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TERRORISM Q&A BROCHUREIntroduction

It is highly unlikely that an act of terrorism will ever directly touch the lives of the vast majority of American citizens. And yet, we now rank terrorism as a serious national problem alongside the budget deficit and strategic arms control.

This concern is not surprising. The past two decades have witnessed a dramatic increase in number as well as indiscriminate terrorist attacks. International terrorists murdered 20 people in 1968 -- when statistics were first compiled -- compared to 926 in 1985. American casualties at home and abroad last year included 170 wounded and 25 killed.

Terrorists of the '80s have added new weapons to their arsenals -- cameras and microphones. Their acts of death and destruction are brought to us live and in color. Terrorism is indeed a unique form of violence. It frustrates Americans by causing a sense of helplessness and victimization.

Terrorists are ideologues who willingly risk their own lives and those of innocent victims in order to draw attention to their cause. Their methods are many, including hostage-taking, aircraft piracy, assassination, threats, hoaxes, indiscriminate bombings or shootings -- all forms of aggression that violate civilized standards of behavior.

Americans are ambivalent about the use of military force to resolve terrorist attacks, but they clearly expect their government to have a consistent policy on terrorism and to protect them wherever they are. Such a national policy is in place. It mandates no concessions to terrorists. This policy of not giving in to terrorists' demands is a primary deterrent to future attacks and affords the greatest protection to all American citizens. However, in the event an American citizen is taken hostage, our policy calls for the use of every available resource to assure a safe return.

This brochure is designed to address the most frequently asked questions about our national policy and programs, the ramifications of using force during a terrorist attack and the safety implications here at home and abroad. As long as terrorism threatens our system, beliefs and policies, public understanding of this worldwide challenge and the United States response is vital.

Q&A

What is terrorism?

A precise definition of this phenomenon is difficult. However, terrorism generally is recognized as the unlawful use or threat of violence to compel a government, individuals or groups to change political or social policies.

When did terrorism originate?

Terrorism is as old as recorded history, but terrorist acts and threats have escalated greatly during the past two decades. Twenty fatalities resulted from terrorist attacks in 1968 -- when statistics were first compiled -- compared to 926 in 1985. During the 1980s, incidents increased from just over 500 in 1980 to 812 in 1985.

Where do most terrorist attacks occur?

Half of the worldwide incidents in the 1980s were aimed at only 10 countries; one-third of the total were directed at the United States. The most deadly terrorists operate in the Middle East, with almost 50 percent of the total 1985 worldwide incidents occurring there. Around one-quarter of

the 1985 total took place in Western Europe. Latin America, particularly El Salvador, Colombia, Guatemala, Chile and Peru, was the scene of about 16 percent of 1985 incidents, although more international terrorist incidents were directed against U.S. citizens in this region than any other.

Why do terrorists attack innocent victims?

Terrorists do not care whether their victims actually can effect change or persuade others to meet their demands. The terrorist's objective is to use these victims as pawns in trying to intimidate governments and groups into responding. Terrorists, therefore, seem to select the most dramatic strike situations, be it a luxury ocean liner or airports jammed with holiday travelers.

Why has terrorism become such a problem recently?

It is generally agreed that many potential terrorist groups have been spurred to action after witnessing the worldwide attention given to highly dramatic and widely publicized terrorist attacks. Other factors include additional financial support or protection that various countries now offer terrorists. The extreme economic and political pressures in some areas have also nurtured the "all or nothing" approach of terrorists.

What is the United States policy on terrorism?

Our national policy is tough and resolute: no concessions to terrorists. This policy is based upon the conviction that to give in to terrorists' demands places even more Americans at risk. The government will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change its policies or agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. The United States will act, with other nations or alone, to prevent or respond to terrorist acts and will use every possible resource to ensure the safe return of American citizens held hostage. Countries that practice terrorism or actively support it will not do so without consequence.

How large is our national program and how much do we spend annually to combat terrorism?

Our national program is comprised of over 150 specific anti-terrorist activities that are a part of a variety of diplomatic, military, legal and law enforcement programs. About \$2 billion was spent in 1985 to combat terrorism both at home and abroad. While few government employees are assigned to antiterrorism responsibilities full-time, the total number of people -- calculated in man-years and assigned to various programs in 1985 -- would have translated to about 18,000.

How many Americans have been wounded or killed by terrorists?

In 1985, 25 Americans were killed, two at home and 23 abroad. There were also 170 Americans wounded in incidents ranging from the capture of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro by Palestinian terrorists to the vicious airport attacks in Rome and Vienna at the end of the year.

What options does the government have in responding to a terrorist attack?

Developing "textbook" solutions is extremely difficult because every terrorist situation is different in terms of location, intelligence and other circumstances. However, while not appropriate for every situation, potential responses are:

- o Preemption -- This approach, designed to keep an attack from occurring, relies on timely, accurate intelligence.

- o Delay -- Such tactics are used to stall for time to position troops, keep terrorists off balance or secure international cooperation.

- o Negotiating -- The United States will make no concessions to terrorists, but it will talk to anyone and use every

possible resource to ensure the safety of American hostages.

- o Counterattacking or force -- The use of military or law enforcement force is the most dangerous option. This option must be carefully planned based on excellent intelligence to minimize risks.

Why doesn't the United States government use strong retaliatory measures when Americans are injured or killed by terrorists?

Any response to a terrorist act must be carefully weighed. The wrong decision can result in the death of innocent people, destruction of property, alienation of allies and possible terrorist reprisals. Recently, a federal task force on combatting terrorism, headed by Vice President Bush, made a number of recommendations to strengthen our ability to respond. The recommendations include the endorsement of legislation making it a U.S. federal crime to kill an American abroad, the death penalty for those convicted of killing hostages and strong extradition treaties so that when terrorists are caught they can be brought to justice.

Is it true that some governments actually support terrorism?

Yes, some governments, like Libya, provide terrorist operations with arms, travel documents, safehaven and even training. In some instances these countries actually use terrorism as a means of conducting foreign affairs -- one that entails few risks and constitutes low-budget "foreign policy."

Has our government successfully stopped any terrorist attacks?

Yes. While terrorist attacks have increased internationally, they have declined domestically from 51 acts in 1982 to only 7 in 1985. The Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies prevented 23 terrorist incidents in 1985 and deserve much of the credit for the decline. In 1985 the FBI successfully foiled a plot to assassinate Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi of India while here on a U.S. State visit; uncovered a pro-Qaddafi conspiracy to carry out assassinations and bombings here; prevented a Sikh assassination plot in New Orleans; and preempted planned bombings in India by the same group.

What are the chances that I may one day be a victim of a domestic terrorist attack?

The risk of a terrorist attack in the United States is minimal compared to the 40,000 highway deaths or 18,000 murders that occur here annually. Also, with the previous successes of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, the numbers of incidents have continued to decrease here at home. However, more is at risk than the loss of life and we must take all threats seriously. Terrorism attempts to undermine the government's ability to protect its citizens, affects the confidence of American people and can make us appear vulnerable before our allies. Such violence cannot be allowed to threaten our beliefs and values.

Is it safe to vacation abroad?

In most cases there is no risk to American tourists. However, because the incidence of terrorism is higher in certain parts of the world than others, it is advisable that when traveling to such areas you should contact prior to departure the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs (Tel. #202/647-5225) for the latest travel advisory on your country of destination.

What can't we control terrorism?

Terrorism poses a complex, dangerous threat that is not easy to control. Terrorists have a distinct advantage in their ability to strike anywhere, anytime. Traditional intelligence, law enforcement and physical security procedures do not always work with these small groups of terrorists who are willing, in many instances, to die for their cause. Terrorism is not declared war. It, therefore, creates an ambiguous situation, especially when it is an international incident.

However, some measures work. Tighter U.S. airport security has resulted in detection of over 30,000 firearms and 13,000 arrests since 1972. Plans are being implemented that provide for even tighter airport and maritime security, more systematic intelligence gathering procedures, and additional monetary rewards for information leading to terrorists.

If terrorists strike here or abroad, who decides what to do?

The United States Government has adopted a Lead Agency plan to determine which government agency has primary responsibility during an attack. The Department of State is responsible for incidents that take place outside the United

States, the Department of Justice (FBI) assumes responsibility for incidents within U.S. territory, and the Federal Aviation Administration handles incidents aboard aircraft within United States jurisdiction. During an actual terrorist incident the Lead Agency appoints a Working Group of several government agencies to provide quick access to resources and intelligence. Regardless of the incident, the Lead Agency in charge works very closely with the White House National Security Council to assure that the President and others are fully informed in order to make any necessary decisions.

Does the media help terrorists by giving them so much attention? Should they be prevented from broadcasting extensively about terrorists acts?

Terrorism is a form of propaganda, demanding publicity to be effective. Terrorists see the media's role as essential to achieving their goals. If the violence is spectacular, wide coverage is usually assured.

The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech and press to all Americans. However, media organizations must exercise care to meet high professional and ethical guidelines during the drama of a terrorist incident. The government is placing great emphasis on better communications with media to hamper

the ability of terrorists to exploit news coverage for their own purposes.

If an American traveler is held hostage, is there anything he or she should do or know to increase the chances of emerging unharmed?

A hostage should listen carefully and follow the instructions of the terrorists. Do not argue or ask questions, and be as inconspicuous as possible. Any sudden or misinterpreted movement could be very dangerous. Remain as calm as you can throughout the incident and conserve your strength.

Most people go through a range of psychological reactions immediately after being taken hostage, but the most common responses are fear, denial and withdrawal. While our specific reactions may vary, the reassuring thing is that we are able to cope mentally with a great deal of stress and we show great resiliency in recovering from extremely trying events. Use your time to note every detail of terrorists activities and methods. Keep a positive attitude.

Should former military or government employees leave their official identification at home when traveling abroad?

If it does not interfere with job performance or international travel requirements, carrying such identification in checked luggage probably is preferable to carrying it on your person.

Does travel insurance cover hostage incidents?

According to the insurance carrier endorsed by the American Society of Travel Agents, those items a policy covers for regular international travel -- medical, baggage damage, etc., -- will also be covered for a hostage situation. Travel cancellation insurance, however, does not cover cancellations based on reports of terrorism in a specific area.

