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Collection Name SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

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RBW 9/24/2009

File Folder CHINESE -KOREAN INITIATIVE 1983-1984 (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F07-057/1

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WAMPLER

31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
76450	CABLE	SEOUL 10474 <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	2	10/12/1983	B1
76451	CABLE	BEIJING 15890 <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	4	10/12/1983	B1
76453	CABLE	STATE 290173 <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	2	10/12/1983	B1
76455	CABLE	SEOUL 10559 <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	6	10/13/1983	B1
76457	CABLE	SECTO 16009 <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	4	12/28/1983	B1
76459	MEMO	SIGUR/LAUX TO MCFARLANE RE. KOREAN TALKS <i>R 11/8/2012 M383</i>	2	1/12/1984	B1
76472	PAPER	RE. NORTH KOREA <i>R 11/8/2012 11/8/2012</i>	1	ND	B1
76462	NOTE	<i>PAR 4/17/2012 M383/1</i>	1	1/19/1984	B1 B3
76464	CABLE	BEIJING 00928 <i>R 11/8/2012 11/8/2012</i>	9	1/18/1984	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Collection Name SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

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File Folder CHINESE -KOREAN INITIATIVE 1983-1984 (1 OF 2)

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76466	CABLE	BEIJING 00921	4	1/18/1984	B1
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China/ Korea

PAGE 01 OF 02 SEOUL 0474
EOB933 AN000918

DTG: 120704Z OCT 83 PSN: 043980
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SECRET SEOUL 10474

NODIS
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO BEIJING ALSO FOR ACTION; AND
TO SECDEF WEINBERGER'S AIRCRAFT FOR INFO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL KN KS
SUBJECT: PYONGYANG'S "OLIVE BRANCH"
REF: (A) BEIJING 15808, (B) STATE 290173

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).

2. WHEN PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) LEARNS OF
PYONGYANG'S "OLIVE BRANCH" OFFERING "TALKS WITH THE U.S.
AND ROK WITH NO CONDITIONS" (REF A) FROM SECDEF
WEINBERGER AND DEPSEC DAM TOMORROW, HIS FIRST REACTION
WILL BE OF SUSPICION AND INDIGNATION. HE WILL PERCEIVE
THE INITIATIVE AS DESIGNED TO DIVERT ATTENTION
FROM THE DPRK CRIME; TO ASSEMBLE SUPPORT FROM THOSE
AROUND THE WORLD WHO WILL SEE THIS - IF IT BECOMES
PUBLIC - AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEFUSE A GROWING CRISIS; AND
TO PUT THE ROK, IF IT SEEMS HESITANT TO LEAP AT THE
OPPORTUNITY, IN A DEFENSIVE POSTURE. PRESIDENT CHUN
WILL ABOVE ALL SEE IT ALSO AS A PLOT TO PREEMPT ANY
RETALIATORY ACTION BY THE ROK, HOWEVER JUSTIFIED IT MAY
BE.

3. HE MAY ALSO REACT POORLY TO THE "CHINESE CONNECTION",
ASKING WHY COULD THE OFFER NOT HAVE BEEN CONVEYED
DIRECTLY, AT PANMUNJOM FOR EXAMPLE?

4. WHEN THE SOUTH KOREANS GET AROUND TO ANALYZING THE
REPORTED DPRK INITIATIVE, OTHER QUESTIONS WILL ALMOST
CERTAINLY OCCUR TO THEM:
-- WHEN PRECISELY DID THE PRC RECEIVE THE
DPRK MESSAGE THEY RELAYED TO EMBASSY BEIJING OCTOBER 11?
-- SPECIFICALLY, WAS IT PRIOR OR SUBSEQUENT TO THE
RANGOON OUTRAGE?
-- TALKS WITH WHOM? BETWEEN ROKG AND DPRK OFFICIALS?
AT WHAT LEVEL?
-- TALKS WHICH ARE HELD WITHOUT REFERENCE TO
THE ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT CHUN'S LIFE?
-- TALKS WHERE?
-- TALKS ABOUT WHAT?

5. IN SHORT, WE DO NOT EXPECT PRESIDENT CHUN'S REACTION
TO BE POSITIVE.

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BY CJ NARA DATE 11/8/12

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6. WHILE WE WOULD AGREE THAT THE ABOVE MAY ARGUE AGAINST DISCUSSING THIS WITH PRESIDENT CHUN AT THIS TIME WE NEVERTHELESS BELIEVE THAT NOT TO INFORM HIM OF THE PRC'S MESSAGE WOULD BREAK OUR AGREEMENT WITH THE KOREANS TO KEEP THEM INFORMED OF MATERIAL EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE. WERE OUR RENEGING LATER TO BECOME KNOWN, AS IT VERY LIKELY WOULD (THE DPRK MAY LEAK), THE KOREANS WOULD BE RIGHTFULLY ANGRY.

7. AT THE SAME TIME WE AGREE WITH BEIJING'S COMMENT THAT WE AND THE ROK NEED NOT ANSWER THE MAIL RIGHT AWAY. IT WOULD BE VERY DIFFICULT TO FASHION AN ANSWER AT THIS TIME WHEN WE ARE SO UNSURE OF DPRK/PRC MOTIVES. ACCORDINGLY IN TELLING PRESIDENT CHUN OF THE NORTH KOREAN INITIATIVE, WE SHOULD ALSO STATE THAT WE FAVOR RESERVING OUR RESPONSE UNTIL THE CURRENT PICTURE BECOMES CLEARER.

8. FOR BEIJING: WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR EXPLORING THE QUESTION OF TIMING OF THE DPRK INITIATIVE WITH THE PRC AT THE EARLIEST APPROPRIATE OPPORTUNITY. WALKER
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BEIJING 5890
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DTG: 120938Z OCT 83
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1938
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 15890

NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KN, CH, US
SUBJ: DPRK MESSAGE AGREEING TO CONTACTS WITH US,
SOUTH KOREA
REF: A) STATE: 290051; B) BEIJING 15808

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: THE OFFER FOR UNCONDITIONAL NEGOTIATIONS INCLUDING SOUTH KOREA IS IN FACT A NORTH KOREAN INITIATIVE APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN NORTH KOREA. IT WAS (#) CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTRY ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, THE DAY BEFORE THE RANGOON BOMBING. THE NORTH KOREANS SEIZED UPON OUR POLICY RELAXING SOCIAL CONTACTS WITH THEIR DIPLOMATS TO COVER THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE A MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT STEP. IN THE WAKE OF THE RANGOON BOMBING, HOWEVER, THE CHINESE WAITED UNTIL OCTOBER 11 TO PRESENT THE NORTH KOREAN OFFER, POSSIBLY BECAUSE THEY NEEDED HIGH-LEVEL, POLITICAL CONCURRENCE ON THE PRECISE MODE OF TRANSMITTAL AND/OR WISHED TO CHECK WHETHER THE NORTH KOREANS STILL WANTED THEIR MESSAGE PASSED TO US. WE BELIEVE THE CHINESE, BY PASSING THIS NORTH KOREAN OFFER, HAVE SIGNALLED THAT THEY DO NOT WANT THE RANGOON BOMBING TO DESTROY DENG'S KOREAN PENINSULA INITIATIVE. THEY BELIEVE THE BALL IS NOW IN OUR COURT. END SUMMARY.
3. MFA DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR KOREAN AND JAPANESE AFFAIRS YANG ZHENYA CONFIRMED TO US OCTOBER 12 THAT THE KOREAN OFFER TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND THE ROK WAS IN FACT MADE BY THE NORTH KOREANS. THE TEXT OF THIS OFFER (REPORTED REFTEL) WAS DELIVERED TO THE CHINESE MFA IN BEIJING BY THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY. ACCORDING TOB ANG, THE NORTH KOREAN EMBASSY DELIVERED THE MESSAGE "ON SATURDAY, OCTOBER 8, IN THE FORENOON." THERE IS NO DOUBT IN THIS EMBASSY'S MIND THAT THE TEXT DELIVERED TO US HAD BEEN APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN NORTH KOREA.
4. THE NORTH KOREAN OFFER IS DIRECTLY TIED TO OUR CONTACTS POLICY. DEPARTMENT WILL HAVE NOTED THAT THE MESSAGE PASSED TO US REFERS EXPLICITLY TO OUR CONTACT GUIDELINES (STATE 274879) WHICH STATE THAT THE "U. S. WILL NOT ENTER INTO ANY DISCUSSION WITH NORTH KOREA ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PENINSULA WITHOUT THE FULL AND EQUAL PARTICIPATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAVE OFFERED TO PARTICIPATE IN TRIPARTITE (E. G., WITH NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA) AND/OR QUADRIPARTITITE

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BY CJ NARA DATE 11/8/12

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AND LARGER DISCUSSION TO EXPLORE MEANS FOR REDUCING TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA. "

5. WHAT THE DPRK HAS DONE, THEREFORE, IS TO USE OUR SMALL GESTURE ON CONTACTS TO COVER THEIR WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ANOTHER, MUCH MORE SIGNIFICANT STEP. OUR CONTACTS INITIATIVE (WHICH BY FORTUITOUS TIMING COINCIDED WITH THE DENG/WEINBERGER TALKS), GAVE THE DPRK THE "FACE" IT NEEDED TO TAKE ANOTHER STEP.

