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
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# U.S. Use of Force Without War, 1975–1982




Source: Zelikow, Force Without War

2	01	7505	SEC OF S. KOREA	3	113
	02	7505	IMP REL W/ PRC	4	113
	03	7601	SOV/ALG SUPPORT OF POLISARIO	5	121
	04	7603	LEBANESE CIVIL WAR	3	123
5	05	7607	KENYA/UGANDA DISPUTE	4	127
	06	7607	SECURITY OF TUNISIA	5	127
	07	7608	KOREAN TREE INCIDENT	2	128
1	08	7702	SAFETY OF AMER IN UGANDA	4	134
	09	7802	WAR BET ETHIOPIA/SOMALIA	5	146
	10	7805	INVASION OF SHABA IN ZAIRE	3	149
	11	7806	RIGHTS OF PASS IN OKHOTSK	5	150
7	12	7809	CIVIL STRIFE IN NICARAGUA	4	153
	13	7809	SOVIET/FIN JOINT MANEUVERS	5	153
	14	7811	MIG-23 AIRCRAFT IN CUBA	5	155
	15	7812	POLITICAL CRISIS IN IRAN	4	156
	16	7903	WAR BETW N & S YEMEN	4	159
	17	7910	SOVIET TROOPS IN CUBA	3	166
5	18	7910	PARK ASSASS IN S KOREA	3	166
	19	7911	HOSTAGE CRISIS IN IRAN	4	167
	20	7912	PEACE TREATY IN RHODESIA	4	168
	21	8001	SOVIET INVASION AFGH: CARTER	2	169
	22	8005	CIVIL STRIFE IN S KOREA	4	173
5	23	8007	VIETNAMESE INTO THAILAND	5	175
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	26	8101	INSURGENTS IN SALVADOR	5	181
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	28	8102	BORDER DISPUTE PERU/ECUADOR	5	182
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	31	8108	RIGHTS OF PASSAGE - SIDRA	2	188
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	36	8201	NICARAGUAN SUPPORT OF ELSAL REBELS	5	193
	37	8203	EG-ISR TREATY, SINAI PEACEKEEPING	3	195
	38	8205	FALKLANDS WAR	5	197
9	39	8206	ISRAELI INVASION OF LEBANON	2	198
	40	8207	ETHIOPIAN ATTACKS ON SOMALIA	5	199
	41	8208	SECURITY OF HONDURAS	5	200
	42	8208	CEASEFIRE IN BEIRUT, PEACEKEEPING	3	200
	43	8209	MASSACRE OF PALESTINIANS, BEIRUT PEACEKEEP	3	201
	44	8212	RELATIONS WITH OMAN, PGULF SECURITY	3	204


3

# Superpower Cooperative Activity January 1981 to May 1984







# Superpower Conflict Activity January 1981 to May 1984




# Superpower Cooperative Activity, 1966-1984




# Superpower Conflict Activity, 1966–1984



# Total Superpower Activity January 1981 to May 1984



# Total Superpower Activity, 1966-1984



KAL - 156 highest spikes

June 1970 - 80

Sep/Oct 1978 - 63/104

Jan 1980 - 73

Dec 1981 - 60

Mar '83 -

Sep/Oct/Nov '83 15/10/10



FIGURE 2

# Total U.S. and Soviet Cooperative and Conflict Activity, 1966–1983




Table 2

Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Conflict Activity

Year	Events	Z-score
1966	119	-0.30
1967	94	-0.59
1968	114	-0.36
1969	82	-0.73
1970	152	0.08
1971	146	0.01
1972	107	-0.44
1973	121	-0.28
1974	60	-0.98
1975	52	-1.08
1976	104	-0.47
1977	153	0.09
1978	151	0.07
1979	103	-0.49
1980	227	0.95
1981	222	0.89
1982	168	0.27
1983	435	3.36

