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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Sigur, Gaston: Files

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File Folder: Korea (South) 1984 (3 of 5)

Date: 2/8/99

Box 90609 *RAC Box 10*

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Note	James Kelly to Sigur, re: Korea..., p.	3/26/84	P1
2. Message	Armitage to Adm Crowe, 5 p.	3/23/84	P1
3. Report	Re: Seoul's Campus Strategy, 4 p. <i>PART 8/13/02 NLSF95-033/2 #74</i>	4/4/84	<i>R1 F1, F3</i>
4. Note	to Gaston Sigur, 1 p. <i>D " " #75</i>	4/16/84	<i>P1/P3 H, F3</i>
5. Report	re: South Korea: Grappling with Import Liberalization, 8 p. <i>D " " #76</i>	4/16/84	<i>R1 F1, F3</i>
6. Report	South Korea's Defense Industry, 39 p. <i>DEPT. MDI-008 #10 "1/21/83"</i>	4/84	<i>B1, B2, B3</i>
7. Memo	Am. Richard L. Walker to Sigur, 2 p. <i>R 10/5/02 NLSMDI-008 #7</i>	5/1/84	P1/P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

Withdrawer

LOJ 6/15/2007

File Folder KOREA (SOUTH) 1984 (3 OF 5)

FOIA

M01-008

Box Number -90609 *Ac Box 10*

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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7	MEMO	AMBASSADOR RICHARD L. WALKER	2	5/1/1984
		<i>MVW 3/13/08</i>		
	TO SIGUR			

Korea (south) (3)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GASTON SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Reply to Representative Barney Frank

Representative Barney Frank wrote the President on February 28, 1984 (Tab B) asking the President to urge the Chun regime to repeal the laws which ban 300 politicians from political activity, and allow Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's leading opposition politician in exile, to return to his country to participate in the political process. State Department has drafted a reply to Representative Frank (Tab A) which we think is fine.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Kathy Jaffke at Tab I forwarding the proposed reply.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to Jaffke
Tab A Proposed Reply
Tab B Ltr from Frank/interim reply from Oglesby

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR KATHY JAFFKE

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Reply to Representative Barney Frank

Representative Barney Frank wrote the President on February 28, 1984 (Tab B) asking the President to urge the Chun regime to repeal the laws which ban 300 politicians from political activity, and allow Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's leading opposition politician in exile, to return to his country to participate in the political process. State Department has drafted a reply to Representative Frank (Tab A) which we think is fine.

Attachments:

Tab A Proposed Reply
Tab B Ltr from Frank/interim reply from Oglesby

March 8, 1984

Dear Barney:

Thank you for your February 28 letter, cosigned by 19 of your colleagues, indicating your concerns regarding the situation in South Korea and the number of individuals who are banned from political activity in that country.

Please know that we appreciate receiving your statement of concern, and your comments have been brought to the President's attention. You may be assured that we are carefully reviewing your correspondence in conjunction with the President's foreign policy advisers. You should be hearing further as soon as any additional information becomes available.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

M. B. Oglesby, Jr.
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Barney Frank
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

MBO/KRJ/pt-(3MBOG)

cc: w/copy of inc. to NSC Secretariat - for DRAFT
response

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Mr. Frank:

This is a followup to M. B. Oglesby's letter of March 8 to you, regarding your February 28 letter about Korean politics.

In his visit to Korea last November, President Reagan addressed, among other audiences, the guests at a state dinner, a group of distinguished non-official Koreans, and the Korean National Assembly. He used these occasions to express American support for Korea's democratic progress and to commend "bold and necessary steps" towards political development. In deference to his hosts' sovereignty, he refrained from prescribing specific steps.

The Korean Government has taken a number of liberalizing steps in the last three months. It has restored the civil rights of hundreds of its opponents to whom it had previously denied those rights. It has freed almost all political prisoners. It has allowed almost 1,400 expelled students to return to college, and withdrawn security forces from all university campuses. And it has lifted political restrictions on 202 of the 301 persons formerly barred from political activity.

The Honorable

Barney Frank,

House of Representatives.

In responding to these various actions, the State Department has commented positively on each and added that we look forward to seeing further progress. Clearly there is room for further political development in Korea, as we have noted publicly. We would welcome, for example, a lifting of the restrictions on political activity which remain in effect against 99 prominent politicians, including Mr. Kim Dae Jung.

The Korean Government and people are aware of the US position on human rights and democratic development. While we do not lecture publicly on this subject, neither do we conceal our views, as the record of the President's trip shows. We consider this a balanced and disciplined approach to an important and sensitive aspect of the Korean-American relationship.

The Department of State, and this office, are at your service should you wish to discuss further this important issue.

Sincerely,

120 Walter E. Fauntroy ✓
WALTER E. FAUNTROY

148 Dan Glickman ✓
DAN GLICKMAN

25 Howard L. Berman ✓
HOWARD L. BERMAN

271 Parren J. Mitchell ✓
PARREN J. MITCHELL

320 Charles B. Rangel ✓
CHARLES B. RANGEL

415 Ted Weiss ✓
TED WEISS

80 George W. Crockett Jr. ✓
GEORGE W. CROCKETT JR.

40 Barbara Boxer ✓
BARBARA BOXER

Gary Ackerman ✓
GARY ACKERMAN

Doug Walgren ✓
DOUG WALGREN

Anthony Beilenson ✓
ANTHONY BEILENSEN

Edward J. Markey ✓ 242
EDWARD J. MARKEY

Mel Levine ✓ 222
MEL LEVINE

Thomas J. Downey ✓ 100
THOMAS J. DOWNEY

Michael D. Barnes ✓ 17
MICHAEL D. BARNES

John F. Seiberling ✓ 35
JOHN F. SEIBERLING

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

March 30, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GASTON SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT: Request to Confer on President Reagan a Medal from the Boy Scouts of Korea

Fred Ryan asked for our recommendation on the above subject (Tab A). State is lukewarm about taking the President's time to receive personally the Korean Boy Scout medal. I agree with this view since the President will be much involved in the Summit conference preparation at the time of the Korean Scout head's visit to Washington.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to Ryan at Tab I recommending against the President's personal reception of the Korean Boy Scout Medal.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Kimmitt to Ryan memo
- Tab A Ryan memo
- Tab B State memo

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Request to Confer on President Reagan a Medal
from the Boy Scouts of Korea

State is lukewarm about taking the President's time to receive personally the Korean Boy Scout medal. We agree with this view since the President will be much involved in the Summit conference preparation at the time of the Korean Scout head's visit to Washington.

