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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection Name MANDEL, JUDYT E.: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 8/21/2007

File Folder TERRORISM-LIBYA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (05/10/1986-05/19/1986)

FOIA

F05-008

Box Number 91721

LAHLOU

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
40526	MEMO	MARVIN STONE TO POINDEXTER RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	1	5/9/1986	B1
40508	SUMMARY	OF PUBLIC DIPLOMACY PLAN FOR COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	1	ND	B1
40766	SUMMARY	SAME TEXT AS 40508 <i>R 10/5/2016 M404/1</i>	1	ND	B1
40510	PLAN	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN RE COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (INCLUDING ANNEXES A-C AND A CHART) <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	12	ND	B1
40511	MEMO	POINDEXTER TO MARVIN STONE RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	1	5/19/1986	B1
40512	MEMO	MANDEL AND WALTER RAYMOND TO POINDEXTER RE LIBYAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	1	5/13/1986	B1

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

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Collection Name MANDEL, JUDYT E.: FILES

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CAS 8/21/2007

File Folder TERRORISM-LIBYA PUBLIC DIPLOMACY (05/10/1986-05/19/1986)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
40513	MEMO	STONE TO POINDEXTER RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GROUP <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	1	ND	B1
40514	PLAN	RE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN FOR COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM (INCLUDING ANNEX A, ANNEX B, ANNEX C AND CHART) <i>R 10/4/2016 M404/1</i>	12	ND	B1
40518	MEMO	SAME TEXT AS 40511 <i>R 10/5/2016 M404/1</i>	1	5/19/1986	B1

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NSC/S PROFILE

UNCLASSIFIED

ID 8603700

RECEIVED 10 MAY 86 12

TO PRESIDENT

FROM WICK, C

DOCDATE 07 MAY 86

KEYWORDS: USIA

TERRORISM

LIBYA

SUBJECT: BROADCASTING OF ADMIN POLICY ON TERRORISM TO FORN AUDIENCES

ACTION: FOR RECORD PURPOSES

DUE:

STATUS C

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FOR ACTION

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RAYMOND

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A. Kingon
**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

393266

Director



USIA

3700

May 7, 1986

Dear Mr. President:

I wanted to let you know how pleased I am with the high degree of Cabinet-level involvement in the USIA's efforts to explain Administration policy on terrorism to foreign audiences. In the wake of the air strike against Libya, USIA's international satellite television network, WORLDNET, was fortunate enough to host three extraordinarily effective televised press conferences in which the most senior Administration spokesmen -- Secretary of State George Shultz (twice) and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger -- responded directly to questions from European journalists about the United States effort to strike a blow against terrorism. As a result of these broadcasts, tens of millions of television viewers, radio listeners, and newspaper readers throughout Europe and elsewhere in the world got the Administration's message -- direct and unfiltered -- from the most authoritative sources.

I would like to share with you just a few of the reports from our field posts that demonstrate the tremendous impact of these broadcasts overseas:

- Portions of Secretary Shultz' WORLDNET program two days after the Libyan raid were seen by more than 90 million television viewers throughout Europe.
- In Italy alone, some 20 million viewers saw excerpts from the Secretary's broadcast.
- In Spain, a nine minute excerpt of the transmission in prime time was seen by an audience of 14 million.
- Two days later, Secretary Weinberger's WORLDNET interview reached an audience of more than 25 million in Europe and Latin America.
- Britain's Independent Television Network ran a total of seven minutes of this broadcast on its evening news programs, with further portions appearing on BBC-TV.
- Secretary Shultz' second appearance, on April 24, again generated intense interest in Europe, with prime time broadcast of excerpts on Britain's ITN and BBC television services, as well as France's TF-1.

My colleagues and I are proud of the role that WORLDNET has played in educating European audiences about the Administration's anti-terrorism policy, and I am delighted with the support we have received from Secretaries Shultz and Weinberger. It is my earnest hope that our efforts have brought us a little closer to the day when the terrible scourge of terrorism is eliminated once and for all.

Warmest personal regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The President
The White House

THE WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET

INCOMING

DATE RECEIVED: MAY 07, 1986

NAME OF CORRESPONDENT: THE HONORABLE CHARLES Z. WICK

SUBJECT: ACKNOWLEDGES THE SUPPORTIVE INVOLVEMENT OF
CABINET MEMBERS IN EXPLAINING ADMINISTRATION
POLICY ON TERRORISM TO FOREIGN AUDIENCES

ROUTE TO: OFFICE/AGENCY	(STAFF NAME)	ACTION		DISPOSITION	
		ACT CODE	DATE YY/MM/DD	TYPE RESP	C COMPLETED D YY/MM/DD
ALFRED KINGON		ORG	86/05/08		C 86 105 08
<i>WICKSON CDA</i>	REFERRAL NOTE:		<i>A 86 105 09</i>		<i>1 1</i>
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COMMENTS: _____

ADDITIONAL CORRESPONDENTS: MEDIA: I INDIVIDUAL CODES: _____

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| *D-DRAFT RESPONSE | *C-COMPLETED | * CODE = A | * |
| *F-FURNISH FACT SHEET | *S-SUSPENDED | *COMPLETED = DATE OF | * |
| *I-INFO COPY/NO ACT NEC* | | * OUTGOING | * |
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REFER QUESTIONS AND ROUTING UPDATES TO CENTRAL REFERENCE
(ROOM 75, OEOB) EXT-2590
KEEP THIS WORKSHEET ATTACHED TO THE ORIGINAL INCOMING
LETTER AT ALL TIMES AND SEND COMPLETED RECORD TO RECORDS
MANAGEMENT.

RECEIVED 12 MAY 86 16

TO POINDEXTER

FROM STONE, M

DOCDATE 09 MAY 86

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

Ch 2/2/07

KEYWORDS: LIBYA

TERRORISM

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

USIA

SUBJECT: 60 DAY ACTION PLAN ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR POINDEXTER DUE: 14 MAY 86 STATUS S FILES IF

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**NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT STAFFING DOCUMENT**

TIME STAMP

86 MAY 12 11 P 4: 08

SYSTEM LOG NUMBER: SYSTEM II 90367

ACTION OFFICER: NORTH DUE: 14 MAY

- Prepare Memo For President
- Prepare Memo For Poindexter / Fortier
- Prepare Memo _____ to _____
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Chew
- Prepare Memo McDaniel to Elliott

CONCURRENCES/COMMENTS* PHONE* to action officer at ext. 3345

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- INFORMATION McDaniel Pearson Secretariat
- Rodman Lehman _____
- Poindexter (advance) Fortier (advance)

COMMENTS

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

CU 8/21/07

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Return to Secretariat

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D C. 20547

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SYSTEM II
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USIA

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May 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone *M.L.S.*
Chairman
International Information Committee

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Working Group on Countering
Libyan Support for Terrorism

Attached, for your consideration, is the 60-day Action Plan on Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism requested by the NSC. An interagency working group of the IIC, under the chairmanship of Philip W. Arnold, is ready to take responsibility for the Plan's implementation. We are counting on the full cooperation of all participating agencies.

Cooperation is particularly critical for the process of identifying data (both classified and unclassified) and ensuring that it is made available in an appropriate coherent form to designated users. This process should be the beginning of the badly needed permanent data base as called for in NSDD-207.

We are ready to proceed immediately upon your approval of the Plan. We will also be prepared to provide you with a final report at the end of the 60-day period, with an assessment of what further steps may be needed at that time.

I look forward to your comments.

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Classified by: Marvin L. Stone
Declassify: OADR

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BY *rw* NARA DATE 10/9/16

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN:
COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

SUMMARY

The next two months will be critical for the U.S. effort to reorient international approaches to state-supported terrorism. The international reaction to U.S. actions against Libya underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive, well-coordinated approach to defend past and potential U.S. measures and enlist more active international cooperation.

This plan focuses only on public activities directed at international audiences, either directly or through European regional or U.S. media coverage, and builds on the already intensive effort underway (see ANNEX C). Any further communication activities should be addressed by an interagency group coordinated by the NSC.

This strategy emphasizes:

- building unambiguous understanding internationally of the cooperative steps that are being taken and need to be taken by all nations to combat Libyan terrorism while emphasizing the inevitable deleterious consequences of failing to cooperate;
- seeking to minimize support for and isolate Qadhafi, furthering the erosion of his stature as a charismatic leader to be feared or respected;
- laying the groundwork for longer term, broader public diplomacy programs against international terrorism;
- identifying the struggle to be aimed at terrorists and terrorism, not against Arabs and Muslims.

USG activities in the coming weeks should seek to intensify international public opposition to Libyan-supported terrorism and to more active and effective international cooperation against international terrorism.