How safe are government employees who work abroad?

The chances of an American citizen abroad actually being involved in a terrorist activity are unlikely. However, the size of American staff in dangerous areas is continually assessed and adjusted. Maintaining tighter physical security of U.S. facilities abroad is expected to be an ongoing

process, with substantial increases in funding and manpower for physical security through 1990.

Is there anything businesses can do to protect their executives traveling or living abroad?

Yes, there are several measures that can reduce vulnerability. Executives in volatile areas should vary their routes to work and family members should be counselled to use care in dealing with strangers. This subject is covered in a Department of State brochure, Countering Terrorism, Security Suggestions for U.S. Business Representatives Abroad. Copies can be obtained by contacting the Bureau of Diplomatic Security at (703)235-9461.

If an American becomes involved in a terrorist incident, who does the family call for help?

When incidents occur overseas, the country where the incident takes place has primary responsibility for managing the situation. Cooperation with host countries is therefore essential, and the United States has actively sought antiterrorism bilateral and multilateral treaties with like-minded nations.

To assure that families of hostages are kept abreast of all developments, a family liaison program is conducted by the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs. The program includes a special telephone line for family members, information on private counseling services, and a personal government contact for each family.

Conclusion

Although terrorism in the 1980s has increased dramatically, the United States and other countries are working together and independently to address the root causes of terrorism. Resolution of economic and political conflicts in volatile parts of the globe is crucial for long-term solutions to the problem. Additionally, our national program is well-conceived and working and is continually being reviewed and improved. There is no guarantee that you will never fall victim to a terrorist attack. Yet, you can be assured that the United States will use every available resource to assure your safe return in the event you are taken hostage.

Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

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April 11, 1986

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BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS SEE LIBYA AS PUBLIC ENEMY NUMBER ONE;
BUT ONLY FRENCH SUPPORT MILITARY RESPONSE TO TERRORISM

Final results from USIA-commissioned general public telephone surveys in Britain, France and West Germany conducted April 4-9 (both before and after the West Berlin bombing) indicate that:

- o Libya is the country most frequently named as supporting terrorism in Western Europe.
- o However, even if there was reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a terrorist attack, an overwhelming majority of Germans (78%) and about half of the British still would disapprove of U.S. military action against Libya. But the U.S. would enjoy plurality support in France for such action. (See Table 1)
- o At the same time, a majority in all three countries feel the U.S. was justified in imposing economic sanctions against Libya. But only in France did a majority think that European governments should have followed suit.
- o More generally, when Libya is not specifically mentioned, few in all three countries champion the use of preventive or retaliatory military force against any countries that may harbor or support terrorists. In fact even if economic and diplomatic efforts failed, half or more in Britain and Germany would not approve of military action against terrorist targets in unnamed countries. However, in France half would approve of military action if economic and diplomatic efforts failed. (See Table 2)
- o Large majorities believe that terrorist acts are primarily committed by organized international groups.
- o Majorities everywhere are pessimistic that terrorism can be fought successfully.

Prepared by: Steven K. Smith, Analyst

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director
Office of Research, 485-2965

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TABLE 1. ATTITUDES ON MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LIBYA

If there is reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a new terrorist attack, would you approve or disapprove of a U.S. military action against Libya?

	<u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>GERMANY</u>
Approve	37%	45%	17%
Disapprove	47	36	78
Don't know	<u>16</u>	<u>19</u>	<u>5</u>
	100%	100%	100%

TABLE 2. SUPPORT FOR MILITARY ACTION IF ECONOMIC AND DIPLOMATIC MEASURES FAIL

Suppose that diplomatic and economic measures against a foreign country that supports terrorism do not have the desired effect. In that case would you approve or disapprove of the United States or other major powers then taking military action against clearly identified terrorist targets in that country?

	<u>BRITAIN</u>	<u>FRANCE</u>	<u>GERMANY</u>
Approve of military action	36%	51%	20%
Disapprove of action	50	33	74
Don't know	<u>14</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%

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2. LIBYA: PRESIDENTIAL AUTHORITY
Q: DOES THE PRESIDENT HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO ACT WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL PRIOR LEGISLATIVE APPROVAL?
A: -- CLEARLY, YES. THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF IS AUTHORIZED BY THE CONSTITUTION TO DEFEND THE NATION AGAINST ATTACK, AND THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZES THIS AUTHORITY.

3. LIBYA: U.N. NOTIFICATION
Q: ARTICLE 51 OF THE U.N. CHARTER STATES THAT MEASURES TAKEN IN THE EXERCISE OF SELF DEFENSE "SHALL BE IMMEDIATELY REPORTED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL." DO WE INTEND TO MAKE SUCH A REPORT?
A: -- A REPORT WAS DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL LAST NIGHT.

4. LIBYA: LEGALITY OF US ACTION
Q: WAS THIS US MILITARY ACTION PERMISSIBLE UNOER INTERNATIONAL LAW?
A: -- AS THE PRESIDENT STATED, THIS US PREEMPTIVE MISSION AGAINST TERRORIST-RELATED TARGETS WAS AN ACT OF SELF-DEFENSE, FULLY CONSISTENT WITH ARTICLE 51 OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER. THE US ACTION HAD TWO PURPOSES: IT WAS DESIGNED TO DISRUPT LIBYA'S ABILITY TO CARRY OUT TERRORIST ACTS AND TO DETER FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS. IT WAS ALSO A NECESSARY AND A PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO AN ONGOING PATTERN OF ATTACKS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LIBYA.

5. LIBYA: CASUALTY REPORTS
Q: REPORTS ARE COMING IN OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENT?
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EO 12356 N/A
SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE 86-18 - APRIL 15 STATE DEPARTMENT PRESS GUIDANCE ON LIBYA AND TERRORISM

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OTHER MILITARY ADEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

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A: -- AS SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID MONDAY NIGHT, THE DESIRE
TO MINIMIZE COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN OR OTHER FACILITIES

NEAR THE TERRORIST-RELATED TARGETS WAS ONE OF THE KEY
CRITERIA IN SELECTING THE TARGETS.

-- WHILE WE HAVE ALSO HEARD PRESS REPORTS FROM LIBYA
ABOUT DAMAGE TO CIVILIAN INSTALLATIONS, WE DON'T HAVE ANY
PRECISE INFORMATION YET ABOUT THE EFFECT OF OUR STRIKES. IT
IS ALWAYS POSSIBLE WHEN HITTING LEGITIMATE TARGETS THAT
NEARBY BUILDINGS WILL SUSTAIN PERIPHERAL DAMAGE.

-- UNTIL I HAVE A COMPLETE ASSESSMENT BY OUR MILITARY AND
INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES, I DO NOT WISH TO COMMENT FURTHER.

6. LIBYA: LONG-TERM EFFECT OF ACTION

Q: CAN WE BE CONFIDENT THAT OUR MILITARY ACTION WILL BE
EFFECTIVE IN DETERRING TERRORISM?

A: -- DETERRING INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IS A LONG-TERM TASK.
THERE IS NO QUICK-FIX SOLUTION. WE ARE NEVERTHELESS
DETERMINED TO GO THE DISTANCE UNTIL IT IS FINALLY ELIMINATED.

-- MILITARY ACTION IS BUT ONE IN A RANGE OF OPTIONS.
OTHERS INCLUDE D INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES, SUCH AS SECURITY
CONTROLS AT BORDERS AND AIRPORTS, IMPROVED
INTELLIGENCE-GATHERING AND SHARING, AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS.
WE HAVE USED ALL THESE OTHER MEANS.

-- IN THIS CASE, AS THE PRESIDENT SAID, "WE TRIED QUIET
DIPLOMACY, PUBLIC CONDEMNATION, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AND
DEMONSTRATIONS OF MILITARY FORCE. NONE SUCCEEDED" IN GETTING
QADHAFI TO CHANGE HIS UNACCEPTABLE POLICIES AND ACTIONS.

-- WHAT WE HAVE DONE IS TO MAKE UNMISTAKABLE CLEAR THAT
SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IS NOT COST-FREE. THE U.S. WILL NOT
TOLERATE TERRORISM AND WILL REACT FORCEFULLY TO COMBAT IT.
WE WILL DO SO AGAIN IF NECESSARY.

7. LIBYA: IS TERRORISM DECLINING?

Q: IN A "WASHINGTON POST" ARTICLE BASED ON STATISTICS
PROVIDED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT, DAVID IGNATIUS WROTE THAT
THERE HAS ACTUALLY BEEN A DECLINE IN THE INCIDENCE OF

TERRORISM OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS; ADDITIONALLY, HE WROTE
THAT AMERICAN CASUALTIES HAVE GONE DOWN SINCE THE MID 1970S.
IF THIS IS THE TREND, WHY HAVE HE TAKEN SUCH FORCEFUL ACTION
AT THIS TIME?

A: -- IT IS MISLEADING TO MEASURE PRESENT TRENDS BY PAST
STATISTICS. THERE ARE AT THIS MOMENT AS MANY AS 30 ACTIVE,
LIBYAN-SPONSORED THREATS AGAINST U.S. EMBASSIES WORLDWIDE.
THIS REPRESENTS A SERIOUS ESCALATION IN TERRORISM, ONE WHICH
WE CANNOT IGNORE.

-- IN ADDITION, WE MUST TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FACT THAT
THE NATURE OF TERRORISM HAS CHANGED OVER TIME AND CONTINUES
TO EVOLVE. THE INVOLVEMENT OF GOVERNMENTS SUCH AS QADHAFI'S
IS A RELATIVELY RECENT PHENOMENON. SUICIDE ATTACKS BY
TERRORISTS AND DEADLY CAR BOMBS ADD DIMENSIONS WHICH WERE NOT
THERE EARLIER.

-- NEW ALSO IS THE TERRORISTS TOTALLY INDISCRIMINATE
TARGETING: TODAY'S TERRORISTS SEEM BENT ON INFLECTING
MAXIMUM CASUALTIES AMONG INNOCENT CIVILIANS. TO MEET THESE
CHANGES BY AGGRESSIVE TERRORISTS, WE ALSO HAVE HAD TO FASHION
NEW RESPONSES.