Attachment:

Tab A Correspondence returned

Tab B State memo

2527

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

MARCH 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM

TO: ROBERT KIMMITT

FROM: FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR., DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING RECOMMENDATION

PLEASE PROVIDE YOUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE FOLLOWING SCHEDULING REQUEST UNDER CONSIDERATION:

EVENT: Brief visit with Mr. KIM Suk-Won, President of the Boy Scouts of Korea and accept Grand Order of Moogunghwa Gold Medal, the highest Scouting award in Korea

DATE: Last part of May or first part of June 1984

LOCATION: The White House

BACKGROUND: See attached

YOUR RECOMMENDATION:

Accept ___ Regret ___ Surrogate ___ Message ___ Other ___
 Priority ___
 Routine ___

IF RECOMMENDATION IS TO ACCEPT, PLEASE CITE REASONS:

RESPONSE DUE 3/23/84

TO JEAN APPLEBY JACKSON

grg

한국 보이 스카우트 연맹

서울특별시 영등포구 여의도동 18-3/ 대채구좌 : 509323
여의도 우체국 사서함 280/ ☎ 782-1803 · 2372 · 2385



BOY SCOUTS OF KOREA

18-3, Yeouido-dong, Youngdeungpo-gu, Seoul 150, Korea
Yeouido P.O. Box 280 Seoul 150, Korea
Tel. 782-1387 · 782-1867 / Cables: BOYSCOUT, SEOUL

5 March 1984

Mr. James A. Baker
Chief of the White House Staff
The White House
Washington D. C. 20500
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. Baker:

Re. Grand Order of Moogunghwa Gold Medal
to H.E. President Ronald Reagan

Greetings from Seoul!

We enclose herewith a copy of our letter dated 11 September 1983 addressed to His Excellency President Ronald Reagan, which is self-explanatory.


As you may recall that President Reagan was unable to receive the above award during his last state visit to Korea due to many commitments of pressing nature. However, we had all prepared the actual medal and a certificate because we had an indication from the U.S. Embassy in Seoul.

Taking this opportunity, we would like to inform you that Mr. KIM Suk-Won, president of the Boy Scouts of Korea and a member of the World Scout Committee for the 119 member Scout countries, is scheduled to attend the Executive Board Meeting of the Boy Scouts of America in Irving, Texas on 29 May at the special invitation of Mr. Edward C. Joullian III, president of the Boy Scouts of America. In this connection, we are humbly soliciting your kind arrangement for Mr. KIM Suk-Won to visit the White House to present the highest Scouting award in Korea to H.E. President Ronald Reagan at his convenient time preferably last part of May or first part of June.

On behalf of three million Scout family, we look forward to hearing from you soon.

With kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,


KIM Kyu-Young
Secretary General

KKY/yak

한국 보이 스카우트 연맹

서울특별시 영등포구 여의도동 18-3/대체구좌 : 509323
여의도 우체국 사서함 280/ ☎ 782-1803 · 2372 · 2385



BOY SCOUTS OF KOREA

18-3, Yeouido-dong, Youngdeungpo-gu, Seoul 150, Korea
Yeouido P.O. Box 280 Seoul 150, Korea
Tel. 782-1387 · 782-1867 / Cables: BOYSCOUT, SEOUL

11 September 1983

His Excellency Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
U.S.A.

Dear Mr. President:

Subject: Grand Order of Moogunghwa Gold Medal
Boy Scouts of Korea


Your Excellency, on behalf of three hundred thousand Scouts and their family, I am extremely happy to inform you that the National awards Committee of the Boy Scouts of Korea unanimously passed a resolution at its special meeting on 6 September 1983 to accord on you the Grand Order of Moogunghwa Gold Medal, the highest Scouting award in Korea, for your devotion and benevolent support to Scout Movement in the United States as well in the whole world as the Honorary President of the Boy Scouts of America.

The Boy Scouts of Korea is proud of the fact that the highest Scouting awards have been presented to President Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1960 and President Gerald R. Ford in 1974 respectively during their state visits to the Republic of Korea. We respectively look forward to the opportunity of conferring the Grand Order of Moogunghwa Gold Medal on you at an appropriate time during Your Excellency's state visit to Korea in November 1983.

May God bless and grant Your Excellency more strength and courage for the achievement of greater prosperity and happiness of the people of the United States of America and free world,

I remain, with great respect,

Very truly yours,


KIM Suk-Won
President

KSW/yak

Enclosure: Facts about the Boy Scouts of Korea

- cc: 1) The Honorable Richard Walker, The Ambassador of the States, Seoul, Korea
2) Mr. Edward C. Joullian III, President, Boy Scouts



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSESubject: Request to Confer on President Reagan a Medal
from the Boy Scouts of Korea

If the President wishes to receive the Korean Boy Scout medal, the Department of State has no objection. There would be no harm to our relations with Korea. There also would probably be little gained in our relations, which are currently very strong, particularly so in the public relations area into which an event of this type would fall.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Corey".

Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Incoming correspondence.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

*Korea*ACTION

April 2, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

GASTON SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT:

Response to Letter to the President from
Mrs. Bonnie Shapira

State has given us a draft of a response to Mrs. Bonnie Shapira. She wrote to the President (Tab B) about the imprisonment in Korea of Mr. IM Tong Kyu. The draft is satisfactory.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Sally Kelley (Tab I) forwarding the draft response (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to Kelley
Tab A Draft response
Tab B Shapira ltr to President

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Response to Letter to the President from
Mrs. Bonnie Shapira

State has provided a draft response (Tab A) to Mrs. Shapira's letter (Tab B) to the President. The draft is fine and is being sent on to you for White House signature.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft response
Tab B Correspondence returned

SUGGESTED REPLY

Dear Ms. Schapira:

I am responding to your letter of January 26 about the imprisonment in Korea of Mr. IM Tong Kyu.

The Chairperson of the Hastings-Dobbs Ferry chapter of Amnesty International, Ms. Rebecca Cooney, wrote to the Department of State on February 28 asking about Mr. Im. In its reply to Ms. Cooney, the Department promised to forward her letter to the American Embassy in Seoul as the basis for an additional inquiry to the Korean government. However, the Department is not optimistic that such an inquiry will elicit new information.

Mrs. Bonnie Schapira

126 Walgrove Avenue,

Dobbs Ferry, New York.

(Classification)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
TRANSMITTAL FORM

S/S 8409032'84 MAR 29Date March 29, 1984

For: Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House

Reference:To: PRESIDENT REAGAN From: Mrs. Bonnie SchapiraDate: January 26, 1984 Subject: HR Violations in Korea

WH Referral Dated: 8409032 NSC ID# 210845
(if any)

 The attached item was sent directly to the
Department of State.

Action Taken:

- A draft reply is attached.
- A draft reply will be forwarded.
- A translation is attached.
- An information copy of a direct reply is attached.
- We believe no response is necessary for the reason cited below.
- The Department of State has no objection to the proposed travel.
- Other.

Remarks:

James W. Hill
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

UNCLASSIFIED
(Classification)

T H E W H I T E H O U S E O F F I C E
REFERRAL

MARCH 13, 1984

TO: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION REQUESTED:
DIRECT REPLY, FURNISH INFO COPY

DESCRIPTION OF INCOMING:

ID: 210845

MEDIA: LETTER, DATED JANUARY 26, 1984

TO: PRESIDENT REAGAN

FROM: MRS. BONNIE SCHAPIRA
126 WALGROVE AVENUE
DOBBS FERRY NY 10522

SUBJECT: HAS NOT HAD RESPONSE TO PREVIOUS LETTER
REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN KOREA

PROMPT ACTION IS ESSENTIAL -- IF REQUIRED ACTION HAS NOT BEEN
TAKEN WITHIN 9 WORKING DAYS OF RECEIPT, PLEASE TELEPHONE THE
UNDERSIGNED AT 456-7486.