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Classified by: Marvin L. Stone
Declassify: OADR

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NLR #40508
BY RW NARA DATE 10/4/16

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**PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN:
COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM**

I. BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the U.S. air attack on Libyan terrorist infrastructure/military targets, the USG faces a formidable, but not insurmountable, public diplomacy challenge of generating significantly more intense international public opposition to -- and ultimately actions against -- Libyan supported terrorism. Widespread, foreign public criticism was apparent in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. air attack on Libyan military sites. Nevertheless, a core of support for U.S. actions exists in Europe and, privately expressed, among leaders and elites in moderate Arab States.

II. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OBJECTIVES

- Achieve unambiguous understanding of U.S. objectives.
- Gain acceptance/support from publics and governments of Allied and friendly nations for a full range of economic, political and (if necessary) military actions against Libyan supported international terrorism.
- Convince European publics that terrorism is a legitimate security concern of the NATO Alliance and that European history illustrates the failure of appeasement; limit the divisive effect within the Alliance of Soviet propaganda.
- Help create a psychological climate through which moderate Arab regimes (particularly Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and other Third World Muslim countries will find it easier to resist pressures to support Libya; emphasize that action is focused on Libya, not the Arab or Muslim worlds.
- Influence publics and governments in non-aligned Third World countries to take stronger stands against terrorism and resist pressures to support Libya in prominent forums such as the U.N. and the NAM Summit.

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NLRP M40471 #40510
BY RW NARA DATE 10/4/16

III. KEY STEPS

- Prepare an effective public presentation of U.S. policies;
- Build on the emerging willingness of Europeans and other friendly governments to consider more active cooperation and measures to combat terrorism in the immediate future; help Europeans see the inevitable costs of their failure to confront the threat;
- Encourage discussion within the Arab world and among sympathetic Third World nations to emphasize Qadhafi's role in sabotaging legitimate Arab interests and his own country's security as well as peace in the Middle East, in order to reduce the degree of Arab support for Qadhafi's activities; encourage a greater realization within the Arab world of the costs of terrorism to them, not only in the substantial loss of tourist business but also increasingly in general commerce;
- Reemphasize to the people of Libya that our quarrel is not with them, but with their leader's reckless use of terrorism; however, support for their leader makes them vulnerable to attack; generate a greater awareness among the Libyan people that Qadhafi is squandering Libya's oil resources on military adventures and terrorism with a resulting decline in the Libyan standard of living.
- Rebut Soviet propaganda or disinformation directed at Europe and the Middle East on U.S. actions regarding Libya, particularly Soviet activities aimed at creating discord in the NATO Alliance.

IV. AUDIENCES AND APPROACHES

1. Influential individuals, groups and media in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, other friendly, democratic industrial nations. A full range of public diplomacy tools are available for direct communication with audiences, or through mass media and personal contact.
2. Leadership within the moderate Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and, to a lesser extent, leadership of non-aligned Third World nations sympathetic to moderate Arab causes. More indirect methods of communication may be necessary, e.g. contact with media in the U.S. and Europe with credibility in key Middle Eastern countries, although direct contact with political and economic leaders and editors and extensive use of the Arabic wireless file will also be employed.

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-3-

3. In Libya: the educated urban middle class, military officers, and other potential leaders and supporters of a post-Qadhafi government. Indirect methods of communication will have to be employed, along with reliance on VOA's Arabic service.

4. In the Soviet Union and certain East European countries: Governing elites, self-selected informed publics reachable largely through international radio broadcasts and word-of-mouth.

V. INITIATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

1. Demonstrating Determination; Fostering Cooperation Against Terrorism

- Actions designed to build on the May 5 statement by Allied leaders at the Tokyo Summit:

-emphasizing and replaying foreign and domestic media coverage of Summit actions against terrorism and Qadhafi;

-encouraging and amplifying subsequent statements from Summit leaders supporting active international cooperation;

-arranging and amplifying a major Presidential appearance during the post-Summit period aimed specifically at audiences from participating Summit nations.

ACTION: The White House, Department of State, USIA

- Press interviews from the Oval Office and other senior Administration officials with selected foreign correspondents and broadcasters. A carefully selected Presidential interview with a moderate, respected Arab journalist, could be quite useful. Al Akhbar, a balanced, pro-U.S. Egyptian newspaper, has a resident correspondent who might be suitable for such an interview.

ACTION: White House, NSC, USIA

--Qs and As (plus photo op) with selected foreign newsmagazine(s);

ACTION: The White House, NSC, USIA

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- Build on April meeting of Justice/Interior Ministers in Europe (The Trevi Group) by amplifying, wherever appropriate, continuing demonstrations including public statements, of international cooperation between justice, police, and other law enforcement officials.

ACTION: Departments of Justice, State, USIA

- USG Washington, US Missions contacts with concerned organizations -- e.g. international airlines associations, pilots association, travel industry, Chambers of Commerce, business groups -- in U.S. and in Europe, Middle East and other selected countries to generate continuing public condemnation of Qadhafi and international terrorism. To the extent possible, tangible actions should be explored which would communicate common (and determined) opposition to terrorists and supporting states.

ACTION: White House, Departments of State, Commerce and Transportation, Federal Aviation Agency

- Human rights and humanitarian groups' public statements against Libyan terrorist support and activities.

ACTION: White House, Department of State

- Public statements by Congressional and other prominent delegations travelling abroad on American determination to combat the terrorist threat and desire to work with allies and other friendly states. Congressional contacts with Parliamentary counterparts.

ACTION: Department of State, U.S. Missions

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2. Major USIA Activities

-Journalist Seminar Responding to Terrorism: to be organized at the earliest possible time, with selected resident foreign correspondents (with senior USG involvement).

-High level regional IV project: for senior journalists/editors/publishers and terrorism experts from Western Europe (possibly with selected individuals from Muslim countries).

-Selective use of WORLDNET and Foreign Press Center briefings.

-Video Product: to assist in carrying forward the discussion in Europe especially of the nature of State-supported terrorism and possible responses.

-One-on-one press briefings: including backgrounders, with high level Administration officials will be intensified, coordinated by White House press and Foreign Press Centers staffs.

-Public Opinion Surveys ("Flash" telephone studies and commissioned research; secondary analysis of commercial studies and EC surveys.)

-Frequent media reaction reporting and trends analysis.

4. Other USIA Activities

-Ongoing systematic teleconferencing, selected employment of U.S. officials and private experts as American Participants (AMPARTS) abroad, Wireless File features, TV and small format VCR programs, America Today and Satellite File transmissions, VOA features and editorials.

-Briefings with USG officials and US terrorism experts for selected foreign visitors in the U.S. under USIA auspices on other IV programs.

-Stepped-up overseas distribution of appropriate informational materials. Particular attention to be given to European and regional publications influential in Third World Arab and Muslim countries and use of crossplay in the Wireless File, VOA and other international services.

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ANNEX A

SUPPORT NEEDED FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN

Substantive informational support is needed for more effective public diplomacy to combat terrorism, most immediately the threat from Qadhafi:

1. The ready availability of substantive expertise: USG officials, supportive Congressional leaders, private experts for USIA activities listed in paper.

2. Assistance in Developing Informational Materials on the following subjects:

- events in Libya (what Qadhafi is doing to his own people, book burning, etc.);
- analysis of the geostrategic significance of Libya;
- description of terrorist training camps within Libya;
- unclassified/declassified data on terrorist groups and networks; banking transactions and other logistical networks, the role of Libya Peoples' Bureaus; Libyan support for international terrorist groups such as the IRA, Basques and Philippine insurgents, as well as Middle East based terrorists;
- the relationship between Qadhafi and notorious terrorists such as Abu Nidal;
- Qadhafi targeting of Libyan dissidents in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere;
- the full range of nonmilitary measures available to states cooperating against terrorism;
- update on human rights in Libya;
- history of Qadhafi, his rise to power, stormy relations with the Arab world, e.g. Qadhafi's role in the disappearance and apparent murder of the prominent Lebanese Shi'ia cleric, Musa Sadr, his mining of the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, his bombing campaigns in Cairo, etc.;

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- an updated chronology of Libyan-sponsored terrorism;
- compendium of bellicose and compromising Qadhafi statements;
- list of major terrorist incidents on European continent over past several months;
- economic impact from the decline in tourism to Europe and elsewhere;
- history of frustrated U.S. diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Libya over the past several years;
- the role of international law in reducing terrorism;
- in the event of further military action, military assessment report as soon as possible;
- public opinion polling results and other evidence of the depth of American public support and determination.

3. Sanitized/ Declassified Evidence: A systematic means of identifying publicly useful data and ensuring it reaches USIA and US commercial media.

4. A calendar of anticipated events, conferences, speeches, and other public diplomacy opportunities.

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ANNEX B

THEMES

1. Specifically defending the Libyan airstrikes and U.S. intention to keep open future options against Libya:

- The United States undertook military action against Libya knowing that further terrorist acts were planned against U.S. targets; it was an appropriate measure to use in this instance to stem the threat.
- The primary obligation of any government is to protect its own citizens. The U.S. obligation in this case is to shield Americans from indiscriminate attack by terrorists trained, supported and directed by the Libyan Government.
- Our military operation against Libyan military and terrorist infrastructure targets was an appropriate response.
- The Administration's demonstrated determination to take action to combat the threat of terrorism, including the strike on Libya, is widely supported by the American people and enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress.
- The U.S. is prepared to sustain all appropriate political, economic and military measures necessary to deter Libyan-supported terrorism.