6. TO ILLUSTRATE WHAT HAS BEEN GOING ON OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS, WE CALL THE DEPARTMENT'S ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING CHRONOLOGY:

-- SEPTEMBER 28 - MORNING -- DENG/WEINBERGER CONVERSATION (SEE BEIJING 15395).

-- SEPTEMBER 28 - EVENING -- MFA OFFICIAL REITERATES POINTS MADE BY DENG, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO CONFEDERATION AND THE CHINESE VIEW THAT A CONFEDERATED KOREA WOULD BE "ONE NATION, TWO STATES."

-- SEPTEMBER 29 -- HU YAOBANG MEETS WITH JAPANESE, SOCIALISTS, REVEALS SOME OF THE CONTENT OF DENG'S COMMENTS ON KOREA. (BEIJING 15469).

-- SEPTEMBER 30 - 11 AM -- MFA OFFICIAL YANG ZHENYA BRIEFED ON OUR REVISED CO TACTS POLICY: SAYS HE HAS NOT YET READ TEXT OF DENG'S COMMENTS TO WEINBERGER.

--OCTOBER 8 MORNING -- KOREANS GIVE MFA THE TEXT OF THEIR OFFER TO HOLD UNCONDITIONAL DISCUSSIONS.

-- OCTOBER 9 -- BOMBING IN RANGOON.

-- OCTOBER 10 - AFTERNOON -- POLCOUNS CALLS ON YANG ZHENYA TO MAKE DEMARCHE ON RANGOON BOMBING, AND REQUEST CHINESE TO URGE RESTRAINT TO DPRK. YANG MAKES NO MENTION OF
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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 BEIJING 15890

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KN, CH, US
SUBJ: DPRK MESSAGE AGREEING TO CONTACTS WITH US,
KOREAN MESSAGE. (BEIJING 15748).
-- OCTOBER 11 - AFTERNOON -- POLCOUNS PULLED INTO
UNSCHEDULED MEETING WITH YANG ZHENYA, AT WHICH YANG
GIVES TEXT OF DPRK MESSAGE.

7. THIS RECORD NO DOUBT RAISES SEVERAL QUESTIONS. FIRST,
WHY DID YANG SAY HE HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF THE DENG COMMENTS
48 HOURS AFTER DENG'S MEETINGS WITH WEIBERGER, WHILE
ANOTHER MFA OFFICIAL WAS FULLY BRIEFED? WE BELIEVE THE
ANSWER LIES IN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE MFA. THE OFFICER
WHO BRIEFED EMBOFFS ON THE EVENING OF SEPTEMBER 28 WAS
FROM THE AMERICAN DIVISION. IN THE MFA, THE GEOGRAPHICAL
BUREAU HANDLES THE VISIT, SEES THE TALKING POINTS, AND
CLEARS THE TRANSCRIPT. IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT, THIS WOULD
BE THE OFFICER CHOSEN TO REINFORCE DENG'S POINTS.

8. GIVEN THE SLOWNESS WE HAVE NOTED IN THE MFA'S INTERNAL
DISTRIBUTION SYSTEM, IT IS CONCEIVABLE THAT YANG HAD NOT
BEEN CLUED IN 48 HOURS AFTER THE VISIT. MORE LIKELY, IN
OUR VIEW, IS THAT HE HAD NOT BEEN INSTRUCTED TO SAY ANY-
THING, AND WITH TYPICAL MFA DISCIPLINE, HE DIDN'T SAY ANY-
THING.

9. SECOND, WHY DID YANG FAIL TO TELL US ABOUT THE NORTH
KOREAN MESSAGE WHEN POLCOUNS CALLED AT MFA ON THE 10TH?
AS REPORTED EARLIER (BEIJING 15748), YANG HAD SAID ONLY
THAT CHINA WAS SURPRISED BY THE RANGOON BOMBING; LATER THE
SAME DAY THE MFA SPOKESMAN SAID CHINA WAS AWAITING THE OUT-
COME OF THE INVESTIGATION WITH GREAT CONCERN.

10. OCTOBER 10TH WAS THE FIRST DAY THE CHINESE COULD HAVE
RAISED THIS SUBJECT WITH US. THE RANGOON BOMBING TOOK
PLACE ON THE 9TH. WE THINK IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT ON THE
10TH THE CHINESE MAY HAVE BEEN SEEKING HIGH-LEVEL POLITI-
CAL CONCURRENCE ON THE PRECISE MODE OF TRANSMITTAL TO US.
BY TUESDAY, THE 11TH, THEY HAD SATISFIED THEMSELVES THAT
THE BOMBING INCIDENT HAD NOT AFFECTED THE INITIATIVE
AND/OR THAT THE NORTH KOREANS STILL WANTED THEIR MESSAGE
PASSED TO US, AND MOVED QUICKLY TO GET THE NORTH KOREAN
MESSAGE TO THE UNITED STATES. A POSSIBLE INDICATION OF
CHINESE ANXIETY OVER THE FUTURE OF DENG'S INITIATIVE WAS
GIVEN OCTOBER 12 WHEN POLOFF CALLED YANG FOR CONFIRMATION
OF THE DELIVERY DATE OF THE NORTH KOREAN MESSAGE. WITH-
OUT PROMPTING, YANG ASKED WHETHER THE UNITED STATES HAD
AN ANSWER TO THE INFORMATION GIVEN YESTERDAY.

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11. THIRD, WHAT IS THE RELATIONSHIP AMONG THE SENIOR LEADERSHIP, THE MFA AND CHINA'S EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG? DEPARTMENT SPECULATED THAT THE CHINESE EMBASSY IN PYONGYANG MAY NOT BE BRIEFED ON WHAT IS GOING ON.

12. WE BELIEVE THAT DECISION-MAKING ON KOREAN ISSUES IS PROCEEDING ALONG TWO DIFFERENT TRACKS: PARTY-TO-PARTY (INVOLVING VERY SENIOR CHINESE AND NORTH KOREAN OFFICIALS), AND STATE-TO-STATE (INVOLVING WORKING-LEVEL MFA OFFICIALS AND THEIR AMERICAN COUNTERPARTS). DENG, HU AND OTHERS ARE CALLING THE SHOTS FOR THE CHINESE SIDE; KIM IL-SUNG AND HIS MOST TRUSTED ADVISERS ARE CALLING THE SHOTS FOR THE NORTH KOREANS. THESE PEOPLE ARE MAKING THE MOST IMPORTANT POLICY DECISIONS, OFTEN IN FACE-TO-FACE MEETINGS.

13. WHEN POLICY DECISIONS ARE TO BE COMMUNICATED TO US, THE MFA IS CHARGED WITH DELIVERING THE INFORMATION IN A STATE-TO-STATE CHANNEL. THIS IS WHAT HAS BEEN HAPPENING OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS HERE. THE GAME IS BEING RUN OUT OF BEIJING, WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTRY BEING CALLED IN TO IMPLEMENT DECISIONS ALREADY TAKEN AT THE PARTY-TO-PARTY LEVEL. THEREFORE, IT COULD BE POSSIBLE THAT THE CHINESE EMBASSY (AS OPPOSED TO THE AMBASSADOR) IN PYONGYANG AND WORKING LEVELS OF MFA MIGHT BE GETTING THE INFORMATION RATHER LATE IN THE GAME.

14. SUMMING UP, WE CONCLUDE THAT THE HINESE, IN PASSING ALONG THE NORTH KOREAN MESSAGE, HAVE SIGNALLED TO US THAT THEY DO NOT WANT THE RANGOON BOMBING TO DESTROY DENG'S KOREAN PENINSULA INITIATIVE. WE BELIEVE THE CHINESE ARE SERIOUS, THAT THEY WISH THE PROCESS TO GO FORWARD, AND THAT THEY BELIEVE THE BALL IS NOW IN OUR COURT.
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SECRET STATE 290173

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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KS, US
SUBJECT: PROSPECTS FOR NORTH-SOUTH KOREAN DISCUSSIONS

REF: BEIJING 15808

(C) FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF BACKGROUND PAPER ON
PROSPECTS FOR NORTH-SOUTH KOREA DISCUSSIONS PREPARED FOR
SEC DEF WEINBERGER AND UNDER SECRETARY DAM, WITH
CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS IF SUBJECT ARISES DURING THEIR
VISIT TO SEOUL.

2. (S) BEGIN TEXT:

ON OCTOBER 11, A WORKING LEVEL CHINESE MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS OFFICIAL CONVEYED TO OUR POLITICAL
COUNSELOR IN BEIJING A MESSAGE THAT THE DPRK (NORTH
KOREA) WOULD BE WILLING TO HOLD TALKS WITH THE US AND ROK
WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS. IN THE PAST, ALTHOUGH THE DPRK
HAS SOUGHT TO ENGAGE THE US IN TALKS, PYONGYANG HAS
REFUSED TO INCLUDE ROK REPRESENTATIVES. THE NORTH HAS
ALSO INSISTED ON PRECONDITIONS FOR NORTH-SOUTH
DISCUSSIONS: WITHDRAWAL OF US TROOPS, REPLACEMENT OF ROK
PRESIDENT CHUN, AND "DEMOCRATIZATION" IN THE SOUTH.