8. LIBYA: ROOT CAUSE OF TERRORISM

Q: THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM INCLUDE POLITICAL GRIEVANCES
BY THE PALESTINIANS AND OTHERS. AS LONG AS THESE ISSUES ARE
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ISSUE. THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY OR JAPANESE RED ARMY ATROCITIES, FOR EXAMPLE, WHICH THE QADHAFI REGIME HAS SUPPORTED, AND PALESTINIAN GRIEVANCES. QADHAFI'S REVOLUTIONARY GOALS ARE MORE GLOBAL AND MORE RADICAL.

IN ANY CASE, NO POLITICAL GRIEVANCE JUSTIFIES TERRORISM. THOSE WHO SEEK TO REDRESS POLITICAL ISSUES IN THIS WAY ALIENATE WORLD OPINION, RATHER THAN WIN SUPPORT FOR THEIR CAUSE.

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- AMCONSUL VANCOUVER
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- USCINCSO QUARRY HIGHTS PANAMA

9. LIBYA: WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

Q: SOME CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS (BYRD, PELL) HAVE STATED THAT THE ADMINISTRATOR DID NOT "CONSULT" WITH CONGRESS AS PROVIDED IN THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION, BUT SIMPLY "INFORMED" CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS OF A DECISION ALREADY MADE AND ACTIONS ALREADY UNDERWAY. WAS THIS A VIOLATION OF THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION? DID GENUINE CONSULTATIONS OCCUR?

A: -- THE TIMING OF CONSULTATIONS WITH CONGRESS PRIOR TO A MILITARY OPERATION INVOLVES CONSIDERATIONS OF OPERATIONAL MILITARY SECRECY. THE NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS TO BE CONSULTED, AND HOW FAR IN ADVANCE, WILL THUS VARY DEPENDING ON THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EACH CASE.

-- EXTENSIVE CONSULTATION OCCURRED IN THIS CASE WITH THE CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP. THESE CONSULTATIONS WERE MORE EXTENSIVE THAN IN PRIOR SIMILAR INSTANCES. THE LEADERSHIP WAS ADVISED OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION AFTER THE OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENTS HAD COMMENCED, BUT SEVERAL HOURS BEFORE MILITARY ACTION OCCURRED. THIS PROVIDED AMPLE OPPORTUNITY FOR CONGRESSIONAL LEADERS TO CONVEY THEIR VIEWS TO THE PRESIDENT BEFORE ANY IRREVOCABLE ACTIONS WERE TAKEN.

10. LIBYA: COOPERATION WITH ALLIES

Q: THE PRESIDENT TALKED ABOUT OUR ALLIES COOPERATING IN THIS MISSION--

WHICH ALLIES? COOPERATE IN WHAT WAY?

WHY DID THE F-111S DETOUR THROUGH THE STRAITS OF GIBRALTAR AND NOT FLY DIRECTLY TO THEIR TARGETS? WEREN'T OUR ALLIES "COOPERATIVE" ENOUGH TO GIVE OVERFLIGHT PERMISSION?

A: -- THE PRESIDENT WAS REFERRING SPECIFICALLY TO THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT, WHICH AUTHORIZED USE OF BRITISH AIRFIELDS. -- SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAS NOTED THAT PERMISSION TO OVERFLY FRANCE WAS REQUESTED AND DENIED. I WILL LET THE FRENCH PROVIDE THEIR REASONING.

-- I'M GOING TO HAVE TO REFER YOU TO THE PENTAGON FOR ALL OTHER OPERATIONAL DETAILS OF THE OPERATION.

-- IN GENERAL, I THINK IT'S ABSOLUTELY CLEAR THAT OUR ALLIES ARE INCREASINGLY COMING TO SHARE OUR APPRECIATION OF THE DANGER LIBYA REPRESENTS TO NORMAL CIVILIZED BEHAVIOR. IT'S LESS A QUESTION OF THE VERY REAL DANGER THE QADHAFI REGIME REPRESENTS THAN WHAT IS THE BEST MEANS OF EFFECTIVELY DEALING WITH IT.

11. ALGERIA: INITIATIVES RE LIBYA

Q: THERE ARE REPORTS THAT THE ALGERIAN GOVERNMENT IS WORKING TO INCREASE AND IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH LIBYA, PERHAPS AS AN ATTEMPT TO MODERATE QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR. ARE THESE REPORTS ACCURATE? IF SO, WHAT IS THE USG REACTION?

A: -- WE HAVE NOTED THE QUICKENED PACE IN CONTACTS BETWEEN BT

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NOT RESOLVED, WON'T TERRORISM CONTINUE?

A: -- LIBYAN TERRORISM HAS LITTLE TO DO WITH THE PALESTINIAN

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THE ALGERIAN AND LIBYAN GOVERNMENTS. NATURALLY, WE WOULD DEFER TO THE ALGERIANS ANY CHARACTERIZATION OF THOSE

RELATIONS AND THE DESCRIPTION OF WHAT ALGERIAN OBJECTIVES MIGHT BE.

-- IT IS OUR UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ALGERIANS AND LIBYANS HAVE REVIVED A NUMBER OF PREVIOUSLY EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENTS. OVER TIME, THE TWO GOVERNMENTS HAVE COOPERATED RATHER CLOSELY IN THE IMPORTANT AREA OF HYDROCARBON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING (BOTH ARE MEMBERS OF OPEC).

-- IT IS OUR ASSESSMENT THAT THE GOA HAS BEEN CAUTIOUS IN RESPONSE TO QADHAFI'S CALL FOR LIBYAN UNION WITH ALGERIA. WE WERE SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE EARLIER MOROCCAN OBJECTIVE TO 'MODERATE QADHAFI'S BEHAVIOR THROUGH CLOSER RELATIONS. SHOULD THIS INDEED BE THE ALGERIAN GOAL, WE WOULD BE EQUALLY SKEPTICAL.

12. LIBYA: CONTACTS WITH SOVIETS
Q: IS IT TRUE, AS REPORTED IN THE GUARDIAN, THAT THE SOVIETS WARNED THE US LAST WEEK AGAINST ANY AGGRESSION AGAINST LIBYA? HAVE THEY FOLLOWED THIS UP SINCE THEN OR NOW, AFTER THE STRIKE?
A: -- I'M NOT GOING TO DISCUSS THE SUBSTANCE OF OUR DIPLOMATIC EXCHANGES WITH THE SOVIETS, BEYOND THE FACT THAT WE HAVE INFORMED THE SOVIETS OF OUR DETERMINATION THAT THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT'S UNDOUBTED SUPPORT FOR INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WILL NOT BE COST-FREE, AND THAT WE DO NOT SEE THIS AS A US/SOVIET ISSUE.

13. LIBYA: WHY NOT IRAN/SYRIA?
Q: OVER TIME, THE GOVERNMENTS OF SYRIA AND IRAN HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AMONG THOSE MOST PROMINENT IN RESORTING TO STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. IN HITTING LIBYA, HAVEN'T WE OVERLOOKED THE MORE IMPORTANT PERPETRATORS?
A: -- WE DO NOT HIDE OUR REPUGNANCE FOR TERRORISM, REGARDLESS OF THE QUARTER FROM WHICH IT COMES. SYRIA AND IRAN ARE BOTH ON THE STATE DEPARTMENT'S LIST OF COUNTRIES

THAT SUPPORT TERRORISM.
-- THE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST LIBYA WAS SPECIFICALLY RELATED TO DIRECT EVIDENCE LINKING QADHAFI TO THE BERLIN DISCO BOMBING AND PLANS FOR A WAVE OF TERRORIST ACTIONS TARGETED AGAINST AMERICANS AND AMERICAN INSTALLATIONS.
-- WE SHOULD NOT GET OURSELVES INTO THE BOX OF DETERMINING THAT WHAT IS AN APPROPRIATE RESPONSE IN ONE SITUATION SHOULD NECESSARILY BE APPLIED IN ANOTHER.
-- ANY COUNTRY CONSIDERING SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM AGAINST THIS COUNTRY SHOULD TAKE CAREFUL NOTE OF OUR DETERMINATION TO RESPOND FORCEFULLY, AS APPROPRIATE.

14. PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE'S VISIT: LIBYA AND TERRORISM
Q: WAS TERRORISM SPECIFICALLY IN CONNECTION WITH LIBYA, DISCUSSED DURING THE NAKASONE-REAGAN MEETING?
A: -- THE TERRORISM ISSUE WAS DISCUSSED IN GENERAL AS AN ITEM FOR PROBABLE DISCUSSION AT THE TOKYO SUMMIT.
-- ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT AND THE PRIME MINISTER DID NOT GO INTO DETAIL, JAPAN SHARES OUR STRONG CONCERN ON CONTROLLING TERRORISM. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED HIS SYMPATHIES OVER THE LOSS OF LIFE IN THE BERLIN BOMBING. WHEN THE PRESIDENT TOOK ECONOMIC ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA EARLIER, JAPAN PLEDGED NOT TO UNDERCUT THE U.S. SANCTIONS. JAPANESE TRADE WITH LIBYA IS VERY SMALL AS JAPAN DOES NOT BUY LIBYAN BT



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15. JAPANESE REACTION TO U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA
Q: DOES JAPAN SUPPORT OUR ACTIONS AGAINST LIBYA? WAS PRIME
MINISTER NAKASONE NOTIFIED IN ADVANCE?
A: -- FOREIGN MINISTER ABE HAS VOICED UNDERSTANDING OF DUR
EXPLANATION OF THE ATTACK AGAINST LIBYAN TERRORISM AS
MOTIVATED BY SELF-DEFENSE. HE INDICATED JAPAN WILL FOLLOW
THE SITUATION CLOSELY, AND HOPES THAT THE SITUATION WILL NOT
BE AGGRAVATED OR ESCALATED. BOTH PRIME MINISTER NAKASONE AND
FOREIGN MINISTER ABE WERE MADE AWARE OF OUR STRONG CONCERNS
REGARDING LIBYAN TERRORISM.

