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**Folder Title:** TWIGS (Terrorism) (1)  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER, NSC: RECORDS

**Withdrawer**

DLB 5/22/2007

**File Folder** TWIGS (TERRORISM) (1 OF 2)

**FOIA**

F97-109-3

**Box Number** 91130

DAVID WILLS

30

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
36443	MEMO	WILLIAM CASEY TO THE PRESIDENT, RE: MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: THE THREAT AND POSSIBLE US RESPONSES	1	2/25/1985	B1
36444	PAPER	MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	10	2/15/1985	B1
36445	MEMO	OLIVER NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE: MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES RE: COMBATTING TERRORISM	1	5/14/1984	B1
36446	PAPER	TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES COMBATTING TERRORISM	3	ND	B1
36447	EMAIL	JOHN POINDEXTER TO OLLIE NORTH, RE: TERRORISM MEETING WITH BRITISH	1	5/10/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 8, 1984

NOTE FOR RICHARD BEAL

FROM: CONSTANTINE MENGES *cm*

Attached is a copy of the paper I sent  
Bud McFarlane on February 21. I hope we  
might discuss this in the very near  
future--perhaps over lunch.

Att: (1)



EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ACTION -- AN URGENT PRIORITY FOR THE  
ADMINISTRATION

There is a broad public consensus that the United States must make additional efforts to assure adequate strategic and conventional military forces while pursuing sensible arms control. While much remains to be done in order to translate this widely shared perception into actions which will deter the direct use of Soviet or proxy forces in regions of vital interest, the challenge is now clear to most.

Unfortunately, there is a second dimension of geopolitical danger which is far less well understood at present. Since 1945, the Soviet Union has waged political warfare with some failures but notable success in Eastern Europe, Asia, Cuba, Africa, and more recently the Middle East and Central America. Economically and ideologically the Soviets have many dimensions of profound failure. Unfortunately these failures -- while important -- do not allow us to ignore this arena. Their complex process of working to weaken the democratic nations by encouraging and helping communist or radical groups overthrow pro-western or moderate governments has begun to gain momentum since 1975.

This has been especially true in the Persian Gulf and the Central America/Mexico regions where the outcome of the current invisible war between moderate or anti-communist and pro-Soviet or radical political forces could determine control over the oil and destiny of those two vital regions. For example, the 1979 revolution in Nicaragua, the present virtual dominance of the communist groups there, along with the pace of Cuban supported terrorism in El Salvador and Guatemala all point toward more victories for the totalitarian left in the near future (possibly after forcing right-wing coups or repression by their polarizing tactics.)

That, in turn, could open Mexico to the politics of polarization through terror and destabilization by a coalition of communist, radical and reformist groups opposed to the injustices of the current one-party regime. Mexico might then become "The Iran Next Door" with highly destructive international and domestic political effects.

Experts have disagreed about the extent of Soviet control and direction of each and every anti-western terrorist or guerrilla group. However, the following construct offers a perspective on the nature of the political-paramilitary war being fought against US interests by hostile groups which agree on targets for destabilization and cooperate with each other in various degrees.

Political-Paramilitary War Against US Interests in Three Strategic Arenas

TARGET COUNTRIES

DESTABILIZATION COALITION

Latin America

Colombia  
 Venezuela  
 Central America  
 Panama  
 Belize  
Mexico\*

Cuba  
 Regional communist/guerrilla groups  
 USSR  
 Palestinian terrorists/Libya

Middle East

Egypt  
 Iran  
 Oman  
 North Yemen  
 Egypt  
 Persian Gulf regimes  
Saudi Arabia\*

USSR  
 Pro-Soviet regimes (South Yemen, Syria)  
Cuba  
 Palestinian guerrillas  
 Libya

Africa

Zaire  
 Morocco  
 Sudan  
 Namibia  
South Africa\*

USSR  
Cuba  
 Libya  
 Pro-Soviet regimes (Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique)  
 Regional guerrillas/communist groups (SWAPO)

\*Designates the main strategic target

Effective political action by the United States is an essential but largely missing element of foreign policy. The following three main elements are the ingredients of a sound political action strategy:

Support for reformist, moderate, pro-western forces

- Better political analysis and intelligence to identify friendly/moderate, neutral and hostile groups within the foreign nations of vital interest:
- Timely efforts to provide support to friendly groups such as political parties, labor unions, civic associations, media, religious (public but discreet, covert only if necessary).