THE TONE OF THE MESSAGE PASSED BY THE CHINESE SUGGESTS
THAT BEIJING MAY HAVE EARLIER CONVEYED TO PYONGYANG AS A
NEW US POSITION, OUR LONG-STANDING PROPOSAL FOR
TRILATERAL (US-ROK-DPRK) TALKS, PUT FORWARD DURING
PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT TO KOREA IN 1979. THE CHINESE
HAVE BEEN EAGER TO ENCOURAGE THE US TO MAKE A GESTURE TO
PYONGYANG, AND MAY HAVE TAKEN THE OPPORTUNITY PRESENTED
BY OUR NOTIFICATION TO THEM OF OUR REVISED GUIDANCE ON
CONTACTS BETWEEN US DIPLOMATS AND NORTH KOREANS IN THIRD
COUNTRIES TO SUGGEST TO PYONGYANG THAT A SIGNIFICANT
SHIFT IN OUR POSITION HAD OCCURRED. THE CHINESE HAVE
TAKEN SEVERAL CAUTIOUS STEPS TOWARD UNOFFICIAL CONTACTS
WITH SEOUL, FOR EXAMPLE, TRADE AND PERMITTING ROK
OFFICIALS TO ATTEND UN MEETINGS IN CHINA. THEY HAVE ALSO
DISCUSSED KOREA WITH RECENT AMERICAN VISITORS; DENG
XIAOPING GAVE SECRETARY WEINBERGER (AND ANNA CHENNAULT)
HIS VIEW OF THE RESPECTIVE NORTH-SOUTH MILITARY
CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS AND INDICATED CHINESE SUPPORT
FOR THE NORTH KOREAN PROPOSAL FOR A "CONFEDERATION"
DURING THEIR RESPECTIVE BEIJING VISITS.

THE COINCIDENCE OF THE NORTH KOREAN SUGGESTION OF TALKS
WITH THE BOMBING INCIDENT IS SUSPICIOUS. WE ARE TRYING

*Chinese Korean
Initiative*

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TO DETERMINE EXACTLY WHEN, IN WHAT FORM AND TO WHOM THE PYONGYANG MESSAGE WAS GIVEN IN BEIJING. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THIS MESSAGE IS A DIVERSIONARY TACTIC TO MUTE US REACTION TO THE TERRORIST ATTACK BY HOLDING OUT THE PROSPECT OF TALKS TO RESOLVE THE KOREAN QUESTION. WE WILL ALSO BE INTERESTED IN LEARNING WHETHER THE NORTH KOREANS IN FACT ARE REFERRING TO DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ROK GOVERNMENT, OR MERELY "REPRESENTATIVES" OF THE PEOPLE, A FORMULA THEY HAVE USED IN THE PAST.

NORTH KOREAN WILLINGNESS TO TALK WITH THE ROK, IF GENUINE, COULD BE A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD REDUCTION OF TENSION ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND IT SHOULD BE EXPLORED. WE INTEND TO MENTION IT TO THE KOREANS, MAKING CLEAR THAT WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES, PARTICULARLY IN THE AFTERMATH OF RANGOON, AND THAT WE DO NOT INTEND TO RESPOND TO THE CHINESE WITHOUT FULLY CONSULTING SEOUL.

END TEXT.

3. (C) CONTINGENCY TALKING POINTS:

BEGIN TEXT.

IN THE SECRETARY'S RECENT MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER WU, HE URGED THE CHINESE TO CAUTION THE NORTH KOREANS NOT TO ATTEMPT TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF ANY PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AGAINST THE SOUTH.

--WE BELIEVE THE CHINESE ARE CONCERNED BY THE RANGOON INCIDENT, AND ITS OBVIOUS POTENTIAL FOR RAISING TENSIONS ON THE PENINSULA.

--WE WERE INFORMED BY THE CHINESE ON OCTOBER 11 THAT THEY HAD RECEIVED A MESSAGE FROM PYONGYANG TO THE EFFECT THAT NORTH KOREA WAS PREPARED TO ENTER INTO TALKS WITH THE U. S. AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, WITHOUT PRECONDITIONS.

--WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES, AND SUSPICIOUS OF THE TIMING OF SUCH A MESSAGE, WHICH COULD HAVE BEEN DIVERSIONARY.

--IF THE NORTH IS IN FACT PREPARED TO ENTER INTO SUCH TALKS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF THE ROK, THIS WOULD OF COURSE BE A MAJOR SHIFT IN ITS POSITION.

--WE DO NOT BELIEVE THIS MESSAGES REQUIRES AN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE, PARTICULARLY GIVEN ITS TIMING IN RELATION TO THE RANGOON TRAGEDY. BUT I BELIEVE WE SHOULD EXAMINE THIS MESSAGE TOGETHER, AND RESPOND TO THE CHINESE IN DUE COURSE, WHICH WE WOULD DO IN FULL CONSULTATION WITH YOU.

END TEXT. SHULTZ
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 SEUL 10559

EXDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS DOD, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPAC FOR POLAD;
TOKYO FOR WEINBERGER PARTY
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MASS, KS, KN, CH, UR, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S LUNCHEON CONVERSATION
- WITH MINISTER YOON

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT
2. FOLLOWING AN EXCHANGE OF PLEASANTRIES, MINISTER YOON REFERRED TO SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S RECENT VISIT TO BEIJING AND HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH DENG XIAO PING ON THE SUBJECT OF KOREA. HE NOTED THAT DENG HAD GIVEN AN INACCURATE ACCOUNT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE ON THE PENINSULA. SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID THAT INDEED DENG'S ASSERTIONS CONCERNING THE MILITARY BALANCE WERE HIGHLY INACCURATE AND THAT THE ONLY THING THAT ONE COULD SAY TO THEM WAS THAT WE HAD A "FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT VIEW." SECRETARY WEINBERGER ADDED THAT IT WAS FOR THIS REASON THAT DIA DIRECTOR WILLIAMS WOULD SOON BE GOING TO BEIJING. WILLIAMS WOULD GIVE CHINESE LEADERS THE FACTS AS WE KNOW THEM ABOUT THE KOREAN PENINSULA. MINISTER YOON EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM AS TO WHETHER WILLIAMS WOULD BE ABLE TO CHANGE THE CHINESE VIEW IF SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAD BEEN UNABLE TO DO SO. SECRETARY WEINBERGER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT DENG INDEED WAS FIRM IN HIS INTERPRETATION, AND HIS ASSERTION THAT THE DANGER OF WAR STEMS FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF THE SOUTH ATTACKING THE NORTH RATHER THAN VICE VERSA. MINISTER YOON CAUTIONED THAT ONE SHOULD NOT BE TAKEN IN BY DENG XIAO PING. THE CHINESE WERE HIGH-HANDED AND WE SHOULD NOT PLAY INTO THEIR HANDS. SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID THAT WE FULLY AGREED BUT, ON THE OTHER HAND, ONE HAD TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE CHINESE WERE TYING DOWN PERHAPS 80 SOVIET DIVISIONS.
3. TO A QUESTION CONCERNING THE STATE OF SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS, SECRETARY DAM NOTED THAT THEY HAD COMPLETED THEIR THIRD ROUND OF TALKS. SECRETARY WEINBERGER ADDED THAT, DURING HIS VISIT, THE CHINESE HAD REITERATED THE THREE BASIC DEMANDS WHICH WOULD HAVE TO BE MET BEFORE THERE COULD BE SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS. THE CHINESE HAD THEN ADDED A FOURTH: A REDUCTION IN THE SS-20 THREAT. SECRETARY WEINBERGER

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THEN BRIEFLY REVIEWED THE U. S. NEGOTIATING POSITION IN THE INF TALKS, EMPHASIZING THAT WE SOUGHT GLOBAL REDUCTIONS WHICH WOULD RESULT IN REDUCED LEVELS OF MISSILES IN ASIA AS WELL AS IN EUROPE.

4. MINISTER YOON THEN STATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO BEAR IN MIND THAT THE CHINESE REGIME REMAINED COMMUNIST. THEREFORE, THERE WERE DANGERS IN PROVIDING THEM ADVANCED MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. THE ROKG WAS CONCERNED THAT SUCH TECHNOLOGY COULD FIND ITS WAY TO NORTH KOREA. SECRETARY WEINBERGER NOTED THAT ANY TECHNOLOGY WE PROVIDED WOULD BE SUBJECT TO OUR NORMAL RETRANSFER AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS. THE CHINESE HAD QUESTIONED THIS AND HAD NOT RESPONDED DEFINITELY. THE SECRETARY EMPHASIZED THAT WE UNDERSTOOD KOREAN CONCERNS. WE WERE CONSIDERING ONLY DEFENSIVE WEAPONS FOR CHINA. CHINESE FORCES VERY MUCH REQUIRED MODERNIZATION. THE CHINESE HAD AMPLE MANPOWER, BUT THEIR MILITARY EQUIPMENT TENDED TO BE OF 1950'S TECHNOLOGY.

5. MINISTER YOON SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD OUR BASIC APPROACH, BUT WONDERED WHETHER CHINESE PRAGMATISM WOULD SURVIVE DENG XIAO PING'S DEMISE. SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID THAT WE FRANKLY DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION, WHICH WAS AN IMPORTANT ONE. THE CHINESE DECISION PROCESS WAS SLOW AND CERTAINLY THERE WAS NO CLEARCUT LINE OF SUCCESSION.