(P/G)

WICK

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Handwritten notes:
Return to J...
Libya

1. FOLLOWING GUIDANCE WAS PREPARED FOR BUT NOT USED AT STATE
EPARTMENT NOON PRESS BRIEFING APRIL 18. AGENCY IS SENDING
IT TO YOU FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY.

2. LEBANON: HOSTAGES
Q: WHAT IS THE USG REACTION TO THE MURDER OF THREE PEOPLE IN
LEBANON?

A: -- WE DEPLORE THESE BRUTAL AND SENSELESS MURDERS. THE
GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES SEND THEIR DEEPEST
SYMPATHY TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS.

-- WE TAKE THIS OCCASION TO ONCE AGAIN CONDEMN THE
CRIMINAL ACTIONS OF THE INDIVIDUALS AND ORGANIZATIONS WHO
HAVE PLANNED AND PARTICIPATED IN THE KIDNAPPING OF HOSTAGES
IN LEBANON. WE CALL FOR THE IMMEDIATE AND UNCONDITIONAL
RELEASE OF THESE INNOCENT VICTIMS.

-- THE CONTINUED CAPTIVITY OF THESE INNOCENT PEOPLE IS
CONTRARY TO ALL CIVILIZED HORMS AND FLIES IN THE FACE OF THE
RELIGIOUS TENETS THEIR CAPTORS PURPORT TO PROFESS.

Q: HAVE THE THREE BODIES BEEN IDENTIFIED?

A: -- I UNDERSTAND THAT TWO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS BRITISH
CITIZENS PHILIP PADFIELD AND LEIGH DOUGLAS. IDENTIFICATION
OF THE THIRD IS NOT YET CONFIRMED.

Q: HAS A FOURTH HOSTAGE BEEN SLAIN?

A: -- WE HAVE HEAR REPORTS TO THAT EFFECT BUT HAVE NO
INFORMATION OF OUR OWN ONE WAY OR THE OTHER.

Q: ARE THE LIBYANS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATHS OF THESE MEN?

A: -- WE HAVE HEARD SIR GEOFFREY HOWE'S STATEMENT THAT THE
TWO WHO HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED WERE "DEFINIELY IN LIBYAN
HANDS." I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER TO SHARE WITH YOU ON THAT AND
SUGGEST YOU CONTACT THE BRITISH.

3. LIBYA: OVERTHROW QADHAFI?

Q: WAS THE U.S. TRYING TO KILL QADHAFI OR REPLACE HIM?A: --

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AS THE PRESIDENT SAID MONDAY NIGHT, OUR STRIKE WAS "AGAINST
THE HEADQUARTERS, TERRORIST FACILITIES AND MILITARY ASSETS

THAT SUPPORT MUAMMAR QADHAFI'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES."

-- THAT PRE-EMPTIVE ACTION WAS DESIGNED NOT ONLY TO
DIMINISH QADHAFI'S CAPACITY TO EXPORT TERROR, BUT ALSO TO
PROVIDE HIM WITH INCENTIVES TO ALTER HIS CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR.

-- THE UNITED STATES IS NOT TRYING TO KILL OR OVERTHROW
QADHAFI. AS WE HAVE SAID MANY TIMES, WE ARE TRYING TO STOP
QADHAFI'S SUPPORT FOR AND INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM

-- WE DID NOT KNOW WHERE QADHAFI WAS MONDAY NIGHT. WE
DID KNOW THAT THE AZIZIYAH BARRACKS, (WHERE HE OFTEN IS,) IS
ONE OF THE NERVE CENTERS FOR TERRORIST TRAINING IN LIBYA.
THAT'S WHAT WE ATTACKED.

Q: SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT A COUP WOULD BE "ALL TO THE
OOD." DOES THAT MEAN WE WANT A COUP TO OCCUR?

A: -- I REFER YOU TO THE SECRETARY'S REMARKS. TAKEN IN
CONTEXT, HE WAS NOT PROPOSING THAT A COUP TAKE PLACE.

Q: WHAT DID THE SECRETARY MEAN IN HIS REFERENCE TO THE
"PRAETORIAN GUARDS"; WERE THEY ANOTHER TARGET?

A: -- ELEMENTS OF QADHAFI'S ELITE GUARD ARE STATIONED AT THE
AZIZIYAH BARRACKS, WHICH WERE ONE OF THE FIVE
TERRORIST-RELATED TARGETS PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED.

4. FRANCE: EXPULSION OF FOUR LIBYANS

Q: WHAT IS YOUR REACTION TO THE FRENCH EXPULSION OF FOUR
LIBYANS?

Q: WHY WERE THE LIBYANS EXPELLED FROM FRANCE? DID IT HAVE
ANYTHING TO DO WITH PLOTS AGAINST AMERICAN FACILITIES?

Q: DID THE U.S. HAVE ANYTHING TO DO WITH THE EXPULSION?

A: -- WE HAVE NOTHING BEYOND WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE STATED
PUBLICLY, WHICH WAS THAT THE LIBYANS WERE BEING EXPELLED FOR
ACTS PREJUDICIAL TO THE PUBLIC ORDER. YOU WOULD HAVE TO ASK
THE FRENCH ABOUT THE DETAILS.

5. EC MINISTERS ON LIBYA

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO NEW MEASURES ON LIBYA PLANNED
BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY?

A: -- WE WELCOME THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' DECISION MONDAY TO
TAKE TOUGHER ANTI-TERRORISM MEASURES AGAINST LIBYAN DIPLOMATS
AND THEIR DECISION YESTERDAY TO ACCELERATE IMPLEMENTATION TO
THESE MEASURES.

-- OUR COMMUNITY ALLIES HAVE CONDEMNED QADHAFI IN STRONG
LANGUAGE AND ARE COMMITTED TO ACTION AGAINST TERRORISM.

-- WHILE WE MAY NOT ALWAYS AGREE ON SPECIFIC TACTICS,
THERE IS NO RIFT. WE ARE JOINTLY COMMITTED TO ENDING THIS
SCOURGE.

-- THE REPORTED FRENCH DECISION TO EXPEL FOUR LIBYAN
DIPLOMATS IS INDICATIVE OF EUROPEAN RESOLVE TO ACT.

-- WE ARE CONSULTING INTENSIVELY WITH OUR ALLIES ON
ANTI-TERRORISM. WE APPRECIATE THEIR SUPPORT AND URGE THEM TO
MOVE QUICKLY IN IMPLEMENTING THEIR DECISION.

6. U.S. WARNINGS TO SOVIETS ON BERLIN BOMBING

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY REACTION TO SOVIET MFA SPOKESMAN
LOMEIKO'S STATEMENT THAT THE U.S. IS "RESORTING TO LIES AND
SLANDER" BY CONTENDING THAT IT WARNED THE SOVIETS ABOUT THE
LIBYAN ATTACK IN WEST BERLIN ON APRIL 5?

A: -- WE WERE SURPRISED TO SEE MR. LOMEIKO'S STATEMENT.

-- HE MUST BE MISINFORMED. -- ON MARCH 27 WE PROVIDED

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AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMCONSUL KRAKOW
AMCONSUL VANCOUVER
VOA /PHILIPPINE RELAY STATION TINANG
AMCONSUL POZNAN
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
USCINCSO QUARRY HIGHTS PANAMA

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OTHER MILITARY ADEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

EO 12356 N/A

THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN BERLIN WITH INFORMATION THAT AGENTS OF
THE LIBYAN GOVERNMENT RESIDENT IN THE SOVIET SECTOR OF BERLIN

WERE PLANNING HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN THE
WESTERN SECTOR OF BERLIN.

-- AT THAT TIME OUR SOVIET INTERLOCUTOR INDICATED THAT HE
TOOK THE INFORMATION SERIOUSLY AND THAT SOVIET AUTHORITIES
WOULD TAKE ACTION.

-- ON THE SAME DAY WE MADE PARALLEL DEMARCHES TO THE
GOVERNMENT OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC BOTH IN
WASHINGTON AND IN BERLIN. WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS WERE AWARE
OF THIS MESSAGE AS WELL.

7. SUDAN/SITUATION

Q: WHAT IS THE STATUS OF THE DRAWDOWN IN KHARTOUM?

A: -- ON APRIL 17 WE EVACUATED 177 PEOPLE FROM KHARTOUM VIA
A COMMERCIAL AIR CHARTER. THESE PEOPLE INCLUDED DEPENDENTS
OF U.S. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, SOME EMPLOYEES OF THE EMBASSY,
AS WELL AS PRIVATE U.S. CITIZENS IN SUDAN. THE FLIGHT
DEPARTED KHARTOUM AT 4:30 A.M. (KHARTOUM TIME) AND ARRIVED IN
NAIROBI AT 8:30 THIS MORNING (NAIROBI TIME). WE DO NOT YET
HAVE A BREAKDOWN FOR YOU, BUT I CAN SAY THAT THE OVERWHELMING
MAJORITY OF THESE PEOPLE ARE DEPENDENTS OF USG EMPLOYEES.

THEY WILL REMAIN BRIEFLY IN NAIROBI BEFORE MOVING ON TO
OTHER DESTINATIONS OF THEIR CHOOSING. WE ANTICIPATE THAT THE
MAJORITY OF THEM WILL BE RETURNING TO THE U.S.

IF ASKED ABOUT FUTURE EVACUATION PLANS: WE CONTINUE TO
REVIEW THE SECURITY SITUATION IN KHARTOUM AND WILL TAKE
WHATEVER PRECAUTIONS WE CONSIDER NECESSARY.

Q: HOW MANY AMERICANS ARE LEFT IN SUDAN?

A: WE DO NOT HAVE SPECIFIC NUMBERS ON AMERICANS LEFT IN THE
SUDAN, BUT THERE ARE SEVERAL HUNDRED SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE
COUNTRY. THE EMBASSY IS MAINTAINING A STAFF WHICH, ALTHOUGH
REDUCED, WILL CONTINUE TO OPERATE ALL ESSENTIAL PROGRAMS.