International communication

- More energetic communications efforts which take political ideas seriously and bring about honest and vigorous debates with the zealous, often misinformed elites in developing countries who have accepted many of the myths preached by communist and other radical groups concerning the comparative international effects of the democratic and communist nations;
- Finding effective ways to affirm the accomplishments of the industrial democracies in social and economic as well as political terms while factually discussing the repression, economic failure, poverty and elitism of the communist societies.

Offensive action against terrorist, radical groups and their transnational supporting networks -- Soviet, Cuban...

- Improved analysis of the Soviet/radical transnational networks supporting terrorist and destabilizing groups.
- Covert, offensive action to reduce political violence in regions of direct interest by penetration, exposures, harassment and neutralization.
- The discreet use of economic sanctions (and incentives where appropriate) in situations where Soviet sponsored terrorism threatens to succeed before countermeasures can be implemented.
- Sustained efforts to help moderates replace newly established communist or pro-Soviet regimes in important regions; Nicaragua, Grenada, Ethiopia, Angola...

In facing up to the task of organizing for international political action, especially against the Soviet threat, there are several dilemmas that we need to face and that will require careful balancing. The Soviet Union, as a totalitarian system, is able to use the technique of operating differently on two or more levels so that official state behavior and statements are often in sharp contrast to other actions of the government and those it controls and manipulates. Because our decision-making system involves commitment to democratic values, a large public and many centers of power and influence, we have to be effective in a different way.

In brief, a workable program of political action must be constrained by the following considerations:

- 1. Total antagonism to the Soviet Union is not appropriate because of United States public attitudes, attitudes of other countries, and because of the need to work with the Soviets against common hazards and to avoid war.
- 2. Some of the most important problems and dangers in the world have fundamental causes quite apart from the Soviet Union--although the Soviets may exploit these problems and make them much more dangerous.
- 3. Communism is not monolithic: Communists sometimes work against each other and sometimes fight each other.
- 4. The Soviets have great economic weaknesses internally which in combination with a unified Western strategy offer potential sanctions against their political warfare.

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	O. North	2/26	
2	J. Covey	2/26	
3	K. deGraffenreid	2/26	
4	R. McDaniel	2/26	<i>RM</i>
5			
6			

~~SECRET~~

NSC/ICS CONTROL NO. 400185

COPY NO. 1 OF 4

1	ACTION	FILE
	APPROVAL	INFORMATION
2/4	COMMENT	PREPARE REPLY
	CONCURRENCE	RECOMMENDATION
	DIRECT REPLY	RETURN
	DISPATCH	SIGNATURE


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# NSC INTELLIGENCE DOCUMENT



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National Security Council  
The White House

System # TV  
Package # 400185



	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>Staff</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

*Staff cover memo for the President.*

*Action North  
Cmt      Covey  
            deg  
            McDaniel*

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36443 MEMO

1 2/25/1985 B1

WILLIAM CASEY TO THE PRESIDENT, RE:  
MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM: THE THREAT AND  
POSSIBLE US RESPONSES

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36444	PAPER  MIDDLE EAST TERRORISM	10	2/15/1985	B1

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

June 19, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

*Red* *Ollie North*  
*concur*

SUBJECT: Terrorism Incidents

Attached is a draft response to Pat Buchanan's request. These statistics can be misleading or misused since so many of the incidents are minor in nature. Hence the offer for a face-to-face followup.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memo to Pat Buchanan at Tab I forwarding the terrorism statistics.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

Tab I - Memo to Buchanan

Tab A - Terrorism Statistics

MEMORANDUM

4889

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR PATRICK J. BUCHANAN

FROM: JOHN M. POINDEXTER

SUBJECT: Terrorist Incidents

The terrorist statistics you requested are attached at Tab A.

