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Withdrawer

RBW 9/24/2009

File Folder CHINESE -KOREAN INITIATIVE 1983-1984 (2 OF 2)

FOIA

F07-057/1

Box Number 5

WAMPLER

32

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
76482	CABLE	SEOUL 00682	3	1/21/1984	B1
76485	MEMO	TO DONALD GREGG, SIGUR, JAMES KELLY, ET AL RE. IG MTG. ON KOREA	1	1/23/1984	B1 B3
76488	PAPER	RE. NORTH KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76485]	6	ND	B1
76490	TALKING PTS.	RE. NORTH KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76488]	3	ND	B1
76491	CHECKLIST	RE. SOUTH KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1
76493	CHECKLIST	RE. NORTH KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1
76495	CABLE	RE. KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1 B3
76497	CHECKLIST	RE. KOREA	1	2/9/1984	B1
76499	CABLE	RE. KOREA	8	3/9/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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76502 CHECKLIST	RE. KOREA	1	6/13/1984	B1
76505 CABLE	BEIJING 23106	6	12/11/1984	B1

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76490	TALKING PTS. RE. NORTH KOREA [ATTACHED TO DOC. 76488]	3	ND	B1

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76491	CHECKLIST RE. SOUTH KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1

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76493	CHECKLIST RE. NORTH KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1

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76495	CABLE RE. KOREA	1	2/2/1984	B1 B3

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76497	CHECKLIST RE. KOREA	1	2/9/1984	B1

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76499	CABLE RE. KOREA	8	3/9/1984	B1


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MAY
1984

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL SOCIETY OF KOREA
SEOUL, KOREA

SOUTH-NORTH DIALOGUE IN KOREA



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Part I

Reaffirmation of Consistent Commitment to Peaceful Unification

1. President Chun's 1984 Policy Statement

— National Unification without Recourse to Violence —

President Chun Doo Hwan delivered this year's policy statement before the 120th extraordinary session of the National Assembly on January 17, 1984. In the statement, President Chun, stating that a hatred of terrorism and a belief in peace are entrenched in his mind as overriding imperatives, called for the establishment of a world free of violence, the realization of unification without force and the elimination of violence from politics and the society this year.

Elaborating on the direction of the year's major policy programs as based on an attachment to peace and the elimination of violence, President Chun reiterated that there is no change in the government's unification policy which is built on the principles of peace and national self-determination. "North Korea has come under worldwide condemnation. Yet we are waiting and will continue to try to induce them to the conference table in the belief that there is no alternative to an inter-Korean dialogue to solve the question of unification," said the President.

The Chief Executive said that when the North Koreans perpetrated the terrorist bombing in Rangoon, the Republic did not react with arms against them not because it was weak or had no means to do so but because its commitment to the cause of peace is so strong. President Chun, however, was quick to warn that "If North Korea does not repent and persist in terrorist provocations which endanger our survival, we will not hesitate to punish them for further provocations."

Pointing out that their policy to communize the South by force of arms and refusal to participate in inter-Korean dialogue will no longer be countenanced or accepted by anyone, the President expressed the conviction that "If North Korea ever renounces the use of force and agrees to our rational unification approach based on the principles of peace and national self-determination, it

would be a truly epochal opportunity to achieve unification in the 1980s."

The part of President Chun's policy statement relating to the inter-Korean question is as follows:

I am thankful that the fortunes of the nation and the concern of my fellow citizens protected and delivered me from the disaster of the terrorist attack at the Aung San Mausoleum last year. As head of the mission, I witnessed the untimely death of some of its members, escaping myself by only a hair's breadth. Grieving at the loss of such able officials, I am convinced that terrorism is the greatest enemy of peace and happiness.

I have always believed in peace as strongly as anyone. But now I must tell you that my hatred of terrorism and belief in peace are entrenched in my mind as overriding imperatives. All of you experienced the same bitterness and emotions. I am convinced that every one of our fellow countrymen share the same thoughts and convictions.

Peace and justice are common ideals cherished by all mankind. They are not the preserve of any period, nation or individual. However, we have suffered the horrors of aggression for many centuries, and as a result have cultivated a commitment to peace stronger than any other in the world. Even today we are troubled by the aftermath of the 36 years of colonial rule, the division of the country and the fratricidal conflict. The repudiation of war resulting from these pains is an urgent imperative for all our contemporaries.

I feel bound to emphasize again that the eradication of violence and the realization of peace and justice are primary

goals of the Fifth Republic which is determined to change the course of history from one of humiliation and hardship. Our efforts to build a nation in the forefront is an attempt to fulfill that historic mission.

The traumatic experiences of the past year have taught that it is not enough to pay lip service to peace and security because they directly affect our safety, livelihood and the fate of this generation and those to come. In the fourth year of the Fifth Republic, I trust that our determination to establish a world free of violence, achieve reunification without force and eliminate violence from politics and the society at large will be translated into action.

A belief in peace and an opposition to violence are at the heart of our attempts to achieve reunification, a goal which is unquestionably basic to the happiness and welfare of the people. The division of the country is a major source of the suffering and unhappiness of all our 60 million compatriots who have a common ethnic, cultural and historic background. It is imperative, therefore, that unification be achieved by peaceful means for violence would only result in more suffering and unhappiness.

All citizens should renew their determination to do their part to prepare for unification in the interest of the national good and well-being. This spirit has inspired my persistent efforts to achieve peaceful unification in accordance with the principle of national self-determination. Last year, here in your presence, I called for the early convocation of a meeting of the top leaders of South and North Korea. I suggested that we should discuss the proposals of both sides with an open mind to prevent war and achieve unification.

The North Korean Communists, however, have continued

to hold out against peace, sabotage dialogue, prepare for war and employ terrorist tactics. They have massacred their compatriots and perpetrated other atrocities wherever and whenever possible. They thus undermine national harmony and have enshrouded their society behind a thick wall of seclusion. They purposely threaten national homogeneity and perpetrate division by refusing to allow North Koreans to meet their compatriots in the South. The North Korean Communists have not yet uttered a single word accepting responsibility or apologizing for the Rangoon murders. They continue to lie and gloss over their crime. Such absurd behavior has made them look ridiculous to the rest of the world.

Nevertheless, we have waited with patience and self-restraint for them to repent and we will continue to do so. We did not react with arms against North Korea at the time of the Rangoon bombing not because we were weak or had no means to do so but because of our commitment to the cause of peace. This firmness of purpose and commitment on our part remains as strong as ever.

North Korea has come under worldwide condemnation. Yet we are waiting and will continue to try to induce them to the conference table in the belief that there is no alternative to an inter-Korean dialogue to solve the question of unification. The North Korean Communists must understand our true intentions. They should make no mistake that our commitment to peace does not extend to violent threats to our very survival.