Q: THERE ARE REPORTS THAT YOU HAVE URGED VOLUNTARY
ORGANIZATIONS TO LEAVE SUDAN. DOES THIS MEAN THE THREAT IS
COUNTRYWIDE?

A: ALTHOUGH WE BELIEVE THAT THE THREAT, INCLUDING FROM
LIBYA, TO AMERICANS IS GREATEST IN KHARTOUM, WE HAVE TOLD ALL
AMERICANS IN SUDAN THAT IN LIGHT OF HEIGHTENED TENSION IN THE
REGION, THEY MAY WISH TO CONSIDER LEAVING TEMPORARILY.

Q: DO YOU HAVE AN UPDATE ON THE CONDITION OF THE
COMMUNICATOR WHO WAS SHOT?

A: WILLIAM J. CALKINS, AN EMBASSY COMMUNICATOR, WAS
EVACUATED TO JIDDAH, SAUDI ARABIA, FOLLOWING AN ASSASSINATION
ATTEMPT. HE HAS UNDERGONE SURGERY AND IS STABLE, ALTHOUGH
HIS CONDITION IS STILL SERIOUS. WE HAVE NO FURTHER
INFORMATION ON THE IDENTITY OF HIS ASSAILANTS. THE MATTER IS
BEING INVESTIGATED BY THE SUDANESE POLICE.

Q: DO YOU HAVE AN UPDATE ON AMBASSADOR SALEH'S RECALL?

A: -- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAS BEEN RECALLED TO
KHARTOUM. I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER FOR YOU ON THAT.

FYI: WE DO NOT KNOW IF HE HAS DEPARTED YET.

8. BLACK SEPTEMBER: BACKGROUND

Q: WHAT IS THIS BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION WHICH HAS
CLAIMED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SHOOTING IN KHARTOUM?

A: -- THE NAME BLACK SEPTEMBER WAS FIRST USED BACK IN
1971-74 BY THE TERRORIST WING OF FATAH, THE LARGEST OF THE
PLO'S CONSTITUENT GROUPS.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

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TO ALL PRINCIPAL POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DOUALA IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY MAPUTO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY PARAMARIBO IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DUSSELDORF IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL FLORENCE IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL HAMBURG IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL NAPLES IMMEDIATE
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USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
ALL POLADS POSTS IMMEDIATE
USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI IMMEDIATE
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
XMT AMEMBASSY BERLIN
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
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AMCONSUL VANCOUVER
VOA /PHILIPPINE RELAY STATION TINANG
AMCONSUL POZNAN
AMCONSUL LENINGRAD
USCINCSO QUARRY NIGHTS PANAMA

9. SOVIET CASUALTIES IN GULF OF SIDRA EXERCISE
Q: CAN YOU CONFIRM THAT THE SOVIETS SUFFERED CASUALTIES IN THE U.S. RETALIATORY ATTACKS DURING THE GULF OF SIDRA EXERCISE AS REPORTED IN THE WASHINGTON POST TODAY? HAVE THE SOVIETS PROTESTED ABOUT THIS?
A: -- THE SOVIET UNION HAS NOT RAISED THIS QUESTIONS WITH US AND WE HAVE NOT SEEN ANY INDICATION IN THE SOVIET PRESS THAT THERE WERE SOVIET CASUALTIES.

10. CYPRUS: SECURITY SITUATION
Q: WHAT IS THE SECURITY SITUATION AT EMBASSY NICOSIA?
A: -- THERE ARE REPORTS OF THREATS HAVING BEEN MADE. THE EMBASSY HAS TAKEN ALL APPROPRIATE AND PRUDENT STEPS, INCLUDING COORDINATION WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, WHO ARE TAKING REQUISITE SECURITY MEASURES.

11. COSTA RICA - EXPLOSION OUTSIDE U.S. CONSULATE
Q: WHAT CAN YOU TELL US ABOUT THE BOMB THAT EXPLODED IN FRONT OF THE U.S. CONSULATE IN SAN JOSE?
A: -- THE U.S. EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE REPORTS THAT NO AMERICANS WERE INJURED AND DAMAGE TO THE CONSULATE WAS MINOR. THE EXPLOSION, WHICH OCCURRED AT 9:50 P.M. EST, APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY A HAND GRENADE. ONE WITNESS CLAIMS TO HAVE SEEN A MAN THROWING A BOMB UNDER A PASSING BUS. IF SO, THE BUS PASSED SAFELY, BUT HAD ITS TIRES RIPPED BY THE SUBSEQUENT EXPLOSION. FOUR COSTA RICANS WAITING IN LINE FOR A BUS WERE INJURED, THREE OF THEM LIGHTLY, THE FOURTH VERY SERIOUSLY. NO ONE HAS CLAIMED CREDIT FOR THE BLAST, ALTHOUGH A MAN, SPEAKING FLUENT SPANISH, TELEPHONED THE LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT AT 10:00 P.M. EST TO SAY THAT ANOTHER BOMB WOULD EXPLODE AT THE EMBASSY AT 10:45 P.M. EST. BY THAT TIME THE POLICE HAD

THOROUGHLY SEARCHED THE AREA. THERE WAS NO SECOND EXPLOSION. TO DATE, THE COSTA RICAN POLICE HAVE MADE NO ARRESTS.
Q: IS IT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR TAMBS HAS SAID THAT THE BLAST IS THE WORK OF LIBYAN TERRORISTS?
A: -- AMBASSADOR TAMBS, WHEN ASKED IF HE THOUGHT IT WAS THE WORK OF LIBYAN TERRORISTS, REPLIED THAT THE POSSIBILITY CANNOT BE DISCOUNTED. THE COSTA RICAN AND U.S. AUTHORITIES WILL BE INVESTIGATING THIS FINCIDENT THOROUGHLY. WE CANNOT CONFIRM A LIBYAN CONNECTION AT THIS POINT, BUT THAT POSSIBLE LINKAGE WILL BE EXPLORED.
Q: WAS SAN JOSE ONE OF THE 30 TARGETS MENTIONED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN IN HIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION?
A: WE DO NOT COMMENT ON SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.
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ALSO PASS OECD; MACDILL FOR USIA ADVISER BELL

OTHER MILITARY ADDEES FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS AND POLADS

EO 12356 N/A

-- IN 1985 TERRORISTS THOUGHT TO BELONG TO ABU NIDAL'S ORGANIZATION USED THE SAME NAME WHEN CLAIMING RESPONSIBILITY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

April 21, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: C - Stanton H. Burnett
FROM: EU - Marlin W. Remick ✓
SUBJECT: Proposed Public Affairs Activities in Support
of U.S. Public Diplomacy Against Terrorism
REFERENCE: Your memo of 4/18/86

EU's recommended major short-term actions in support of U.S. Public Diplomacy against terrorism follow:

-- Designate and make available on short notice, if necessary, senior Administration officials for interactive WORLDNET telepress conferences to key posts in the event of major news-making events connected with terrorism.

-- Produce a tape for possible TV placement in Europe which chronicles terrorist acts that have struck at those supporting the peace process in the Middle East.

-- Consider a Presidential statement, perhaps included in the President's next weekly radio address, praising the measures taken against Libya by the EC Foreign Ministers at their April 21 meeting in Luxembourg, urging prompt implementation of these measures by member states, and highlighting the importance of the discussion of terrorism on the agenda at the Tokyo Summit.

-- Encourage a joint resolution of Congress or another highly visible and prestigious way to express the thanks of the American people to the British people -- not just to Mrs. Thatcher's government -- for their courage and support in the battle to bring international terrorism to heel.

-- Use the April 24 WORLDNET with Secretary of State Shultz as a scene-setter for the Tokyo Summit that includes a call for forward momentum by the democracies against international terrorism.

-- Make available to European opinion-makers via a special Wireless File section editorial commentary from the Middle East critical of Qaddafi and his public pose as a rallying point of Arab nationalism. VOA roundtables, discussions with Middle East experts would also be useful in this regard.

-- Conduct a series of FPC and Satellite Speaker-arranged in-depth interviews for European journalists with USG policy-makers and experts on the Middle East situation, emphasizing U.S. support for a negotiated settlement and how terrorism has repeatedly struck at the heart of this process over the last several years. Special briefings may be offered as well to selected IVP participants traveling to the U.S. through the Summer.

Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

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April 23, 1986

AMONG BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS, ONLY FRENCH WOULD SUPPORT U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO NEW TERRORIST ATTACK

USIA-commissioned general public telephone surveys in Great Britain, France, and West Germany conducted after the U.S. air strike against Libya (April 18-20) found that:

- o Large majorities in Britain (83%), France (88%) and Germany (65%) see Libyan-sponsored terrorism as a threat to the safety of the people living in their country.
- o The British (60%) and West Germans (70%) disapprove of the recent U.S. air strike to combat Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Those who disapprove of the U.S. action are uncertain if Libya was responsible for the discotheque bombing. But availability of evidence does not seem to be a major factor as solid majorities of disapproving British, French and Germans also would disapprove of future U.S. military retaliation even if reasonably good evidence pointed to Libya as behind a new terrorist attack.
- o The loss of innocent lives is one of the most commonly cited reasons by those disapproving of the air strike. In Germany, a majority cite their opposition to the use of force to combat terrorism.
- o Only in France is there approval (51%) for the air strike and would there be majority support for future U.S. military action. The levels of support and opposition in all three countries for U.S. military action against Libya have not changed dramatically since measured the week before the air strike. (See Table 1)
- o British and French attitudes on the U.S. strike are related to its long term impact on combatting terrorism. Those who disapprove of the U.S. action believe it will either increase terrorism or have no impact. By contrast, more of those who approve feel it will reduce Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The results in Germany are mixed.
- o Attitudes on the U.S. strike also are related to perceptions of whether the U.S. acted in self-defense. In all three countries, solid majorities of those approving think the U.S. acted in self-defense. Those disapproving reject the view that the U.S. acted in self-defense.