Table 3

Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Activity

Year	Events	Z-score
1966	94	-0.93
1967	94	-0.93
1968	95	-0.92
1969	163	-0.10
1970	179	0.09
1971	108	-0.76
1972	196	0.30
1973	390	2.63
1974	235	0.76
1975	118	-0.64
1976	110	-0.74
1977	296	1.50
1978	235	0.76
1979	152	-0.24
1980	92	-0.96
1981	142	-0.36
1982	130	-0.50
1983	258	1.04

FIGURE 3

# U.S. Activity to the Soviet Union, 1966–1983




FIGURE 4

# Soviet Activity to the United States, 1966–1983







FIGURE 5

# U.S. and Soviet Conflict Activity, 1966–1983



# U.S. and Soviet Cooperative Activity, 1966–1983




Table 4

Total U.S.-Soviet Activity, 1984

Month	Coop		Conf	Tot
January	22		27	49
February	18		10	28
March	7		27	34
April	21		35	56
May	19		27	43
--	--		--	
Total	87	126	213	
Average	17.4	25.2	42.6	
Projected Annual Total	209	302	511	

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Projected Annual Total = Average x 12



## DATA AND METHODS

The methods and information used in this analysis are embodied in the World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS); a set of data collection and analysis procedures that have been ongoing since 1 January 1966. Briefly, the information is extracted from the daily New York Times according to a rigorous and well-tested content analytic methodology. The information has been and is collected daily and captures the official, high-level actions (both words and deeds) originating in one national government and directed toward another. The WEIS process is designed to analyze relations between nations and not to analyze the intricate maneuvers taking place within nations.

These official, high-level governmental actions are known as "events." The WEIS data collection is organized around 22 discrete event types arranged in a simple categorical scheme. Each category is designed to capture the "nuts and bolts" of official international political activity; meetings, accusations, warnings, attacks, proposals, comments, demands, agreements, grants and accolades are the diplomatic actions that are made into event data. These events are collected for every nation in the world.

For the purpose of this analysis, the 22 event types are collapsed into two (2) major categories of international political behavior. One category is labelled "cooperative" because it includes the more-or-less cooperative actions such as comment, agree, propose, request, grant. The other category is titled "conflictual" because it includes the more-or-less conflictual actions of demand, accuse, warn, reject, seize and use of force. "Cooperative" and "conflictual" are primarily titles of convenience but enjoy wide acceptance in the quantitative foreign affairs research community. All events from the U.S. to the USSR and the reverse (USSR to U.S.) were retrieved on an annual basis from the full WEIS data collection and placed into the cooperative/conflictual scheme.

A common criticism of the WEIS process is the use of the New York Times as a data source. For the various demands of the data making, data managing and data analyzing effort, the New York Times is the best possible source: the Times of London (probably the best data source) cannot be maintained in real-time and is often on strike; Le Monde does not have the global coverage but does have more on Africa; Pravda and Izvestia do not report "events" as defined here; the Los Angeles Times is improving but emphasizes Asia and Latin America and tends not to cover well the rest of the world; and other regional papers (the Straits Times, the Arab News and the Nairobi Evening Standard for example) do not have the necessary global coverage.

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Another criticism of the New York Times is that it has a distinct liberal bias making unfair or not objective its reporting of a conservative government or national leader. The coding scheme used in the data making excludes all editorial comment or opinion; only the reported actions (both words and deeds) between nations are included in the data, not analysis or opinion on those actions. If it appears that the data in this paper are biased, it is due probably to the increased attention the New York Times has given to the U.S.-Soviet relationship and not to a distinct bias for one nation.

### Z-Scores

A z-score is a standardized measure of the "unusualness" of a raw value with respect to the distribution of all the raw values. As mentioned in the main text, a z-score above 2.0 or below -2.0 indicates an extreme departure from the normal or routine. In statistical terms, a z-score of plus or minus 2.0 is two standard deviations above or below the mean or equal to 95th or 5th percentile of the distribution. In this analysis, a z-score above 2.0 (rather than minus 2.0) is the main concern because this represents an unusual number of events above the average.