RETURN CORRESPONDENCE, WORKSHEET AND COPY OF RESPONSE
(OR DRAFT) TO:
AGENCY LIAISON, ROOM 91, THE WHITE HOUSE

SALLY KELLEY
DIRECTOR OF AGENCY LIAISON
PRESIDENTIAL CORRESPONDENCE

126 Walgrove Avenue
Dobbs Ferry, New York 10522
January 26, 1984

210845

Dear President Reagan,

S.K.
I am writing to you again as I did not receive a response to my letter dated September 13, 1983 about your impending visit to South Korea. As an American citizen, I am very disturbed about continuing human rights violations in South Korea.

As you have reaffirmed and strengthened our relationship with South Korea, it is imperative that the government of President CHUN Doo-hwan be made aware of how strongly Americans value human rights as defined in our own Bill of Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.

The situation of one man illustrates the seriousness of the problem of violation of human rights. He was one of many people in 1978-79 who were working to improve the situation of farmers in South Korea. His name is IM Tong-gyu and he was the Head of General Affairs Division at Korea University Labor Problem Research Institute. He was trying to help establish independent agricultural cooperatives and was critical of the government's agricultural policies (the Saemaul Undong or New Village Movement)

He was arrested in March 1979 and sentenced to life imprisonment on charges that he had attempted to instill "anti-government" ideas through agricultural articles he had written and that he possessed "non-approved" books such as a history of the German farmers struggle against feudalism. The charges against Mr IM follow a pattern common in South Korea where people who have peacefully criticized the government are convicted of "anti-state" charges.

Mr IM is now serving a life sentence in Taejon Prison (Prisoner #3607) His health is reported to be poor because of torture inflicted on him before his trial, and because of severe prison conditions such as no heat.

Any assistance you can give to Mr. IM, any manner in which you can impress upon the South Korean government, our value of human rights and our expectation that they will protect the human rights of their own citizens--will be greatly appreciated. Thank you for your consideration of this very serious matter. I look forward to your reply.

Sincerely yours,

Bonnie Schapira
Mrs. Bonnie Schapira

417A
2/2/84

**WHITE HOUSE
CORRESPONDENCE TRACKING WORKSHEET**

HW

- O - OUTGOING
- H - INTERNAL
- I - INCOMING

Date Correspondence Received (YY/MM/DD) 84 10/1/29

Name of Correspondent: Mr. Mrs. Miss Bonnie Schapiro

MI Mail Report User Codes: (A) _____ (B) _____ (C) _____

Subject: Has not had response to previous letter re: human rights violations in Korea

ROUTE TO:

ACTION

DISPOSITION

Office/Agency	(Staff Name)	Action Code	Tracking Date YY/MM/DD	Type of Response	Code	Completion Date YY/MM/DD
	CoKell	ORIGINATOR	84 10 3/09			84 10 1
99	<i>WOS</i>		84 10 3/13			84 10 1

ACTION CODES:

- A - Appropriate Action
- C - Comment/Recommendation
- D - Draft Response
- F - Furnish Fact Sheet to be used as Enclosure

- I - Info Copy Only/No Action Necessary
- R - Direct Reply w/Copy
- S - For Signature
- X - Interim Reply

DISPOSITION CODES:

- A - Answered
- B - Non-Special Referral
- C - Completed
- S - Suspended

FOR OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE:

- Type of Response = Initials of Signer
- Code = "A"
- Completion Date = Date of Outgoing

Comments: _____

Keep this worksheet attached to the original incoming letter.
Send all routing updates to Central Reference (Room 75, OEOB).
Always return completed correspondence record to Central Files.
Refer questions about the correspondence tracking system to Central Reference, ext. 2590.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP	DATE 4 April 1984
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TO: Dr. Gaston Sigur, NSC

ROOM NO. 302	BUILDING Old EOB
------------------------	----------------------------

REMARKS:



FROM: Chief, Korea/NA/OEA

ROOM NO. 4G-39	BUILDING Headquarters	EXTENSION 351-5117
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FORM NO.
1 FEB 55 **241**

REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

(47)



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

0358

4 April 1984

South Korea: Seoul's Campus Strategy [REDACTED]

Summary

Concurrent with lifting restrictions on formerly banned politicians, Seoul is lowering its security profile on university campuses. Its goal is to reduce tensions prior to assembly elections to be held in late 1984 or early 1985. Liberalization on the campuses is a risky move. Isolated instances of campus violence have taken place this semester and the universities cannot manage major outbreaks. The government's new approach will be tested during the traditional campus rallying period in late April and the papal visit in early May. Should sizeable offcampus demonstrations take place, we believe Seoul will quickly reimpose tight controls. [REDACTED]

EA M #84-10082

**WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED**

DECL OADR
DERIVED FROM FOR 9-82

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F95-033/2#74

~~SECRET NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON~~

By HJ, NARA, Date 8/13/02

The Recent Steps

Within the past three months, Seoul has:

- Released over 350 students imprisoned since President Chun consolidated his power in May 1980.
- Permitted more than 1,000 students who had been expelled from university for political activity to reapply for admission.
- Removed uniformed police from the campuses and made their return contingent on the request of university officials.
- Allowed students to form committees to discuss these changes. [REDACTED]

By pulling back the police, the government is removing a key source of tension. [REDACTED] however, the number of undercover agents on campus has increased, and this could cause tensions to develop anew. Indeed, in an incident in late March students on one Seoul campus spotted and briefly held captive one such undercover agent before releasing him. These undercover agents have been placed on campuses to monitor student activities rather than to intervene, as the police had done. The government has thus shifted the burden of keeping students in line to university officials, who are now responsible for deciding when to ask for police intervention. [REDACTED]

Motivations

The civilian bureaucracy, including the Agency for National Security Planning (NSP, formerly KCIA), has been the driving force behind these "liberalizing" moves. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] President Chun agreed uniformed police on the campuses were unnecessarily provocative. Their removal was seen as depriving the more radical student activists of one of their major causes. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] claim that the government recognizes the need for political--as well as economic--liberalization if it is to maintain stability. They assert privately that Seoul recognizes that legitimate grievances exist. They say the government is prepared to allow freer discussion and even dissent among students. [REDACTED] outlined a phased liberalization that, if continued, would eventually permit more open criticism of the government both on campus and among the population in general. [REDACTED]

Although authorities in Seoul are anxious to defuse major sources of tension, we believe these steps are also part of a broader attempt to keep relations with Washington on an even keel, particularly during a US Presidential election year. [REDACTED]

Perspective

Chun and his civilian advisers recognize the risks involved in easing restrictions on the campuses, and there are definite limits to their tolerance. Already Seoul has resisted student efforts to broaden their discussions about campus policies by dissuading organizers from holding a public forum on the return of expelled students. [REDACTED]

