

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Sigur, Gaston J.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Korea (South) 1984 (7)  
**Box:** RAC Box 10

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Sigur, Gaston: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Korea (South) 1984 (5 of 5) (70 of 7)  
 Box 90609 RSe Buro 10

Date: 2/8/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Report	South Korea: Implications of President Chun's Visit to Japan, 4 p.	8/28/84	P1 <del>B3</del>
2. Cable	Part. 6/11/01 F95-033/2 # 80 #310853Z Aug 84, 3 p.	8/31/84	P1
<del>3. Memo</del>	<del>Sigur, Douglas McMinn to Robert McFarlane, re: Your Meeting with the Korean Ambassador Concerning Steel, Monday, September 10, 2 p.</del>	<del>9/7/84</del>	<del>P1</del>
4. Letter	R 6/20/00 NLS F95-033/2 President Chun to Reagan, (translation), 3 p.	8/29/84	P1
<del>5. Draft Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Chun, 2 p.</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
6. Cable	R 6/20/00 NLS F95-033/2 copy of item #2, 4 p.	8/31/84	P1
7. Letter	copy of item #4, (translation), 3 p.	8/29/84	P1
<del>8. Memo</del>	<del>McFarlane to Reagan, re: Your Reply o President Chun's Letter on Steel, 1 p.</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
<del>9. Letter</del>	<del>Reagan to Chun, 2 p.</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1</del>
10. Letter	R 6/20/00 NLS F95-033/2 Copy of item #4, (Translation), 3 p.	8/29/84	P1
11. Report	re DPRK: Possible Change in Strategy toward the ROK, 4 p.	11/28/84	P1
12. Memo	P NLS F95-033/2 # 90 6/22/00 Cap Weinberger to McFarlane, re: Contingency Planning -- Republic of Korea (ROK), 1 p.	12/5/84	P1
13. Memo of Understndg	ROK/US, 8 p.	3/31/82	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Sigur, Gaston: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Korea (South) 1984 (5 of 5)

Date: 2/8/99

Box 90609 Page 2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. Memo of Understndg	ROK/US, 8 p	12/29/83	P1
<del>15. Memo</del>	<del>Sigur to McFarlane, re: Presidential Response to Letter from Korean President Chun, 1 p.</del>	<del>12/21/84</del>	<del>P1</del>
16. Memo	R 6/20/00 NLSF95-033/2 McFarlane to Reagan, re: Your Response to Letter from Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, 2 p.	n.d.	P1
17. Letter	P 6/20/00 NLSF95-033/2 Reagan to President Chun, 2 p.	n.d.	P1
18. Letter	1) NLSF95-033/2 6/21/80 # 96 Chun to Reagan, (translation), 5 p. 2) NLSF95-033/2 6/21/00 # 97	12/7/84	P1

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 6/15/2007

**File Folder** KOREA (SOUTH) 1984 (5 OF 5)

**FOIA**

F95-033/2

**Box Number** 90609 *Rae Box 10*

---

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
-------------	----------------------	-------------	----------

---

1 REPORT SOUTH KOREA · IMPLICATIONS OF *MVH 3/12/08* 4 8/28/1984  
PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT TO JAPAN

---

0933 Sign  
[Handwritten signature]

# South Korea: Implications of President Chun's Visit to Japan (U)

DIAAPPR 89-84  
28 AUG 1984



Defense Intelligence Agency  
Appraisal

## Summary

~~(C)~~ South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan's forthcoming visit to Japan will reinforce the current trends in South Korean-Japanese relations. It will be carefully choreographed to insure domestic and international perceptions of a favorable bilateral interchange. The two nations are expected to eschew cultural differences and historical animosities that could adversely affect the trip and to concentrate instead on common values and objectives aimed at mutual accommodation. The visit's primary significance will be in how it is perceived by other states in the region.

## Discussion

~~(C)~~ In early September, South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan will travel to Japan, the first visit to that country by a South Korean head of state. The specifics reportedly were finalized in Seoul by Foreign Minister Shintaro Abe. Already the subject of much speculation, Chun's visit implies more symbolically than it will actually accomplish.

~~(C)~~ Both South Korean and Japanese interests will be served by Chun's visit, providing it goes well. The two countries have economic, political, and military motivations for forging closer relations. Key problems include Chun's personal security and the perceptions that regional states and political factions will have of such a meeting.

~~(C)~~ Economically, the South Koreans want a greater share in Japanese-Korean joint ventures. Specifically, they will ask for access to state-of-the-art technology that could enhance production in a host of affiliated industries. This is important to Seoul because of competition from other labor-intensive economies in Asia.

~~(C/NF)~~ The outcome will probably be a greater South Korean share in joint ventures. The Japanese, however, will keep these projects pruned by using some less than state-of-the-art technologies. To the extent that Beijing will allow, the Koreans will simultaneously expand and attempt their own development of markets in China. The impact of such agreements will depend on the venture, industry, and nation(s) concerned.

~~(S/NF)~~ China's reactions to increased Japanese-Korean economic agreements probably would be very limited. On the positive side, increased economic development in South Korea would open a door for China, allowing it, for example, to play one business supplier off against another. Other benefits for Beijing might be increased regional stabilization and increased opportunities for intelligence acquisition. These would be counterpoised by the negative reactions of North Korea. Inevitably, North Korea would pressure Beijing to curtail any of its increased

NOFORN

~~SECRET~~

Classified by multiple sources; declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLS F95-033/2 #80  
By CAJ, NARA, Date 6/7/01

economic contacts with the South. Moreover, progress might be forestalled on the Chinese-sponsored concept of a North and South Korean "confederation," thereby decreasing the chances for long-term regional stability. Hence, China's private reactions probably would be cautious.

~~(C/NF)~~ Soviet reactions to strengthened economic ties between South Korea and Japan probably would be negative. For one thing, these ties would increase the economic gap between North and South Korea. Because Moscow is sensitive to Third World perceptions, it resists developments that highlight disparities between the communist system practiced in North Korea and the Western-style capitalism of the South. Further, Japanese investment in a strongly anti-communist country would divert capital from possible Japanese-Soviet joint ventures. It would strengthen South Korea, a staunch U.S. ally, while also providing economic opportunities for another Soviet rival, China.

~~(C)~~ Domestic, regional, and international political considerations are of key importance to this visit. President Chun views his effort as an enhancement of the status of South Korea and his own image. As a precondition, Chun has requested an audience with Japan's emperor. Moreover, he wants the emperor to address Japan's treatment of Korea during the Japanese colonial era (1910-1945). If he succeeds, as is expected, Chun will reap the benefit of having South Korea treated as an equal, and he will accept a Japanese "apology" for colonial-era practices on behalf of all Koreans. In the North-South rivalry, this would be perceived as a distinct gain for the South. President Chun would try to capitalize on this perception, while North Korea would denigrate it.