Since a z-score is a standardized measure, it can be used to compare "apples and oranges;" the z-scores for one variable (cooperation) have the same meaning as the z-scores for another variable (conflict). Although the raw values of the variable may not suggest the possibility of comparison, the z-scores of the raw values permit comparative analysis.



6601	2	7	9	2	4	6	4	11	15	1
6602	4	2	6	1	3	4	5	5	10	2
6603	3	0	3	3	3	6	6	3	9	3
6604	0	1	1	1	6	7	1	7	8	4
6605	3	1	4	0	11	11	3	12	15	5
6606	3	2	5	7	4	11	10	6	16	6
6607	9	11	20	7	12	19	16	23	39	7
6608	3	4	7	2	9	11	5	13	18	8
6609	9	6	15	2	14	16	11	20	31	9
6610	10	0	10	7	8	15	17	8	25	10
6611	6	1	7	6	3	9	12	4	16	11
6612	3	1	4	1	6	7	4	7	11	12
6701	7	0	7	4	2	6	11	2	13	13
6702	7	1	8	9	10	19	16	11	27	14
6703	3	2	5	5	4	9	8	6	14	15
6704	7	2	9	3	5	8	10	7	17	16
6705	2	5	7	0	11	11	2	16	18	17
6706	11	3	14	5	12	17	16	15	31	18
6707	3	3	6	2	6	8	5	9	14	19
6708	4	4	8	3	5	8	7	9	16	20
6709	5	5	10	2	4	6	7	9	16	21
6710	4	0	4	1	1	2	5	1	6	22
6711	3	1	4	1	5	6	4	6	10	23
6712	1	0	1	2	3	5	3	3	6	24
6801	4	0	4	5	7	12	9	7	16	25
6802	3	5	8	3	10	13	6	15	21	26
6803	3	2	5	1	8	9	4	10	14	27
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6805	5	1	6	4	8	12	9	9	18	29
6806	5	2	7	2	5	7	7	7	14	30
6807	13	5	18	10	10	20	23	15	38	31
6808	3	8	11	2	4	6	5	12	17	32
6809	4	8	12	3	6	9	7	14	21	33
6810	5	9	14	4	3	7	9	12	21	34
6811	1	2	3	3	1	4	4	3	7	35
6812	5	1	6	4	4	8	9	5	14	36
6901	15	3	18	10	4	14	25	7	32	37
6902	9	3	12	9	3	12	18	6	24	38
6903	12	4	16	11	3	14	23	7	30	39
6904	10	9	19	12	4	16	22	13	35	40
6905	5	4	9	4	5	9	9	9	18	41
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6907	5	0	5	9	1	10	14	1	15	43
6908	2	1	3	2	3	5	4	4	8	44
6909	3	1	4	4	5	9	7	6	13	45
6910	8	4	12	7	5	12	15	9	24	46
6911	6	1	7	6	11	17	12	12	24	47
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7003	5	1	6	4	10	14	9	11	20	51
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7006	6	2	8	5	8	13	11	10	21	54
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7008	6	0	6	4	4	8	10	4	14	56
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7010	21	13	34	17	28	45	38	41	79	58
7011	10	7	17	11	9	20	21	16	37	59
7012	4	5	9	4	4	8	8	9	17	60
7101	6	13	19	3	10	13	9	23	32	61
7102	5	10	15	2	29	31	7	39	46	62
7103	4	13	17	5	12	17	0	25	34	63