6. MINISTER YOON THEN REFERRED TO IMPROVING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND JAPAN, WHICH HE BELIEVED HAD MERIT. HE ASKED WHETHER THOSE RELATIONSHIPS MIGHT SOMEHOW BE USED TO ENCOURAGE CHINA TO ASSERT INFLUENCE ON NORTH KOREA. FOR EXAMPLE, COULD THE CHINESE HELP TO IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE BETWEEN NORTH

AND SOUTH KOREA, OR MIGHT THEY BE AMENABLE TO FURTHER CONTACTS WITH THE ROK? SECRETARY WEINBERGER SAID THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD MADE THAT POINT PRECISELY TO FOREIGN MINISTER WU ONLY TWO DAYS AGO AND THAT IT WOULD BE REITERATED IN FUTURE CONVERSATIONS WITH CHINESE LEADERS. SECRETARY WEINBERGER THEN NOTED THAT, DURING HIS RECENT VISIT TO BEIJING, DENG XIAO PING HAD PUT FORWARD THE IDEA OF A "CONFEDERATION" FOR
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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 SEOUL 10559

EXDIS
DEPT PLEASE PASS DOD, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPAC FOR POLAD;
TOKYO FOR WEINBERGER PARTY
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINS, MASS, KS, KN, CH, UR, US
SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S LUNCHEON CONVERSATION
THE PENINSULA, WHICH WOULD COMPRISE TWO INDEPENDENT
STATES. MINISTER YOON EXPRESSED SOME SKEPTICISM ABOUT
DENG'S MOTIVES, SPECULATING THAT PERHAPS DENG'S INTEREST
IN THESE ISSUES REFLECTED CHINESE CONCERN THAT NORTH
KOREA MIGHT BE TURNING TOWARD THE SOVIETS.

7. AT THIS POINT IN THE CONVERSATION, MINISTER YOON BEGAN
SPEAKING MORE FORMALLY FROM NOTES. HE EXPRESSED THE DEEP
THANKS OF HIS GOVERNMENT, AND PERSONALLY, FOR ALL THAT THE
UNITED STATES HAS DONE OVER THE PAST SIX WEEKS IN SUPPORT
OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA. THE ROKG IS GRATEFUL FOR THE
UNITED STATES' STRONG AND EFFECTIVE EFFORTS IN THE WAKE
OF THE KAL 007 TRAGEDY. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER,
INCLUDING HIS MOST RECENT TO PRESIDENT CHUN FOLLOWING THE
RANGOON BOMBING, PLUS THE AIR DEFENSE PROTECTION FOR HIS
AIRCRAFT WE PROVIDED ON PRESIDENT CHUN'S RETURN FROM
RANGOON, WERE IMMENSELY REASSURING AND GREATLY APPRECIATED.

8. YOON THEN OBSERVED THE ROKG LEADERSHIP "AND I" ARE
IN A DIFFICULT POSITION. THE KOREAN PEOPLE ARE DEEPLY
OUTRAGED BY THE EVENTS IN RANGOON. FOLLOWING THE
FUNERAL SERVICES TODAY (OCTOBER 13), THE SENSE OF OUTRAGE
WILL DEMAND FIRM AND STRONG POLITICAL RESPONSE. THE ROKG
LEADERSHIP CANNOT APPEAR TEPID AND LUKEWARM IN THE FACE
OF THIS ANGER.

9. "MY YOUNG MILITARY OFFICERS," SAID YOON, "ARE
EXTREMELY ANGRY AND WANT US TO TAKE ACTION." KOREA
OVER THE YEARS HAS EXPERIENCED A SERIES OF CRIMINAL
NORTH KOREAN ACTIONS -- THE BLUE HOUSE RAID, THE PUEBLO,
THE C-121, THE AXE MURDERS AT PANMUNJOM, AND THE
ATTEMPT TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT CHUN IN CANADA IN
1982 -- NOW THIS! YOON SAID HE RECALLED THE STRONG,
RESOLUTE UNITED STATES' ACTION FOLLOWING THE AXE MURDERS,
WHICH WAS "ACKNOWLEDGED BY THE NORTH WHICH SUBSEQUENTLY
TOOK A MORE RESTRAINED COURSE. "WE MUST AGAIN RESPOND
IN A RESOLUTE WAY TO THE PROFOUND ANGER ROUSED BY THE
BURMESE ASSASSINATION," YOON SAID. "OUR PEOPLE HAVE
COME TO THE BREAKING POINT. WE CANNOT JUST BE RESTRAINED

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AND PATIENT IN THE FACE OF TRAGEDY OF THIS MAGNITUDE."

10. YOON THEN SAID THE ROKG IS DEEPLY ENCOURAGED TO RECEIVE A DELEGATION HEADED BY THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, DEPUTY SECRETARY DAM, AND GENERAL WICKHAM BECAUSE THIS WILL UNDERLINE THE TWO COUNTRIES' CLOSE COOPERATION AND RESOLVE TO TAKE STRONG MEASURES IN THE FACE OF BARBARISM. SECRETARY WEINBERGER HAD SAID THE UNITED STATES HAS A VITAL INTEREST IN THE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA, RECALLED YOON; THESE WORDS SHOULD NOT SIMPLY BE EMPLY; CONCRETE FOLLOW-UP IS NECESSARY, AND IT IS NOW HIGH TIME.

11. YOON COMMENTED THAT HE AND ALL OF THE ROK SERVICE CHIEFS ARE TRYING VERY HARD TO CONVINCHE THEIR ANGRY SUBORDINATES THAT THERE ARE MANY THINGS TO CONSIDER IN THE CURRENT SITUATION: THERE ARE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC IMPLICATIONS. HE STATED THERE IS A NEED TO CONVINCHE ALL ELEMENTS THAT A LEVEL-HEADED BUT RESOLUTE APPROACH IS NEEDED TO OVERCOME PRESENT DIFFICULTIES. YOON THEN ASKED, "HOW CAN YOU BE OF HELP? COULD YOU MAKE A STATEMENT PRIOR TO DEPARTURE WHICH WOULD DEMONSTRATE ROK/US JOINT RESOLVE TO PRECLUDE FUTURE TERRORIST ACTS?"

12. SECRETARY WEINBERGER THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

- -- WHATEVER WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN AND CAN DO TO SUPPORT KOREA AT THIS TIME OF NEED, WE ARE HAPPY TO DO; THAT IS WHAT FRIENDS AND ALLIES ARE FOR. WE STAND READY TO HELP IN ANY WAY WE CAN.
 - -- KOREAN RESTRAINT IN THE FACE OF THIS TRAGEDY IS ADMIRABLE, AND INDICATES THAT THE ROK IS OF GREAT STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE. WHILE QUICK MILITARY RETALIATION MIGHT BE UNDERSTANDABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, IT COULD LEAD TO ESCALATION AND AN EVEN WORSE SITUATION.
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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 1870
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EXDIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS DOD, JCS, CINCPAC, CINCPAC FOR POLAD;
TOKYO FOR WEINBERGER PARTY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, PINS, MASS, KS, KN, CH, UR, US

SUBJECT: SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S LUNCHEON CONVERSATION

- -- THIS IS NOT TO SAY NOTHING CAN OR SHOULD BE DONE,
ONLY TO EMPHASIZE THAT SOUTH KOREA HAS ALREADY GAINED
ENORMOUSLY IN WORLD OPINION BY RESPONSIBLE ACTION,
WHEREAS THE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE OF NORTH KOREAN
INVOLVEMENT IS GROWING.

- -- THE ROK IS A VITAL ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND
OUR IMPORTANT ALLIANCE MUST BE STRENGTHENED. PRESIDENT
REAGAN BELIEVES STRONGLY IN THIS AND WANTS IT CLEARLY
UNDERSTOOD THAT HE IS COMMITTED TO STRENGTHEN THE
ALLIANCE. I WILL MAKE THIS POINT PUBLICLY, SAID THE
THE SECRETARY, WHEN I LEAVE KOREA.

- -- ONE PRACTICAL THING WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO DO
WOULD BE TO HELP WITH TRAINING, EQUIPMENT AND OTHER MEANS
TO BUILD UP KOREA'S ALREADY PROFICIENT COUNTERTERRORIST
FORCES. MOREOVER, WE WILL BE GLAD TO SHARE ANY
INFORMATION WE ACQUIRE INDICATING PLANNED TERRORIST
ACTS AGAINST THE ROK SO THAT WE CAN WORK TOGETHER TO
PREVENT THEM.

13. "WE UNDERSTAND HOW FRUSTRATING IT IS NOT TO TAKE
DECISIVE ACTION," CONTINUED THE SECRETARY, "BUT KOREA
IS MAKING GREAT PROGRESS AND SHOULD NOT RISK A SETBACK
BY ILL-CONSIDERED ACTION. I KNOW PRESIDENT REAGAN
LOOKS FORWARD TO HIS VISIT; HIS COMING WILL UNDERLINE
THE DEPTH OF UNITED STATES' COMMITMENT," CONCLUDED THE
SECRETARY.