If you wish further interpretation of these statistics or more information, please advise; I will have someone from my staff come by to answer your questions.

Attachment

Tab A - Terrorist Statistics


TERRORIST INCIDENTS AGAINST AMCITS/AMERICAN PROPERTY

YEAR	80	81	82	83	84	85(1 QTR)
WORLDWIDE INCIDENTS(1)	169	162	211	200	146	48
KILLED	9	7	8	271	11	1
INJURED	17	40	11	115	31	1
ARAB INCIDENTS	5	3	5	24	21	5
KILLED	-	-	1	266	4	-
INJURED	-	-	-	105	27	60
PALESTINIAN	4	2	3	5	3	-
KILLED	-	-	1	266	-	-
INJURED	-	-	-	4	3	60
LEBANESE	-	1	2	18	16	3
KILLED	-	-	-	-	4	-
INJURED	-	-	-	101	24	-
OTHER	1	-	-	1	2	2
KILLED	-	-	-	-	-	-
INJURED	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTES:

(1) MOST ARE MINOR INCIDENTS WITH NO INJURIES OR DAMAGE

TERRORIST INCIDENTS  
AGAINST AMCITS/AMERICAN PROPERTY




NOTE: 1985 FIRST QUARTER ONLY

# TOTAL INCIDENT VERSUS ARAB INSTIGATED





# ARAB INSTIGATED INCIDENTS




1985 FIRST QUARTER ONLY

PERPETRATORS OF ARAB INCIDENTS

1980-1985

PALESTINIAN

OTHER



LEBANESE

## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 17, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

PAT BUCHANAN *PB*

For contingency purposes, we ought to have on hand a list of all the attacks upon American citizens and American diplomats in recent years by extremists in the Arab world.

Rod McDaniel,

Please take for action. We should not limit this to Arabs. I'm not sure what point Pat is thinking about making. I believe CIA publishes such a summary. Please send me info red tagged.



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

July 18, 1984

Mr. Richard Beal  
Special Assistant to the President  
Room 303  
Washington, DC 20050

Dear Mr. Beal:

Senior administration officials have declared terrorism as one of the major threats to American foreign policy. The latest CSIS Contingencies Paper "On Terror and Civil Liberties" by CSIS Senior Associate Robert H. Kupperman expands on that theme in several, highly important ways. First, Bob highlights the largely "invisible and ironic" threat posed by terrorism to our civil liberties, namely that overreaction in implementing counter-terrorist policies could provoke a cure as bad or worse than the affliction itself. Second, he suggests exploring the possibility of joint U.S. - Soviet initiatives to control international terrorism. These initiatives may lead nowhere or may only be marginally effective. But, they also might lead to containment of future terrorist related incidents before superpower crisis was precipitated.

This paper is timely and important. We hope it will make a useful contribution.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Harlan K. Ullman".

Harlan K. Ullman  
Project Director



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

## **CONTINGENCIES PROJECT**



Center for Strategic & International Studies  
Georgetown University • Washington DC

ON TERROR AND CIVIL LIBERTIES

by

Robert H. Kupperman  
Senior Associate

July 16, 1984

Within the next several weeks, the 1984 Olympic Games and the two presidential nominating conventions will take place amidst widespread concern over possible terrorist violence. In the aftermath of the bombing of the U.S. Marine compound in Beirut in October 1983, the possibility of terrorist attacks against such potentially lucrative targets both at home and abroad has heightened sensitivities of government officials, some to the point of near-hysteria. But, behind the direct threat terrorism presents, there is a vicious and largely invisible irony lurking. That has to do with overreaction to the threat. Unless extreme caution is exercised, we can cause more problems for America by overreacting against terrorism without due regard for civil liberties and due process of law than we would cause by taking no action at all. This means that any policy initiatives, intended to deal with what is fundamentally an external and international terrorist threat, must not excessively impinge upon the constitutional rights of Americans.

