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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo (8531952)	From Executive Secretary, DOS to Robert McFarlane re: President's Interview with TASS Correspondents. 1 p.)	10/28/85	P1
2. list	Basic Themes for the TASS Interview. (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
3. talking points	General Talking Points. (3 pp.)	n.d.	P1
4. list	Written Questions Posed by TASS. (7 pp.)	n.d.	P1
5. list	Questions re Ethiopia, East Asia/Pacific and Terrorism. (1 p.)	n.d.	P1
6. memo (8531953)	From Executive Secretary, DOS to Robert McFarlane re: President's Interview with the BBC. (1 p.)	10/28/85	P1
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COLLECTION: Coordination Office, NSC: Records, 1981-88			RS
FILE FOLDER: 157 To Geneva (11/16-21/85) File 1 (2) [Box 90538]			11/3/95

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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RECEIVED 29 OCT 85 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

DOCDATE 28 OCT 85

KEYWORDS: USSR

MEDIA

Q+A

AP

SUBJECT: DRAFT RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION / PRES INTERVIEW W/ TASS
CORRESPONDENTS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 29 OCT 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MATLOCK

SESTANOVICH

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Contingency Questions and Answers
for President's TASS Interview

Q: One of the most important treaties between our countries is the ABM Treaty of 1972. Most observers believe it has been a cornerstone of the entire arms control process. How do you view the importance of that treaty today? Does the ABM Treaty not prohibit the development, testing and deployment of new ABM systems as envisaged in the "Star Wars" program?

A: -- Our Strategic Defense Initiative is solely a research program designed to answer questions concerning the feasibility of defenses against ballistic missiles. I launched this program because I thought that we owed it to ourselves and our children to see if such technologies might provide an opportunity to begin moving to a world where nuclear deterrence is based more on protecting our societies than on annihilating each other.

-- I continue to hope that the Soviet leadership will see the great potential such defenses, if practical, might provide our two peoples.

-- From the very beginning I have said that the SDI program will be conducted in strict compliance with the ABM Treaty. That remains the case today.

-- When our SDI research is completed, we intend to consult with our allies concerning any possible decisions on development and deployment of strategic defenses. If it is feasible we are also committed to discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with your government as required by the ABM Treaty.

Q: It can be said that the United States and the Soviet Union share an equal responsibility for peace in the world today. Do you agree that this search must take place on the basis of equality and equal security between our countries, and that both sides must accept the principle of parity?

A: -- I agree that our two countries share an important responsibility for peace in the world. This is why I first suggested a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev. That is why I am hopeful that we can make serious progress in Geneva when I meet with the General Secretary.

-- We do want a relationship based on genuine equality. We cannot agree, however, with the Soviet concept of equal security. As you conceive it, this principle gives the Soviet Union the right to forces equal to all other nuclear powers -- France, Britain, China and the United States put together -- a concept of absolute security for the Soviet Union and complete insecurity for all the rest. This is unfair. We make no such demands of you and think it is unfair of you to expect us to agree to such a proposal.

Q: There is a strong feeling in Western public opinion in favor of a return to a more constructive atmosphere of normal relations between East and West. Do you feel that such a change is desirable and possible. How, specifically, can the U.S. and the Soviet Union cooperate to achieve a return to detente?

A: -- Americans react with a great deal of suspicion when you mention the word, detente. For us, that word recalls a period when the United States acted with great restraint while the Soviet Union did not reciprocate. For us detente brings forth memories of a massive Soviet military buildup and the unrestrained use of Soviet military power in the Third World.

-- Americans want peaceful and stable relations with the Soviet Union. We want greater contacts between our peoples. But we also want genuine equality. We want both sides to live up to their international obligations -- whether they be arms control agreements or humanitarian commitments. We want both sides to exercise restraint and not attempt to take advantage of the other.

-- This is the kind of relationship about which I intend to talk to Mr. Gorbachev. If the Soviet Union is ready for this type of relationship, they will find the United States a ready partner.

Q: In your view, what specific areas exist for increased cooperation between our countries? Can these lead to improvement in areas of major differences between us?

A: -- I think there are significant possibilities for resolution of differences and increased cooperation between our two countries.

-- In preparing for my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev, we have proposed concrete ideas to your government in every area of our bilateral agenda. We want to make concrete progress in Geneva.

-- For example, last week at the United Nations I put forward a new plan under which our two countries could work together in resolving difficult regional problems.

-- We want to promote increased contacts between our two peoples and have put forward a number of specific ideas.

-- Most of all we want to reduce radically the number of nuclear arms in the world. Toward this end we will soon be presenting new ideas at the Geneva negotiations on nuclear and space arms.

Q: The Middle East has long been an area marked by tragic events and scant progress toward peace. The Soviet Union has made constructive proposals for an international conference to resolve the complicated problems plaguing that region. Why does the U.S. oppose these proposals, which have the support of Arab countries? Shouldn't the rights of the Palestinian people to statehood be recognized?

A: -- I am committed to working for peace in the Middle East. We want the parties in the region to search seriously for answers. In our view, our task is to help the parties to the Arab-Israeli dispute move to direct negotiations; in the end, it is up to them to secure peace and learn to live with each other.

-- There are some hopeful signs. For the first time, there is agreement among Jordan, Egypt, Israel and the Palestinians that negotiation between the parties is the only way to achieve a settlement.

-- While the Soviet Union has recognized Israel's right to exist, it generally has allied itself with "rejectionist" forces in the region, and used arms supplies as its main source of influence.

-- We have said on many occasions that, if the Soviet Union demonstrates a willingness to play a constructive role in the Middle East peace process, we would welcome that development.

Q: What is your view of the Soviet proposal regarding nonproliferation of chemical weapons?

A: -- Our goal remains the achievement of a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all chemical weapons. As you know, Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW Treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in April 1984. Unfortunately, your government has not yet engaged us in a serious discussion of that treaty, particularly with regard to essential verification measures.

-- You speak of the many Soviet initiatives to which the United States has not responded. Why has your government not responded to this proposal which would ban all chemical weapons from the face of the earth?

Q: Why does the U.S. continue to reject Soviet proposals for an end to nuclear weapons testing? Also why does the U.S. refuse to ratify the TTBT and the PNET, which were negotiated under administrations of your political party?

A:-- We had a very unhappy experience with a Soviet-proposed international nuclear testing moratorium in 1958. We observed that moratorium for three years, only to discover that the Soviet Union was using that period to prepare secretly the largest series of nuclear explosions ever conducted. On August 20, 1961 the Soviet Union began the first of 40 atmospheric tests conducted over a two month period. As President Kennedy said after that experience: "We know enough now about broken negotiations, secret preparations and long test series never again to offer an uninspected moratorium."

-- We continue to observe scrupulously the 150 kiloton threshold limitation of the TTBT. We have not moved to ratify the treaty, however, because we have serious questions about the verification measures in the Treaty. Your government unfortunately has refused to talk about verification improvements.

-- I am still hopeful that we can resolve this issue. That is why I have invited Soviet experts unconditionally to visit our Nevada test site to monitor one of our nuclear tests. I hope such a step would help establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear tests.