~~(C)~~ President Chun will increase his personal prestige if the trip is successful, a point of significance for domestic and international political purposes. A successful visit will also enhance the image of Chun's Democratic Justice Party, which faces National Assembly elections next March. In international arenas, the visit will help South Korean economic ventures and preparations for the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympiad, planned to take place in Seoul.

~~(C)~~ Domestic Japanese reactions to a successful visit will be generally favorable. Political concerns about economic stagnation caused by giving away technology and apprehension about foreign entanglements should be eased by the perception of a stabilizing role for Japan in the region. The Japanese will also anticipate increased investment opportunities and a deemphasized military factor, both of which will undercut some of the major opposition party's arguments. Domestic reaction in Japan to an "apology" by the emperor probably will cause few problems. The precedent for such an apology has already been established with the visit to Japan by China's Communist Party General Secretary Hu Yaobang, as well as the heads of several other East Asian states. Further, the emperor's statement on the subject will be very carefully phrased.

~~(C)~~ Japan's Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone stands to gain politically from meeting with Chun. With Japanese elections scheduled later in the year, the image of a strong, balanced, national leadership will serve Nakasone's Liberal Democratic Party well after its setback in the last election. Nakasone's ability to arrange this bilateral event illustrates an increasingly potent Japanese political role in regional and international affairs. Further, improved relations with South Korea will indicate a potentially greater influence in affairs on the Korean peninsula, in which the Japanese have historically had a very high interest. This interest and Tokyo's implied influence have already been signaled by Nakasone's head-of-state visit to Seoul last January.

~~(C/NF)~~ China's political response will be tempered by its overriding bilateral relationship with North Korea. Japan's relationship to North Korea, on the other hand, probably will not suffer greatly since, in the absence of diplomatic relations, Pyongyang wants to keep its unofficial channels open. Indeed, the Japanese will probably try to soften the perception of a tilt toward the South by increasing unofficial contact with Pyongyang.

~~(C)~~ Moscow's political response will be negative and colored in military and ideological terms. The USSR is expected to cite this meet-

ing as another example of unfriendly Japanese actions.

~~(C)~~ Third parties will make a great deal of the military implications of the visit, mostly in the form of speculation and rhetoric. Nevertheless, little of actual substance is likely to occur in this area. Because of regional sensitivities and because the US has military treaties with Japan and South Korea, both Chun and Nakasone will play down the military aspects of their talks.

~~(C/NF)~~ The most important military-related accomplishment will be the public acknowledgment that Japan and Korea have mutual defense concerns. Separately, each chief executive has already made statements on this subject. Nakasone, in the Japanese Diet, has specified that peace and stability of the Korean peninsula is in Japan's interest, while President Chun has told the Korea-Japan Parliamentary Union that his country's security is "directly linked" with that of Japan. Public acceptance of this commonality of security interests will have great long-range importance for the region.

~~(C/NF)~~ Although China is likely to refrain from substantive public comment, it may privately be mildly supportive (and cautious) if a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul-Beijing alignment results from this visit. Beijing may perceive a Tokyo-Seoul entente as a stabilizing force that would serve to limit the possibility of China's embroilment in another Korean conflict.

~~(C/NF)~~ North Korea's response to the meeting is likely to be hostile with many allusions to a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul axis. From Pyongyang's perspective, a successful visit would connote little good. South Korea may gain economic, political, and military benefits. North Korea, on the other hand, can only anticipate a possible increase in political and material support from the USSR, and even that would be at the price of reduced flexibility in its relationship with China.

~~(C)~~ Soviet perceptions of the potentially hostile nature of Beijing indicate that Moscow's response will specify a Washington-Tokyo-Seoul-Beijing entente. Soviet propaganda is likely to follow the theme of the "NATOization" of the Far East with obvious anti-Soviet military alignments. Equally ominous to Soviet observers

is the fact that a Seoul-Tokyo entente would lend flexibility to China while enhancing the anti-Soviet posture of Beijing, Seoul, and Tokyo.

~~(C)~~ While Japanese domestic security forces are well trained, they may not be able to discover or prevent all violent incidents during the visit. Security will be complicated by the demonstrated potential for North Korean terrorism, by opposition from members of the large Korean population in Japan, and possibly by violence from domestic extremist groups. The probability of large demonstrations with attendant violence is high. Indeed, bombings have already occurred, ostensibly as protests to the Chun visit.

~~(C)~~ Japanese protestors will come from leftist, extreme rightist, and labor groups throughout Japan. Both the Japanese Socialist Party and the Japan Communist Party have already made statements opposing the Chun visit. Other groups are expected to join them. Korean demonstrators will include members of the North Korean-affiliated Chosen Soren (General Federation of Koreans Residing in Japan). South Koreans opposed to the authoritarian nature of the Seoul regime are also expected to participate in anti-Chun demonstrations.

## Outlook

~~(C/NF)~~ The visit will concentrate on economic and political issues with both Prime Minister Nakasone and President Chun playing down the military implications. South Korea will probably gain access to some high technology, while the Japanese will seek increased financial opportunities. Major shifts from the current trends in Japanese-Korean relations are not expected.

~~(C/NF)~~ North Korean reactions to the visit will be negative and will perhaps manifest great frustration or desperation. The Chinese will generally be cautious. Soviet propaganda will be negative and will emphasize the military aspects of Chun's trip.

~~(C/NF)~~ The blossoming Japanese-Korean alignment is rooted in a mutual desire to enhance regional stability through economic and political cooperation, and in Japan's fundamen-

~~SECRET~~

tal distrust of the USSR. The exchange should strengthen international perceptions that Japan and South Korea are increasingly independent from Washington. Nevertheless, it will not conflict with current U.S. national objectives or policies for the Far East. Indeed, U.S. interests

are most likely to be served by further development of this relationship.

Prepared by:

[REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~



Korea (South) 1984(5)

# RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

2

10

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Gaston Sigur*  
6701  
*A*  
*Woo*

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 7, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: DOUGLAS W. ~~McMINN~~ / GASTON SIGUR

SUBJECT: Your Meeting with the Korean Ambassador  
Concerning Steel, Monday, September 10

Ambassador Byong Hion Lew has asked for this meeting with you to discuss the pending steel import relief case. The Koreans are very concerned that, as a new entrant to the U.S. steel market, they will bear an excessive burden of any protection that is granted to U.S. industry. As a highly efficient producer and one of the few world suppliers of "fairly traded" steel products, Korea argues that she should not be singled out for Draconian action. The Koreans are concerned that such action could have serious adverse consequences for overall U.S.-Korean relations; as well as for our bilateral trade relations.