2. More generally on U.S. concerns about the growing threat of international terrorism and Qadhafi's role as prominent instigator of terrorist activity:

- Terrorism increasingly threatens the basic norms of civilized social and political life.
- Past acquiescence has not led to a decline in terrorism; rather, incidents have increased.
- European history demonstrates that appeasement of radicals only encourages worse outrages; accommodation does not work.
- A more determined and active response is essential if terrorism is to be dealt with effectively, and innocent publics protected.
- Qadhafi is using his nation's wealth to commit aggression against his neighbors, including military occupation of Chad, instead of devoting Libya's resources for critically needed national development in his neighbors' desperately poor areas.
- Qadhafi provides support to a growing network of extremists and mercenaries who threaten the well-being of diverse civilized societies. Determined international resistance is their only barrier.

- A full range of options is available to governments to provide that resistance. The EC-12 decision to reduce the presence of Libyan diplomats is a good start. Other cooperative actions must be taken.

- Cooperating states can fashion a collective international approach to confronting terrorism to keep it from becoming the political determinant of our times.

- At the same time, the U.S. recognizes the need to deal with the social, economic and political conditions that are the fertile ground of terrorism.

- The US shall, for example, continue to work toward a negotiated resolution of the Palestinian problem. But terrorism has become a major impediment to a just and honorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to a lasting peace that could fulfill the aspirations of all the peoples of the region.

- Terrorism has taken on a life of its own. It is illusory to think that a resolution of the Palestinian or any other specific regional issue would quickly remove terrorism from the scene.

3. Special messages directed at Libyan publics:

- Qadhafi's policies and practices are diverting Libyan resources from national development and welfare. Unlike other oil rich countries, Libya has little to show for the vast amounts of money it has derived from its oil resources. Now that the price of oil has dropped on world markets, the effects of Qadhafi's wasteful policies are being felt even more domestically.

- Qadhafi's terrorist practices and his aggression against neighboring states, including Chad, are isolating Libya from other African and Arab countries as well as the U.S. and Western Europe.

- The Libyan people should question whether their interests and traditional Islamic values are best served through terrorist actions.

- The Libyan people should also ask whether their interests and traditional Islamic values are served through association with a Communist regime whose main objective is to manipulate Libya for its own political and security aims, but who offers little more than rhetorical support.

4. For Soviet audiences:

- Terrorism is a universal threat to world stability, exempting no nation. Soviets have also been victims and will continue to be in the future if cooperative and determined action is not taken against terrorist perpetrators, including Qadhafi.

- Libya under Qadhafi is an erratic, explosive, untrustworthy ally of increasing embarrassment to the world image of the USSR.

- Continued Soviet support for Qadhafi is having the effect of reinforcing his determination to support terrorist groups.

ANNEX C

TERRORISM: USIA PRODUCTIVITY

The general subject of terrorism, Libyan-sponsored terrorism in particular, has been a USIA priority for some time. During the period covered by the chart on the following page, January 1985 through April 15, 1986, USIA produced 2,378 separate items related to the issue of terrorism, 603 since the President's January initiative imposing sanctions on Libya. Of the total, 33 were offerings of films and VTR's and 2,303 were Wireless File items (transcripts, official texts, reprinted articles, original features, VOA editorials and WORLDNET and Foreign Press Center briefing transcripts).

There were nine WORLDNET productions during this period:

Sep. 15, 1985	Ambassador-at-Large Robert Oakley
Oct. 18, 1985	Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Jan. 19, 1986	Secretary of State George Shultz
Mar. 3, 1986	Gordon Brown, Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Dept. of State
Mar. 12, 1986	Marcelino Oreja, Secretary General of Council of Europe
Apr. 3, 1986	Under Secretary of State Michael Armacost
Apr. 15, 1986	US Spokesman Edward Djerejian
Apr. 16, 1986	Secretary of State George Shultz
Apr. 18, 1986	Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger

These nine briefings have produced 25 separate products, including wireless file items in the form of transcripts and VCRs for posts to order.


Following are the figures on a month-by-month basis:

January, 1985	34	January, 1986	338
February	32	February	52
March	28	March	138
April	52	April	75
May	96		
June	344		
July	239		
August	103		
September	111		
October	393		
November	198		
December	145		

TERRORISM

Comparison of Years
Wireless File/USInfo Support

Prepared by P/G: SBruckner



TERRORIST ATTACKS AND U.S.-LIBYAN RELATIONS

1986

- May 5 Meeting at the Tokyo Economic Summit, the leaders of seven major industrial nations and the representatives of the European Community issue a joint statement on international terrorism reaffirming condemnation of international terrorism in all its forms and pledging to make maximum efforts to fight the scourge of terrorism. The statement specifically names Libya as a state clearly involved in sponsoring or supporting international terrorism.
- April 23 West Europeans begin leaving Libya en masse. Attorney General Meese meets with members of the EC Trevi group to discuss intelligence exchange on terrorism, as well as extradition and U.S. jurisdiction in selected overseas terrorist attacks against Americans. British hostage, Alec Collett, is reportedly hung by an Abu Nidal group calling itself the Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems.
- April 22 Italy arrests one former Libyan diplomat for allegedly plotting to kill the U.S. Ambassador.
- April 21 EC foreign ministers meet in Luxembourg, agree to reduce Libyan diplomats in EC to "essential minimum," restrict their movements, and apply stricter visa requirements for all Libyans.
- April 18 Four Libyans arrested in Ankara, Turkey attempting to attack a U.S. Air Force officers club. Four Libyans expelled from France for suspected terrorist activity against U.S. targets.
- April 17 Two British hostages and one American hostage, Peter Kilburn, are murdered in Beirut, allegedly in response to the U.S. airstrikes on Libya from British bases.
- April 15 Presumed Libyan shelling of U.S. Coast Guard LORAN station on the Italian island of Lampedusa (near Sicily). Libya seeks OPEC oil embargo against the U.S.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

(Chronology, page two)

- April 14 European foreign ministers meeting in Netherlands brand Libya as supporter of terrorism and vow to restrict movements of Libyan diplomats. However, ministers reject imposing economic sanctions against Tripoli and urge U.S. military restraint. The U.S. responds to planned Libyan terrorist attacks against Americans abroad with airstrikes against terrorist-related targets in Libya.
- Central African Republic expelled two Libyan diplomats for suspected terrorist activities against American targets.
- April 13 Libyan officials order Westerners in that country to move into Army camps it expects the U.S. may try to bomb.
- April 12 Special U.S. envoy Vernon Walters begins series of closed-door talks with world leaders seeking allied support for U.S. action against Libya.
- April 10 Qadhafi says he was prepared to "escalate the violence against American targets" if United States uses West Berlin discotheque and TWA bombings as excuse to attack Libya. Bodies of four Americans killed in TWA bombing flown back to United States.
- April 9 Two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean ordered to remain in area. Qadhafi threatens to attack United States and U.S. targets worldwide if Reagan orders military strikes against his nation.
- West Germany expels two Libyan diplomats from Bonn for alleged terrorist plans.
- April 5 Bomb rips through West Berlin discotheque frequented by American troops, killing an American serviceman and a Turkish woman and injuring more than 230 people, about one fourth of them Americans.
- France expels two Libyan diplomats for involvement in a planned attack against U.S. interests in Paris.
- April 2 Bomb explodes on TWA Flight 840 traveling from Rome to Athens, blowing a hole in the side of the Boeing 727. Four passengers, all Americans, are killed.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

(Chronology, page three)

- April 2 France expels two Palestinians with Algerian and Tunisian passports for alleged involvement in a planned attack against the U.S. Consulate in Paris.
- March 28 Libya, claiming victory over U.S. in Gulf of Sidra confrontation, urges "all Arab peoples" to attack anything American, "be it an interest, goods, a ship, a plane or a person."
- March 27 While on maneuvers in international waters in the Gulf of Sidra, U.S. Navy planes are fired upon by Libyan ground-to-air missiles. U.S. forces targeted the missile sites and attacking Libyan "fast attack" guided missile boats and returned fire.
- March 25 Qadhafi vows his forces will not give up their "brave confrontation" against the U.S. military in the Mediterranean.
- March 24 In a clash lasting two days, Libyan ground batteries fire missiles at U.S. planes operating below Qadhafi's "line of death." U.S. missiles hit Libyan radar installation twice and damage Libyan vessels.
- February 4 Israel intercepts Libyan civilian jet flying from Tripoli to Damascus and forces it to land in Israel in a search for Palestinian terrorist leaders. Libya accuses U.S. Navy ships of aiding the Israeli action.
- February 1 Many Americans leave Libya by the President's February 1 deadline. Some risk legal action and stay.
- February CIA reports Libyan agents are watching 35 U.S. installations abroad, casing them as potential terrorist targets.
- January President Reagan announces economic sanctions against Libya and orders all Americans out by Feb. 1 under penalty of legal action. Western allies refuse to join boycott.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

