chemical weapons by less scrupulous powers. Until a reliable ban is achieved, the West must maintain the capability to deter use of these weapons by other states.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

U.S. ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES

MAY 13, 1988

Arms reduction negotiations are one element in the Administration's strategy for ensuring peace and strengthening security. Through arms reductions, the United States seeks to preserve a stable strategic balance at the lowest possible levels of military force, thus reducing the risk of conflict. The United States took an important step toward this goal when President Reagan signed the INF Treaty in Washington last December.

As part of our efforts to make the world safer, we have undertaken a number of arms reduction initiatives, including proposals for:

- A stabilizing and effectively verifiable 50 percent reduction in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arsenals;
- A managed transition to deterrence based increasingly on defenses -- which threaten no one -- rather than on the threat of nuclear retaliation;
- An effective, verifiable and truly global ban on chemical weapons;
- Effective verification provisions for existing treaties limiting nuclear testing;
- A strengthened nuclear nonproliferation regime;
- Reductions of conventional forces in Europe to equal levels; and
- Confidence- and security-building measures.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

The INF negotiations have concluded successfully. On December 8, 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev signed the historic INF Treaty. The Treaty provides for the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missile systems in the range of 500-5,500 kilometers (about 300-3,400 miles) and the elimination of related support facilities and support equipment within three years after it enters into force. The Treaty bans all production and flight testing of these missiles immediately upon entry into force as well as the production of any missile stages or launchers for these missiles. After the three-year period of elimination, neither side may possess any INF missiles, launchers, support structures or support equipment. The Treaty contains the most comprehensive verification provisions in the history of arms control, including various types of short-notice, on-site inspections as well as inspection by resident, on-site teams at a key missile facility in each country.

The success of these negotiations is a direct consequence of the President's steadfast commitment to achieving real arms reductions rather than merely limiting increases as in

previous treaties. The Treaty is also the result of NATO solidarity in responding to the threat posed by Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles.

On January 25, 1988, the treaty was submitted to the U.S. Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE FORCES

The United States places highest priority on its efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviet Union for deep and stabilizing reductions in strategic nuclear arms. In particular, the United States seeks reductions in the most destabilizing nuclear arms -- fast-flying ballistic missiles, especially heavy, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.

As a concrete step toward this end, the United States presented a draft treaty at the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in Geneva on May 8, 1987. This draft treaty reflected the basic areas of agreement on strategic arms reductions reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at Reykjavik in October 1986 to achieve 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear arms. The Soviets presented a draft treaty on July 31, 1987. While the Soviet draft contained some areas of similarity to the U.S. proposal, it offered no movement on the major outstanding issues. The U.S. and Soviet draft treaties provided the elements for a joint draft treaty text, which continues to be the basis of negotiations.

During their meetings in Washington in December 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to instruct their negotiators to work toward completion of a START agreement at the earliest possible date. The negotiators are building upon areas of agreement: 50 percent reductions as reflected in the joint draft START treaty text, including ceilings of no more than 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles with 6,000 warheads and 1,540 warheads on 154 heavy ICBMs as well as the agreed rule of account for heavy bombers and their nuclear armament.

During the Washington Summit, the two leaders made further progress on START, including agreement on a sublimit of 4,900 for the total number of ballistic missile warheads, the numbers of warheads attributed to existing types of ballistic missiles, and approximately a 50 percent reduction in the existing aggregate throw-weight of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, with this level not to be exceeded by either side for the duration of the treaty. The leaders also agreed on guidelines for effective verification of a START treaty, including short-notice on-site inspections, data exchanges and continuous on-site monitoring of critical facilities.

In recognition of the importance of details for effective verification, the U.S. has presented a number of key verification documents, including a draft Protocol on Conversion or Elimination (October 1987), a draft Protocol on Inspection and Monitoring (February 1988), and a draft Memorandum of Understanding on data exchange (March 1988). After the Soviets had put forth their own versions of these documents, the negotiators were able to develop joint draft texts, a step critical to completion of a START treaty. However, important substantive differences remain on issues such as mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles, a warhead sublimit on ICBMs, modernization of existing types of Soviet heavy ICBMs, counting rules for air-launched cruise missiles, sea-launched cruise missiles and the details of an effective verification system. In addition, the Soviets continue to link agreement on strategic arms reductions with U.S.

acceptance of measures which would cripple the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative. The U.S. has repeatedly told the Soviets that such measures are unacceptable.

The United States seeks a fair and durable agreement to bring about -- for the first time in history -- deep reductions in the strategic nuclear arsenals of the United States and the U.S.S.R. We believe such an agreement could be reached this year if the Soviet Union will match our constructive approach to the Geneva negotiations.

DEFENSE AND SPACE ISSUES

In the Defense and Space forum, the United States seeks to discuss with the Soviets the relationship between strategic offense and defense. We also seek to discuss how, if we establish the feasibility of effective defenses, the United States and U.S.S.R. could jointly manage a stable transition to deterrence based increasingly on defenses -- which threaten no one -- rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons.

During their December 1987 meetings in Washington, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev -- taking into account the preparation of the START treaty -- instructed their Geneva negotiators to work out an agreement that would commit the sides to observe the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as signed in 1972, while conducting their research, development and testing as required, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty, and not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a specified period of time. They agreed that intensive discussions of strategic stability shall begin not later than three years before the end of the specified period, after which, in the event the sides have not agreed otherwise, each side will be free to decide its own course of action. Such an agreement would have the same legal status as the START treaty, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, and other similar, legally binding agreements and would be recorded in a mutually satisfactory manner.

On January 22, 1988, the United States put a draft Defense and Space treaty on the table at the Geneva negotiations. This draft fulfilled the instructions of President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. The U.S. draft treaty seeks to transform the areas of agreement reached at the Washington Summit into treaty language and to identify and resolve areas of disagreement.

The U.S. draft calls for a new and separate treaty and incorporates the following elements:

- Entry into force contingent upon entry into force of a START treaty;
- Agreement not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for a "specified period of time" to be determined through negotiations;
- Observance of the ABM Treaty through that period and until either party chooses a different course of action; and
- After the "specified period of time," either party is free to choose its own course of action, including deployment of strategic missile defenses beyond the limitations of the ABM Treaty, after giving the other party six months written notice of its intention to do so.

The United States also proposes confidence-building measures -- in the form of a protocol on predictability -- as an integral part of the Defense and Space treaty. Such measures would provide predictability regarding each side's strategic defense programs. On March 15, 1988, the U.S. proposed a draft predictability protocol to its January 22 draft treaty, including an annual exchange of programmatic data on planned strategic defense activities, reciprocal briefings on respective strategic defense efforts, reciprocal visits to associated research facilities and establishment of procedures for reciprocal observation of strategic defense tests.

In early May 1988, the Soviets presented drafts for a separate Defense and Space agreement and associated side agreements. Although these Soviet drafts use the agreed language from the Washington Summit, the Soviets have made clear that they continue to maintain an interpretation of the ABM Treaty that is more restrictive than agreed to by the parties in 1972. The Soviet proposal fails to meet fundamental U.S. concerns such as the retention of rights of withdrawal recognized under international law. Furthermore, Soviet violations of the ABM Treaty continue. The U.S. cannot agree to any further obligations until the Soviets deal with these violations satisfactorily.

We hope that the Soviets will join us in serious discussions to conclude a Defense and Space treaty that achieves the important goals which the two leaders identified at the Washington Summit. We hope that such a treaty will hasten progress toward a safer, more stable world -- one with reduced levels of nuclear arms and an enhanced ability to deter war based on the increasing contribution of effective strategic defenses against ballistic missile attack.

NUCLEAR TESTING

The United States and the Soviet Union have undertaken step-by-step negotiations on nuclear testing. In these talks, the two countries agreed as a first step to negotiate effective verification measures for two existing but unratified nuclear testing treaties, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Once these verification concerns have been satisfied and the treaties ratified, the United States will propose negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel program -- in association with a program to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons -- of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing.

We are making progress toward our goal of effective verification of the two existing treaties. During the December 1987 Summit in Washington, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to design and conduct a Joint Verification Experiment intended to facilitate agreement on effective verification of these two treaties. This joint experiment, which will take place at each other's nuclear test site, will provide an opportunity to measure the yield of nuclear explosions using techniques proposed by each side. Through this experiment, we hope to provide the Soviet Union with all the information they should need to accept U.S. use of CORRTEX -- the most accurate technique we have identified for verification of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty.

During their April 20-22, 1988, meetings in Moscow, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze approved a schedule for the Joint Verification Experiment as well as an agreement on its conduct. They also instructed the negotiators to complete annexes to the agreement which would contain technical details of the experiment. Preparations for the experiment are already underway, and it is expected the experiment will be conducted this summer.

At their April meeting, the two ministers also instructed their negotiators to complete work on a verification protocol to the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty for signature at the Moscow Summit. In the case of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, however, the Soviets have insisted that the experiment is necessary before the protocol can be finalized. The negotiators are now focusing on arrangements for conducting the experiment as soon as possible, at the same time continuing to work on the protocols. We hope the Soviets will continue to work with us toward agreement on effective verification measures that would permit these treaties to be ratified -- a longtime goal of the Administration.

NUCLEAR RISK REDUCTION CENTERS

On April 1, 1988, the U.S. Nuclear Risk Reduction Center, which is located in the Department of State, officially opened. This Center, along with the Soviet counterpart in Moscow, was established through an agreement signed by Secretary Shultz and Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze on September 15, 1987. These Centers, which are the direct result of a U.S. initiative, are practical measures that strengthen international security by reducing the risk of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union that might result from accident, misinterpretation or miscalculation. The Centers exchange information and notifications required under certain existing and possible future arms control and confidence-building measures agreements. For example, the Centers would be used to transmit notifications related to short-notice inspections conducted under the INF Treaty.

NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION

In January 1988 the United States and the Soviet Union held the 10th round in an ongoing series of consultations, which began in December 1982, on nuclear nonproliferation. These consultations have covered a wide range of issues, including prospects for strengthening the international nonproliferation regime, support for the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and the mutual desire of the United States and the U.S.S.R. to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These consultations are not negotiations but, rather, discussions to review in depth various issues of common concern related to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The next consultations will be held around the time of the June IAEA Board of Governors meeting.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

In April 1984 the United States presented, at the 40-nation Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, a draft treaty banning development, production, use, transfer and stockpiling of chemical weapons, to be verified by various means, including short-notice, mandatory on-site challenge inspection. At the November 1985 Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to intensify bilateral discussions on all aspects of a comprehensive, global chemical weapons ban, including verification. Since then, we have held eight rounds of bilateral talks on a chemical weapons treaty. A ninth round is proposed for July 1988. These discussions have narrowed differences in a few areas, including early data exchange and destruction of production facilities.