Korean carbon steel exports have increased dramatically in 1983 and 1984, over previous years.

Korean Carbon Steel Exports  
to U.S.  
(000 Net Tons)

<u>1977</u>	<u>1983</u>	<u>1984</u> <u>Annualized</u>
815	1,811	2,294

However, these exports still only account for approximately 2 percent of apparent U.S. domestic steel consumption.

President Chun has written President Reagan on the steel case (attached at Tab A). Chun's principal points are:

- o If the United States is forced to impose protection, bear in mind that Korea is not the cause of U.S. steel industry difficulties;
- o Korea is a fair trader in steel, based on free market principles; and
- o severe restrictions would have an adverse impact on Korea's fragile debt situation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Declassify on: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NLS F95-053/2 # 82

BY CAS, NARA, DATE 6/20/00

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

2

You should also be aware that President Chun expressed a desire to come to Washington in early 1985 to meet with President Reagan.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Korean President Chun

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Korea(South) 1984

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 3-4 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~

6588

S. Korea

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

September 19, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *gjs*

SUBJECT: Revision of Letter to President Chun Regarding  
Steel Imports to the United States

Attached for your signature is a memorandum to Charles Hill (Tab I), returning the letter they drafted from the President to President Chun Doo Hwan of Korea.

In view of the decision on steel that was made yesterday, we are asking State to revise the letter.

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to State  
Tab A Draft letter to President Chun  
Tab B President Chun's ltr to President Reagan

SECRET

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By *dlb* NARA, Date *2/8/97*

~~SECRET~~

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR CHARLES HILL  
Executive Secretary  
Department of State

SUBJECT: Letter to President Chun Regarding Steel  
Imports to the United States

We are returning your draft letter to President Chun Doo Hwan for revision (Tab A).

In view of the decision that has been made, we would like to have State revise that section of the letter which deals with the steel issue.

Robert M. Kimmitt  
Executive Secretary

## Attachment:

Tab A Draft letter to President Chun  
Tab B President Chun's ltr to President Reagan

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 25, 1997  
By alb NARA, Date 2/8/99

Draft Response to President Chun

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your recent letter, which Ambassador Lew delivered on August 31. I too am pleased at the growth and expansion of the ties between our two nations, and I believe our exchange of visits has contributed greatly to both our countries and to the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

I also note the success Korean athletes had at the recent Olympic Games in Los Angeles. I hope that your nation's six gold medals in the XXIII Olympiad are seeds which will produce a much larger harvest of gold at the 1988 Games in Seoul.

You make clear in your letter your appreciation of the political and economic factors that I must consider in arriving at a decision on steel imports to the United States. You have also explained your concerns about the possible impact on your steel industry and your international finances very clearly. I want to assure you that my staff and I are treating with utmost seriousness the points that you and other friends and allies of the United States have raised in connection with this issue.

His Excellency  
Chun Doo Hwan,  
President of the Republic of Korea,  
Seoul.

NLS F95-033/2 # 84  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 6/20/00 (RE/EXSE)

I would suggest that we leave the question of a visit open for the time being. Although I appreciate your confidence in the outcome of our November elections, it would not be proper for me to discuss commitments until after those elections take place.

Thank you again for your thoughtful comments on the steel issue and for your greetings, which I warmly reciprocate. Nancy and I have pleasant memories of your hospitality and renew our best wishes to you and Mrs. Chun.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan



Korea (south) 1984  
(4)

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 5-7 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



S/S 8426323

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

September 24, 1984

*Koro*

*10/8  
add-on  
Sign*

RECEIVED  
A4:51

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Robert M. Kimmitt  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Subject: Alerting NSC on Presidential  
Correspondence

Enclosed is a copy of a letter to President Reagan from S. Korean President Chun Doo Hwan which is transmitted for your information.

This document was received in the Executive Secretariat Information Management Section on 9/24/84.

Director, S/S-I  
Information Management Section  
Executive Secretariat  
ext. 23836

SEOUL, SEPTEMBER 21, 1984

HIS EXCELLENCY  
RONALD W. REAGAN  
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

EXCELLENCY,

I WAS SHOCKED AND DEEPLY GRIEVED TO LEARN OF THE  
TERRORIST CAR BOMBING ATTACK IN BEIRUT AGAINST THE  
AMERICAN EMBASSY, KILLING MANY PEOPLE AND INJURING  
MANY OTHERS INCLUDING THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR.

THE PEOPLE OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA JOIN WITH ALL  
PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES OF THE WORLD IN STRONGLY CONDEMNING  
THIS OUTRAGEOUS ACT OF TERRORISTS CONTINUOUSLY THREATENING  
PEACE ALL OVER THE WORLD.

SHARING DEEP GRIEF AND ANGER WITH YOU AND THE AMERICAN  
PEOPLE, I WISH TO EXTEND TO YOU AND THROUGH YOU TO THE  
FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OUR HEARTFELT CONDOLENCES AND  
SYMPATHY.

ACCEPT, EXCELLENCY, THE RENEWED ASSURANCES OF MY  
HIGHEST CONSIDERATION.

CHUN DOO HWAN

PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

KAM/84-219

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honor to enclose herein the cable message from His Excellency President Chun Doo Hwan extending condolences and sympathy to the Honorable President Ronald Wilson Reagan over the terrorist bombing attack against the United States Embassy in Beirut.

It would be highly appreciated if the Department could kindly forward the aforementioned message to its high destination.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of the opportunity to renew to the Department of State the assurances of its highest consideration.

Enclosure : As stated.

Washington, D.C.

September 21, 1984

*J. Kim*

SECRET

6588

*Korea*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

September 25, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: President's Reply to President Chun's Letter on Steel

Attached at Tab A is a Presidential response to President Chun's letter to President Reagan at Tab B.

Speechwriters approve text.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to the President.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I McFarlane memo to President
- Tab A President's ltr to Chun
- Tab B Chun's ltr to President

~~SECRET~~  
Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED  
 2008, Manual Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
 By *dlb* Date *2/8/97*

SECRET

SECRET

6588

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE  
SUBJECT: Your Reply to President Chun's Letter on  
Steel

Issue

Whether to sign a letter to President Chun of Korea.

Facts

President Chun Doo Hwan of Korea wrote to you on August 29, 1984, about the steel import matter, and also about his hopes to visit you in 1985 (Tab B). A response has been prepared for your signature (Tab A).