We are strong enough to ensure survival. Their repeated attempts to infiltrate armed agents into the South have been quickly intercepted and aborted by the thoroughly prepared armed forces and through the alertness of the public. Any

armed provocation will be nipped in the bud.

If North Korea does not repent and reform and if they persist in terrorist provocations which endanger our survival, we will not hesitate to punish them so severely as to incapacitate them for further provocations. This is my warning to them.

Their continued policy to communize the South by military means and refusal to participate in a South-North dialogue will no longer be countenanced or accepted by anyone. Our determination to achieve peace has matured and our power to achieve unification has become greater. If North Korea ever renounces the use of force and agrees to our rational unification approach based on the principles of peace and self-determination, I believe it will be a truly epochal opportunity to achieve unification in the 1980s.

2. President Chun's Policy Statement and the Nation's Belief in Peace

Having suffered countless alien incursions, national division and even a fratricidal conflict, Koreans have come to desire peace and abhor violence more than any other people. Especially through the shocking downing of a Korean Air Lines plane by the Soviets and the terrorist bombing by North Korea in Rangoon, the Korean people were again made to realize that the rooting of peace on this land and the elimination of violence are essential to their national survival and prosperity.

Only those peoples who have undergone the bitterness of invasion, subjugation and war can realize the true meaning of peace. Many decades ago, patriotic fighters actually practiced a philosophy of peace under the Japanese colonial rule through an unparalleled non-violent resistance movement known as the 1919

Samil Independence Movement. In a declaration of independence, the Koreans made it clear at that time that the eventual objective of their movement was to realize the co-existence and co-prosperity of all peoples in peace and to embody humanism based on international justice. They then mounted a relentless yet peaceful resistance against injustice and violence. "Oh, a new world unfolds before us. An age of force has gone and a period of ethics has come..." This resounding shout in the declaration shows that the Samil Independence Movement was intended not merely to resist the Japanese imperialists and obtain independence but also to call for a worldwide peace campaign as well as an anti-violence drive.

Peace is apt to be understood as a "state without war." But, a "state without war" is always a passing and casual peace and a "state of uneasiness" depending on the times. On the Korean peninsula, an unstable state of truce, not peace, has persisted for the more than 30 years since the Korea War came to a halt. Such an unstable state cannot be called peace, especially in this age when peoples are under the constant threat of nuclear weapons.

While pointing out the unstable condition of world peace, Pope Paul VI said in a speech before the United Nations General Assembly in 1965, "A genuine peace is not the one built merely on a materialistic and worldly basis, but should take root eventually in man's conscience." Thus seen, a positive peace may well begin, as Immanuel Kant once said, with the "state of cessation of all hostile conduct." Moreover, a durable peace can take root only when a state of mutual independence, equality, respect and cooperation exists between the parties involved. No genuine peace can ever come into being if inequality, subjugation, confrontation and distrust exist.

Such a positive meaning of peace can be found in the Charter of the United Nations. Article 1, Chapter I of the Charter, "Objective of the United Nations," says in part that the United Nations is:

1) ... to maintain international peace and security, and to that end to take effective collective measures for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace... and further to coordinate and resolve with peaceful means all international disputes and states threatening peace, based on the principles of justice and international law...

2) ... to develop good neighborly relations among nations on the basis of respecting all the nations' rights to equality and self-determination, and to take proper measures to consolidate peace of all human beings...

3) ... to respect and promote all persons' human rights and freedom without any discrimination due to race, sex, language and religion, and to promote international cooperation to resolve various problems in the economic, social, cultural and humanitarian areas...

As these provisions of the United Nations Charter prescribe, today's world demands peace of a kind wherein war and violence can be renounced thoroughly and hostilities ended by transcending differences in ideologies, religion, race and national boundaries. The Marxist-Leninists call for "peace for classes" or "war of justice" can no longer be justified.

Nonetheless, violent rampages and peace-threatening acts never cease to occur around the world as friction and disputes fueled by the East-West ideological confrontation, clash in national interests and religious prejudices.

Of course, it is natural for countries to place their own interests above others in the international community. However, in today's age of nuclear weapons when human destiny is intertwined more tightly than at any other time in the past, all nations should share common responsibility for world peace and security, and cooperate closely with one another.

Already beset with such serious problems as the population explosion, the depletion of resources and the polluting of the

environment, man today is confronted with yet another threat—nuclear war. In other words, this is an uneasy and perilous age for reckless violence can ignite a dreadful nuclear world war at any time and any place.

It is against this backdrop that the Korean peninsula is considered one of the most volatile areas in the world in view of its history and geopolitical position, that is the tense military confrontation between world powers having stakes in Korea and between South and North Korea.

In particular, the downing of a KAL airliner by the Soviets and the terrorist bombing by North Koreans in Burma last year have further increased tension on the Korean peninsula, adding to the danger of a military clash in this part of the world.

It was at such a grave juncture that President Chun, in his policy statement of the year, reiterated his rejection of violence as well as his belief in peace, disclosing the policy resolve of the Fifth Republic “to establish a world free of violence, achieve unification without force and eliminate violence from politics and the society.”

Pointing out that “a belief in peace and an opposition to violence” constitute the Republic’s basic stance toward realizing the paramount task of unification, President Chun emphasized that national reconciliation forged through inter-Korean dialogue is the only shortcut to peaceful unification.

The President deplored the fact that the world order is being destroyed and that the danger of war is forever escalating because some countries and groups are attempting to solve problems through violence. President Chun particularly stressed that the North Korean Communists, indulging in the destruction of world order and the killing of their own brethren, are the most bellicose, violent group standing in the way to national reconciliation and world peace.

Warning that the violence they pursue would only lead to their further isolation and eventual self-destruction, President Chun

again warned North Korea not to underestimate the South's patience and resolve for peace, and to repent and return quickly to the table of inter-Korean dialogue.

The President also reaffirmed the peaceful unification policy by stating, "If North Korea ever renounces the use of force and agrees to our rational unification approach based on the principles of peace and national self-determination, it would be a truly epochal opportunity to achieve unification in the 1980s."

President Chun's statement regarding inter-Korean relations was meant to make known to everyone the South's true intention and to call upon North Korea to join early in the sacred duty of achieving national unification. It was made in the conviction that despite North Korea's intransigence and incessant provocative acts, the efforts to bring durable peace and expedite unification cannot be halted under any circumstances.

The President reiterated the nation's belief in peace when he stated, "It would be a contradiction in terms to call for world peace and justice if we were to resort to violence to solve our own problems." President Chun thus stressed that the country's efforts to promote lasting peace and unification on the Korean peninsula constitute an inevitable part in the creation of a history of world peace.