Until March 1987, the Soviets, who possess by far the world's largest chemical weapon stockpile, had not admitted that they even had such weapons. In April 1987, they claimed that they had stopped producing them -- had no chemical weapons positioned outside their borders -- and were building a facility to destroy existing stocks. They also hosted a visit by Conference on Disarmament representatives to the Soviet chemical weapon facility at Shikhany in October. In addition, the Soviets finally accepted a longstanding U.S. invitation to observe the U.S. chemical weapon destruction facility in Tooele, Utah; on November 19-20, 1987, a delegation of Soviet experts visited that facility. We see these moves as useful steps toward building confidence, which will facilitate negotiation of an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

Nonetheless, a number of key issues remain, including how to ensure participation of all states that could pose a chemical weapons threat; how to strengthen verification in light of new technologies, the continuing proliferation of chemical weapons and the nature of chemical

industries capable of both military and civilian production; how to maintain security under a convention; and how to protect sensitive information not related to chemical weapons during inspections.

At the December 1987 Washington Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for intensified negotiations toward conclusion of a truly global and verifiable convention encompassing all chemical weapons-capable states. They also agreed on the importance of greater openness and confidence-building measures. The United States is prepared to work constructively with other members of the Conference on Disarmament to resolve outstanding issues.

In addition to treaty discussions, we are working with allies and other friendly countries as well as with the Soviets on preventing the proliferation of chemical weapons.

Primarily in response to the continuing use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war, the United States and 18 other Western industrialized countries have been consulting since 1985 to harmonize export controls on commodities related to chemical weapon production and to develop other mechanisms to curb the illegal use of such weapons and their dangerous spread to other countries. Also, in bilateral discussions with the Soviets on chemical weapon nonproliferation, we have reviewed export controls and political steps to limit the spread and use of chemical weapons.

CONFERENCE ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES AND DISARMAMENT IN EUROPE (CDE)

In September 1986, after almost three years of negotiations, the 35-nation Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe adopted a set of concrete measures designed to increase openness and predictability of military activities in Europe. These measures, which are built around NATO proposals, provide for prior notification of certain military activities above a threshold of 13,000 troops or 300 tanks, observation of certain military activities above a threshold of 17,000 troops and annual forecasts of upcoming notifiable military activities. The accord also contains provisions for on-site air and ground inspections for verification, with no right of refusal. Although modest in scope, these provisions were the first time the Soviet Union agreed to inspection on its own territory for verification of an international security accord. The United States is encouraged by the record of implementation to date which generally reflects both the letter and the spirit of the Stockholm document.

On August 30, 1987, the United States -- under the terms of the Stockholm document -- successfully completed the first-ever on-site inspection of a Soviet military exercise.

Since then, several inspections have been conducted by both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Most recently, the U.S. conducted an inspection in April of troops from the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union in East Germany. This was the first inspection by a Western state of a non-notified activity. In early May, Bulgaria conducted an inspection of a NATO amphibious exercise in Italy. The U.S. considers inspections an integral part of the Stockholm agreement and an important step in the process of increasing openness and building confidence and security in Europe.

FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES

At the Vienna CSCE follow-up meeting in July 1987, NATO proposed that the 35 CSCE participating countries resume negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in order to build on and expand the work begun in Stockholm.

Warsaw Pact and neutral and nonaligned states also support resumption of these negotiations. However, final agreement to resume such negotiations can only come as part of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference, including significant progress in Eastern-bloc human rights performance.

CONVENTIONAL STABILITY TALKS

NATO began consultations with the Warsaw Pact in February 1987 to develop a mandate for new negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. In July 1987 representatives of NATO presented a draft mandate for negotiations between the countries belonging to the NATO Alliance and the Warsaw Pact, covering their conventional forces on land from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. These negotiations would take place within the framework of the CSCE process, but would be autonomous regarding subject matter, participation and procedures.

In the ensuing months, the negotiators have reached preliminary agreement on several aspects of the mandate, including procedures, participants, objectives and methods, and verification. Discussion continues on the remaining issues. We hope to conclude these mandate discussions in 1988 so we can get the new negotiations underway. As with the negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, our ability to proceed with new conventional stability negotiations depends on the achievement of a balanced outcome to the Vienna CSCE Follow-up Conference, including progress in Eastern-bloc human rights performance.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS (MBFR)

On December 5, 1985, NATO presented, at the MBFR negotiations, a major initiative designed to meet Eastern concerns. The proposal deferred the Western demand for data agreement on current forces prior to treaty signature. The Soviets had claimed that this Western demand was the primary roadblock to agreement. The proposal also called for a time-limited, first-phase withdrawal from Central Europe of 5,000 U.S. and 11,500 Soviet troops, followed by a three-year, no-increase commitment by all parties with forces in this zone. During this time, residual force levels would be verified through national technical means, agreed entry/exit points, data exchange and 30 annual on-site inspections. Effective verification of a conventional arms agreement requires such special measures. The Soviets have not responded constructively to the Western initiative.

Chronology

JANUARY 1, 1986 - MAY 13, 1988

U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

Nuclear and Space Talks

- Round IV: January 16-March 4, 1986
Round V: May 8-June 26, 1986
Round VI: September 18-November 13, 1986
Round VII: January 15-March 6, 1987 (INF continued to March 26)
Round VIII: April 23-December 7, 1987 (INF); May 5-November 23, 1987, (START and Defense and Space)
Round IX: Began on January 14, 1988

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (Multilateral)

- Round IX: January 28-March 15, 1986
Round X: April 15-May 23, 1986
Round XI: June 10-July 18, 1986
Round XII: August 19-September 19, 1986 -- agreement concluded

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

- First Round of Follow-up Conference: November 4-December 20, 1986
Second Round of Follow-up Conference: January 27-April 11, 1987
Third Round of Follow-up Conference: May 4-July 31, 1987
Fourth Round of Follow-up Conference: September 22-December 18, 1987
Fifth Round of Follow-up Conference: January 22-March 25, 1988
Sixth Round of Follow-up Conference: Began April 15, 1988

Conference on Disarmament (Multilateral)

- Chemical Weapons
Committee Rump Session: January 13-31, 1986
Spring Session: February 4-April 25, 1986
Summer Session: June 10-August 29, 1986
Chemical Weapons Committee
Chairman's Consultations: November 24-December 17, 1986
Chemical Weapons
Committee Rump Session: January 6-30, 1987
Spring Session: February 2-April 30, 1987

Summer Session: June 8-August 26, 1987
Chemical Weapons
Committee Rump Session: November 30-December 16, 1987
Chemical Weapons
Committee Rump Session: January 11-29, 1988
Spring Session: February 2-April 28, 1988
Summer Session: To begin July 7, 1988

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (Multilateral)

Round 38: January 30-March 20, 1986
Round 39: May 15-July 3, 1986
Round 40: September 25-December 4, 1986
Round 41: January 29-March 19, 1987
Round 42: May 14-July 2, 1987
Round 43: September 24-December 3, 1987
Round 44: January 28-March 17, 1988
Round 45: To begin May 19, 1988

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers

Round I: January 13, 1987
Round II: May 3-4, 1987 -- agreement concluded, ad referendum; agreement signed in Washington on September 15, 1987

Nuclear Testing Talks

Round I: November 9-20, 1987
Round II: Began on February 15, 1988

U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERT-LEVEL MEETINGS

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks

August 6-7, 1986, in Moscow

September 10-11, 1986, in Washington

Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe

August 14-15, 1986, in Stockholm

Chemical Weapons Treaty Talks (in Geneva, unless otherwise noted)

January 28-February 3, 1986

April 15-25, 1986

July 1-18, 1986

October 28-November 18, 1986, in New York City

February 16-March 5, 1987

July 20-August 7, 1987

November 30-December 17, 1987

March 8-25, 1988

Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

March 31-April 15, 1987, in Geneva

Chemical Weapons Nonproliferation Discussions (in Bern)

March 5-6, 1986

September 4-5, 1986

October 7-8, 1987

Conventional Stability Mandate Consultations (in Vienna)

February 17-April 6, 1987

May 11-July 31, 1987

September 28-December 14, 1987

January 25-March 24, 1988

April 20, 1988, began in Vienna

Nuclear Testing (in Geneva)

First Session: July 25-August 1, 1986

Second Session: September 4-18, 1986

Third Session: November 13-25, 1986

Fourth Session: January 22, 1987, recessed on February 9, resumed on March 16,
concluded on March 20.

Fifth Session: May 18-29, 1987

Sixth Session: July 13-20, 1987

Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (in Geneva)

May 5-6, 1986

August 25, 1986

Nuclear Nonproliferation Talks

December 15-18, 1986, in Washington

July 28-30, 1987, in Moscow

January 11-14, 1988, in Washington

Acronyms

ABM	--	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
CORRTEX	--	Continuous Reflectrometry for Radius versus Time Experiment
CSCE	--	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CW	--	Chemical Weapons
IAEA	--	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICBM	--	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
INF	--	Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces
IRM	--	Intermediate-Range Missiles
MBFR	--	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
PNET	--	Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty
SDI	--	Strategic Defense Initiative
SRM	--	Shorter-Range Missiles
START	--	Strategic Arms Reduction Talks
TTBT	--	Threshold Test Ban Treaty



MOSCOW SUMMIT

CSCE PROCESS

In November 1986, the third follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) opened in Vienna. Delegations from the 35 participating states -- East, West, and neutral and non-aligned -- have reviewed implementation of commitments undertaken in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. They are now considering proposals to encourage stricter compliance.

The importance of reviewing implementation of CSCE commitments -- and why such review is often contentious -- is explained by the nature of the Final Act itself and by the course to date of the CSCE process.

The Final Act, which resulted from years of East-West negotiations, establishes a set of standards and goals for the behavior of states toward each other and toward their own citizens. It also sets out a program of practical steps for turning these goals into reality.

In addressing human, economic and security matters, the Final Act affirms basic human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as other principles such as the sovereign equality of states and the right to self-determination.

The basic objective of the CSCE process is to reduce the artificial barriers which divide East from West across the range of human endeavor -- including respect for human rights, the free flow of information, cooperation in education and culture, economic and scientific cooperation, and the arrangements we make for our security.

The Final Act recognizes that these issues are interdependent and that the health of the CSCE process depends on making balanced progress in all areas.

