

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Mandel, Judyt: Files  
**Folder Title:** [US Policy toward Libya and Terrorism] (1)  
**Box:** 91755

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

**Withdrawer**

SMF 11/8/2010

**File Folder** [U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

**FOIA**

F95-023/9

**Box Number** 91755

WILLS

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
100065	MEMO	WICK TO POINDEXTER RE USIA PLAN TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING	2	3/18/1986	B1
100066	OUTLINE	USIA ACTIONS TO SUPPORT SUMMIT 86	2	ND	B1
100067	MINUTES	SUMMARY MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP TO COMBAT LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM (W/HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON BACK OF PAGES)	4	5/6/1986	B1
100068	OUTLINE	PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN	6	ND	B1
100069	MINUTES	DUPLICATE OF 10067 (W/O NOTES)	2	ND	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

*smf 11/8/10*



NSC/S PROFILE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ID 8602289

RECEIVED 20 MAR 86 17

TO POINDEXTER . . . FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 18 MAR 86

*To → Raymond*

KEYWORDS: USIA

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

USSR

SUBJECT: PROPOSED PLAN FOR INTL SUPPORT / REAGAN - GORBACHEV MTG

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 25 MAR 86 STATUS S FILES WH

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

*To →*

RAYMOND

LENCZOWSKI

MANLOCK

SESTANOVICH

MANDEL

*OK*

COMMENTS

*Judyx MANDEL - Action*

REF#

LOG

NSCIFID

( HW )

ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

COPIES TO

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*  
Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

*Withdrawer*  
SMF 11/8/2010

*File Folder*  
[U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

*FOIA*  
F95-023/9  
WILLS

*Box Number*  
91755

5

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100065	MEMO  WICK TO POINDEXTER RE USIA PLAN TO BUILD SUPPORT FOR REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING	2	3/18/1986	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*  
Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

*Withdrawer*  
SMF 11/8/2010

*File Folder*  
[U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

*FOIA*  
F95-023/9  
WILLS

*Box Number*  
91755

5

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100066	OUTLINE  USIA ACTIONS TO SUPPORT SUMMIT 86	2	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing  
Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

U.S. ACTION AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISTS

At 7:00 p.m. EST, April 14, air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities and military assets that support Muammar Qadhafi's international terrorist activities.

This necessary move by the President is supported by the American people, and established a dramatic marker by which Libya and the rest of the world can assess future U.S. responses to acts of terrorism against Americans.

The attack followed clear and irrefutable evidence that Qadhafi had ordered and helped execute the bombing of a West Berlin discotheque that killed two people and injured 230, as well as confirmed reports of Libyan planning and preparation for numerous additional terror attacks.

Repeated Warnings, Diplomatic Efforts, Sanctions Unheeded

- o As early as July 1985, the President warned Libya that continued sponsorship of terrorism was a form of aggression under the United Nations Charter and would bring an appropriate response.
- o In accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, the U.S. response was in self defense and was intended to pre-empt Qadhafi's widespread and ongoing campaign of terrorist activities against Americans and the rest of the civilized world.
- o The U.S. strike damaged the Libyan terrorist infrastructure and demonstrated to Qadhafi that he cannot continue these savage attacks on innocent, defenseless civilians with impunity and without cost. As President Reagan said, "If necessary, we will do it again."

Appeasement of terrorism affords no safety

Qadhafi launched a bloody assault on American servicemen in Berlin and was planning a series of other such atrocities against Americans.

To sit back passively would have been inexcusable and could have cost many American lives. Inaction would have been a clear invitation to Qadhafi to proceed.

Within Libya there are many Libyans who must be outraged by Qadhafi's behavior and his obvious disregard for innocent human lives. He has squandered his country's resources in building his military might and exporting terrorism.

REPEATED WARNINGS TO LIBYA IGNORED

The President repeatedly warned Libya that continued sponsorship of international terrorism would bring a swift and appropriate response from the United States:

"...these terrorist states are now engaged in acts of war against the Government and people of the United States. And under international law, any state which is the victim of acts of war has the right to defend itself... [T]he American people are not -- I repeat, not -- going to tolerate intimidation, terror, and outright acts of war against this nation and its people."

--- President Reagan  
July 8, 1985

Less than six months later, Libya backed terrorist attacks at Rome and Vienna airports that killed 20 people and wounded 110 on December 27, 1985.

"...we call upon other nations to join us in denying [Libya] the normal economic and diplomatic privileges of the civilized world. If these steps do not end Qadhafi's terrorism, I promise you that further steps will be taken."

--- President Reagan  
January 7, 1986

On January 15, 1986, Qadhafi declared that Libya will train, arm and protect Arab guerillas for "suicide and terrorist missions." On March 25, Qadhafi vowed his forces will not give up their "brave confrontation" against the United States.

"...the United States will not be intimidated by new threats of terrorism against us. We're aware of intensive Libyan preparations that were already underway for terrorist operations against Americans. Mr. Qadhafi must know that we will hold him fully accountable for any such actions."