Discussion

In the draft response you express your pleasure at the success of the Korean athletes in the Olympics, and explain the reasons for your steel decision, including your "serious concerns about the impact of protectionism on the health of the American economy." Also, you suggest that the question of a Chun visit to Washington be left open until after the elections. This matter is now under careful consideration in the State Department.

Recommendation

OK      No

\_\_\_\_\_ That you sign the letter to President Chun.

Attachments:

Tab A      Your letter to Chun  
Tab B      Chun's letter to you

Prepared by:  
Gaston J. Sigur

SECRET  
Declassify: OADR

NLS F95-033/2 #87  
BY CAS, NARA, DATE 6/20/00

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED  
NLS 195-033/2 #88  
BY CLS, NARA, DATE 11/20/08

Dear Mr. President:

Thank you very much for your recent letter, which Ambassador Lew delivered on August 31. I am also pleased at the growth and expansion of the ties between our two nations, and believe our exchange of visits has contributed greatly to both our countries and to the stability of the Korean Peninsula.

I also note the success Korean athletes had at the recent Olympic Games in Los Angeles. I hope that your nation's six gold medals in the XXIII Olympiad are seeds which will produce a much larger harvest of gold at the 1988 Games in Seoul.

You make clear in your letter your appreciation of the political and economic factors that I had to consider in arriving at a decision on steel imports to the United States. You also explained very clearly your concerns about the possible impact on your steel industry and your international finances. Although the most important element in my consideration of this matter was the overall health of the American economy, your comments and those of other trading partners of the United States reinforced my serious concerns about the impact of protectionism on the health of the American economy.

As you know, steel imports in the United States have reached unprecedented levels, depressing prices, profits and employment in our industry and seriously jeopardizing its efforts to modernize. As a matter of national policy, I have decided to respond to the legitimate concerns of the steel industry while keeping our market open to free and fair import competition.

Over the next few years we will attempt to eliminate the injurious effects of unfairly traded steel imports from our market, whether they arise from dumping, subsidization or trade barriers abroad that divert steel to the United States.

I'm sure that you can appreciate the importance of achieving these objectives, not only for the survival of a vital United States industry, but also to uphold the basic principles of fairness that are absolutely essential to the maintenance of an open trading system.

I would suggest that we leave the question of a visit open for the time being. Although I appreciate your confidence in the outcome of our November elections, it would not be proper for me to discuss commitments until after those elections take place.

Thank you again for your thoughtful letter and for your greetings, which I warmly reciprocate. Nancy and I have pleasant memories of your hospitality and renew our best wishes to you and Mrs. Chun.

Sincerely,

His Excellency  
Chun Doo Hwan  
President of the Republic of Korea  
Seoul



Korea (South) 1984 (5)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 8 10 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

*Korea*

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 25, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT:

Presidential Message to Chairman of the Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee

Attached at Tab A is a message from President Reagan to the Chairman of the Olympic Organizing Committee in Seoul, Korea. State has reviewed the draft and has no objections. NSC also concurs with text and we recommend you get Presidential signature and dispatch.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you dispatch the message at Tab A.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Speechwriters approve text.

Attachment:

Tab A Presidential message

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Roh:

I am delighted that my friend Bowie K. Kuhn -- America's foremost unofficial ambassador of our national pastime, baseball -- is again visiting Korea. It is a source of great pride that so many of our friends in Korea, and around the world, have come to enjoy baseball as fully as we do in the United States.

As you know, we were pleased that baseball was a demonstration sport at the Los Angeles Games, an important prelude to its designation as a Gold Medal sport. The extraordinary attendance at the baseball games provides ample proof of the popularity of the sport, not only in our two countries, but in many countries in different parts of the world.

Please accept my sincere best wishes as you move forward in preparation for the 1988 Games in Seoul. Obviously we believe that a decision to elevate baseball to its proper status as a Gold Medal sport will enhance the success of the XXIV Summer Olympiad.

Sincerely,

Mr. Tae Woo Roh  
Chairman  
1988 Seoul Olympic Organizing Committee  
19 Moohyo-Dong, Choong-Ku  
Seoul, Korea

OCT 17 1984

→ Sign  
FYI

RCM HAS SEEN

THE AMBASSADOR OF KOREA  
WASHINGTON, D. C.

October 12, 1984

The Honorable  
Robert C. McFarlane  
Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs  
The White House  
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

Thank you for your letter of August 24, 1984. I appreciate your attention and interest in my Government's Aide Memoire and position paper concerning U.S. restrictions on steel imports.


As you may know, from September 18, 1984 when President Reagan announced the direction of his Administration's steel import policy, Korea has 90 days in which to negotiate a final judgement with the United States Trade Representative on U.S. imports of Korean-made steel.

Korea has always been a fair trader in steel matters, and a mutually acceptable resolution of this important issue would most certainly enhance the U.S.-Korea trading relationship.

To this end, I am hopeful that we can count on your continued support and cooperation in the future negotiations.

With my best regards,

Sincerely,

  
Byong Hion Lew

*NLS White House*  
~~SECRET~~

NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

THIS ADVANCE COPY IS PROVIDED FOR  
YOUR PERSONAL USE PRIOR TO APPROVAL  
FOR WIDER DISTRIBUTION. DO NOT  
FURTHER REPRODUCE, DISTRIBUTE, OR  
CITE

~~(S)~~ DPRK: POSSIBLE CHANGE IN STRATEGY  
TOWARD THE ROK

Summary

~~(S)~~ Over the past two months, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea has taken a number of steps to promote dialogue with the Republic of Korea. It has provided flood relief to the ROK, proposed North-South talks on a variety of subjects, and agreed to ROK-proposed talks on economic and humanitarian cooperation. History suggests skepticism about North Korean intentions, but these moves reinforce speculation earlier this year that the DPRK might have made or might be slipping into a decision to seek a prolonged period of relaxation with the South as distinct from a short-term tactical pause in its policy of confrontation.

~~(S)~~ Although Pyongyang continues to deploy its military machine more effectively and to upgrade its forces, at the same time it might calculate that a change in strategy is needed to provide a lengthy breathing space in which to spur its anemic economy with increased international trade and investment, repair its tattered image abroad, and deal with the dilemma of the upcoming 1986 Asian Games and 1988 Olympics in Seoul.

