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40796	REPORT	THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM - INTERDEPARTMENTAL REPORT ON COMBATTING TERRORISM (REPORT IS SPLIT BETWEEN FOLDER 1 AND 2) <i>D 11/5/2012 M404/1</i>	61	12/1/1985	B1

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 USUN NEW YORK 03880

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: UN, PREL, PTER
SUBJECT: UN SYG LAUDS ANTI-TERRORISM RESOLUTIONS AT
----- END-OF-UNGA PRESS CONFERENCE

1. AT HIS DECEMBER 18 PRESS CONFERENCE MARKING THE
SUSPENSION OF THE 40TH SESSION OF THE UN GENERAL
ASSEMBLY, SECRETARY-GENERAL PEREZ DE CUELLAR CITED THE
UNANIMOUS DECISIONS OF THE UNGA AND THE SECURITY COUNCIL
CONDEMNING TERRORISM AND HOSTAGE-TAKING RESPECTIVELY AS
WELL AS UNITED ACTION TO COMBAT DRUG TRAFFICKING AS THE
PRINCIPAL ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE UN THIS SESSION. IN HIS
PREPARED OPENING STATEMENT HE SAID THE SESSION MARKED A
WELCOME CHANGE FROM THE RETREAT FROM INTERNATIONALISM AND
MULTILATERALISM HE HAD DETECTED PREVIOUSLY. HE ALSO
WELCOMED THE "CHANGE IN THE TEMPERATURE OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS" DETECTABLE AT THE UN, ATTRIBUTABLE IN PART TO
THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV SUMMIT AND IN PART TO THE 40TH
ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. IN SUMMING UP, HE
CHARACTERIZED THE SESSION AS MEMORABLE BUT NOT HISTORIC.

2. IN A THINLY VEILED REFERENCE TO THE KASSEBAUM
AMENDMENT, THE SYG ALSO NOTED IN HIS OPENING STATEMENT
THAT IT WAS IRONIC THAT AFTER SO MANY COUNTRIES HAD
EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR THE UN, IT SHOULD BE FACED WITH A
SERIOUS CHALLENGE TO ITS FINANCIAL SECURITY AND ITS
CAPACITY TO FULFILL ITS MANDATE. HE DECLINED TO DISCUSS
THE ISSUE FURTHER, REFERRING REPORTERS TO THE STATEMENT
HE PLANNED TO MAKE IN THE UNGA PLENARY SESSION LATER THE
SAME DAY.

3. THE SYG ANSWERED PRESS QUESTIONS ON A POTPOURRI OF
ISSUES. HIGHLIGHTS FOLLOW:

-- GENEVA PROXIMITY TALKS ON AFGHANISTAN. HE IS IN TOUCH
WITH UNDER SECRETARY GENERAL CORDOVEZ, BUT HAS NOTHING TO
REPORT. TALKS ARE AT A DELICATE STAGE, BUT HE WILL BE
SURE TO BRIEF THE PRESS IF THERE IS SOMETHING TO REPORT.

-- IRAN-IRAQ WAR. IT WAS HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT IRAN
CONTINUED TO INSIST ON PRECONDITIONS BEFORE IT WOULD
CONSENT TO SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION.

-- MIDDLE EAST PEACE CONFERENCE. HE WOULD CONTINUE HIS
EFFORTS TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS FOR SUCH A CONFERENCE,
WHICH IS HIS MANDATE. AT THE SAME TIME, HE WELCOMES
OTHER INITIATIVES, SUCH AS JORDAN'S, TO CREATE THE PROPER
CONDITIONS FOR A CONFERENCE OR TO FIND A SOLUTION TO
MIDDLE EAST PROBLEMS.

-- THE GENEVA SUMMIT. IT WAS AN IMPORTANT STEP FORWARD
IN US-USSR BILATERAL RELATIONS, BUT ITS IMPACT ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SITUATION REMAINS TO BE SEEN. IT HAS HAD
SALUTARY EFFECT ON THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE AND COULD
AFFECT POSITIVELY THE PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVING THE
SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN, CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTHERN
AFRICA, CYPRUS, AND SOUTHEAST ASIA.

-- CYPRUS. THE GREEK AND TURKISH CYPRIOTS ARE WORKING
FOR A SOLUTION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SYG'S DRAFT,
AND A NEW TEXT MAY EMERGE AT THE END OF THE EXERCISE. HE
IS NOT PESSIMISTIC.