(Chronology, page four)

- January Two Libyan MiG-25 jet fighters buzz U.S. Navy surveillance plane north of Libya. Qadhafi two days later declares Libya will train, arm and protect Arab guerrillas for "suicide and terrorist missions."
- 1985
- December 27 Rome and Vienna. Gunmen attack airports and 20 people are killed, including 4 terrorists and 5 Americans, and more than 110 others are wounded. Libya appears to have been deeply involved in helping Abu Nidal carry out these coordinated terrorist attacks.
- November 24 Frankfurt. Car bomb explodes at U.S. military shopping center, wounding 35, including 33 Americans.
- November 23 Athens. Egyptair jetliner is hijacked on flight from Athens to Cairo and forced to land in Malta. An American passenger, Scarlett Marie Rogenkamp, is killed. Egyptians then storm plane; 57 passengers and 2 hijackers are killed.
- October 7 Four hijackers seize the Achille Lauro cruise ship in the Mediterranean, killing Leon Klinghoffer. After surrendering to Egypt, the hijackers and two PLO guerrillas are flown out of Egypt on a commercial airliner, forced down in Sicily by U.S. warplanes. The hijackers are arrested, but Italian authorities release PLO officials. U.S. charges Libyan support for the operation.
- September 3 Athens. Grenades are thrown into Cafe de Paris, wounding 38 people, including 9 Americans.
- August 15 Nineteen ships damaged by mines in the Red Sea; mines were
July 9 - presumed laid by a Libyan roll-on/roll-off vessel.
- August 8 U.S. Rhein-Main Air Base, near Frankfurt. Car bomb explodes, killing 2 Americans and wounding 20 Americans and Germans.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

(Chronology, page five)

- August 7 American serviceman murdered near Wiesbaden, Germany, presumably to obtain his military ID card for terrorist use next morning to obtain access to the Rhein-Main Air Base with the car bomb.
- July President Reagan urges a Western campaign against terrorist attacks and cites the countries of Iran, Libya, North Korea, Cuba and Nicaragua, as "engaged in acts of war" against the United States.
- June 19 Frankfurt. Bomb explodes at Frankfurt's international airport, killing 3 and wounding 42.
- April Qadhafi instructs followers "to die just to spite America" and calls for violent action against the United States. National Security Adviser Robert McFarlane recommends "proportional military response against bona fide military targets in a state which directs terrorist actions against us."
- April 13 Paris. Bombs explode at branch of Israeli-owned Bank Leumi and National Immigration Office and at offices of rightist weekly newspaper Minute the next day.
- March Qadhafi calls on guerrilla groups to launch organized "suicide missions" to topple moderate Middle Eastern governments.
- 1984
- December State Department again warns Americans to leave Libya.
- 1982
- October Qadhafi says Libyan exiles who work against his regime are "escaped agents of America" and face assassination.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

(Chronology, page six)

1981

- December President Reagan asks Americans in Libya, some 1,500, mostly in the oil industry, to leave. Hundreds leave; many only temporarily.
- August After being fired upon, Two F-14 fighters from the aircraft carrier USS Nimitz down two Soviet-built Libyan Sukhoi-22 fighters over the Gulf of Sidra.
- May The Reagan Administration, referring to Libyan "assassination squads," orders closing of Libya's Washington Embassy and expulsion of Libyan diplomats. Administration says United States will "not conduct business with a regime that grossly distorts the rules of international behavior."

1980

- October A Colorado State University graduate student, an opponent of Qadhafi, is shot and seriously wounded at his home in Fort Collins, Colorado. Authorities charge a former Green Beret was hired to assassinate anti-Qadhafi dissidents living in the United States.
- May U.S. Embassy in Tripoli closed after attacks on the French Embassy. Libya detains two U.S. nationals and expels 25 others on espionage charges.

1979

- December U.S. Embassy in Tripoli burned. United States suspends diplomatic activities, but embassy staff remains. U.S. interests in Libya represented by Belgium.



A
JM

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

May 14, 1986

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Secretary

FROM: PA - Bernard Kalb *BK by H*

SUBJECT: Public Attitudes Toward Terrorism: An Overview

Recent polls reveal the American public's views on the causes of terrorism and preferred ways to counter it. (Results from comparable surveys in Western Europe are presented in the final section.)

Concern About Terrorism at High-Point

Last November, terrorism ranked well below nuclear war and the Middle East as a public concern. Now, the public ranks it as the top foreign policy problem, according to a CBS/New York Times poll taken April 6-10, shortly before the US raids against Libya (see Table 1, attached).

Large Majority Supports Raid Against Libya -- Nine polls taken after the mid-April raid all found a large majority of Americans approving the US action (about 70% in favor vs 20% opposed). The latest of these surveys -- by ABC/Washington Post, April 24-28 -- revealed no diminution of support two weeks after the raid: A 76-22 percent majority approved the US "having launched the military air strike against Libya April 14," including 56 percent who "strongly approved" the strike compared to only 7 percent who "strongly disapproved" of it.

A consensus supporting the US raid prevailed in all major population groups. Most supportive were males, Republicans and those with high school education (about 80% in favor vs 15% opposed). The groups having the smallest majority approving the US action were Blacks, Hispanics and those having graduate-school education (about 60% vs 35%).

Majority Expects No Reduction in Terrorism -- Four polls asked respondents about the likely near-term effect of the US raid. All found a larger proportion expected it to increase the incidence of terrorism, rather than reduce it. For example, the ABC/Post poll found 50 percent expected the US raid to "lead to more terrorism" versus 19 percent who expected "less terrorism,"

while 29 percent said it wouldn't make much difference. Among the 50 percent who expected more terrorism, a two-to-one majority still approved it (by 66 to 32 percent).

Confidence in President Helps Underpin Support for Raid --
After the US raid against Libya, confidence in President Reagan's handling of foreign affairs rose to a six-year high point. According to the latest ABC/Post poll, 69 percent approved versus 27 percent disapproved, distinctly more positive than the previous high of 63 percent versus 30 percent recorded in October 1981. Those who expressed confidence in the President overwhelmingly approved the US "military air strike" against Libya (91% approved vs 8% disapproved). Those who expressed lack of confidence in the President predominately disapproved the US strike (42% approved vs 55% disapproved).

Plurality Approves Discriminate Use of Force -- About half of the public approved, in general, taking "military action" (49%) to "reduce terrorism sponsored by another nation." According to a national poll taken in March by the Gary C. Lawrence Co. of California, most of those who favored "military action" wanted it directed at "terrorist facilities" in the offending country (39% of the total public), rather than at "any economic or military target in that country" (10%).

Last January, an ABC poll found a much larger majority favored economic sanctions than military action against Libya. An 87-8 percent majority approved the economic measures taken by the US, compared to a 53-37 percent majority who favored the idea of "military action against Libya if we find Libya has been aiding terrorist actions against Americans."

Terrorism Mostly Attributed to Mid-East Sponsors.

The top factor contributing to terrorism was considered to be sponsorship by "radical countries such as Libya, Syria and Iran," according to a Roper poll taken in January. Two-thirds of the public (68%) believed this was a "major reason" for the increase in terrorism, compared to one-third (34%) who attributed increased terrorism largely to Soviet sponsorship. Also, nearly twice as many believed increased terrorism stemmed largely from Western policies being "too soft" toward terrorists (58%) than believed increased terrorism was largely a reaction to US support for "rebels in Nicaragua, Afghanistan and other countries" (31%).

Lack of Support Affects View of Allies -- A 77-21 percent majority said the US was not "getting enough support from its European allies in the attempt to stop terrorism," according to the ABC/Post late April poll. France was singled out for blame. Other questions on the same poll show little change since 1981 in the majorities who perceive Britain (90%) and West Germany (62%) as "reliable allies" of the US. The proportion who view France as a "reliable ally," however, dropped from 59 percent (Oct. 1981) to 42 percent (April 1986).

Even among those (77%) who believed the US was not adequately supported in dealing with terrorism, a clear majority still perceived Britain (91%) and West Germany (59%) as "reliable allies" of the US. In contrast, a 60-38 percent majority of this group perceived France as not a reliable ally.

West European Attitudes Toward Terrorism

French Public Approved US Raid Against Libya; British and West Germans Disapproved -- Several polls of West European publics show that about a 60-30 percent majority of the French public favored the US mid-April raid -- not much less than the support among the American public (about 70-20 percent). However, a roughly 60-30 percent majority of the British public opposed the raid, and the West Germans opposed it by about 70-20 percent.