Q: At the U.N., the Soviet Union has made a significant and well-received proposal for accepting the principle of Non-Use of Force. Do you agree that this principle should become a part of the arms control process to increased confidence on both sides?

A: -- We are ready to reaffirm our pledges in the UN Charter and Helsinki Final Act not to use force. We think that we should go further and agree to a number of measures that would give concrete, new meaning to those pledges.

-- This is why we and our NATO allies have proposed a comprehensive package of genuine confidence building measures at the Stockholm Conference on Security in Europe. If the Soviet Union and its Allies would agree to these steps, I am confident we could reduce the risk of war and make military activities both more predictable and more stable.

Q: World opinion rejects the racist policies of South Africa. Why does the United States continue to support the Botha regime?

A: -- The United States strongly opposes the system of apartheid -- institutionalized racism denying the black majority their God-given rights. Apartheid is repugnant to the values we hold so high in this country. All Americans condemn it and are united in hoping for the day when apartheid will be no more.

-- Our influence over South African society is limited. But we do have some influence and the question is how to use it. Many Americans of good will have differing views on how to use that influence. I believe that we must use it to promote peaceful political evolution and reform. We must and will help all those who peacefully oppose apartheid.

-- Recently I announced a number of steps designed to disassociate the United States from the system of apartheid and associate us with the forces of positive change. These include a ban on all computer exports, a prohibition on exports of nuclear goods and technology, and a ban on loans to the South African government. I believe that these and other steps we have taken will best advance our goal of peaceful change in South Africa.

Q: During the recent Achille Lauro affair, you and your administration noted that the crimes of terrorists, no matter where they are committed, must be punished most severely and unflinchingly. In this regard, do you not think that the two Soviet citizens, the Brazinskis father and son, who hijacked a Soviet Airliner to Turkey in 1970, killing one person and wounding others, should be returned to the Soviet Union from the United States to stand trial?

A: -- We have deep sympathy for the relatives of the Soviet air hostess who was killed in the hijacking and for all victims of terrorist violence, including the Soviet diplomat who was recently killed in Beirut. We have told your Government on several occasions that we are ready to work together to prevent future terrorist violence.

-- Pranas and Algirdas Brazinskis, father and son, hijacked a Soviet airliner and forced its landing in Turkey in October, 1970. In the course of the hijacking, a Soviet stewardess was killed and others were wounded. On landing in Turkey, the Brazinskises requested asylum from the Turkish Government. They were subsequently arrested and prosecuted for hijacking and manslaughter.

-- They were later released under an amnesty in 1974 and lived in a Turkish refugee camp until their departure in July 1976. The decision which allowed them to leave Turkey was made by the Turkish Government in accordance with Turkish judicial procedures. The Brazinskises later went to Venezuela and then entered the United States illegally in August, 1976. The U.S. Government rejected their appeal for political asylum and has moved for their deportation. They remain the subject of deportation proceedings, which is a matter for our courts to decide.

Q: The Soviet Union has embarked on major new programs for economic development to increasingly perfect our socialist society and to improve the lives of Soviet citizens. Mikhail Gorbachev has underscored the priority of this task and the necessity of a peaceful international environment for its fulfillment. What is your view of U.S. economic priorities? In that regard, U.S. defense spending has increased markedly to unprecedented levels under your Administration. How do you justify such increased at the expense of many sectors of the U.S. economy crucial to the well-being of your people?

A: -- It is true that we have increased military spending in recent years. We have done it to rectify the serious military imbalances created in the 1970's. Frequently, during that decade the U.S. chose a path of military restraint in the hope that the Soviet Union would do likewise. Unfortunately, we discovered that your country did not want to match our restraint. As former Secretary of Defense Harold Brown once said about U.S.-Soviet military programs: "When we build, they build; when we stop, they build."

-- We do not seek military superiority over the Soviet Union. We want only equality and to maintain the military deterrent which has preserved the peace since the Second World War. I would like nothing better than if your leaders would agree to begin genuine and verifiable reductions in conventional and strategic weapons. Then both our countries can begin to devote fewer resources to military programs and more resources to the social and economic betterment of our peoples.

Q: Frequently you and members of your Administration have been quite critical of the Soviet Union and its Human Rights policy. What then is your justification for not allowing 12-year old Walter Polovchak to accompany his parents when they returned to the Soviet Union from the United States? Why have you imprisoned American Indian rights activist Leonard Peltier?

A: -- The Soviet media frequently cite these two cases as examples of U.S. human rights abuses. In fact, you have consistently and seriously distorted the facts in both cases.

-- Walter Polovchak, the son of Soviet parents who immigrated to the U.S., has always been free to return to the Soviet Union. In 1981, when his parents decided to return to the Soviet Union, Walter requested and was granted political asylum in the United States. Since that time, Walter's parents have contested this finding in the U.S. courts.

-- Unlike some American citizens, their spouses and their children, who have been denied the right to leave the Soviet Union, Walter has never been denied the right to leave the United States.

-- As you know, Walter recently reached the age of 18, and his parents have decided to no longer contest Walter's decision to live in the U.S.

-- Leonard Peltier is an American Indian who was convicted in 1977 of murdering two agents of our Federal Bureau of Investigation. He is serving two concurrent sentences of life imprisonment for his crime. It is simply not true that Mr. Peltier has been deprived of his human rights. So that there will be no further misunderstanding, let me briefly describe his case.

-- The two FBI agents entered an Indian reservation on June 26, 1975 to arrest a suspect. Mr. Peltier and several other co-defendants fired on the FBI agents' car. Over 125 bullets struck their automobile and the two agents were wounded. According to official accounts of the incident, Mr. Peltier walked over to the two wounded agents and shot each of them in the head, at point-blank range in execution fashion. When Mr. Peltier was captured several months later, the service revolver of one of the FBI agents was discovered in the stolen car he was driving.

Q: Reading U.S. official statistics, Soviet citizens are struck by a number of facts about American society. For instance, those statistics which show that over thirty million people live beneath the poverty level. Or those, released by the organization "Doctors" research group on hunger," which note that 1.5 Million Americans in 36 cities suffer constantly from hunger. At least twenty million go hungry at least two days a month. Three million are homeless do these official U.S. statistics not indicate that large segments of American society are being deprived of basic Human Rights?

A: -- The United States is not perfect. We recognize that many of our citizens have not been able to share in the prosperity enjoyed by the majority of Americans. We are working very hard, however, to change that -- to eradicate poverty, to feed the hungry, to house the homeless, to find good jobs for the unemployed.

-- I could cite figures to demonstrate how much we are spending on social programs and the considerable progress we are making. But perhaps the best evidence I can give that the American dream of prosperity and freedom remains alive is to point to the thousands of immigrants who strive to come to our country to seek a better life for themselves and their children. With all our problems, we are proud of our accomplishments and will continue to strive to achieve a higher standard of living for all our citizens.