7104	1	7	8	3	5	8	4	12	16	64
7105	10	2	12	5	6	11	15	8	23	65
7106	2	0	2	4	8	12	6	8	14	66
7107	3	0	3	3	1	4	6	1	7	67
7108	3	0	3	3	0	3	6	0	6	68
7109	6	1	7	6	3	9	12	4	16	69
7110	5	1	6	4	10	14	9	11	20	70
7111	6	1	7	7	5	12	13	6	19	71
7112	7	3	10	5	6	11	12	9	21	72
7201	5	8	13	7	11	18	12	19	31	73
7202	10	4	14	8	11	19	18	15	33	74
7203	9	1	10	3	1	4	12	2	14	75
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7205	15	3	18	14	6	20	29	9	38	77
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7212	3	0	3	6	13	19	9	13	22	84
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7303	21	0	21	15	2	17	36	2	38	87
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7506	1	0	1	4	7	11	5	7	12	114
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7601	21	9	30	8	6	14	29	15	44	121
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7707	9	3	12	9	13	22	18	16	34	139
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7709	18	2	20	13	4	17	31	6	37	141
7710	17	5	22	6	7	13	23	12	35	142
7711	18	4	22	6	2	8	24	6	30	143
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7901	18	4	22	5	5	10	23	9	32	157
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7904	14	3	17	4	3	7	18	6	24	160
7905	11	1	12	7	0	7	18	1	19	161
7906	11	1	12	4	5	9	15	6	21	162
7907	3	2	5	1	2	3	4	4	8	163
7908	8	4	12	6	5	11	14	9	23	164
7909	9	6	15	5	6	11	14	12	26	165
7910	4	0	4	0	4	4	4	4	8	166
7911	2	1	3	3	7	10	5	8	13	167
7912	12	12	24	1	8	9	13	20	33	168
8001	4	38	42	2	29	31	6	67	73	169
8002	4	19	23	4	12	16	8	31	39	170
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8005	7	6	13	4	4	8	11	10	21	173
8006	3	3	6	0	1	1	3	4	7	174
8007	3	2	5	0	2	2	3	4	7	175
8008	1	4	5	2	7	9	3	11	14	176
8009	9	5	14	5	5	10	14	10	24	177
8010	7	1	8	7	8	15	14	9	23	178
8011	7	17	24	9	10	19	16	27	43	179
8012	6	10	16	2	8	10	8	18	26	180
8101	4	11	15	1	3	4	5	14	19	181
8102	7	10	17	9	21	30	16	31	47	182
8103	10	10	20	5	6	11	15	16	31	183
8104	12	14	26	0	10	10	12	24	36	184
8105	6	4	10	0	13	13	6	17	23	185
8106	6	6	12	3	14	17	9	20	29	186
8107	5	2	7	3	4	7	8	6	14	187
8108	3	3	6	1	9	10	4	12	16	188
8109	9	2	11	8	9	17	17	11	28	189



8110	7	9	16	5	8	13	12	17	29	190
8111	13	4	17	6	9	15	19	13	32	191
8112	12	16	28	7	25	32	19	41	60	192
8201	8	6	14	5	11	16	13	17	30	193
8202	3	9	12	4	9	13	7	18	25	194
8203	4	5	9	1	12	13	5	17	22	195
8204	7	3	10	3	5	8	10	8	18	196
8205	12	4	16	5	8	13	17	12	29	197
8206	9	4	13	4	7	11	13	11	24	198
8207	1	6	7	2	11	13	3	17	20	199
8208	1	6	7	2	6	8	3	12	15	200
8209	3	3	6	4	10	14	7	13	20	201
8210	3	0	3	5	9	14	8	9	17	202
8211	15	8	23	8	7	15	23	15	38	203
8212	9	6	15	12	13	25	21	19	40	204
8301	18	10	28	5	15	20	23	25	48	205
8302	9	3	12	2	10	12	11	13	24	206
8303	12	11	23	1	26	27	13	37	50	207
8304	5	6	11	5	17	22	10	23	33	208
8305	15	15	30	3	18	21	18	33	51	209
8306	17	20	37	7	11	18	24	31	55	210
8307	5	7	12	7	9	16	12	16	28	211
8308	15	11	26	9	15	24	24	26	50	212
8309	27	66	93	12	51	63	39	117	156	213
8310	18	28	46	5	28	33	23	56	79	214
8311	22	17	39	18	30	48	40	47	87	215
8312	16	3	19	5	8	13	21	11	32	216
8401	15	10	25	7	17	24	22	27	49	217
8402	14	3	17	4	7	11	18	10	28	218
8403	4	10	14	4	16	20	8	26	34	219
8404	13	12	25	8	23	31	21	35	56	220
8405	15	15	30	8	15	23	23	30	53	221