--- President Reagan  
March 27, 1986

On March 28, Libya urged "all Arab peoples" to attack anything American, "be it an interest, goods, a ship, a plane or a person." On April 5, a Libyan bomb ripped through a West Berlin discotheque, killing an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and injuring 230 people, among them some 50 American military personnel.

LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

Qadhafi's agents are particularly active in the Arab world, where they have been involved in assassination attempts, provision of weapons to radical groups, and plots to destabilize and undermine neighboring governments.

Elsewhere in the world, Qadhafi provides money, training, and technical support to revolutionary and terrorist groups as disparate as the Sandinistas, Colombian M-19 guerrillas, Caribbean leftist movements, the Irish Republican Army, rebel movements throughout Africa, and muslim insurgents in Thailand and the Philippines.

Qadhafi: Focus of World Terrorism

- o Libya has become a textbook case of state-supported terrorism -- operating terrorist training camps for instruction in demolition, sabotage, hijacking and assassination.
- o Libya makes a mockery of international diplomatic privilege to smuggle arms and explosives and store them at its diplomatic missions, as was clearly demonstrated by the shoot-out at the Libyan embassy in London in April 1984, where a British policewoman was gunned down.
- o Libyan "diplomats" have also been directly involved in several recent terrorist operations, including a plot to kill dissident Libyan students in the U.S. last year.

Safe Haven for Abu Nidal Terrorists

- o Libya has a long history of support for radical Palestinian terrorists, including the notorious Abu Nidal group. With the active support of Qadhafi, Abu Nidal has moved its base of operations to Libya over the past year.
- o Abu Nidal has conducted at least 30 terrorist attacks since the beginning of 1984. Last year, two-thirds of these attacks took place in Western Europe.
- o Libya was involved in helping Abu Nidal carry out the attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, and provided at least two of the Tunisian passports used by the terrorists. Qadhafi's spokesman referred to these attacks as "heroic actions."
- o Abu Nidal was also responsible for the hijacking of an Egyptian airliner last November which resulted in the deaths of 59 passengers, including one American. Libya is suspected of providing assistance in this attack.



PRE-EMPTING LIBYAN TERRORIST ATTACKS

Despite repeated warnings by President Reagan, Qadhafi showed no intention of stopping his attacks against Americans. Qadhafi and key lieutenants of his terrorist apparatus have on-going plans for violence against U.S. citizens and facilities in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America.

- o U.S. citizens are being followed and our embassies watched by Libyan agents in a number of cities around the world. /
- o Reports indicate that Qadhafi intends to attack American citizens and facilities overseas. /
- o In Africa, Libyans are planning attacks and conducting surveillance of U.S. facilities in no less than ten countries. Just last week, three Libyan agents entered one of these African countries intent on bombing the U.S. Chancery and kidnapping our Ambassador. /

There is compelling evidence of Libyan involvement in other planned attacks against United States citizens in recent weeks, several of which were designed to cause maximum casualties similar to the Berlin bombing.

- o France expelled two members of the Libyan People's Bureau in Paris for their involvement in a planned attack on visa applicants waiting in line at the U.S. Embassy on March 28. /
- o Six days later, France expelled two Fatah Force 17 members recruited by Libya to conduct another operation against the United States in Paris. /
- o On April 6, a Libyan-inspired plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in Beirut resulted in a near miss when a 107 mm rocket fired at the Embassy exploded on launch. /

There is ample evidence that Qadhafi and his key lieutenants have planned to conduct widespread attacks against Americans over the next several weeks and that they were confident they could carry out a series of hostile acts against the United States.

The President's action has put Qadhafi on notice that future terrorist actions will only come at considerable cost.

Release of additional evidence on the specific nature of Qadhafi's terrorist network and agenda would compromise U.S. intelligence sources.

---

U.S. TARGETS -- ROOTS OF LIBYAN TERRORISM

The U.S. pre-emptive action was directed at these military and terrorist staging areas in Libya:

Azizia barracks compound:

This facility contains command and communications centers for use in conducting terrorist attacks and other subversive activities. The attack was undertaken in an effort to disrupt Qadhafi's limited ability to stage additional terrorist attacks and to vividly demonstrate Qadhafi's limited capacity for response to his adversaries, who oppose his terrorist and subversive activities.

Tripoli military aircraft parking area (Tripoli airport):

Targets in this area included IL-76s, which Qadhafi uses as a primary means of air transport to support his subversive and terrorist activities. We have evidence that these aircraft have been used to resupply Libyan forces and Libyan-backed dissidents in Chad and have even been used to transport military equipment elsewhere around the world. Three of these IL-76 aircraft were involved in an abortive 1983 effort to transport L-39 jet trainers to the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua.

Banghazi army barracks east:

We had information that this facility provided an alternative command post for Qadhafi's activities.

Sidi Bilal port facility:

This base is used as a training center for Libyan naval commandos. The head of this unit supervised the mining of the Red Sea in the summer of 1984 -- an action which damaged at least 19 merchant ships. Libyan frogmen have also undertaken training at this base to conduct unconventional strikes against U.S. and allied shipping and shore facilities in the Mediterranean. Radical Palestinians and other dissident groups, naval commandos, and frogmen are regularly trained at this location.