Sadly, the record of compliance with commitments made in the Final Act has been marred by the performance of the Soviet Union and other East European states. For example:

--The Soviet Union, while committed to withdraw, still occupies Afghanistan; it still imprisons and penalizes its own citizens for exercising the civil rights which the U.S.S.R. undertook to protect in Helsinki (e.g., freedom of religion and freedom of movement).

--Despite the occasional resolution of individual cases, many Soviet citizens remain cruelly separated from their families by official denial of exit permission.

--While the number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate has risen in the last year, it remains at levels far below those permitted in the late 1970s. There has nonetheless been some progress in CSCE over the years.

--Some Warsaw Pact states have taken steps to fulfill their commitments, and a few notable cases involving human rights activists and divided families have been resolved. There

have been some positive developments in Soviet human rights performance, but on the whole much more needs to be done, including steps to institutionalize recent reforms.

--Under the CSCE umbrella, contacts at the individual level between the citizens of Eastern and Western Europe have multiplied.

--CSCE negotiations that concluded in Stockholm in September 1986 added significant provisions to the Final Act to build confidence and security and to reduce the risk of war through miscalculation. The agreed measures concerned the forecasting, notification, observation and inspection of military activities from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The CSCE process has evolved since Helsinki through follow-up meetings in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83), and through a series of experts meetings on specific aspects of the Final Act, including human rights, human contacts, peaceful settlement of disputes, and cultural relations.

At each of these meetings, the United States has insisted on a candid and thorough review of the record. The Final Act embodies a political commitment by the 35 participating states to comply with certain standards; it is not legally binding and has no enforcement mechanism. Therefore, it is crucial to bring compliance failures to public light and to insist on improved performance.

Our NATO partners take the same approach. Together we use the CSCE process as a vehicle for putting political and moral pressure on the Soviets and others to improve respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Improved performance remains the primary objective of our delegation at the ongoing Vienna Follow-up Meeting. We seek a balanced outcome within and among each CSCE dimension -- human, economic and security.

Accordingly, the West has made significant proposals in all areas. For example, in the security area, the West has proposed two distinct negotiations within the framework of the CSCE process:

- 1) resumed negotiations among all 35 CSCE states to build on and expand the results achieved in Stockholm on confidence- and security-building measures; and
- 2) an autonomous negotiation among the 23 members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact designed to achieve conventional stability in Europe at lower levels of forces.

On human rights and human contacts, we are working to elaborate and extend Helsinki commitments, emphasizing performance, not rhetoric. These include, among others, strengthened commitments to freedom of movement within one's own country and the right to leave any country; freedom of religion, especially religious teaching; facilitation of family reunification; access to information; and the freedom to maintain cultural identity. The West has also put forward a proposal for extensive follow-up activities on human rights issues focussed on improving compliance, including a mechanism for addressing serious human rights violations.

We are determined that new steps forward must be based solidly on significantly improved Eastern implementation of the human rights and fundamental freedoms provisions of the Final Act.

The sixth round of the Vienna meeting began on April 15, 1988. Delegations are working on the basis of compromise papers tabled by coordinators drawn from neutral and non-aligned states. These papers, together with existing proposals, provide a solid basis for serious negotiations on the text of a concluding document. Due to Eastern stalling, however, virtually no

progress has been made on human rights issues, although considerable language has been provisionally agreed on security issues.

The United States is working with our Allies and neutral and non-aligned delegations to ensure useful and substantive progress in Vienna. We have made clear that we are prepared to stay in Vienna as long as it takes to obtain improved compliance and expanded commitments by the East in the area of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Despite the gap between Eastern promises and Eastern performance, the potential remains for the Final Act to improve the lives of individuals subject to oppression. Therefore, the Final Act and the process it launched remain important instruments of Western diplomacy, with key roles in our overall East-West agenda.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

"THE COMMITMENT TO HUMAN RIGHTS"

Address to the National Strategy Forum

Chicago, Illinois

May 4, 1988

It's a pleasure to be in Chicago and an honor to be able to speak to you, the members of the National Strategy Forum.

Our agenda for U.S.-Soviet relations has four main parts -- regional conflicts, bilateral exchanges, arms reductions and human rights. I've spoken elsewhere at some length about the first three. Today, I'd like to take a moment to discuss with you the subject of human rights.

We Americans often speak about human rights, individual liberties and fundamental freedoms. We know that the promotion of human rights represents a central tenet of our foreign policy; we even believe that a passionate commitment to human rights is one of the special characteristics that helps to make America, America. It was Lincoln who said that the Declaration of Independence granted liberty not to our nation alone, but "gave promise that in due time the weights should be lifted from the shoulders of all men...."

And it is important to note that this American emphasis on human rights represents much more than merely a vague respect for human dignity. No, part of our heritage as Americans is a very specific and definite understanding of human rights -- a definition of human rights that we can assert to challenge ourselves and our own institutions, and that we can hold up as an example for all the world.

Ultimately, our view of human rights derives from our Judeo-Christian heritage and the view that each individual life is sacred. It takes more detailed form in the works of the French and English writers of the 18th-century Enlightenment. It is the notion that government should derive its mandate from the consent of the governed, this consent being expressed in free, contested, regular elections. And there you have a first human right, the right to have a voice in government -- the right to vote.

Elected governments would reflect the will of the majority, but the Enlightenment writers and our own Founding Fathers gave the concept of human rights still more definite, specific form. For they held that each individual has certain rights that are so basic, so

fundamental to his dignity as a human being, that no government -- however large the majority it represents -- no government may violate them.

Freedom of speech. Freedom of religion. Freedom of assembly. Freedom of the press. These and other rights enshrined in our Constitution and Bill of Rights consist in severe limitations upon the power of government. They are rights -- and this is another basic point -- they are rights that every citizen can call upon our independent court system to uphold. They proclaim the belief -- and represent a specific means of enforcing the belief -- that the individual comes first: that the government is the servant of the people, and not the other way around.

That contrasts with those systems of government that provide no limit on the power of the government over its people. Within the Soviet Union, decision-making is tightly concentrated at the top. The authority of the Communist Party is not determined by a document -- a Constitution, if you will -- but by the leadership who determine what is right for the people. Rights such as free speech, free press and free assembly are granted if they are "in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system."

I have in the past stressed these contrasts between the United States and the Soviet Union -- the fundamental and profound differences between our philosophies of government and ways of life. And I have always said that our negotiations must be undertaken with precisely this sort of realism, this sort of candor. And yet while establishing this context is essential and reminding ourselves of these basic distinctions always useful, today I have something additional in mind. For in recent months, the Soviet Union has shown a willingness to respect at least some human rights. It is my belief that there is hope for further change, hope that in the days ahead the Soviets will grant further recognition to the fundamental civil and political rights of all.

But before discussing our hopes for the future, I'd like to turn for a moment to a subject that the Soviets themselves often raise. The United States may recognize civil and political rights, but what of economic and social rights? The Soviets point out, for example, that the United States has an unemployment problem. Or they point to the American problem of homelessness. Or to racial discrimination. Well, it deserves a full response.

To begin with, so-called economic and social rights belong to an essentially different category from civil and political rights. The economic and social conditions in any society are constantly changing -- new social groupings constantly taking shape; new markets forming as old markets disappear. Yet there is nothing shifting about civil and political rights like freedom of speech or worship: They are constant and immutable, forever basic to the dignity of each human being. They are fundamental -- fundamental to everything.

Yes, the United States has social and economic shortcomings. Unemployment, for one. As a free people, we have created an economic expansion that over the past five years has created nearly 16 million jobs -- but we need to do more. Homelessness is indeed a problem, an agonizing one. To some extent, we are bound in dealing with it by our very commitment to liberty; for while we seek to help the homeless in every way possible, we must avoid at all costs coercive solutions. It is true that, as a free people, we spend hundreds of millions of dollars a year through our federal, state and local governments to

care for the homeless. As a free people, our churches, synagogues and a host of volunteer organizations do much to provide the homeless with food, clothing and medicines.

And yet -- there is no denying that a problem remains. Racial discrimination -- our strides as a free people during just the past three decades have been dramatic. Yet the problem lingers, and we continue to battle bigotry and prejudice.

The problems, as I said, are serious -- no one would seek to deny that. Yet in freedom we are constantly confronting them, criticizing ourselves, seeking to do better...in full view for all to see.

But consider, if you will, the economic conditions of the Soviet Union. Now, I do not mean to suggest that the Soviet economy has made no progress. But the limited successes of the past arose largely from constant additions to the labor force and the availability of inexpensive resources. Now that these have been to a great extent depleted, there remains a gap between the Soviet Union and the West. Indeed, given the enormous advances in Western technology, the gap is likely to widen.

I do not bring this up simply for the sake of sounding critical. I mention it here because in recent months -- and this is a development of tremendous significance -- in recent months they have begun to mention it themselves -- just like Americans do about their problems. Soviet economists have published articles about Soviet shortages -- one recent article dealt with the inadequacies of Soviet housing. The Soviet press now carries stories about the need for progress. And, of course, Soviet economic progress is one of Mr. Gorbachev's chief aims.

And this brings us back to the subject of the day, human rights. For I believe that the Soviets may be coming to understand something of the connection -- the necessary and inextricable connection -- between human rights and economic growth.

The connection between economic productivity and certain kinds of freedom is obvious. Private plots of land make up only three percent of the arable land in the Soviet Union but account for a quarter of the produce. The free flow of information, to provide another example, will clearly prove vital for Soviet science and technology to have hope of reaching new and higher standards.

And yet there is a still deeper connection. For it is the individual who is always the source of economic creativity -- the inquiring mind that produces a technical breakthrough, the imagination that conceives of new products and markets. And in order for the individual to create, he must have a sense of just that -- his own individuality, his own self-worth. He must sense that others respect him -- and yes, that his nation respects him. Respects him enough to permit him his own opinions. Respects the relationship between the individual and his God enough to permit him to worship as he chooses. Even respects him enough to permit him, if he chooses to do so, to leave.

The Soviets should recognize basic human rights because it is the right thing to do. They should recognize human rights because they have accepted international obligations to do so, particularly in the Helsinki Final Act. But if they recognize human rights for reasons of their own -- because they seek economic growth, or because they want to enter into a more normal relationship with the United States and other nations -- well, I want to say that's fine by me.

Over the past three years, some 300 political and religious prisoners have been released from labor camps. More recently, the incarceration of dissidents in mental hospitals and prisons has slowed and in some cases stopped completely. And while the press remains tightly controlled by the Party and state, we've seen the publication of stories on topics that used to be forbidden -- topics like crime, drug addiction, corruption, even police brutality.

These changes are limited, and the basic standards contained in the Helsinki Accords still are not being met. But we applaud the changes that have taken place -- and encourage the Soviets to go farther. We recognize that changes occur slowly; but that is better than no change at all. And if I may, I'd like now to share with you a brief summary of the human rights agenda that I'll be discussing in my meetings in Moscow. It has four aims.