U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS FROM 1966 TO 1983:  
REVIEWING THE PAST AND EVALUATING THE PRESENT

INTRODUCTION

Recent U.S.-Soviet relations have been characterized as the "worst in recent memory" and as being responsible for "the most peace we've had in ages." Opinions abound on this controversial and vital relationship (e.g., Brian Crozier, "Learning to Love Chernenko" and John McLaughlin, "Fortress Russia," in the 29 June 1984 National Review, "Fusillade of nyets," in the 16 June 1984 Economist, the Debate between Kenneth Adelman and Gerard C. Smith in the 17 June 1984 Washington Post, and others). This brief paper seeks to evaluate through quantitative analysis of the last 18 years of U.S.-Soviet relations the present state of the superpower relationship. Figures and tables appear after the "Conclusion" and a discussion of data and methods is at the end of the paper.

A major finding is that 1983 was an extremely unusual year; it was the peak of a relatively new trend. In 1980, the U.S.-Soviet relationship became dominated by conflictual, as opposed to cooperative, activity and the level of conflictual interaction rose to an all time high in 1983. This reversed nearly ten (10) years in fairly cooperative superpower relations.

ANALYSIS OF THE RELATIONSHIP

Figure 1, displays the general context of the U.S.-Soviet relationship from 1966 to 1983. It is important to note that the values indicate the complete (i.e. reciprocal) nature of the relationship and not just U.S. actions toward the USSR (or just USSR actions to the U.S.). The more specific details of these actions will be discussed shortly.

The best indicator of the overall state of the U.S.-Soviet relationship is the total volume of events between the two nations. Research over the last eighteen years has demonstrated that the total volume of events is a reliable indicator of the amount of confrontation in an international political relationship. Peaks in the data are typically associated with periods of heightened tension between countries. That is, the higher the total number of all events between countries, the more antagonistic is the relationship.

The line in Figure 1 depicts the total volume of events between the U.S. and Soviet Union from 1966 to 1983. The total volume of activity exhibits a number of peaks, all of which are associated with periods of heightened tension between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The most important peaks are in 1970, 1973, 1977, 1980-81 and 1983. These peaks are associated with years in which significant episodes in the superpower relationship took place.



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Incidents in the Middle East contributed to the 1970 peak; "Black September" (Jordan's expulsion of the PLO) and the Egyption-Israeli War of Attrition. The dominant factor forming the 1973 peak was the October War. In 1977-1978 the Ogaden War took place and the incident involving a Soviet brigade in Cuba occurred. Following the December 1979 decision to deploy the Pershing II missiles in Europe and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the conflictual interactions between the Soviet Union and the United States began to increase and reached a peak in 1981. The highest peak for the series occurred in 1983, with an unprecedented volume of 693 events. This volume is primarily attributable to the KAL 007 shootdown, the NATO INF deployments and the breakdown of the arms control negotiations.

Table 1, displays z-scores for the total volume of U.S.-Soviet events. (See the section on "Data and Methods" for more information on z-scores.) A z-score above 2.0 indicates an extreme departure from the normal or routine level of events. The 1983 z-score (2.89) is the highest of the time period, and indicates that relations in 1983 were extremely unusual. That is, using z-scores of the total volume of events as an indicator of confrontation or tension between the U.S. and USSR, U.S.-Soviet relations reached in 1983 their most unusual, and therefore serious, point in the period from 1966 to 1983.