14. "I HAVE TRIED TO CONVEY THE NATURE AND DEPTH OF
DISTRESS HERE, REPLIED YOON, PARTICULARLY AS EXPRESSED
BY MY OFFICERS. WE MUST CONVINCED THEM THAT THE ONLY
SOLUTION IS TO FOSTER NATIONAL STRENGTH. AN EVEN MORE
POSITIVE US/ROK ALLIANCE AND MORE POSITIVE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE WILL BE HELPFUL. THEN WE CAN DEVELOP A
CALCULATED, EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO PYONGYANG."

15. THANKING MINISTER YOON FOR HIS AND HIS COLLEAGUES
EXTRAORDINARY HOSPITALITY AT THIS SAD TIME OF TRIAL,
SECRETARY WEINBERGER CONCLUDED BY SAYING "OUR ALLIANCE
IS IN EXCELLENT CONDITION." THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS

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PARTICULARLY PLEASED THAT CONGRESSMEN PEPPER AND HALL
COULD BE PRESENT AT THIS CONVERSATION. "WE WILL CONTINUE
OUR MAXIMUM EFFORT TO STRENGTHEN OUR ALLIANCE, SO THAT
TOGETHER WE CAN PREVAIL."

16. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH COMUSKOREA;
NOT WITH SECRETARY WEINBERGER'S PARTY. WALKER
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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 SECTO 16009

NODIS
DEPT PASS BEIJING, SECDEF, CIA, WHITE HOUSE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, CH, JA, KN, KS, US
SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DPRK MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 6

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. WE APPRECIATE THE THOUGHTFUL ANALYSES AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF BEIJING, SEOUL AND TOKYO REGARDING THE NORTH KOREAN MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 3 AND OUR PROPOSED RESPONSE. WE ARE EXTREMELY SKEPTICAL OF NORTH KOREA'S MOTIVES, GIVEN THE JUXTAPOSITION OF ITS MESSAGES TO US AND ITS TERRORIST AND PARAMILITARY ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE SOUTH, AND MINDFUL THAT IT (AND PERHAPS BEIJING AS WELL) MAY BE SEEKING TO DIVERT ATTENTION FROM RANGOON AND DEFLECT THE INTERNATIONAL CENSURE STEMMING FROM THAT INCIDENT. AT THE SAME TIME, WE CANNOT IGNORE THE APPARENT SHIFT IN NORTH KOREA'S POSITION ON INCLUSION OF "ROK AUTHORITIES" IN FUTURE TALKS. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT THE NORTH KOREAN MESSAGES MAY REFLECT CONCERTED PRC LOBBYING WITH PYONGYANG, AND THAT CHINA CLEARLY WISHES TO ENGAGE US IN A DIALOGUE ON THE KOREAN QUESTION.
3. WITH THESE THOUGHTS IN MIND, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR RESPONSE SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE OUR RESPONSIBILITY, ALONG WITH THAT OF CHINA, IN THE MAINTENANCE OF STABILITY ON THE PENINSULA AND MAKE CLEAR OUR WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN A FURTHER DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC ON KOREAN ISSUES. HOWEVER, IT SHOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT THE ROK, NOT THE UNITED STATES, MUST BE NORTH KOREA'S PRIMARY INTERLOCUTOR IN ANY DISCUSSIONS OF THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND THAT WE CANNOT AND WILL NOT ATTEMPT TO SPEAK TO THE NORTH IN BEHALF OF THE ROK. WE BELIEVE THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BEST BE ACHIEVED BY HAVING AS THE CORE OF OUR PRESENTATION TO THE CHINESE AND ROKG MESSAGE, PRECEDED BY A GENERAL REITERATION OF OUR POSITION TOWARD TENSION REDUCTION ON THE PENINSULA. WE DO NOT WISH TO MINIMIZE THE CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY EMBASSY BEIJING THAT OUR DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC COULD BE JEOPARDIZED SHOULD WE ATTEMPT TO CONVEY AN ROK MESSAGE. HOWEVER, WE HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE RISKS OF ATTEMPTING TO SPEAK FOR SOUTH KOREA ON THIS CENTRAL ISSUE ARE GREATER, NOT ONLY FOR OUR RELATIONS WITH THE ROKG AND OUR LONG-STANDING POSITION THAT THE KOREAN QUESTION MUST BE DEALT WITH THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH, BUT IN TERMS OF

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JAPANESE PERCEPTIONS AND POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EFFORTS WE BELIEVE MUST BE MAINTAINED TO CENSURE THE NORTH FOR ITS RANGOON ATTACK. ALTHOUGH OUR PROPOSED RESPONSE, IN BOTH FORM AND CONTENT, WILL BE LESS THAN WHAT THE CHINESE MAY WANT, WE BELIEVE THEY WILL REMAIN INTERESTED IN A DIALOGUE WITH US ON THESE ISSUES.

4. ACCORDINGLY, EMBASSY SEOUL SHOULD SEEK ROKG AGREEMENT ON AN URGENT BASIS IN A RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE AS OUTLINED IN PARA. 5 BELOW. YOU SHOULD INFORM THE ROKG THAT THE FIRST FOUR TICKS ARE IN THE NATURE OF A PREFACE TO THEIR MESSAGE, NOTING THAT THEY MERELY REITERATE PREVIOUSLY STATED POSITIONS OF THE US TOWARD TENSION REDUCTION, AND THAT WE ASSUME THE ROKG WILL NOT OBJECT TO THIS LANGUAGE. AS FOR THE ROKG MESSAGE ITSELF, POINTS A) AND B) ARE VERBATIM AS APPROVED BY PRESIDENT CHUN. POINT C) IS OUR ATTEMPT TO WORK OUT AN ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE KOREAN DEMAND FOR AN APOLOGY FROM THE NORTH, WHICH WE DO NOT BELIEVE IS REALISTIC AND WHICH THE CHINESE MIGHT WELL SEE AS GRATUITOUSLY OFFENSIVE, HOWEVER JUSTIFIED IT MAY IN FACT BE. WE BELIEVE POINT C) AS WRITTEN VIGOROUSLY UNDERSCORES ROKG SENTIMENTS CONCERNING RANGOON, AND COMBINED WITH OUR OWN REFERENCE TO NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS AND THE NEED FOR INTERNATIONAL CENSURE OF THE NORTH, CONSTITUTES A STRONG PRESENTATION ON THAT ISSUE. (IF THE ROKG, DESPITE OUR ARGUMENTATION, CONTINUES TO INSIST ON SOMETHING MORE AKIN TO A DEMAND FOR AN APOLOGY, WE WOULD RECOMMEND AS A FALL-BACK AN ADDITIONAL SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: "WE BELIEVE THE NORTH SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE RANGOON OUTRAGE AND PUNISH THOSE RESPONSIBLE.")

5. TEXT OF PROPOSED RESPONSE:

-- THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA SHARE A RESPONSIBILITY TO PREVENT RENEWED CONFLICT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, AND WE BELIEVE OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD WORK TOGETHER TOWARD THAT END. THE PURPOSE OF THE US-ROK ALLIANCE IS TO DEFEND THE SOUTH; IT DOES NOT THREATEN THE NORTH.
-- WE HAVE IN THE PAST PUT FORWARD VARIOUS IDEAS TO REDUCE TENSION AND PERMIT PROGRESS TOWARD PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION, INCLUDING PROPOSALS FOR MULTI-PARTY CONFERENCES ON KOREA IN WHICH BOTH KOREAN STATES WOULD BE REPRESENTED AS EQUALS, AND FOR CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES TO REDUCE THE RISK OF MISCALCULATION ALONG THE DMZ. THE UNITED STATES AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THOSE PROPOSALS.
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NODIS

DEPT PASS BEIJING, SECDEF, CIA, WHITE HOUSE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, CH, JA, KN, KS, US

SUBJECT: RESPONSE TO DPRK MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 6

THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS ALSO PROPOSED, ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS, DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN SOUTH AND NORTH TO DISCUSS ANY IDEAS EITHER MAY WISH TO TABLE WHICH WOULD LEAD TO REDUCED TENSIONS. THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THESE PROPOSALS FOR UNCONDITIONAL TALKS PUT FORWARD BY THE ROKG. WE STRONGLY BELIEVE THAT DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA MUST BE MADE BY THE TWO KOREAN PARTIES THEMSELVES, AND THAT A DIALOGUE BETWEEN THEM IS THEREFORE REQUIRED.

-- WE ARE DEEPLY DISTURBED BY THE NORTH KOREAN TERRORIST ATTACK IN RANGOON AND BY SUBSEQUENT ARMED PROVOCATIONS, AND WE BELIEVE NORTH KOREA DESERVES INTERNATIONAL CENSURE FOR SUCH ACTIONS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE CHINA'S ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREAN INTENTIONS. AND WHETHER ITS ATTACKS ON THE SOUTH ARE LIKELY TO CONTINUE.

-- IN RESPONSE TO THE NORTH KOREAN MESSAGE OF DECEMBER 3, THE ROKG HAS AUTHORIZED US TO CONVEY TO CHINA THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

A) WE HAVE MADE STRENUOUS EFFORTS TO EASE TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND TO SEEK A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA THROUGH DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE TWO PARTS OF KOREA. THIS POSITION REMAINS UNCHANGED.

B) THE QUESTION OF THE KOREAN PENINSULA SHOULD BE SETTLED BETWEEN THE TWO PARTIES DIRECTLY CONCERNED, SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA. IF NORTH KOREA WISHES, HOWEVER, WE DO NOT OPPOSE THE HOLDING OF A QUADRIPARTITE MEETING INCLUDING THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.