The success of Seoul's campus strategy will depend on the actions of the more radical students. The vast majority of students are moderate and not politically involved. Expelled students returning to the campuses this month, however, include many whose experiences in and out of jail over the past decade have radicalized them. Such individuals, often well into their thirties, have little to lose: their reputation as troublemakers already has closed the door to good careers in government and private industry. For these students, the issue is President Chun himself. An umbrella group representing expelled students--the Youth Federation for Democracy Movement--is particularly combative. [REDACTED]

Many university officials doubt they can control the students. By mid March, a small but violent campus incident had occurred in Seoul and one took place in the southern city of Kwangju. In Kwangju, radical students attempted to disrupt student elections, and in Seoul they harassed cameramen covering student activity. The melee in Kwangju injured 10 people, including one professor seriously. The government's policy of inducting troublemakers into the military could become the next focus of campus agitators. [REDACTED]

More critical tests of the new campus policies will come on 19 April, the anniversary of the student riots that helped topple Syngman Rhee in 1960, and in early May, when Pope John Paul II visits South Korea. The authorities are concerned that students will use these occasions to publicize their grievances. [REDACTED]

Should violent demonstrations proliferate and move off the campuses, we believe Seoul will reimpose direct controls. At a minimum, the government would return uniformed police to the campuses; in a worst case, it could resort to martial law. Seoul probably would justify return to stricter controls by pointing out that it had attempted to liberalize but had not been met

halfway by the students. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] are saying [REDACTED] that the government plans to use campus violence as an excuse to reimpose martial law. The government would then be better able to control all political activity in the period leading up to the National Assembly elections,

[REDACTED] The Assembly elections are scheduled to take place no later than March 1985 but could occur as early as autumn 1984. We still believe martial law is only an outside possibility; Seoul is likely to revert to less harsh controls that so far have made student dissidence a nagging but manageable problem. [REDACTED]

Handwritten: Korea

he was famous, in the preparation of my book "The Fed," a highly critical study of the Federal Reserve.

At the time of his death Bob Weintraub was senior staff economist with the Joint Economic Committee in Washington and dwelt in a cubicle in the bowles of a gray Washington bureaucracy-box. His most recent commitment was in opposition to the International Monetary Fund \$8.5 billion "bailout bill" which he saw as entirely unnecessary and likely to continue to encourage Less Developed Countries to develop bad habits as well as over-regulated socialist economies.

During the 1970s, Bob Weintraub was, in the context of official Washington, the "father of the money targets."

In 1974 he presented a House Banking Committee staff report, based on interviews with the presidents of the 12 Federal Reserve banks and five of the Federal Reserve governors, which recommended that Congress treat monetary policy in the same way that the 1974 Budget Control Act mandated that it treat fiscal policy.

ANNUAL PLAN

"Specifically," said Weintraub, "I recommended that the Federal Reserve annually present to Congress a plan for M1 growth expressed as target ranges for each of the next 12 months and delineated in terms of percentage changes from the same month of a year previously."

In March 1975, Congress passed the famous House concurrent Resolution 133, which obliged the Federal Reserve to issue targets for money growth and to report to Congress on the achievement of those targets.

Initially, Bob Weintraub was very optimistic about the prospects for the new system.

But by the time he wrote the 1980 report of the House Banking Committee's subcommittee on domestic monetary policy, he was deeply disillusioned by the devious manner in which the Federal Reserve officials cheated on the targets—as they do to this day.

He wrote these bitter words in that report:

"In concluding the 1976 report, we commended 'the steadiness of recent Fed money policy' and concluded optimistically that 'we can bring inflation under control and keep it in check by achieving moderate M1 growth, commensurate with our potential to increase production.'

"We recommended 4 to 6 percent M1 growth for 1977 and a gradual deceleration thereafter to 2 to 4 percent per year. We said that in time this would 'reduce inflation to the attainable 1 to 3 percent rate.'

FOILED HOPE

"Our optimism was based on the hope that the Federal Reserve was embarked on a course for money growth much like the one we were recommending.

"It was not.

"Although we had noted a spurt of money growth in the month of October 1976 we did not think that this portended a new inflationary surge of money growth; a surge that would persist well into 1979, propel inflation upwards once again and set the stage for the recession that now (summer 1980) afflicts our economy."

In that report, Bob Weintraub also pointed to the key failure in the Fed operating procedures that precipitated the tragic World Economic Crisis of 1978-1983.

"Beginning in April 1976, the Open Market Committee narrowed the band in which the manager was instructed to keep the Federal Funds rate and widened the inter-meeting target for money growth.

"Thereby, the committee deemphasized control of the money supply as an operating

goal and increased the importance of resisting interest rates movements.

"Money growth subsequently emerged primarily as the incidental corollary of the Committee's Federal Funds interest rate goals."

INFLEXIBLE FED

It is a cruel fact that, despite its record of abysmal failure in money management, the Federal Reserve is today committed to an extremely inflexible Federal Funds rate target (9½ percent.)

Among Bob Weintraub's many great achievements, he provided a system of analysis that made it possible to see how wrong the Federal Reserve policies were—and are. He had the courage to express these unpopular views to Administrations of different political colors.

ADDRESS BY SENATOR HATCH COMMEMORATING 30TH ANNI- VERSARY OF UNITED STATES- KOREA MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY

Mr. SYMMS. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Senator HATCH's fine speech entitled "What Should the Friends of South Korea Be Doing" given in Seoul, Korea on September 2, 1983, in commemoration of the 30th anniversary of the United States-Korea Mutual Defense Treaty be entered into the RECORD. My friend, Senator HATCH, who has distinguished himself in the field of national security affairs over the past several years, gave an excellent and broadly ranging speech in South Korea, and his speech is particularly relevant to our memorial efforts on behalf of the late Congressman Larry P. McDonald and the late Senator Henry M. Jackson. Both of these great and distinguished legislators are honored in Senator HATCH's outstanding speech. I therefore would like to make the speech available to my colleagues in respectful memory of Larry and Scoop. I had the privilege of being present and Senator HATCH was well received.

There being no objection, the address was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

WHAT SHOULD THE FRIENDS OF SOUTH KOREA BE DOING?

(By U.S. Senator Orrin Hatch)

Chairman Park, Chairman Helms, other Distinguished Guests and Participants, Ladies and Gentlemen:

This morning as we mourn the loss of my friend Congressman Larry McDonald and as the Republic of Korea is officially in mourning for the loss of the 269 people aboard Korea Air Lines Flight Seven, we must remember that this is not the first time Americans in Seoul have felt the loss of friends and fellow warriors here in Korea or in Asia as a whole. Three times in this century Americans have gone to war in Asia with losses in the tens of thousands each time. I fear that one lesson of the 269 deaths on Flight Seven is that the prospects of war in Asia have not yet disappeared. At present, stability in Asia is clear, but beneath the surface there are still sufficient dangers to the American people and to the Korean people that I feel this morning we should turn to the nuts and bolts and the specifics that should be done. My friend Larry McDonald and my friend and col-

league the late Senator Henry Jackson would have wished no less. We should ask ourselves this morning what would Larry and Scoop have wanted to come out of the concluding session of this conference. I suggest two answers.