3. Domestic Reactions

The press circles in Korea positively welcomed the remarks President Chun made in his policy statement, commenting that the President's stressing of the importance of peace and justice was quite timely in view of the situations at home and abroad. All newspapers, for instance, allotted large spaces to the policy statement under such headings as "Freedom from Violence," "Time to Initiate New Order of Non-Violence in Pursuit of Peace and Justice," and "Realization of Peace and Justice through Violence-Free Politics and Order." The newspapers observed that

the idea of the "the eradication of violence and the realization of peace and justice," constitutes a distinct milestone in the President's political philosophy.

At the same time, leading figures in various social strata and positions expressed their unreserved support and trust in President Chun's unswerving commitment to the realization of peaceful unification.

Part II

A Call for Direct Dialogue between South and North Korea

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Part II

between South and North Korea

A Call for Direct Dialogue

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1. Minister of National Unification Sohn Issues Statement to North Korea

On January 11, 1984, Minister of National Unification Sohn Jaeshik issued a statement concerning the North Korean proposal for a tripartite meeting in which the Minister charged that North Korea assumes an attitude that can in no way be considered a basis for sincere dialogue.

The Minister noted that after committing such a heinous act of terrorism in Burma the North Korean authorities had the audacity to declare that the incident was fabricated instead of apologizing, and that they have been attempting to shift the responsibility for the intensification of tensions to the South.

Stressing in the statement that the question of unification should be solved basically through a direct dialogue between South and North Korean because it is an internal national problem of Koreans, Minister Sohn urged North Korea to agree to a meeting between the highest authorities of South and North Korea, which the South had already proposed. The Minister added that if it is difficult for such a meeting to take place immediately, at least a ministerial-level meeting should be held.

At the same time, Minister Sohn showed flexibility regarding the question of holding a meeting of relevant countries when he said, "It would be constructive to call an enlarged meeting including those countries directly or indirectly responsible for the division of Korea and the Korean War to help guarantee a permanent peace on the peninsula and foster an international atmosphere conducive to unification."

The full text of Minister Sohn's statement follows.

In the hope of restoring trust between South and North Korea and laying a solid foundation for peaceful unification,

our government proposed, on January 12, 1981, an exchange of visits by the top leaders of South and North Korea, and on June 5, proposed a direct meeting between the two leaders at a time and place to be decided by the North Koreans. On January 22, 1982, the government announced the Formula for National Reconciliation and Democratic Unification and again on January 18, 1983, set forth four immediate tasks to be discussed and solved at a meeting of the top leaders. We have thus continuously worked to bring about peace and unification by easing tension on the peninsula and fostering reconciliation. Despite these efforts, there is still tension and no contact or dialogue has facilitated relations, due to North Korea's rejection of dialogue and use of violence.

The reckless North Korean provocations over the past year have aggravated inter-Korean relations to a perilous degree. And, as the North Koreans themselves have said, another war on the Korean peninsula would not remain a local conflict but would quickly become an international war, a nuclear war. It behooves us all to prevent such a catastrophe.

The North Korean authorities first brought up the question of tripartite talks on October 8, 1983, the day before the terrorist bombing in Burma; they renewed the suggestion on December 3, 1983, the very day they tried to infiltrate armed agents into Tadaep'o; and this morning they made the proposal again.

After the atrocity in Burma, the North Koreans groundlessly claimed they had been framed and refused to take responsibility or apologize. Instead, just as a thief cries "thief" to draw attention from himself, they attempted to shift the blame onto us for heightening tensions. Such an attitude is hardly the basis for a sincere dialogue.

As a basis for peace, unification and national reconciliation, the North Korean authorities must first, officially or unofficially, take responsibility for the Burma

incident, which has angered the whole world, apologize, and punish those responsible. Since unification is an internal problem, it is important for the South and North to talk together, restore understanding and trust. I am convinced that a dialogue and the joint solution, under the scrutiny of the rest of the world, of the problems dividing us is the only way to preserve national dignity.

To remedy the tense relations and explore the possibilities for peaceful unification, there should be a meeting of the top leaders of the two sides, as we have already proposed. If such is difficult, at least there should be a meeting of South and North Korean cabinet-level officials. Such a dialogue should discuss and solve the question of a non-aggression pact to ease tension and halt the arms race.

If such talks make smooth progress, it would be constructive to call an enlarged meeting including those countries directly or indirectly responsible for the division of Korea and the Korean War to help guarantee a permanent peace on the peninsula and foster an international atmosphere conducive to unification. If the North Korean authorities are truly interested in participating with us in the sacred task of unification, they must immediately cease their violent ways and join in such a dialogue; should they refuse, it would prove to the world that their peace-proposals have been deceptive. I am positive that if the North Koreans would join us in responding affirmatively to the need to alleviate tension and to achieve national reconciliation, we would have an epochal opportunity to achieve unification in the 1980s.

The position of the South as shown in Minister Sohn's statement boils down to a demand for official or unofficial apology for the Burma incident, and the punishment of those responsible; a call for the resumption of a direct dialogue between the authorities of South and North Korea over the Korean question; and the

disclosure of its stand toward a possible meeting of those countries responsible for the partitioning of the Korean peninsula and the Korean War.

Demand for Official or Unofficial Apology for Burma Incident and Punishment of Responsible Persons

It is a well-known fact that ever since national division North Korea has continued to use violence in their unending acts of provocation, and that the tension on the Korean peninsula has been due to North Korea's scheme to bring the South under their control by force of arms.

Moreover, their call for a dialogue while alleging the terrorist bombing they perpetrated in Burma to be a frame-up wrought by the South, cannot but be taken as a fraudulent machination designed to cover up their terrorism.

The demand of the South for Pyongyang's admittance of and apology for the Burma incident as well as the punishment of those responsible, stems from its basic stand that a constructive dialogue based on inter-Korean trust can take place only when North Korea departs from their violent habits and prove their genuine willingness, if any, to enter a dialogue with the South.

And, the demand for an official or unofficial admittance of, and apology for, the terrorist bombing, derives from the South's resolve and broadmindedness regarding the question of inter-Korean dialogue. Seoul's position is that if it is difficult for the North to admit to the bombing and apologize openly because of their position internationally, then they may take some other acceptable measure to show their sincerity toward dialogue.

Direct Inter-Korean Dialogue
Best Method of Solving Korean Question

The idea of realizing unification through a direct dialogue based on the principle of national self-determination is the core of the unification policy the government of the Republic of Korea steadfastly pursues. The idea is well justified and persuasive for a number of reasons.