~~(S)~~ It is safe to assume that Pyongyang has not altered its basic objective of reunifying the peninsula under its control, but it could be opting for a longer term approach. This approach, however, could undermine the DPRK goal of denying the legitimacy of the ROK. Thus, it is probably a potentially controversial strategy in Pyongyang. The ROK, although highly suspicious of the DPRK, seeks to retain a positive image on reunification and to use the new DPRK strategy to advance a number of ROK interests, including a successful 1988 Olympics.

\* \* \* \* \*

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR (multiple sources)

Report 962-CA  
November 28, 1984



BUREAU OF  
INTELLIGENCE  
AND RESEARCH

CURRENT  
ANALYSES

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS #90  
F95-033/2

By C4S, NARA, D


6/22/10

The North Korean Dilemma

~~(C)~~ In the early 1970s, a North Korean stress on economic development similar to that of today was paralleled by a period of North-South contact and dialogue. The collapse of the US position in Indochina in 1975 apparently revived hopes in the DPRK that a renewal of the policy of confrontation followed in the late 1960s might, after all, persuade the US to withdraw from the Korean Peninsula. Domestic turmoil in the South in 1979-80 again excited expectations in the North. Now, however, the DPRK probably has sharply downgraded the chances of either a US troop withdrawal or an upheaval in the South in the near to mid-term.

~~(C)~~ Meanwhile, DPRK economic development has never recovered from the setbacks caused by the mid-1970s recession and the North's related inability to pay its foreign debt. Unable to afford purchases of whole plants and to obtain advanced technology, the North's economy has fallen further behind that of the South. If the North's new Chinese-style "open door" policy of economic growth is to succeed, and in particular if foreign investments are to be attracted, there must be a relaxation of tensions on the peninsula.

~~(S/NF)~~ Although militarily the North is still superior to the South in numbers of troops and weaponry, Pyongyang is very likely concerned with the growing improvement in the South's military forces and the prospect that by 1990 ROK defense outlays at 6 percent of gross national product will exceed in aggregate amount the military spending of the North at 20 percent of GNP.



(C) [REDACTED] If detente with the South included arms limitations, the North could hope to avoid impending military gains by the South and, by concentrating on improving its own economic base, enhance its prospects for future military modernization.

(C) The North also needs badly to repair an international reputation that was well tarnished even before the Rangoon bombing. The South, however, has translated its economic strength into diplomatic gains, and the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics promise to bestow upon the ROK a prestige and status now unattainable by the DPRK. Thus, a period of relaxation extending over the next several years not only would enhance the North's reputation but also could provide the environment to allow the DPRK to participate in or perhaps share the Seoul games rather than fulminate on the sidelines.

(C) The North could easily rationalize a conciliatory strategy as a step toward eventual achievement of its proprietary and revolutionary goals vis-a-vis the South. Kim Il-sung might accept the argument that only in this way could he achieve the withdrawal of US forces. He also, however, would fear serious erosion of a major policy objective--avoidance of formalization and world acceptance of the de facto, indefinite separation of the two Koreas. In response to this dilemma, he might pursue the strategy of detente while he pressed for a peace treaty that would include US troop withdrawal and at the same time keep his military options open. This does in fact seem to be what the North is doing.

(C) The South Korean Perspective

A long-term relaxation of tensions on the peninsula would of course also serve South Korean interests. President Chun and other officials, however, fear that the North's policy of detente is a ploy intended to weaken South Korea psychologically and militarily. The ROK also is probably nervous that a strategy of normalization is intended to set the stage for a peace treaty that would include a commitment to US troop withdrawal.

But popular desire in the South for reunification makes it difficult for the ROK not to be seen as taking the initiative on the issue. In addition, the ROK has set great store on the success of the 1988 Olympics, one condition of which is a reasonably relaxed state of relations with the North. This would facilitate Soviet bloc, Chinese, and full Third World participation. ROK presidential elections are also due in 1988. Seoul, therefore,

has been willing to sublimate its festering bitterness over the Rangoon bombing and to put aside its demand for an apology. Indeed, it has adopted a positive posture, accepting the North's Red Cross aid and itself proposing talks on economic, sports, and humanitarian cooperation. The latest series of exchanges has so far been nonpolemical in tone, and the DPRK has even referred to the "Republic of Korea"--terminology it has not used in recent years. Seoul-Pyongyang hot lines have been warmed up again.

Both sides are also motivated to move ahead with the process of detente by the position of their respective allies and friends. The North recognizes that China and the Soviet Union both desire stability on the peninsula and are gradually increasing their ties to the South and thus their informal recognition of the ROK's legitimacy. Likewise, the South is aware of strong US and Japanese interest in a peaceful and stable resolution of the Korean issue and of Japanese eagerness to improve links with the DPRK, while further enhancing ties to the ROK. As Pyongyang and Seoul improve their bilateral relations, they know that their respective supporters will feel freer to broaden their own ties on the peninsula.

~~(c)~~ US Interests

Development of detente between the two Koreas would improve stability in Northeast Asia generally and in US-China relations specifically. If it continues, it would be widely seen as a major victory for the US policy of deterrence over the past 30 years. It also conceivably could encourage a moderating process in the North, and North Korea's role in supporting international terrorism might diminish.

On the other hand, the US could be faced with a problem in maintaining a united front with the ROK on the timing and nature of a response to Pyongyang's persistent strategy of detente. And once North-South normalization is in progress, the US could face pressure from China and from international public opinion to move prematurely to negotiate a peace treaty that would include a commitment on US troop withdrawal.

Prepared by J. Taylor, W. Eaton, C. Fritsch  
632-0616

Approved by J. Taylor  
632-1338



RECEIVED 11 DEC 84 13

TO MCFARLANE

FROM WEINBERGER, C

DOCDATE 05 DEC 84

*Kres*

KEYWORDS: FMS

KOREA

CONGRESSIONAL

CM

SUBJECT: CONTINGENCY PLANNING - REPUBLIC OF KOREA / MEMORANDA OF AGREEMENT

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 13 DEC 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

SIGUR

SABLE

SESTANOVICH

LEHMAN, C

MAHLEY

CHILDRESS

THOMPSON

KIMMITT

COMMENTS

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

REF# 33149

LOG 8308842

NSCIFID

( CM )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_ W/ATTCH FILE \_\_\_\_\_ (C)

South(Korea)1984 (5)

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 12 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

A

South (Korea) 1984

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 13 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

B

Korea (south) 1984 (5)

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 14 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

**A. THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES:**

1. Agree to furnish such items from its Department of Defense (hereinafter referred to as "DOD") stocks and resources, or to procure them under terms and conditions consistent with DOD regulations and procedures. When procuring for the Purchaser, the DOD shall, in general employ the same contract clauses, the same contract administration, and the same inspection procedures as would be used in procuring for itself, except as otherwise requested by the Purchaser and as agreed to by the DOD. Unless the purchaser has requested that a sole source contractor be designated, and this Letter of Offer and Acceptance reflects acceptance of such designation by the DOD, the Purchaser understands that selection of the contractor source to fill this requirement is solely the responsibility of the Government of the United States (hereinafter referred to as "USG"). Further, the Government of the United States DoD is solely responsible for negotiating the terms and conditions of all contracts necessary to fulfill the requirements in the Letter of Offer.