-- THE UN AT 40. THE PROBLEM IS THERE IS NO FOLLOW-UP BY
UN MEMBERS TO THEIR FINE SPEECHES. EVERYONE TAKES
ADVANTAGE OF THE UN AS A FORUM BUT THEY GIVE BACK NEXT TO
NOTHING IN RETURN.

-- THE VETO POWER IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL. IN RESPONSE
TO A QUESTION ON WHETHER THE AFRICANS SHOULD HAVE A VETO
IN THE COUNCIL, THE SYG RESPONDED THAT IN HIS VIEW NO ONE
SHOULD HAVE A VETO POWER.

-- SWISS MEMBERSHIP IN THE UN. THE SYG RESPECTS THE
FREEDOM OF DEMOCRATIC SWITZERLAND TO MAKE ITS OWN
DECISION. IF IT DECIDES TO JOIN, IT COULD MAKE AN
BT



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SUBJECT: UN SYG LAUDS ANTI-TERRORISM RESOLUTIONS AT
IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TO THE UN.

-- INTERNATIONAL DEBT CRISIS. THE UN COULD SERVE AS A FORUM SOONER OR LATER ON THIS ISSUE, BUT TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NO SUGGESTION CONDUCIVE TO INVOLVEMENT BY THE UN, OR AT LEAST BY ITS NEW YORK HEADQUARTERS. THE IMF IS OF COURSE INVOLVED. THERE MUST BE COMPROMISE BETWEEN DEBTOR NATIONS AND FINANCING NATIONS, AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS THE IMF SHOULD BE INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS.

-- ROLE OF CONTADORA. THE SYG IS NOT READY TO BURY CONTADORA. THE CONTADORA FORUM MUST BE PRESERVED, AS IT IS THE ONLY APPROPRIATE ONE. THE UNGA AND SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS NOT TO PASS RESOLUTIONS ON CENTRAL AMERICAN WERE PRUDENT ONES, WHICH WILL GIVE THE PROCESS TIME.

WALTERS
BT

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Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

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April 23, 1986

AMONG BRITISH, FRENCH AND GERMANS, ONLY FRENCH WOULD SUPPORT U.S. MILITARY ACTIONS IN RESPONSE TO NEW TERRORIST ATTACK

USIA-commissioned general public telephone surveys in Great Britain, France, and West Germany conducted after the U.S. air strike against Libya (April 18-20) found that:

- o Large majorities in Britain (83%), France (88%) and Germany (65%) see Libyan-sponsored terrorism as a threat to the safety of the people living in their country.
- o The British (60%) and West Germans (70%) disapprove of the recent U.S. air strike to combat Libyan-sponsored terrorism. Those who disapprove of the U.S. action are uncertain if Libya was responsible for the discotheque bombing. But availability of evidence does not seem to be a major factor as solid majorities of disapproving British, French and Germans also would disapprove of future U.S. military retaliation even if reasonably good evidence pointed to Libya as behind a new terrorist attack.
- o The loss of innocent lives is one of the most commonly cited reasons by those disapproving of the air strike. In Germany, a majority cite their opposition to the use of force to combat terrorism.
- o Only in France is there approval (51%) for the air strike and would there be majority support for future U.S. military action. The levels of support and opposition in all three countries for U.S. military action against Libya have not changed dramatically since measured the week before the air strike. (See Table 1)
- o British and French attitudes on the U.S. strike are related to its long term impact on combatting terrorism. Those who disapprove of the U.S. action believe it will either increase terrorism or have no impact. By contrast, more of those who approve feel it will reduce Libyan-sponsored terrorism. The results in Germany are mixed.
- o Attitudes on the U.S. strike also are related to perceptions of whether the U.S. acted in self-defense. In all three countries, solid majorities of those approving think the U.S. acted in self-defense. Those disapproving reject the view that the U.S. acted in self-defense.

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- o Almost all Germans (93%), a majority of the British (57%) and a plurality of the French (48%) would disapprove of their own government's use of military force against Libyan-sponsored terrorism. However, majorities in all three countries would approve of their country's expelling all Libyan officials as a response to a new terrorist attack. In this respect, French and German publics are presently ahead of their governments.

- o Solid majorities (56-68%) would approve of their country's participating in "comprehensive economic and political sanctions against Libya in order to stop Libyan-sponsored terrorism."

