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01/29/1983-02/10/1983 II Korea and Hong Kong,
NSC - Mr. Sigur [Briefing Book] (3)
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File Folder: Sec. Shultz's Trip to Asia 1/29-2/10 II Korea and
Hong Kong NSC Mr. Sigur [3 of 5] ~~Box 90230~~

Date: February 7, 1997

RAC Box 14

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|------------------------------|---|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. note | re objectives re meeting with Prime Minister Kim (1 pp.) | n.d. | P1, P5 |
| 2. briefing memo | from Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary re your call on P.M. Lee 2/7 (5 pp.) | 1/21/83 | P1, P5 |
| 3. note | re objectives in meeting with President Chun 2/7/83 (1 pp.) | n.d. | P1, P5 |
| 4. briefing memo | from Paul Wolfowitz to the Secretary re your meeting with President Chun 2/7 (13 pp.) | 1/21/83 | P1, P5 |
| 5. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) | 1/14/83 | P1, P5 |
| 6. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) | n.d. | P1, P5 |
| 7. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) <i>R 7/17/00 MR99-004 # 15</i> | 1/13/83 | P1 |
| 8. briefing paper | re Korea visit (2 pp.) | 1/14/83 | P1, P5 |
| 9. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) <i>R 7/17/00 MR99-004 # 16</i> | 1/17/83 | P1 |
| 10. briefing paper | re Korea visit (2 pp.) | 1/20/83 | P1, P5 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: SIGUR, GASTON: Files

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File Folder: Sec. Shultz's Trip to Asia 1/29-2/10 II Korea and
Hong Kong NSC Mr. Sigur [3 of 5] Box 90230

Date: February 7, 1997

RAC 30014

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-------------------------------|---|----------|---------------|
| 11. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) <i>R 7/17/00 MR99-004 #17</i> | 1/11/83 | PI |
| 12. briefing paper | copy of item #11 (1 pp.) <i>R " " copy of #17</i> | 1/11/83 | PI |
| 13. briefing paper | re Korea visit (2 pp., including copy) <i>R 4/17/99 NLSF95-033</i> | 1/17/83 | PI |
| 14. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) <i>R 7/17/00 MR99-004 #18</i> | n.d. | PI |
| 15. briefing paper | re Korea visit (1 pp.) <i>R " " #19</i> | 1/11/83 | PI |
| 16. bio | re Chun Doo Hwan (2 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #104</i> | 1/17/83 | PI P3/F3 |
| 17. bio | re Kim Sang Hyup (2 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #105</i> | 10/21/82 | PI " |
| 18. bio | re Lee Bum Suk (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #106</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 19. bio | re Gong Ro Myung (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #107</i> | 10/21/82 | PI " |
| 20. bio | re Kim Jae-ik (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #108</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 21. bio | re Hahn Byung-choon (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #109</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 22. bio | re Chung Soon-duk (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF 95-033, #110</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 23. bio | re Jung Nae Hiuk (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF 95-033, #111</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 24. bio | re Stephen Cardinal Kim (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033, #112</i> | 1/20/83 | PI " |
| 25. bio | re Kim Kwan Suk (1 pp.) <i>D 6/20/00 NLSF95-033</i> | 1/19/83 | PI " |

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#113

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: SIGUR, GASTON: Files

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File Folder: Sec. Shultz's Trip to Asia 1/29-2/10 II Korea and
Hong Kong NSC Mr. Sigur [3 of 5] ~~Box 90230~~

Date: February 7, 1997

RAC 30014

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|---------|-------------|
| 26. briefing memo | from Wolfowitz to the Secretary re checklist for your visit to Korea (2 pp.) | 1/20/83 | P1, P5 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS

Both the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea are committed in principle to reunification, but each sets conditions to protect its own interests that are unacceptable to the other. The two Koreas have developed anti-theoretical economic, political and social systems in their nearly forty years of separate existence. The incompatibility of the two systems, the deep mutual distrust which their long and bitter division has engendered, and the determination of Kim Il Song to reunify the country in his lifetime have made the peninsula one of the most tense and dangerous areas in the world.