First, the ultimate objective of unification lies in the bringing about of the happiness and well-being of all the members of the Korean nation. Therefore, the question of national unification is basically a problem for the Koreans themselves, and the Korean question should naturally be solved by Koreans.

Of course, there is no denying that national division was caused by outside forces and that the interests of the world powers are entangled in the Korean peninsula. Still, inasmuch as unification has been hampered by political confrontation and distrust between the two sides of Korea, this internal problem ought to be solved first through dialogue and negotiations between the direct parties — South and North Korea.

Second, the world community has today entered an age of uncertainty and instability, an age utterly unpredictable because of the ever increasing selfishness among nations and clashes over national interests. Under the circumstances, the only way to firmly assure national survival and prosperity is for the Koreans themselves to explore and develop their rights and interests. In fact, the Koreans have learned this historical lesson in the past century through such tribulations as alien incursions, loss of national sovereignty, national division and a fratricidal war.

Third, the inter-Korean agreement in the historic July 4 South-North Joint Communique on the three principles for national unification — independence, peace and national unity — also means that the nation's right to self-determination and the

solution of problems between the direct parties involved — South and North Korea — should be the basis for resolving the unification question.

It is a contradiction for North Korea to reject a direct inter-Korean dialogue and adhere to a so-called tripartite meeting while talking about “expelling outside forces,” “independence” and “national integrity” with respect to the question of national unification. It is also an affront to the South-North Joint Communiqué which they solemnly pledged before the nation to abide by.

To improve the strained inter-Korean relations and explore the road to peaceful unification under these circumstances, the two sides of Korea, the direct parties involved, should sit face to face. The question of a declaration of non-aggression the North proposed could naturally be discussed and decided at such a direct meeting.

The Desirability of a Meeting of the Countries
Responsible Directly or Indirectly for the Partitioning
of Korea and the Korean War

What is most desirable is to solve the pending and future problems facing Korea through a direct dialogue between South and North Korea. Considering, however, the entangled stakes the world powers have in the Korean peninsula, a meeting of those countries having something to do directly or indirectly with the partitioning of Korea and the Korean War, too, is considered advisable if it can contribute to the securing of a durable peace on this land and the fostering of an international atmosphere conducive to unification.

If such a meeting is organized reasonably and operated effectively as hoped for, it could be a good impetus to solving the

unification question through direct dialogue between South and North Korea. Such a meeting between the direct parties to the Korean War could also provide an opportunity to establish an apparatus to ease tension on the Korean peninsula, prevent the recurrence of war and secure peace. At the same time, depending on its progress, such a meeting could be developed into an international system guaranteeing peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, even if a meeting of relevant countries takes place, South and North Korea should play the main role in solving the unification question inasmuch as the Korean issue is basically a question of South and North Korea. The role of such relevant countries should be limited to assisting and cooperating in an inter-Korean dialogue in much the way a helper would.

2. North Korean Proposal for a Tripartite Meeting

North Korea held a joint meeting of the Central People's Committee and the Standing Council of the Supreme People's Assembly on January 10, 1984, during which they adopted a letter to the government of the Republic of Korea and the U.S. Administration and Congress, proposing a so-called tripartite meeting. The contents of the letter were broadcast through Radio Pyongyang the following day, January 11.

Gist of Proposal

— In order to dissolve the state of military confrontation and ease tension between South and North Korea, we have decided to hold a tripartite meeting between the U.S. and North Korea with the inclusion of South Korea.

— At a tripartite meeting, the question of concluding a peace agreement could be discussed between the U.S. and

North Korea, while South and North Korea may discuss the issue of adopting a bilateral non-aggression declaration.

— A peace agreement could include the question of U.S. military withdrawal from Korea, while a non-aggression declaration may include the issues of mutual non-use of military force and mutual reduction of arms.

— Once a peace agreement is concluded between the U.S. and North Korea, and a non-aggression declaration is adopted between South and North Korea through a tripartite meeting, a political conference like a pan-national meeting could be held between South and North Korea separate from a tripartite meeting to discuss the question of establishing a confederal state of Korea.

— The tripartite meeting could be held either at Panmunjom or a third country deemed convenient.

Treacherousness of Proposal

No sincerity can be found in the North Korean proposal for a tripartite meeting, nor does it indicate any change in their past negativism toward dialogue.

On first glance, it may appear from the North Korean proposal that they have backed down from their past position that South Korea attend merely as an observer a U.S.-North Korean meeting designed to replace the Armistice Agreement with a peace treaty. But, their latest idea is, in effect, to exclude South Korea from the discussion of the question of concluding a peace agreement by insisting that in a tripartite meeting a peace agreement should be concluded between the U.S. and North Korea along with the discussion of the issue of withdrawing American troops from the Republic of Korea.

This indicates that there is no change whatsoever in their

scheme to conclude a peace agreement with the U.S. over the head of South Korea and thereby speed the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea. The tripartite meeting they suggest is, thus, tripartite in name only. It is merely a deceptive overture intended to achieve their long-standing goals of Washington-Pyongyang talks, a peace agreement and the withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

Second, North Korea says that the questions of concluding a peace agreement and adopting a non-aggression declaration can be discussed at a tripartite meeting. In effect, however, they insist that both the conclusion of a peace agreement and the pullout of U.S. forces are prerequisite to peace and unification, thus suggesting that they can discuss the issue of adopting a non-aggression declaration between the two sides of Korea only after the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States.

This peace agreement first and non-aggression declaration later policy was explained clearly in the remarks Pyongyang's charge d'affaires to Peking Kim Chang-kyu made in a press conference, January 13, 1984. Kim said, "In the tripartite meeting we proposed, the questions of concluding a peace agreement between North Korea and the U.S. and withdrawing U.S. forces from South Korea should be discussed first."

What North Korea is after with its latest offer is to achieve the departure of American troops from Korea and the opening of a channel of direct talks with the United States. Their ulterior intent, once the goal of a peace agreement with the U.S. is achieved, is to deliberately drag on talks for a non-aggression declaration until they disrupt the talks altogether after which they would invent some excuse to shift the blame for the break-off to the South.

Moreover, North Korea used the term "agreement" in their call for a peace agreement with the U.S. whereas they chose the word "declaration" in regards to the issue of non-aggression which allegedly would feature the renouncement of the use of military

force and arms reduction. This is another area where their insincerity is evident.

An agreement, as is well known, is a kind of treaty made between states or other parties on paper, that is legally binding, whereas a declaration, designed to openly announce a matter or matters agreed on between states or other parties, is a political act which is not legally binding. The North Korean attempt to adopt a non-aggression pledge in the form of a declaration stems from their scheme to scrap it in due course at their discretion without being bound by any legal obligation, just as they denied the existence of the South-North Coordinating Committee established under the express terms of the July 4 South-North Joint Communique.