Benina airfield:

Libya's primary base for MIG-23 fighter interceptors. Striking Benina airfield was essential to ensure the security of our attacking forces. Benina is also the home of units which support Libyan-directed forces in Chad. Soviet-supplied "Flogger" aircraft parking areas were targetted.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 14, 1986

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

9:00 P.M. EST

THE PRESIDENT: My fellow Americans, at 7:00 p.m. this evening Eastern Time air and naval forces of the United States launched a series of strikes against the headquarters, terrorist facilities and military assets that support Muammar Qaddafi's subversive activities. The attacks were concentrated and carefully targeted to minimize casualties among the Libyan people with whom we have no quarrel.

From initial reports, our forces have succeeded in their mission. Several weeks ago in New Orleans I warned Colonel Qaddafi we would hold his regime accountable for any new terrorist attacks launched against American citizens. More recently I made it clear we would respond as soon as we determined conclusively who was responsible for such attacks.

On April 5th in West Berlin a terrorist bomb exploded in a nightclub frequented by American servicemen. Sargeant Kenneth Ford and a young Turkish woman were killed and 230 others were wounded, among them some 50 American military personnel.

This monstrous brutality is but the latest act in Colonel Qaddafi's reign of terror. The evidence is now conclusive that the terrorist bombing of LaBelle discotheque was planned and executed under the direct orders of the Libyan regime. On March 25th, more than a week before the attack, orders were sent from Tripoli to the Libyan People's Bureau in East Berlin to conduct a terrorist attack against Americans to cause maximum and indiscriminate casualties. Libya's agents then planted the bomb. On April 4th the People's Bureau alerted Tripoli that the attack would be carried out the following morning. The next day they reported back to Tripoli on the great success of their mission.

Our evidence is direct, it is precise, it is irrefutable. We have solid evidence about other attacks Qaddafi has planned against the United States installations and diplomats, and even American tourists.

Thanks to close cooperation with our friends, some of these have been prevented. With the help of French authorities we recently aborted one such attack -- a planned massacre, using grenades and small arms, of civilians waiting in line for visas at an American embassy.

Colonel Qaddafi is not only an enemy of the United States. His record of subversion and aggression against the neighboring states in Africa is well-documented and well-known. He has ordered the murder of fellow Libyans in countless countries. He has sanctioned acts of terror in Africa, Europe and the Middle East, as well as the Western Hemisphere.

Today we have done what we had to do. If necessary,

MORE

we shall do it again. It gives me no pleasure to say that and I wish it were otherwise.

Before Qaddafi seized power in 1969, the people of Libya had been friends of the United States. And I'm sure that today most Libyans are ashamed and disgusted that this man has made their country a synonym for barbarism around the world. The Libyan people are a decent people caught in the grip of a tyrant.

To our friends and allies in Europe who cooperated in today's mission, I would only say you have the permanent gratitude of the American people. Europeans who remember history understand better than most that there is no security, no safety in the appeasement of evil. It must be the core of western policy that there be no sanctuary for terror and to sustain such a policy, free men and free nations must unite and work together.

Sometimes it is said that by imposing sanctions against Colonel Qaddafi or by striking at his terrorist installations we only magnify the man's importance -- that the proper way to deal with him is to ignore him. I do not agree. Long before I came into this office, Colonel Qaddafi had engaged in acts of international terror -- acts that put him outside the company of civilized men. For years, however, he suffered no economic or political or military sanction, and the atrocities mounted in number, as did the innocent dead and wounded. And for us to ignore by inaction the slaughter of American civilians and American soldiers, whether in night clubs or airline terminals, is simply not in the American tradition. When our citizens are abused or attacked, anywhere in the world, on the direct orders of a hostile regime, we will respond so long as I'm in this Oval Office. Self-defense is not only our right, it is our duty. It is the purpose behind the mission undertaken tonight -- a mission fully consistent with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

We believe that this pre-emptive action against his terrorist installations will not only diminish Colonel Qaddafi's capacity to export terror, it will provide him with incentives and reasons to alter his criminal behavior. I have no illusion that tonight's action will ring down the curtain on Qaddafi's reign of terror. But this mission, violent though it was, can bring closer a safer and more secure world for decent men and women. We will persevere.

This afternoon, we consulted with the leaders of Congress regarding what we were about to do and why. Tonight, I salute the skill and professionalism of the men and women of our armed forces who carried out this mission. It's an honor to be your Commander in Chief.

We Americans are slow to anger. We always seek peaceful avenues before resorting to the use of force -- and we did. We tried quiet diplomacy, public condemnation, economic sanctions and demonstrations of military force. None succeeded. Despite our repeated warnings, Qaddafi continued his reckless policy of intimidation, his relentless pursuit of terror. He counted on America to be passive. He counted wrong.

I warned that there should be no place on earth where terrorists can rest and train and practice their deadly skills. I meant it. I said that we would act with others, if possible, and alone if necessary to ensure that terrorists have no sanctuary anywhere. Tonight, we have.