A Gallup/Newsweek poll taken shortly after the US raid against Libya asked respondents in Britain, France, and West Germany whether their government had been "too supportive of US policy against Libya, not supportive enough or about right in its support?" The British predominantly said their government had been "too supportive" of US policy (56% vs only 5% "not supportive enough"); the French predominantly said their government had been "not supportive enough" (43% vs only 5% "too supportive"). The West Germans were about evenly divided (16% "not supportive enough" vs 22% "too supportive"). In each country, about two-fifths said their government was "about right" in its response.

Europeans Prefer Non-Military Measures -- Diplomatic and economic pressures were generally preferred over military means against "countries that support terrorists" in each of four West European countries surveyed by USIA last year. Preference for non-military means predominated by about a 4 to 1 margin in Britain and West Germany, by nearly 2 to 1 in Italy, and by a narrow 6 to 5 margin in France. As in the US, less than 10 percent in each country favored "doing nothing" (Table 2).

Attachment: Tables.

^{ar}
Drafted: PA/OAP:ARichman
5/13/86 Ext. 72257 W0110H

Clearances:
PA:GBHigh ^H
PA/OAP:BRoshco ^{BR}

Public Attitudes Toward Terrorism

Table 1. Most Important Problem (CBS/NY Times, 4/6-10/86)

"What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?"

	<u>April 6-10</u> <u>1986</u>	<u>Nov. 18-19</u> <u>1985</u>
Terrorism	15%	-
War/nuclear war	10	20%
Defense, Russia, arms control	3	7
Middle East	1	-
Central America	1	-
Other foreign affairs	9	2 (incl. terrorism)
(Total: Foreign Policy)	(39%)	(29%)
Unemployment	11	12
Other economic issues	11	13
Budget deficit	6	9
Government/taxes	2	4
Domestic programs	7	-
Farmers	3	-
Crime, drugs	3	-
Other domestic issues	3	10
(Total: Domestic issues)	(46%)	(48%)
Misc.	6	13
No opinion	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%

Table 2. West European Publics' Preferences on Ways to Counter Terrorism (USIA, March-April 1985)

"What actions on this list (RESPONDENT SHOWN CARD) should the (survey country) government take against other countries that harbor or support terrorists?"

	<u>France</u>	<u>Italy</u>	<u>Britain</u>	<u>West Germany</u>	<u>4-Country Average</u>
"Try to <u>prevent</u> terrorists attacks by striking against suspected terrorists in other countries"	45%	35%	13%	11%	26%
"Retaliate by using <u>military force</u> against terrorists who have taken refuge in other countries"	9	12	13	8	10
(Total: Military Action)	(54)	(47)	(26)	(19)	(36)
"Use <u>economic sanctions</u> to get the terrorists punished or handed over to (survey country)"	23	18	36	36	28
"Use <u>diplomatic pressure</u> to get the terrorists punished or handed over to (survey country)"	41	62	62	56	55
(Total: Econ and Dipl. Pressure)	(64)	(80)	(98)	(92)	(83)
"Do nothing"	2	3	4	7	4
Don't know	19	5	9	4	9
	<u>139%*</u>	<u>135%</u>	<u>137%</u>	<u>122%</u>	<u>132%</u>

Underlines added

* Total exceeds 100% due to multiple responses.

~~SECRET~~

Mandel.
3669 40511

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

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16

MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN L. STONE
Chairman
International Information Committee


SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Working Group on Countering
Libyan Support for Terrorism (U)

The Sixty-Day Public Diplomacy Strategy on Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism and establishment of a special IIC Working Group under the chairmanship of Philip W. Arnold, is approved. The group should work closely with the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and other elements of the national security community involved in that effort. (S)

The Working Group should begin implementation of the strategy immediately, and provide an interim report on progress by June 15. A final report should be submitted by July 15. (S)

The Working Group should call on resources and assistance as necessary from other concerned members of the community in implementing this important effort. (S)

In particular, the cooperation of the intelligence community is essential to make available to the public relevant information on Libyan support for terrorism. The preparation and publication of such materials should be given high priority. One additional full-time consultant's position for the sixty-day period to assist in this effort is authorized. (S)


John M. Poindexter

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence

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Log Number 3669

Date May 19, 1986

US 4/20/07

Subject: PUBLIC DIPLOMACY WORKING GRP ON COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT / TERRORISM

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY Main Bldg/Room 3422				
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE The Pentagon	<u>1</u>	<u>19 MAY</u>	<u>1235 L</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>
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THE ATTORNEY GENERAL Dept. of Justice, Room 5119	<u>1</u>	<u>5-19-86</u>	<u>2:01</u>	<u>Michael A. [Signature]</u>
DIRECTOR, OSTP Room 360, OEOB				
DIRECTOR, USIA 400 C Street, S.W.	<u>ORIG</u>	<u>5/19/86</u>	<u>13:10</u>	<u>Shirley Taylor</u>
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17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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REF M4041 #40512

ACTION

May 13, 1986

BY bw NARA DATE 10/4/16

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JUDYT MANDEL/WALTER RAYMOND, JR.

SIGNED

SUBJECT: Libyan Public Diplomacy

Attached at Tab II for your approval is an advance copy of the Public Diplomacy Strategy on Libya, which was prepared in the wake of the air strike in April to increase public -- especially foreign public -- support for collective measures to stop Libyan sponsored terrorism.

We have been working closely with State and USIA to generate a high priority public diplomacy strategy. The 23 April meeting of the IIC, responding to a request from the NSC staff, established a working group to produce and implement a sixty-day strategy to build public understanding and support for our action. Phil Arnold, the USIA policy guidance chief, was asked to lead this effort, drawing on the resources of the community, as required. Eventually this "start-up" effort will be folded into the reinforced IG/T Public Diplomacy team led by Dave Miller.

In addition to the strategy paper, which has been vetted inter-agency, USIA has a draft action plan including preparation of speakers' packets, updating publications on Libyan terrorism, suggested initiatives with the private sector and Congress, and media events, which will require active contributions from other agencies. USIA will also need the services of a contractor to help with writing and editing.

Your endorsement of the strategy and the mandate of the IIC Working Group, under Phil Arnold's direction, will be crucial to the success of this effort.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to Marvin Stone endorsing the Public Diplomacy Strategy on Libya, and calling on other agencies to assign the necessary resources and manpower to implement it.

Approve J Disapprove _____

WMT
Howard Teicher, Craig Coy, and Karna Small concur. ^{cc} ^{les}

Attachment

- Tab I Memo to Stone
- Tab II Public Diplomacy Strategy on Libya, w/cover memo

~~SECRET~~
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~~SECRET~~

FROM: NSWR --CPUA
TO: NSCLM --CPUA

DATE AND TIME 05/15/86 12:21:53

NOTE FROM: WALTER RAYMOND
SUBJECT: #3669 - LIBYAN PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

I WOULD LIKE TO RECLAMA THE IDEA OF CHANGING THE AUTHOR; I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT FOR JMP TO SIGN THIS ONE BECAUSE IT IS SETTING PUBLIC DIPLOMACY POLICY IN A KEY AREA AND IS ESTABLISHING A NEW STRUCTURE. I WANT TO BE SURE THAT THE COMMUNITY GIVES THIS THE SERIOUS CONSIDERATION IT DESERVES. NOT THAT THEY WOULD RESPECT A EXSEC COMMUNICATION, BUT I THINK IT IS IMPORTANT TO HAVE THE PUB DIP COMMUNITY KNOW WHO THERE BOSS IS--IN THIS JMP (IN HIS CAPACITY AS CHAIRMAN OF THE SFG) IS COMMUNICATING TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMUNITY (IIC). THANKS.

OK



TAB 1

40513

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral John M. Poindexter
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

FROM: Marvin L. Stone
Chairman
International Information Committee

SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Working Group on Countering
Libyan Support for Terrorism

Attached, for your consideration, is the 60-day Action Plan on Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism requested by the NSC. An interagency working group of the IIC, under the chairmanship of Philip W. Arnold, is ready to take responsibility for the Plan's implementation along with the full cooperation of participating agencies. One additional full time position will be required to identify data (both classified and unclassified) needed and to ensure that it is made available in appropriate coherent form to designated users.

We are ready to proceed immediately upon your approval of the Plan. We will also be prepared to provide you will a final report at the end of the 60-day period, with an assessment of what further steps may be needed at that time.

I look forward to your comments.

~~SECRET~~

Classified by: Marvin L. Stone
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 40513
BY RW NARA DATE 10/14/16

~~SECRET~~

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN:
COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

SUMMARY

The next two months will be critical for the U.S. effort to reorient international approaches to state-supported terrorism. The international reaction to U.S. actions against Libya underscores the urgent need for a comprehensive, well-coordinated approach to defend past and potential U.S. measures and enlist more active international cooperation.

This plan focuses only on public activities directed at international audiences, either directly or through European regional or U.S. media coverage, and builds on the already intensive effort underway (see ANNEX C). Any further communication activities should be addressed by an interagency group coordinated by the NSC.