First, freedom of religion. Despite the recent relaxation of some controls on the exercise of religion, it is still true that churches, synagogues, mosques or other houses of worship may not exist without government permission. Many have been imprisoned in the past for acts of worship. And yet -- to quote the Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion." And General Secretary Gorbachev has indicated a willingness to consider "a new law" on the freedom of conscience.

Second, freedom of speech. There are still many serving long prison sentences for offenses that involve only the spoken or written word. Yet the clear, internationally recognized standard as defined, once again, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, is that -- and I quote -- "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression." And today, there is more such freedom in the Soviet Union than two years ago. Many persons imprisoned for expressing dissenting views have been released from prison. This issue can be removed by granting full recognition to this basic human right. And I know you join me in urging the freeing of people imprisoned for nothing more than the expression of their views.

Emigration, third, has long represented a matter of great concern to us. The Universal Declaration states that, quote, "Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." It is true that during the past 12 months, the rate of people permitted to leave the Soviet Union has been significantly higher than during the preceding six years. And it is true as well, that the number of those permitted to leave for short trips -- often family visits -- has gone up. We're heartened by this progress. Our hope is that the Soviets grant all their peoples full and complete freedom of movement.

And one point in particular. The Soviets refuse many the right to leave on the grounds that they possess secret information -- even though they had ended their secret work many years before, and whatever information they had has become public or obsolete. I hope such cases will be rationally reviewed and the decision will be made to free these people and their families.

This brings me now to the fourth and final area I want to discuss. As I've said a number of times now, we welcome the human rights progress that the Soviets have made -- and believe there is good reason to hope for still more. Yet it is only being realistic to point out that we have seen progress in the Soviet Union before. Khrushchev loosened things up a bit -- the intellectual and cultural life of the Soviet Union underwent a kind of thaw, a

kind of springtime. But it was a springtime followed by a winter -- for Khrushchev's relaxations reversed. And for the nearly three decades until today, oppression and stagnation once again became the determining characteristics of Soviet life.

And that is why those of us in the West both publicly and in direct conversation with the Soviets must continue to make candor and realism the basis of our bilateral relationship. My Chief of Staff, Howard Baker, told me recently of an old Tennessee saying, "Plain talk -- easily understood." Exactly. And just as previous hopeful moments in Soviet history ended all too soon, so, too, *glasnost* -- today's new candor -- will succeed if the Soviets take steps to make it permanent, to institutionalize it.

Freedom of religion, freedom of speech, freedom to emigrate -- and the willingness to make new freedoms permanent: these are our hopes -- these are our prayers -- for the future of human rights in the Soviet Union, in the world, in our own country.

In granting greater liberty, I am confident that the Soviets will discover that they have made possible economic growth. But even more important, this recognition of human rights will advance the cause of peace. For in the words of Andrei Sakharov -- a man who suffered much under the Soviet system, but who has also experienced the benefits of *glasnost*: "I am convinced that international confidence, mutual understanding, disarmament and international security are inconceivable without an open society with freedom of information, freedom of conscience, the right to publish and the right to travel and choose the country in which one wishes to live....Peace, progress, and human rights -- these three goals are insolubly linked."

Since I have been speaking today about the relationship of human rights and economic progress, let me say a few words about the present situation in Poland, a nation with which millions of Americans share bonds of kinship. We hope and pray that the Polish government will hear the voice of the Polish people -- and that economic reform and recovery will soon begin. The Polish people have long been ready for it.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

CONTINUITY IN U.S. HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY

Human rights forms part of the four-part agenda which has been developed between the United States and the Soviet Union, along with arms control, ending regional conflicts, and bilateral cooperation. Human rights discussions figure prominently at every high-level meeting with Soviet officials.

The importance the United States places on human rights reflects our history and traditions. The American people and their elected representatives have a deep and genuine concern for human rights issues everywhere. Private individuals, members of Congress and private organizations are in frequent contact with the U.S. government on the subject of Soviet human rights performance, and their backing has been of great assistance to U.S. government efforts.

In the past few years, the Soviet Union appears to have recognized the significance we place on human rights, and Soviet officials now seem willing to engage in serious discussions on human rights topics. They no longer take the stance that U.S. mention of such topics is interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Union is a signatory to the Helsinki Final Act and other international human rights agreements which represent an international obligation to respect human rights.

Human rights is now accepted as an integral part of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. In December 1987, this fact was recognized for the first time in a summit joint statement. U.S.-Soviet discussions on human rights are now both more frequent and more detailed. Several series of discussions have been initiated, in varying formats. Since the Reykjavik Summit, almost all high-level meetings have included a special working group on human rights. In addition, there have been frequent "case review sessions" to review individual human rights cases. We have held bilateral "experts roundtables" to discuss specific topics such as freedom of expression. Human rights issues are also dealt with at sessions of the "U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Review Commission."

During human rights discussions, Soviet representatives frequently raise what they term human rights abuses in the United States, which often relate to socioeconomic issues. The U.S. is willing to discuss problems raised by the Soviet Union. We do not grant the premise, however, that economic issues are the same as political rights. Furthermore, as U.S. officials often emphasize during discussions, the true test of the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on human rights will be the concrete results it produces.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

The United States remains dissatisfied with Soviet human rights performance. The Soviet Union persists in violating human rights and fundamental freedoms, as outlined in the Helsinki Final Act and other international agreements.

Nevertheless, there have been several significant human right developments in the Soviet Union during the past year and a half. In December 1986, Soviet authorities permitted Andrei Sakharov to return to Moscow after seven years of internal exile. Over 300 political prisoners have been let go since February 1987, the largest release of dissidents since the immediate post-Stalin period. The Soviets have also said that the Ministry of the Interior will no longer administer "special" psychiatric hospitals.

Clubs and organizations not sponsored by the government are now tolerated, although the members of some organizations with political interests, such as "Press Club Glasnost," have been harassed. "Press Club Glasnost" managed to hold a human rights seminar in December 1987, although participants had to meet in private apartments and several persons who wished to attend were arrested. A number of Americans who wished to attend were also denied Soviet visas.

Much more needs to be done. We know the names of over 300 persons still incarcerated in prisons, labor camps and psychiatric hospitals as a result of their political or religious beliefs. Although a review of the legal code was announced in November 1986, so far there has been no significant reform effected. It is especially disturbing that Armenian activist Paruyr Ayrikyan was arrested in March 1988 on charges of "anti-Soviet slander"; this is one of the "political" articles which Soviet officials intimated would be eliminated by the legal reform, and Ayrikyan's was the first arrest under this article in a year and a half.

In this year of the Millennium of Christianity in Kiev Rus', religious instruction outside the home remains forbidden. Places of worship, numbers of clergy, and the supply of religious literature are insufficient to serve the needs of the faithful. Teaching the Hebrew language is illegal. The independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church remains forcibly incorporated into a Russian Orthodox Church, and the Ukrainian Catholic Church is denied legal existence.

Emigration levels rose in 1987. The final total for Jewish emigration in 1987 was 8,155, and currently about 1,000 Soviet Jews are receiving exit permission each month. While these figures compare favorably with a total of 914 for the entire year of 1986, they are far lower than totals in the 1970s, when over 2,000 Soviet Jews departed each month. In the peak year for Jewish emigration, 1979, over 51,000 Soviet Jews emigrated.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

RELIGIOUS RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION

Although the Soviet government claims to respect the right of its citizens to practice any religion, religious believers are constrained by many state-imposed obstacles. The Soviet Constitution, for example, guarantees the right to "religious worship" but does not allow for the formation of religious organizations and the dissemination of religious beliefs on terms of full constitutional equality with atheistic organizations.

Even the constitutionally guaranteed right to religious worship is tightly circumscribed in the Soviet Union. All religious faiths must be officially recognized by the Soviet government in order to practice their faith legally. This provision has been used to block the legalization of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, which was banned by the Soviet government more than 40 years ago, and to prevent the registration of the Krishna Consciousness Movement (Hare Krishna). Furthermore, each religious community, which by law must include at least 20 believers, must be approved and registered by the government. Sometimes applications for registration are kept in process for years, thus effectively keeping a congregation from forming legally.

Soviet citizens who persist in practicing their faith despite these obstacles are often harassed. Religious believers are excluded from membership in the Communist Party and thereby denied nearly all access to positions of power and influence in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, believers are denied access to educational and employment opportunities.

Many believers have been imprisoned. Most of these individuals were convicted on the basis of criminal code articles, such as "anti-Soviet slander" and "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," which are in direct violation of international commitments that the Soviet Union has freely undertaken. Other articles, such as those preventing "the infringement of the laws on separation of the Church from the state," are used to deny the right of believers. Although more than 100 religious believers have been released from prison, labor camps and exile in the past one and a half years, more than 100 individuals remain imprisoned. Some reports place the number of religious prisoners even higher.

Religious education is also tightly circumscribed. All forms of religious education, except seminary training and parent-to-child education, are illegal in the Soviet Union.

Religious practice is further hindered by obstacles to import and production of religious materials and by lack of trained clergy and houses of worship.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

PRISONERS OF CONSCIENCE

One critical test of Soviet respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of its people is the treatment of those who dissent in their political views. The Soviet government has treated such dissidents harshly in the past, often sentencing them to prison, labor camp, exile, or placing them in mental hospitals. The criminal code articles used for convictions of dissidents by definition are violations of international human rights commitments, such as the Helsinki Final Act, which the Soviet Union has freely undertaken. Articles 70 ("anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda") and 190/1 ("anti-Soviet slander") of the Russian Criminal Code have been used to punish dissidents for expressing themselves freely and for publishing their views. In other cases, Soviet citizens who were exercising their constitutionally guaranteed rights of free expression were convicted on trumped-up charges such as parasitism.

Two years ago there were more than 700 political prisoners known to the West, although there may be at present hundreds of others who are not known. During the past two years, more than 300 of these prisoners have been released. Most of these individuals were compelled to sign self-incriminating statements as a condition of their release. Some of those who refused were returned to their place of imprisonment. Many of the released prisoners have been denied residence permission in their locations of former residence and have been denied employment in their fields, which is further evidence of denial of basic human rights.

More than 300 political prisoners remain incarcerated, including 14 former Helsinki monitors who were arrested for monitoring Soviet compliance with the Helsinki Final Act, a right which is mentioned in the Helsinki Accords. Although the Soviet government claims that there are no more than 18 remaining political prisoners, the narrow figure of those convicted on charges of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," this figure does not include religious prisoners and those convicted on trumped-up charges. Nearly 100 of these remaining prisoners are incarcerated in psychiatric institutions.