Thank you and God bless you.

END

9:09 P.M. EST

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Indy (Fyi)*  
~~*[Signature]*~~

April 17, 1986

Dear Editor:

Attached are materials that review the various aspects of the President's recent action against Libya and state-supported terrorism.

Targets attacked in Libya were selected for the purpose of disrupting ongoing Libyan terrorist activities. It is the President's belief that America has made plain to Qadhafi and the world that terrorist actions against Americans will not be allowed to occur with impunity.

If you have questions regarding this information, please feel free to contact the White House Office of Public Affairs at (202) 456-7170.

Sincerely,



Thomas F. Gibson  
Special Assistant to the President and  
Director of Public Affairs

Enclosure

WORLDNET 192/EURONET 116

April 18, 1986

~~h~~  
JM

GUEST:

Caspar W. Weinberger  
Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT:

U.S. Policy Toward Libya

EURONET POSTS

Interactive: Bonn, Brussels, Copenhagen, London, Rome

Passive: Bern, Bogota, Madrid, Oslo, Santo Domingo, Stockholm, Vienna

Significant Reaction and Usage

BONN

USIS Bonn reported: The strength of this WORLDNET was in the Secretary's repetition of two of the main themes emerging from this week's events: that the U.S. launched its attack to make terrorists pay for their actions and that the Alliance was not seriously damaged by the reaction of our continental European allies to the initiative. Whether these statements are covered by the FRG media or not, Secretary Weinberger left no room for doubt about U.S. objectives in the minds of the press who attended this interactive WORLDNET.

The following persons attended this interactive WORLDNET: Mark Pritzke, Reuters; Gerhard Bohmueller, German Wire Service (DDP); Nicole Martithe, French News Agency; Hans-Juergen Hoefler, German Press Agency (DPA); Mark Pritzke, Reuters; Wilfried Bonse, Federal Press Office; Karin P. Vanis, Editor, ZDF Television, ZDF Television Team; Frauke Alles, Press Office, Foreign Ministry; Dierk-Ludwig Schaaf, ARD Television Team; APF Television Team; Dr. Thomas Witke, General Anzeiger, Bonn; Klaus Jonas, Die Welt.

The DPA Wire Service has already produced a three-paragraph article on the interview entitled "Allies Didn't Want To Know About The Attack's Timing." The piece reports factually about the Secretary's WORLDNET.

18 APR 86

An additional report from USIS Bonn stated: On April 18, the ZDF National Television Network devoted 15 seconds of its evening news at 19:30 (est. 8.6 million viewers) to atmospheric in our Embassy

conference room. Later in the evening, ZDF played a one-and-a-half-minute segment on its main news program at 21:45 (est. 7.43 million viewers) showing the Secretary answering a question on the prospects for conventional arms reductions.

The same evening, ARD's "Report from Bonn" (est. 4.5 million viewers) aired a total of two minutes from this WORLDNET and from Secretary Shultz's interview two days earlier, focusing on the issue of U.S. consultations with its allies prior to the Libyan action.

Bonn's General Anzeiger (independent, circ. 80,000) published an article in its Saturday edition by correspondent Thomas Witke who attended the Weinberger WORLDNET.

Reftel noted DPA wire service piece sent immediately after the conclusion of Friday's WORLDNET press conference. Weekend editions of the Rheinische Post (pro-CDU, circ. 394,000) and the Stuttgarter Zeitung (independent/liberal, circ. 154,000) carried articles taken from that DPA wire services report.

21 APR 86

#### BRUSSELS

USIS Brussels reported: Despite last minute notice and the fact that Assistant Secretary Whitehead was holding a press conference at NATO at almost the same time, subject interactive attracted a large and interested audience. The program proved a useful complement to Mission's efforts to clarify America's motives for and assessments of the raid on Libya. The Secretary showed great patience in answering the same question posed with only slight variations by several interlocuters. It was also appreciated that the Secretary was willing to answer questions beyond the original thirty-minute limit.

The fact that Secretary Weinberger was able to clarify the misinterpretation by one of Brussels' questioners that the U.S. was reverting to the idea of economic sanctions after seeing military action as a failure showed the value - in fact, the necessity - of having an interactive dialogue rather than a one-way presentation.

Asking questions were Miel Dekeyser of BRT, Belgian Dutch-language radio and Herman De Prinz of BRT Television. Post supplied a BVU hi-band tape to De Prinz and sent VHS copies of the program to USEC and USNATO. Also present were M.S. Parone of ANSA, Italian News Agency, and Jean-Paul Collette of Le Soir, Belgian French-language daily.

18 APR 86

An additional report from USIS Brussels stated: BRT TV and RTBF TV April 18 carried actualities of Secretary Weinberger's WORLDNET remarks on their main evening newscasts.

BRT used part of Secretary Weinberger's reply to a question by BRT radio reporter Miel Dekeyser suggesting that the Administration was returning

to economic sanctions because of disappointment about a military intervention. The station used Mr. Weinberger's remark that "I did not say that we would turn to economic sanctions because we're disappointed with our military actions. I said exactly the opposite. I said we had to turn to the military, because there seemed to be no other way to deal with it, and that it might be even more effective, or as effective, if we could get economic sanctions. We tried to get economic sanctions in the first place."