C) IN VIEW OF THE SAVAGE NORTH KOREAN ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT ON PRESIDENT CHUN IN RANGOON ON OCTOBER 9, AND ANOTHER ARMED INFILTRATION ATTEMPT ON DECEMBER 3, THE SAME DATE AS THE MOST RECENT NORTH KOREAN MESSAGE, WE ARE SKEPTICAL OF NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES, AND THEREFORE WHETHER TALKS WITH NORTH KOREA COULD ACHIEVE ANY RESULTS.

-- THE UNITED STATES SIDE LOKS FORWARD TO FURTHER DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES DURING PREMIER ZHAO'S UPCOMING VISIT.

6. IN DISCUSSING THIS PROPOSED MESSAGE WITH THE ROKG YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE HOPE TO GO FORWARD WITH IT AS SOON

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AS POSSIBLE, IN ORDER TO ENABLE THE CHINESE TO CONSIDER IT CAREFULLY AND BE PREPARED TO ADDRESS THE ISSUE DURING ZHAO'S VISIT ON JANUARY 10. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT WE BELIEVE JAPAN SHOULD BE APPRISED OF THE CONTENT OF THIS RESPONSE BEFORE IT IS PASSED TO THE CHINESE. PLEASE INFORM US BY NIACT IMMEDIATE, INFO TOKYO AND BEIJING, WHEN ROKG AGREEMENT IS OBTAINED.

7. FOR TOKYO: YOU SHOULD INFORM THE GOJ THAT WE ARE NOW DISCUSSING WITH THE ROKG A PROPOSED RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE; THAT WE ARE THINKING IN TERMS OF CONVEYING AN ROKG MESSAGE (WHICH WOULD PRESERVE SYMMETRY AND UNDERSCORE THE PRIMARY ROLE OF THE ROK IN ANY DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING KOREAN PENINSULA ISSUES); AND THAT WE WOULD ALSO EXPRESS TO THE CHINESE OUR OWN INTEREST IN TENSION REDUCTION AND IN A CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH THE PRC ON THE KOREAN QUESTION. YOU SHOULD STRESS THAT WE REMAIN SKEPTICAL OF NORTH KOREAN MOTIVES, AND CONVINCED THAT THE INTERNATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO PUNISH THE NORTH FOR RANGOON MUST BE SUSTAINED. YOU SHOULD ADD THAT AS SOON AS ROKG AGREEMENT IS OBTAINED, WE WILL FULLY INFORM THE GOJ OF THE CONTENT OF OUR RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE BEFORE IT IS CONVEYED.

8. FOR BEIJING: WE WILL SEND A FURTHER INSTRUCTION CONCERNING THE TIMING OF OUR DEMARCHE, FOLLOWING ROKG AGREEMENT AND CONSULTATIONS WITH THE JAPANESE. WE PLAN TO DELIVER OUR RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE HERE IN THE FIRST INSTANCE. SHULTZ
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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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January 12, 1984

DECLASSIFIED

INFORMATION

NLRR M383 #76459

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

BY LN NARA DATE 11/8/12

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR *G. J. Sigur*

DAVID LAUX *DL*

SUBJECT:

Quadripartite Korean Talks and the Vice President's Concerns

The purpose of this memo is to examine briefly how quadripartite talks involving Korea might be conducted. The Vice President is concerned that the U.S. might be put in the position of exacerbating U.S.-PRC relations by having to side with South Korea against the PRC and North Korea.

Two important factors should govern our thinking: First, we need to go slow. We cannot push too far, nor too rapidly, from the front of our thoughts the Rangoon killings. Also, we are talking about a process which, when and if begun, will likely be inconclusive for some time to come. Second, South Korea must be comfortable with whatever formula we decide on. In addition, the fact that China is reluctant to be at the table causes us a problem.

South Korea will never do anything which would seem not to support the easing of tensions on the peninsula, but it opposes the idea of tripartite talks with only representatives of the U.S. and North and South Korea present for two reasons: 1) It makes the South Koreans look too much like puppets of the U.S.; and 2) they fear that North Korea would begin to use such a forum to establish their own bilateral relationship with the U.S. without South Korea being able to make a commensurate move with respect to the PRC or, perhaps at some future date, to the USSR. Seoul has consistently said it would be willing to deal on a bilateral basis with the North, or on a quadripartite basis (with the U.S. and PRC as full participants, or simply observers), but they look askance at tripartite talks.

There are other aspects to the problem. One is Taiwan. We need to be careful in whatever structure and process we establish that it does not appear that the U.S. is squeezing a small loyal ally in a way that appears opportunistic in terms of pursuing a strategic objective. Taiwan would be especially sensitive to this, watching the developments closely for any message that might be in it for their own dealings with the PRC and the role that the U.S. might eventually play in that context.

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Another problem is Japan. The Japanese will feel left out if they are not included in the talks, believing that they should be just as much, if not more concerned, than the U.S. in developments on the Korean peninsula. Therefore, they are pushing for a six-way conference, with the USSR and themselves included. They don't really believe that the Soviets should be there, but are pressing for it as a device by which to ensure their own presence.

The possible combinations and permutations obviously need some hard analysis before we reach any conclusions on a strategy. This is a quick response to John Poindexter's note of earlier today. We will be thinking more about this over the next few days, and when I return from Tokyo we will put more down on paper for you.

NLRR M383 #76472

BY CW NARA DATE 11/8/12 North Korean Proposal of January 11, 1984

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 So. Korea

- Proposed tripartite talks, to discuss measures for easing tensions and creating "preconditions" for a peaceful settlement.
- Signalled as matters of "prime importance":
 - signing a "peace agreement" to replace armistice and officially end Korean War;
 - withdrawing all foreign (i.e., U.S.) troops;
 - adopting a declaration of non-aggression between North and South Korea, involving arms reductions on both sides.
- Peace Agreement would be followed by North-South dialogue, to discuss reunifying the country in accordance with the principles of the 4 July 1972 North-South Joint Statement, i.e., independence, peaceful reunification, and "great national unity."
- North-South dialogue would lead to convening a national conference to promote "great national unity," and ultimately to a confederation "based on regional autonomy, leaving the existing socio-political systems in North and South as they are."

ROK Response to North Korean Proposal of January 11, 1984
 (Statement of Unification Minister SON Chae-sik)

- Renewed ROKG call for North-South dialogue, i.e., for direct talks between "highest responsible authorities."
- Countries "responsible, directly or indirectly, for division of Korean peninsula and Korean war," should hold talks in which all participate (i.e., quadripartite or larger). This presumably would come after the North-South dialogue.
- Sincerity of North Korea doubted because of Pyongyang's refusal to admit or apologize for Rangoon incident and its claim that the attack was fabricated by the South.
 - to create conditions for peace, unification and national reconciliation, North Korean authorities should "officially or unofficially admit and apologize for the Rangoon incident."
- However, if North Korean authorities show sincere desire to reduce tension and move toward national reconciliation, progress is possible. (Thus, a formal North Korean apology for Rangoon, while desirable, is not a prerequisite for talks.)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

1/19/84

SITUATION ROOM:

Please LDX the attached to

Mr. David Gries
CIA



Thank you.


G. Sigur

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.5 (c)

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1/19

Recipient
CIA

Please call Mr. David Gries on
 immediately for pick up.

Thank you.

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NLRR mu-383# 76462
BY RW NARA DATE 4/17/12

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5607

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 00928

NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KN, US
SUBJECT: TEXTS OF DPRK LETTERS TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES AND
USG
REF: BEIJING 00920

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING ARE COMPLETE TEXTS OF DPRK "LETTER TO SEOUL
AUTHORITIES" AND "LETTER TO U. S. GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS,"
BOTH OF WHICH WERE ENCLOSURES TO LETTERS TO THE VICE
PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY, AS PROVIDED TO EMBASSY
THROUGH CHINESE MFA OFFICIAL JANUARY 18.

3. LETTER TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES, AS FOLLOWS:
QUOTE WE ARE SENDING THIS LETTER TO THE SEOUL AUTHORITIES
AFTER DISCUSSING ON JANUARY 10 THE QUESTION OF TAKING A
NEW MEASURE FOR PROMOTING THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY IN CONNECTION WITH THE
PRESENT SITUATION.
NEARLY 40 YEARS HAVE PASSED SINCE THE COUNTRY WAS DIVIDED
AND MORE THAN 30 YEARS SINCE THE CEASEFIRE.
IN THE YEARS OUR NATION HAS IN UNISON DESIRED PEACE
AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION.
BUT, IN OUR COUNTRY TODAY, CONTRARY TO THE DESIRE OF THE
WHOLE NATION, TENSIONS HAVE GROWN MORE ACUTE THAN EVER
BEFORE AND A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION WHICH MAY LEAD TO
A WAR ANY MOMENT HAS BEEN CREATED.