Although there had been no arrests on the basis of the political articles in the criminal code in more than one-and-one-half years, on March 25 of this year Armenian activist Paruyr Ayrikyan was arrested on charges of "anti-Soviet slander." More recently, on May 7th, Sergei Grigoryants and other human rights activists were arrested when they assembled to form an alternative political party. This return to the use of the political articles of the criminal code (Articles 70 and 190/1 of the Russian Criminal Code) is disappointing and occurred despite intimations by Soviet officials that Article 190/1 might be repealed altogether in the upcoming reform.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT ISSUES

Freedom of movement is an important issue in all high-level discussions on human rights with Soviet officials. Our commitment on this issue was the first human rights provision to be written into domestic legislation, in the form of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment to the Trade Act of 1974.

At the beginning of 1987, Soviet Jewish emigration levels began to rise over the extremely low levels of the mid-1980s. The final total of 1987 was 8,155, compared with a 1986 total of only 914. During 1987, 700-900 Soviet Jews received exit documentation each month. At the beginning of 1988, the Soviet authorities appear to have increased this figure to 1,000 a month, a rise which began to be reflected in the numbers of those completing their arrangements for departure in March and April. Soviet Jewish emigration is still far less than in the 1970s, however, when an average of about 25,000 a year departed. In the peak year of 1979, 51,320 Soviet Jews emigrated.

New Soviet regulations on entry and exit came into effect on January 1, 1987. They require that applicants have an invitation from abroad from a close relative -- a sibling, parent, child, or spouse. The Soviet authorities have not always strictly enforced this provision, but it serves as a deterrent to new applicants.

The majority of refusals continue to be on grounds of alleged "knowledge of state secrets." This rationale is applied in a highly arbitrary manner, and is frequently used even when the applicant has never had access to sensitive information, or when the access occurred so long ago that nothing learned at that time could still be sensitive. Another obstacle to emigration is the requirement that the parents and ex-spouses of adult applicants sign financial waiver forms. The U.S. government has called on the Soviets repeatedly to remove these and other barriers to emigration.

Emigration levels have also risen for the only other two groups permitted to emigrate in significant numbers, ethnic Germans and Armenians. Over 14,000 Germans emigrated to West Germany in 1987, a new record, compared with 783 in 1986. During 1988, German emigration has averaged over 2,000 a month. In 1986, only 247 Soviet Armenians were able to depart. In 1987, an estimated 8,000 received permission to leave, most of them in the second half of the year. Because of this sharp and unexpected rise, the U.S. Embassy in Moscow was able to process only about 3,000 Armenian cases by the end of the year. The Embassy has now increased its processing capacity to match the number of those receiving exit permission, and during 1988 an average of 1,000 Soviet Armenians have departed each month.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

"THE EXPANSION OF HUMAN FREEDOM"

*Remarks by President Ronald Reagan
to the World Affairs Council
of Western Massachusetts
Springfield, Massachusetts
April 21, 1988*

I am delighted to be here, especially in the state where America's own struggle for freedom began. "I am well aware," John Adams wrote in 1776, "of the toil and blood and treasure that it will cost us to support and defend these states. Yet through all the gloom I can see the rays of ravishing light and glory."

Historians have wondered ever since what it was that made men like Adams and that outnumbered band of colonists believe they could overthrow the power of the mightiest empire on Earth. How appropriate it seemed -- five years later -- when the British band played at Yorktown "The World Turned Upside Down."

Truly, the predictions of the wiser heads in Europe had been proven wrong: The boldness, the vision, and, yes, the gift for dreaming of a few farmers, merchants and lawyers here on these shores had started a revolution that today reaches into every corner of the world; a revolution that still fires men's souls with the ravishing light and glory of human freedom.

As members of the World Affairs Council, as active students of global politics, all of you here today can testify to how unlikely the prospects for freedom seemed at the start of this decade. You can recall democracy on the defensive in country after country, an unparalleled buildup in nuclear arms, hostages in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, predictions of economic contraction and global chaos ranging from food and fuel shortages to environmental disaster: All of these were the unrelenting themes of so much of what we read and heard in the media.

With the economic recovery of the United States and the democracies, however, much of this talk abated. And this economic recovery, anticipated in Massachusetts in 1981 and 1982 with reduced state and local tax rates, was itself rooted in the insight that was at the heart of the revolution begun here two centuries ago: Trust the people, let government get out of the way, and leave unharnessed the energy and dynamism of free men and women.

But I have come here today to suggest that this notion of trusting the power of human freedom and letting the people do the rest was not just a good basis for our economic policy: It proved a solid foundation for our foreign policy as well. That's what we have given to the people; why we have repeated what they instinctively knew but what the experts had shied away from saying in public.

We spoke plainly and bluntly; we rejected what Jeane Kirkpatrick calls "moral equivalency." We said freedom was better than totalitarianism; we said communism was bad; we said a future of nuclear terror was unacceptable. We said we stood for peace, but we also stood for freedom. We said we held fast to the dream of our Founding Fathers: the dream that someday every man, woman and child would live in dignity and in freedom. Because of this, we said containment was no longer enough -- that the expansion of human freedom was our goal. We spoke for democracy and we said we would work for the day when the people of every nation enjoyed the blessings of liberty.

At first, the experts said this kind of candor was dangerous, that it would lead to a worsening of Soviet-American relations. But far to the contrary, this candor made clear to the Soviets the resilience and strength of the West; it made them understand the lack of illusions on our part about them or their system.

By reasserting values and defining once again what we as a people and a nation stood for, we were, of course, making a moral and spiritual point. In doing this, we offered hope for the future -- for democracy -- and we showed we had retained that gift for dreaming that marked this continent and our nation at its birth.

But in all this we were also doing something practical. We had learned long ago that the Soviets get down to serious negotiation only after they are convinced that their counterparts are determined to stand firm. We knew the least indication of weakened resolve on our part would lead the Soviets to stop the serious bargaining, stall diplomatic progress and attempt to exploit this perceived weakness.

So we were candid. We acknowledged the depth of our disagreements and their fundamental, moral import. In this way, we acknowledged that the differences that separated us and the Soviets were deeper and wider than just missile counts and numbers of warheads. As I've said before, we do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. I spoke these words to General Secretary Gorbachev at our first meeting in Geneva.

And that was why we resolved to address the full range of the real causes of that mistrust and raise the crucial moral and political issues directly with the Soviets. In the past, the full weight of the Soviet-American relationship all too often seemed to rest on one issue: arms control, a plank not sturdy enough to bear up the whole platform of Soviet-American relations. So we adopted not just a one-part agenda of arms control but a broader four-part agenda. We talked about regional conflicts, especially in areas like Afghanistan, Angola and Central America, where Soviet expansionism was leading to sharp confrontation. We insisted on putting human rights on our bilateral agenda and the issue of Soviet noncompliance with the Helsinki Accords. We also emphasized people-to-people exchanges and we challenged the Soviets to tear down the artificial barriers that isolate their citizens from the rest of the world.

As for the final item on the agenda -- arms control -- even that we revised. We said we wanted to go beyond merely establishing new limits that would permit even greater buildups in nuclear arms. We insisted on cutting down -- reducing, not just controlling -- the number of weapons. This approach -- public candor about their system and ours, a full agenda that put the real differences between us on the table -- has borne fruit.

Just as we look at leading indicators to see how the economy is doing, we know the global momentum of freedom is the best leading indicator of how the United States is doing in the world. When we see a freely elected government in the Republic of Korea; battlefield victories for the Angolan freedom fighters; China opening and liberalizing its economy; democracy ascending in Latin America, the Philippines and on every continent -- where these and other indicators are strong, so too is America and so too are our hopes for the future.

And yet, even while freedom is on the march, Soviet-American relations have taken a dramatic turn -- into a period of realistic engagement. In a month, I will meet Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow for our fourth summit since 1985. Negotiations are underway between our two governments on an unparalleled number of issues. The INF Treaty is reality and now the Senate should give its consent to ratification. The START treaty is working along. And I know that on everyone's mind today is this single, startling fact -- the Soviets have pledged that next month they will begin withdrawing from Afghanistan.

If anyone had predicted just a few years ago that by the end of this decade a treaty would be signed eliminating a whole class of nuclear weapons, that discussions would be moving along toward a 50-percent reduction in all strategic nuclear arms and that the Soviets had set a date certain for pulling out of Afghanistan, that individual would have faced more than a little skepticism. But that -- on the eve of the fourth summit -- is exactly where we are.

So let me summarize for you some of the issues that need crucial definition as we approach this summit.

Let's begin with Afghanistan.

History records few struggles so heroic as that of the Afghan people against the Soviet invasion. In eight years, more than a million Afghans have been killed. More than 5,000,000 have been driven into exile. And yet, despite all this suffering, the Afghan people have fought on -- a determined patriotic resistance force against one of the world's most powerful and sophisticated armies. Yes, their land has been occupied, but they have not been conquered.

Now the Soviets have said they've had enough. The will for freedom has defeated the will for power, as it always has and I believe always will.

But let me say here that the next few months will be no time for complacency, no time to sit back and congratulate ourselves. The Soviets have rarely before -- and not at all in more than three decades -- left a country, once occupied. They have often promised to leave -- but rarely in their history -- and then only under pressure from the West, have they actually done it.

Afghanistan was a critical, strategic prize for the Soviets. The development of air bases near Afghanistan's border with Iran and Pakistan would have dramatically increased the Soviet capability to project their power to the Strait of Hormuz and to threaten our ability to keep open that critical passage. We believe that they still hope to prop up their

discredited, doomed puppet regime, and they still seek to pose a threat to neighboring Pakistan, to whom we have a long-standing defense commitment.

So we ask: Have the Soviets really given up these ambitions? Well, we don't know. We can't know until the drama has fully played. We must make clear that any spreading of violence on the part of the Soviets or their puppets could undo the good that the Geneva Accords promised for East-West relations.

The Soviets are now pledged to withdraw their forces totally from Afghanistan by next February 15 at the latest. In the meantime, they know that as long as they're aiding their friends in Kabul, we will continue to supply the *mujahidin* by whatever means necessary.

Let me repeat -- we will continue to support the *mujahidin* for as long as the Soviets support the Kabul regime. The Soviets understand that this is our position and that we wouldn't have entered into this agreement without it. And it is more than a position. This is a hard and fast commitment on my part -- backed up by a unanimous resolution of the U.S. Senate.

From the start, our policy in Afghanistan has been directed at restoring that country to an independent, nonaligned status, in which the Afghan people could decide their own future, and to which their refugees could return safely and with honor -- the same goals as those stated in successive U.N. General Assembly resolutions over the years.