RTBF, showing an actuality of Secretary Weinberger at WORLDNET, paraphrased his remarks, saying that he underscored the ties between the U.S. and its allies, adding that Secretary Weinberger said that "U.S. isolationists have failed and will always fail. For Caspar Weinberger, the Atlantic Alliance remains, in spite of it all, the main bulwark of freedom against Soviet threats."

21 APR 86

#### COPENHAGEN

USIS Copenhagen reported: Although we had less than 24-hours notice, we were able to attract a high level audience of parliamentarians and Ministry of Defense officials and representatives from other NATO embassies to this April 18 program. On the press side, we had three of the four major dailies and the Ritzau National Wire Service.

Both audiences thought Secretary Weinberger gave a vigorous defense of the U.S. position and placed the Libyan action in proper perspective in regard to U.S.-European relations. The ensuing press coverage April 19 stressed the role that lack of European support played in the U.S. decision. Excerpts follow.

Berlingske Tidene (conservative, circulation: 132,270) Defense correspondent Nils Eric Boesgaard wrote: "European support for economic sanctions against Libya would have rendered the attack unnecessary, says U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to 'Berlingske Tidende.'

"Caspar Weinberger admitted that there were differing opinions between the U.S. and its European allies. It was the Americans who during two world wars had attempted to keep the U.S. isolated, but the vast majority did understand how important the Alliance is to the U.S. and how important the U.S. is to the Alliance.

"The U.S. Secretary of Defense denied allegations that in the opinion of many European politicians the attack against Libya constituted so grave a strain on NATO cooperation that it would be practically impossible to repair the damage.

"He admitted that it was a problem, but underscored that opinion polls in the NATO countries showed how much importance people attached to the Alliance. If the governments of all the member countries had united on a really effective boycott of Libya an attack would not have been necessary, said Weinberger...."



Aktuelt (social democratic, circulation: 56,060) Foreign Affairs editor Tage Baumann said: 'The U.S. attack on Libya took place because the Americans didn't know what else to do about Colonel Qadhafi's stronghold for terrorists. There were no plans to kill Qadhafi or to start a rebellion against him.

"U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger made the above statement during a satellite-transmitted interview from the U.S. capital yesterday.

"Weinberger felt that the criticism that had been voiced by Western Europe is taken very seriously by the U.S., but he did not believe that the fact the U.S. did not inform its allies of the action against Libya had weakened U.S. credibility within the Alliance....

"Weinberger did not share Western European fear that the action would have serious consequences for East-West relations. He felt it was too early to express an opinion on this issue....

Writing in conservative Jyllands-Posten (circulation: 118,298) journalist Nina Hansen observed: "It was primarily the lack of support among the USA's European allies for intensified economic sanctions that made the Reagan administration resort to military action against Libya's Colonel Muammar Qadhafi.

"'Something had to be done to make it clear to Qadhafi that terrorism has a high price,' said U.S. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger yesterday when he held a televised press conference via satellite with journalists in London, Brussels, Rome and Copenhagen...."

This program shows the value of WORLDNET; a high level spokesman talking directly to the Danish press on a vital issue. This interactive proves again that if we have a newsmaker we can put together an effective program with minimal lead time.

21 APR 86

#### LONDON

USIS London reported: The following attended subject WORLDNET: Independent Television News (ITN): Trevor McDonald, presenter; David Mannion, producer; plus camera crew.

BBC Television News: John Simpson, producer; plus camera crew; BBC TV "Newsnight" program: Olivia O'Leary, presenter; Nick Guthrie, producer; Ann McQuire, reporter; Larry Hodgson, editor, BBC Radio News; Bob Simpson, diplomatic correspondent, BBC Radio Four News; Rodney Cowton, defense correspondent, The Times; Harold Briley, diplomatic correspondent, BBC World Service; Lou Miliano, U.S. Radio.

Copies of audio cassettes were also sent to Bill Katz, Associated Press; and John Bulloch, diplomatic correspondent, Daily Telegraph. The Deputy Public Affairs Officer also attended subject WORLDNET.

All questions were asked by ITN's Trevor McDonald who sought Mr. Weinberger's views on the differing public reactions in Europe and the U.S. to the attack on Libya. McDonald also focused on the issue of Britain's cooperation and the political row it has raised in the Parliament and in the press.

18 APR 86

ROME

USIS Rome reported: Our interactive participants were Emedocle Maffia of RAI's Giornale Radiouno (First Channel Radio), and Fabrizio Del Noce, foreign affairs reporter for RAI-TV's First Channel.

Other attendees were: Piero Meucci, ANSA, Paolo Lepri, AGI, Guido Bimbi, L'Unita, Roberto Sorano, AGA, Alessandro Caprettini, Il Resto Del Carlino, Giuseppe Tabasso, GR-3, Tony Austin, Reuters, Giorgio Canessa, Il Giorno, Pierluigi Capurso, Il Secolo XIX, Guido Moltedo, Il Manifesto, Lavinia Cavalletti, Il Mattino, Vladimiro Odinzov, La Repubblica, Telemontecarlo-TV, Massimo Comito (with camera crew), TV Greece - Athanasia Synghellaki.