ARMS CONTROL

Soviet Build-up and U.S. Modernization

- The Soviet Union has conducted an enormous military buildup which far exceeds anything necessary for the defense of the Soviet Union and its allies. This understandably has alarmed the West, and fueled suspicions about Soviet intentions.
- The Soviet Union has continually deployed modern nuclear systems, in great numbers. Right now the USSR is deploying two new types of intercontinental missiles, one of them, the SS-25, which is in violation of Soviet commitments under the SALT II agreement.
- The Soviet Union has developed the capability to conduct a first-strike against our current ICBM force using the SS-18 missiles alone. We have no comparable capability.
- There are equally threatening developments from the West's standpoint in the modernization and expansion of Soviet conventional, chemical warfare and defense capabilities.
- U.S. and Allied security requires that we maintain an effective strategic deterrent. We have to modernize our strategic forces to redress the imbalance in key strategic capabilities that exists between the U.S. and the USSR as the result of the Soviet nuclear buildup.
- U.S. modernization efforts are intended to ensure Soviet restraint, to make sure that there are no miscalculations about emerging successfully from a nuclear conflict.

U.S. Arms Control Objectives

- The United States seeks arms control agreements that make a real contribution to reversing the arms race and improving security and stability.
- We comply scrupulously with arms control agreements reached and insist that other states do so as well.
- We want arms control agreements that:
 - Enhance our security and that of our allies;
 - Achieve genuine, significant reductions in military forces;
 - Strengthen stability by reducing potential incentives for one side to strike first.
 - Bring about overall US-Soviet equality.
 - Are verifiable.
- The United States, in close cooperation with its friends and Allies, has over the last few years put forward major arms control initiatives. This includes proposals for radical reductions in nuclear arms, to lower conventional force levels in Europe, to negotiate confidence-building measures that would reduce the risk of miscalculation and misunderstandings, and to eliminate chemical weapons entirely.

Strategic Defense Initiative

- SDI is a research program designed to answer questions concerning the feasibility of defenses against ballistic missiles, such as whether such defenses can be effective, survivable, and cost effective.
- SDI has been and will continue to be conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty. Although a rigorous analysis of the Treaty and the negotiating record has convinced me that a broader interpretation of the Treaty is fully justified, I have determined that our research program can achieve its goals as it is currently structured. Accordingly, SDI will continue to be conducted within our restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
- When our SDI research is completed, we intend to consult with our allies concerning any possible decisions on development and deployment of strategic defenses. We will discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with the Soviets prior to deployment, in accordance with the ABM Treaty.
- We are seeking even now in our discussions with Soviet negotiators in Geneva to lay the groundwork for a managing together a transition to greater reliance on defenses that threaten no one.

U.S. NST Position - General

- The US seeks to fulfill the objectives agreed to with the Soviet Union in January of this year: to end the arms race on earth and prevent one in space.
- We are guided by the belief that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Ultimately, nuclear weapons are a menace that must be removed from the face of the earth.
- As first steps toward these goals, we seek in Geneva radical reductions of offensive nuclear weapons to equal levels under verifiable agreements. In addition we are seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play an increasingly prominent role.

U.S. Position in START

- The U.S. has long had a sound and far-reaching proposal on the negotiating table calling for sharp reductions in offensive forces--in a stabilizing and equitable way. The fact that the Soviets have now put forward a counterproposal that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions in nuclear weapons is a welcome development.
- The U.S. has proposed reductions of nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles, which would involve deep cuts on both sides. I have given American negotiators unprecedented flexibility to work with their Soviet colleagues on ways to achieve this objective.
- The U.S. position is that any agreement must provide for significant reductions to equal, verifiable levels. Equally important, any agreement must enhance stability and improve security by placing special limitations on the most destabilizing forces--ballistic missiles, and particularly multiple warhead ICBMs.

U.S. Position on INF

- The US proposal in Geneva would eliminate totally US and Soviet LRINF missiles or, as an interim measure, result in reductions to the lowest possible equal number of US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads on a global basis.
- The proposed Soviet medium-range missile freeze would not only perpetuate the overwhelming superiority of the USSR, but would also leave intact the Soviet SS-20 force in the eastern USSR which threaten our allies in Asia. In addition, it is unreasonable to expect the U.S. to compensate the USSR for the independent nuclear deterrents of Britain and France.
- The Soviet offer to negotiate separately with the French and British on their nuclear deterrents is a matter for the involved countries. The leaders of Britain and France have indicated that it would not be appropriate for them to enter into such negotiations until the USSR and US have agreed to significant reductions of strategic forces.

U.S. Position - Defense and Space

- It is my hope for the future that we can move toward a more stable and secure world in which strategic defenses play a growing role -- one which would neutralize the menace of ballistic missiles and, ultimately, allow us to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.
- Making that transition would not be simple or quick. It is in everyone's interest for us to explore now the possibilities for doing so. For that reason, we are seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems and ways for jointly managing a stable transition to a peace based on defensive systems rather than the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Soviet Geneva Counterproposal

- We welcome the fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a proposal at the Geneva arms control talks that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions
- As I said at the United Nations in October, the new Soviet proposal has seeds that should be nurtured.
- Unfortunately, there are also many elements which don't meet our ideas of sound arms control.
 - o The Soviet proposal would not, for example, promote strategic stability since it does not require cuts in the Soviet first-strike force which threatens US ICBMs.
 - o The proposed reductions would result in US inequality in weapons, throw-weight and delivery vehicles.
 - o It is anti-European and anti-Asian by proposing to reduce US systems that defend our allies in Europe and Asia, but would not limit comparable Soviet weapons which threaten them.
 - o It would cut-off the US SDI research program, leaving similar Soviet programs untouched, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research. It would inequitably prevent US force modernization needed for maintaining deterrence.

o Key elements are not verifiable.

- Nevertheless, we are studying the Soviet proposal carefully, and in the coming weeks we will be prepared for a genuine give and take.

Soviet "Star Peace" Proposal

- The US has long been in the forefront of peaceful exploration and cooperation in space. This is one of the principal goals of our space program and has been embodied in numerous projects, for example, the space shuttle.
- We have also been an active member of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This is the appropriate UN organization for discussions of space cooperation and would seem to be an entirely adequate mechanism for carrying forward such space cooperation, which we greatly favor.
- Peace will not spring from catch-phrases, however; it can only spring from the earnest desire of nations to resolve their differences through frank, open discussion rather than violence. The United States is dedicated to opening that type of a relationship with the Soviet Union.

ASAT

- The Soviet Union is the only country with an operational ASAT capability.
- The U.S. has been seeking to determine in good faith possible constraints on anti-satellite weapons that would meet our national security interests and which would be verifiable.
- In the meantime, the U.S. must continue testing the MV ASAT to avert clear and irrevocable harm to US national security.

Nuclear Testing

- The US has observed the 150 kiloton threshold limitation of the TTBT and PNET. Unfortunately, there are serious questions whether the Soviet Union has violated the testing limit on several occasions. This underscores the need for better verification measures.
- The US proposed to the USSR on several occasions in 1983 opening negotiations on verification improvements for these treaties. Each time the USSR refused.
- A nuclear testing moratorium is unacceptable under existing circumstances. A way must first be found to achieve essential verification capability and to fulfill our national security needs.
- Our unilateral and unconditional invitation to Soviet experts to visit a Nevada test site was made in the hope that such a step would help establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control

- I have been particularly disturbed with repeated instances of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.
- A few important examples have been the deployment of the SS-25, encryption of telemetry during Soviet missile testing, and the ongoing construction near Krasnoyarsk of a large phased-array radar in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- On June 10, I reaffirmed the US commitment made in 1982 not to undercut the SALT I or II agreements. The US has strictly adhered to this restraint. Equal restraint, however, must be exercised by the Soviet Union if arms control is to be effective.

Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe

- This conference results from an initiative by the NATO Allies.
- The U.S. and the NATO Allies have proposed a comprehensive package of genuine confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of war by making military activities more predictable and stable.
- The Soviet Union has advanced proposals for pledges not to use force, but have resisted measures which would give meaning to these pledges.
- The U.S. stands ready to reaffirm its pledges in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act not to use force if that would bring the Soviet Union to agree to measures which would give concrete, new meaning to those pledges.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)

- MBFR remains an integral and important part of our commitment to achieve genuine progress in arms control.
- Our objective is to increase security and stability in Central Europe by reducing the destabilizing imbalance of Eastern and Western forces to parity at lower levels.
- The United States and its NATO Allies have studied the recent Eastern proposal and are consulting closely on ways to move the Vienna talks forward.

Chemical Weapons Arms Control and Modernization

- The foremost U.S. objective remains the achievement of a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on all chemical weapons.
- Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in April 1984. The USSR has yet to engage in serious discussions of that treaty, particularly with regard to essential verification measures.
- Until a global ban is achieved, the U.S. needs a modern and effective CW retaliatory stockpile to deter possible Soviet use of its massive and growing CW capability. U.S. production of binary weapons also provides the Soviet Union concrete incentive to negotiate seriously in Geneva to achieve a global ban.
- The U.S. is actively taking steps to prevent the dangerous spread of chemical weapons. We hope the Soviet Union will also do its part in this regard. The lasting solution to this problem is to conclude an effective and verifiable global ban on such weapons.

Arms Control Themes - TASS & BBC

Drafted by:PM/ SNP:RHansen;EUR/ RPM:GMattox
10/25/85 (4035C)

REGIONAL ISSUES

President's Initiative

- The plan I outlined at the UN is an effort set up a flexible, comprehensive framework for the United States and Soviet Union to cooperate in solving very serious problems.
- The conflicts involved have taken a terrible toll in human lives and treasure. They should come to a stop as soon as possible.
- Real peace requires the consent of the governed. That's why these conflicts have gone on so long -- the people in these countries refuse to submit to an alien ideology and outside military force. That's why I called for negotiations among the warring parties, for an effort to achieve internal reconciliation. Our sympathies are with those who are struggling for their freedom and national liberation.
- These conflicts also have caused severe strains in East-West relations. They have made many people in the United States and elsewhere question the Soviet Union's intentions whether it really is committed to peace. So there is a need to solve these problems if East-West relations are to be put on a better footing.
- Most important, if this plan succeeds, it would let the people in these troubled areas to begin living in peace and offer them help in rebuilding their lands. It would improve the entire international climate, reduce suspicions, and make progress easier in other areas.

Middle East

- The way to peace in the Middle East is direct negotiation among the parties involved. The current peace process based on King Hussein's initiative offers great hope.
- The renewed cycle of violence is tragic and frustrating, but we will not give up.
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions are those of a spoiler. The Soviet Union consistently attacks the very concept of direct negotiations between the parties. We note Soviet recognition of Israel's right to exist; we would welcome the Soviet Union playing a constructive role towards Middle East peace.

Afghanistan

- The Soviet war against the Afghan people is morally indefensible and an ongoing threat to regional and world stability.
- The key to peace is a political settlement that brings about the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the return in safety of the more than 3 million refugees caused by this tragic war.
- The U.S. fully supports UN efforts to achieve this goal.

Central America/Caribbean

- We want to address the urgent social and economic problems in the region and help promote stability and democracy. We have embarked on an unprecedented initiative to help the economies of countries there. Soviet and Cuban policies of intervention and export of revolution promote instability and waste the human and economic resources of the region.
- Nicaragua has supported insurgencies in its neighbors, increased its military strength to alarming levels and made clear its contempt for democracy. Our policies are intended to restore a balance to the region.

Southern Africa

- We deplore the apartheid system, which is a major source of instability. It is an issue that the South Africans themselves must solve. We are strongly urging dialogue between the government and representative black leaders in South Africa that would lead to an end to apartheid and a political system based on the consent of the governed.
- On Angola and Namibia, the United States has tried over the last four years to bring the Angolans into a negotiating framework which could help them reach agreement. The Soviet Union has not contributed to this effort. Indeed, the Soviet Union has helped fuel the conflict by providing huge amounts of military equipment to Angola, including \$2 billion in the last two years. There are 1,200 Soviet advisers involved in planning and supervising combat operations, and 35,000 Cuban troops.

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PRESIDENT'S THEMES FOR BBC/TASS INTERVIEWS

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BILATERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

- Contacts among people of different nationalities are important parts of normal international life. But our societies have remain isolated from each other, and lots more needs to be done.
- Communication between our two societies should not be limited to contact between governments. We want to expand personal contacts, to increase sharing of experiences and culture. Both nations will be better for it.

US-Soviet Exchanges

- Scientific and technical exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union give each country's experts an opportunity to share in the benefits of the other's expertise, and build personal relationships with their colleagues.
- Our cabinet-level discussions on commerce, agriculture, housing and the environment show that we take these exchanges very seriously.
- We are ready to have scientific or technical exchanges that offer mutual benefits.

Trade

- Trade can have important benefits for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. We support mutually beneficial trade with the Soviet Union.
- The fact is, however, that trade, like other issues, is bound to be affected by the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Realizing the full potential of our trading relationship will take time -- and the removal of barriers such as human rights problems.

Space Cooperation

- We have offered to negotiate a U.S.-Soviet agreement to improve cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space. This agreement would enhance our bilateral relationship; it remains on the table.

Soviet Repression

- We do not seek to impose our system on others. But we do have a legitimate interest in the state of human rights in the Soviet Union, which has international human rights commitments.
- More fundamentally, one of the painful lessons of this century is that we cannot be indifferent to human rights; when a country does not respect the basic rights of its citizens, it cannot be trusted to respect the basic rights of other countries.
- We are deeply disturbed at the extreme downturn in Jewish emigration, which has been combined over the past year with an ominous crackdown on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists.
- We remain troubled by Soviet repression of courageous human rights activists such as Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun.
- Current intense Soviet repression of religious believers is deeply troubling to the millions of religious believers in the United States.
- We are also deeply concerned about the approximately 40 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals and Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens who have been denied permission to leave the Soviet Union.
- These human rights abuses are a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks. Practical steps to meet these concerns, which are shared throughout the Western countries, would greatly improve the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Helsinki Process

- The Helsinki Final Act committed Europe, the United States and Canada to mutual respect for the fundamental tenets of Western civilization, among the most important of which is the commitment to respect the basic human rights of individuals.
- The failure of the Soviet government to meet the commitments embodied in the Helsinki Accord is a problem of great significance to the West. Soviet leaders emphasize that the USSR is one part of a greater Europe; if so, they should prove it by meeting the obligations set out in this most European document.