But these aren't the only goals of our policy there. In a broader sense our policy is intended to nurture more normal relations between East and West. Just as a Soviet Union that oppresses its own people, that violates the Helsinki Accords on human rights to which it is a party, that continues to suppress free expression, religious worship and the right to travel -- just as such a Soviet Union can never have truly normal relations with the United States and the rest of the free world, neither can a Soviet Union that is always trying to push its way into other countries ever have a normal relationship with us. And that's what has happened in countries like Angola, Nicaragua and Ethiopia. The Soviet Union has helped install or maintain client regimes against the will of the people.

None of these regimes have brought peace or a better life to their people. Each has brought misery and hardship. Each is an outrage to the conscience of mankind, and none more so than Ethiopia.

Two years ago a pitying world believed that at last the hopes of all compassionate people had been realized and that the famine in Africa had come to an end. Humanity prayed that it would never again see pictures of children with bloated stomachs or hear stories of families dying one by one as they walked dozens of miles to reach feeding stations. But now in one country, the famine has returned.

Ethiopia suffers from drought, and even more it suffers from inadequate agricultural policies. But now to drought and failed policy has been added a third, even more deadly element -- war.

The Ethiopian army has recently suffered major defeats in its long war with the Eritrean secessionist forces. The combination of drought and the dislocations of war is the immediate cause of famine in that part of the country. But the Ethiopian regime recently ordered all foreign famine relief workers to leave the afflicted northern region. That leads us to the horrible conclusion that starvation and scorched earth are being considered as weapons to defeat the rebellion.

The subject of Ethiopia has long been on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, but now it is more urgent because of this tremendous human catastrophe in the making. Is the world to know another holocaust? Is it to see another political famine?

The Soviets are the principal arms supplier and primary backer to the regime in Addis Ababa. They are also supplying 250,000 tons of food this year. They can stop this disaster before it happens. And I appeal to them to persuade the Ethiopian regime, as only they can, to change its decision and to allow the famine relief efforts to continue. And let me add that I hope that the Soviet Union will join us and other concerned governments in working toward a peaceful, negotiated solution to the civil war.

In Ethiopia and in every country in which the Soviets have imposed a regime, the issues of human rights and regional conflicts merge into one greater issue -- that of Soviet intentions, designs, and behavior both at home and across the Earth.

Several years ago the French political thinker and writer Jean-François Revel reported on a conversation that a member of the French Cabinet had with a high Soviet official. The Soviet official, in reviewing the history of the 1970s, said, as Revel writes, "We took Angola and you did not protest. We noted the fact and included it in our analyses. Then we took Mozambique....Then we took Ethiopia, a key move....(You had) no reply. We took Aden and set up a powerful Soviet base there. Aden! On the Arabian Peninsula! In the heart of your supply center! (You had) no response." And the Soviet official concluded, "So we noted: We can take Aden."

The years of Western passivity in the face of Soviet aggression ended seven years ago. But the issue here is that the mentality that produced such "analyses," as the Soviet official called them, has not ended. Until it does, the world can not know true peace.

That's a lesson we should apply closer to home, in Nicaragua. A few months before the Soviets launched their invasion of Afghanistan, they also helped Sandinista communists in Nicaragua to steal a democratic revolution. The communists promised democracy and human rights, but instead imposed a cruel dictatorship -- massively militarized -- and began a secret war of subversion against Nicaragua's peaceful neighbors.

The people of Nicaragua took up arms against the communists, and they have fought a valiant struggle. But our Congress, instead of giving the Nicaraguan resistance the same steady support the Afghans have received, has repeatedly turned aid on and off. Even now, while the Soviet bloc pours \$500 million a year in arms into Nicaragua, Congress has denied the freedom fighters the support they need to force the Sandinistas to fulfill their democratic promises. I think it's about time that Congress learned the lessons of Afghanistan.

America, by supporting freedom fighters against brutal dictatorships, is helping to advance the values we hold most dear -- peace, freedom, human rights, and, yes, democracy. At the same time, we're helping to secure our own freedom by raising the cost of Soviet aggression and by extending the battle for freedom to the far frontier.

Some say the Soviet Union is reappraising its foreign policy these days to concentrate on internal reform. Clearly, there are signs of change. But if there is change, it's because the costs of aggression and the real moral difference between our systems were brought home to it. If we hope to see a more fundamental change, we must remain strong and firm. If we fulfill our responsibility to set the limits -- as well as offering constructive

cooperation -- then this could indeed turn out to be a turning point in the history of East-West relations.

By starting now to show real respect for human rights and abandoning the quest for military solutions to these regional conflicts, the Soviet Union would also be working to build trust and improve relations between our two countries. Regional conflicts and human rights are closely intertwined. They are issues of moral conscience. They are issues of international security. Because when a government abuses the rights of its own people, it is a grim indication of its willingness to commit violence against others.

Two of the most basic rights that we have called on the Soviets to comply with under the Helsinki Accords are the right to emigrate and the right to travel. How can we help but doubt a government that mistrusts its own people and holds them against their will? And what better way would there be to improve understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union than to permit free and direct contact between our two peoples? In the new spirit of openness, why doesn't the Soviet government issue passports to its citizens? I think this would dramatically improve U.S.-Soviet relations.

The World Affairs Council is a major sponsor of USIA's International Visitors Program. I don't have to tell you the importance of people-to-people exchanges. And I want personally to thank all of you who have provided assistance and hospitality to foreign visitors.

I have often reflected on how, if our planet was ever threatened by forces from another world, all nations and all people would quickly come together in unity and brotherhood. You here at the World Affairs Council understand better than most this lesson about how much all of us have in common as members of the human race. It is governments, after all, not people, who put obstacles up and cause misunderstandings.

When I spoke at the United Nations several years ago, I mentioned the words of Gandhi, spoken shortly after he visited Britain in his quest for independence for India.

"I am not conscious of a single experience throughout my three months in England and Europe," he said, "that made me feel that after all East is East and West is West. On the contrary, I have been convinced more than ever that human nature is much the same, no matter under what clime it flourishes, and that if you approached people with trust and affection, you would have ten-fold trust and thousand-fold affection returned to you."

You in the World Affairs Council have done much praiseworthy work in this area. And I'm hopeful that American foreign policy -- based as it has been on strength and candor -- is opening a way to a world where trust and affection between peoples is an everyday reality. This is my hope as I prepare to leave for Moscow. I am grateful for your prayers and support.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

AFGHANISTAN SOVIET WITHDRAWAL

We welcome the beginning of Soviet withdrawal as a step toward the goal the U.S. shares with almost all Afghans: freedom and self-determination. One hundred twenty members of the U.N. also share this goal.

The Geneva Accords do not include cease-fire for the Resistance and the U.S.S.R. rejected a U.S. proposal for mutual cessation of military assistance to Kabul and the Resistance. We expect the *mujahidin* will continue fighting hard and will rapidly gain control of areas evacuated by the Soviets.

Under the April 14 Geneva agreement, the Soviet Union must pull out half its troops in the first three months (by August 15), the remainder by the end of nine months (February 15). The Soviets have told us that the troops will be out by end of year. We will push the Soviets on this as well as monitor progress spelled out at Geneva.

Soviet withdrawal is a victory which belongs to the courageous and unrelenting fight of the Afghan people and the *mujahidin*. They have borne heavy costs in their pursuit of freedom but have won support of the vast majority of the international community.

Pakistan deserves great credit for shouldering the burden of over 3,000,000 Afghan refugees and negotiating a political settlement that gets the Soviets out of Afghanistan.

AID TO RESISTANCE

There will be no hiatus in U.S. aid to the *mujahidin* unless the Soviet Union agrees to stop military assistance to the regime in Kabul.

We will not put the Resistance at a disadvantage. The Soviets understand this and knew that the obligations of guarantors must be balanced.

For the Resistance, the struggle isn't over. Their goal: freedom and self-determination with the support of U.S. and other governments. We are confident the brave *mujahidin* will be able to achieve this goal.

The Kabul regime is illegitimate. It does not have the support of the Afghan people. We hope the Afghans can agree on a broad-based interim government as soon as possible, thus stopping the bloodshed. How they do this is up to the Afghans, but the Soviets can play a role by making it clear to the PDPA regime that it cannot maintain power.

Pakistan's support for the Resistance has been unflagging and will remain so. So has our support for Pakistan. We have warned the U.S.S.R. about the dangers of pressure by PDPA or others on Pakistan.

REFUGEES

There are 3,000,000 to 5,000,000 refugees outside Afghanistan. It is the greatest resettlement challenge since World War II. We have been helping the refugees all along and have humanitarian assistance programs already underway in Afghanistan. These can be adapted to evolving circumstances.

We believe the U.N. and its specialized agencies are the logical organizations to coordinate this job, and encourage a multilateral U.N.-led relief effort to assist in repatriation, resettlement and reconstruction. We are pleased at the appointment of a special U.N. coordinator to oversee this effort. The Soviet Union, which inflicted so much suffering on the Afghan people, has a special obligation to provide resources for resettlement.

PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT

We will continue our support for the Resistance as a whole, not picking or choosing; on political matters, it is up to the Afghans to determine their future, not the U.S. or other outside powers.

We hope a broad-based successor regime to PDPA can be formed as soon as possible.

In deciding whether or not to recognize any alternative or successor regime, the U.S. would use a number of widely-used international criteria to help determine its position.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

REGIONAL DIALOGUE

In recent years, we have established and sustained an active and candid dialogue with Moscow on regional issues. This remains an integral facet of our four-part agenda.

This dialogue has been useful in reducing the possibility of misunderstandings and miscalculations.

As in other areas of U.S.-Soviet relations, however, we do not see dialogue as a substitute for concrete progress.

The Soviets have recently shown greater flexibility in talking about regional conflicts, stressing need for political solutions based on national reconciliation, self-determination, enhanced regional dialogue.

This is encouraging, especially since these ideas were borrowed from President Reagan's October 1985 U.N. General Assembly speech. But we must continue to judge Soviet actions, and not just their words.

We believe that one key factor necessary for making progress with the Soviets on regional issues is our continued support (be that political, economic or military) for freedom fighters opposing repression by Moscow and its allies.

Our objective is to find just political solutions to regional conflicts.

As stated in the Washington Summit Statement, we want to find ways to help "third parties to regional conflicts find peaceful solutions that advance their independence, freedom and security."

The signing of the Geneva Accords on Afghanistan April 14 represented an historic step in resolving regional conflicts through political dialogue.