TV Coverage: A RAI-TV crew came to our on-premises WORLDNET room to film cut-away shots to be used in Dei Noce's First Channel report on this evening's newscast. Also in attendance was a correspondent (Mark Phillips) and camera crew from the Rome Bureau of CBS News, who covered the program as a media event and later interviewed the interactive journalists on their opinions of how Italians viewed the recent U.S. military actions against Libya.

In this, our third WORLDNET on the Libyan situation in four days, we were still riding a high-interest curve and media turnout was excellent. Interest was such, in fact, that a simple note on the major local wire service the night before had journalists clambering to come rather than having to be invited. Without too many other events on the Libyan news horizon today, this program may prove to be a particularly good source for copy.

The overall crispness of questions and answers...was to everybody's advantage, much as it was with the Shultz program on Wednesday.

CBS asked Maffia whether or not Weinberger's presentation clarified or convinced him of the American point of view regarding the Libyan attack. He pointed up the apparent misunderstanding between American and Italian spokesmen on the issue of adequate consultation surrounding the Walters visit. Maffia said either the Italian side or the American side was not telling the truth. Maffia said his question stems from Italian press reports this morning quoting Craxi's diplomatic advisor Badini that Walters "did not make clear that the U.S. decision had already been arrived at definitely and that it would be carried out imminently. (Maffia later told CPAO that he had personally spoken before the WORLDNET to Craxi, who had given him the same line as Badini).

18 APR 86

An additional report from Rome stated: Italian print and broadcast media carried extensive coverage of Secretary Weinberger's WORLDNET April 18 on Libya. April 19 moderate Channel One RAI newscast, whose correspondent Fabrizio Del Noce had participated in the conference, gave two minutes of air time to the Secretary's remarks. Socialist RAI Radio News GR 1, whose correspondent Empedocle Maffia was Post's second interactive participant, also gave extensive play. The Secretary's comments were also picked up and quoted in many newspapers on April 19, with several U.S.-based correspondents mentioning the Weinberger WORLDNET and its content in their reports. The Secretary's response to a question about the Libyan missile attack on the Italian island of Lampedusa drew much attention and some implied criticism.

Headlines: "An EEC Economic Boycott to Avoid Further Raids" (centrist La Stampa, circ. 468,072), "But Weinberger Insists: Sanctions are Needed" (leading conservative IL Giornale, circ. 181,202) "No More Raids If Europe Is With Us;" "Libya's Attack On Italy Was Just A Gesture", (leftist, influential La Repubblica, circ. 320,462) "Weinberger: New Raids Possible" (Naples' Il Mattino, circ. 151,914), "Weinberger: Missiles Against Lampedusa Were a Stunt" (Rome conservative Il Tempo, circ. 133,780), "Weinberger: Lampedusa? It's Not NATO" (Communist Paese Sera, circ. 30,000).

Material drawn from the WORLDNET broadcast was also incorporated into articles in radical left Il Manifesto (circ. 22,000) and Italian socialist party official organ Avanti! (circ. 54,500).

For the most part, newspapers quoted Secretary Weinberger without commenting. Scant commentary referred to the Secretary's response to a question from a Danish journalist about the Libyan missiles fired at Lampedusa, an incident the Italian government strongly denounced as an unjustifiable attack on Italian soil. La Repubblica's front-page box read "(Secretary Weinberger) also defined the Libyan attack against the island of Lampedusa as a "propagandistic gesture", thus disparaging the danger and the gravity (of that event)." Il Mattino described the Secretary as "having dismissed, in a few words, the issue of Lampedusa."

22 APR 86

#### BERN

USIS Bern reported: Although a non-interactive Post and despite the very hectic media activity underway in Bern due to the CSCE Human Contacts Experts Meeting, USIS Bern was able to find a very able passive participant in the April 18 SecDef Weinberger Euronet. Wiinfried Wiegandt, foreign affairs editor of the center-left Berner Zeitung (120,000 circulation), sat through the entire program...and reported on the program and its content in the April 19 editions of the newspaper.

The article began: "American Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger answered questions put to him Friday by European journalists on a 'WORLDNET' television program which dealt with the Libyan conflict and terrorism." It goes on to quote the Secretary extensively and emphasizes remarks concerning private comments the USG has received which suggest that the public statements of foreign leaders - including those in the Arab world -- do not necessarily reflect personal views. Wiegandt's article also quotes Weinberger to suggest that just as there are differences within the western alliance between the United States and Europe concerning the policy toward terrorism, there are also those within the American population who did not approve of the action against Libya: "However, they also do not approve of terrorism. Such differences of opinion within NATO do not mean mistrust; they would be there in any event. This is not the same thing as mistrust."

