

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Coordination Office, NSC: Records,
1983-1989

Folder Title: 157. To Geneva (11/16/1985-
11/21/1985) File 1 (4)

Box: RAC Box 10

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	From Donald Regan and Robert McFarlane to the President re: Approaching Geneva: Current Assessment. (1 p.)	n.d.	P4 B1
2. memo	From George Shultz to the President re Your October 23-24 Trip to the United Nations General Assembly: Scope Paper. (2 pp.)	10/7/85	P4 B1
3. PROF note	From Jack Matlock re: Henkel Meeting with the Soviet Advance Team. (1 p.) <i>KS 10/23/00</i>	10/11/85	P5
4. paper	re: Toward a More Constructive Relationship President Reagan's Meeting with Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev Geneva, November 19-20, 1985. (5 pp.)	n.d.	P4/P5 B1
COLLECTION: Coordination Office, NSC: Records, 1981-88			rs
FILE FOLDER: 157 To Geneva (11/16-21/85) File 1 (4) [Box 90538]			11/3/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(5) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

October 21, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM:

LYNN S. SACHS

LS Sachs

SUBJECT:

Presidential Consultation with Key Members on Geneva

Attached at Tabs I thru IV are schedule proposals for the President to have four events with key members of Congress prior to his meeting with Gorbachev. These meetings will give members an opportunity to share their views on the wide range of Geneva issues and give the President an opportunity to actively prepare for the November meeting with a broad and bipartisan group from Congress.

White House/State/DoD and NSC Legislative Affairs have been working together to coordinate all Congressional activities that affect Geneva. Attached at Tab V is our proposed plan of key Congressional events for the next few weeks.

Max Friedersdorf and M. B. Oglesby support these schedule proposals.

Don Fortier, Jack ~~Patlock~~ ^{in for} Miller concur.

Recommendation

That you approve the schedule proposals at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Breakfast with Bipartisan Group of Senators
 Tab II Breakfast with Bipartisan Group of Representatives
 Tab III Weekend at Camp David
 Tab IV Congressional "Send-Off"
 Tab V Geneva Gameplan Overview

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Breakfast with Bipartisan Group of Senators

PURPOSE: To consult with Senators on issues for the Geneva meeting.

BACKGROUND: Members of Congress are keenly interested in preparations for the Geneva meeting. An informal breakfast will give the President an opportunity to consult with Congress and to request their views on the range of issues that will be discussed in November. This will show broad, active and bipartisan participation in the President's preparations for Geneva.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President has not met with members on the Geneva meeting.

DATE & TIME: October 29 or 30, 1985
8:30 - 9:30 a.m.
DURATION: 60 minutes.

LOCATION: Old Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, The Vice President, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Robert C. McFarlane, Max Friedersdorf, M. B. Oglesby, Jr., and 30 Senators.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Members arrive diplomatic entrance - 8:15.
Members assemble in Dining Room - 8:25.
President arrives for breakfast - 8:30.
Presidential remarks - 8:50.
Secretaries Shultz/Weinberger brief remarks - 9:00.
President opens floor for discussion - 9:05.
President wraps up discussion - 9:25.
President departs to Oval Office - 9:30.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks, NSC will provide talking points.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer only.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane
Max L. Friedersdorf
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.

OPPOSED BY: None

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Breakfast with Bipartisan Group of
Representatives.

PURPOSE: To consult with members of the House of
Representatives on issues for the
Geneva meeting.

BACKGROUND: Members of Congress are keenly interested
in preparations for the Geneva meeting. An
informal breakfast will give the President an
opportunity to consult with Congress and to
request their views on the range of issues
that will be discussed in November. This
will show broad, active and bipartisan
participation in the President's preparations
for Geneva.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President has not met with members on the
Geneva meeting.

DATE & TIME: November 6 or 7, 1985
8:30 - 9:30 a.m.
DURATION: 60 minutes.

LOCATION: Old Family Dining Room

PARTICIPANTS: The President, The Vice President,
Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Robert C.
McFarlane, M. B. Oglesby, Jr., and 30
Congressmen.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Members arrive diplomatic entrance - 8:15.
Members assemble in Dining Room - 8:25.
President arrives for breakfast - 8:30.
Presidential remarks - 8:50.
Secretaries Shultz/Weinberger brief remarks -
9:00.
President opens floor for discussion - 9:05.
President wraps up discussion - 9:25.
President departs to Oval Office - 9:30.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks, NSC will provide talking points.

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer only.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane
Max L. Friedersdorf
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.

OPPOSED BY: None

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Weekend at Camp David

PURPOSE: To consult with key bipartisan congressional leadership on the upcoming meeting with Gorbachev.

BACKGROUND: This will be a major part of the President's active preparation for the November meeting. An informal weekend of consultation will show broad and active participation and an effort to achieve bipartisanship. Congress should be very supportive of the President as he departs for Geneva, these meetings will help assure their support.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: The President has not met with key bipartisan leadership on the Geneva meeting.

DATE & TIME: Weekend of November 1, 1985.

LOCATION: Camp David, Maryland.

PARTICIPANTS: President, Vice President, Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger, Robert C. McFarlane, M. B. Oglesby, Jr.

House: Tip O'Neill, Speaker
Jim Wright, Majority Leader
Dante Fascell, Chairman Foreign Affairs
Les Aspin, Chairman Armed Services
Bob Michel, Republican leader
Trent Lott, Minority Whip
Bill Broomfield, Ranking Minority Member, Foreign Affairs
Bill Dickinson, Ranking Minority Member, Armed Services

Senate: Bob Dole, Majority Leader
Dick Lugar, Chairman Foreign Relations Committee
Barry Goldwater, Chairman, Armed Services Committee

Robert Byrd, Minority Leader
Claiborne Pell, Ranking Minority
Member, Foreign Relations Committee
Sam Nunn, Ranking Minority Member,
Armed Services Committee

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: To be determined.

REMARKS REQUIRED: None.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Photo opportunities to be determined.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane
Max Friedersdorf
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.

OPPOSED BY: None.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN

REQUEST: Congressional "Send-off" before President's
Departure for Geneva.

PURPOSE: To show strong bipartisan support for the
President as he departs for Geneva.

BACKGROUND: The President will be concluding weeks of
Geneva preparation and consultation.
This event will illustrate the importance
of congressional support and unity on the eve
of the President's departure for his meeting
with Gorbachev.

PREVIOUS
PARTICIPATION: The President will have consulted with these
members in the weeks prior to his departure.

DATE: November 15.

LOCATION: Oval Office and the Rose Garden.

PARTICIPANTS: The President, Vice President, Secretaries
Shultz and Weinberger, Robert C. McFarlane,
M. B. Oglesby, Jr., Bipartisan Leadership.

OUTLINE OF EVENTS: Members will assemble in the Oval Office for
10 minutes of informal discussion. They will
then proceed to the steps of the Rose Garden.
The President will make brief remarks.

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief remarks, to be provided by
speechwriters.

MEDIA COVERAGE: Open press.

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane
M. B. Oglesby, Jr.

OPPOSED BY: None

GENEVA GAMEPLAN OVERVIEW

Oct. 22	GOP Leadership with preview of UNGA speech.
Oct. 22-24	Additional calls to members to preview speech and advance distribution of speech.
Oct. 28 or 29	Presidential breakfast with bipartisan Senators.
Oct. 29 or 30	Shultz informal meeting with bipartisan Representatives.
Nov. 1-3	Weekend at Camp David for bipartisan Leadership.
Nov. 5	GOP Leadership -- Geneva on agenda.
Nov. 6 or 7	Presidential breakfast with bipartisan Representatives.
Nov. 6 or 7	Shultz informal meeting with bipartisan Senators.
Nov. 12	Bipartisan Leadership -- Geneva on agenda.
Nov. 15	Congressional "Send-Off".