First, Larry and Scoop would want us to urge a strong response on President Reagan and his advisors. The President is flying today from his ranch to Washington. But even as we meet I know from conversations with the State Department that many of his advisors plan to urge business-as-usual with the Russians. Yes, they will agree to the President calling the Soviets liars, which he did this morning, and yes, they will agree to a U.N. Security Council session and for all the moral condemnation the free world can muster. But when it comes to specifics, to the kinds of actions that Larry and Scoop would have studied and advised, the State Department has already said no. It intends to continue the meeting planned next week in Madrid between Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko in Madrid to sign the follow-up Madrid Conference Agreement that implies the Soviets are abiding by their Helsinki 1975 Final Act Commitments—when they are not doing so and when they have arrested most of the Soviet citizens who have been monitoring the Helsinki Agreement.

Moreover, the State Department has advised that the negotiations to begin immediately to re-establish an Agreement on Cultural and Educational Exchanges with Moscow should also go ahead unaffected by the loss of Flight Seven. And the plan just announced to start talks on a new Soviet Consulate in New York in return for an American Consulate in Kiev—these talks too are to go ahead. Unless those of us here can appeal to President Reagan's own views and his own instincts about how to deal with what the Soviets have done to Flight Seven.

My hope is that President Reagan will remember the long slow slide into World War Two in which ever more outrageous acts by aggressive tyrants were met with moral condemnation and clucking of tongues while business and diplomacy as usual continued to mark the policies of the free world. Ladies and gentleman, each time we let the Soviets escape punishment for their barbaric acts, we ourselves condone and become accomplices in their behavior. We need from the Soviets not only an apology for Flight Seven and punishment by public trail for those responsible and full generous compensation for the families of the dead, but we also need to teach them a lesson that they will keep in mind next time. This is what I hope the President and his advisors will focus on in their discussions today and tomorrow. Let me turn now to Korea.

In the spirit of what Larry and Scoop would want us to think about let me be as specific as possible about what the friends of the Republic of Korea should be doing now.

First, we should be talking in Congress and in public about the North Korean threat. Much too little is said about North Korea. Too few appreciate the tremendous drive of the North Koreans to militarize their society. It makes the Soviets look pacific by comparison. Some estimate that the North Koreans are spending 24 per cent of their GNP on their military effort which would be almost double the Soviet level of effort. The North Koreans are practicing offensive exercises with their Army, Navy and Air Force. They have formed over twenty commando units designed to raid and disrupt the unprotected rear areas of South Korea. Four years ago Kim II Sung called

for the storage of six months of war supplies and the North Korean forces have made impressive progress towards this goal. Six months of war supplies, ladies and gentlemen. How many Americans know about that?

And I am not talking about slow steady growth of the North Korea threat but a doubling in the past ten years of the North Korean Army to 750,000 and a doubling of its weapons. Their reserve forces are being armed with the older weapons from the regular forces and may now reach as many as four million armed reservists. Four million!

Their Air Force, now well over seven hundred fighters and bombers is housed and protected either underground or in shelters in sharp contrast to our forces and those of South Korea. They are basing their new Navy craft with ship to ship missiles in forward areas like the Northwest Islands to pose immediate threats to shipping and our patrols.

Just reminding our Congress and the American public about what North Korea is doing is one of the vital things fine friends of Korea must do.

The second thing that friends of the Republic of Korea can do is support the specific initiatives now underway but not yet funded by Congress or fully implemented by the Reagan Administration. There are several of these. First, we must continue to improve the Combined Forces Command set up five years ago manned by equal numbers of American and Korean military officers. This Command will fight the war that will come if our deterrence strategy fails. The Combined Forces Command must be able to combine our forces, to train together in air to air and air to ground exercises, to develop tactics now under discussion in NATO so as to be able to strike deep against an enemy to disrupt and slow his forces before they reach the front lines, to seize the initiative at the right time by being able to see deeply into enemy territory with new intelligence systems and with combined all-source intelligence centers at the Field Army level to allow commanders to both see deep and attack deep so that North Korea will know that any war will be costly to them and will be lost by them.

In addition to the Combined Forces Command, we must continue to improve our logistics and supplies such as the important agreement last year to transfer up to two billion dollars worth of war reserve stocks to South Korea in the event of a military emergency. We must make the trans-Korean pipeline survivable so that fuel can move from South Korea ports to combat forces. We must harden and expand the vital lifeline of our fuel transportation and storage facilities, one of the weak points that could attract North Korean attention. Logistics are not the most glamorous aspect of deterrence, but they are crucial and I commend the new agreement by the Republic of Korea to make available its flag carrying air and sea assets to augment our strategic lift during crises.

The third area where friends of South Korea should be active is supporting the improvements in American forces for the Korea region. Our Eighth Army and Seventh Fleet and U.S. Air Forces are undergoing dramatic improvements under President Reagan's leadership. For those who were depressed and alarmed by Jimmy Carter's plans to withdraw the Second Division from Korea, I reply that five years later help is on the way! One hundred and eighty new systems will be introduced into the U.S. forces under the Eighth Army in Korea in the next five years from counter fire radar to the M60 A3 tank, improved tow anti-tank missiles, the Blackhawk helicopter, the mul-

tipule launch rocket system, the Viper, and the Divad Gun. We will even be modestly increasing our military and civilian manpower in the Eighth Army. Our Air Forces will be significantly augmented by the introduction of F-16 and A-10 aircraft already underway. The Seventh Fleet is improving its firepower. I welcome the arrival of the battleship New Jersey and the increased anti-submarine surveillance of the Eastern Sea (or the Sea of Japan as some call it) by P-3 aircraft. All these efforts are part of President Reagan's defense budget that Senator Symms and I supported on the Senate Budget Committee (cut in half by the Senate from ten percent real growth to about five).

In addition to supporting U.S. defense budget improvements for the Korean region, a fourth area for action by friends of South Korea is the foreign military sales credits for Korea. These have been too small and ought to have a greater portion at a reduced interest rate or a longer repayment period to keep South Korea from falling behind their force improvement plan schedule. More importantly, we have got to find a way within current laws to encourage South Korea to keep its defense production lines operating and to avoid bankruptcies by defense corporations that built up here in response to American recommendations that Korea should provide for its own defense production. Now Korea can provide most of its own military production needs and in an emergency a "warm" production line here can provide a surge capability to aid our own forces. To do all this means that Korean defense production will have to find some export markets in cooperation with the United States so that our own corporations are not damaged but so that Korean production capacity can at least not be lost.

It seems to me that a sixth area for friends of the Republic of Korea to work is simply expressing appreciation and gratitude for the fact that Korea provides us the best financial support for our forward deployed forces of any, and I mean any, of our allies. This may upset some West Germans and Japanese when they hear it but it is so true that we need to remind our Japanese and German allies just what Korea provides for American forces. This is not only a favor to South Korea, when we advertise what they do and express our appreciation, but it ought to have a healthy effect on our other allies when they hear what South Korea does for us. Let me point out several examples, Korea pays through the Combined Defense Improvement Program for U.S. Forces and activities including construction of over one thousand family units, command facilities, ammunition storage, fuel storage and distribution, more importantly, Korea combat service support probably takes the place of about forty thousand American support personnel who would otherwise be needed here. I believe we ought to be able to increase the number of American military systems that can be repaired and maintained here in Korea without having to overload the American depot system. We already have contracted to maintain and modernize about five hundred M113 armored personnel carriers which will save us about fifteen million dollars and help the Korean defense industry I mentioned earlier. We need more of this.