General Secretary Gorbachev has indicated that the Afghan settlement should open the way to resolution of other regional conflicts by political means. We fully agree.

We'll seek to follow up with the Soviets by pressing for practical steps aimed at ending other regional conflicts, many involving Soviet client regimes.

The President expects to cover the full range of regional issues during the Moscow Summit, including Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the Middle East peace process, Southern Africa, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Korea and Central America.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

EAST ASIA

Since General Secretary Gorbachev came to power, the Soviet Union has shown new interest in the Asia-Pacific region. We can expect this interest to continue in the coming years.

The more active Soviet policy in East Asia is motivated by a desire for involvement with the dynamic economic forces at work along the Pacific Rim, and the recognition that past Soviet policy failed to provide Moscow with the influence and standing it seeks in Asia.

At the same time, the Soviets persist in efforts to enhance their military presence in the region, e.g. strengthening their base at Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam, and in attempts to undermine our defense alliance structure in East Asia and the Pacific.

Soviet objectives require that the U.S. continue to maintain significant military forces in East Asia while we pursue mutually beneficial relations -- economic, commercial, political and cultural -- with the nations in the region.

The burden is on the U.S.S.R. to prove itself able to play a more constructive role in the region. In our discussions, we are looking for indications of Soviet willingness to promote real peace initiatives in Cambodia and the Korean Peninsula.

CAMBODIA

The U.S. supports the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' (ASEAN's) lead in efforts to achieve a Cambodian settlement and the economic and diplomatic isolation of Vietnam as a way to pressure that country to settle the Cambodian conflict.

Peaceful settlement in Cambodia must be reached by an agreement that provides for the complete withdrawal of Vietnamese forces and self-determination for the Cambodian people. Self-determination must be carried out through genuinely free elections under international supervision.

Direct participation by Vietnam in negotiations toward a settlement in Cambodia and Vietnam's commitment to an irrevocable timetable for troop withdrawal in advance of 1990 are essential to resolve the Cambodian issue.

We believe that the leader of the non-communist Cambodian resistance, Prince Sihanouk, must play an essential role in the settlement of the Cambodian conflict; we call upon the Vietnamese to negotiate directly with him.

KOREA

The 1988 Seoul Olympics should be a great success. Athletes from a record 161 countries, including the U.S.S.R., will compete. The Olympic Games will demonstrate Seoul's coming of age as an important regional economic power and flourishing democracy. The Games are an international festival which the entire world should attend.

North-South dialogue is the key to the reduction of tensions and development of understanding on the Korean peninsula. It is important that the two Korean governments sit down together to exchange views candidly.

Our security commitment to the Republic of Korea (ROK) is unshakable. U.S. ground troops remain an essential part of the defensive shield behind which the ROK has made tremendous economic and political strides.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

GENERAL

Secretary of State Shultz returned from Moscow April 23. The Soviets say an international conference should have an active and substantive role in negotiations. We understand the need for an international conference, but not a plenipotentiary one. That will make bilateral negotiations -- the only kind that can produce a settlement -- impossible. The conference must be a mechanism for facilitating, not supplanting such negotiations.

The Secretary traveled to the Middle East in early April. His stops included Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria. He reemphasized our commitment to the peace initiative. No one has said yes to our proposal, but no one said no. All encouraged us to continue our efforts.

Our proposal is the only realistic and workable approach available. It is an integrated package -- no part can be removed without destroying its essential balance. Not Israelis, not Arabs, and not the Soviets. President Reagan said, "The U.S. will not slice this initiative apart and will not abandon it."

Our initiative emphasizes an interlocking mechanism between transitional arrangements and final status negotiations.

Negotiations must start on transitional arrangements to avoid driving each party to its most extreme positions; to move quickly to end Israeli military occupation; to grant Palestinians the right of self-rule; and to establish a basis for the final status talks.

The fundamental objectives of a negotiated settlement remain security for all states in the region, including Israel, and the realization of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. Neither of these central objectives is possible over the long term without a settlement.

Three issues are central to the process of bringing about negotiations between Israel and its neighbors: a properly structured international conference, Palestinian representation and the meaning of U.N. Security Council Resolution 242.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

The conference some are opposing is not the conference we are proposing.

Under procedures set out in our proposal, parties move quickly to direct negotiations within a properly structured international conference.

The conference we propose would not impose solutions or veto agreements. It would launch direct negotiations, and would receive reports from the parties to the negotiations, in a manner to be agreed.

Those invited to the conference must accept U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiations, and must renounce violence and terrorism.

PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION

Everyone agrees that the Palestinians are a party to the Arab-Israeli conflict who must be represented at every stage of the negotiating process.

Everyone also agrees that a settlement must address the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people -- in the same way that it must address the legitimate rights of the other negotiating parties.

Palestinian representatives will participate in negotiations as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.

Those who come to negotiate must be of good will and committed to peace. People must not be selected who would drive away the representatives of another party.

Insistence on visible Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) participation from the outset will mean no conference, no process.

THE MEANING OF U.S. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

This is the primary substantive issue confronting the parties. It is important because the parties must understand the accepted basis for negotiations and must share essentially the same view of what the parameters of a final settlement might be.

Clearly, one of 242's central principles is negotiations involving an exchange of territory for peace. U.S. position: in return for peace, withdrawal provision of 242 applies to all fronts, including West Bank, Gaza and Golan Heights.

All attempts to avoid or reinterpret 242 are bound to fail.

Arabs cannot avoid peace; Israel cannot avoid withdrawal.

In our proposal, Resolution 242 is enshrined as the basis of negotiations, and all its provisions and principles will apply in each of the negotiations undertaken between Israel and its neighbors.

Much scope remains for negotiations. In our view, the extent to which Israel should be asked to give up territory will be heavily affected by the extent of true peace and normalization, and the security arrangements offered in return.

SUMMARY

The U.S. proposal is a carefully thought-out plan which addresses the fundamental substantive issue -- land for peace -- and which provides a way to deal with the two key procedural problems -- the conference and Palestinian representation. The sooner decisions are made, the sooner parties can move to the negotiating table.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

U.S. ACTION IN GULF APRIL 18

U.S. action against Iran's platforms was a measured response, brought on by Iran's mining of international waters and their mine attack on the "Samuel Roberts" injuring 10 men.

Subsequent U.S. actions were defensive in the face of Iranian hostile action. The episode is closed and the U.S. hopes for peaceful, more normal relations with Iran. However, we will continue to respond firmly in self-defense when challenged.

Congress was informed of our response in advance. We will stay in close contact with Congress and we welcome the strong bipartisan support we have received.

U.S. POLICY

Vital U.S. interests in Gulf: a stable supply of oil, support for nonbelligerent Gulf Arab states, prevent the expansion of Soviet influence, block Iranian efforts at intimidation and hegemony.

U.S. Navy presence, security assistance and diplomatic efforts are means to achieve objective.

In addition to escort operations, we have decided to assist friendly, innocent neutral vessels under attack in the Gulf in certain circumstances. We're not the policeman of the Gulf and not protecting cargoes for either belligerent.

The decision requires no increase in our Gulf presence.

U.S. decision means that our naval ships will now operate under orders already in effect for French and UK naval vessels in the Gulf. Welcomed by many governments and U.S. shipowners as contribution to freedom of navigation by nonbelligerent shipping.

No tilt in policy. We do not seek conflict with Iran. Root cause of tension is the war. Must focus on a solution.

Iran refuses to accept and implement Resolution 598, as required by the U.N. Security Council. Iraq has accepted it.

The Iranian charge that the U.S. influenced Saudis to break relations with Iran is unfounded; it is also untrue that the U.S. has participated in Iraqi military actions.

The U.S. is strongly opposed to the use of chemical warfare by both Iran and Iraq and supports the recent report by the U.N. Secretary General calling for a halt to its use and an end to the war by implementing Security Council Resolution 598.

U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598

Our goal is the immediate negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war, based on Resolution 598. We need a comprehensive end to the war -- land, sea, and air. Recent events underscore the need for urgent U.N. Security Council action on follow-up, arms embargo resolution against Iran for noncompliance with 598.

U.S. welcomes Iraq's acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 but regrets its rejection of the proposal by the U.N. Secretary General that both Iraq and Iran accept Security Council Resolution 598 and explore with his representative how to implement that resolution in all its parts.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

BERLIN INITIATIVE

The Berlin Initiative was launched by President Reagan during his Berlin visit last June 12.

The objective is to bring certain practical improvements to the lives of Berliners:

- Expand air access to the city.
- Foster youth and other exchanges across East/West Berlin.
- Bring more international meetings to Berlin.
- Stage more international sports events in Berlin, including possibly a future Olympics.

The U.S. Initiative has the active support and participation of the French, British and West German governments.

Experts-level discussions between the four governments have been going on since last summer.

The U.S., U.K. and France formally presented the Initiative to the Soviets last December and suggested talks to discuss its four proposals.

The Soviets have announced they hope to respond to the Initiative by this summer.

The President raised the subject of the Initiative with General Secretary Gorbachev at last December's Washington Summit and will likely do so again at the Moscow Summit.

Key Point: The three Western allies in Berlin, with the support and cooperation of the Bonn government and local authorities in Berlin, are making and will continue to make a strong effort to bring positive change to Berlin.

There will be no change in the city's status. Our proposal is meant to build upon, not revise, the 1971 Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.

If the Soviets are serious about reducing tensions in Europe and ensuring peace, then we invite them to cooperate with the three Western allies in taking some limited steps, particularly at the human level, to improve the situation of the people of Berlin.

We look forward to discussing the President's proposals with the Soviets as soon as they respond positively to the allies' invitation.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

AFRICA

ANGOLA / NAMIBIA

It is increasingly obvious to all parties that negotiated settlement is the only way to remove all foreign forces from the region, achieve independence for Namibia, and allow Angolans to reconcile their internal differences.

In stepped up contacts with Angolans, Cubans, Soviets and South Africans, the U.S. has sought to narrow differences.

A U.S.- arranged meeting in London May 3-4 was the first direct meeting ever between South Africa and Cuba and the first meeting in four years between South Africa and Angola.

Based on the progress made and the constructive tone of all parties at the first round, it was agreed that another session in the near future is warranted.

Key remaining issue: timetable for withdrawal of all Cuban forces from Angola and of South African forces from Namibia.

THE HORN

War and famine plague the Horn of Africa, particularly Ethiopia and Sudan, where victims already number in the millions. Many are beyond the reach of international emergency assistance efforts.

The recent intense fighting in northern Ethiopia culminated in the Mengistu regime's misguided decision to expel foreign relief workers from the area.

A few U.N. workers have since been allowed to return, but the full resumption of the international relief effort is needed if the 2,000,000-to-3,000,000 people at risk are to be fed.