RECEIVED 18 OCT 85 16

TO POINDEXTER

FROM KEYWORTH, G

DOCDATE 18 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR
SDI

SCIENTIFIC

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY OPTION FOR GENEVA MTG

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 21 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

KORENGOLD

MILLER

FORTIER

LINHARD

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (JF)


ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: G. A. KEYWORTH 

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S NOVEMBER MEETING WITH
SECRETARY GENERAL GORBACHEV: CONSIDERATION
OF A SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OPTION

Issue

How to respond to possible Soviet overtures in science and technology and whether to propose a comprehensive S&T Initiative at Geneva to portray the President as an open, peace-loving world leader and create a public diplomacy success.

Objective

To protect long-term security interests and promote national goals in foreign policy, science and technology, and public relations.

Scenario for S&T Option

- 1) The President raises the theme of science and technology cooperation with Gorbachev and highlights peaceful scientific research as an international endeavor critical to the future of mankind.
- 2) Commending both nation's accomplishments in science and technology, the President portrays this area as one in which the U.S. and USSR could derive reciprocal benefits from enhanced interaction.
- 3) The President proposes to Gorbachev that the two nations chart a new scientific relationship. Demonstrating his commitment to this concept, the President proposes that the two leaders task their respective Science Advisors to determine the scientific priorities and fields of research for future bilateral cooperation.

AdvantagesPolitical

- ° This option would further given objectives for the November meeting. The President would score significant political mileage from initiating cooperation in an area uniformly perceived as beneficial to mankind.

- This option does not hinge upon a flashy isolated initiative in space, health, or environment which Gorbachev can accept, reject, negotiate, or link to other bilateral issues.
- In keeping the Initiative general, the President cannot be viewed as having a "hidden agenda", as was the case with the Soviets' interpretation of the space cooperation proposal which they rejected and linked to SDI.
- The President's only commitment at Geneva will be future discussions. By entrusting the "S&T store" to his Science Advisor, the President closes the door on negotiations at Geneva and ensures that critical technical discussions will take place in the proper venue, away from the political spotlight.
- The Soviets cannot reject this Initiative without publicly denouncing future cooperation with the U.S. in science and technology and risking negative world opinion.

Scientific

- A national science policy will underpin all US-USSR S&T cooperation to maximize scientific gain and protect strategic technologies and security interests. The technical content of US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be re-defined and the scope of interactions controlled. The "balance of benefits" from US-Soviet S&T cooperation will be redressed in favor of the U.S.
- This Initiative would harness the Soviets, curtail their ability to carve out separate, isolated S&T programs with U.S. technical agencies and limit the technical benefits they can reap by manipulating a fragmented U.S. system.

Military

- US-Soviet scientific contacts, dependent upon reciprocity and the joint selection of research fields, will result in better access to the Soviet elite. New intelligence opportunities to assess Soviet S&T strengths and weaknesses will enhance analyses of Soviet economic/military capability and acquisition of strategic technologies.
- Soviet on-site access to university-based cutting-edge basic research, in which the U.S. leads, but the Soviets target, will be limited.

Public Relations

- The President will be portrayed as a world leader, sharing his nation's expertise in science and technology to benefit all nations--including his adversary--the USSR.

- ° U.S. political prestige and credibility will be enhanced among our allies and adversaries who will view the President's proposal as open and forthright and without a hidden purpose.
- ° The President's call for US-Soviet research ventures to promote the health and well-being of mankind will deflect the Soviet propaganda campaign aimed at linking all U.S. scientific research efforts to SDI and the "militarization of space".
- ° The President's sincerity and personal commitment to improving US-Soviet relations will be publicly demonstrated when he entrusts this important task to his Science Advisor.
- ° Possible Headlines Include:
 - Reagan calls for a new beginning in US-Soviet scientific relations.
 - Americans and Soviets agree to cooperate in the peaceful uses of science and technology to benefit mankind.
 - President Reagan invites Soviets to participate in U.S. science and technology research programs.

Disadvantages

- ° This option could be viewed as giving US-Soviet science and technology cooperation high political visibility and inappropriate linkage with the overall state of US-Soviet relations.
- ° This option could be misinterpreted as signalling a return to the era of detente and an expansion in US-Soviet S&T relations, whereas the objective is to deliver maximum political pay-off and chart a new course for US-Soviet interactions to achieve national goals.

Interagency Support

This option should enlist support from a number of constituencies. The scientific and military applications protect the technology transfer/security concerns of Defense, CIA, and Treasury's Enforcement Operations. Our scientific agencies will endorse a Presidential Initiative that creates a national science policy to underpin their present and future dealings with the Soviet Union. The President's public relations advisors, State, and USIA will recognize the political benefits the Initiative confers and should welcome this opportunity for a public diplomacy success at Geneva.

RECEIVED 04 NOV 85 11

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SANTER, JACQUES

DOCDATE 17 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: LUXEMBOURG
HS

USSR

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

SUBJECT: PM SANTER 17 OCT THANK YOU LTR FOR PRES 25 SEP LTR / GENEVA TALKS

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES DUE: STATUS C FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

COBB

SOMMER

MATLOCK

CLEVELAND

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID (HW HW)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH LK. 11/4 W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

October 17th, 1985



LE PRÉSIDENT DU GOUVERNEMENT

Dear Mr President,

Thank you very much, indeed, for your letter of 25 September 1985 concerning your upcoming Meetings with Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.

I very much appreciate your continuous efforts to keep me informed of your talks with the Soviet Union.

Jacques SANTER
Prime Minister

His Excellency
Ronald Reagan
President of the
United States of America

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY CR, NARA, Date 8/17/95



AMBASSADE DU GRAND-DUCHÉ
DE LUXEMBOURG
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Washington D.C., October 31, 1985

The Ambassador of Luxembourg presents his compliments to the Honorable the National Security Adviser and has the honor to transmit herewith a message addressed to the President of the United States by the Prime Minister of Luxembourg.

The Ambassador of Luxembourg would be grateful if the above mentioned letter could be forwarded to its High Addressee.

The Ambassador of Luxembourg avails himself of this opportunity to renew to the Honorable the National Security Adviser the assurances of his highest consideration.

The Honorable
Robert McFarlane
National Security Adviser
The White House
Washington D.C.



REFERRAL

DATE: 04 NOV 85

MEMORANDUM FOR: STATE SECRETARIAT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION:

TO: PRESIDENT

SOURCE: SANTER, JACQUES

DATE: 17 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: LUXEMBOURG

USSR

GORBACHEV, MIKHAIL S

HS

SUBJ: PM SANTER 17 OCT THANK YOU LTR FOR PRES 25 SEP LTR / GENEVA TALKS

REQUIRED ACTION: ADVANCE / INFORMATION CY

DUE DATE:

COMMENTS:



FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM

October 17, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

FROM: Edward Djerejian *ED*

SUBJECT: Papers Required for Geneva Meetings Press Book

The papers referred to in the attached list (Tab II) are needed for the Press Book being prepared for the President's Geneva meetings.

RECOMMENDATION

That you send the memorandum at TAB I to State.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____
Jack *Platt* and Bud Korengold concur.

Attachments

TAB I	Memo to Platt
TAB II	List of required papers
TAB III	Format for background papers
TAB IV	Format for fact sheets
TAB V	Format for GISTS

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NICHOLAS PLATT
Executive Secretary
Department of State

SUBJECT: Papers Required for President's Geneva Meetings
Press Book

State Department assistance is requested in the preparation of the press book being compiled for the President's November meetings with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva. Specifically, unclassified background papers or fact sheets on the subjects on the attached list are needed. If GISTs on these subjects are current, they may be substituted for any of the background papers.

The appropriate format for each type of paper is attached. Background papers and fact sheets should be no longer than one page, while GISTs should run one page, front and back, in the standard GIST format. All drafting and clearance information should be included on a separate sheet of paper.