The dashed red line in Figure 2 represents conflictual activity. A peak can be seen in 1970, one in 1973, one in 1977-78, one in 1981, and one in 1983. A generally upward trend in the level of conflict activity between the two superpowers can clearly be seen from 1975 to the present, with the trend indicated by successively higher peaks. Since 1975, the level of conflict activity in the U.S.-Soviet relations has been steadily increasing.

Table 2 provides z-scores for the number of conflict events between the U.S. and Soviet Union. The most unusual years for conflict activity are 1980 (due largely to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the sustained American response to that action) and 1983. The z-score (3.36) associated with 1983, indicates that the level of conflict activity was extremely unusual, more so than the z-score for the total volume. In other words, the high levels of conflict in 1983 were more unusual than the total volume for that year.

Major peaks in cooperative activity (solid blue line) can also be seen in Figure 2. The peak in 1970 again probably reflects the events of the War of Attrition and Black September; the peak in 1973 reflects the voluminous efforts to manage the October War. Recognizing the dangers inherent in a direct superpower confrontation, both nations made a tremendous effort to bring about a resolution of these regional conflicts. The cooperative z-score (2.63) for 1973 in Table 3 supports this observation.



The peak in 1977-78 probably reflects the competitive manner in which the Ogaden War was being treated by the two superpowers (covert support to the belligerents) and again, possibly the Soviet brigade in Cuba incident in 1978. During times of heightened tension, cooperative as well as conflictual activity increase. The peak beginning in 1980 is a direct result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In Table 3, the most unique year is 1973 (with a score of 2.63, very unusual), followed by 1977 (with a score of 1.50).

An interesting finding is that 1983's volume of cooperative events ranks third (behind 1973 and 1977), in addition to being the top year for conflictual events. Research has shown that when hostilities increase, both the conflict and cooperation event totals increase because of conflict management efforts. Conflict management involves meeting, offering proposals, and making agreements as well as making demands, rejecting proposals and criticizing the other nation. This full range of actions contains both cooperative and conflictual events. Therefore, during times of crisis and confrontation, both the cooperative and conflictual, and obviously the total, number of events increase.

From 1982 to 1983, all three categories of behavior---total, cooperative, and conflictual---increased dramatically. The reasons for this can be attributed largely to the Soviet shutdown of Korean Air Lines flight 007, the heightened rhetoric leading up to Moscow's failure to forestall deployment of Cruise and Pershing II missiles in Europe, and the consequent breakdown of the INF and START negotiations. These events brought U.S.-Soviet relations to unprecedented levels of total and conflict activity.

Finally, Figure 2 clearly shows that the volume of conflict activity relative to cooperative activity reversed in 1979-80. As indicated in the Introduction, a major finding was that until 1979 there was typically more cooperative than conflictual activity in the superpower relationship. The period from 1979 to the present has, on the other hand, consistently exhibited more conflict than cooperation, a reversal of the pattern evident for most of the period, 1966-1978.

#### ASSESSMENT OF EACH NATION'S FOREIGN POLICY

To understand more fully the relationship and to get a better idea of the characteristics of each nation's foreign policy toward the other, the data have been arranged for each nation acting toward the other. The same variables (cooperation, conflict, total) are used in this analysis.

Figure 3, depicting U.S. activity to the Soviet Union, indicates that in 1980 the conflictual behavior (dashed red line) of the U.S. toward the Soviet Union for the first time exceeded cooperative behavior (solid blue line). In 1983, conflict



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behavior again exceeded cooperative behavior. Z-scores for U.S. conflict activity toward the Soviet Union showed unusually high levels of activity in only one year -- 1983. The z-score of 3.27 is extremely unusual, suggesting that U.S. policy actions and statements increased dramatically, particularly when compared with previous years of U.S. policy statements and actions. With a conflict activity z-score of 1.36, 1980 was unusual as well, but not to the extent of 1983.