Clearly, the administration needs to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorist policy that is both effective and mindful of the potential pitfalls and damage any overreaction can cause to our rights and privileges. But, to illustrate the potential risks and damage to which our counter-terrorist policies and liberties are subject, one need only examine the Administration's proposed anti-terrorist legislation now in Congress. Of this package, parts of which are innocuous, at least one provision is truly dangerous: a bill which would allow the Secretary of State, without providing any meaningful definition of terrorism, to declare groups and nations terrorists, and which would provide for criminal punishment of Americans who aid those groups or nations. This sort of open-ended legislation, while appealing on the surface, portends the abuse of our constitutionally guaranteed rights. And, it is unlikely to achieve its desired end of reducing international terrorism.

To understand the uneasy relationship between civil liberties and the government's understandable zeal to combat terrorism, we should note that Western societies like the United States are particularly susceptible to terrorist actions. In totalitarian states, there are relatively few opportunities for such activities, and if terrorism does occur, it is simply crushed as a matter of state prerogative. Americans, by contrast, accept a degree of disorder as part of the implicit price we pay for individual liberties. It is this combination of an open society with many leverage points for terrorism, and a society which places fundamental values in protecting human rights and civil liberties, that is the perfect breeding ground for terrorism.

A successful terrorist act itself can be viewed as an attack on the constitutional rights and processes that we take for granted. Those killed in a terrorist bomb explosion have certainly been deprived of their right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. But the real danger to our democratic way of life may not come from terrorism, however horrible any particular act or series of acts of violence might be. We must also guard against an overreaction to terrorism on the part of the government, law enforcement agencies, the intelligence community, and the citizenry as a whole.

Indeed, the most insidious form of terrorism is intended precisely to produce such an overreaction. Through well-publicized attacks against high-ranking officials, sensitive military and industrial targets, or even through random acts of violence in public places (which are all the more frightening for being random), terrorists turn the instruments of a democratic society against itself.

As terrorist acts occur, public and media pressure will grow correspondingly to "do something". That "something" often results in our giving up more than we have lost in the immediate tragedy. For example, a policy of doing proportionate harm to terrorists, or countries sponsoring terrorism, in response to an act of violence may be a sound policy in theory. So too may be covert preemptive measures taken against suspected terrorists. If they are to be successful, these activities demand utmost secrecy -- and herein lie the dangers of unethical behavior and subsequent sensationalized revelations.

Even the administration's proposed legislation itself runs the risk of justifying both legally and practically a policy of guilt by association. Like the McCarthy era, there will be a tendency to take out the frustration of being unable to deal with an invisible enemy by reaching for simplistic and constitutionally corrosive solutions.

This is not to say that action against terrorism is impossible or unnecessary. For example, there are certain chokepoints (nodes) in this country whose destruction would presage a national disaster. The electrical power grid is particularly susceptible to catastrophic regional failures that may not be repairable for weeks or months; this could occur as the result of a few select attacks against critical transformers and switching stations. The financial health of the United States depends on a teleprocessing network between banks and other institutions, a network whose overall and potential vulnerability has not yet been fully assessed. Sabotage against key railroad bridges could snarl large portions of this nation's rail transportation capability, which would be a serious if not fatal blow to our ability to mobilize the armed forces in the event of an international crisis or war. The destruction of critical pumping stations in the natural gas and petroleum pipeline system is also a major concern.

These potential national vulnerabilities do not require draconian corrective measures that necessitate the curtailing of civil liberties. They can best be remedied by prudent prophylactic steps: through physical protection, development of redundant systems, proper training of operating personnel, stockpiling of critical equipment, and organizing effective crisis management capabilities prior to an incident occurring.