Third, North Korea asserts that as a solution to the unification question, their idea of a confederation system should be discussed at an inter-Korean political conference like a grand national conference held separate from a tripartite meeting after the adoption of a peace agreement and a non-aggression declaration through a tripartite meeting. This makes it clear that they are scheming to reject a dialogue in connection with their demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and the conclusion of a peace agreement with the United States, and to put off the discussion of the unification question until the remote future.

This is adequate proof that there is no change in their negative attitude toward a direct inter-Korean dialogue.

Moreover, it is worth noting that North Korea first raised the issue of a tripartite meeting through Mainland China on October 8, 1983, just one day before the Burma incident; renewed the proposal on December 3, 1983, the very day when they infiltrated armed agents to the Tadaepo beach; and, on January 11, 1984, when they openly proposed a tripartite meeting, they publicized over Radio Pyongyang the contents of an interview Kim Il-sung had with a Romanian journalist, which said in part, "It is difficult to have a dialogue with South Korean authorities... Even if a

dialogue is held, it would be totally meaningless." All of these actions stem from their time-worn policy to make themselves appear as though working hard for peace while secretly conspiring something crooked, just as they proposed the formation of a single inter-Korean legislature on June 19, 1950, barely one week before they unleashed the southward aggression.

The Ulterior Motive behind the Proposal

The ulterior motive behind their proposal for a tripartite meeting can be explained as follows.

First, they are seeking a way out of the diplomatic isolation resulting from the Burma incident and also a way to save their declining international prestige.

The attempt on the life of President Chun they conspired in Burma was harshly denounced as violent, anti-civil and barbaric even by Communist-bloc countries as well as the Western world. Faced with the danger of the ultimate collapse of their diplomatic base, they devised the idea of a tripartite meeting in a desperate attempt to find an outlet.

Second, riding the tide of the efforts of the world powers to promote stability on the Korean peninsula, they attempted to mislead world opinion by seeking to build up a peace-oriented image. Of note is the fact that they openly proposed the tripartite meeting at a time when world attention was drawn to the Korean peninsula as the issue of easing tension in Korea emerged as a major topic of a Washington-Peking summit meeting, and that they offered the idea in the form of a direct proposal to both the U.S. Administration and U.S. Congress.

Besides, North Korea apparently made the offer as a stratagem to intensify agitation and subversion against the South, expecting that favorable conditions for such activities could be easily

developed owing to the U.S. presidential election, the visit to Korea by the Pope and an overheating of the election fever in the South this year.

Third, taking into account the U.S.'s reluctance to enter any dialogue with Pyongyang unless South Korea is allowed to participate on the same footing as a full participant, North Korea is seeking the realization of contacts with the United States by dragging Seoul into the talks as a "relevant" party. They are thereby attempting to take the initiative regarding the Korean question and hasten the removal of the U.S. forces, which they consider a major obstacle to the communization of the South.

Fourth, in a bid to take the offensive in regard to a dialogue for national unification, which the Republic of Korea has repeatedly proposed since the birth of the Fifth Republic, they feign interest in a dialogue in order to escape censure for shunning talks with the South.

3. Reactions at Home and Abroad

Major press media in Korea rejected the North Korean proposal for a tripartite meeting as "another piece" in their typical deceptive peace offensive, while positively endorsing the major principles of national self-determination and direct inter-Korean dialogue as stressed by Minister of National Unification Sohn in his January 11th statement. The press challenged North Korea to prove their interest, if any, through actual deeds, such as apologizing for the Rangoon atrocity, instead of merely paying lip service to peace.

Noting that the latest Pyongyang proposal was designed only to serve their scheme to communize all of Korea under a Vietnam-style strategy, the press called upon the people to have a firmer faith in the national integrity, especially in view of the turbulent situation surrounding the Korean peninsula.

Meanwhile, major foreign press media, showing a keen interest

in Minister Sohn's statement and the North Korean proposal for a tripartite meeting, expressed misgivings about Pyongyang's sincerity toward peace talks. They pointed out that the North Korean offer was illogical, lacked consistency, and seemed void of any sincerity.

Observing that this latest overture of North Korea might have been designed to check their further diplomatic isolation, the foreign media commented that though Pyongyang was attempting to distract world attention away from their terrorist bombing in Rangoon, their "peace chorus" would not be echoed so long as they do not account for the Rangoon incident that had shaken peace on the Korean peninsula to its very base.

In Minister John's statement and the North Korean proposal for a trilateral meeting expressed misgivings about Pyongyang's sincerity toward peace talks. They pointed out that the North Korean offer was illogical, lacked consistency, and seemed to be of any substance. They stated that the North Korean offer was based on the fact that the North Korean leadership had not decided to start talks but rather to continue the war. The North Korean leadership had announced that they would only accept peace talks if the South Korean government would first withdraw its troops from their territory. In addition, they stated that the North Korean leadership had not taken any steps to create a favorable atmosphere for peace on the Korean peninsula. In fact, they stated that the North Korean leadership had been engaged in military preparations for a possible invasion of the South. They also stated that the North Korean leadership had been engaged in a campaign of propaganda to incite violence against the South.

The North Korean leadership's proposal for a trilateral meeting was also criticized. It was stated that the proposal was based on the assumption that the North Korean leadership would be able to control the South Korean government. This was considered to be an unrealistic assumption. It was also stated that the proposal was based on the assumption that the North Korean leadership would be able to control the United States. This was also considered to be an unrealistic assumption. The North Korean leadership's proposal was also criticized for its failure to address the issue of the withdrawal of North Korean troops from the South. It was stated that the North Korean leadership's proposal was based on the assumption that the North Korean leadership would be able to control the South Korean government. This was considered to be an unrealistic assumption. It was also stated that the North Korean leadership's proposal was based on the assumption that the North Korean leadership would be able to control the United States. This was also considered to be an unrealistic assumption.

Part III

The Delivery of the Prime Minister's Message to North Korea and the Issuance of Statement by Prime Minister

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Message to North Korea and
the Issuance of Statement
by Prime Minister

1. Background

On January 24, 1984, South Korea received, through the international postal system, a North Korean letter addressed to Prime Minister Chin Iee-jong. The letter, signed by Lee Jong-ok, then Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council, was about the proposal for a so-called tripartite meeting which a joint session of the Central People's Committee and the Standing Committee of the Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea adopted on January 10, 1984.

In response to the North Korean letter, Prime Minister Chin sent a message to the Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council on February 14, 1984. The message was delivered to North Korea by two liaison officers of the South at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m., February 14.