This strategy emphasizes:

- building unambiguous understanding internationally of the cooperative steps that are being taken and need to be taken by all nations to combat Libyan terrorism while emphasizing the inevitable deleterious consequences of failing to cooperate;
- seeking to minimize support for and isolate Qadhafi, furthering the erosion of his stature as a charismatic leader to be feared or respected;
- laying the groundwork for longer term, broader public diplomacy programs against international terrorism;
- identifying the struggle to be aimed at terrorists and terrorism, not against Arabs and Muslims.

USG activities in the coming weeks should seek to intensify international public opposition to Libyan-supported terrorism and to more active and effective international cooperation against international terrorism.

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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN:
COUNTERING LIBYAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

I. BACKGROUND

In the aftermath of the U.S. air attack on Libyan terrorist infrastructure/military targets, the USG faces a formidable, but not insurmountable, public diplomacy challenge of generating significantly more intense international public opposition to -- and ultimately actions against -- Libyan supported terrorism. Widespread, foreign public criticism was apparent in the immediate aftermath of the U.S. air attack on Libyan military sites. Nevertheless, a core of support for U.S. actions exists in Europe and, privately expressed, among leaders and elites in moderate Arab States.

II. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OBJECTIVES

- Achieve unambiguous understanding of U.S. objectives.
- Gain acceptance/support from publics and governments of Allied and friendly nations for a full range of economic, political and (if necessary) military actions against Libyan supported international terrorism.
- Convince European publics that terrorism is a legitimate security concern of the NATO Alliance and that European history illustrates the failure of appeasement; limit the divisive effect within the Alliance of Soviet propaganda.
- Help create a psychological climate through which moderate Arab regimes (particularly Tunisia, Morocco, Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia) and other Third World Muslim countries will find it easier to resist pressures to support Libya; emphasize that action is focused on Libya, not the Arab or Muslim worlds.
- Influence publics and governments in non-aligned Third World countries to take stronger stands against terrorism and resist pressures to support Libya in prominent forums such as the U.N. and the NAM Summit.

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III. KEY STEPS

- Prepare an effective public presentation of U.S. policies;
- Build on the emerging willingness of Europeans and other friendly governments to consider more active cooperation and measures to combat terrorism in the immediate future; help Europeans see the inevitable costs of their failure to confront the threat;
- Encourage discussion within the Arab world and among sympathetic Third World nations to emphasize Qadhafi's role in sabotaging legitimate Arab interests and his own country's security as well as peace in the Middle East, in order to reduce the degree of Arab support for Qadhafi's activities; encourage a greater realization within the Arab world of the costs of terrorism to them, not only in the substantial loss of tourist business but also increasingly in general commerce;
- Reemphasize to the people of Libya that our quarrel is not with them, but with their leader's reckless use of terrorism; however, support for their leader makes them vulnerable to attack; generate a greater awareness among the Libyan people that Qadhafi is squandering Libya's oil resources on military adventures and terrorism with a resulting decline in the Libyan standard of living.
- Rebut Soviet propaganda or disinformation directed at Europe and the Middle East on U.S. actions regarding Libya, particularly Soviet activities aimed at creating discord in the NATO Alliance.

IV. AUDIENCES AND APPROACHES

1. Influential individuals, groups and media in Western Europe and, to a lesser extent, other friendly, democratic industrial nations. A full range of public diplomacy tools are available for direct communication with audiences, or through mass media and personal contact.
2. Leadership within the moderate Arab and non-Arab Muslim world and, to a lesser extent, leadership of non-aligned Third World nations sympathetic to moderate Arab causes. More indirect methods of communication may be necessary, e.g. contact with media in the U.S. and Europe with credibility in key Middle Eastern countries, although direct contact with political and economic leaders and editors and extensive use of the Arabic wireless file will also be employed.

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3. In Libya: the educated urban middle class, military officers, and other potential leaders and supporters of a post-Qadhafi government. Indirect methods of communication will have to be employed, along with reliance on VOA's Arabic service.

4. In the Soviet Union and certain East European countries: Governing elites, self-selected informed publics reachable largely through international radio broadcasts and word of mouth.

V. INITIATIVES FOR IMPLEMENTATION:

1. Demonstrating Determination; Fostering Cooperation Against Terrorism

- Actions designed to build on the May 5 statement by Allied leaders at the Tokyo Summit:

-emphasizing and replaying foreign and domestic media coverage of Summit actions against terrorism and Qadhafi;

-encouraging and amplifying subsequent statements from Summit leaders supporting active international cooperation;

-arranging and amplifying a major Presidential appearance during the post-Summit period aimed specifically at audiences from participating Summit nations.

ACTION: The White House, Department of State, USIA

- Press interviews from the Oval Office and other senior Administration officials with selected foreign correspondents and broadcasters. A carefully selected Presidential interview with a moderate, respected Arab journalist, could be quite useful. Al Akhbar, a balanced, pro-U.S. Egyptian newspaper, has a resident correspondent who might be suitable for such an interview.

ACTION: White House, NSC, USIA

--Qs and As (plus photo op) with selected foreign newsmagazine(s);

ACTION: The White House, NSC, USIA

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- Build on April meeting of Justice/Interior Ministers in Europe (The Trevi Group) by amplifying, wherever appropriate, continuing demonstrations including public statements, of international cooperation between justice, police, and other law enforcement officials.

ACTION: Departments of Justice, State, USIA

- USG Washington, US Missions contacts with concerned organizations -- e.g. international airlines associations, pilots association, travel industry, Chambers of Commerce, business groups -- in U.S. and in Europe, Middle East and other selected countries to generate continuing public condemnation of Qadhafi and international terrorism. To the extent possible, tangible actions should be explored which would communicate common (and determined) opposition to terrorists and supporting states.

ACTION: White House, Departments of State, Commerce and Transportation, Federal Aviation Agency

- Human rights and humanitarian groups' public statements against Libyan terrorist support and activities.

ACTION: White House, Department of State

- Public statements by Congressional and other prominent delegations travelling abroad on American determination to combat the terrorist threat and desire to work with allies and other friendly states. Congressional contacts with Parliamentary counterparts.

ACTION: Department of State, U.S. Missions

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2. Major USIA Activities

-Journalist Seminar Responding to Terrorism: to be organized at the earliest possible time, with selected resident foreign correspondents (with senior USG involvement).

-High level regional IV project: for senior journalists/editors/publishers and terrorism experts from Western Europe (possibly with selected individuals from Muslim countries).

-Selective use of WORLDNET and Foreign Press Center briefings.

-Video Product: to assist in carrying forward the discussion in Europe especially of the nature of State-supported terrorism and possible responses.

-One-on-one press briefings: including backgrounders, with high level Administration officials will be intensified, coordinated by White House press and Foreign Press Centers staffs.

-Public Opinion Surveys ("Flash" telephone studies and commissioned research; secondary analysis of commercial studies and EC surveys.)

-Frequent media reaction reporting and trends analysis.

4. Other USIA Activities

-Ongoing systematic teleconferencing, selected employment of U.S. officials and private experts as American Participants (AMPARTS) abroad Wireless File features, TV and small format VCR programs, America Today and Satellite File transmissions, VOA features and editorials.

-Briefings with USG officials and US terrorism experts for selected foreign visitors in the U.S. under USIA auspices on other IV programs.

-Stepped-up overseas distribution of appropriate informational materials. Particular attention to be given to European and regional publications influential in Third World Arab and Muslim countries and use of crossplay in the Wireless File, VOA and other international services.

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ANNEX A

SUPPORT NEEDED FOR PUBLIC DIPLOMACY ACTION PLAN

Substantive informational support is needed for more effective public diplomacy to combat terrorism, most immediately the threat from Qadhafi:

1. The ready availability of substantive expertise: USG officials, supportive Congressional leaders, private experts for USIA activities listed in paper

2. Assistance in Developing Informational Materials on the following subjects:

- events in Libya (what Qadhafi is doing to his own people, book burning, etc.)
- analysis of the geostrategic significance of Libya;
- description of terrorist training camps within Libya;
- unclassified/declassified data on terrorist groups and networks; banking transactions and other logistical networks, the role of Libya Peoples' Bureaus; Libyan support for international terrorist groups such as the IRA, Basques and Philippine insurgents, as well as Middle East based terrorists;
- the relationship between Qadhafi and notorious terrorists such as Abu Nidal;
- Qadhafi targeting of Libyan dissidents in Europe, the U.S., and elsewhere;
- the full range of nonmilitary measures available to states cooperating against terrorism;
- update on human rights in Libya;
- history of Qadhafi, his rise to power, stormy relations with the Arab world, e.g. Qadhafi's role in the disappearance and apparent murder of the prominent Lebanese Shi'ia cleric, Musa Sadr, his mining of the Red Sea and Gulf of Suez, his bombing campaigns in Cairo, etc.;

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- an updated chronology of Libyan-sponsored terrorism;
- compendium of bellicose and compromising Qadhafi statements;
- list of major terrorist incidents on European continent over past several months;
- economic impact from the decline in tourism to Europe and elsewhere;
- history of frustrated U.S. diplomatic initiatives vis-a-vis Libya over the past several years;
- the role of international law in reducing terrorism;
- in the event of further military action, military assessment report as soon as possible;
- public opinion polling results and other evidence of the the depth of American public support and determination.