Prepared by: Steven K. Smith, Analyst

N-4/23/86

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director
Office of Research 485-2965

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Table 1. Attitudes on U.S. Military Action to Combat Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism Have Not Changed Dramatically Since U.S. Air Strike

	<u>BRITAIN</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	37%	30%	34%
Disapprove	47	60	49
Don't Know	<u>16</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>17</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

	<u>FRANCE</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	45%	51%	56%
Disapprove	36	38	28
Don't Know	<u>19</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>16</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

	<u>GERMANY</u>		
	<u>before^a strike</u>	<u>toward^b strike</u>	<u>toward future^c mil. action</u>
Approve	17%	25%	19%
Disapprove	78	70	71
Don't Know	<u>5</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>10</u>
Total	100%	100%	100%

^aSurvey April 9-11, 1986. "If there is reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a new terrorist attack, would you approve or disapprove of a U.S. military action against Libya?"

^bSurvey April 18-20, 1986. "Now, thinking about the recent U.S. air strike against terrorist-related targets in Libya, do you strongly approve, somewhat approve, somewhat disapprove, or strongly disapprove of the U.S. strike?"

^cSurvey April 18-20, 1986. "Now suppose that there is reasonably good evidence that Libya was behind a new terrorist attack, would you approve or disapprove of another U.S. military action against Libya?"

Foreign Media Analysis

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

April 24, 1986

WEST EUROPEAN PRESS CRITICAL OF U.S., BUT ALSO OF EUROPEAN INACTION AFTER THE U.S. STRIKE AT LIBYA

This analysis is based on USIS Post reporting of the most influential press of Western Europe. It analyzes more than 145 editorials and 210 commentaries and news analyses appearing in 74 papers of 15 countries from April 10 through April 23, 1986.

QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS:

1. 95 percent of European press coverage treated the strike against Libya as inappropriate and counterproductive.
2. 80 percent said the strike will strain NATO unity and cause divisions that the Soviets will exploit.
3. At the same time, 90 percent were critical of European inaction on anti-terrorist measures.
4. 75 percent said the diplomatic sanctions adopted by the Common Market against Libya do not go far enough and may not satisfy the U.S.
5. 70 percent said U.S. frustrations over West European "cowardice" led to the air strike.
6. 60 percent said the Soviets did not intervene because they consider their relations with the U.S. too important.

SUMMARY:

The West European press, across the political spectrum, overwhelmingly condemned the U.S. air strike against Libya as a deplorable act that will not stop terrorism. The press said the U.S. attack could divide NATO and create opportunities for Soviet exploitation. At the same time, the papers widely assailed Europe's own inability to agree on measures against terrorism. Many said the U.S. acted out of frustration over Europe's "cowardice." Most papers said the Soviets did not intervene because they consider superpower relations more important and Qaddafi not worth the price. When the European ministers agreed to impose restrictions on Libyan diplomats, a wide spectrum of editorials said they did not go far enough and that the U.S. may not be satisfied.

END SUMMARY

A Mix Of Condemnation And Self-Criticism

The West European press reacted to the U.S. air strike against Libya with a barrage of commentary that both condemned the military action and assailed Europe's own inability to agree on measures against terrorism.

The main themes included:

- o The air strike was not appropriate and would only create a spiral of violence;
- o U.S. frustration over "Europe's cowardice" led to the strike;
- o Europe is a weak and fearful appeaser, unable to act in unanimity against terrorism;
- o The strike could create serious divisions in NATO unity and encourage the Soviets to exploit the differences;
- o The unsolved Palestinian problem is the root cause of terrorism;
- o Soviet inaction reflects the fact that Moscow is more interested in arms control than Qaddafi;
- o Arab states, as expected, gave only verbal support to Qaddafi;
- o Diplomatic sanctions adopted by the EEC against Libya are not enough and may not satisfy the U.S.

European Editorials Criticize U.S. Air Strike

Initial West European press reaction to the U.S. air strike against Libya was highly critical. Most papers called it overreaction and said it showed U.S. disregard for European opinion. They said "President Reagan had slapped Europe in the face" by dismissing repeated European warnings against military action. Many editorials pointed out that the decision to strike had been made and the warplanes were flying only a few hours after the twelve Common Market Foreign Ministers had finally met to discuss terrorism.