U.S. Human Rights Performance

- If Soviet leaders want to compare their human rights record with ours, fine. We aren't perfect by any means, but we are constantly striving to do better. We have absolutely nothing to lose by a comparison of our human rights records.
- By any standard of human freedom and dignity, the United States stands among the most progressive countries of the world. We take literally, and protect, the freedoms and liberties guaranteed by our basic documents. The Soviet government should do the same.

NSC/S PROFILE

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Questions and Answers for the BBC Interview

1. This interview is taking place just after the 40th anniversary celebrations of the United Nations. After 40 years the world is still racked with tensions. What hopes do you have that by the end of your presidency the world will be a more peaceful and stable place to live?

A. There are only three years until I leave the White House and a lot of very serious problems to be tackled. But there are also some encouraging trends, and it's possible we can make real progress in a number of areas.

I think there is a real opportunity to strengthen peace and reduce the risks of nuclear war. We are negotiating with the Soviet Union on radical reductions in nuclear arms. We are also seeking to discuss with the Soviets how we both might base peace not on the threat of nuclear terror, but on an increasing reliance on defensive weapons that threaten no one. Such a world won't be realized during my term in office, but we can make a major step forward if we stick to our principles and pursue our vision.

I want to see democracy continue the remarkable strides it has made in the last few years. For example, when I first came into office, only a handful of countries in Latin America were democratic; now, only four are not. We see other peoples in other continents struggling for their freedom and national liberation. There can be no greater force for peace than the reawakening of democracy.

With the spread of freedom and democracy, I also think we'll see an expanding global prosperity. Freedom works: it unlocks the creativity and energy of people. As I said at the United Nations, those who have the courage to give economic freedom and personal incentive a chance, find their economies becoming success stories. We need to sustain and broaden this trend.

I believe we have a good chance to put East-West relations on a more productive footing, to find ways to manage our competition peacefully. This will require restraint and responsibility by the Soviet Union in its actions abroad, and strict observation of the commitments it already has assumed, whether on arms control or on human rights. We cannot solve all the problems in East-West relations over the next few years, but we are working hard to move forward, and I think there's cause for optimism for progress down the road.

2. Mrs. Thatcher has said that Mr. Gorbachev is a man she can do business with. Earlier in your presidency, before Mr. Gorbachev, you described the Soviet Union as a focus of evil in the modern world -- an evil empire. Do you still regard it as such, or can you also do business with Mr. Gorbachev's Russia?

That's what we want to find out -- whether the Soviet Union is willing to do the business of peace. General Secretary Gorbachev appears to be an optimist and a problem solver. So am I. That's why I proposed an early meeting between us, to see if we can get off to a fresh start.

The United States, with the support and counsel of the NATO Allies and others in the West, has over the last year or two advanced a very broad agenda. We think there needs to be progress in all these areas -- arms control, regional problems, human rights, and bilateral matters. There are some good signs, some disturbing. The Soviets have finally put forward a counterproposal in Geneva; there are serious problems with it, but it also contains some seeds worth nurturing. On the other hand, the Soviets continue to fuel tragic conflicts in the Third World. That's why I came forward with an initiative last week at the UN; to see if the Soviet Union is willing to cooperate with us in ending these wars that have taken such a terrible toll on the lands involved, and have done so much damage to East-West relations.

3. What are the most important things you hope to achieve in your meeting with Mr. Gorbachev?

The meeting with Mr. Gorbachev is an important part of a process we have long pursued of putting East-West relations on a safer and more productive course.

In the few weeks before the meeting, we want to make as much progress as possible in all aspects of our relationship. We are ready to do this, if the Soviet Union is willing to reach realistic agreements.

Arms control, obviously, is one of the main areas, and we need to consider how to move the process along, not just at Geneva but in other negotiations as well. We also have to pay serious attention to other problem areas. One of the points of my UN speech is that Soviet actions towards its own citizens, and actions against other countries, are fundamental sources of tensions in our relations.

Obviously, we're not going to solve every difference in the next few weeks. I hope, however, that the meeting will give momentum to a genuine process of problem solving, and that we can agree on an agenda for the future that will bring dividends in the future.

4. Could you describe your view of the best way in which the U.S. and USSR can live in peace together when your political systems are so opposed?

There are profound differences in the way we view individuals, how we organize our societies, and how we deal with other countries. The Soviets have built up their military arms to levels which are far beyond their legitimate security needs. They are conducting actions in other countries, such as Afghanistan, that raise deep suspicions about the Soviet Union's ultimate objectives.

Because the Western democracies and Soviet Union see things so differently, it's clear that we will continue to compete with each other in many respects, for many years to come. Despite these differences, we need to search for common ground. Fortunately, we have found that cooperation is possible in some areas. Most important, despite our differences, we have managed to avoid nuclear war. We live in one world, and must handle our competition in peace.

Maintaining peace has not been easy. It has required a sustained effort by the West to maintain our military strength and to act in close concert with one another. We will have to continue this for the foreseeable future, on the basis of a realistic appraisal of the nature of the Soviet Union and a recognition that our relations are going to remain competitive.

At the same time, we will continue to pursue realistic understandings with the Soviet Union that reduce the chances of conflict. We will continue seeking radical reductions in nuclear and other arms. We will continue to encourage the Soviet Union to act with restraint and responsibility abroad. We will pursue more open communication and exchange among our societies. Progress in all of these areas is necessary if the United States and Soviet Union are to build a better relationship in the years ahead.

5. How central do you expect the SDI issue to be in your talks with Mr. Gorbachev? Can anything be achieved without some understanding in this area?

SDI seems to be very much on their minds. In fact, we have been trying to reach some understanding with them on strategic defense during three negotiating rounds in Geneva. I'm more than ready to talk about it at Geneva.

Both the United States and Soviet Union have agreed that our ultimate objective is the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and we are negotiating at Geneva on how to begin that process. The United States has proposed that there should be very deep cuts in nuclear arms. The Soviet Union recently has presented specific ideas which also call for deep reductions, and that's a welcome step. We've been ready for a long time to engage in the genuine give-and-take needed to achieve an agreement. We hope the Soviet Union is also ready for this.

But there is more to the Geneva negotiations than nuclear arms reductions. We agreed in January, and have sought ever since, to talk about strategic defense -- ours and theirs. This is important because new technologies, which is what the SDI program is studying, may offer a way out of the trap of nuclear terror. Both our countries are conducting research into new defensive technologies. If these technologies prove workable, we could be presented with an historic opportunity to move together to a more stable and secure world. What we want the Soviet Union to do is undertake a genuine, mutual effort to begin now to think through how we could jointly move to greater reliance on defense in preserving the peace in the future. If there is a better way to preserve peace than to threaten nuclear retaliation, Mr. Gorbachev and I have the responsibility to pursue it.

6. It is accepted that you wish to continue with SDI -- and will do so. But will you authorize the SDI program to go beyond the research stage? In other words, will you be prepared to bend or break the ABM Treaty if you feel it necessary?

SDI is a research program designed to answer questions concerning the feasibility of defenses against ballistic missiles. It has been and will continue to be conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty.