3. Sanitized/ Declassified Evidence: A systematic means of identifying publicly useful data and ensuring it reaches USIA and US commercial media.

4. A calendar of anticipated events, conferences, speeches, and other public diplomacy opportunities.

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ANNEX B

THEMES

1. Specifically defending the Libyan airstrikes and U.S. intention to keep open future options against Libya:

- The United States undertook military action against Libya knowing that further terrorist acts were planned against U.S. targets; it was an appropriate measure to use in this instance to stem the threat.
- The primary obligation of any government is to protect its own citizens. The U.S. obligation in this case is to shield Americans from indiscriminate attack by terrorists trained, supported and directed by the Libyan Government.
- Our military operation against Libyan military and terrorist infrastructure targets was an appropriate response.
- The Administration's demonstrated determination to take action to combat the threat of terrorism, including the strike on Libya, is widely supported by the American people and enjoys strong bipartisan support in Congress.
- The U.S. is prepared to sustain all appropriate political, economic and military measures necessary to deter Libyan supported terrorism.

2. More generally on U.S. concerns about the growing threat of international terrorism and Qadhafi's role as prominent instigator of terrorist activity:

- Terrorism increasingly threatens the basic norms of civilized social and political life.
- Past acquiescence has not led to a decline in terrorism; rather, incidents have increased.
- European history demonstrates that appeasement of radicals only encourages worse outrages; accomodation does not work.
- A more determined and active response is essential if terrorism is to be dealt with effectively, and innocent publics protected.
- Qadhafi is using his nation's wealth to commit aggression against his neighbors, including military occupation of Chad, instead of devoting those resources for critically needed national development in those desperately poor areas.
- Qadhafi provides support to a growing network of extremists and mercenaries who threaten the well-being of diverse civilized societies. Determined international resistance is their only barrier.

- A full range of options is available to governments to provide that resistance. The EC-12 decision to reduce the presence of Libyan diplomats is a good start. Other cooperative actions must be taken.

- Cooperating states can fashion a collective international approach to confronting terrorism to keep it from becoming the political determinant of our times.

- At the same time, the U.S. recognizes the need to deal with the social, economic and political conditions that are the fertile ground of terrorism.

- The US shall, for example, continue to work toward a negotiated resolution of the Palestinian problem. But terrorism has become a major impediment to a just and honorable resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and to a lasting peace that could fulfill the aspirations of all the peoples of the region.

- Terrorism has taken on a life of its own. It is illusory to think that a resolution of the Palestinian or any other specific regional issue would quickly remove terrorism from the scene.

3. Special messages directed at Libyan publics:

- Qadhafi's policies and practices are diverting Libyan resources from national development and welfare. Unlike other oil rich countries, Libya has little to show for the vast amounts of money it has derived from its oil resources. Now that the price of oil has dropped on world markets, the effects of Qadhafi's wasteful policies are being felt even more domestically.

- Qadhafi's terrorist practices and his aggression against neighboring states, including Chad, are isolating Libya from other African and Arab countries as well as the U.S. and Western Europe.

- The Libyan people should question whether their interests and traditional Islamic values are best served through terrorist actions.

- The Libyan people should also ask whether their interests and traditional Islamic values are served through association with a Communist regime whose main objective is to manipulate Libya for its own political and security aims, but who offered little more than rhetorical support.

4. For Soviet audiences:

- Terrorism is a universal threat to world stability, exempting no nation. Soviets have also been victims and will continue to be in the future if cooperative and determined action is not taken against terrorist perpetrators, including Qadhafi.

- Libya under Qadhafi is an erratic, explosive, untrustworthy ally of increasing embarrassment to the world image of the USSR.

- Continued Soviet support for Qadhafi is having the effect of reinforcing his determination to support terrorist groups.

ANNEX C

TERRORISM: USIA PRODUCTIVITY

The general subject of terrorism, Libyan-sponsored terrorism in particular, has been a USIA priority for some time. During the period covered by the chart on the following page, January 1985 through April 15, 1986, USIA produced 2,388 separate items related to the issue of terrorism, 603 since the President's January initiative imposing sanctions on Libya. Of the total, 33 were offerings of films and VTR's and 2,303 were Wireless File items (transcripts, official texts, reprinted articles, original features, VOA editorials and WORLDNET and Foreign Press Center briefing transcripts).

There were nine WORLDNET productions during this period:

Sep. 15, 1985	Ambassador-at-Large Robert Oakley
Oct. 18, 1985	Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger
Jan. 19, 1986	Secretary of State George Shultz
Mar. 3, 1986	Gordon Brown, Director of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Dept. of State
Mar. 12, 1986	Marcelino Oreja, Secretary General of Council of Europe
Apr. 3, 1986	Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost
Apr. 15, 1986	US Spokesman Edward Djerejian
Apr. 16, 1986	Secretary of State George Shultz
Apr. 18, 1986	Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger

These nine briefings have produced 25 separate products, including wireless file items in the form of transcripts and VCRs for posts to order.

Following are the figures on a month-by-month basis:

January, 1985	34	January, 1986	338
February	32	February	52
March	28	March	138
April	52	April	75
May	96		
June	344		
July	239		
August	103		
September	111		
October	393		
November	198		
December	145		

“TERRORISM

The Issue Since 1983
Wireless File/USInfo Support


Jan-Dec 1983

Jan-Dec 1984

Jan-Dec 1985

Jan-Apr 1986

Prepared by P/G: SBruckner



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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 19, 1986

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MEMORANDUM FOR MARVIN L. STONE
Chairman
International Information Committee


SUBJECT: Public Diplomacy Working Group on Countering
Libyan Support for Terrorism (U)

The Sixty-Day Public Diplomacy Strategy on Countering Libyan Support for Terrorism and establishment of a special IIC Working Group under the chairmanship of Philip W. Arnold, is approved. The group should work closely with the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and other elements of the national security community involved in that effort. (S)

The Working Group should begin implementation of the strategy immediately, and provide an interim report on progress by June 15. A final report should be submitted by July 15. (S)

The Working Group should call on resources and assistance as necessary from other concerned members of the community in implementing this important effort. (S)

In particular, the cooperation of the intelligence community is essential to make available to the public relevant information on Libyan support for terrorism. The preparation and publication of such materials should be given high priority. One additional full-time consultant's position for the sixty-day period to assist in this effort is authorized. (S)



John M. Poindexter

cc: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director of Central Intelligence

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BY  NARA DATE 10/4/10
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TRANSLATED EXCERPTS OF AN ARTICLE IN JEUNE AFRIQUE
DATED APRIL 30, 1986, PP. 50-51

"WHAT I BELIEVE: SHOULD WE SUPPORT KADDAFI?"

by Bechir Ben Yahmed

Whatever may be the wrongs or even the crimes which provoked (the U.S. strike), the decision and the act of bombing civilian populations in peacetime are -- and I weigh my words -- an abomination, an unforgivable crime, an offense against humanity. Its authors, because they are a superpower, place themselves above the law; actually, they have put themselves outside the law.

I maintain, for my part, that the man (Kaddafi) has embarked upon a dangerous personal adventure and is pursuing a policy which is bad for Libya, bad for the Maghreb, for Africa and the Arab world: a policy which, instead of uniting, is killing a lot of people, is enormously wasteful (about 200 billion dollars in 15 years), and is bringing the French army back into Chad and Central Africa, and the fleet, bombers and high-ranking officers of the United States -- and, before long, of the Soviet Union -- back into the waters, the skies and the capitals of the Mediterranean.

Such is my judgement, based on observation and analysis, not on prejudice or passion.

LIBYE
USA

FAUT-IL SOUTENIR KADDAFI ?

Efforçons-nous de comprendre avant de juger : qu'il soit national ou international, qu'il émane de la base ou qu'il soit manié au sommet par un pouvoir étatique, le terrorisme est l'arme des faibles et des opprimés. Pas, comme on peut en avoir l'impression, l'offensive triomphante d'êtres démoniaques indifférents à la mort des autres comme à la leur.

C'est un spasme de révolte d'hommes et de femmes qui, au fond, sont des désespérés. Ils entrent dans le terrorisme parce qu'ils ressentent plus fort que la moyenne des autres l'injustice faite à eux-mêmes ou à leur communauté, l'indifférence des autres à leur sort (ou, parfois, la haine). Ils constatent l'inanité des formes traditionnelles de lutte et souffrent de la « trahison » de ceux qui sont en charge de mener le combat légal. Un jour, « ils sautent le pas ». Le terroriste est donc un désespéré mais qui refuse de s'avouer vaincu ; un mal aimé qui se révolte, se met hors la loi, tue et se fait tuer pour tenter d'être reconnu.