2. Advises that when the DOD procures for itself, its contracts include warranty clauses only on an exceptional basis. However, the USG shall, with respect to items being procured, and upon timely notice, attempt to the extent possible to obtain any particular or special contract provisions and warranties desired by the Purchaser. The USG further agrees to exercise, upon the Purchaser's request, any rights (including those arising under any warranties) the USG may have under any contract connected with the procurement of any items. Any additional cost resulting from obtaining special contract provisions or warranties, or the exercise of rights under such provisions or warranties, or any other rights that the USG may have under any contract connected with the procurement of items, shall be charged to the Purchaser.

3.a. Shall, unless the condition is otherwise specified herein (e.g., "As is"), repair or replace at no extra cost defense articles supplied from DOD stocks which are damaged or found to be defective in respect of material or workmanship, when it is established that these deficiencies existed prior to passage of title, or found to be defective in design to such a degree that the items cannot be used as all for the purpose for which they were designed. Qualified representatives of the USG and of the Purchaser, upon notification pursuant to paragraph B.6. below, shall agree on the liability of the USG hereunder and the corrective steps to be taken.

b. With respect to items being procured for sale to the Purchaser, the USG agrees to exercise warranties on behalf of the Purchaser pursuant to A.2. above to assure, to the extent provided by the warranty, replacement or correction of such items found to be defective.

3. In addition, the USG warrants the title of all items sold to the Purchaser hereunder. The USG, however, makes no warranties other than those specifically set forth herein. In particular the USG disclaims any liability resulting from patent infringement occasioned by the use or manufacture by or for Purchaser outside the United States of items supplied hereunder.

4. Agree to deliver and pass title to the items to the Purchaser at the initial point of shipment unless otherwise specified in this Offer and Acceptance. With respect to defense articles procured for sale to the Purchaser, this will normally be at the manufacturers' loading facilities; with respect to defense articles furnished from stocks, this will normally be at the U.S. depot. Articles will be packed, crated or otherwise prepared for shipment prior to the time title passes. If "Point of Delivery" is specified otherwise than the initial point of shipment, the supplying Military Department or Defense Agency will arrange movement of the items to the authorized delivery point as reimbursable service but will pass title at the initial point of shipment; the USG disclaims any liability for damage or loss to the items incurred after passage of title irrespective of whether transportation is by common carrier or by the U.S. Defense Transportation System.

5. Advises that: a. Unless otherwise specified, USG standard items will be furnished without regard to make or model.

b. The price of items to be procured shall be at their total cost to the USG. Unless otherwise specified, the cost estimates of items to be procured, availability determination, payment schedule, and delivery projections quoted are estimates based on current available data. The USG will use its best efforts to advise the Purchaser or its authorized representatives by DD Form 1513-2:

- (1) of any identifiable cost increase that might result in an increase in the "Estimated Total Costs" in excess of 10 percent;
- (2) of any changes in the payment schedule(s); and
- (3) of any delays which might significantly affect the estimated delivery dates;

but its failure to so advise of the above shall not affect the Purchaser's obligation under paragraphs B.1. and B.3. below.

6. The USG will, however, use its best efforts to deliver items or render services for the amount and at the times quoted.

7. Under unusual and compelling circumstances when the national interest of the United States so requires, the USG reserves the right to cancel or suspend all or part of this Offer and Acceptance at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles or performance of services (including training). The USG shall be responsible for all termination costs of its suppliers resulting from cancellations or suspensions under this paragraph.

8. Shall refund to the Purchaser any payments received hereunder which prove to be in excess of the final total cost of delivery and performance of this Offer and Acceptance, and are not required to cover arrearages on other open Offers and Acceptances of the Purchaser.

9. Advises that personnel performing defense services provided under this Offer and Acceptance will not perform any duties of a combatant nature, including any duties relating to training, advising, or otherwise providing assistance regarding combat activities, outside the United States in connection with the performance of these defense services.

10. Advises that in the assignment or employment of United States personnel for the performance of this Offer and Acceptance, the USG will not take into account race, religion, national origin or sex.

11. Advises that, notwithstanding Purchaser's agreement to pay interest on any net amount by which Purchaser may be in arrears on payments (as provided for in paragraph B.3.g. below), USG funds will not be used for disbursements by DOD to its contractors in the event of any such arrears in payments. Accordingly, failure by the Purchaser to make timely payments in the amounts due may result in delays in contract performance by DOD contractors, claims by contractors for increased costs (including the above mentioned interest costs), claims by contractors for termination liability for breach of contract or termination of contracts by the USG under this or other open Offers and Acceptances of the Purchaser at Purchaser's expense.

**B. THE PURCHASER:**

1. Shall pay to the USG the total cost to the USG of the items, even if the final total cost exceeds the amounts estimated in this Offer and Acceptance.

2. Shall make payment(s) for the items by check(s) or by wire transfer payable in United States dollars to the Treasurer of the United States.

3.a. Shall, if "Terms" specify "cash with acceptance", forward with this Offer and Acceptance a check or wire transfer in the full amount shown as the estimated total cost, and agree to make such additional payment(s) as may be specified upon notification of cost increase(s) and request(s) for funds to cover such increases.

b. Agree if "Terms" specifies payment to be "cash prior to delivery" to pay to the USG such amounts at such times as may be specified from time to time by the USG (including any initial deposit set forth under "Terms") in order to meet payment requirements for articles or services to be furnished from the resources of the US Department of Defense. USG requests for funds may be based on estimated requirements to cover forecasted deliveries of articles or costs to provide defense services. It is USG policy to obtain funds 90 days in advance of the time DOD plans such deliveries or incurs such expenses on behalf of the Purchaser.

c. Agree, if "Terms" specify payment by "dependable undertaking" to pay to the USG such amounts at such times as may be specified from time to time by the USG (including any initial deposit set forth under "Terms") in order to meet payments required by contracts under which items are being procured, and any damages and costs that may accrue, or have accrued, from termination of contracts by the USG because of Purchaser's cancellation of this Offer and Acceptance under paragraph B.7. hereof. USG requests for funds may be based upon estimated requirements for advance and progress payments to suppliers, estimated termination liability, delivery forecasts or evidence of constructive delivery, as the case may be. It is USG policy to obtain such funds 90 days in advance of the time USG makes payments on behalf of the Purchaser.