Figure 4, describing Soviet events to the U.S. from 1966 to 1968, shows a preponderance of conflict activity (dashed red line) relative to cooperative activity (solid blue line). In 1969, however, perhaps reflecting Soviet concerns that the U.S. would try to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet border conflict, the level of Soviet cooperative activity toward the U.S. exceeded Soviet conflict activity. The period 1970-71 saw Soviet conflictual behavior (in red) again overshadow cooperative behavior, perhaps reflecting Soviet interest in "Black September" and the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition. The period of detente is perhaps best represented by the high level of cooperation and low level of conflict in 1973, and is anomalous insofar as it produced the highest volume of cooperative events in the series. The z-score associated with 1973 Soviet cooperative events, at 3.19, is very unusual. Since approximately 1976, (the year of the Angola conflict) Soviet conflict behavior has consistently exceeded its cooperative behavior. Further, the gap between conflictual and cooperative behavior has grown dramatically since approximately 1979, with the trend accelerating in 1982-83.

Figure 5 compares U.S. conflict activity (solid blue line) with that of the Soviet Union (dashed red line) during the period 1966-1983. As can be seen from the graph, Soviet conflict behavior typically exceeds that of the U.S. However, U.S. conflictual actions actually exceeded those of the Soviet Union in two years---in 1976 and 1980. The peaks for Soviet conflict behavior are 1970, 1977, 1981 and 1983. The peaks for the U.S. are in 1970, 1973, 1978, 1980 and 1983, with the highest peak in 1983. The figure clearly shows that conflict activity for both the U.S. and Soviet Union actually reached their highest levels in 1983. Further, both the 1983 U.S. conflict activity level (at 197) and the Soviet conflict activity level (at 238) appear to be nearly three times their normal levels.

Examination of U.S. and Soviet conflict activity in Figure 5 makes apparent the high degree of reciprocity in conflict events. Using z-scores to evaluate the unusualness of the conflictual component of foreign policy activity, the Soviet Union, with an unusually high 1983 z-score of 3.29, is comparable to the U.S. z-score of 3.27. This confirms that in 1983 both the U.S. and Soviet Union reached unprecedented levels of conflict activity toward one another.



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Figure 6, U.S. (solid blue line) and Soviet (dashed red line) cooperative behavior, also shows a fairly strong positive relationship between the superpowers' cooperative activity. An intriguing finding is that U.S. cooperative behavior consistently exceeds Soviet cooperative behavior; of all U.S. events toward the USSR, 64.45% were cooperative, while 45.28% of the total of Soviet actions were cooperative. Peaks of this behavior are in 1970, 1973, 1977-78, and 1983, with the highest peak in 1977. There are two interesting aspects of this plot. The first is the very close alignment of the cooperative activity of the two superpowers in the peak year of 1973, the year of the October War---the U.S. and Soviet Union evidently were quite committed to avoiding the ultimate confrontation. The second aspect of interest is the tremendous gap between U.S. and Soviet cooperative activity in 1976 and 1983.

#### 1984: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT

Table 4 contains the preliminary monthly figures for 1984 events in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Based upon these preliminary data, and when compared with other years, 1984 is likely to be the ranked second, after 1983, in terms of total volume. That is, the total volume of events, while not likely to be as high as 1983, is likely to be at a higher level than any other year, including 1973.

Our evaluation of these preliminary data yield another finding. The current average level of conflictual events for 1984 is second only to the levels in 1983. This means that if present trends continue, 1984 is likely to be a very conflictual year, perhaps similar in character to 1983. In fact, if present trends continue, 1984 will contain more conflictual activity than 1980 (the year following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), 1981, or 1982.

#### ADDITIONAL FINDINGS

A number of additional findings from our research bear on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. These will be treated briefly.

- o The Soviets had twice as many weeks as the U.S. which exhibited a higher frequency of conflictual than cooperative behavior toward the other superpower.
- o There is a higher probability that the USSR will be conflictual when the U.S. is cooperative (.33) than the U.S. being conflictual when the USSR is cooperative (.08);
- o There is a higher probability that the U.S. will be cooperative when the USSR is conflictual (.40) than the USSR being cooperative when the U.S. is conflictual (.12);

## CONCLUSION

This paper has outlined the major patterns in the U.S.-Soviet relationship. The study has demonstrated that the two nations work well with one another when managing regional conflicts. But the two nations do not work well in direct "face-to-face" competition or confrontation. According to these data, therefore, 1983 was the "worst in recent memory," due possibly to the fact that the U.S. and the Soviet Union were confronting directly one another over significant bilateral issues and not over conflicts involving client states.