The South could have simply ignored the letter from Pyongyang since Minister of National Unification Sohn Jae-shik had already disclosed the government's stand in a statement on January 11, 1984. However, the South sent the message in a move to stress again the appropriateness of a direct inter-Korean dialogue which the government of the Republic of Korea has consistently been promoting to prepare the base for the alleviation of tension and eventual peaceful unification of Korea, and also to provide an impetus to improving the inter-Korean relations that had been extremely aggravated by the Burma incident.

In response to Prime Minister Chin's message to the North, North Korea sent a letter to the South through Panmunjom on March 7, 1984. In the reply, North Korea rejected the South's renewed call for a direct dialogue between the two, and instead reiterated again their demand for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea, a demand they have raised on every opportunity for more than 30 years.

North Korea asserted that the pullout of American troops

should be prerequisite to unification of the Korean peninsula, and, alleging unfoundedly that South Korea has no supreme control of its armed forces, claimed that no inter-Korean issues could be solved through direct talks between the two sides of Korea. They then renewed in the letter their call for a tripartite meeting.

Going a step farther, Pyongyang sought to shift the blame for the rising tension on the Korean peninsula to the U.S. forces in Korea and South Korea in an apparent scheme to smoke-screen the Rangoon incident and other provocative acts and also to engineer the rise of the question of the American forces in Korea as an election issue during the upcoming U.S. presidential election.

The gist of the letter from the Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council is as follows:

— To lay conditions for peaceful unification, a tripartite meeting should be held with South Korea attending a meeting between us and the United States, where steps should be arranged to withdraw American troops from South Korea through the conclusion of a peace agreement between us and the United States and a non-aggression declaration should be adopted between the North and the South.

— Under the present conditions, in which the U.S. forces are forcibly occupying South Korea and the U.S. commander seizes control over the South Korean forces, the South Korean authorities cannot sit face to face with us to solve the questions of replacing the Armistice Agreement with a peace agreement, withdrawing American troops from South Korea, adopting a non-aggression declaration, and dissolving the state of military confrontation through arms reduction.

— When we proposed North Korea-U.S. talks in 1974, the United States emphatically demanded from the beginning that they attend such a meeting together with South Korea. Your side, too, endorsed it when the United States proposed

three-party meeting.

— As to a meeting of countries related to the Korean question as your side proposed, such a meeting can hardly be justified because no other country besides the United States is directly responsible for the Korean question.

In response to this insincere attitude of North Korea and their deceptive offer for talks, Prime Minister Chin issued a statement, in which the Prime Minister, pointing out the unreasonableness of North Korea's rejection of a direct inter-Korean dialogue, again urged North Korea not to betray national expectations any further and agree with sincerity to a direct inter-Korean dialogue.

2. Delivery of the Message from Prime Minister Chin to the North Korean Premier

Prime Minister Chin sent a message to Prime Minister Kang Song-san of North Korea's State Administration Council on February 14, 1984. The message was delivered to North Korea through liaison officers at the conference room of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission at Panmunjom at 10 a.m.

In the message, Prime Minister Chin stressed that if the North Korean authorities are truly interested in a dialogue with the South, they should first take acceptable measures over the Burma incident. The Prime Minister said that since reconciliation and the unification of the Korean nation are the problems of the Koreans themselves, they should be solved with the Koreans' own strength and efforts. He added that no other country can resolve the issue on the Koreans' behalf.

Prime Minister Chin then urged North Korea to come forward to a direct inter-Korean dialogue in accordance with the principle of national self-determination expressly agreed on between the two sides in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique. The Prime Minister also stressed that North Korea should agree to explore, at an early date, ways to realize an exchange of letters and

mutual visits between the dispersed families and other people of South and North Korea.

The full text of Prime Minister Chin's message to North Korea follows.

I have received your message of last January 11 and on the same day, we made our position concerning the tripartite meeting known. We have consistently urged that contacts and dialogue begin as soon as possible in conformity with the ardent wish of the whole nation for peace and unification. We have exerted every effort to this end.

On the other hand, the North Korean authorities have rejected any inter-Korean dialogue and perpetrated, at home and abroad, acts harmful to the nation, pursuing a course diametrically opposed to our determination to achieve peace and unification. Especially the terrorist bombing in Burma last October has aggravated inter-Korean relations to an extremely dangerous state.

Under such circumstances, the North Korean authorities have raised the question of a tripartite meeting while at the same time, not only refusing to admit and apologize for the bombing incident but contending that the North had been framed. This is hardly an attitude conducive to dialogue.

If you are genuinely interested in a dialogue, you should take appropriate steps to atone for the Burma incident. Otherwise, few persons will accept your proposal for talks as genuine. Since reconciliation and unification are issues between only us, they can only be achieved through our own strength and efforts. No other country can solve these problems on our behalf. This conforms to the principle of national self-determination contained in the South-North Joint Communique of July 4, 1972.

Under the current domestic and international situation, I

believe that we can no longer leave unchecked the deepening distrust, enmity and tension between South and North Korea. To alleviate the situation and prepare for reconciliation and unification, we must, above all, open a dialogue between the two parties directly concerned—South and North Korea—and foster trust. At the same time, we must as soon as possible pave the way for exchanges of letters and visits both among relatives dispersed in South and North Korea and between other people.

In this context, the series of proposals we have made, including the call for a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea and a cabinet-level officials meeting, are the measures which can most realistically settle through dialogue the present and future problems of our nation.

I believe that if a South-North dialogue proceeded smoothly, we could foster an environment favorable to a permanent peace and unification by holding talks participated in by South and North Korea and those countries directly or indirectly responsible for the division of the peninsula and the Korean War.

We once again urge the North Koreans to join, with a positive attitude, a direct dialogue with us to discuss all the problems mentioned above. We look forward to a positive response.

3. Prime Minister Chin Issues Statement Calling for Direct Inter-Korean Dialogue

Prime Minister Chin issued a statement on March 10, 1984 in connection with the March 7th letter from the Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council.

In the statement, the Prime Minister demanded that North Korea should take appropriate measures at an early date to atone for the barbaric terrorist act they committed abroad with the intent of assassinating the Head of State of the Republic of Korea,

and come forward to a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea.

Saying that if and when a direct inter-Korean dialogue gets under way, it would be possible to also hold a meeting with other countries which have an interest in the Korean question, Prime Minister Chin again urged North Korea to stop betraying the national desire and respond affirmatively to direct inter-Korean talks with a sincere attitude.

Also in the statement, Prime Minister Chin took note of the fact that North Korea ignored the South's calls for an early exchange of letters between dispersed families and for appropriate measures to atone for the Burma incident, adding that this insincere attitude of North Korea is indicative of the fact that there can be no sincerity whatsoever in any offer they produce for talks.