Although a rigorous analysis of the Treaty and the negotiating record has convinced me that a broader interpretation of the ABM Treaty is fully justified, I have determined that our research program can achieve its goals as it is currently structured. Accordingly, SDI will stay within our restrictive interpretation of the Treaty.

When our SDI research is completed, we intend to consult with our allies concerning any possible decisions on development and deployment of strategic defenses. We will discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with the Soviets prior to deployment, in accordance with the ABM Treaty.

We are seeking even now in our discussions with Soviet negotiators in Geneva to lay the groundwork for a managing together a transition to greater reliance on defenses that threaten no one.

As for bending the rules, that's a question you might pose to the Soviet Union. They are building a large radar at Krasnoyarsk that is a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. They have conducted other activities which raise serious questions about their commitment to the treaty. This is a compelling reason in itself to pursue research into strategic defense -- as a prudent hedge against the possibility of a Soviet abandonment of the agreement.

7. More than two years ago you expressed the hope that the SDI would make all nuclear weapons obsolete -- do you still believe that?

I expressed the hope then, and reaffirm that hope now. Defense against nuclear weapons is a goal worth pursuing. The Strategic Defense Initiative is a research program. We think there are promising technologies which may prove effective in defending against ballistic missiles. But we cannot know the answers for several years. A future American President will have to make the decisions.

It is clear that if we can at some point move towards elimination of nuclear weapons, we will have to have very effective defenses. That is the purpose of the SDI -- to see whether such defenses are possible. In the meantime, the priority task is radical reductions in nuclear arms and we are vigorously seeking such an agreement in Geneva.

8. How important is it that the Soviet Union has proposed a dialogue with Britain and France on their own nuclear deterrents?

Mr. Gorbachev's offer to negotiate separately with the French and the British on their nuclear deterrents is a matter for the involved countries.

I would note that Prime Minister Thatcher and President Mitterrand have indicated that it would not be appropriate for them to enter into such negotiations until, among other things, the Soviet Union and the U.S. have agreed to significant reductions in their own strategic nuclear arsenals.

9. Do you feel that the commitment in Europe to the western alliance is as strong as it ever was, or is it the case that European leaders are finding it more difficult now to convince their electorates of the merits of American policy?

That's a question you might better put to other governments.

For my part, one of my most rewarding accomplishments has been working with European leaders to strengthen the NATO Alliance. We have had close and cooperative relations with the Alliance in many areas. I have valued the counsel and support of Allied leaders. Our consultations have been intensive and fruitful.

I also think that we have accomplished a good deal by maintaining our strength, our unity, and our sense of purpose. The fact that the Soviet Union returned to the Geneva negotiations, and now has advanced a concrete counterproposal that envisions deep reductions in nuclear forces, is fresh evidence that our strategy is paying off.

10. Apart from your concerns regarding arms control, which you will be discussing with Mr. Gorbachev, the cause of human rights has been a central theme in Soviet-American relations. How high will it rank in your November meeting with the Soviet leader?

It will be very high. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Helsinki Final Act commit the Soviet Union to respect the basic human rights of its citizens. The failure of the Soviet Union to meet these commitments is a matter of great concern to the West.

We do not seek to impose our system on others. We are not asking the Soviet Union to violate its own laws. We do insist that it meet its international commitments.

We demand this because of our own moral values, and sense of worth of the individual, would not let us do otherwise. But we have a practical purpose as well. One of the painful lessons of this century is that we cannot be indifferent to abuses of human rights in other countries; when a state does not respect the basic rights of its own citizens, how can it be trusted to respect the basic rights of other countries? So improvement in the Soviet government's fulfillment of international standards of human rights is central to any long term improvement in East-West relations.

Optional Questions

1. The United States continues to be the victim of acts of terrorism. You have made clear your determination to stamp it out, but are you prepared to risk your relationship with friendly governments in pursuit of this end?

We don't think stamping out terrorism should jeopardize relationships with friendly governments; we believe all states have an obligation to cooperate in eliminating terrorism.

2. Is there not a danger that by such acts as intercepting the Egyptian airliner that you increase the risk of reprisals against the United States and its citizens? (London)

Hundreds of Americans lost their lives to terrorist actions, well before we intercepted the airliner, and there are dangers yet to come. But we are not going to be cowed by terrorists. If we have a chance to bring murderers to justice, we will do so.

3. The Commonwealth, the EEC, and the Scandinavian nations, have all adopted similar economic measures as the United States to try to encourage an end to apartheid. President Botha, however, only last week, refused to yield to outside pressure, and declared that only South Africa will decide its own future. Meanwhile, we have seen months of escalating violence. Has the West really done enough?

The crisis in South Africa is one that must be settled by the South Africans themselves, and we should do everything we can to ensure that the solution is achieved peacefully. We deplore apartheid and want it to end. The United States is urging dialogue between the government and representative black leaders in South Africa that would lead to an end to apartheid and to establishment of a political system based on the consent of the governed.

4. How powerful are the forces within the United States which are urging upon you a protectionist trade policy?

There are some highly protectionist ideas circulating in Congress and elsewhere right now. We remain committed to free trade and I will continue to fight protectionism.

To remain free, however, trade must be fair. Many of our industries face unfair trade practices by other nations; millions of Americans are affected. Unless our trading partners stop these practices, support in the United States for free trade will be undermined.

I recently outlined steps which we will take to eliminate unfair practices. I want to stress that we mean business; fairness is fundamental to freedom and essential to avoiding the disastrous mistake of protectionism.

ARMS CONTROL

Soviet Build-up and U.S. Modernization

- The Soviet Union has conducted an enormous military buildup which far exceeds anything necessary for the defense of the Soviet Union and its allies. This understandably has alarmed the West, and fueled suspicions about Soviet intentions.
- The Soviet Union has continually deployed modern nuclear systems, in great numbers. Right now the USSR is deploying two new types of intercontinental missiles, one of them, the SS-25, which is in violation of Soviet commitments under the SALT II agreement.
- The Soviet Union has developed the capability to conduct a first-strike against our current ICBM force using the SS-18 missiles alone. We have no comparable capability.
- There are equally threatening developments from the West's standpoint in the modernization and expansion of Soviet conventional, chemical warfare and defense capabilities.
- U.S. and Allied security requires that we maintain an effective strategic deterrent. We have to modernize our strategic forces to redress the imbalance in key strategic capabilities that exists between the U.S. and the USSR as the result of the Soviet nuclear buildup.
- U.S. modernization efforts are intended to ensure Soviet restraint, to make sure that there are no miscalculations about emerging successfully from a nuclear conflict.

BBC Qs & As

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U.S. Arms Control Objectives

- The United States seeks arms control agreements that make a real contribution to reversing the arms race and improving security and stability.
- We comply scrupulously with arms control agreements reached and insist that other states do so as well.
- We want arms control agreements that:
 - Enhance our security and that of our allies;
 - Achieve genuine, significant reductions in military forces;
 - Strengthen stability by reducing potential incentives for one side to strike first.
 - Bring about overall US-Soviet equality.
 - Are verifiable.
- The United States, in close cooperation with its friends and Allies, has over the last few years put forward major arms control initiatives. This includes proposals for radical reductions in nuclear arms, to lower conventional force levels in Europe, to negotiate confidence-building measures that would reduce the risk of miscalculation and misunderstandings, and to eliminate chemical weapons entirely.