Please have the papers prepared in camera-ready form and submitted to my office as early as possible, but in no case later than Friday, October 25. This deadline is essential to meeting the press book printing schedule. Questions on the papers should be referred to Deborah Cavin or Ronald Harms of the NSC's Public Diplomacy Coordination team, who can be reached on 456-6712/6713.

William F. Martin
Executive Secretary

Attachment

List of Papers Requested

Format Examples

Background Papers

Human Rights in Soviet Union (4 papers):

- Helsinki Accords
- Emigration
- Religious Freedom
- Prominent Human Rights Cases

Regional Issues (6 papers):

- Afghanistan
- Central America
- Eastern Europe
- Middle East
- Far East
- Southern Africa

U.S.-USSR Bilateral Issues (8 papers):

- Cultural Exchanges
- Science and Technology Agreements
- CIVAIR
- Grain
- Other Current Agreements
- Other Ongoing Talks (include Consulate proposals, etc.)
- East-West Trade
- Other Bilateral Issues

Arms Control (18 papers):

- Glossary of Arms Control-Related terms
- SALT I: Summary
- SALT II: Summary
- Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Interim Restraint
- Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Current Talks
- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons: Positions in Previous Talks
- Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons: Current Talks
- SDI
- Soviet Strategic Defensive Efforts
- Strategic Defense: U.S. Objectives in Negotiations
- Compliance
- ASAT: U.S. Position
- ASAT: Soviet Proposal
- Nuclear Testing (including PNET and TTBT)
- Nuclear Nonproliferation
- Chemical Weapons
- MBFR
- CDE

Fact Sheets

List of Previous Meetings Between U.S. Presidents and Soviet General Secretaries

- Soviet Government Structure
- Soviet Military
- Soviet Economy
- U.S.-Soviet Trade
- U.S. Arms Control Initiatives
- Soviet Arms Control Initiatives

EXAMPLE

US-JAPAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The US and Japanese economies combined account for nearly 50 percent of free world GNP, and have become increasingly interdependent. With over \$85 billion in total bilateral trade in goods and services expected this year, Japan is our second largest trading partner after Canada, taking almost 10 percent of our exports. The US is Japan's largest market, accounting for about 25 percent of its total exports. Long-term capital flows also are increasing, particularly Japanese direct investment in the US which now stands at some \$8-9 billion. Moreover, we are entering a new era of cooperation in science and technology, including space.

Over the past several years, there have been difficulties in the trade relationship, however. Our recent large trade deficits with Japan (about \$19 billion in 1983), the awareness that Japan's markets generally still remain more closed than US markets and the obvious successes enjoyed by Japanese firms in the US and other markets have led to a strong concern in public and Congressional opinion about the fairness of our trade relations with Japan. Since President Reagan took office, the Administration has made it a priority objective to induce Japan to provide greater access to its economy by liberalizing and internationalizing its trade and financial markets.

Over the last two years, the GOJ has announced five market-opening trade "packages," which have included in part tariff reductions, streamlined customs procedures, revamped product standards and certification requirements, improved NTT (telecommunications) procurement arrangements, and expanded beef, citrus and other agricultural quotas. Since the President's visit to Japan last November, both governments have been engaged in a continuing effort to make progress toward resolving outstanding bilateral economic issues. The most recent Japanese trade package, issued April 27, included several initiatives which may substantially increase market opportunities in the tobacco and telecommunications service sectors as well as tariff reductions on paper products, wine and other items of interest to the U.S.

A number of issues, however, remain outstanding, including tariff cuts on wood and other products; liberalization of capital markets, banking and legal services; and the facilitation of access for foreign investment. We will continue to address the remaining bilateral economic issues in the framework of the cooperative partnership existing between our two countries with the goal that US goods, services and investment should enjoy access to Japan's markets on a basis comparable to that enjoyed by Japanese products in the US.

EXAMPLE

FACT SHEET

United States Economic Status

First Quarter 1984

Gross National Product

Gross National Product in the first three months of 1984 grew at a rate of 8.8 percent. Solid real growth has been accomplished in an environment of low inflation, improved productivity, and restored business profitably. There were signs that economic activity began to slow at the end of the quarter and real growth in the second quarter is expected to proceed at a more moderate pace.

Unemployment

Civilian unemployment fell from a peak rate of 10.7 percent at the end of 1982 to 7.8 percent in April 1984. Civilian employment increased by 5.4 million over the same time span to a new record of 104.4 million Americans working.

Inflation

Inflation, as measured by the implicit GNP deflator, rose only 3.7 percent in the first quarter. It was 4.1 percent for all of 1983, the smallest increase for any year since 1967. Inflation at the wholesale level in April did not increase. It was up at an annual rate of 6.0 in the first quarter. The Consumer Price Index rose at a seasonally adjusted annual rate of 5.0 in the first quarter.

Leading Indicators

The leading economic indicators, which predict economic activity in the months ahead, were down 1.1 percent in March 1984. This is the first drop in 19 months. This decline tends to confirm predictions of moderating growth in the economy in the second quarter.

Housing Sales

Housing starts in the first quarter were at a 2.0 million unit seasonally adjusted annual rate, their fastest pace in over five years. Starts continued at the same rate in April.

New Car Sales

Total new car sales were at 10.6 million unit annual rate in the first quarter, up from a low 8.0 million rate through all of 1982. Sales of domestic models were particularly strong, averaging an 8.2 million unit rate in the first quarter.

gist

A quick reference aid on U.S. foreign relations
Not a comprehensive policy statement
Bureau of Public Affairs • Department of State

US-Canada Relations

March 1985

Background: The relationship between Canada and the US is both productive and complex--more so than our ties to any other country. We share the world's longest land border, as well as its longest water boundary. We each play a distinct but compatible role in world affairs and our security interests are inextricable. We are each other's most important economic partner. With two countries as interdependent as ours, occasional differences naturally arise, but both Prime Minister Mulroney and President Reagan have placed a high priority on maintaining the good relations that now exist. In September 1984 the two agreed to meet annually (this year, March 17-18 in Quebec City), and other Cabinet officers were encouraged to talk frequently with their counterparts. Secretary Shultz expects to meet at least four times a year with Canadian Secretary of State for External Affairs Joseph Clark.



Global interests: Canada and the US are founding members of both the UN and NATO. Both countries are active in international affairs and consult extensively on development assistance, arms control efforts, and peacekeeping issues.

Security relations: In addition to being NATO allies, the US and Canada maintain the joint North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD). A special arrangement for the development and procurement of defense goods also exists. Our security relationship is coordinated by the Permanent Joint Board on Defense.

Economic relations: The volume of US-Canadian trade is the largest in the world. Two-way exchanges have tripled from \$39 billion in 1974 to more than \$110 billion in 1984, accounting for more than 19% of US trade and more than 75% of Canada's foreign trade. More than one-fifth of our exports go to Canada, one-and-one-half times the total exported to Japan, our next largest customer.

In 1965 we concluded an automotive agreement providing for duty-free bilateral trade in vehicles and parts. Both countries have realized substantial advantages in investment and employment and in economies of scale (i.e., the fall in unit costs as the number of units produced increases). The total exchange for automotive products in 1984 was about \$40 billion.

Canada and the US held preliminary discussions in 1984 on a Canadian proposal to negotiate additional free trade arrangements for selected industrial sectors. Although the Mulroney government has not yet decided whether to continue these talks or pursue other approaches, both governments agree on the benefits of further trade liberalization.

In 1983, US investment in Canada totaled \$47.5 billion, 20% of US investment abroad. Canada's private direct investment in the US amounted to more than \$11 billion.