The full text of Prime Minister Chin's statement, which was read for him by Minister of National Unification Sohn at the conference room of the office of South-North Dialogue at 11 a.m., March 10, follows.

In the February 10 message I sent to the Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council, I called for direct talks between South and North Korea, such as a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea or a ministerial-level meeting. In their reply of March 7, however, North Korea turned their backs on a direct inter-Korean dialogue which all our people desire and simply renewed the time-worn demands they have repeated for some 30 years, which include a call for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea.

At the same time, the North Korean reply ignored my proposal for an early exchange of letters and visits between relatives separated in the two halves of the peninsula and between other compatriots. Moreover, North Korea ignored

our demand that they take appropriate measures to atone for the atrocious terrorist bombing in Burma which enraged the nation and which evoked world-wide condemnation of North Korea. In spite of the fact that the terrorist incident in Burma was an unforgivable heinous anti-national provocation, we exercised patience and prudence because of a deep craving for national reconciliation and peaceful unification and asked North Korea to take appropriate measures to atone. This is the minimum requirement to prove the truthfulness of their proposal for a meeting.

The insincere attitude of North Korea in not only rejecting a direct dialogue with us but also in ignoring our minimum demand proves that they do not really want to improve inter-Korean relations or find a peaceful solution through dialogue to the unification question. Seen in this context, it is clear that their proposal for tripartite talks which was timed to coincide with the terrorist atrocity in Burma was not designed to solve pending inter-Korean problems through dialogue but was a deception aimed at covering up their terrorism.

In the recent letter, North Korea raised the issue of the authority of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea and irrationally asserted that no question can be solved at a direct inter-Korean meeting. It is an insult to our sovereignty and a crooked distortion of truth for them to question the authority of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces which is solemnly exercised by the Head of State.

North Korea claims that the U.S. forces in Korea and we are to blame for the tension on the peninsula. However, the fundamental source of tension is the incessant North Korean

perpetration of violent acts such as the terrorist atrocity in Burma in the hope of communizing all of Korea.

As for the U.S. forces in Korea, they were withdrawn in 1949 and never would have returned if North Korea had not invaded the South, starting the Korean War. The whole world knows that even after the armistice, the North Koreans did not abandon their schemes to reinvade and have continued to build up their military strength, incessantly committing acts of violent armed provocation. In January 1968, they infiltrated special commandos in an abortive raid on Chong Wa Dae. Beginning in the early 1970s, at the very time that an inter-Korean dialogue was being held, they began to dig invasion tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone. And in October last year, they perpetrated the terrorist bombing in Burma.

The U.S. forces are stationed in Korea under the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty for the purpose of dealing with the threats of invasion from North Korea and maintaining peace on the peninsula. The question of U.S. troops in Korea is a bilateral treaty matter between the Republic and the United States and is not in the nature of something in which North Korea can meddle. Before demanding their withdrawal, North Korea should abandon their schemes to communize the whole peninsula by force and respond affirmatively to an inter-Korean dialogue. But North Korea insists that an inter-Korean dialogue is not necessary, arguing that we have no competence to solve problems.

If this is true, we cannot help but wonder why North Korea agreed to the South-North Coordinating Committee meetings we proposed in 1972 on the principle of the independent solution of the unification question, a principle that was agreed upon in the July 4 South-North Joint

Communique, and the South-North Red Cross Conference held from 1971 through 1977? And for what purpose did they come to the ten working-level meetings held from February to October 1980 to prepare for a meeting between the prime ministers of South and North Korea?

Their rejection now of direct inter-Korean talks cannot be justified under any pretext. It is a self-contradictory attitude for them to oppose the principle of national self-determination and to refuse to solve the issue of national unification by direct contact with us.

There are so many issues that must be solved in the interest of peace and unification. The suffering of the divided families who live with the pain of separation from their relatives, discontinuity in all areas of national life, ever-deepening distrust and enmity, heightening military confrontation — all these are acute problems that cannot be left unsolved any longer. Since these are problems that only we ourselves can solve, we must get together to solve them one by one.

The unification question cannot be solved in the current state of confrontation and distrust. The clue to a solution will only be found when the parties directly involved—South and North Korea—open a dialogue on the basis of national self-determination and reconciliation and restore under standing and trust. Though we are divided into South and North, there is no reason why Koreans cannot be reconciled with each other and achieve unification if we strive to do so with faith, in the spirit of national self-determination and peace.

If North Korea rejects inter-Korean contacts while still calling for peaceful unification, it will be difficult to trust

them even if they do propose a dialogue of some kind. To achieve peace and unification, South and North Korea should first get together. North Korea should take appropriate measures at an early date to atone for the barbaric terrorist act they committed abroad with the intent of assassinating our Head of State, and come forward to a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea. If it is impossible to hold such a meeting immediately, they should agree to a ministerial-level meeting. If and when a direct inter-Korean conference gets under way, it would be possible to also hold a meeting with other countries who have an interest in the Korean question.

I once again urge North Korea to stop betraying the national desire and respond affirmatively to a dialogue with us with a sincere attitude.

The statement by Prime Minister Chin was significant in many aspects:

The Justness of the Direct Inter-Korean Talks
and the Renewed Call for a Meeting
between the Top Leaders of South and North Korea

In the statement, Prime Minister Chin pointed out that if North Korea rejects inter-Korean contacts while still calling for peaceful unification, it will be difficult to trust them even if they do propose a dialogue of some kind. Stressing that the two sides of Korea, therefore, should first get together to achieve peace and unification, the Prime Minister urged North Korea to come

forward to a meeting between the top leaders of South and North Korea at an early date.

Since the unification of Korea is an all-important task facing the Koreans and since unification should be of a kind that can promise a strong country and the future prosperity of Koreans, the question of unification must be solved by the Koreans themselves and cannot be tackled by anyone else by proxy.

And, because the fostering of mutual trust and national reconciliation are essential to the peaceful solution of the Korean question, especially under the present conditions of conflicting ideologies and systems and of mounting tensions and enmity between the two sides of Korea, it is imperative to hold a direct inter-Korean dialogue under the principle of solving the issues between the direct parties.

Nonetheless, North Korea rejects an inter-Korean dialogue by ignoring the principle of national self-determination and the need of mutual trust and national reconciliation between the South and the North. Here, it is obvious that their ulterior motive is to unify the whole of Korea under communism by force of arms or other violence.

If North Korea is truly interested in the easing of tension on the Korean peninsula and its peaceful unification, they should come to the table for a meeting between the top leaders of the two sides and discuss openly and with sincerity all the issues the two sides raise, providing an epochal breakthrough in the efforts to improve inter-Korean relations and realize peaceful unification.