Strategic Defense Initiative

- SDI is a research program designed to answer questions concerning the feasibility of defenses against ballistic missiles, such as whether such defenses can be effective, survivable, and cost effective.
- SDI has been and will continue to be conducted in compliance with the ABM Treaty. Although a rigorous analysis of the Treaty and the negotiating record has convinced me that a broader interpretation of the Treaty is fully justified, I have determined that our research program can achieve its goals as it is currently structured. Accordingly, SDI will continue to be conducted within our restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty.
- When our SDI research is completed, we intend to consult with our allies concerning any possible decisions on development and deployment of strategic defenses. We will discuss and, as appropriate, negotiate with the Soviets prior to deployment, in accordance with the ABM Treaty.
- We are seeking even now in our discussions with Soviet negotiators in Geneva to lay the groundwork for a managing together a transition to greater reliance on defenses that threaten no one.

U.S. NST Position - General

- The US seeks to fulfill the objectives agreed to with the Soviet Union in January of this year: to end the arms race on earth and prevent one in space.
- We are guided by the belief that nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Ultimately, nuclear weapons are a menace that must be removed from the face of the earth.
- As first steps toward these goals, we seek in Geneva radical reductions of offensive nuclear weapons to equal levels under verifiable agreements. In addition we are seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems, including the possibility of moving toward a more stable and secure world in which defenses play an increasingly prominent role.

U.S. Position in START

- The U.S. has long had a sound and far-reaching proposal on the negotiating table calling for sharp reductions in offensive forces--in a stabilizing and equitable way. The fact that the Soviets have now put forward a counterproposal that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions in nuclear weapons is a welcome development.
- The U.S. has proposed reductions of nuclear forces down to 5,000 warheads on ballistic missiles, which would involve deep cuts on both sides. I have given American negotiators unprecedented flexibility to work with their Soviet colleagues on ways to achieve this objective.
- The U.S. position is that any agreement must provide for significant reductions to equal, verifiable levels. Equally important, any agreement must enhance stability and improve security by placing special limitations on the most destabilizing forces--ballistic missiles, and particularly multiple warhead ICBMs.

U.S. Position on INF

- The US proposal in Geneva would eliminate totally US and Soviet LRINF missiles or, as an interim measure, result in reductions to the lowest possible equal number of US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads on a global basis.
- The proposed Soviet medium-range missile freeze would not only perpetuate the overwhelming superiority of the USSR, but would also leave intact the Soviet SS-20 force in the eastern USSR which threaten our allies in Asia. In addition, it is unreasonable to expect the U.S. to compensate the USSR for the independent nuclear deterrents of Britain and France.
- The Soviet offer to negotiate separately with the French and British on their nuclear deterrents is a matter for the involved countries. The leaders of Britain and France have indicated that it would not be appropriate for them to enter into such negotiations until the USSR and US have agreed to significant reductions of strategic forces.

U.S. Position - Defense and Space

- It is my hope for the future that we can move toward a more stable and secure world in which strategic defenses play a growing role -- one which would neutralize the menace of ballistic missiles and, ultimately, allow us to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether.
- Making that transition would not be simple or quick. It is in everyone's interest for us to explore now the possibilities for doing so. For that reason, we are seeking to discuss with the Soviet Union in Geneva the vital relationship between offensive and defensive systems and ways for jointly managing a stable transition to a peace based on defensive systems rather than the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Soviet Geneva Counterproposal

- We welcome the fact that the Soviets have finally put forward a proposal at the Geneva arms control talks that seems to accept the principle of deep reductions
- As I said at the United Nations in October, the new Soviet proposal has seeds that should be nurtured.
- Unfortunately, there are also many elements which don't meet our ideas of sound arms control.
 - o The Soviet proposal would not, for example, promote strategic stability since it does not require cuts in the Soviet first-strike force which threatens US ICBMs.
 - o The proposed reductions would result in US inequality in weapons, throw-weight and delivery vehicles.
 - o It is anti-European and anti-Asian by proposing to reduce US systems that defend our allies in Europe and Asia, but would not limit comparable Soviet weapons which threaten them.
 - o It would cut-off the US SDI research program, leaving similar Soviet programs untouched, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has been deeply involved for years in strategic defense programs, including advanced research. It would inequitably prevent US force modernization needed for maintaining deterrence.

o Key elements are not verifiable.

- Nevertheless, we are studying the Soviet proposal carefully, and in the coming weeks we will be prepared for a genuine give and take.

Soviet "Star Peace" Proposal

- The US has long been in the forefront of peaceful exploration and cooperation in space. This is one of the principal goals of our space program and has been embodied in numerous projects, for example, the space shuttle.
- We have also been an active member of the UN Committee for the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. This is the appropriate UN organization for discussions of space cooperation and would seem to be an entirely adequate mechanism for carrying forward such space cooperation, which we greatly favor.
- Peace will not spring from catch-phrases, however; it can only spring from the earnest desire of nations to resolve their differences through frank, open discussion rather than violence. The United States is dedicated to opening that type of a relationship with the Soviet Union.

ASAT

- The Soviet Union is the only country with an operational ASAT capability.
- The U.S. has been seeking to determine in good faith possible constraints on anti-satellite weapons that would meet our national security interests and which would be verifiable.
- In the meantime, the U.S. must continue testing the MV ASAT to avert clear and irrevocable harm to US national security.

Nuclear Testing

- The US has observed the 150 kiloton threshold limitation of the TTBT and PNET. Unfortunately, there are serious questions whether the Soviet Union has violated the testing limit on several occasions. This underscores the need for better verification measures.
- The US proposed to the USSR on several occasions in 1983 opening negotiations on verification improvements for these treaties. Each time the USSR refused.
- A nuclear testing moratorium is unacceptable under existing circumstances. A way must first be found to achieve essential verification capability and to fulfill our national security needs.
- Our unilateral and unconditional invitation to Soviet experts to visit a Nevada test site was made in the hope that such a step would help establish the basis for verification of effective limits on underground nuclear testing.

Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control

- I have been particularly disturbed with repeated instances of Soviet noncompliance with arms control agreements.
- A few important examples have been the deployment of the SS-25, encryption of telemetry during Soviet missile testing, and the ongoing construction near Krasnoyarsk of a large phased-array radar in violation of the ABM Treaty.
- On June 10, I reaffirmed the US commitment made in 1982 not to undercut the SALT I or II agreements. The US has strictly adhered to this restraint. Equal restraint, however, must be exercised by the Soviet Union if arms control is to be effective.

Stockholm Conference on Disarmament in Europe

- This conference results from an initiative by the NATO Allies.
- The U.S. and the NATO Allies have proposed a comprehensive package of genuine confidence building measures designed to reduce the risk of war by making military activities more predictable and stable.
- The Soviet Union has advanced proposals for pledges not to use force, but have resisted measures which would give meaning to these pledges.
- The U.S. stands ready to reaffirm its pledges in the UN Charter and the Helsinki Final Act not to use force if that would bring the Soviet Union to agree to measures which would give concrete, new meaning to those pledges.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction Talks (MBFR)

- MBFR remains an integral and important part of our commitment to achieve genuine progress in arms control.
- Our objective is to increase security and stability in Central Europe by reducing the destabilizing imbalance of Eastern and Western forces to parity at lower levels.
- The United States and its NATO Allies have studied the recent Eastern proposal and are consulting closely on ways to move the Vienna talks forward.