The seventh and last area is the most important and the most difficult for friends of Korea to be active in. It is the area of diplomacy and the area of where members of Congress, no matter how senior a Senator may be, must yield sometimes in frustration and anger, to the power of the State Department which in my experience seems to have a life of its own and a mind of its own

beyond the reach of the President or the Congress, at least much of the time. Generally speaking, American world wide diplomacy is very effective and highly supportive of the peace and stability of the Korean peninsula. A famous Korean proverb describes the international political situation of South Korea as "a shrimp among whale." This is really too modest a description, of course, for the economic and military power of Korea, but it captures the reality of the importance of China and Russia and the U.S. and Japan in the strategic equation for Korea's future.

There is one single area for American diplomacy which affects Korea most of all and that friends of Korea must be vigilant about. That ladies and gentlemen is the principled refusal of our Government not to deal separately with North Korea. There are many reasons to force North Korea into dialog and some brilliant offers have been made by South Korea I will mention in a minute but it would be tragic to see reciprocity for South Korea left out of any of these initiatives toward the North which is precisely what the Carter Administration tried to do in the June 1979 proposals for a tri-partite conference among the United States and the two Koreas. The key point is that any such initiative with North Korea should not only involve the South but also must be reciprocated by Soviet and Chinese agreements to be present at such a conference.

The friends of Korea should be active to be sure that any American diplomatic initiatives that involve North Korea have the full support of South Korea and require reciprocity from Communist China and Russia. We in the Senate of course cannot have any hope that the State Department will inform us in advance of secret initiatives along these lines so we can only make clear again and again that our wishes are against such moves. President Reagan dissociated himself from the tri-partite conference idea of the Carter Administration soon after President Reagan took office. I believe this idea is dead and should remain dead. The only promising approach to take is the idea of cross recognition by all the whales of both shrimps, to use that famous Korean proverb again. North Korea would be recognized by the U.S. and Japan while China and Russia simultaneously recognize South Korea. This could add to stability in this region and the world, but it is a long way off, in my view, and it is made more difficult every time someone makes a proposal like the tri-partite conference without China and Russian reciprocity.

There are two other ways American diplomacy strengthens the peace in Korea and aids our ally the Republic of Korea. First, we can provide general support to the initiatives of President Chun like his successful and highly publicized trips to Southeast Asia in 1981 and to Africa and Canada in 1982. Such travel helps to diversify South Korean trade and diplomatic relationships and should be encouraged. It was kind and gracious of President Chun last night at dinner in the Blue House to say prayers and thank God for the United States so that the Soviet Union would not be the sole superpower able to put the rest of the world at its mercy as it showed in the downing of Flight Seven what it would do. In fact, however, the friends of Korea know that Korea must have other friends and partners in the free world and not rely solely on the United States. Frankly, Korea should be in close touch with France about the long rumored French desire to recognize North Korea. We stopped in Paris on this long trip and I can assure you that President Mitterand's advis-

ers have not yet completely given up the idea of independent French recognition of North Korea. France has always valued her independence and North Korea is the only country in the world that France has no diplomatic relations with so the friends of Korea may wish to watch vigilantly French contacts with North Korea. We were assured in Paris that France also highly values her friendship and trade with South Korea, so I hope that France will ultimately make the right decision in this matter as the French usually do—ultimately.

The final area for American diplomatic support for South Korea is also one of the most important aspects of our own global strategy. That is our policy towards the conflict between China and Soviet Union. We did not start this conflict and I doubt very much whether it will ever completely end. The Soviets and the Chinese have their own scores to settle with each other very separate from their relations with the free world. But we in the free world can still be very, very careful to take no action that would tend to drive together these two natural antagonists. We can treat Moscow and Beijing separately. We can recognize that Moscow and Beijing compete with respect to North Korea and that Kim Il Sung has been very adept at playing them off against each other. We in the free world should be aware of this. We should recognize that as long as Kim Il Sung cannot count completely on joint support from Russia and China, he is restrained from some actions he might otherwise wish to take toward South Korea.

Now in terms of the kinds of specific things to do that Larry and Scoop would have wanted us to focus on this morning, I want to conclude by praising the joint U.S.-Korean initiative that have been taken in the last two years and urge that more be done. I am referring to the kinds of diplomatic moves that force Kim Il Sung and his potential successor to react with peaceful initiatives of their own. The strategy I believe is useful to overload North Korea with peaceful initiatives, to put the ball in their court, to deny North Korea the pretext for the massive military buildup they have been pursuing with twenty four or twenty five percent of their GNP. We must avoid any and all appearance of belligerence and hostility on our part for this strategy to work. That is why it was smart to invite North Korean observers to the Joint Korean-American military exercise a year ago following the large North Korean military exercises. This is why it was wise to invite the North Korean and Chinese members of the Military Armistice Commission to observe our exercise "Team Spirit" and to propose that both sides ought to give advance notice of major military training exercises to reduce the risk of a tragic misunderstanding. We even outlined the agenda of our exercise "Team Spirit 1982" to the North Korean and Chinese members of the Military Armistice Commission. We have proposed that a third party be available to investigate any armistice agreement violations. To be sure, ladies and gentlemen, we have received no positive response from North Korea to any proposal to reduce tensions. But I believe these offers have a political effect in North Korea and they make it a little more difficult for the North Korean leadership to sustain the burden of its massive military buildup with its enormous costs to the economy and society of North Korea.

This is a happy note on which to conclude my remarks. I hope this is the kinds of nuts and bolts detail and recommendations that Larry and Scoop would have wanted our concluding session to focus on this morning.

THE KOREAN AIR LINES INCIDENT

Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the criminal and brutal attack on the Korean airliner has sent shock waves around the world. I was in Chicago on Monday, September 19, when well over 1,000 people of the 23d Ward of Chicago observed the tragedy with a moment of silent respect at the Sportsmens Park Race Track.

The U.S. Congress and the President have acted with one voice on this matter. The governments and people of the nations of the free world have spoken in unison against the action of the Soviet Union. The people of Illinois share the sense of grief, and are extending their sympathy to the families of the victims.

The 23d Ward Regular Republican Organization in Chicago and its ward committeeman, Phillip Bianco, Jr., have adopted an important resolution this week which I commend to the attention of my colleagues. The resolution states clearly that "it is evident from all the facts that the Soviet Union had no reason to take such brutal military action against a civilian aircraft." I ask unanimous consent that the resolution be printed in the RECORD following my remarks.