Energy: Canada is our principal foreign source of natural gas and electricity and our second largest supplier of crude oil and petroleum products. In 1984, the value of our energy trade in Canada came to about \$10 billion, a figure larger than total US trade with most countries. Even at these levels, however, Canada supplies a relatively modest share of the US energy market: 4% for natural gas, 3.5% for oil, and 1.5% for electricity. Canada in turn is an important market for US coal, with net imports worth \$673 million in 1983. Overall, Canada is by far our largest energy trading partner.

Since 1981, Canada's National Energy Program (NEP) has been the cornerstone of Canadian energy policy. Passed during a period of tight world energy supplies and rapidly increasing energy prices, the NEP has as its primary goals increasing Canadian self-sufficiency in energy and raising the share of Canadian ownership of its energy industry to more than 50% by 1990. We do not disagree with these objectives, and Canada has made substantial progress toward achieving them. However, certain features of the NEP discriminate unfairly against US and other foreign investors. The Mulroney government recently announced its intention to eliminate a number of these features.

Environment: Canada and the US share a common interest in protecting the North American environment. Environmental cooperation has a long history; the joint cleanup of the Great Lakes following a US-Canada agreement in 1972 is a recent success story. Canadian controls on air pollution and toxic chemicals generally are less stringent than US regulations, although the Government of Canada has moved to tighten some standards. An important bilateral issue is acid rain, a form of transboundary air pollution. Canadians fear that acid rain threatens their forests and freshwater streams and have proposed that both countries begin soon to reduce the emissions believed responsible. US emissions are substantially smaller than Canada's, on a per capita basis, and the US is continuing to reduce emissions under current laws while devoting large sums (\$85 million in the proposed fiscal year 1986 budget) to intensive research into all aspects of the problem.

Maritime boundary and fisheries: In October 1984, the International Court of Justice, at the request of the US and Canada, ruled on the disputed boundary in the Gulf of Maine. The court's ruling settled the boundary, which gave Canada jurisdiction over about one-sixth of the rich Georges Bank fishing grounds. The impact on both countries' east coast fisheries is significant, and we will eventually need to work out a cooperative arrangement for managing the fish stocks that cross the boundary and are caught by both countries' fishermen.

On the west coast, we have nearly concluded a Pacific salmon fishing treaty after 15 years of negotiations. The treaty will benefit both Canadian and US fishermen by regulating interceptions of salmon spawned in the fresh water of one country and caught by the other's fishermen.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 16, 1985

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: FREDERICK J. RYAN, Director
Presidential Appointments and Scheduling

FROM: WILLIAM F. MARTIN *WFM*

REQUEST: NSC Meeting

PURPOSE: Briefing of the President prior to his attendance at the UNGA

BACKGROUND: The President will hold several bilateral meetings and mini-bilaterals during his attendance at the UNGA. The 60-minute NSC meeting time on October 22 will be used to brief the President. However, an additional 60-minute briefing slot is required and requested.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: Not applicable

DATE & TIME: Monday, October 21, 1985
DURATION: 60 minutes

LOCATION: Cabinet Room

PARTICIPANTS: To be determined

OUTLINE OF EVENT: Briefing

REMARKS REQUIRED: None

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House Photographer

RECOMMENDED BY: Robert C. McFarlane

OPPOSED BY: None

*Fred,
The 10/22 NSC time will
now be used for an arms
control topic. Will need an
hour on 10/21 to
cover all the
UNGA. NY
Schedule does not
include pre-brief
time for the
bilaterals.
Tx,
Bob*

October 16, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM F. MARTIN

THROUGH: JOHNATHAN S. MILLER *BSJ*

FROM: MARY M. WENGRZYNEK *M*

SUBJECT: Schedule Proposal

Attached at Tab I for your signature is a Schedule Proposal requesting a 60-minute time slot on Monday, October 21, to brief the President in preparation for his attendance at the UNGA.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the Schedule Proposal at Tab I.

Approve *WRF*

Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab I Schedule Proposal

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

7 Oct

Mary,

Please replace
this corrected copy
of page 3 to one
Mr. Miller received
Friday, 4 Oct.
System II, 91033 of
4 Oct.

Memo to McFarlane
From Rod McD, D/CMC
re Second Simulation
of Pre-Summit Public
Diplomacy

thanks, Lois

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

- o Themes/Perceptions for Geneva
- o Major Events on the Road to Geneva
- o Secretary's Scope Paper and Outline of UNGA Speech
- o Geneva Schedule
- o People to People Initiative

SECRET

DECLASSIFY: OADR

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

CP

ROAD TO GENEVA AND BEYOND

Themes and Perceptions for Public Presentation

Theme: BUILDING A SAFER WORLD

Basic Messages: (Bracketed portions to be used when proposals made.)

- We want countries to stop trying to expand their influence through armed intervention and subversion.

[That is why we are proposing negotiated settlements, withdrawal of outside forces, and international efforts to build economies and meet human needs.]

- We have the mandate and opportunity to reduce the danger of nuclear war by drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals.

[That is why we are proposing radical, verifiable and balanced reductions of offensive nuclear weapons and are pursuing research to identify defensive technologies - which threaten no one.]

- We must defend human rights everywhere, since countries which respect human rights are unlikely to unleash war.

[That is why we insist that the Helsinki accords and other international commitments be observed.]

- We must establish better communication between our societies, since misunderstandings make the world more dangerous.

[That is why we are proposing dramatic increases in people-to-people exchanges, programs to share information, and enhanced cooperation in meeting human needs.]

- The meeting in Geneva marks a new phase in this process. Our efforts to reach these ambitious goals will continue.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE GENEVA MEETING

Working for a Safer Future

The President seeks to build the foundation for peaceful and constructive relations with the Soviet Union. This will require a long-term, sustained effort. It must be based on the principles of fairness, reciprocity and honest fulfillment of all agreements.

Soviet Behavior: The Roots of Tension

The use or threat of force by the Soviet Union and its proxies is an underlying cause of Soviet-American and world tension. The President is determined to defend the United States and its Allies. The USSR must cease using arms and force to expand its influence if tensions are to diminish.

Leading from Strength

The President's hand is strong: he has reversed the decline in American strength and has a robust economy, a united public and strong alliances behind him. He is able to defend us whatever the Soviets do. But he wants more: he wants to lower arms levels, reduce tensions and create a more cooperative relationship with the USSR.

Promoting Democratic Ideals

The President will speak out for democracy, freedom, justice and decency everywhere since these values are the surest foundation of a just and peaceful world in the future. He does not attempt to impose our political or economic system on others, but will insist that the Soviet Union also refrain from attempts to dominate others.

Probing Soviet Intentions

We can have a more cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union only if the Soviet leaders also want it. The Geneva meeting will determine whether there has been a change in Soviet policy or only in Soviet style.

Realistic but Determined Effort

The President is preparing seriously for the meeting in Geneva. He has no illusions about the profound differences in our philosophies and societies but will go the extra mile for enduring peace and a safer world. He will bring creative and ambitious ideas to the meeting. His efforts will not end when the Geneva meeting is over. He is in this for the long haul.