Pyongyang's approach to unification has been to insist on an overall political settlement first, with details left for later; Seoul has favored a step-by-step approach, starting with economic and humanitarian measures such as family reunification, opening of phone and mail links, and trade. These differences in approach led to the foundering of the 1971-72 North-South talks. In October 1980 Kim Il Song proposed a confederation and offered to talk with the ROK about it just as soon as US troops left Korea and Chun Doo Hwan stepped down. President Chun proposed, twice in 1981 and again in January 1982, a summit meeting with Kim Il Song to discuss any and all ideas, including specific measures to reduce tensions and promote humanitarian and cultural exchanges. His January 1982 proposal seized the rhetorical initiative in that it addressed both short term (i.e. normalization of relations through an interim agreement) and long term (drafting a constitution and holding elections for a unified government) aspects of the issue. It was nonetheless rejected by the North, and serious talk on reunification is unlikely as long as the DPRK insists on unacceptable preconditions: withdrawal of US forces, "democratization" of the ROK political system (i.e. replacement of Chun), and an end to Seoul's anti-communist policy.

The DPRK has sought to engage the US, as signer of the 1953 armistice agreement, in discussions on a peace treaty, but we have refused direct contact with the North unless the ROK is represented on a full and equal basis. The USG supports the principle of peaceful reunification of Korea and we maintain that the future of the Korean peninsula is primarily a matter for the two Koreas to decide. In the absence of realistic near-term prospects for unification, our policy is to acknowledge the reality of two states on the peninsula, and to work for reduced tension between the two Koreas by encouraging a dialogue between them, measures to ease the danger of military confrontation, and improved relations between South Korea and the communist allies of the North.

January 13, 1983

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NLS MR99-004 #15

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BY CS NARA, DATE 7/17/00

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BY out, NARA, DATE 6/9/99HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

Human rights remains a chronic problem area in US-Korea relations. The issue attracts a good deal of both public and Congressional interest, the latter mostly from the HFAC (Solarz and Bonker), and Senators Percy, Cranston, and Kennedy. Current concerns include instances of prolonged detention without charge, and credible allegations of torture and inhumane conditions of imprisonment.

We believe that increased respect for human rights, including a more open political environment, would enhance Korea's long-term political stability. The Korean leadership, on the other hand, insists that tight controls are necessary to preserve stability and national unity in the face of the North Korean threat. It was this conviction which led the ROKG to suppress, with great harshness, what it saw as a potentially insurrectionary situation in Kwangju in 1980--an event which in many Koreans' eyes seriously tarnished the fledgling Chun government's legitimacy.

Prior to the lifting of martial law in January 1981, Chun imposed new laws that disbanded all political parties and created new ones, including a relatively docile opposition, and placed restrictions on political activity, the media, and public gatherings. The government deploys an extensive informer network, engages in widespread surveillance of its critics, and regularly portrays the latter as pro-communist. The laws limit labor organizing and collective bargaining, and ban strikes. Religious freedom does not extend to church involvement in political and social affairs, resulting in recurrent tension in church-state relations.

Despite a number of prisoner amnesties in the last two years, notably the release in December of Kim Dae Jung and 47 other persons, activists in the field estimate about 300 political prisoners remain in jail. In addition, 567 persons are banned from politics, and scores of academics and journalists are barred from practicing their professions.

We normally express our human rights concerns to the Koreans through "quiet diplomacy." Ambassador Walker and his staff have made innumerable representations on these issues in Seoul, as we have to the ROKG officials in Washington. The Ambassador, and high level visitors such as Vice President Bush last year, have also noted our human rights concerns in well publicized speeches. While our overall approach has been criticized as being insufficiently "visible," its practical efficacy was demonstrated dramatically with the ROKG decision to amnesty Kim Dae Jung and others. We intend to use basically the same tactics in continuing to urge Chun to move toward more extensive political liberalization.

January 17, 1983

BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/1/79

HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION

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January 17, 1983

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND ARMS EXPORT PROBLEMS

In addition to our direct military involvement in Korea where we deploy some 39,000 troops, we have provided since 1950 over \$10 billion in security assistance. Grant aid terminated in 1977, but FMS credits continue to be a very important resource for the Korean force modernization program which projects some \$3.5 billion in purchases from the US over the next five years. FMS credits amounted to \$167 million in FY 83. We proposed \$210 million for FY 83 but under the continuing resolution the current working figure is only about \$150 million, considerably less than last year. Although the Koreans know we are having difficulty with FY 83 funding, they are not yet aware of the magnitude of reduction from last year's level. The Koreans already allocate 6% of GNP to defense and reduced FMS levels will cause further delays in Korean force improvement plans.