Parmi les premiers, dans ce journal, nous avons affirmé que le terrorisme en dehors de territoires militairement occupés n'était *ni défendable, ni efficace*. Quant au terrorisme dit aveugle, celui qui frappe indistinctement — la bombe dans un avion ou un aéroport — ou s'en prend à des innocents — les otages —, il est à condamner sans nuance, quelle que soit la justesse de la cause qu'il croit servir.

Cela dit, le plus odieux des terrorismes, celui qui aurait dû révolter la planète entière, est le *bombardement aérien*. Je suis consterné, pour ma part, de voir et d'entendre tant d'intellectuels et tant d'instances morales

- débattre du degré de responsabilité de ceux qui jettent des bombes de 1 000 kg sur des concentrations humaines ;
- se poser la question : faut-il approuver ou condamner le président Reagan pour

avoir ordonné le bombardement des deux plus grandes villes libyennes ?

Quels que soient les torts ou même les crimes qui les ont provoqués, la décision et l'acte de bombarder des populations civiles en temps de paix sont — je pèse mes mots — une abomination, un crime impardonnable, une faute contre l'humanité. Ses auteurs, parce que surpuissants, se placent au-dessus des lois ; en vérité, ils se mettent hors la morale.


Perpétré de sang-froid, la nuit (pour surprendre, faire le maximum de mal et réduire ses propres pertes), contre des *objectifs civils*, en épargnant ostensiblement les grandes installations militaires (pour ménager l'armée libyenne dont on espère qu'elle prendra le pouvoir), le bombardement américain de villes libyennes, le 15 avril 1986, par une formidable armada de quelque cent avions est l'acte le plus cynique et le plus méprisant pour l'opinion internationale et les valeurs dont elle se réclame qui ait été commis en Occident depuis longtemps. C'est la force militaire sans la force morale.

S'il n'apparaît pas à tous comme tel, s'il recueille au contraire l'approbation de larges couches de la population américaine et européenne, c'est que le terrorisme aveugle des derniers mois a préparé l'opinion à une riposte tout aussi aveugle et démesurée. Ajoutez à cela la pratique fréquente, par Israël en particulier mais aussi par l'Afrique du Sud contre ses voisins et par l'URSS contre les résistants afghans de ce type de représailles, et vous comprendrez pourquoi ce terrorisme-là, le plus odieux, ne choque plus guère les consciences d'Occident.

Les Occidentaux condamnent le terrorisme aveugle dont ils ressentent la menace dans leur vie quotidienne mais s'interrogent (sic) sur le bombardement d'une grande ville bien qu'il tue obligatoirement des femmes et des enfants, qu'il ne touche en général que des innocents. Ceux-là mêmes qui n'accepteraient pas que des policiers tirent sur un gangster dans la foule approuvent qu'on bombarde une ville dans l'espoir d'atteindre Arafat ou Kaddafi...

Ce que la morale condamne et que l'opinion publique, pour le moment, tolère est-il néanmoins efficace ? Autrement dit, si M. Reagan et son gouvernement veulent tuer Kaddafi ou, comme ils le proclament, renverser son régime, quelles chances ont-ils d'atteindre leur objectif ?

Mon opinion sur ce plan est que le duel Reagan-Kaddafi n'est pas gagné d'avance par le premier, quelles que soient sa détermination et la disproportion du rapport de forces : Ronald Reagan a soixant-quatorze ans, ne l'oublions pas ; sa santé n'est pas assurée et il ne lui reste que vingt



PAR BECHIR BEN YAHMED

mois d'exercice du pouvoir. Quant à Kaddafi, certes son régime et sa vie sont aujourd'hui plus menacés que jamais, sa puissance financière n'est qu'un souvenir et, surtout, l'exode des étrangers (les Européens en particulier) va mettre le fonctionnement même de la Libye en question. Mais il a quarante-six ans ; il est, au sens littéral du terme, le maître de son pays depuis seize ans ; et il est désormais, grâce en bonne partie à Reagan, véritablement populaire dans toute l'Afrique et dans le monde arabe. La popularité de Kaddafi est un phénomène récent, peu ou mal connu, car ni la presse ni les gouvernements n'ont envie de le mettre en évidence.

Tandis qu'à une ou deux exceptions près les dirigeants africains et arabes le détestent, continuent à n'avoir pour lui en privé que sarcasmes et condescendance (ce qui ne les empêche pas de lui sourire en public, de le recevoir, de lui prodiguer des paroles de soutien), les foules se sont prises à admirer et aimer cet homme. Comme elles ont aimé, il y a vingt-cinq ans, Lumumba, Guevara, Nasser, Sékou Touré. Et pour la même raison : les humiliés se reconnaissent en celui qui ose lever la tête, sait dire non, ne s'incline pas devant la force et... survit à la foudre.

Kaddafi connaîtra-t-il le sort de Lumumba et de Guevara, fauchés avant le zénith de leur vie par ceux-là mêmes qui, aujourd'hui, veulent le tuer ? Ou bien sera-t-il épargné par le sort comme Nasser et Sékou Touré ? Je ne saurais vous le dire.

Je sais en revanche qu'avant de renverser Kaddafi, si elle y parvient, l'Amérique fera beaucoup de dégâts et de victimes parmi les gouvernants de la zone ou même d'Europe qui ont attelé leur char à son carrosse ; Sadate et Nimeiri ne sont que les premiers d'une longue liste.

Je sais aussi que pour combattre la politique de Reagan bruyamment approuvée par les dirigeants israéliens, il faut avoir l'opinion européenne et américaine avec soi. Sinon, c'est Reagan qui gagnera.

Je sais enfin que le terrorisme d'origine moyen-orientale a deux causes auxquelles il faut s'attaquer si l'on veut avoir une chance de revenir à une certaine normalité :

- l'injustice faite aux Palestiniens en particulier, l'abus par Israël de sa force militaire et des avantages qu'il tire de son mariage avec les USA ;
- la faillite des directions politiques actuellement au pouvoir dans les pays arabes de la région ; c'est parce que les gouvernements ne font rien (quand ils ne sont pas complices des ennemis de leurs peuples) que des hommes et des groupes ont eu recours à cette « guerre sauvage » qu'est le terrorisme.

Plus loin, dans ce numéro, nous ouvrons un débat auquel nous invitons nos lecteurs à participer : faut-il

soutenir Kaddafi dès lors qu'il est agressé ?

S'agissant du leader libyen, cas particulier de la politique, la question n'est pas incongrue et, au risque d'aller à contre-courant, je n'hésiterai pas à lui donner une réponse négative. Aujourd'hui comme hier, et pour les raisons que voici.

D'une manière générale, je ne me situe pas parmi ceux qui pensent et disent qu'« il faut soutenir son frère, qu'il soit coupable ou victime », ou « mon pays d'abord et par-dessus tout, qu'il ait tort ou raison ». Je me place parmi ceux qui préfèrent donner leur appui aux hommes et aux causes justes.

Dès lors que la Libye est agressée, je m'élève contre l'agression et condamne l'agresseur. Dois-je pour autant soutenir l'agressé, alors que je sais ses torts ; approuver tout ce qu'il dit, m'aligner sur sa politique, alors que je l'estime mauvaise ?

Le Kaddafi d'après le 15 avril — jour de l'agression — est à mes yeux le même que celui d'avant... sur lequel nous nous sommes prononcés ici même plus d'une fois. Nous avons présenté les diverses facettes de sa politique au fur et à mesure que l'actualité (et ses propres initiatives) les mettait en lumière. Et nous avons chaque fois donné notre opinion.

Nous n'avons changé d'avis ni sur Kaddafi ni sur sa politique : l'homme est peu banal, ce qu'il dit est parfois d'une grande pertinence ; ce qu'il fait n'est pas toujours si ridicule ou dépourvu de sens qu'on le proclame. « S'il est fou, comme le soutiennent certains, alors c'est un fou qui raisonne juste. Et qui, jusqu'ici, ne s'en tire pas trop mal », m'a dit de lui un homme d'Etat maghrébin qui le connaît et l'observe sans passion.

-Je maintiens, pour ma part, que l'homme s'est embarqué dans une aventure personnelle dangereuse et mène une politique mauvaise pour la Libye, pour le Maghreb, pour l'Afrique et pour le monde arabe : une politique qui divise au lieu d'unir, qui tue (beaucoup), qui gaspille énormément (environ 200 milliards de dollars en quinze ans), ramène l'armée française au Tchad et en Centrafrique, la flotte, les bombardiers et les officiers généraux américains — et, demain, soviétiques — dans les eaux, les cieux et les capitales de la Méditerranée.

Tel est mon jugement, fondé sur l'observation et sur l'analyse, pas sur le préjugé ou la passion.

Je sais qu'il n'est pas partagé, aujourd'hui, par la majorité de mes lecteurs. Mais mon rôle, tel que je le conçois, n'est pas de véhiculer le point de vue du moment, les idées à la mode. Ni d'être le feffet de la majorité. ●