1030 October 8, 1985

TENTATIVE
PROPOSED MAJOR PRESIDENTIAL EVENTS ON THE ROAD TO GENEVA

- October 7-11 Short Presidential meeting with Prime Minister
Blaize of Grenada (success of Grenada a good
message to send to the world before Geneva).
- October 12: Radio Address - SDI
- Mid October: Interview Times of India (Theme: regional
issues)
- Off the record cocktails with selected White
House Correspondents (40 minutes)
- Off the record cocktails with principal
Washington Bureaus
- Interview with White House News Service
Reporters. (30 Minutes)
- October 15-18: 10 minute meeting/photo op with Jerzy Milewski
of Poland's Solidarity Trade Union. Theme:
American Respect for Freedom; Human Dignity
- October 19: Radio Address previewing Global Visions Theme
of UNGA Speech; reference First Ladies Drug
Conference.
- Late October -- Interview with Independent White House Radio
Network Correspondents. (30 minutes)
- October 21: First Lady's Drug Conference at the UN

October 23-25 Trip to New York for United Nations

- October 23: Bilaterals with President Zia and President
Gandhi (Emphasis on U.S. concern for Third
World; Afghanistan)
- Thirty minute Bilateral with Prime Minister
Nakasone (Emphasis on close consultation with
Allies prior to Geneva).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4(b)
White House Guidelines, Feb. 24, 1983
BY RP, NARA, Date 8/17/95

- October 23: Reception for visiting Heads of State/Government and short remarks (hosted by President and Mrs. Reagan); potential mini meetings with several leaders
- October 24: Presidential Address before the United Nations General Assembly (Global Vision Theme; US-Soviet relations, including regional initiatives)
Two hour Meeting with Thatcher, Kohl, Nakasone, Mulroney, Craxi at USUN at U.S. Mission (Emphasis on Close Allied Consultation)
President attends 40th Anniversary ceremony at the U.N. Brief remarks
Private Dinner, hosted by President in honor of Allied leaders.
- October 25: Mid morning bilaterals of 30 minutes each with P.M. Thatcher and Chancellor Kohl; Late morning departure from New York for Washington (and then Camp David)
- October 26: Radio Address from Camp David. Theme: Reemphasizing message of UN Speech and Consultations with Allies
- October 28: 15 minute Statue of Liberty Anniversary Ceremony at the White House. Theme: Freedom and Open Societies
- Week of October 28: Rose Garden Ceremony with Afghan Resistance Leaders
Interview with Press (to be determined)
- November 2: Radio Address
Working lunch with outside advisors at Camp David (such as former National Security Advisors)
- Early November: SDI Event TBD
Youth event with remarks emphasizing people-to-people initiatives; peace through people.
- Week of Nov 4: Soviet Experts lunch with President
Private Meeting (Academics and other experts)

Taped Interview with Selected Foreign Broadcast Representatives; broadcast media from England, France, Germany, and Italy. (30 minutes) State Dining Room

Interview with selected U.S. Press

November 8: On-the-record Luncheon for Network Anchors (15 minutes)

November 9: Radio Address. Theme: U.S. efforts to reduce nuclear danger

President meets with U.S. arms negotiators in Roosevelt Room/Cabinet Room.

Week of Nov 11: Interview with selected Foreign Press Representative; Print Media from England, France, Germany and Italy. (30 Minutes)

November 11: Veterans' Day Appearance at Arlington National Cemetery. Theme: The need to discourage the use of force

November 12: Private lunch with religious leaders (Human Rights)

November 13: Meeting with bipartisan Congressional Arms Control Oversight Group (State Dining Room or Cabinet Room). Theme: A United America goes to Geneva

November 14 or 15: Presidential Address to the Nation (Oval office) Vision of Future if Soviets are responsive (Integrating four main themes: reduce force; eliminate nuclear weapons; improve human contact; defend human rights)

November 16: Breakfast at the White House with former Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter. Theme: United America

Predeparture remarks (East Room - 5 minutes) to be broadcast worldwide (Worldnet). Theme: Commitment to Century of Peace.

Short arrival statement in Geneva (variation on predeparture statement of Commitment to Peace; Geneva's legacy in such efforts)

November 16-21 Meeting in Geneva (See separate schedule)

November 21: Televised Address to Joint Session of Congress Theme: Future Agenda for Peace

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

PRESIDENT'S UNGA ADDRESS, 1985
Basic Outline

Introduction on UN

- On UN anniversary, should not only evaluate its record, but what we want to work for, and, how to make it happen.
- UN is a political institution, and politics requires compromise. But we should remember the true path to UN's original vision -- peace and human progress. We cannot attain either unless we recall their relationship to freedom and human rights. America's policies based on this relationship.

America's Record

- Recall Charter principle: to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."
- In the past 40 years, a new world war has been averted. The US takes pride in the efforts we've made along the way: from helping rebuild war-ravaged nations to maintaining a secure military balance with our NATO and other allies; protecting peace-loving friends in danger from Korea to Pakistan, El Salvador and Grenada; to taking risks for peace in the Middle East and through our proposals to reduce the weapons of war and the dangers of misunderstanding.

Looking Ahead to Geneva: A Fresh Start

- First meeting of US-Soviet leaders in over 6 years. Differences between us are deep and abiding, but this does not mean we cannot deal with these differences peacefully.
- In Geneva, we will look to the new Soviet leadership for a willingness to engage in real give-and-take -- a complete and candid discussion of where dangers exist and where peace is being disrupted.
- We will present a full explanation of our arms proposals, and how past disappointments can be avoided in the future. We do not seek treaties for treaties' sake. We seek to combine radical, equitable and verifiable reductions in offensive strategic weapons with progress on strategic defenses to make the entire world safer.
- Success in this and other efforts described above can contribute to building peace, to guaranteeing a safe path into the 21st century. But have to do more than that: try to lay the foundation for a truly enduring peace.

... And Obstacles

- Much stands in our way, but we shouldn't settle for second-best in seeking peace. Harry Truman said that ultimately, our greatest hopes for peace and human progress lie not only in measures of defense or in the control of weapons, but in the growth and expansion of freedom and self-government.
- He, like the UN's founders, saw the core of peace in mutual trust among nations, and self-determination -- in both national independence and democracy. To live up to this vision, need to change our thinking in four ways:
 - Peace based on partition is not true peace. Years after World War II, nothing justifies permanent division of European continent. [Foreshadow exchanges proposals]. This pattern must not spread to other continents through intervention and interference.
 - Peace based on repression is not true peace. To make peace secure, and to enjoy its blessings, individuals must be free to direct their own governments.
 - Peace based on quarantine is not true peace. World community can't avert its eyes from the tragic consequences of conflict, just because contained within one country.
 - Finally, peace based on mutual fear is not true peace. Sketch rationale for SDI; reiterate hope for a nuclear weapons-free future. Hope Soviets will see this serves their interests.
- Rather than walls of partition and mistrust, we need greater communication for an OPEN WORLD. In place of repression, policies that enhance reform. In place of quarantine, engagement. In place of fear and insecurity, increased safety.
- Always hard to find practical ways to bring these closer. Today want to present an American approach on one of the most important areas on the Geneva agenda.

Initiative on Regional Conflicts

- A plan to deal with conflicts taking a heavy human toll, which have drawn in outside powers and greatly concerned peaceloving people everywhere about the conduct of the Soviet Union. Builds on proposal for US-Soviet discussions made at 1984 UNGA.

- Among the most brutal wars being fought today: those in which popular resistance forces battle Communist regimes, in Afghanistan, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Ethiopia, Angola. In all these cases: people refusing to accept imposed regimes; conflicts spilling over borders, threatening neighboring states and more dangerous confrontation; external involvements prolonging the fighting.
- A three-part American proposal:
 - First, ceasefire and negotiations among the warring parties in countries I've mentioned.
 - Second, once these negotiations open, a separate set of Soviet-American talks on how to eliminate external military presence in the country and to cut off the external flow of arms into the area of conflict.
 - These talks would lay the basis for the third element of a long-term solution -- reintegration of these countries into the world economy. US would participate generously.
- To succeed, such a proposal has to address the underlying conflicts that have drawn others in, but also to find a formula for keeping them out in the future. Plan is not meant to replace but to complement existing efforts at mediation, peace-making.
- Ask careful thought before rejecting this proposal: to reject is to take responsibility for perpetuating violence. Benefits of proposal should be clear, for the US and USSR, but most of all for the peoples of these regions. Creates a basis for internal reconciliation, and for beginning economic growth.