IT IS PAINFUL THAT DISTRUST AND ANTAGONISM WITHIN THE
NATION ARE GROWING DEEPER AND THE PROSPECT OF NATIONAL
REUNIFICATION IS GETTING GLOOMIER. THE SOUTHERN LAND
HAS EVEN TURNED INTO A NUCLEAR FORWARD BASE.
IF ANOTHER WAR BROKE OUT ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA NOW,
IT WOULD EXPAND INTO A NUCLEAR WAR, NOT AN ORDINARY WAR
AS IN THE PAST. THIS IS AS CLEAR AS NOONDAY.
NO ONE SHOULD REMAIN AN ONLOOKER TO THIS GRAVE DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE SITUATION IN WHICH OUR NATION MAY FALL A
VICTIM TO A NUCLEAR HOLOCAUST AND LOSE THE POSSIBILITY
OF A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION FOR GOOD AND ALL.
WE MUST, AT ALL COSTS, REALIZE IN OUR GENERATION THE
PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, THE GREATEST
SUPREME DESIRE OF THE NATION, AND, FOR THIS NOBLE
PURPOSE, FIND A WAY OF BREAKING THE DEADLOCK THROUGH
THE UNITED EFFORTS OF THE WHOLE NATION.
FOR THE PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY UNDER THE
PRESENT SITUATION, IT IS REQUIRED FIRST OF ALL TO BRING
AN END TO THE ACUTE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NORTH

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BY CN NARA DATE 11/8/12

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DTG: 180713Z JAN 84 PSN: 062239

AND SOUTH AND EASE TENSIONS.
A CLIMATE OF DIALOGUE AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION CAN NEVER BE CREATED UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITION IN WHICH NORTH AND SOUTH ARE LEVELLING GUNS AND POINTING BAYONETS AT EACH OTHER.

IF THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH IS TO BE ENDED AND TENSIONS BE EASED IN OUR COUNTRY, PROBLEMS MUST BE SOLVED WITH THE UNITED STATES FIRST OF ALL. THIS IS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES IS NOT ONLY A SIGNATORY TO THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BUT ALSO HAS ITS TROOPS STATIONED IN SOUTH KOREA AND HOLDS ALL THE PREROGATIVE OF MILITARY SUPREME COMMAND. THEREFORE, WE HAVE PROPOSED ANEW TALKS WITH THE UNITED STATES ON THIS QUESTION THIS TIME.

AND WE CONSIDER THAT THE SEOUL AUTHORITIES, ANOTHER PARTY DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE TENSIONS CREATED IN OUR COUNTRY, MAY PARTICIPATE ON AN EQUAL FOOTING IN THE TALKS BETWEEN US AND THE UNITED STATES.

SHOULD TRIPARTITE TALKS BE HELD, WE THINK, THE QUESTION OF ENDING THE MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND EASING TENSIONS IN OUR COUNTRY WOULD BE SOLVED WITH FULL GUARANTEES IN ALL ASPECTS.

THE TRIPARTITE TALKS MAY TAKE UP QUESTION OF SIGNING A PEACE AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD REPLACE THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE UNITED STATES, THE TWO SIGNATORIES TO THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, AS A MEASURE FOR DISPELLING TENSIONS BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH
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PAGE 01 OF 02 BEIJING 0928
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5608

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 05 BEIJING 00928

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, KN, US

SUBJECT: TEXTS OF DPRK LETTERS TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES AND
AND GUARANTEEING A DURABLE PEACE AND THE QUESTION OF
ADOPTING A DECLARATION OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN NORTH
AND SOUTH.

THE PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN US AND THE UNITED STATES,
IN OUR OPINION, MAY INCLUDE MAINLY THE PROBLEM OF
WITHDRAWING THE U. S. TROOPS AND MILITARY EQUIPMENT
INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THE PROBLEM OF CONDITIONS
GUARANTEEING A DURABLE PEACE AND THE DECLARATION OF
NOJ-AGR SSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH INCLUDE THE
PROBLEMS OF NORTH AND SOUTH REFRAINING FROM THE USE OF
ARMS AGAINST EACH OTHER AND CUTTING ARMAMENTS.
OTHER QUESTIONS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE
SEOUL AUTHORITIES ALSO MAY BE DISCUSSED AT THE TRIPARTITE
TALKS.

AFTER A GUARANTEE IS PROVIDED FOR THE RELAXATION OF
TENSIONS AND PRECONDITION FOR NATIONAL REUNIFICATION
IS CREATED WITH THE SOLUTION OF THOSE PROBLEMS AT THE
TRIPARTITE TALKS, WE CONSIDER, A DIALOGUE MAY BE OPENED
BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH FOR A DISCUSSION OF THE
REUNIFICATION QUESTION.

AT THE NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE THE QUESTION OF ACHIEVING
THE COUNTRY'S REUNIFICATION INDEPENDENTLY, PEACEFULLY
AND BY THE UNITED EFFORTS OF THE NATION SHOULD BE
DISCUSSED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE THREE PRINCIPLES OF
NATIONAL REUNIFICATION WHICH THE TWO SIDES AGREED UPON
AND FIRMLY PROMISED THE NATION TO FULFILL ALREADY IN
THE JULY 4 NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT.

FOR THE INDEPENDENT AND PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE
COUNTRY, A POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE MGETING SUCH AS A
NATIONAL CONFERENCE EMRRACING VARIOUS PARTIES, GROUPINGS
AND CIRCLES INCLUDING THE AUTHORITIES OF NORTH AND SOUTH,
SHOULD BE CONVENED, WHICH MAY DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF
FOUNDING A NEUTRAL CONFEDERAL STATE, LEAVING THE
SYSTEMS IN THE NORTH AND THE SOUTH AS THEY ARE ALLOWING
AUTONOMY IN THE TWO REGIONS.

IF THE SEOUL AUTHORITIES HAD ANOTHER REASONABLE
PROPOSAL FOR THE FOUNDING OF A UNIFIED STATE, IT MAY
ALSO BE DISCUSSED.

OUR NEW PROPOSAL FOR TRIPARTITE TALKS IS AN EPOCHAL
INITIATI. E HERALDING A TURNING POINT FOR PRACTICALLY
REMOVING TENSIONS AND FIRMLY GUARANTEEING PEACE IN OUR
COUNTRY AND OPENING A FAVOURABLE PHASE FOR PEACEFUL
REUNIFICATION.

THE TRIPARTITE TALKS MAY BE HELD AT PANMUNJOM OR IN A

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CONVENIENT THIRD COUNTRY.
CONSIDERING THAT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS MUST BE CONVENED
AT AN EARLY DATE AS A NEW PRELUDE TO THE RELAXATION
OF TENSIONS AND NATIONAL REUNIFICATION, WE HOPE THAT
THE SEOUL AUTHORITIES WILL PAY DEEP ATTENTION TO OUR
PROPOSAL AND SHOW AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE TO IT.
JOINT MEETING OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S
ASSEMBLY OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
PYONGYANG, JANUARY 10, 1984.
UNQUOTE.

4. LETTER TO U. S. GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS, AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE

A JOINT MEETING OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND
THE STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY
OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA IS SENDING
THIS LETTER TO THE GOVERNMENT AND BOTH THE SENATE AND
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA AFTER DISCUSSING AND DECIDING UPON THE QUESTION
OF TAKING A NEW STEP FOR A PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE
KOREAN QUESTION.

TODAY THE KOREAN PENINSULA FINDS ITSELF AT THE GRAVE
CROSSROADS OF PEACE AND WAR.

30 YEARS HAVE ALREADY PASSED SINCE THE CEASEFIRE IN
KOREA, BUT THE PROSPECT OF PEACE IS GETTING EVER
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 05 BEIJING 00928

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C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT - FIRST 4 PARAS THIS SECTION)

E. O. 12356: DECL: IDR

TAGS: PREL, KN, US

SUBJECT: TEXTS OF DPRK LETTERS TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES AND GLOOMIER AND THE SITUATION IS PRESSING CLOSER TO AN ACUTE PHASE REMINDING US OF THE EVE OF A WAR.

WHILE HUGE ARMED FORCES OF BOTH SIDES STAND IN ACUTE CONFRONTATION ALONG THE MILITARY DEMARCAVION LINE ARMS BUILDUP IS GOING ON AND MASSIVE WAR EXERCISES NEVER CEASE IN THE SOUTH.

THE PRESENT SITUATION IS STRAINED SO EXTREMELY THAT AN ACCIDENTAL TRIFLING INCIDENT MIGHT TRIGGER OFF A WAR ANY MINUTE.

THIS AROUSES DEEP APPREHENSIONS AMONG THE WORLD PEOPLE AND URGENTLY REQUIRES AN APPROPRIATE STEP TO AVERT WAR AND DEFEND PEACE.

AFTER THE TRUCE IN KOREA THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA HAS ALL ALONG SOUGHT BY ALL MEANS WAYS OF TERMINATING THE HOSTILE RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES AND, ALREADY IN 1974, AS PART OF THIS, PROPOSED THE QUESTION OF HOLDING DIRECT DIALOGUES AND SIGNING A PEACE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE DPRK AND USA.

TO OUR REGRET, HOWEVER, THESE EFFORTS ON OUR PART HAVE NOT MET WITH A DUE RESPONSE SO FAR.

ALLEGING THAT WE INTEND TO "INVADE THE SOUTH", YOU ARE CONSTANTLY BUILDING UP ARMED FORCES AND HASTENING WAR PREPARATIONS IN SOUTH KOREA AND ARE TRYING TO DECEIVE THE WORLD PEOPLE UNDER THE PRETEXT OF PREVENTING THE FICTITIOUS "SOUTHWARD INVASION."