The U.S. has asked the Soviet Union, as the primary military supplier, to use its influence with Mengistu to permit relief operations to resume.

Over the longer term, political solutions to Ethiopia's secessionist wars are needed. We have encouraged the Soviet Union to use its influence in Ethiopia to encourage peaceful solutions.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

CENTRAL AMERICA

NICARAGUA

The U.S. goal in Nicaragua is the implementation of a genuine and enduring democracy.

CEASE-FIRE NEGOTIATIONS: The second round ended April 30 without significant progress. The Sandinistas have taken a hard-line position against democratization and are preventing humanitarian aid from reaching forces inside Nicaragua.

DEMOCRATIZATION: The Guatemala accords specify steps to be taken to implement democracy. The Sandinistas have not fulfilled the requirement. The democratic elements in the country -- labor, opposition parties, independent media, church leaders -- have been harassed, intimidated, threatened and arrested over the nine-month period since the Guatemala accords were signed.

ARMS BUILD-UP: Since the Guatemala agreement, the Soviet bloc has shipped about 250 million dollars in arms to Nicaragua. The Sandinista military is now almost twice the size of any other country's forces in the region. The leaders of every other Central American country have called on the Soviets to stop the military build-up.

PANAMA

Panama is not an issue on the U.S.-Soviet agenda, though it is a vital strategic interest for the U.S.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

U.S. - U.S.S.R. COOPERATIVE EXCHANGES

Since President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev first called for broader exchanges at their Geneva meeting in November 1985, our countries have been exploring new cooperative exchange activities in a broad field of areas. Since then the United States has gradually expanded scientific cooperation under existing Agreements in the fields of medical science and public health, environmental protection, peaceful uses of atomic energy, housing and other construction, and in studies of the world ocean. In addition, the General Exchanges Agreement, signed at the 1985 Summit, revived a wide variety of contacts between the American and Soviet peoples in the areas of cultural, educational and people-to-people exchanges. In April 1987, our two countries signed a new Agreement in the field of civil space cooperation.

At the Washington Summit in December 1987, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev approved an initiative in global climate and environmental change under the Environmental Protection Agreement and the new Space Agreement. They also expressed support for expanded bilateral and regional cooperation in the Arctic.

At the December 1987 Summit, the two leaders also agreed to continue efforts to expand exchanges under the General Exchanges Agreement, noting the 30th anniversary of the first Exchanges Agreement in January 1988, and reaffirmed their commitment to expand people-to-people contacts, including young people.

Since then, the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to discuss new areas of cooperation where there are mutual gains to be made. This year we began fresh negotiations with the Soviets aimed at reviving cooperation in the field of transportation and at introducing a new field of cooperation in the area of basic scientific research. In April of this year our countries signed a new cooperative accord in the field of nuclear reactor safety aimed at preventing another nuclear accident like the 1986 accident at Chernobyl.

At the 1985 Geneva Summit, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev emphasized the importance of research aimed at utilizing magnetic fusion for the benefit of all mankind. In April 1988, together with the European Atomic Energy Community and Japan, the U.S. and Soviet Union embarked on a three-year conceptual design of a magnetic fusion test reactor, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The foremost objectives of the United States in pursuing scientific cooperation with the U.S.S.R. are to strengthen scientific capability, to lessen distrust and tension between the superpowers, to communicate American views and values to an influential segment of Soviet society and to illustrate the benefits of maintaining peaceful relations within the international community.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

MOSCOW EMBASSY ISSUES

The U.S. and the U.S.S.R. agreed to build new embassies in the 1960s. The first concrete step was the signing, in 1969, of an exchange of sites agreement giving each side comparably-sized plots of land to accommodate new chanceries and housing complexes. An agreement spelling out detailed construction procedures was signed in 1972.

Dramatic public revelations in the spring of 1987 about Soviet efforts to plant listening devices in our new embassy building generated significant public interest in the question of the building's future. Several studies of security problems and related issues affecting both the new and existing chanceries were completed last summer. We have reviewed these studies carefully, and it appears clear that major dismantling and rebuilding will be necessary before we can move into the new building.

We have commissioned a private sector engineering and feasibility survey of deconstruction/reconstruction options. The target date for completion of the survey is August. In addition, a number of technical studies are underway on the nature and extent of the security problems and on possible solutions to those problems. We will carefully evaluate all options before a final decision is made on the best way of ensuring that the new building is as safe and secure as possible. The Reagan Administration will continue to work closely with the Congress as plans develop.

It would be premature to set a date for moving into the new chancery, but given the detailed studies and extensive renovation that will be required, there is little likelihood of using the new building within the next three-five years. As we have made clear in the past, the Soviets will not be permitted to move into their new office building in Washington until we are in a position to begin using our new chancery in Moscow.

Work is well underway to upgrade both the physical security and habitability of our existing chancery in the U.S.S.R. The heating system is being upgraded after the devastating effects of last year's record winter, and a new fire safety system is being installed.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

U.S.-SOVIET TRADE

GENERAL

Bilateral trade looms small for either side -- less than one percent of total U.S. trade, two percent of Soviet trade. It has consistently produced a surplus for the United States, the largest of which was 3.3 thousand million dollars in 1979. The surplus dropped from an average of 2.35 thousand million dollars in 1984-85 to .8 thousand million dollars in 1986-87 due to decline in bilateral trade.

U.S. EXPORTS TO THE SOVIET UNION

U.S. exports to the Soviet Union averaged almost three thousand million dollars in 1984-85 but only 1.4 thousand million dollars in 1986-87. Agricultural items have dominated U.S. exports since 1972, but the proportion of total exports they represent has declined. Recently, U.S. exports to the Soviets have declined as their grain purchases have dropped.

In 1984 U.S. grain sales were 2.8 thousand million dollars and total U.S. exports were 3.3 thousand million dollars; in 1985, grain sales were 1.9 thousand million dollars, total exports were 2.4 thousand million dollars. In 1986-87 grain sales averaged only .7 thousand million dollars. U.S. exports to the Soviet Union of manufactured goods and crude materials have decreased significantly, as well.

U.S. IMPORTS FROM THE SOVIET UNION

U.S. imports from the Soviet Union constitute only about .2 percent of all U.S. imports and about 2.8 percent of total Soviet exports to the industrialized West. These imports averaged .5 thousand million dollars in both 1984-85 and 1986-87, but fell from 605 million to 470 million dollars in 1987, in part due to a successful antidumping case against Soviet urea. Except for 1982, when total U.S. imports from the Soviets were low, agricultural items have represented only two to three percent of these imports.

**TOP 10 U.S. EXPORTS
TO THE U.S.S.R.
(\$ millions)**

Wheat	389	(26%)
Corn	381	(26%)
Fertilizers	229	(15%)
Soybean cake/meal	58	
Press. sens. tape	56	
Soybeans	43	
Physical anal eq	39	
Almonds	27	
Tallow	19	
Insulating oils	16	

Total Above 1,257 (85%)

Total Exports 1,480

**TOP 10 U.S. IMPORTS
FROM THE U.S.S.R.
(\$ millions)**

Anhydr. ammonia	69	(15%)
Lgt fuel oils	56	(12%)
Rhodium	49	(10%)
Palladium	30	
Aluminum waste	26	
Sable furskins	19	
Fuel oil to 25 api	17	
Vodka nov 1 gal	13	
Palladium bars	12	
Fuel oil 25 api up	11	

Total Above 302 (64%)

Total Imports 470



MOSCOW SUMMIT

GRAIN SALES TO THE U.S.S.R.

U.S. grain sales to the U.S.S.R. are governed by the five-year Long Term Grain Agreement (LTA), signed in 1983. In each agreement year (October 1-September 30), the U.S. guarantees to supply and the U.S.S.R. to purchase, a minimum of 9 million metric tons (mmt) of grain. This must consist of at least four mmt of wheat and four mmt of corn. The remaining tonnage may be any combination of wheat and/or corn, or 500,000 metric tons (mt) of soybeans counted at two for one. The Soviets may buy up to three mmt of additional grain without further consultations. Should they want to purchase more than a total of 12 mmt, and U.S. supplies are judged adequate, USDA may offer them an additional amount.

In the first year of the agreement, the Soviets purchased 14.485 mmt of U.S. grain, composed of 7.593 mmt of wheat, 6.476 mmt of corn and 416,000 mt of soybeans. In the second year they bought a record 18.675 mmt: 15.750 mmt of corn, but only 2.887 mmt of wheat and no soybeans. In the third year the Soviets purchased 6.935 mmt of corn, 1.535 mmt of soybeans and only 153,000 mt of wheat. In the fourth year, they purchased four mmt of wheat, 4.1 mmt of corn and .06 mmt of soybeans. In the fifth year, to date, the Soviets have purchased nearly nine mmt of wheat, over four mmt of corn and about 1.5 mmt of soybeans and soy meal.

The Soviets' failure to meet their purchase commitments for wheat in the second and third years of the LTA was attributed to a dispute over the pricing requirements of the LTA. The shortfall in fourth-year total purchases was ascribed by the Soviets to concerns over the condition of the U.S. grain arriving in the U.S.S.R., a problem which now appears to have been solved. The price dispute was resolved when the U.S. agreed to offer an Export Enhancement Program (EEP) for fourth-year wheat purchases, which resulted in sales of four mmt of wheat. Fifth-year wheat purchases have also been made under EEP programs.

The current LTA expires on September 30, 1988. Two rounds of negotiations (the delegation is chaired by Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Holmer) have been conducted on a new agreement, but significant differences remain to be resolved.



MOSCOW SUMMIT

KIEV-NEW YORK CONSULATE EXCHANGE

President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev agreed in Geneva in November 1985 to open consulates in Kiev and New York. This was a resumption of a consulate exchange begun in the mid-1970s but interrupted when Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979.

Kiev, capital of the Ukrainian Republic, is the third largest city in the Soviet Union. The Ukraine is a major industrial and agricultural center and the most populous Soviet republic after the Russian Republic. Several million Americans of Ukrainian and Jewish heritage have family ties to this area. A consulate in Kiev would be the only U.S. representation in a non-Russian region of the U.S.S.R.

For the past year we have concentrated our efforts on repairing our existing Moscow chancery and on planning for our new Embassy. Planning for the full-scale consulate originally envisioned has been suspended, as we are not prepared at the present time to undertake another costly and complex project in Kiev.

We continue to believe, however, that the Kiev-New York consulate exchange is in our interest, and we are exploring the possibility of establishing a smaller, five to six person post which could be in operation by the end of the year. The Soviets would be permitted the same number of consulate personnel in New York.