The strike ended days of nervousness and fear in the press that the U.S. was considering military action. Editorials across the political spectrum had called on their governments to pressure the U.S. to seek a peaceful solution. They said Europe had to convince the U.S. to follow a moderate course.

Condemnation of the strike was especially strong in the liberal/leftist press. London's Guardian was typical: "Surgical strike is certainly one word for it because the international system has a knife in its back."

An editorial in the independent Financial Times of London was typical of the remaining West European reaction: "The bombing was futile, deplorable and almost certainly counterproductive. It is unlikely to halt Libyan-sponsored terrorism and will leave in its wake significant political damage. European allies are left looking disunited, ineffective and foolish." Most agreed that "violence only breeds more violence."

Some papers said that the only good news is that Qaddafi now faces "a merciless logic: the fear and death he commands throughout the world can now reach him in his own country."

Papers Deplore the Death of Civilians

Comments about "the senseless killing of defenseless people" were widespread in the liberal press. Photos of civilian casualties and destroyed buildings dominated the front pages of most papers across the political spectrum. The papers said U.S. should have realized that civilian casualties would be inevitable when hitting populated areas, "regardless of all the laser-guided smart ordnance." They said a great democracy like the U.S. is measured by its magnanimity and regard for human life. The press said that one feels revulsion over the terrorist killing and maiming of children, but the revulsion is even greater if the killing and maiming is done by a civilized power.

U.S. Was Frustrated

In many papers across the political spectrum, however, condemnation and criticism were tempered with understanding. These editorials said that "U.S. frustrations" over lack of a common effort against terrorism led to the strike.

Most conservative papers, while calling military action inappropriate, sympathized with the reasons behind the action. They said that a military strike could have been avoided if Europe had responded positively and effectively to U.S. calls for sanctions against terrorism, more so because the incidents took place on European soil and involved far more European than American victims. They said the U.S. had helped Europe unselfishly in times of need. Now Europe had let America down.

European Self-Criticism: An Overdose Of Timidity

Many editorials agreed that U.S. "had offered Europe a good chance to earn credit to stop the shooting," but Europe was unable or unwilling to face the issue. A typical headline in the West European press said "Reagan's Hardness Stems from a Weak Europe." They also noted that the first ministerial meeting after the strike had ended "with the usual show of fear and ambiguity."

The papers said that Europe's "complacent attitude" toward Qaddafi had not brought it immunity from terrorist attacks. France's conservative Figaro added that "since Munich, Europeans know that dictators cannot be tamed. Small surrenders always end in huge disasters."

A majority of the papers across the political spectrum said the strike taught Europe that it must end its "diplomacy of appeasements, compromises and smiles." They said Europe must agree on effective alternatives to military action, such as diplomatic, political and economic sanctions.

Many commentators admitted that Americans were right in charging the Europeans with cowardice and appeasement by not joining in actions against Libya. However, they pointed out that the U.S. is far away while Europeans and Arabs are neighbors. Europeans will pay the price of major escalation. Europe, they said, does not ever again want to become a battlefield.

A wide spectrum of editorials reflected a fear of the "uncontrollable consequences" of U.S. military action. They said that "taking a sledgehammer to a nut" would not end terrorism, but escalate it. The papers said the end result would be more Libyan terror and spillage of innocent blood.

Most papers acknowledged that Europe had not heeded U.S. calls for sanctions. However, many editorials expressed satisfaction that meetings were taking place to discuss them, even though "those meetings had to be convened under the threat of U.S. aircraft carriers again moving closer to the Libyan coast." They said that when Europe could not agree on an "overdue common strategy" to combat terrorism, the U.S. was bound to take action alone.

Italy's centrist, influential Corriere della Sera added: "Ignored by Reagan, made ridiculous by Qaddafi, and betrayed by itself, Europe, in order to redeem itself, would need to agree on a strategy capable of returning it to the world scene in a less humiliating role [than the one] it has played so far."

U.S. Action Is Seen As A Threat To NATO Unity

Almost all European papers expressed alarm that, "for the first time in NATO's history," U.S. and European security concerns seemed to diverge. They said that the differences showed the fragility of the alliance and that these differences could cause serious divisions. The editorials said this could be a prelude to future U.S. disregard of European interests.