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- o Almost all Germans (93%), a majority of the British (57%) and a plurality of the French (48%) would disapprove of their own government's use of military force against Libyan-sponsored terrorism. However, majorities in all three countries would approve of their country's expelling all Libyan officials as a response to a new terrorist attack. In this respect, French and German publics are presently ahead of their governments.
- o Solid majorities (56-68%) would approve of their country's participating in "comprehensive economic and political sanctions against Libya in order to stop Libyan-sponsored terrorism."

Prepared by: Steven K. Smith, Analyst

N-4/23/86

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director
Office of Research 485-2965

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Table 1. Attitudes on U.S. Military Action to Combat Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism Have Not Changed Dramatically Since U.S. Air Strike

	<u>BRITAIN</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	37%	30%	34%
Disapprove	47	60	49
Don't Know	<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>17</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

	<u>FRANCE</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	45%	51%	56%
Disapprove	36	38	28
Don't Know	<u>19</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

	<u>GERMANY</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	17%	25%	19%
Disapprove	78	70	71
Don't Know	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

^aSurvey April 9-11, 1986. "If there is reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a new terrorist attack, would you approve or disapprove of a U.S. military action against Libya?"

^bSurvey April 18-20, 1986. "Now, thinking about the recent U.S. air strike against terrorist-related targets in Libya, do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the U.S. strike?"

^cSurvey April 18-20, 1986. "Now suppose that there is reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a new terrorist attack, would you approve or disapprove of another U.S. military action against Libya?"

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INTERNATIONAL INFORMATION COMMITTEE
RECORD OF MEETING
APRIL 23, 1986 — 10:30 a.m.

I. U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY TO COMBAT TERRORISM

USIA is drafting a 60-day public diplomacy action plan requested by the NSC. The Public Diplomacy Working Group is also preparing responses to several recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force Report on combatting terrorism.

Effective implementation of a public diplomacy strategy requires:

- A central public diplomacy coordinator with a mandate from the White House — an "Otto Reich for Counterterrorism";
- A single, small and coherent task force within the PDWG to coordinate guidelines on counterterrorism in general and Libya in particular;
- A pool of readily available experts for Worldnets, Foreign Press Center and other briefings, daily Wireless File features, Ampart programs and other public diplomacy activities;
- A systematic collection of data that can be declassified, and of unclassified data that can be made available to the public in coherent form.

To deal with the immediate Libyan problem, the IIC should take the lead and work closely with both the task force in State and the policy group examining contingencies. USIA should be present at these meetings on contingencies. It is also necessary to keep guidance on Libya flowing and work on an ad hoc basis until there is an approved plan.

ACTIONS:

- A) Appointment of a high-level coordinator is under serious consideration — suggested names are welcome.
- B) Pending such an appointment, a small sub-group of the IIC will fill the gap and implement the 60-day public diplomacy strategy on Libya.

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Classified by: Charles Horner
Declassify or Downgrade on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLR 11404/1 # 40494
RW DATE 10/5/11

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- 2 -

II. THE REAGAN DOCTRINE: SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY, FREEDOM FIGHTERS

1. Draft Public Diplomacy Strategy Paper

USIA's draft public diplomacy strategy paper on the Reagan Doctrine was distributed. An NSC mandate would raise the visibility of public diplomacy efforts on U.S. support for freedom fighters and related regional issues, which are one-fourth of the U.S.-Soviet agenda. A high-level "Ambassador" for freedom fighters should be considered.

ACTION:

Comments on draft paper to be made to Maria Copson (USIA/P, 485-8558) by May 2.

III. BRIEFINGS ON FREEDOM MOVEMENTS

1. ETHIOPIA

Ethiopia presents problems for U.S. public diplomacy: almost all opponents of Mengistu are Marxists, Leninists, or "Albanian Stalinist" in orientation, and belong to separatist movements.

Since 1948 the U.S. has recognized the territorial integrity of an Ethiopia that includes Eritrea and Tigre. Any perception that the U.S. is advancing separatist movements would have important consequences in Africa, primarily in the OAU, where support for the maintenance of national borders is the sine qua non of regional relations.

VOA broadcasts in Amharic, but should consider an increase in time. USIA programs are important because the U.S. needs to find ways of maintaining the access gained in Ethiopia as a result of humanitarian aid during the famine.

ACTIONS:

VOA to reconsider and report to the IIC on implementation of the NSDD calling for more broadcasts in Amharic.

NSC to recommend USIA attendance at a forthcoming major NSC review of U.S. policy regarding the Horn of Africa.

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II. CAMBODIA

The situation in Cambodia also poses a challenge to U.S. public diplomacy. The U.S. supports two non-communist resistance groups led by Prince Sihanouk and Son Sann, and follows the political lead of ASEAN in finding a negotiated settlement to the conflict. Since 1982, however, these two groups have been closely aligned with the Khmer Rouge.

The U.S. faces the possibility that ASEAN and China -- the largest supplier of military aid to the Cambodian resistance -- will try to make the Khmer Rouge leadership more visible. If the Khmer Rouge were to regain power, one oppressive regime would be exchanged for another. Any move in this direction would dry up support in the U.S. At the Bali meeting with ASEAN ministers, President Reagan might offer to raise the Cambodian question with the Soviets -- this would focus attention on Moscow's role.

3. ANGOLA

EAU condemnation of UNITA/Savimbi is a major obstacle for U.S. public diplomacy.

On the other hand, UNITA is a genuine nationalist movement, has some support in Europe, especially in Portugal, FRG and France, and has representatives around the world. Public diplomacy should stress: the legitimacy of Savimbi's cause; his fight to secure an Angola free of Cuban troops and Soviet intervention; and his desire for negotiations to promote Cuban withdrawal and thus facilitate beginning of national reconciliation.

ACTIONS:

USIA to consider broadcasting in Spanish to Cuban troops in Angola.

USIA needs tasker to IIC to set up working groups on Angola, Ethiopia and Cambodia.

IV. ANZUS PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

The interagency-cleared updated public diplomacy action plan for New Zealand on ANZUS and nuclear issues was distributed. It will be sent to the NSC for approval as soon as possible.

ACTION: Clearance by telephone to USIA/EA desk officer Daniel Scherr (485-7837), by COB April 24.

Foreign Media Analysis

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

SS
John
JM *John*



Office of Research

April 24, 1986

WEST EUROPEAN PRESS CRITICAL OF U.S., BUT ALSO OF EUROPEAN INACTION AFTER THE U.S. STRIKE AT LIBYA

This analysis is based on USIS Post reporting of the most influential press of Western Europe. It analyzes more than 145 editorials and 210 commentaries and news analyses appearing in 74 papers of 15 countries from April 10 through April 23, 1986.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS:

1. 95 percent of European press coverage treated the strike against Libya as inappropriate and counterproductive.
2. 80 percent said the strike will strain NATO unity and cause divisions that the Soviets will exploit.
3. At the same time, 90 percent were critical of European inaction on anti-terrorist measures.
4. 75 percent said the diplomatic sanctions adopted by the Common Market against Libya do not go far enough and may not satisfy the U.S.
5. 70 percent said U.S. frustrations over West European "cowardice" led to the air strike.
6. 60 percent said the Soviets did not intervene because they consider their relations with the U.S. too important.

SUMMARY:

The West European press, across the political spectrum, overwhelmingly condemned the U.S. air strike against Libya as a deplorable act that will not stop terrorism. The press said the U.S. attack could divide NATO and create opportunities for Soviet exploitation. At the same time, the papers widely assailed Europe's own inability to agree on measures against terrorism. Many said the U.S. acted out of frustration over Europe's "cowardice." Most papers said the Soviets did not intervene because they consider superpower relations more important and Qaddafi not worth the price. When the European ministers agreed to impose restrictions on Libyan diplomats, a wide spectrum of editorials said they did not go far enough and that the U.S. may not be satisfied.

END SUMMARY

A Mix Of Condemnation And Self-Criticism

The West European press reacted to the U.S. air strike against Libya with a barrage of commentary that both condemned the military action and assailed Europe's own inability to agree on measures against terrorism.

The main themes included:

- o The air strike was not appropriate and would only create a spiral of violence;
- o U.S. frustration over "Europe's cowardice" led to the strike;
- o Europe is a weak and fearful appeaser, unable to act in unanimity against terrorism;
- o The strike could create serious divisions in NATO unity and encourage the Soviets to exploit the differences;
- o The unsolved Palestinian problem is the root cause of terrorism;
- o Soviet inaction reflects the fact that Moscow is more interested in arms control than Qaddafi;
- o Arab states, as expected, gave only verbal support to Qaddafi;
- o Diplomatic sanctions adopted by the EEC against Libya are not enough and may not satisfy the U.S.

European Editorials Criticize U.S. Air Strike

Initial West European press reaction to the U.S. air strike against Libya was highly critical. Most papers called it overreaction and said it showed U.S. disregard for European opinion. They said "President Reagan had slapped Europe in the face" by dismissing repeated European warnings against military action. Many editorials pointed out that the decision to strike had been made and the warplanes were flying only a few hours after the twelve Common Market Foreign Ministers had finally met to discuss terrorism.

The strike ended days of nervousness and fear in the press that the U.S. was considering military action. Editorials across the political spectrum had called on their governments to pressure the U.S. to seek a peaceful solution. They said Europe had to convince the U.S. to follow a moderate course.

Condemnation of the strike was especially strong in the liberal/leftist press. London's Guardian was typical: "Surgical strike is certainly one word for it because the international system has a knife in its back."

An editorial in the independent Financial Times of London was typical of the remaining West European reaction: "The bombing was futile, deplorable and almost certainly counterproductive. It is unlikely to halt Libyan-sponsored terrorism and will leave in its wake significant political damage. European allies are left looking disunited, ineffective and foolish." Most agreed that "violence only breeds more violence."

Some papers said that the only good news is that Qaddafi now faces "a merciless logic: the fear and death he commands throughout the world can now reach him in his own country."

Papers Deplore the Death of Civilians

Comments about "the senseless killing of defenseless people" were widespread in the liberal press. Photos of civilian casualties and destroyed buildings dominated the front pages of most papers across the political spectrum. The papers said U.S. should have realized that civilian casualties would be inevitable when hitting populated areas, "regardless of all the laser-guided smart ordnance." They said a great democracy like the U.S. is measured by its magnanimity and regard for human life. The press said that one feels revulsion over the terrorist killing and maiming of children, but the revulsion is even greater if the killing and maiming is done by a civilized power.