d. Agree, if "Terms" specify "payment on delivery" that bills may be dated as of the date(s) of delivery of the defense articles or rendering of the defense services, or upon forecasts of the date(s) thereof.

e. Agree, if "Terms" specify payment under a Credit Agreement between the Purchaser and DOD, to pay to the USG on a "dependable undertaking" basis, in accordance with B.3.c. above, such costs as may be in excess of the amount funded by the Credit Agreement.

f. Agree, that requests for funds or billings under paragraphs B.3.a. through e. above are due and payable in full on presentation, or, if a payment date is specified in the request for funds or bill, on the payment date so specified, even if such payment date is not in accord with the estimated payment schedule, if any, contained in the Offer and Acceptance. Without affecting Purchaser's obligation to make such payment(s) when due, documentation concerning advance and progress payments, estimated termination liability or evidence of constructive delivery or shipment in support of request for funds or bills will be made available to the Purchaser by DOD upon request. When appropriate, Purchaser will request adjustment of any questioned billed items by subsequent submission of required discrepancy reports in accordance with paragraph B.6. below.

g. Agree to pay interest on any net amount by which it is in arrears on payments, determined by considering collectively all of the Purchaser's open Offers and Acceptances with the DOD. Interest shall be calculated on a daily basis. The principal amount of the arrearage shall be computed as the excess of cumulative financial requirements of the Purchaser over total cumulative payments after quarterly billing payment due dates. The rate of interest paid shall be a rate not less than a rate determined by the Secretary of the Treasury taking into consideration the current average market yield on outstanding short-term obligations of the USG as of the last day of the month preceding the net arrearage and shall be computed from the date of net arrearage.

3. Shall designate the Procuring Agency and responsible Paying Office and address thereof to which the USG shall submit requests for funds and bills under this Offer and Acceptance.

4. Shall furnish shipping instructions for the items with its acceptance of this Offer and Acceptance. Such instructions shall include (a) Offer/Release Code, (b) Freight Forwarder Code, and (c) the Mark for Code, as applicable.

5. Shall be responsible for obtaining the appropriate insurance coverage and customs clearances, and, except for items exported by the USG, appropriate export licenses.

6. Shall accept title to the defense articles at the initial point of shipment (see A.4. above). Purchaser shall be responsible for in-transit insurance and shipping of defense articles transported by parcel post shall pass to the Purchaser on date of parcel post shipment. Standard Form 364 shall be used in submitting claims to the USG for overage, shortage, damage, duplicate billing, item deficiency, improper identification or improper documentation and shall be submitted by Purchaser promptly. Claims of \$100.00 or less will not be reported for overages, shortages, or damages. Claims received after one year from date of passage of title or billing, whichever is later, will be disallowed by the USG, unless the USG determines that unusual and compelling circumstances involving latent defects justify consideration of the claim.

7. May cancel this Offer and Acceptance with respect to any or all of the items listed in this Offer and Acceptance at any time prior to the delivery of defense articles or performance of services (including training). It shall be responsible for all costs resulting from cancellation under this paragraph.

8. Shall, except as may otherwise be mutually agreed in writing, use the items sold hereunder only:

a. For the purposes specified in the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, if any, between the USG and the Purchaser;

b. For the purposes specified in any bilateral or regional defense treaty to which the USG and the Purchaser are both parties, if subparagraph a. of this paragraph is inapplicable; or

c. For internal security, individual self-defense, and/or civic action, if subparagraphs a. and b. of this paragraph are inapplicable.

9. Shall not transfer title to, or possession of, the defense articles, components and associated support material, related training or other defense services (including any plans, specifications or information) furnished under this Offer and Acceptance to anyone not an officer, employee or agent of the Purchaser (excluding transportation agencies), and shall not use or permit their use for purposes other than those authorized by A.8. above, unless the written consent of the USG has first been obtained. To the extent that any items, plans, specifications, or information furnished in connection with this Offer and Acceptance may be classified by the USG for security purposes, the Purchaser shall maintain a similar classification and employ all measures necessary to preserve such security, equivalent to those employed by the USG, throughout the period during which the USG may maintain such classification. The USG will use its best efforts to notify the Purchaser if the classification is changed. The Purchaser will ensure, by all means available to it, respect for proprietary rights in any defense article and any plans, specifications, or information furnished, whether patented or not.

#### C. INDEMNIFICATION AND ASSUMPTION OF RISKS:

1. It is understood by the Purchaser that the USG in procuring and furnishing the items specified in this Offer and Acceptance does so on a nonprofit basis for the benefit of the Purchaser. The Purchaser therefore undertakes, subject to A.3. above, to indemnify and hold the USG, its agents, officers, and employees harmless from any and all loss or liability (whether in tort or in contract) which might arise in connection with this Offer and Acceptance because of: (I) injury to or death of personnel of Purchaser or third parties; (II) damage to or destruction of (A) property of the DOD furnished to Purchaser or suppliers specifically to implement this Offer and Acceptance, (B) property of Purchaser (including the items ordered by Purchaser pursuant to this Offer and Acceptance, before or after passage of title to Purchaser), or (C) property of third parties; or (III) patent infringement.

2. Subject to any express, special contractual warranties obtained for the Purchaser in accordance with A.2. above, the Purchaser agrees to release the contractors and subcontractors of the USG from liability for, and will assume the risk of, loss or damage to: (I) Purchaser's property (including the items procured pursuant to this Offer and Acceptance, before or after passage of title to Purchaser) and (II) property of the DOD furnished to suppliers specifically to implement this Offer and Acceptance, to the same extent that USG would assume for its property if it were procuring for itself the item or items procured pursuant to this Offer and Acceptance.

#### D. ACCEPTANCE:

1. To accept this Offer and Acceptance, the Purchaser will not later than the expiration date of the Offer and Acceptance, as set forth herein, return three copies properly signed to the security assistance accounting center designated herein, accompanied by such initial deposit or other payment as may be required by the Terms herein. In addition, Purchaser will concurrently return three copies properly signed to the U.S. Military Department or Defense Agency making the offer. When property accepted and returned as specified herein, the provisions of this Offer and Acceptance shall be binding upon the USG and the Purchaser.

2. It is understood that implementation of the Offer and Acceptance cannot proceed without a proper acceptance. Failure to comply with Terms and Conditions required for acceptance, as, for example, delay in submission of any required initial deposit or payment of full estimated cost, as the case may be, may require revision or reissue of the Offer and Acceptance.