More significant, however, is that a major pattern in the superpower relationship changed between 1979 and 1980. Almost 10 years of predominantly cooperative behavior between the two nations was replaced in 1980 with a new, more antagonistic relationship. In this regard, 1983 was an acute indication of this new trend. As outlined in Table 4, 1984 apparently will maintain this trend. Whether this major realignment of the U.S.-Soviet relations is due to leadership changes in both nations or other factors is impossible to determine from this broad overview. Whatever the case, it now appears (based on these data) that after 10 years, the U.S.-Soviet relationship has undergone dramatic change. Although 1983 was an unusual year, it was chiefly a continuation of a pattern that began three years earlier.

It is still too early to determine the strength of this trend. Because 1984 is an election year a decline in the event indicators is expected; unless of course an incident of the magnitude of the KAL shootdown or an Aghanistan invasion takes place. However, current projections for 1984 indicate that the event total may nearly equal the total for 1973 (year of the October War). This may simply demonstrate that the new era of U.S.-Soviet relations is marked by high levels of activity and that in a few years this new level will become the norm. But experience has shown that high levels of international activity are harbingers of danger and trouble.



FIGURE- 1

# Total U.S. and Soviet Activity, 1966–1983




Table 1


Z-scores for U.S.-Soviet Total Activity

Year	Events	Z-Score
1966	213	-0.79
1967	188	-0.99
1968	209	-0.83
1969	245	-0.55
1970	331	0.11
1971	254	-0.48
1972	303	-0.10
1973	511	1.49
1974	295	-0.17
1975	170	-1.12
1976	214	-0.79
1977	449	1.02
1978	386	0.53
1979	255	-0.47
1980	319	0.02
1981	364	0.36
1982	298	-0.14
1983	693	2.89




	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
	IX									
	I4	Jean Mon								
IX	<del>IX</del>									
	9	(I3, IX)								
				USA COOP						
				USA CONF						
				USA TO						
				USR COOP						
				USR CONF						
				USR TOT						
				COOP						
				CONF						
				TOT						

# Soviet Activity Toward the U.S., 1981-1983







# U.S. Activity Toward the Soviet Union, 1981-1983




# U.S. Activity Toward the Soviet Union, 1983




# Soviet Activity Toward the U.S., 1983



# Soviet Conflict Activity To the U.S., 1981–1983




# Soviet Cooperative Activity To the U.S., 1981-1983






# U.S. Conflict Activity To the USSR, 1981-1983



# U.S. Cooperative Activity To the USSR, 1981-1983



① Eric - Fig 1 doesn't support your point. Coop looks more highly correlated with Total than CONF, except for 1980 to 1985.

Some inconsistencies. You talk about 1973 being a tense year based on Total events but then you say it had the highest coop. I think you need to repackage the entire relationship among Total events / COOP / CONF.

As you know, Total is only COOP + CONF, thus there are only two pieces of info in the three vectors. Total reflects the "action level" between the two superpowers but given the changing correlations B/w Total & COOP/CONF it becomes very tricky to state generalities

② Labels & ~~titles~~ (Fig 1) etc on plots would make references easier.


③ Perhaps too many figures - too much detail. over →

too many highly correlated  
things. Think you could cut  
Tenzian scores with no loss  
of content.




# U.S. and Soviet Tension Scores, 1966–1983

## World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS)



# Percent Cooperation, 1966–1983 World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS)



# Total U.S. and Soviet Behavior, 1966–1983

## World Event/Interaction Survey (WEIS)






Figure 1