U.S. Was Frustrated

In many papers across the political spectrum, however, condemnation and criticism were tempered with understanding. These editorials said that "U.S. frustrations" over lack of a common effort against terrorism led to the strike.

Most conservative papers, while calling military action inappropriate, sympathized with the reasons behind the action. They said that a military strike could have been avoided if Europe had responded positively and effectively to U.S. calls for sanctions against terrorism, more so because the incidents took place on European soil and involved far more European than American victims. They said the U.S. had helped Europe unselfishly in times of need. Now Europe had let America down.

European Self-Criticism: An Overdose Of Timidity

Many editorials agreed that U.S. "had offered Europe a good chance to earn credit to stop the shooting," but Europe was unable or unwilling to face the issue. A typical headline in the West European press said "Reagan's Hardness Stems from a Weak Europe." They also noted that the first ministerial meeting after the strike had ended "with the usual show of fear and ambiguity."

The papers said that Europe's "complacent attitude" toward Qaddafi had not brought it immunity from terrorist attacks. France's conservative Figaro added that "since Munich, Europeans know that dictators cannot be tamed. Small surrenders always end in huge disasters."

A majority of the papers across the political spectrum said the strike taught Europe that it must end its "diplomacy of appeasements, compromises and smiles." They said Europe must agree on effective alternatives to military action, such as diplomatic, political and economic sanctions.

Many commentators admitted that Americans were right in charging the Europeans with cowardice and appeasement by not joining in actions against Libya. However, they pointed out that the U.S. is far away while Europeans and Arabs are neighbors. Europeans will pay the price of major escalation. Europe, they said, does not ever again want to become a battlefield.

A wide spectrum of editorials reflected a fear of the "uncontrollable consequences" of U.S. military action. They said that "taking a sledgehammer to a nut" would not end terrorism, but escalate it. The papers said the end result would be more Libyan terror and spillage of innocent blood.

Most papers acknowledged that Europe had not heeded U.S. calls for sanctions. However, many editorials expressed satisfaction that meetings were taking place to discuss them, even though "those meetings had to be convened under the threat of U.S. aircraft carriers again moving closer to the Libyan coast." They said that when Europe could not agree on an "overdue common strategy" to combat terrorism, the U.S. was bound to take action alone.

Italy's centrist, influential Corriere della Sera added: "Ignored by Reagan, made ridiculous by Qaddafi, and betrayed by itself, Europe, in order to redeem itself, would need to agree on a strategy capable of returning it to the world scene in a less humiliating role [than the one] it has played so far."

U.S. Action Is Seen As A Threat To NATO Unity

Almost all European papers expressed alarm that, "for the first time in NATO's history," U.S. and European security concerns seemed to diverge. They said that the differences showed the fragility of the alliance and that these differences could cause serious divisions. The editorials said this could be a prelude to future U.S. disregard of European interests.

The press agreed that the strikes had put a severe strain on the alliance. However, many suggested that the raids may shock the Europeans into taking terrorism seriously. The papers said Europeans want to be protected by the U.S., but refuse to accept their share of responsibilities and risks.

The European press was also alarmed over anti-European feelings among Americans in the wake of the strike, especially because of the refusal of France and Spain to grant overflights. Some papers said that many Americans blamed Europe for the loss of one plane and death of its two-man crew because they had to fly a long, tiring distance from Britain to their targets.

The papers noted strong support by the U.S. public for the President's decision to strike Libya. They said this could lead, with the backing of public opinion, to a Presidential decision to reduce American troop strength in Europe. Said one: "Only by closing one's eyes can one state that Reagan is not interpreting America's will and its national interests."

Switzerland's conservative Neue Zuercher Zeitung best summed up a range of comments: "Reagan's readiness for action is having a salutary effect on the Europeans. When a few months ago the U.S. invited its allies to join an economic and diplomatic boycott of Libya, they balked. But when the U.S. forces went into action, [the allies] suddenly discovered that firmness is a good thing. It is likely that the 'lesson' U.S. taught Libya - one intended indirectly for the Europeans as well - will make it easier for Europe to reach a common anti-terrorist policy."

Palestinian Problem Cited As Root Cause Of Terrorism

Most editorials said the U.S. does not seem to understand that the root cause of Arab terrorism is in the world's inability to solve the Palestinian problem. They said terror is the result of regional conflicts and social and economic crises. They described "today's terrorist [as] a Palestinian from Lebanon. He gets his money from Libya or Iran, his weapons from Syria and his training in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, which is under Syrian control." The papers held that Libya, therefore, is not the only source of terrorism. However, most papers agreed that

Qaddafi has exploited the Palestinian issue in pursuing his objective of destabilizing the Mediterranean.

Leftist commentaries especially suggested that Israel does not have a policy for a peaceful solution in the Middle East and that the U.S. has been unable to persuade Israel to seek compromise. Some said the U.S. deliberately looked for a military confrontation because its diplomatic efforts to find a Mideast peace had failed.

Arabs Paid Lip-Service To Qaddafi

European editorials took note that, as expected, Qaddafi did not get Arab support beyond "lip-service." However, they cautioned that the same cannot be predicted if there is a new U.S. strike.

The papers said that the strike created an embarrassing problem for moderate and pro-Western Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They said those states may be put on the spot to choose sides the next time.

Many editorials said there are Arab states that don't like Qaddafi and would rather see him overthrown. They agreed the strike had unified the Arab and Islamic worlds with a chorus of anti-U.S. denunciations. However, the papers doubted that most Arab countries, with the possible exception of Syria, would take up Qaddafi's cause and fight alongside him.

Papers Said U.S. Hoped For An Anti-Qaddafi Coup

A few days after the U.S. strike, many European papers suggested that it had not been meant as just a "pinprick," but an attempt to topple Qaddafi from power. Liberal papers generally condemned any attempts to "assassinate" foreign leaders. However, other papers commented that "Qaddafi's departure" from the Libyan scene would have been a welcome result of the strike. Many commentators concluded that Qaddafi's departure from Tripoli into hiding and street battles between rival factions indicated that the Libyan leader was standing on a thin power base.

Conservative papers especially hoped that the air strike will encourage anti-Qaddafi groups in Libya. Many papers, however, urged caution because no-one favorable to the West appears to be in a position to stage a coup. They claimed that Soviet advisers had trained and indoctrinated groups of Libyan military officers favorable to them and there is a danger those officers will gain control in the ensuing chaos.

Soviet Commentary Seen As A Carefully Calculated Anger

The European press generally called the Soviet verbal assault on the U.S. after the strike "a carefully calculated anger," designed to show support for its "pesky ally" without impairing superpower relations. The papers suggested that cancellation of the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze "was the only way to preserve Soviet credibility." Some said it was probably a recognition of its weakness that prevented USSR from intervening, especially after the U.S. had signalled its intentions. What was left, they said, was to revert to traditional Soviet exploitation of NATO differences, peace propaganda and the usual maneuvering to gain advantages in any negotiations with the U.S.

Prior to the air strike, the European press had generally refrained from predictions of Soviet involvement in any new U.S. action against Libya. This was in striking contrast to speculation at the start of the U.S.-Libyan clash in the Gulf of Sidra that the Soviets would come to Libya's aid.

Most editorials concluded that Moscow decided to stay out because there is more propaganda mileage in looking like a peacemaker. They said typically: "It is much more advantageous for the USSR to stay aside and accuse the U.S. of jeopardizing world peace." Others added that the Soviets do not feel strong enough to get into a confrontation with the U.S. and that Qaddafi is not worth the price.

Many papers said Gorbachev's statements show that he wants a summit this year, and that he needs it more than President Reagan. They said Gorbachev still needs to establish his position as the leader of a superpower, and that it is especially important "in the light of Moscow's impotence to defend its Libyan friend."

The papers said it is also clear that Gorbachev wants an arms control agreement because he is fearful of advances in U.S. arms technology. They said his overriding objective is to scuttle the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), preserve Soviet advantages over U.S. arms modernization, and free a greater share of the budget for the troubled Soviet domestic economy.

Diplomatic Sanctions Against Libya Do Not Go Far Enough

The long-awaited decision by the Common Market Foreign Ministers to agree on measures against Libya was assailed across the political spectrum as timid and weak. Most European papers had hoped that anti-Libyan sanctions would have the dual effect of

restraining the U.S. from another air strike and thwarting Libya's ability to direct terrorist attacks.

While hailing the unanimous action to restrict the movement of Libyans, many papers made clear that it is not enough. They said that attempts to impose limited economic sanctions were sacrificed "at the altar of unanimity." Most said the action may not appease the U.S. because it had called for a full trade embargo, including a boycott of Libyan oil, "the most important prop of the Qaddafi regime." Some editorials said the U.S. might ask why it should guarantee the freedom of "a continent that pays for it only with small change."

Many editorials agreed with the London Daily Telegraph: "In the meantime, [the decision] must be placed in the rather non-descript category of 'a step in the right direction.'"