Economic Growth and Human Rights

- Recall Charter principle: "promoting social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom." Scientific achievement, technological advance today promise revolutionary improvements in lives of ordinary people.
- Proud of American record of helping others, from Marshall Plan to Mexican and African relief. Cite 40-year foreign aid totals.
- But the real energy of economic growth comes from assuring individual freedom; it depends on rewarding individual initiative to the fullest. Nations cannot enjoy the blessings of peace and prosperity, without also protecting human rights.

- Those who doubt the link between peace, growth and freedom should compare the nations that have been denied them: e.g., Eastern Europe, Indochina, southern Africa, Nicaragua, Cuba, with those where freedom has been welcomed as a friend and staunch ally.
- Sakharov quote: international trust, mutual understanding, disarmament and security inconceivable without an open society.

Looking with hope and realism to a better future -- How do we get there?

- We're practical: look problems in the face, develop fair and balanced solutions. Understand what works, what doesn't.
- No country can ignore its responsibility to contribute. At present, we're pursuing improved relations with the Soviet Union. Given importance of these two powers, people everywhere would benefit from results.
- Consider what would be possible if Soviet side ready to work with us. Relief for the Soviet people of major burdens; benefits for all nations. Less likelihood of confrontations arising from regional conflicts. The confidence that can help us to lessen reliance on nuclear weapons, and in the future eliminate altogether. Confidence that facilitates unfettered economic cooperation.
- Emphasize: we don't exaggerate what greater Soviet-American agreement can accomplish. The real revolution of our time cannot be made by the great powers, but by free people who can show what peace really means.
- As for the UN's future, plainly it, too, is only a part of securing peace, because its members -- governments -- are themselves only a part of it. But won't begin to play the role it could unless we understand the true meaning, and real requirements, of its high goals.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

TRIP OF THE PRESIDENT

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

NOVEMBER 16 - NOVEMBER 21, 1985

Saturday, November 16, 1985

(T) Breakfast with Former Presidents

- Departure Remarks from South Lawn (8:20 am)
- Depart The White House (8:30 am)
- Depart Andrews Air Force Base (8:45 am)
- Arrive Cointrin Airport, Geneva Switzerland (10:25 pm)
- Brief Remarks
- Arrive Maison de Saussure (Residence) (10:50 pm)
- REMAIN OVERNIGHT - MAISON DE SAUSSURE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Sunday, November 17, 1985

- Private Breakfast at Residence (am)
- WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME
- Private Lunch at Residence (pm)
- Meet Senior Advisors at Residence (1:30 pm)
- Walk to Pometta Residence * for Briefing with Advisors
- Optional Walk in Garden of Residence with Mrs. Reagan
(2:45 pm)
- Tour of Meeting Facilities and Grounds of Fleur d'Eau
(3:20 pm)
- WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME
- FREE EVENING
- REMAIN OVERNIGHT - MAISON DE SAUSSURE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Monday, November 18, 1985

- Private Breakfast at Residence (am)
- WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME
- Briefing with Senior Advisors at Pometta Residence
(11:15 am)
- Working Lunch at Pometta Residence (12:15 pm)
- PRIVATE TIME (1:20 pm - 30 mins)
- Arrive Le Reposeir (2:00 p.m. **)
- Arrival Ceremony (2:00 pm)
- Meeting with President Furgler (2:20 pm)
- (T) Arrive University of Geneva (3:15 pm)
- Address to Students
- Mix and Mingle with Students

* NOTE: Pometta Residence is adjacent to Maison de Saussure on the same grounds.

** Subject to confirmation (GOS)

Monday, November 18, 1985 (con't)

WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME
FREE EVENING
REMAIN OVERNIGHT - MAISON DE SAUSSURE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Tuesday, November 19, 1985

Private Breakfast at Residence (am)
Briefing with Senior Advisors at Pometta Residence
(9:10 am)
Tete-a-tete with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Fleur d'Eau (10:00 am)
Plenary Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Fleur d'Eau (10:20 am)
Working Lunch at Pometta Residence (12:35 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (1:20 pm - 55 mins.)
Plenary Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Fleur d'Eau (2:30 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (4:40 pm - 3 hrs.
5 mins.)
Small Dinner hosted by Soviets at Soviet Mission
Villa (8:00 pm)
Arrive Residence (10:15 pm)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT - MAISON DE SAUSSURE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Wednesday, November 20, 1985

Private Breakfast at Residence (am)
Briefing with Senior Advisors at Pometta Residence
(9:10 am)
Plenary Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Soviet Mission (10:00 am)
Working Lunch at Pometta Residence (12:40 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (1:25 pm - 45 mins.)
Plenary Meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev at
Soviet Mission (2:30 pm)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME (4:45 pm - 2 hrs.
35 mins.)
Reception hosted by Swiss Government at La Gandole
(7:00 pm)
Small Dinner hosted by U.S. at Maison de Saussure
(8:15 pm)
REMAIN OVERNIGHT - MAISON DE SAUSSURE
GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

Thursday, November 21, 1985

Private Breakfast at Residence (am)
EVENTS TBD
Depart en route Andrews Air Force Base (12:00 pm *)
Arrive Andrews Air Force Base (3:00 pm *)
Arrive The White House (3:15 pm *)
WASHINGTON WORK/PRIVATE TIME
(T)Televised Address to Joint Session of Congress (8:00 pm)

* Denotes approximate time

EXCHANGES INITIATIVES FOR GENEVA

- - People to People Exchanges

- - exchange of undergraduate students - to begin, at least 5,000 each way for one year of study
- - youth exchange - at least 5,000 secondary school age youngsters to live with host family and attend school or summer camp
- - sister cities - expansion of sister city relationships
- - Soviet-American scholarship program - ten top college students to study for a year

- - Increased Consultations

- - regular bilateral consultations to combat terrorism and
- - to combat alcoholism, drug abuse, and drug trafficking

- - Wider Information Exchanges

- - establishment of cultural centers and libraries
- - regular media exchanges
- - mutual satellite program transmissions
- - increased publication and distribution of books, to include establishing a book store in each country
- - increased language study - two educators, one American one Soviet, to study ways of improving understanding through language study

- - Cooperation in Science and Space

- - exchange of astronauts to participate in space flight (pending NASA clearance)
- - jointly staffed medical research institutes in each country (pending HHS clearance)
- - joint development of microcomputer educational software

- - Sports Cooperation and Exchanges

- - increased athletic exchanges
- - joint sponsorship of annual "great race" (auto, bicycle, etc.) between Moscow and Washington
- - greater binational sporting competition

afgan 2 / kamal
ap

501 ent / Steiner
ap

MSG FROM: NSJSM --CPUA TO: NSMMW --CPUA
To: NSMMW --CPUA

10/11/85 18:10:15

NOTE FROM: Johnathan Miller
Subject: Henkel Meeting with the Soviet Advance Team
Thanks

*** Forwarding note from NSJFM --CPUA 10/11/85 18:03 ***
To: NSJSM --CPUA

*** Reply to note of 10/11/85 17:32
NOTE FROM: Jack Matlock

Subject: Henkel Meeting with the Soviet Advance Team
I think Henkel should raise the subject, but it is important to do it in the right way -- i.e., not requesting (at the outset) Soviet agreement to a U.S. suggestion, but by saying that we have no plans for public activities by the President on the 18th except for the call on Furgler, and asking what plans the Soviets have. If they don't answer clearly, we should observe that it seems to us appropriate to refrain from public statements by the leaders on the eve of the meeting, in order to set the stage for the most productive exchange at the meeting itself. If the Soviets give us a clear indication, fine. If they don't, we should not press the point (this would give them the impression that we feel a vulnerability and could egg them on to greater activity). But if we don't get a commitment as the result of such a "gentle" approach, we should reconsider the situation upon Henkel's return. It may be that the Soviets will readily agree, but if they don't we should not leave the impression that we are asking them for a favor.