There being no objection, the resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

RESOLUTION

Whereas, Two hundred sixty nine civilians were brutally murdered and shotdown in a South Korean Air Line Flight 007 by the Soviet Union of Socialist Republics; and

Whereas, This despicable act of murder is a cruel violation of the human rights of people throughout the world; and

Whereas, It is evident from all the facts that the Soviet Union had no reason to take such brutal military action against a civilian aircraft; and

Whereas, The entire world has been horrified by this incident and demands certain concessions to the families of the deceased; and

Whereas, The officers and members of the 23rd Ward Regular Republican Organization and the people of the 23rd Ward feel a deep frustration and sympathy for the families of the two hundred sixty nine civilians; and

Whereas, In an act of respect, one minute of silence will be observed by the entire 23rd Ward Regular Republican Organization and their approximate one thousand friends and supporters who attend their annual Party-Nite at the Races, Sportsmen's Park Race Track on Monday night, September 19, 1983; therefore, be it

Resolved, by the 23rd Ward Regular Republican Organization, City of Chicago, County of Cook, State of Illinois.

MESSAGES FROM THE PRESIDENT

Messages from the President of the United States were communicated to the Senate by Mr. Saunders, one of his secretaries.

EXECUTIVE MESSAGES REFERRED

As in executive session, the Acting President pro tempore laid before the Senate messages from the President of the United States submitting treaties which were referred to the appropriate committee.

MESSAGES FROM THE HOUSE

At 12:10 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Ms. Goetz, one of its reading clerks, announced that the House has passed the following bills, in which it requests the concurrence of the Senate:

H.R. 3871. An act to amend the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1982 to provide that the figure used in determining hourly rates of pay for Federal employees not be changed before the comparability adjustment in the rates of pay for such employees has been made for fiscal year 1984; and

H.R. 3914. An act to require the Secretary of Agriculture to make an earlier announcement of the 1984 crop feed grain program and of the 1985 crop wheat and feed grain programs.

ENROLLED JOINT RESOLUTIONS SIGNED

The message also announced that the Speaker has signed the following enrolled joint resolutions:

S.J. Res. 81. Joint resolution to authorize and request the President to designate October 16, 1983, as "World Food Day";

S.J. Res. 82. Joint resolution designating November 1983 as "National Alzheimer's Disease Month"; and

S.J. Res. 119. Joint resolution to designate the week of December 11, 1983, through December 17, 1983, as "National Drunk and Drugged Driving Awareness Week".

The enrolled joint resolutions were subsequently signed by the President pro tempore (Mr. THURMOND).

At 5:11 p.m., a message from the House of Representatives, delivered by Mr. Berry, one of its reading clerks, announced that the Speaker appoint as additional conferees in the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the House to the bill (S. 1340) entitled "An Act to revise and extend the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and to extend the Developmental Disability Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, and for other purposes."

From the Committee on Education and Labor for consideration of title I of the Senate bill and modifications committed to conference: Mr. KILDEE and Mr. NIELSON of Utah; from the Committee on Energy and Commerce, to serve jointly with Education and Labor Committee members for consideration of section 402(c)(8) of title IV of the House amendment and modifications committed to conference: Mr. DINGELL, Mr. SCHEUER, Mr. OTTINGER, Mr. SHARP, Mr. MARKEY, Mr. LUKE, Mr. BROYHILL, Mr. CORCORAN, and Mr. MOORHEAD; and as exclusive conferees for consideration of title II of the Senate bill and modifications commit-

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Congress of the United States

House of Representatives

Washington, D.C. 20515

February 28, 1984

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear President Reagan:

Several weeks ago, in your State of the Union Address, you told us that

. . .our vision of a better life for farmers, merchants and working people, from the Americas to Asia, begins with a simple premise: the future is best decided by ballots, not bullets.

We share your view, Mr. President, that the United States should be a forceful advocate and protector of liberty throughout the world. Thus it is a matter of deep concern to us that democracy has been eclipsed in a nation on behalf of whose freedom many Americans died.

Currently in South Korea, 300 politicians are banned from political activity; this is hardly what one would expect in a country which you referred to on your recent visit as "the front lines of freedom." While we share with you the view you reiterated on that visit that America should help South Korea defend herself against the threat from the north, we cannot share the satisfaction you expressed with the "continued progress" of the Chun regime towards democracy.

A more telling sign of progress towards democracy in South Korea would be a repeal of the laws banning the 300 politicians from political activity. In addition, Kim Dae Jung, South Korea's leading opposition politician in exile, should be allowed to return to his country to participate in the political process. We ask that you openly urge the Chun regime to enact these reforms, and make it clear that American relations with South Korea will be affected by the response.

135 *Barney Frank* ✓
BARNEY FRANK

Jim Oberstar ✓
JAMES L. OBERSTAR 292

306 *Jerry M. Patterson* ✓
JERRY M. PATTERSON

Mickey Leland ✓
MICKEY LELAND 219

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 12, 1984

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GASTON SIGUR *GS*SUBJECT: Letter to McFarlane from Korean Institute
for Human Rights

I understand from State that Paul Wolfowitz has recently sent a letter to Kim Dae Jung regarding U.S. policy toward Korea and the human rights question. Under these circumstances, State has agreed to respond to Kim on Bud's behalf, making reference to the Wolfowitz letter as containing the official position of the USG. This is good enough, in my view, and the appropriate way to respond to the deluge of letters coming to us all from Kim.

Attachments:

Tab A Background papers



KOREAN INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

March 8, 1984

Mr. Robert C. McFarlane
National Security Council
The White House
Washington, DC 20500

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

North Korea has proposed a three-way dialogue which would involve the United States and North and South Korea. This represents a change in attitude from its traditional position of intransigence. Previous to this proposal, it had only sought dialogue between North Korea and the United States. South Korea is now insisting on bilateral talks between North and South Korea alone. As I mentioned in one of the enclosed speeches, I see a good possibility of dialogue developing between both sides which might involve two, three, four or six nations.

Also at this time, there is a political crisis in the South stemming from the present military government's lack of popularity among our people and the lack of democratization to which our people have long aspired.

In a word, I see great possibility of change in Korea this year. There is looming danger because of the present dictatorial rule in the South and because of United States government support for that dictatorship.

I have made some speeches which address these issues and I am sending them to you for your reference as you evaluate the situation in Korea. I really hope you will have time to read this material. I would appreciate any comments you may have to make on it.

Sincerely,


KIM Dae Jung

enclosures: "The Present Situation in Korea"; February 21, 1984
"The Korean Peninsula - Peace and Reunification"; February 22, 1984



KOREAN INSTITUTE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS

"THE KOREAN PENINSULA - PEACE AND REUNIFICATION"
by KIM, Dae Jung

Riverside Church
New York City
February 22, 1984

It is a privilege for me to speak before you at this church - a church which is so closely identified with one of the themes in my talk - that of peace. This church must take pride in the role it has had and in its minister, Rev. Coffin, who has been a leader in the peace movement for a long, long time. He is widely recognized as having been an outstanding figure in the Vietnam peace movement. I believe we may safely call him a prophet of our time as he continues to press for a resolution of the conflict in Central America.

I am touched by and deeply grateful for the role Rev. Coffin and this church took in my personal plight in 1980. I know that on very short notice Rev. Coffin opened this church to a gathering of some 600 people who expressed concern and anger when news of my arrest in May of that year reached here at the time of the Kwangju incident.