Comment: TV/ND's extraordinary efforts during the week of April 7-11 to explain America's actions in Libya are very much appreciated by this Post. The Djerejian, Shultz, and Weinberger programs all demonstrate the extraordinary value of WORLDNET as a public affairs medium.

21 APR 86

#### BOGOTA

USIS Bogota reported: In a 45 second story, mid-day newscast Telediario (12:30 P.M., channel 9) summarized the main points of the Weinberger WORLDNET. Estimated audience for the 4/18 newscast is 4.5 million.

Four of the five major Colombian radio chains (RCN, Todelar, Radio Super, Sutatenza) broadcast the complete audio of the Weinberger WORLDNET (4/18). Caracol, Colombia's leading radio network, excerpted a three minute portion and combined it with a five minute update from its correspondent in Washington. The evening of 4/18 Caracol broadcast the entire Weinberger interactive. Combined estimated audience for the five networks is 14.5 million.

21 APR 86

#### OSLO

USIS Oslo reported: Despite our "non-interactive" status, members of the Norwegian electronic and print media appeared to view the WORLDNET featuring SecDef Weinberger. Among the guests were representatives of the two Norwegian national radio stations, including the Norwegian radio broadcasting company's "P-2", who reported live during the WORLDNET program.

18 APR 86

#### SANTO DOMINGO

USIS Santo Domingo reported: Four of Santo Domingo's five television stations used all or portions of the special feed on Secretary Weinberger's April 18 WORLDNET on Libya. Two stations used the entire feed; two used portions.

Channel 2, Teleantillas, used a two to three minute segment on Saturday, April 19. Estimated audience: 150,000.

Channel 4, Radio Television Dominica, used the entire feed on both its evening news program and its late news program of April 18. Estimated audience: 180,000.

Channel 9, Color Vision, also used the complete feed on its evening news program of April 18. Estimated audience: 710,000.

Channel 11: Telesistema, used a two to three minute segment on its late news of April 18. Estimated audience: 150,000.

Note: Post is using new estimated audience figures for Channels 9 and 4, given to Post by these stations in March, as we mentioned in an earlier cable. They attribute these increased audiences for news programs to a change in equipment, an increase in the power of their broadcasts and to a growing interest in public affairs which has developed as a consequence of the local election campaign.

22 APR 86

STOCKHOLM

USIS Stockholm reported: Post invited half a dozen key contacts from press, academic and defense fields to watch today's WORLDNET with Secretary Weinberger. Despite the short notice, the following people showed up. (Other invitees may have been intimidated by presence of fire trucks and police barriers in connection with ongoing bomb threat at the neighboring British embassy.)

Hans-Henric Ronnow, Defense Researcher and author, Stockholm Institute of International Affairs; Anders Hellner, Head of Programming, Stockholm Institute of International Affairs; Cdr. Karl-Gustaf Dybeck, Strategic Planning and Analysis Section, Swedish Defense Staff.

Participants were very pleased with the opportunity to watch today's transmission and regretted that they could not have participated in the questioning. FYI, we learned during the program that Cdr Dybeck is the Swedish Defense staff's expert on military responses to terrorism.

In addition to those attending [the] program at the USIS office, [it] was monitored at Swedish TV. Post also provided [a] high band tape of [the] program to TV-2 news program "Rapport."

We were extremely pleased with [the] program and hope that we can have the opportunity to take part as active participants in a future program.

21 APR 86

VIENNA

USIS Vienna reported: Although short notice and the time of day reduced our ability to attract media contacts to this event, representatives of

the Austrian Army's Inspectorate of Troops (equivalent to the JCS), as well as from the Institute for Strategic Research viewed the SecDef. Secretary Weinberger's comments were extremely timely and had the effect of summarizing U.S. policy and thinking at a crucial juncture in the confrontation with Libya. Our guests greatly appreciated the opportunity to hear administration views quickly and authoritatively. Congratulations again to TV/ND for a highly useful initiative.

21 APR 86

POSSIBLE SPEAKERS ON TERRORISM

Yonah Alexander  
CSIS

Craig Alderman  
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy

Ray Cline  
CSIS

Lawrence Eagleburger

Admiral B.R. Inman

Brian Jenkins  
RAND

Dr. Judith Kipper  
AEI

Robert Kupperman

Bruce Laingen

Michael Ledeen  
CSIS

Samuel Lewis  
SAIS

Neil Livingstone

Edward Luttwak  
CSIS

Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr.  
Institute of Foreign Policy Analysis, Tufts University