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PRESS SOURCES USED

Independent

AUSTRIA	<u>Die Presse; Kurier</u>
BELGIUM	<u>Le Soir</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Financial Times</u>
GREECE	<u>Akropolis</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>NRC Handelsblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Dagbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>Diario de Noticias</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Expressen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>La Suisse</u>
TURKEY	<u>Hurriyet</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>General-Anzeiger; Westdeutsche Allgemeine; Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin)</u>

Centrist

ITALY	<u>Corriere della Sera; La Stampa; Stampa Sera</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>Haagsche Courant</u>
NORWAY	<u>Nationen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tribune de Geneve</u>

Conservative/Rightist

BELGIUM	<u>Gazet van Antwerpen; La Libre Belgique</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Times; Daily Telegraph</u>
DENMARK	<u>Berlingske Tidende; Jyllands-Posten</u>
FRANCE	<u>Figaro; Quotidien; Les Echos</u>
GREECE	<u>Kathimerini</u>
ITALY	<u>Il Giornale; Il Tempo; Il Sole-24 Ore</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Telegraaf; Algemeen Dagblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Aftenposten; Verdens Gang; Vaart Land</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>O Dia</u>
SPAIN	<u>ABC</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Svenska Dagbladet</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Neue Zuercher Zeitung; Journal de Geneve</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Welt; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Handelsblatt</u>

PRESS SOURCES (Cont'd)

Liberal/Leftist

AUSTRIA	<u>Neue AZ</u>
BELGIUM	<u>De Morgen; De Standaard; Het Volk</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Guardian</u>
DENMARK	<u>Information; Politiken; Aktuelt</u>
FRANCE	<u>Le Monde; Liberation; Le Matin</u>
GREECE	<u>Avriani</u>
ITALY	<u>La Repubblica; Avanti; Il Messaggero</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Volkskrant; Trouw</u>
NORWAY	<u>Arbeiderbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>A Capital; Diario Popular</u>
SPAIN	<u>El Pais</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Dagens Nyheter; Aftonbladet</u>
TURKEY	<u>Milliyet; Cumhuriyet</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Zeit; Frankfurter Rundschau; Stuttgarter Zeitung</u>

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***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ C O D E W O R D *****

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**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01094

MONTREAL FOR ICAO REP

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
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SUBJECT: USUN'S ROLE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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***** ~~TOP SECRET~~ C O D E W O R D *****

2. THIS IS AN ACTION CABLE - SEE PARA 13.

3. RECENT EVENTS REQUIRE MORE THAN EVER THAT THE U.S. SEEK TO DRAW UPON ALL AVAILABLE RESOURCES TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. IN THIS MESSAGE, USUN SHARES

ITS REFLECTIONS AND SEEKS DEPARTMENT'S VIEWS ON WHAT MISSION CAN DO AT THE UN IN THE COMING MONTHS CONCERNING THE TERRORISM ISSUE. MISSION IS CONSIDERING BUILDING ON THE MAJOR SECURITY COUNCIL AND GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS AND STATEMENTS AGAINST TERRORISM THAT CAME OUT OF THE LAST MONTHS OF 1985. IN THIS CONNECTION THE DEMONSTRATION OF CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST BY CONGRESSMEN DANTE FASCELL AND DANIEL MICA LAST DECEMBER 2 WAS A GREAT BOOST.

4. DISCUSSIONS WITH SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS: AMBASSADOR WALTERS WILL CONTINUE TO TAKE OPPORTUNITIES DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR FOREIGN OFFICIALS ON DIFFERENT MATTERS TO PRESS THE STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. HE WILL URGE (A) WILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN COPING WITH FUTURE INCIDENTS; (B) SUPPORT OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN DENUNCIATIONS BY UN BODIES OF TERRORIST ACTS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THEY OCCUR AND APPROPRIATE REMEDIAL ACTION BY UN ORGANS TO DENOUNCE OUTRAGES; AND (C) RATIFICATION OF UN CONVENTIONS ON HIJACKING, HOSTAGE-TAKING AND PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS. THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO INTRODUCE SOME OF THESE MATTERS IN HIS OWN DISCUSSIONS, PERHAPS NEXT AUTUMN IN NEW YORK DURING THE 41ST GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

5. US/UK EXTRADITION TREATY: AS AMBASSADOR WALTERS SEES VARIOUS SENATORS, HE COULD ADD A VOICE TO THE NEED FOR APPROVAL OF THE REVISED US/UK EXTRADITION TREATY. OUR AIM WOULD BE TO LIMIT THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL OFFENSES EXCEPTION SO THAT TERRORISTS DO NOT HAVE AN ESCAPE HATCH.

6. WIDER RATIFICATION OF EXISTING TREATIES: IN THE 1970'S, A SMALL INFORMAL GROUP OF UN DELEGATIONS OBTAINED INCREASED ACCESSION TO THE HIJACKING AND AIRCRAFT SABOTAGE CONVENTIONS. USUN MIGHT FURTHER ENCOURAGE THE RENEWED EFFORTS WE HAVE ALREADY STIMULATED ON THE PART OF THE WEST GERMANS ON THE UN HOSTAGE CONVENTION, AND OF THE NORDICS ON THE UN PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS CONVENTION, AS THE OSTENSIBLE PARENTS OF THESE TREATIES. WE WOULD THUS ENCOURAGE THE DIPLOMATIC APPROACHES BY SEVERAL STATES ON BEHALF OF RATIFICATION IN CAPITALS OF NON-PARTIES.

7. USING THE SECURITY COUNCIL: THE UNPRECEDENTED CONDEMNATIONS BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE ACHILLE LAURO AND THE ROME/VIENNA AIRPORT OUTRAGES LAST YEAR WERE WELCOME DEMONSTRATIONS OF THE UN'S UNEQUIVOCAL OPPOSITION TO TERRORISM. WE MAY WISH TO ENCOURAGE THE ISSUANCE OF

FURTHER DENUNCIATIONS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE OCCURRENCE OF SIMILAR TERRORIST ACTS IN THE FUTURE IN ORDER TO DRAMATIZE THE OUTRAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY.

8. GENERAL ASSEMBLY ACTION: THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM CORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT A WORLDWIDE TERRORISM TREATY STRONG ENOUGH TO BE USEFUL "IS PROBABLY NOT REALISTIC," SINCE IT WOULD NECESSARILY BE REDUCED TO THE LOWEST LEVEL OF COMMITMENT (RECOMMENDATION 17, DECEMBER 1985 REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING

TERRORISM). YET THE SUCCESS LAST DECEMBER IN SECURING UNANIMOUS APPROVAL BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF A STRONG RESOLUTION CONDEMNING TERRORIST ACTS, INCLUDING A CALL FOR INTER-STATE COOPERATION, SUGGESTS THE DESIRABILITY OF A FURTHER CONSCIOUSNESS-RAISING RESOLUTION.

9. UNGA LEGAL (SIXTH) COMMITTEE ACTION: ANOTHER POSSIBILITY MIGHT BE TO PIN A CONDEMNATION OF ABUSE OF DIPLOMATIC FACILITIES ON BEHALF OF TERRORISM TO POSSIBLE
** END OF CABLE **

**** SECTION BREAK ****

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 01094

MONTREAL FOR ICAO REP

UNGA LEGAL (SIXTH) COMMITTEE DISCUSSION OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S WORK ON THE DIPLOMATIC POUCH AND COURIER. WHILE THIS WORK AROSE FROM EARLIER SOVIET EFFORTS TO ADD TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS, IT IS BEING REFASHIONED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION AND BY THE FALL OF 1986 MAY BE ABLE TO SERVE U.S. PURPOSES. THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATION 32 APPEARS TO ENDORSE AN EFFORT ALONG THESE LINES.

10. REPORTING ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATS: THE U.S. SHOULD REVIVE MECHANISMS FOR REPORTING AND CIRCULATING AT THE UN FACTUAL INFORMATION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS ON DIPLOMATS. WE MAY ALSO WANT TO CONSIDER EXTENDING THIS REPORTING/CIRCULATION MECHANISM TO TERRORIST ATTACKS ON INNOCENT BYSTANDERS.

11. FORMING A LIKE-MINDED GROUP: USUN BELIEVES THAT TO PROMOTE THE USG INTEREST IN USING THE UNITED NATIONS MACHINERY TO COMBAT TERRORISM, IT WOULD BE ADVISABLE TO ORGANIZE A GROUP OF LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES TO CONSIDER THE PROPOSALS OUTLINED ABOVE AS WELL AS THOSE ORIGINATING FROM OUR FRIENDS. THIS DEVICE HAS HELPED THE U.S. TO SECURE PASSAGE BY OVERWHELMING MAJORITIES OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTIONS CRITICAL OF THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE VIETNAMESE OCCUPATION OF CAMBODIA. SUCH A GROUP SHOULD BE GEOGRAPHICALLY REPRESENTATIVE BUT

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SMALL, INFORMAL AND ACTIVE. USUN HAS ALREADY HEARD FROM EGYPT AND ISRAEL AS WELL AS MEMBERS OF THE WESTERN GROUP THAT THEY WOULD LIKE TO PARTICIPATE IN SUCH A GROUP.

12. A CAVEAT--U.S. HOST COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES: JUST AS THE U.S. INSISTS THAT OTHER GOVERNMENTS ARE OBLIGATED TO PROTECT OUR OWN DIPLOMATS ABROAD, UN MEMBER STATES CORRECTLY ASSUME THAT WE HAVE A SIMILAR OBLIGATION TOWARDS THEIR DIPLOMATS. GIVEN THE STEADY INCREASE IN ACTS OF TERRORISM -- TERRORISM INVOLVING ABDUCTION AND OUTRIGHT MURDER OF POLITICIANS AND DIPLOMATS, THE US RESPONSIBILITY IS AN EXCEPTIONALLY HEAVY ONE, REQUIRING ELABORATE PRECAUTIONS. FAILURE BY THE UNITED STATES TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE PROTECTION TO FOREIGN DIGNITARIES OR TO PURSUE THE PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO HARASS DIPLOMATIC

PREMISES AS WELL AS DIPLOMATS DAMAGES OUR EFFORTS TO PRESS THE UN TO GRAPPLE WITH TERRORISM. ANY FORMULATION OF THE DEPARTMENT'S POLICY AGAINST TERRORISM SHOULD THEREFORE TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE USG'S UNIQUE HOST COUNTRY RESPONSIBILITIES IN NEW YORK AND THE BEST MEANS FOR FULFILLING THEM. IF THE USG IS PERCEIVED BY UN DELEGATES AS RELUCTANT TO PROTECT THEM AND TO PROSECUTE AT THE FEDERAL LEVEL ATTACKS AGAINST THEM OR THEIR PROPERTY, THEY WILL MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR US TO USE THE UN MECHANISM TO FURTHER OUR ANTI-TERRORISM AGENDA.

13. ACTION REQUESTED: DEPARTMENT'S REACTION TO THE PROPOSALS SET FORTH PARAS 3-11.

WALTERS

** END OF CABLE **