Chemical Weapons Arms Control and Modernization

- The foremost U.S. objective remains the achievement of a comprehensive and verifiable global ban on all chemical weapons.
- Vice President Bush tabled a draft CW treaty at the Conference on Disarmament in April 1984. The USSR has yet to engage in serious discussions of that treaty, particularly with regard to essential verification measures.
- Until a global ban is achieved, the U.S. needs a modern and effective CW retaliatory stockpile to deter possible Soviet use of its massive and growing CW capability. U.S. production of binary weapons also provides the Soviet Union concrete incentive to negotiate seriously in Geneva to achieve a global ban.
- The U.S. is actively taking steps to prevent the dangerous spread of chemical weapons. We hope the Soviet Union will also do its part in this regard. The lasting solution to this problem is to conclude an effective and verifiable global ban on such weapons.

Arms Control Themes - TASS & BBC

Drafted by:PM/SNP:RHansen;EUR/RPM:GMatttox
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REGIONAL ISSUES

President's Initiative

- The plan I outlined at the UN is an effort set up a flexible, comprehensive framework for the United States and Soviet Union to cooperate in solving very serious problems.
- The conflicts involved have taken a terrible toll in human lives and treasure. They should come to a stop as soon as possible.
- Real peace requires the consent of the governed. That's why these conflicts have gone on so long -- the people in these countries refuse to submit to an alien ideology and outside military force. That's why I called for negotiations among the warring parties, for an effort to achieve internal reconciliation. Our sympathies are with those who are struggling for their freedom and national liberation.
- These conflicts also have caused severe strains in East-West relations. They have made many people in the United States and elsewhere question the Soviet Union's intentions whether it really is committed to peace. So there is a need to solve these problems if East-West relations are to be put on a better footing.
- Most important, if this plan succeeds, it would let the people in these troubled areas to begin living in peace and offer them help in rebuilding their lands. It would improve the entire international climate, reduce suspicions, and make progress easier in other areas.

Middle East

- The way to peace in the Middle East is direct negotiation among the parties involved. The current peace process based on King Hussein's initiative offers great hope.
- The renewed cycle of violence is tragic and frustrating, but we will not give up.
- Unfortunately, Soviet actions are those of a spoiler. The Soviet Union consistently attacks the very concept of direct negotiations between the parties. We note Soviet recognition of Israel's right to exist; we would welcome the Soviet Union playing a constructive role towards Middle East peace.

Afghanistan

- The Soviet war against the Afghan people is morally indefensible and an ongoing threat to regional and world stability.
- The key to peace is a political settlement that brings about the withdrawal of Soviet forces and the return in safety of the more than 3 million refugees caused by this tragic war.
- The U.S. fully supports UN efforts to achieve this goal.

Central America/Caribbean

- We want to address the urgent social and economic problems in the region and help promote stability and democracy. We have embarked on an unprecedented initiative to help the economies of countries there. Soviet and Cuban policies of intervention and export of revolution promote instability and waste the human and economic resources of the region.
- Nicaragua has supported insurgencies in its neighbors, increased its military strength to alarming levels and made clear its contempt for democracy. Our policies are intended to restore a balance to the region.

Southern Africa

- We deplore the apartheid system, which is a major source of instability. It is an issue that the South Africans themselves must solve. We are strongly urging dialogue between the government and representative black leaders in South Africa that would lead to an end to apartheid and a political system based on the consent of the governed.
- On Angola and Namibia, the United States has tried over the last four years to bring the Angolans into a negotiating framework which could help them reach agreement. The Soviet Union has not contributed to this effort. Indeed, the Soviet Union has helped fuel the conflict by providing huge amounts of military equipment to Angola, including \$2 billion in the last two years. There are 1,200 Soviet advisers involved in planning and supervising combat operations, and 35,000 Cuban troops.

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PRESIDENT'S THEMES FOR BBC/TASS INTERVIEWS

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BILATERAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES

U.S.-Soviet Exchanges

- Contacts among people of different nationalities are important parts of normal international life. But our societies have remain isolated from each other, and lots more needs to be done.
- Communication between our two societies should not be limited to contact between governments. We want to expand personal contacts, to increase sharing of experiences and culture. Both nations will be better for it.

US-Soviet Exchanges

- Scientific and technical exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union give each country's experts an opportunity to share in the benefits of the other's expertise, and build personal relationships with their colleagues.
- Our cabinet-level discussions on commerce, agriculture, housing and the environment show that we take these exchanges very seriously.
- We are ready to have scientific or technical exchanges that offer mutual benefits.

Trade

- Trade can have important benefits for both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. We support mutually beneficial trade with the Soviet Union.
- The fact is, however, that trade, like other issues, is bound to be affected by the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations. Realizing the full potential of our trading relationship will take time -- and the removal of barriers such as human rights problems.

Space Cooperation

- We have offered to negotiate a U.S.-Soviet agreement to improve cooperation for the peaceful uses of outer space. This agreement would enhance our bilateral relationship; it remains on the table.

Soviet Repression

- We do not seek to impose our system on others. But we do have a legitimate interest in the state of human rights in the Soviet Union, which has international human rights commitments.
- More fundamentally, one of the painful lessons of this century is that we cannot be indifferent to human rights; when a country does not respect the basic rights of its citizens, it cannot be trusted to respect the basic rights of other countries.
- We are deeply disturbed at the extreme downturn in Jewish emigration, which has been combined over the past year with an ominous crackdown on Hebrew teachers and other Jewish cultural activists.
- We remain troubled by Soviet repression of courageous human rights activists such as Andrey Sakharov, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Iosif Begun.
- Current intense Soviet repression of religious believers is deeply troubling to the millions of religious believers in the United States.
- We are also deeply concerned about the approximately 40 U.S.-Soviet dual nationals and Soviet spouses of U.S. citizens who have been denied permission to leave the Soviet Union.
- These human rights abuses are a serious obstacle to the improved relations with the Soviet Union that the United States seeks. Practical steps to meet these concerns, which are shared throughout the Western countries, would greatly improve the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations.

Helsinki Process

- The Helsinki Final Act committed Europe, the United States and Canada to mutual respect for the fundamental tenets of Western civilization, among the most important of which is the commitment to respect the basic human rights of individuals.
- The failure of the Soviet government to meet the commitments embodied in the Helsinki Accord is a problem of great significance to the West. Soviet leaders emphasize that the USSR is one part of a greater Europe; if so, they should prove it by meeting the obligations set out in this most European document.

U.S. Human Rights Performance

- If Soviet leaders want to compare their human rights record with ours, fine. We aren't perfect by any means, but we are constantly striving to do better. We have absolutely nothing to lose by a comparison of our human rights records.
- By any standard of human freedom and dignity, the United States stands among the most progressive countries of the world. We take literally, and protect, the freedoms and liberties guaranteed by our basic documents. The Soviet government should do the same.