West European Attitudes on the November
October 1 - 8,

This is the second in a series of briefing judgments from overseas USIS posts and foreign analyses. The Posts surveyed for this report are The Hague, Ottawa, and Geneva. Future papers will cover selected major posts around the world including Canberra and Brasilia.

ARMS CONTROL AND SDI

Gorbachev's proposal for a 50% reduction in strategic weapons tied to gutting SDI is viewed as both an astute public relations gambit and as the first signal that the Soviets may be seriously interested in negotiating arms agreements in Geneva. At a stroke, Gorbachev took the 'deep reductions' issue from the President and made it his own. Most Europeans appreciate the political skill that Gorbachev displayed, but they are not buying his proposal. They realize only too well its implications for their own defense. Nonetheless, they still think it concrete enough to be a starting point for negotiations. Gorbachev's evident determination to restrain SDI reinforces Europeans' impression of SDI as a useful prod, if not an outright bargaining chip, in the arms control process. Unlike Europeans, Canadians tend to see Gorbachev's proposal as a true initiative, pure and simple.

HUMAN RIGHTS

Press speculation that prominent Soviet dissidents may be released before the Geneva Meeting is seen as an admission by the Soviets that Gorbachev did not do well with the French press, the French people, or other West European publics on this issue. Informed Europeans view human rights as probably the only issue -- other than arms control -- capable of commanding significant public attention in Europe between now and November 19. In the view of some, Gorbachev realizes this and may attempt to defuse his human rights problem with a 'significant' gesture.

WEST EUROPEAN MEDIA ON GORBACHEV PARIS VISIT AND ARMS CONTROL

The West European press viewed Gorbachev's visit to Paris as a diplomatic offensive designed to manipulate Western public opinion, create splits in the NATO alliance, strengthen his position in the upcoming negotiations with President Reagan, and put pressure on the U.S. to abandon SDI.

The media talked about the "new look" of the Soviet leader but also were disappointed that Gorbachev did not bring a change in Soviet attitudes. The consensus was that Soviet rigidity persists.

Commentators held mixed views of Gorbachev's arms reduction proposal ranging from "impractical," or "a clever trap," to a few calling it a "breakthrough." Still, most felt the proposal should be given serious consideration even though many questions are yet to be answered. They see that "the ball is now in the U.S. court."

Mary,

10/11

Here are the papers I got at yesterday's 3 pm meeting.

J.P.



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

October 10, 1985

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK by N*

SUBJECT: Editorial Comment on I. Recent Arms Control Proposals
II. Gorbachev in Paris

I. RECENT ARMS CONTROL PROPOSALS

We have received editorial comment on reported Soviet arms control proposals and U.S. responses from 30 papers (September 25-October 2). Most papers characterized each side's actions and statements as at least partially propagandistic.

Propaganda Points--Who's Ahead?

According to eight papers, the Soviets have taken the public diplomacy lead: "Though Soviet hype won't produce an arms-control agreement, it does set the agenda of the summit" (WALL STREET JOURNAL); "Washington is playing defense" (Cleveland PLAIN DEALER); "Mr. Shultz's was a tired-blood response" (Cincinnati ENQUIRER). The Chicago TRIBUNE, New York DAILY NEWS, Chicago SUN-TIMES, Little Rock ARKANSAS GAZETTE, and Richmond TIMES-DISPATCH agreed. No paper gave the lead to the U.S. in the public diplomacy game.

The Soviet Proposals and SDI

Because precise details of the Soviet proposals were not available, most editorial reaction was rather tentative: "If the Soviets are sincere--and it's a big if...." (New York DAILY NEWS); "The fine print, please" (Detroit NEWS).

In contrast, most comment on the U.S. SDI program was clear and divided. Twenty papers argued for including SDI in negotiations: "One must hope that the President does not believe his pronouncements and that he will see fit to place SDI on the table at the proper time" (Dallas TIMES HERALD); "[The President's] stubbornness [on SDI] now need not prevent agreement later" (Los Angeles TIMES); "If [he] sticks to his position...any hope for sanity at Geneva is dim" (Chicago TRIBUNE). The New York TIMES, New York DAILY NEWS, Boston GLOBE, Atlanta

CONSTITUTION, Chicago SUN-TIMES, Cleveland PLAIN DEALER, Newark STAR-LEDGER, Milwaukee JOURNAL, Raleigh NEWS & OBSERVER, Dayton NEWS, Cincinnati ENQUIRER, Seattle POST-INTELLIGENCER, Columbia (S.C.) THE STATE, Hackensack, N.J., RECORD, Wichita EAGLE-BEACON, Bangor NEWS, and Little Rock ARKANSAS GAZETTE agreed.

Six papers argued for retaining SDI: "Shultz is right.... It must be a permanent element of U.S. strategic planning" (New York POST). The Detroit NEWS, WALL STREET JOURNAL, San Diego UNION, Washington TIMES, and Savannah NEWS agreed.

The St. Louis POST-DISPATCH took a middle ground: "Moscow must make more concessions on Star Wars research and testing, while the U.S. must accept at least some deployment limits."

European Factor

Referring to the then-imminent Gorbachev-Mitterand meeting in Paris, two papers mentioned Europe in the context of the strategic arms control debate: "A depletion of nuclear arms automatically places an increasing burden on [NATO] conventional arms" (Detroit NEWS); and "If the president does lose the moral high ground in Geneva, it...might someday jeopardize European security" (Cleveland PLAIN DEALER).

II. GORBACHEV IN PARIS

So far, we have comment from seven papers (October 3-10) on the impact of Mr. Gorbachev's visit to Paris on U.S.-Soviet issues.

U.S. Responses to Soviet Initiatives

Five papers commented on Administration responses to Gorbachev's statements in Paris, three critically: "It's a sad day when U.S. policy-makers criticize the Soviets for going public....A negative stance does not serve our interests" (Hartford COURANT); "Gorbachev threatens to run rings around [the] White House....The President must get better staff work and do more homework if he is to hold his own" (Pittsburgh PRESS); and "The Reagan administration has chosen this moment to be especially maladroit" (Baltimore SUN).

Two papers approved: "The administration correctly chose to view the overall thrust of the Paris foray as potentially positive" (CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR); and "Reagan has responded to Gorbachev with cautious optimism, which is exactly right" (Cleveland PLAIN DEALER).

How Gorbachev Did

Three papers considered Gorbachev's performance to have been effective. The Cleveland PLAIN DEALER said that "Gorbachev is well on his way toward redefining the Soviet persona in a way that is remarkably attractive to the European public," and the Pittsburgh PRESS called him "adroit" in presenting offers appealing to Europeans. The Baltimore SUN observed that "Gorbachev's objective is not to change the stand of NATO governments but to go over their heads."

On the other hand, the CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR referred to his "Khrushchevian bluster, denial, and steely defiance," and the Detroit NEWS said that "A cursory look at his proposals proves that he is cast from the same old mold." The Washington POST, after outlining Gorbachev's strategy toward Western Europe, which he denied having, commented, "You could almost see him rolling his eyes."

Drafted:PA/OAP:PAKnecht:rg
10/10/85 632-3165 W0493K



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

October 8, 1985

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK ly H*

SUBJECT: U.S. Editorial Opinion on Preparations for
the Reagan/Gorbachev Meeting

Over the period mid-August to the end of September we reviewed a number of editorials on the upcoming Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Geneva. The principal common thread was reaction to the Administration's recent statements and actions vis-a-vis arms control and U.S.-Soviet relations. During the initial period from August 15-September 13, editorials focused on the U.S. approach to the meeting. From September 15 through 28 the print media commented on the public relations aspects of preparations for Geneva and urged exploration and negotiation of arms control issues. (These comments are in addition to the large number of editorials we received on Gorbachev's TIME magazine interview, which we reported on earlier.)