In order to compensate in part for our inability to fund FMS credits at higher levels, we are seeking Treasury and OMB agreement to improve the repayment terms of the Korean loans from a three year grace/nine year repayment formula to five and seven years, respectively. We are also considering a legislative initiative for FY 84 that would add Korea to the list of countries that received terms of ten years grace and twenty years repayment.

During the 1970s Korea built a substantial defense industry, based almost entirely on US technology. Having satisfied most of their immediate procurement requirements, Korean industry is now faced with an excess capacity (the industry is only operating at about 35% of capacity) that threatens the existence of a number of companies. They hope to take up the slack by expanding exports. As many of the items they wish to export are produced with US technology, however, this can not be done without US consent. We have given blanket approval to market a number of items to specified countries, but have had to refuse many requests because the equipment was destined for countries to which we would not sell (i.e. Iraq, Iran), or because the export by Korea of a particular item would harm the US production base.

Because of the importance of defense industries to many local economies throughout the country, there has been a great deal of congressional interest in our third country sales policy. This has severely handicapped our efforts to be responsive to a key ally, whose economic and military health is vital to our interests in East Asia. Korean frustration with our policy may well lead to efforts to modify US designs sufficiently to claim them as indigenous and thus escape US controls. State and Defense have formed a joint task force to formulate a policy for the future.

January 17, 1983

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BY

CAS

NARA, DATE

7/17/00

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ECONOMIC AND TRADE ISSUES

After nearly two decades of spectacular economic growth, Korea had a serious recession in 1980 and a real GNP decline of 6.2%. The recession was caused by a variety of internal and external factors, including rapidly increasing wage rates; an accelerating rate of inflation; recession in important developed country markets; the petroleum shock of 1979; political instability following the assassination of President Park, and a major failure of the 1980 rice crop. These factors were compounded by the effects of Korea's efforts to deflate the overheated economy.

The economy began to recover in 1981 and grew by 6.4%. The 1982 real growth rate of approximately 5.5% was one of the best in the world. Inflation as measured by the wholesale price index declined from 44.2% in 1980 to 11.8% in 1981 and about 2+% in 1982. Wages have increased only nominally, and there was significant improvement in the balance of payments. Smaller trade deficits and increased payments from overseas construction contracts have reduced current account deficits from \$5.7 billion in 1980 to \$4.4 billion in 1981 and approximately \$2 billion in 1982. Real GNP growth of 6-7% is expected in 1983 and continued steady growth of the same magnitude through the middle of the decade. This, of course, will depend largely on the health of the world economy and continued Korean access to developed country markets.

Korea is becoming an increasingly complex industrial society. It has one of the most efficient steel industries in the world, has emerged as the world's second largest shipbuilding nation in less than a decade, has a diversified chemical industry, is broadening its capabilities in the electronics sphere, and is one of the major competitors for international construction contracts. The services sector remains underdeveloped but accounts for an increasing share of GNP.

Our bilateral trade increased to about \$12 billion in 1982 and Korea has enjoyed a small surplus for the last two years. We are, by far, Korea's most important customer and the government seeks to maintain a balance in bilateral trade. Korea's leadership is increasingly concerned about American protectionism, and frequently emphasizes that continued access to U.S. markets is essential if Korea is to sustain the economic growth needed to maintain stability and support our mutual defense effort in Northeast Asia. It views the recent imposition of countervailing duties on certain steel products and our increasingly rigid barriers to Korean textile, garment, and shoe exports with considerable apprehension. We have sought from the ROKG continued liberalization of its market, and improved business conditions for U.S. firms operating in Korea.