3. Unless a written request for extension is made by the Purchaser and granted in writing by an authorized representative of the appropriate U.S. Military Department or Defense Agency, this Offer and Acceptance shall terminate on the expiration date set forth herein.

#### E. ENCLOSURES:

Enclosures attached hereto are, by this reference, incorporated herein and are made a part hereof as though set forth in full.

#### F. PUBLIC INSPECTION:

This Offer and Acceptance will be made available for public inspection to the fullest extent possible consistent with the national security of the United States.

### EXPLANATORY NOTES

1. The item or reference numbers appearing in the "ITEM OR REF. NO." column may not correspond with references used in Purchaser's original request. However, this number, together with the case identifier shown should always be used as a reference in future correspondence.

2. Availability leadtime quoted is the estimated number of months required to complete delivery of the item(s) in accordance with the terms of delivery after receipt of acceptance of this Offer pursuant to Section D. of the Conditions, and the conclusion of appropriate financial arrangements. Phased deliveries are shown by quantity and leadtime for each increment, where applicable. Items for which delivery leadtime is not shown are noted in column headed "Item Description" as items to be installed in the applicable end item prior to shipment.

3. The planned source of supply for each item is expressed in the following codes:

S	(*)	Service Stocks
P	(*)	Procurement
R	(*)	Rebuild/Repair/Modification
X	(*)	Stock and procurement, e.g., initial repair parts
E	(*)	"Mimex" major items in long supply or excess

\*Availability is stated in months.

4. Condition of the defense articles shown in the "AVAILABILITY AND REMARKS" column is expressed in the following codes:

AS	-	Items to be provided in existing condition without repair, restoration or rehabilitation which may be required. Condition indicated in item description.
M	-	Articles of mixed condition (new, reworked, and rehabilitated) may be commingled when issued. Example: repair parts, ammunition, set assemblies, kits, tool sets and shop sets.
B	-	Serviceable defense articles.
O	-	Obsolete or non-standard item in an "AS IS" condition for which repair parts support may not be available from DOD.
S	-	Substitute. Suitable substitutions may be shipped for unavailable defense articles unless otherwise advised by the Purchaser.
U	-	Reworked or rehabilitated defense articles possessing original appearance insofar as practicable; including all Modification Work Orders and Engineering Change Orders as applied to such defense articles when issued but defense articles should not be considered as having had total replacement of worn parts and/or assemblies. Only parts and components not meeting US Armed Forces serviceability tolerances and standards will have been replaced; in all instances such defense articles will meet US Armed Forces standards of serviceability.

5. Training notes:

AP	-	Annual Training Program.
SP	-	Special Training designed to support purchases of US equipment.
NC	-	This offer does not constitute a commitment to provide US training.
SC	-	US Training concurrently being addressed in separate Offer and Acceptance.
NR	-	No US training is required in support of this purchase.

6. For meaning of delivery codes, see Military Assistance Program Address Directory (MAPAD).

7. The use of Offer/Release Codes "Y" and "Z" will incur a storage fee of .125% per month for shipment delays in excess of 15 days.



T  
OPS w

KAM/84-142

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to the Memorandum of Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Korea and the Government of the United States of America relating to the Sale of U.S. Peacetime Stocks and War Reserve Materiel, other than that designated as War Reserve Stocks for Allies, to Korea in a Military Emergency signed on March 7, 1984.

The Embassy further has the honour to notify the Department, in accordance with the provisions of Paragraph E, Article 4 of the Memorandum of Agreement, that the Government of the Republic of Korea has completed all the legal procedures required for its entry into force.

The Embassy of the Republic of Korea avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

June 25, 1984

Washington, D.C.



~~SECRET~~

9222

*Korea*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

December 21, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Presidential Response to Letter from Korean President Chun

President Chun Doo Hwan wrote to President Reagan on December 7 about his idea for cross-recognition by the People's Republic of China and Japan (Tab B). Both would recognize the two Korean governments. State has prepared a response for the President which I have gone over and approve (Tab A). Also, I have drafted a memorandum to the President providing some background information for him on the current situation on the Korean Peninsula (Tab I).

Speechwriters approve text.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward the memorandum and letter to the President for his signature.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments:

- Tab I McFarlane memo to President
- Tab A President's ltr to President Chun
- Tab B President Chun's ltr to President Reagan

~~SECRET~~

Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F95-033/2 #94

BY AS, NARA, DATE 6/20/00

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9222

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~ACTION

## MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Your Response to Letter from Korean President  
Chun Doo Hwan

Issue

Whether to sign letter to President Chun of Korea.

Facts

President Chun has sent you a letter informing you of his thinking on the issue of cross-recognition by Japan and the People's Republic of China of North Korea and South Korea.

Discussion

A recent positive development in the dialogue between South and North Korea has been the talks aimed at economic cooperation which began in November and, after a temporary disruption caused by the Russian defector incident at the DMZ, will resume in January. Red Cross talks on family reunification will also continue in January. We are pleased by the pressure [REDACTED] on North Korea to continue the talks and to open up its economy to the West for needed modernization, although how much the independent minded North Koreans will heed this advice remains to be seen. More worrisome has been the North Korean's strong opposition to Seoul's hosting of the 1988 Olympic Games and the Russians seem to be playing a helping propaganda role in this regard. Further, a North Korean policy of gradual redeployment of troops toward the DMZ continues, thus lessening the warning time for a surprise attack.

We have shared [REDACTED] the more softly worded DPRK proposal for DPRK/US/ROK talks which was presented to us [REDACTED]. We are framing the response with the South Koreans, seeking the best way to retain the initiative and to place continuing emphasis on the North/South direct dialogue.

~~SECRET~~


Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS #95-033/2 #95

By CAS, NARA, Date 6/20/00

~~SECRET~~

  
Chun is aware of our own caveats. We do not oppose the idea but believe that in view of the unlikelihood China will accept the proposal at this time, the timing of the approach must be carefully considered. It may be possible after concrete results are achieved in the North/South talks, for we continue to believe that bilateral North/South talks are fundamental to resolving the Korea problem. Your letter to Chun expresses these views on cross-recognition and reaffirms our close relationship and ties to the Republic of Korea.

Recommendation

O.K.      No

\_\_\_\_\_      \_\_\_\_\_      That you sign the letter to President Chun at  
Tab A.

Attachments:

Tab A      Your letter to President Chun  
Tab B      President Chun's letter to you

Korea (south) 1984 (5)

**RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY**

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 17-18 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.