WE HAVE NO INTENTION TO "INVADE THE SOUTH" AND DO NOT SEEK A FRATRICIDAL WAR. NO: ONLY ONCE OR TWICE HAVE WE MADE THIS CLEAR. WE HAVE ALWAYS BENT EFFORTS TO DEFEND THE NATION'S SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RIGHT TO EXISTENCE. THE WORSENING STATE OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES HAS ONLY CREATED MUTUAL DISTRUST AND ANTAGONISM AND FURTHER INCREASED THE DANGER OF WAR. SHOULD A WAR BREAK OUT AGAIN IN KOREA, IT WOULD NOT BE CONFINED WITHIN THE BOUNDARY OF KOREA, BUT WOULD INEVITABLY EXPAND INTO A NUCLEAR WAR. THEN NOT ONLY THE KOREAN PEOPLE BUT ALSO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WILL NOT BE SAFE AND THE WHOLE WORLD WILL BE UNABLE TO EVADE THE SCOURGE OF NUCLEAR WAR.

NOW THE QUESTION POSES SO SERIOUSLY WHETHER TO CONTINUE ALONG THE ROAD OF NUCLEAR WAR OR TO TURN AROUND TO TAKE THE ROAD OF PEACE.

FACTS CLEARLY SHOW THAT YOU WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO GAIN,

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IF YOU KEPT SUCH ACUTE STATE OF CONFRONTATION AS NOW.
WE CONSIDER IT IS HIGH TIME BOTH OUR GOVERNMENT AND THE
U. S. GOVERNMENT DISENGAGED THEMSELVES FROM THE STATE OF
SECLUSION FROM EACH OTHER AND JOINTLY SOUGHT WAYS TO
REMOVE THE GRAVE DANGER OF WAR FROM THE KOREAN PENINSULA
AT AN EARLY DATE AND SOLVE THE KOREAN QUESTION
PEACEFULLY.

WE DEEPLY BELIEVE THAT THE WAY OUT DOES NOT LIE IN
CONFRONTATION BUT IN DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE PARTIES
CONCERNED.

IF THE U. S. GOVERNMENT TRULY DESIRED PEACE, IT, TOGETHER
WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES, ANOTHER PARTY
RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INCREASED TENSION IN KOREA TODAY,
SHOULD HAVE CONTACTS WITH US TO HOLD NEGOTIATION FOR THE
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION, WE THINK.
FROM THIS VIEWPOINT WE DECIDED TO FORMALLY PROPOSE
TRIPARTITE TALKS, WITH THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES
PARTICIPATING IN THE TALKS BETWEEN US AND THE UNITED
STATES IN THE NEW YEAR 1984.

PANMUNJOM OR ANY OTHER PLACE REGARDED CONVENIENT TO ALL
PARTIES MAY BE CHOSEN AS THE VENUE OF THE TRIPARTITE
TALKS.

THE TRIPARTITE TALKS SHOULD DISCUSS FIRST OF ALL MEASURES
FOR EASING THE TENSIONS IN KOREA AND CREATING PRECONDITIONS
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SECRET SECTION 04 OF 05 BEIJING 00928

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, KN, US

SUBJECT: TEXTS OF DPRK LETTERS TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES AND FOR A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE KOREAN QUESTION. BECAUSE NO ONE CAN THINK OF THE PEACEFUL SOLUTION OF THE KOREAN QUESTION UNDER THE PRESENT CONDITION WHERE THE STATE OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION HAS GROWN WORSE THAN EVER BEFORE AND THE DANGER OF NUCLEAR WAR IS HANGING HEAVILY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA.

WE CONSIDER, THEREFORE, THAT THE MATTERS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS ARE THE QUESTIONS OF SIGNING A PEACE AGREEMENT, A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE ARMISTICE AGREEMENT, BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, A SIGNATORY TO THE KOREAN ARMISTICE AGREEMENT WHICH HOLDS THE PREROGATIVES OF THE SUPREME MILITARY COMMAND IN SOUTH KOREA, AND US AND OF ADOPTING A DECLARATION OF NON-AGGRESSION BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH OF KOREA.

THE PEACE AGREEMENT MAY INCLUDE THE PROBLEMS OF OFFICIALLY ANNOUNCING THE END OF THE KOREAN WAR BY LAW, CONVERTING THE ARMISTICE INTO A DURABLE PEACE AND WITHDRAWING ALL FOREIGN TROOPS, AND THE DECLARATION OF NON-AGGRESSION INCLUDE THE PROBLEMS OF NORTH AND SOUTH NOT RESORTING TO ARMED FORCES AGAINST THE OTHER AND REDUCING THEIR ARMIES.

AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS, A COMPREHENSIVE DISCUSSION MAY BE HELD ON THE QUESTION RAISED BY THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTH KOREAN AUTHORITIES TO EASE TENSIONS IN KOREA.

WHEN PRECONDITIONS FOR THE RELAXATION OF TENSION IN KOREA AND HER NATIONAL REUNIFICATION ARE CREATED WITH THE SIGNING OF A PEACE AGREEMENT AND ADOPTION OF A DECLARATION OF NON-AGGRESSION AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS, A DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH OF KOREA WILL BE HELD TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM OF REUNIFYING THE COUNTRY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF INDEPENDENCE, PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION AND GREAT NATIONAL UNITY AS LAID DOWN IN THE JULY 4 NORTH-SOUTH JOINT STATEMENT.

THERE ARE SUCH QUESTIONS AS CONVENING A NATIONAL CONFERENCE AND PROMOTING GREAT NATIONAL UNITY AND ENFORCING A CONFEDERATION BASED ON REGIONAL AUTONOMY, LEAVING THE EXISTING SOCIO-POLITICAL SYSTEMS IN NORTH AND SOUTH AS THEY ARE MAY BE DISCUSSED.

WHEN ALL THESE PROBLEMS ARE SOLVED SUCCESSFULLY AT THE TRIPARTITE TALKS AND DIALOGUE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH FOR REUNIFICATION, ALL GUARANTEES NEEDED FOR A LASTING AND FAIR PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA WILL BE PROVIDED CREDITABLY.

REUNIFIED KOREA WOULD NOT BE A MILITARY BASE OR SAN

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OPERATIONAL BASE FOR ANY FOREIGN COUNTRY OR A SATELLITE COUNTRY, BUT WOULD BE COMPLETELY INDEPENDENT AND STRICT NEUTRAL STATE WHICH WOULD NOT JOIN ANY POLITICAL AND MILITARY ALLIANCE OR BLOC.

REUNIFIED KOREA WOULD LEAVE INTACT THE FOREIGN CAPITAL INVESTED IN SOUTH KOREA BEFORE THE REUNIFICATION OF THE COUNTRY, BUT CONTINUE TO GUARANTEE ITS INTERESTS AND WOULD DEVELOP FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES ON THE PRINCIPLES OF CHAJUSONG (INDEPENDENCE), NON-INTERFERENCE IN OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, EQUALITY, MUTUAL BENEFIT AND PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE.

THEN THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE ABLE TO WASH ITS HANDS OFF THE KOREAN QUESTION WITH HONOUR WITHOUT LOSING FACE OR IMPAIRING ITS INTERESTS AND THIS WOULD BE IN FULL ACCORD WITH THE INTERESTS NOT ONLY OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE BUT ALSO OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

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THE UNITED STATES AND WE HAD FOUGHT A WAR. THIS DOES NOT MEAN THAT OUR TWO COUNTRIES SHOULD REMAIN HOSTILE COUNTRIES FOREVER AND THERE IS NO NEED WHATSOEVER TO FIGHT ANOTHER WAR.

WE THINK WE CAN HAVE FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, IF ITS GOVERNMENT DOES NOT INTERFERE IN THE DOMESTIC AFFAIRS OF THE KOREAN PEOPLE OR OBSTRUCT KOREA'S REUNIFICATION, SHOWING TRUE INTEREST IN PRESERVING PEACE IN KOREA AND IN SOLVING THE KOREAN QUESTION PEACEFULLY. OUR PROPOSAL FOR THE TRIPARTITE TALKS THIS TIME IS MOST TIMELY AND PROPER UNDER THE PRESENT CHANGED SITUATION.
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TAGS: PREL, KN, US

SUBJECT: TEXTS OF DPRK LETTERS TO SEOUL AUTHORITIES AND
THE KOREAN QUESTION MUST NOT BE LEFT UNSOLVED FOR AN
INDEFINITE PERIOD EITHER IN VIEW OF ITS HISTORICAL
BACKGROUND OR IN VIEW OF ITS ACTUAL URGENCY.

THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE AND THE STANDING COMMITTEE
OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF THE DEMOCRATIC
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA EXPRESS THE HOPE THAT THE
U. S. A. GOVERNMENT AND CONGRESS WILL PONDER OVER OUR NEW
PEACEFUL INITIATIVE AND SHOW AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE TO
IT.

JOINT MEETING OF THE CENTRAL PEOPLE'S (#) THE
STANDING COMMITTEE OF THE SUPREME PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY OF
THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA.
PYONGYANG, JANUARY 10, 1984.

UNQUOTE.
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