The United States may also wish to undertake covert operations as a means of preempting or disrupting a terrorist attack. But again, the advantages of clandestine actions should be weighed against their potential political and constitutional drawbacks. Preemptive or retaliatory actions if mistargeted (poor intelligence) or bungled (amateur operations) have disastrous potential for political overreaction here and abroad. Either the action must be truly covert and held at a distance to be plausibly deniable, or it must be completely overt with the concurrence of Congress and the public at large. Our track record in keeping pro-active responses covert, with the latest example of mining the harbors of Nicaragua, is not very promising. To be effective, the covert mode of response has to be done correctly or not at all.

We must of course continue to develop a versatile intelligence apparatus. Intelligence collection and subsequent analysis, however, often tend to highlight trends which are already evident to any astute observer, missing the more critical activity beneath the surface. In fact, the greatest dangers loom when the noise level appears lowest. When terrorist groups appear to be shooting or bombing everything in sight, they do not have the time, resources, or manpower to undertake a major operation. It is during lulls that competent terrorist groups are best



able to devote their scarce resources to planning, logistics, and their own counter-intelligence for the most devastating attacks. Data collection and analysis will not be sufficient to predict these kinds of operations which the terrorists are at pains to hide. Attempts to penetrate terrorist organizations may force us into the position of looking for a "needle in a haystack" without any guarantees about the reliability of the informants or the information. And, if the information received is too reliable, it is unlikely that the informant will survive for very long.

On the other hand, counter-intelligence activities, including counter-surveillance efforts of potential terrorist targets, can greatly increase the probability of our learning about an impending event. We should put enormous effort in this neglected area both at home and abroad. Our greatest protection from attack is substantive knowledge. What we seldom recognize is that the projected "image" of a forewarned nation (even if only partially true) is itself a powerful tool. We need to develop and organize both our visible and invisible resources -- and then test them to prove that we are, in fact, a "porcupine" target.

Perhaps most importantly, we must realistically address the risk that a terrorist or other unconventional incident could trigger unintended confrontation with another nation, possibly with the Soviet Union. While it is encouraging to see the acceptance of a counter-terrorism responsibility by the administration, it is equally frightening to contemplate possible actions (and overreactions stemming therefrom) which increase international tension.

Consider, for example, the potential for escalation had we retaliated against Syria for its involvement in the Beirut massacre. A successful counterattack -- the deployment of an elite team to assassinate the Syrian officials in charge of planning and logistical support -- would likely not have resulted in unbridled military escalation. But suppose the "hit team" had failed; our elite forces caught, publicly tried, and executed. We could have provided a terrorism-sponsoring nation with a cause celebre in which they become the heroes and we the villains of the drama. The U.S. leadership would then have had to face the equally unpalatable options of appearing politically and militarily impotent or returning with a larger force. Given the immediate and often editorial scrutiny of a global media, the pressure for an instantaneous, decisive, military response -- action which might engage the Soviet Union as well -- would be great.

Any new policy must also address the pivotal role of the media in such incidents. The media molds public perceptions about the success or failure of any open confrontation, about the prowess of our enemies, and about the compe-

tence of our leaders in the face of the apparent threat. The American experience in the Iranian desert was presented not simply as a complicated maneuver that failed -- but as a debacle, a symbol of American command weakness and presidential bungling. Whether it is their intention or not, the media can transform small embarrassments into large ones, increasing the potential for even more risky military actions which could place the White House and the rest of the world at the edge of an abyss. Again, the necessity to avoid overreaction must constantly be paramount.

Finally, the United States must develop a capability to contain the escalatory pressure resulting from terrorist attacks abroad. We must be able to recognize threats -- even classes of threats -- in which we have a comity of interest with the Soviets. We ought to be able to develop jointly with the Soviets the techniques and institutions to contain crises at the margins. Indeed, if such arrangements are possible, their deterrent effect could be very positive. In fact, we may not be able to prevent or resolve successfully every unconventional attack in every troubled area on the globe, but we can and must assure that a single incident does not snowball into a cataclysmic series of events.