U.S. Projects Firm Approach to the Geneva Meeting

Five papers expressed general approval of the tone of U.S. responses: "The Administration's recent tough series of statements and actions, which have irritated if not angered Mr. Gorbachev, were calculated to check increasing eagerness for 'success' at Geneva" (Columbia, S.C., THE STATE); "Nothing could be more dangerous than to convince the Kremlin that the United States is prepared to tolerate serious violations and to accept the Red Army's evaluation of U.S. defense needs" (Birmingham NEWS); "the administration's actions have sensibly lowered the public's expectations in advance of the summit. That reduces the pressure on Reagan, which in turn increases the pressure on Gorbachev to reach a genuine compromise" (New York POST); "Concern about the Reagan hang-tough stance probably is overdone" (Norfolk VIRGINIAN-PILOT); "Strength and firmness are the two essentials to successful negotiations with the Soviets" (New Orleans TIMES-PICAYUNE).

Three papers thought the U.S. posture counterproductive: "One-upmanship is business-as-usual in the context of the Geneva arms-control talks; but it is not the behavior of a nation seriously interested in a productive summit" (Los Angeles TIMES); "[Reagan's] actions indicate that he may be unwilling to give Gorbachev an opportunity to make any

proposals which might improve relations" (Burlington, Vt., FREE PRESS); "Carried too far, toughness may make the Soviets look like peacemakers to Western Europeans, a possibility we ignore at our peril" (Los Angeles HERALD-EXAMINER).

Alone among those editorials reviewed, the Washington TIMES called for a stronger approach to the Soviets, headlining U.S. behavior as "Kneewalking to Geneva", and charging that "Washington will overlook anything in order to set the proper tone for a summit".


For the period September 15 through 28 we received an additional 17 editorials from major domestic newspapers which continued to focus on "the great pre-summit show" (San Francisco CHRONICLE). Many papers emphasized the overwhelming public relations efforts being made by both the U.S. and Soviet Union. General Secretary Gorbachev (the "hot new item", according to the Houston CHRONICLE) continued to receive high marks for his sophisticated public style.

Cooling Expectations/Lowering the Rhetoric

Several papers reflected on the massive public buildup to the Geneva meeting. "The President...is intent at this time on cooling any anticipation of a substantial breakthrough in U.S.-Soviet relations. It is a reasonable position to take..." (Columbia, S.C. STATE); "Mr. Reagan's refusal to engage in summit euphoria strikes us as realistic" (Baltimore SUN). A similar line was taken by the Des Moines REGISTER.

Summit Provides Opportunity for Arms Control

Substantively, eight of the papers reviewed called for exploration and negotiation in the arms control area at the Geneva meeting. The two leaders should seek "compromise and substantive developments in the vital search for a saner, safer world community" (Newark, N.J. STAR-LEDGER); "the U.S.' responsibility at the summit will be to facilitate an arms agreement, not to thwart one" (Boston GLOBE); "if Gorbachev offers to cut first-strike, multiwarhead missiles sharply enough to improve U.S. security, Mr. Reagan ought to be prepared to deal" (Pittsburgh PRESS); "the purpose of the summit must be to create a framework on which both nations can indeed coexist" (Baltimore NEWS AMERICAN); "the problem for both sides is the immediate future and the preventing of a dangerous instability in the arms race" (Nashville TENNESSEAN). Other papers expressing a similar reaction include the Washington POST, San Francisco EXAMINER, and San Jose MERCURY.

Drafted: PA/OAP: 
PKnecht/JWMartin
Cleared: PA:GHigh
W0341I 632-2376



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

September 20, 1985

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK by A*

SUBJECT: U.S. Editorial Comment on General Secretary Gorbachev's Interview in TIME Magazine

Over the past several weeks a large number of editorials has appeared in the U.S. press on various facets of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These editorials focused on three major areas: the current Soviet propaganda offensive, preparations for the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting and, most recently, Gorbachev's TIME magazine interview.

We reviewed editorial comment from 21 major newspapers following the General Secretary's cover story profile and interview with TIME magazine editors. A striking feature of these editorials, which appeared during the period September 4 through 13, is the enviable array of attributes possessed by the Soviet leader. Gorbachev is depicted as deft, debonair, dazzling, witty, articulate, charming, confident, candid, smart, organized, and knowledgeable--in sum, a striking contrast to the traditional image of a Soviet leader.

The TIME article was recognized by the press as part of a well-orchestrated, sophisticated Soviet propaganda offensive. Despite this acknowledged pre-meeting public posturing, however, many papers stressed the vital importance of substantive discussions at the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting. Several commented that it would be a mistake to allow public relations offensives to prevent progress at Geneva. A top priority for many is a commitment by both countries to genuine peaceful coexistence and a lessening of tensions. Gorbachev's intentions will be put to a test at Geneva where he will have an opportunity to match his rhetoric with action, according to several commentators. One paper (Burlington (VT) FREE PRESS) referring to "tense circumstances that now exist", suggested that the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting be postponed "as potential for further damage to Soviet-American relations outweighs the possibility for progress toward a resolution of their differences."

Access to the Media and Reciprocity

Six papers explicitly supported the U.S. requests (by USIA Director Wick and White House Spokesman Speakes) to the Soviets for the President to speak on Soviet television. The Milwaukee SENTINEL said Reagan "should be allowed the same access to Soviet media as Soviet leaders get here." Similar views were expressed by the Chicago TRIBUNE, Des Moines REGISTER, USA TODAY, Cincinnati POST, and Hartford COURIER.

Gorbachev Seizes Initiative

A number of papers referred to the Soviet leader's headstart in the pre-Geneva public relations arena. The Washington TIMES said "Gorbachev is running circles around the president in the talk-talk competition", while the St. Louis POST DISPATCH noted that "Gorbachev is obviously someone to be reckoned with". The Washington POST suggested that "Ronald Reagan is going to have to be at his best to hold his own in the November meeting of the two men." These comments were tempered by the realization that Gorbachev's rhetoric doesn't match Soviet action in areas such as arms control, e.g., "if it is a serious proposal [to reduce strategic and medium-range offensive missiles], it should have been put on the table at the Geneva arms talks rather than dangled in informal conversations" (Pittsburgh PRESS). The Detroit FREE PRESS called for an action "that would convince many people in the West that he is different from his predecessors: He should free Andrei Sakharov."

Proposals for U.S. Response

Six papers specifically urged that the U.S. respond to the Soviet initiatives: "Reagan should use [the time before Geneva] to devise a few substantive initiatives of his own" Milwaukee JOURNAL; "The Gorbachev views are worth the Reagan Administration's close study" (Providence BULLETIN); "Gorbachev has opened an important subject--'radical' reduction of nuclear arms--and U.S. officials have a chance to nail him to the wall on it. But it can only happen if Reagan will agree to come down from outer space and his Star Wars dream" (Tucson ARIZONA DAILY STAR); Reagan and Gorbachev "ought to agree on two things: Nuclear war is unwinnable and steps must be taken to reduce the arsenals that could annihilate us all" (USA TODAY).

A Final Thought

The Boise [Idaho] STATESMAN sums it all up: "...talk is cheap. What counts in the U.S.-Soviet dialogue is what Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev say to each other privately at their summit in November. The rest is just hot air."

JWM
PA/OAP:JWMartin
9/20/85 632-2376 W322I

UNGA MEETING
Wednesday, October 9, 1985 -- 5:30pm
Situation Room

SUBJECT: To discuss substantive preparations for the
President's meeting with allied leaders while in
New York

MEETING PARTICIPANTS:

Ty Cobb	395-5076
Michael Klosson	632-8050
Judyt Mandell	395-3595
Bill Martin	456-2224
Jack Matlock	395-5112
Johnathan Miller	395-3440
Angus Simmons	632-8448
Peter Sommer	395-5732
Steve Steiner	395-5697
Ken Quinn	632-8448
Bill Woessner	632-1566

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.