January 11, 1983

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NLS MR99-004 #17

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DECL: OADR

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/17/00

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

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ECONOMIC AND TRADE ISSUES

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January 11, 1983

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DECL: OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BRIEFING PAPER

RICE SALES TO KOREA

The current controversy over rice exports to Korea evolved from a 1980 Korean commitment to buy 500,000 tons of 1981 crop US rice in exchange for U.S. agreement to waive restrictions in a U.S.-Japan agreement to enable Japan to sell its subsidized surplus rice to alleviate shortfalls caused by a serious crop failure in Korea. Korea sought to discharge its commitment by signing contracts for the purchase of 500,000 tons of 1981 crop California rice. Korea has taken delivery of half of that amount but 250,000 tons remain to be shipped because the American exporter has not obtained enough rice to complete the contract. We delivered a diplomatic note to the Koreans requiring them to complete the shipment of the remaining 250,000 tons by February 28, 1983. We have yet to receive a formal response to our demarche. The remaining rice is held by two large cooperatives and in CCC stocks. The Koreans refuse to do business with the cooperatives' export agent because of what they regard as his abusive business tactics.

Korea believes that it has taken appropriate action to discharge its commitment. It contends that it provided a way for our farmers to sell their rice by signing a contract with a reputable supplier and by subsequently extending that contract. In the Korean view, it is up to the US industry and the US Government to make the rice available for export. We rejected Korea's suggestion that it take 1982 rice because the government-to-government commitment clearly states that 1981 crop rice is required. We have repeatedly stated that we are neutral as to the contractual arrangements through which Korea fulfills its commitment.

There is intense Congressional interest in the completion of the exports. Our farmers have large stocks of rice and limited sales prospects. Interested Congressmen want us to continue our intervention with Korea and we expect Congressional demands that you attempt to resolve the rice issue while in Korea.

DECLASSIFIED
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BY CAS, NARA, DATE 7/17/00

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
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PUSAN ARSON CASE

Last March, arsonists attacked the US cultural center in Pusan, extensively damaging the building and killing a college student. The six perpetrators were quickly captured. Also arrested and tried with them were a writer, Kim Hyon Jang, accused of instigating the arson, and a Catholic priest and several laymen, accused of harboring Kim.

The arson attack was in protest of US support for the Chun government, and what many Koreans perceived to be US responsibility for the 1980 clashes between civilians and martial law troops in the city of Kwangju which left some 300 persons dead. Defendant Kim, a participant in the Kwangju incident, is alleged to have persuaded the arsonists that the troops in Kwangju had been subject to US command.

Although the criminal case against the accused was pretty airtight, from the beginning the government attempted to politicize the trial, portraying the defendants and their supporters as communist-influenced, anti-government agitators. To make matters worse, there were plausible allegations that the police tortured the accused to extract confessions of communist motivation. (We made stiff, high-level protests against these actions.)

The Pusan court convicted all 16 defendants, stressing in its verdict the political rather than the criminal charges in the case. An appeals court later reduced most of the sentences but upheld the three most controversial: death for Kim Hyon Jang and arson leader Mun Bu Shik, and 3 years imprisonment for the priest, Father Choe.

Opposition groups in Korea and some Americans, including members of the US Catholic Conference (at Cardinal Kim's behest), have pressed us to intervene with President Chun to overturn the death sentences. (They have not sought aid for Father Choe, though his involvement clearly deepens Catholic concern with the case.) Inasmuch as the judicial process has not yet run its course, we have not intervened. However, because the arson was directed against an American office, we would be associated in the public mind with the execution of Mun or Kim. If, as expected, the Supreme Court upholds the lower courts' verdict, we will have to decide whether and how to intervene to prevent their death and the widespread protest which would ensue, against ourselves as well as the ROKG.

January 11, 1983

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NLS MR99-004 #19

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DECL: OADR

BY C/S NARA DATE 7/17/00

BIOGRAPHIES

RESUME OF SERVICE CAREER

of

ROBERT WILLIAM SENNEWALD, General

DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH 21 November 1929, St. Louis, Missouri

YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE Over 31

PRESENT ASSIGNMENT Commander in Chief, United Nations Command/Commander in Chief, Combined Forces Command/Commander, United States Forces, Korea/Commander, Eighth United States Army, APO San Francisco 96301, since June 1982

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

The Artillery and Missile School, Basic and Advanced Courses
United States Army Command and General Staff College
The National War College

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Iowa State College - BS Degree - Physical Education
George Washington University - MS Degree - International Affairs