The press agreed that the strikes had put a severe strain on the alliance. However, many suggested that the raids may shock the Europeans into taking terrorism seriously. The papers said Europeans want to be protected by the U.S., but refuse to accept their share of responsibilities and risks.

The European press was also alarmed over anti-European feelings among Americans in the wake of the strike, especially because of the refusal of France and Spain to grant overflights. Some papers said that many Americans blamed Europe for the loss of one plane and death of its two-man crew because they had to fly a long, tiring distance from Britain to their targets.

The papers noted strong support by the U.S. public for the President's decision to strike Libya. They said this could lead, with the backing of public opinion, to a Presidential decision to reduce American troop strength in Europe. Said one: "Only by closing one's eyes can one state that Reagan is not interpreting America's will and its national interests."

Switzerland's conservative Neue Zuercher Zeitung best summed up a range of comments: "Reagan's readiness for action is having a salutary effect on the Europeans. When a few months ago the U.S. invited its allies to join an economic and diplomatic boycott of Libya, they balked. But when the U.S. forces went into action, [the allies] suddenly discovered that firmness is a good thing. It is likely that the 'lesson' U.S. taught Libya - one intended indirectly for the Europeans as well - will make it easier for Europe to reach a common anti-terrorist policy."

Palestinian Problem Cited As Root Cause Of Terrorism

Most editorials said the U.S. does not seem to understand that the root cause of Arab terrorism is in the world's inability to solve the Palestinian problem. They said terror is the result of regional conflicts and social and economic crises. They described "today's terrorist [as] a Palestinian from Lebanon. He gets his money from Libya or Iran, his weapons from Syria and his training in the Lebanese Bekaa Valley, which is under Syrian control." The papers held that Libya, therefore, is not the only source of terrorism. However, most papers agreed that

Qaddafi has exploited the Palestinian issue in pursuing his objective of destabilizing the Mediterranean.

Leftist commentaries especially suggested that Israel does not have a policy for a peaceful solution in the Middle East and that the U.S. has been unable to persuade Israel to seek compromise. Some said the U.S. deliberately looked for a military confrontation because its diplomatic efforts to find a Mideast peace had failed.

Arabs Paid Lip-Service To Qaddafi

European editorials took note that, as expected, Qaddafi did not get Arab support beyond "lip-service." However, they cautioned that the same cannot be predicted if there is a new U.S. strike.

The papers said that the strike created an embarrassing problem for moderate and pro-Western Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They said those states may be put on the spot to choose sides the next time.

Many editorials said there are Arab states that don't like Qaddafi and would rather see him overthrown. They agreed the strike had unified the Arab and Islamic worlds with a chorus of anti-U.S. denunciations. However, the papers doubted that most Arab countries, with the possible exception of Syria, would take up Qaddafi's cause and fight alongside him.

Papers Said U.S. Hoped For An Anti-Qaddafi Coup

A few days after the U.S. strike, many European papers suggested that it had not been meant as just a "pinprick," but an attempt to topple Qaddafi from power. Liberal papers generally condemned any attempts to "assassinate" foreign leaders. However, other papers commented that "Qaddafi's departure" from the Libyan scene would have been a welcome result of the strike. Many commentators concluded that Qaddafi's departure from Tripoli into hiding and street battles between rival factions indicated that the Libyan leader was standing on a thin power base.

Conservative papers especially hoped that the air strike will encourage anti-Qaddafi groups in Libya. Many papers, however, urged caution because no-one favorable to the West appears to be in a position to stage a coup. They claimed that Soviet advisers had trained and indoctrinated groups of Libyan military officers favorable to them and there is a danger those officers will gain control in the ensuing chaos.

Soviet Commentary Seen As A Carefully Calculated Anger

The European press generally called the Soviet verbal assault on the U.S. after the strike "a carefully calculated anger," designed to show support for its "pesky ally" without impairing superpower relations. The papers suggested that cancellation of the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze "was the only way to preserve Soviet credibility." Some said it was probably a recognition of its weakness that prevented USSR from intervening, especially after the U.S. had signalled its intentions. What was left, they said, was to revert to traditional Soviet exploitation of NATO differences, peace propaganda and the usual maneuvering to gain advantages in any negotiations with the U.S.

Prior to the air strike, the European press had generally refrained from predictions of Soviet involvement in any new U.S. action against Libya. This was in striking contrast to speculation at the start of the U.S.-Libyan clash in the Gulf of Sidra that the Soviets would come to Libya's aid.