If their situation does not permit their outright agreement to such a constructive meeting between the highest authorities of the two sides, they should agree at least to a ministerial-level meeting between South and North Korea.

North Korea's Refusal to Take Proper Actions to Atone for the Burma Incident

North Korea, as is the case with a robber accusing his victim, insists that the terrorist bombing they perpetrated in Burma was the South's frame-up, and have not admitted to it or apologized. Such brazenness makes it all the clearer that their offer for a tripartite meeting was not intended to solve problems pending between the two sides of Korea through dialogue but was a mere deceptive peace offensive to get out of the international isolation they incurred as a result of the Burma incident.

The Burma incident was an unforgivable, anti-national provocation. In the hope of achieving unification through national reconciliation, however, the government of the Republic of Korea asked North Korea to show their sincerity toward a dialogue by taking acceptable measures to atone for the Burma incident.

Nonetheless, North Korea did not mention anything about this in their March 7th letter from the Prime Minister of the State Administration Council, indicating that there is no change in their intransigency. This can only be taken as a display of their intent to pursue violence in the future, too.

North Korea's Ignoring of the Call for an Exchange of Letters and Mutual Visits

In their answer, North Korea ignored the proposal made in the February 10th message by Prime Minister Chin for an exchange of letters and mutual visits between dispersed families and between other peoples of the South and the North of Korea. Their ignorance was yet another indication that they are not the least interested in the improvement of inter-Korean relations and the

laying of a base for peaceful unification.

There can be no reason why North Korea cannot agree to such exchanges, the most fundamental step toward improving inter-Korean relations.

North Korea's Excuses for Rejecting Direct Inter-Korean Dialogue

As excuses for their rejection of a direct inter-Korean dialogue, the North Koreans first disputed in their letter the question of the supreme control of the Republic of Korea Armed Forces. Second, they demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Korea as a prerequisite to an inter-Korean dialogue. Third, they rejected a direct inter-Korean dialogue saying that "the South Korean government has no power to solve problems." And fourth, they contended that the South should accept their offer for a tripartite meeting because the South itself proposed a similar meeting among the authorities of the three countries earlier.

North Korea's questioning of the issue of the supreme control over the Armed Forces as an excuse for their rejection of a direct dialogue is something intolerable and an insult to the sovereignty of the Republic. As is expressly stipulated in the provisions of Paragraph 1, Article 49 of the Republic of Korea Constitution, the supreme authority over the Armed Forces rests with the Head of State of the Republic of Korea. Also it is a well-known fact that though the operational control of the armed forces of the member nations of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty Organization lie in their American and Russian commanders, respectively, the supreme authority over the military forces of these countries definitely rests with their respective Heads of State.

As for the issue of the U.S. forces in Korea, the American troops

are stationed in Korea under the Korea-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty for the purpose of forestalling any reinvasion from the North and maintaining peace on the Korean peninsula. The question of U.S. troops in Korea is a bilateral treaty matter between the Republic of Korea and the United States, and is not in the nature of something in which North Korea can meddle. Before demanding their withdrawal, therefore, North Korea should abandon their scheme to invade the South and agree to an inter-Korean dialogue to establish peaceful inter-Korean relations free of the danger of war.

Besides, North Korea rejects a direct inter-Korean dialogue on the grounds that the South Korean government has no competence to solve problems. If this is true, why on earth did they enter talks with the South in the past? The whole world knows that they, together with the South, attended the meetings of the South-North Coordinating Committee held on the principle of independent solution of the unification question as embodied in the July 4 South-North Joint Communique, the South-North Red Cross Conference from 1971 through 1977, and the 10 working-level meetings held from February to August 1980 to prepare for a meeting between the prime ministers of the two sides of Korea. Their rejection now of direct inter-Korean talks is a self-contradictory attitude designed only for them to reject direct talks between South and North Korea.

Lastly, their allegation that the South should accept their offer for a tripartite meeting because Seoul itself once proposed a meeting of the authorities of the three nations, stems from their deliberate distortion of the essential difference between the two ideas.

In proposing a meeting of the authorities of the three nations, the South made it clear that the South and the North of Korea should play a principal role in the solution of the present and future problems facing the Koreans as was expressly stated in Article 12 of the Korea-U.S. Joint Communique of July 1, 1979:

"The two Presidents agreed that any arrangement that would reduce tension and establish lasting peace leading ultimately to the peaceful unification of the Korean people should result from dialogue between the two responsible authorities of both the South and the North of Korea."

However, in the Pyongyang version of a tripartite meeting, North Korea tries to exclude South Korea from the issue of concluding a peace agreement by arguing that the United States and North Korea alone should sign a peace agreement featuring the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Korea.

This indicates that North Korea is trying to convene a meeting with the U.S. and North Korea as the principal participants in a bid largely to engineer the pullout of the U.S. forces from Korea. The North Korean proposal, therefore, basically differs in purport and objective from a meeting of the authorities of three nations the South proposed before.

4. Domestic Reactions

The Press in Korea had invariably voiced support for Prime Minister Chin's call for a direct inter-Korean dialogue on the basis of the principle of national self-determination. Commenting on the Prime Minister's February 10th message to North Korea, the media stressed that since the Korean question is basically an internal issue of the Koreans, the problem should naturally be solved through a direct dialogue between South and North Korea. The press then accused North Korea of offering a deceptive and fictitious tripartite meeting in their schemes to communize the whole of Korea and of launching a slanderous propaganda campaign against the South in connection with their offer.

Also discussing the March 7th letter from the Prime Minister of North Korea's State Administration Council and the March 10th statement of Prime Minister Chin, the press said that the

nonsensical and childish allegations North Korea made in their letter made their idea of a tripartite meeting all the more fictitious. Refuting North Korean contentions one by one, the press said North Korea should desist from paying empty lip service and instead promptly agree to a direct inter-Korean dialogue.

Dear Reader,

The questionnaire that follows was prepared as an aid towards making **South-North Dialogue** more informative and readable. Your frank answers to the questions would be greatly appreciated. Please forward the questionnaire to the following address:

P.O. Box 4161
Central Post Office
Seoul 100, Republic of Korea

Questionnaire

Nationality :

Age : Sex : Education :

Occupation :

Please check your choices.

1. How often do you use or consult **South-North Dialogue** in your duties and research activities?
 - a. Very often.
 - b. From time to time.
 - c. Seldom.

2. Do you find this booklet helpful to your understanding of the inter-Korean question?
 - a. Very helpful.
 - b. A little helpful,
 - c. Not helpful

3. How do you the phrasing and style of this booklet?
 - a. Easy to understand.
 - b. So, so.
 - c. Difficult to understand.

4. Please state your suggestions and comments on **South-North Dialogue**.

Published on May 10, 1984

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