Countering terrorism is at best a "balancing act" -- on the one hand we seek effective operational means (intelligence collection, physical security, and police interdiction); on the other hand we run the risk of trampling upon our civil liberties by taking such measures. Were a serious terrorist attack to occur here, we might react convulsively and to our own detriment. Domestic intelligence collection and other infringements of privacy could explode, lists of undesirables might be drawn up, and calls for preventive detention could become deafening.

The need to take effective measures could be used to excuse virtually any behavior. Slowly, a new McCarthyism could metastasize within our society: on national security grounds, a White House might censor the more vexsome elements of the press; the need to monitor politically objectionable groups might be condoned as a temporary measure; and those who would speak out against the government's actions might be branded subversive.

These are not predictions of things to come; they are warnings of what might be if we do not deal thoughtfully with the problems of countering terrorism. Terrorism is real. We will have to act in legal and forceful ways to combat it.

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36445 MEMO

1 5/14/1984 B1

OLIVER NORTH TO JOHN POINDEXTER, RE:  
MEETING WITH BRITISH REPRESENTATIVES RE:  
COMBATTING TERRORISM

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Patrick Henry WRIGHT CMC

Born: 28 June 1931

MARRIED WITH 2 SONS AND 1 DAUGHTER  
WIFE'S NAME: VIRGINIA

1955 Foreign Office  
1956 Middle East Centre for Arabic Studies,  
Shemlan, Lebanon  
1957 Foreign Office  
1958 Second Secretary, British Embassy, Beirut  
1960 Private Secretary to HM Ambassador,  
Washington  
1963 First Secretary, Washington  
1965 Private Secretary to Permanent Under-  
Secretary, Foreign Office  
1968 First Secretary and Head of Chancery,  
British Embassy, Cairo  
1971 Deputy Political Resident, Bahrain  
1972 Head of Middle East Department, Foreign  
and Commonwealth Office  
1974 Private Secretary to the Prime Minister  
1977 HM Ambassador and Consul-General,  
Luxembourg  
1979 HM Ambassador, Damascus  
1982 *DEPUTY* Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee,  
and Deputy Under-Secretary, Foreign and  
Commonwealth Office

1984

*Appointed Ambassador to Saudi Arabia.*

## BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

### Robin J O'NEILL

Chief of Assessments Staff since June 1981.

Born 1932. Foreign Office 1955. Third Secretary. Ankara, 1957. Second Secretary, Dakar, 1961. Foreign Office 1963. First Secretary 1964. Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 1966. Private Secretary to the Minister of State, Foreign Office, 1967. First Secretary, Bonn, 1968. Counsellor 1972. On secondment to the Cabinet Office 1972. Head of South Asian Department 1975. Deputy Governor and Political Adviser, Gibraltar, 1978.


Married, with three children (2 daughters both 1959 and 1965; one son born 1962).

### Andrew F GREEN

Representative in Washington of Joint Intelligence Committee since August 1982.

Born 1941. 1959-62 Cambridge University - BA in Natural Sciences and Economics; 1962-65 Infantry Officer British Army; 1965-67 School of Arabic; 1968 Second Secretary, Aden; 1970 First Secretary and Head of Chancery, Abu Dhabi; 1972 Eastern European and Soviet Department, FCO; 1975 Private Secretary to Minister of State; 1977 First Secretary UK Delegation to the OECD, Paris; 1979 Economic Relations Department, FCO; 1982 Counsellor in Washington.

Married 1968 to Jane Churchill (1 daughter born 1970; 1 son born 1973).





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JOHN POINDEXTER TO OLLIE NORTH, RE:  
TERRORISM MEETING WITH BRITISH

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