RECENT MAJOR DUTY ASSIGNMENTS

| <u>FROM</u> | <u>TO</u> | <u>ASSIGNMENT</u> |
|-------------|-----------|---|
| Mar 68 | Apr 69 | Commander, 6th Battalion, 15th Artillery, 1st Infantry Division, Vietnam |
| Apr 69 | Jul 70 | Member, Western Hemisphere Division, later Member, Strategic Operations Defense Branch, Operations Directorate, J3, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC |
| Aug 70 | Jun 71 | Student, The National War College, Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC |
| Jun 71 | May 74 | Chief, Congressional Activities Division, later Deputy Secretary of the General Staff (Coordination and Reports), Office, Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| May 74 | Feb 76 | Commander, Division Artillery, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized), Fort Carson, Colorado |
| Feb 76 | Jun 76 | Chief, Firepower Division, Requirements Directorate, Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, United States Army, Washington, DC |
| Jul 76 | Jun 78 | Assistant Deputy Director, later Deputy Director, Politico-Military Affairs, Plans and Policy Directorate, J5, Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, DC |
| Jul 78 | Feb 80 | Commanding General, United States Army Training Center and Fort Dix, New Jersey |
| Feb 80 | Jul 81 | Assistant Chief of Staff, C3/J3 (Operations), Eighth United States Army/United Nations Command/United States Forces Korea/Combined Forces Command Korea. |
| Jul 81 | May 82 | Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff, United States Pacific Command, Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii |

ROBERT WILLIAM SENNEWALD, General

PROMOTIONS

DATES OF APPOINTMENT

| | <u>Temporary</u> | <u>Permanent</u> |
|-----|------------------|------------------|
| 2LT | | 15 Jun 51 |
| 1LT | 11 Jun 52 | 12 Jul 54 |
| CPT | 15 May 56 | 10 Jan 58 |
| MAJ | 15 May 62 | 15 Jun 65 |
| LTC | 7 Jun 66 | 15 Jun 72 |
| COL | 9 Mar 71 | 23 Mar 76 |
| BG | 1 May 76 | 29 Aug 78 |
| MG | 1 Sep 78 | 1 Jun 80 |
| LTG | 17 Jul 81 | |
| GEN | 24 May 82 | |

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal with V Device (with 2 Oak Leaf Clusters)
Air Medals
Army Commendation Medal (with Oak Leaf Cluster)
Purple Heart
Parachutist Badge

SOURCE OF COMMISSION ROTC

As of 4 June 1982

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CHECKLIST

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KOREA FACT SHEET

1. Basic Economic Indicators

| | |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Population: | 39.3 million (1982) |
| GDP: | 68.7 billion dols (1982 est.) |
| GDP Per Capita: | 1746.7 dols (1982 est.) |
| Real GDP Growth: | 5.2 percent (1982 est.) |
| Inflation: | 4.8 percent (1982 consumer prices) |
| BOP Current Account: | 2.5 billion dol deficit (1982 prel.) |
| International Reserves: | 6.98 billion dols (1982 prel.) |

2. Balance of Trade

| | |
|--------------------------|---|
| U.S. Exports to Korea: | (1981) 6.0 billion dols (1982 est.) 5.9 billion dols |
| U.S. Imports from Korea: | (1981) 5.7 billion dols (1982 est.) 6.1 billion dols |
| Balance | (1981) plus 0.3 billion dols (1982 est.) -0.2 billion dols |

| | |
|--|--------------------------------------|
| 3. <u>Foreign Investment in Korea:</u> | US dols 1.307 million (1982 est.) |
| <u>U.S. Investment in Korea:</u> | US dols 778 million (1981) |
| <u>Korea's Direct Investment Abroad:</u> | US dols 240 million (1982 est.) |

4. Immigration/Tourism - Seoul is the second largest immigrant visa issuing post in the Foreign Service, issuing about 28,500 and denying about 11,000 visas in FY 1982. In the same period there were approximately 102,000 applications for nonimmigrant visas, of which just over 83,000 were approved. A visa fraud complex of unprecedented scope and sophistication has occupied the attention of the Embassy, Washington, and the ROKG for the past year. The ethnic Korean population of the United States is estimated at about 600,000 at present.

5. U.S. citizens in Korea - There are an estimated 25,000 American citizens in Korea in addition to the U.S. military forces. Tourism by Americans is relatively rare, but many businesses and religious groups have personnel stationed here. U.S. residents and visitors generally are treated very well, and there are few serious incidents between members of the U.S. and Korean communities.

6. Government-to-Government Agreements in Effect:

Consular
Privileges and Immunities to be Enjoyed by the UN