Most editorials concluded that Moscow decided to stay out because there is more propaganda mileage in looking like a peacemaker. They said typically: "It is much more advantageous for the USSR to stay aside and accuse the U.S. of jeopardizing world peace." Others added that the Soviets do not feel strong enough to get into a confrontation with the U.S. and that Qaddafi is not worth the price.

Many papers said Gorbachev's statements show that he wants a summit this year, and that he needs it more than President Reagan. They said Gorbachev still needs to establish his position as the leader of a superpower, and that it is especially important "in the light of Moscow's impotence to defend its Libyan friend."

The papers said it is also clear that Gorbachev wants an arms control agreement because he is fearful of advances in U.S. arms technology. They said his overriding objective is to scuttle the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), preserve Soviet advantages over U.S. arms modernization, and free a greater share of the budget for the troubled Soviet domestic economy.

Diplomatic Sanctions Against Libya Do Not Go Far Enough

The long-awaited decision by the Common Market Foreign Ministers to agree on measures against Libya was assailed across the political spectrum as timid and weak. Most European papers had hoped that anti-Libyan sanctions would have the dual effect of

restraining the U.S. from another air strike and thwarting Libya's ability to direct terrorist attacks.

While hailing the unanimous action to restrict the movement of Libyans, many papers made clear that it is not enough. They said that attempts to impose limited economic sanctions were sacrificed "at the altar of unanimity." Most said the action may not appease the U.S. because it had called for a full trade embargo, including a boycott of Libyan oil, "the most important prop of the Qaddafi regime." Some editorials said the U.S. might ask why it should guarantee the freedom of "a continent that pays for it only with small change."

Many editorials agreed with the London Daily Telegraph: "In the meantime, [the decision] must be placed in the rather non-descript category of 'a step in the right direction.'"

Prepared by: Vello Ederma (P/R)
485-7116

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Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research
485-2965

PRESS SOURCES USED

Independent

AUSTRIA	<u>Die Presse; Kurier</u>
BELGIUM	<u>Le Soir</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Financial Times</u>
GREECE	<u>Akropolis</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>NRC Handelsblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Dagbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>Diario de Noticias</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Expressen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>La Suisse</u>
TURKEY	<u>Hurriyet</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>General-Anzeiger; Westdeutsche Allgemeine; Der Tagesspiegel (West Berlin)</u>

Centrist

ITALY	<u>Corriere della Sera; La Stampa; Stampa Sera</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>Haagsche Courant</u>
NORWAY	<u>Nationen</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Tribune de Geneve</u>

Conservative/Rightist

BELGIUM	<u>Gazet van Antwerpen; La Libre Belgique</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Times; Daily Telegraph</u>
DENMARK	<u>Berlingske Tidende; Jyllands-Posten</u>
FRANCE	<u>Figaro; Quotidien; Les Echos</u>
GREECE	<u>Kathimerini</u>
ITALY	<u>Il Giornale; Il Tempo; Il Sole-24 Ore</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Telegraaf; Algemeen Dagblad</u>
NORWAY	<u>Aftenposten; Verdens Gang; Vaart Land</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>O Dia</u>
SPAIN	<u>ABC</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Svenska Dagbladet</u>
SWITZERLAND	<u>Neue Zuercher Zeitung; Journal de Geneve</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Welt; Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung; Handelsblatt</u>

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Liberal/Leftist

AUSTRIA	<u>Neue AZ</u>
BELGIUM	<u>De Morgen; De Standaard; Het Volk</u>
BRITAIN	<u>Guardian</u>
DENMARK	<u>Information; Politiken; Aktuel</u>
FRANCE	<u>Le Monde; Liberation; Le Matin</u>
GREECE	<u>Avriani</u>
ITALY	<u>La Repubblica; Avanti; Il Messaggero</u>
NETHERLANDS	<u>De Volkskrant; Trouw</u>
NORWAY	<u>Arbeiderbladet</u>
PORTUGAL	<u>A Capital; Diario Popular</u>
SPAIN	<u>El Pais</u>
SWEDEN	<u>Dagens Nyheter; Aftonbladet</u>
TURKEY	<u>Milliyet; Cumhuriyet</u>
WEST GERMANY	<u>Die Zeit; Frankfurter Rundschau; Stuttgarter Zeitung</u>

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