Richard Shultz  
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy

Malcolm Toom  
former Ambassador to Israel and U.S.S.R

Eugene Mastangelo

Howard T. Bane

John Jerome Norton

Col. William Fell  
Naval War College

General Paul Gorman  
Bradshaw Associates

Alexander Haig

Richard Helms

Dr. Paul Henze  
RAND

Dr. Nicholas Kettrie  
American University

William Mazzocco  
Washington Forum

Alan Nanes  
Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service

Col. George Olmstead



Dr. Gary Sick  
Ford Foundation

Dr. William Taylor  
CSIS

Walter Stoessel

R. James Woolsey  
CSIS

Jeffrey Record

Potential Speaker List

U.S. Libya Policy

KEY:1=Media interviews  
2=Briefings (media,  
groups, etc.)  
3=Speeches

STATE DEPARTMENT

Mr. George P. Shultz	Secretary of State	1
Mr. John C. Whitehead	Deputy Secretary of State	1
Mr. Michael H. Armacost	Under Secretary for Political Affairs	1,2,3
Amb. Richard W. Murphy	Asst. Secretary for Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	1
Amb. Morton I. Abramowitz	Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research	2
Amb. Robert B. Oakley	Director of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning	1,2,3
Mr. Arnold L. Raphel	Deputy Asst. Sec. for Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	1,2,3
Mr. Roscoe S. Suddarth	Deputy Asst. Sec. for Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	2
Mr. Michael Ussery	Deputy Asst. Sec. for Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	1,2,3
Mr. George Harris	Director, Office of Analysis for Near East and South Asia	2
Mr. David Zweifel	Director, Office of North African Affairs	2,3
Mr. Roger Merrick	Dep. Director, Office of North African Affairs	2
Mr. Roger Dankert	Libyan Desk Officer	2

\* \* \*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

VADM John M. Poindexter	Director, National Security Council	2
Mr. Donald R. Fortier	Dep. Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs	2
Mr. Peter W. Rodman	Dep. Assistant to the President for Foreign Policy	1,2,3
Mr. Howard R. Teicher	Director of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs	1,2,3
Ms. Elaine Morton	Director, Crisis Policy Planning	2

\* \* \*

KEY:1=Media interviews  
2=Briefings (media,  
groups, etc.)  
3=Speeches

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger	Secretary of Defense	1
Mr. Richard L. Armitage	Assistant Secretary International Security Affairs	1,2,3
Amb. Robert H. Pelletreau	Dep. Assistant Secretary, Near East And South Asian Affairs	1,2,3
Ms. Sandra Charles	Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs	2
General John H. Moellering	Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff	2

\* \* \*

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Mr. James A. Baker, III	Secretary of the Treasury	1
Mr. Robert Kimmitt	General Counsel, Treasury Dept.	1,2

CIA

Mr. William Casey	Director of the Central Intelligence Agency	2
-------------------	--	---

ACADEMIA

Dr. Lisa Anderson	Associate Professor of Political Science at Columbia University	1,2
-------------------	---	-----

CONGRESSIONAL

Senator Robert Dole	R-Kansas	1
Senator Richard G. Lugar	R-Indiana	1

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

*Withdrawer*

SMF 11/8/2010

*File Folder*

[U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

*FOIA*

F95-023/9  
WILLS

*Box Number*

91755

5

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100067	MINUTES  SUMMARY MINUTES OF WORKING GROUP TO COMBAT LIBYAN SUPPORTED TERRORISM (W/HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON BACK OF PAGES)	4	5/6/1986	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*

Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

*Withdrawer*

SMF 11/8/2010

*File Folder*

[U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

*FOIA*

F95-023/9  
WILLS

*Box Number*

91755

5

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100068	OUTLINE  PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN	6	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

May 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: IIC Working Group on Countering Libyan Support  
for Terrorism

FROM: Philip W. Arnold *[Signature]*  
Working Group Chairman

SUBJECT: Report of May 6 Meeting

Enclosed for your information are brief minutes and action items from the Working Group's meeting of May 6, 1986.

I will call you within the next few days to set up the next meeting of the Working Group.

Distribution:

NSC - Ms. Mandel *[checkmark]*

Department of State:

S/CT - Mr. Kraft  
NEA/AFN - Mr. Merrick  
PA/OAP - Mr. Knecht  
P - Mr. Salvia

DOD - OSD/DUSD(P)/PSP - Mr. Kern

USIA

P/G - Mr. Fischman  
P - Ms. Super

~~SECRET~~ *Amf 11/8/10*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

~~SECRET~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

May 7, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: IIC Working Group on Countering Libyan Support  
for Terrorism

FROM: Philip W. Arnold *PA*  
Working Group Chairman

SUBJECT: Report of May 6 Meeting

Enclosed for your information are brief minutes and action items from the Working Group's meeting of May 6, 1986.

I will call you within the next few days to set up the next meeting of the Working Group.

Distribution:

NSC - Ms. Mandel ✓

Department of State:

S/CT - Mr. Kraft  
NEA/AFN - Mr. Merrick  
PA/OAP - Mr. Knecht  
P - Mr. Salvia

DOD - OSD/DUSD(P)/PSP - Mr. Kern

USIA

P/G - Mr. Fischman  
P - Ms. Super

~~SECRET~~

*and 11/8/10*

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

*Collection Name*  
Mandel, Judyt E.: Files

*Withdrawer*  
SMF 11/8/2010

*File Folder*  
[U.S. POLICY TOWARD LIBYA AND TERRORISM] (1)

*FOIA*  
F95-023/9  
WILLS

*Box Number*  
91755

5

---

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
100069	MINUTES  DUPLICATE OF 10067 (W/O NOTES)	2	ND	B1

---

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.