It is my hope that Rev. Coffin and this church will continue to play a significant role in the resolution of problems facing my country, Korea.

I. The Conditions of Peace

Technically speaking, the Korean peninsula has continued on in a state of war ever since the truce of July, 1953 because there has been no progress toward a peace treaty. Intense hostility has remained. The number of soldiers and the amount of weaponry has actually increased. The possibility of another conflict has been evident for over thirty years. The United States has maintained tens of thousands of troops in South Korea throughout this period in order to prevent another conflict. However, there has been peace on the peninsula - though it has been tenuous.

I see two major reasons that this peace has been maintained in spite of the poor conditions. First, there has been a balance of power factor not only between the South and the North but also with their respective supporters, the United States and Japan on one side and China and the Soviet Union on the other. As in Europe, the balance of power on the Korean peninsula has helped to keep the peace. The situation in Korea is thus not like that in the Middle East where there is no effective balance of power. Second, neither side has felt that it could gain any advantage by provoking war and thus upset this balance of power. Each side has felt it would only sustain serious damage should war break out. The damage would destroy the works of great labor which went into building up out of the ashes of war. War has been avoided because there has existed a balance of power and there has been no temptation to gain advantage on either side. These conditions will last long into the future. Thus, I don't see much possibility of another conflict. In addition, China has recently expressed a strong desire to promote peaceful conditions on the peninsula in cooperation with the United States and Japan. The Soviet Union is also unwilling to see any conflict on the Korean peninsula because it can see no advantage in such a conflict.

Last month, North Korea proposed a three-way dialogue revealing a drastic change in attitude. It had strongly opposed any dialogue with South Korea before then and had persistently insisted on having negotiations only with the United States to bring about a peace treaty. There is a great possibility that dialogue involving both South and North Korea will take place this year in spite of present delays. President Reagan's visit to China this April may bring about significant progress toward the start of dialogue. Though I am not sure that a permanent peace treaty can be achieved, I believe that dialogue can ease the tensions and hostility on the peninsula. I know that South Korea on the one hand and China and the Soviet Union on the other have hopes of establishing trade ties. It is known that North Korea also has a desire to develop economic relations with western countries. There is talk that North Korea is preparing a free port for this purpose on its west coast. Such economic relations could greatly help to maintain peace on the Korean peninsula.

However, there is a serious factor which if uncorrected can certainly damage the balance of power on the peninsula and the national security of South Korea. Since South Korea is under dictatorial rule, there is no guarantee of freedom of speech, academic freedom, freedom to organize and participate in trade unions, and elections of true value. There is a rubber stamp opposition party, National Assembly, and judicial branch. The more the economy grows, the greater is the gap between the haves and the have-nots, between urban and rural areas, between big enterprises and small enterprises, and between regions. Ten tycoon businessmen alone control 50% of the GNP. Therefore, the people's dissatisfaction has seriously increased. Consequently the present military regime can not enjoy the people's support and the United States is being criticized as the main support of this evil government. North Korea is eager to take advantage of the situation, but I don't see much chance that North Korea will stage an invasion across the DMZ. As Congressman Stephen Solarz has said North Korea will become ever bolder in seeking to promote turmoil by agitating dissatisfied people. Without improvement toward democracy there is no doubt that turmoil will become common and continue. Thus, North Korea may have a chance to create another Vietnam-like situation.

The clearest danger to peace is within South Korea. For peace, the most important thing is not good negotiations with the North but establishing a sound government which enjoys the voluntary support of the people. Only democratic government can gain the people's full support and ask for the people's dedication in maintaining stability and security. This is so because democratic government can guarantee the freedom, justice, and human dignity to which the Korean people have so long aspired. Support from the people will prevent any subversive force from gaining hold in the South and will prevent any possibility of the North's communizing the South. Furthermore, from a position of strength, the South can lead North Korea to dialogue and peaceful resolution of problems. The future for peace on the Korean peninsula will be decided on the question of whether the people in the South can restore democratic government and on whether the United States supports such efforts and terminates its present policy of support for military dictatorship.

Another important factor is on an international level. Support for peace must come from the four big powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China, which have geographical and traditional interests in the region. So, a three-way dialogue alone will not be sufficient. It must develop toward a six-way dialogue.

In a word, restoration of democracy and four-power cooperation are essential

for peace on the Korean peninsula.

II. Prospects for Reunification

Unlike the two Germanys, both Koreas have taken unification as their main goal. Unification has been persistently supported internationally. The four powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan and China, which have strong interests in and influence on the peninsula now also support unification officially. In spite of the lack of opposition to unification, we have failed to achieve it in forty years time and there is no strong hope that we may achieve this goal in the near future.

There are two reasons for failure to achieve unification. First, even though the four powers support unification, they have not been truly interested in the realization of unification due to the nature of the cold war. They have not wanted to see any change in the balance of power on the peninsula and unification might upset it. The strategic importance of the peninsula is perceived as critical. The four powers have preferred to maintain the status quo with the peninsula divided in two. There is no real possibility of establishing a unified and neutral government such as that in Austria. Second, the persistent ambition of North Korea to communize South Korea and South Korea's continuing fear of North Korea have prevented moves toward peaceful unification. There has been no mutual trust, no progress toward reduction of hostilities between the two sides, no progress toward the restoration of a national consensus. There is a significant difference in the two systems' political, economic, and social development over the last forty years, and so we can see little possibility of early peaceful reunification as one country under the present circumstances.

To achieve peaceful unification we must succeed in addressing two areas of concern - a local one and an international one.

First, in South Korea, we must establish a strong and truly stable government with the people's cooperation and full support via the implementation of democracy. Such a government may have meaningful dialogue with North Korea in working toward the realization of peaceful coexistence and move toward a loose federal system as a first step. The existence of the communist government in the North could be recognized on one hand while South Korea would have to be guaranteed its right to exist as a democratic government on the other. The greater the increase of mutual trust and negotiation, the farther along we may proceed toward establishing one country under a loose federal systems.

According to a recent report, Chinese Prime Minister Zhao Zi Yang when meeting with Australian Prime Minister Hawke said that he did not believe it was possible for the two Koreas at present to achieve unification as one country. This might indicate a significant change in policy by not only China but also North Korea. At present the only way to proceed is to adopt a style of a loose federal system such as that of Great Britain or the Soviet Union. But, our final and absolute goal must be to realize one country.

Second, on an international level, though we think of unification as something to be solved by the 60 million Koreans in the South and North, we can not deny that there is a strong influence coming from the four powers affecting the goal of unification. Each of the big powers has serious misgivings about a unified Korea. Each fears that a unified Korea might damage its security or other

interests. The four powers may maneuver to thwart our efforts for the realization of unification thus augmenting the anti-unification factors within the South and the North. Whether we like it or not, we can not, therefore, ignore international attitudes though we should maintain a strong national determination to work toward one Korea.

Fundamentally speaking, peace and unification should be gained with the aid of the Korean people's strength. When there is a government in the South which is strong, North Korea will be cooperative in working toward the realization of peace and unification. When there is such a strong government in the South, the four powers will not be able to disregard the Korean people's desire for peace and reunification. Such strength must come from democratic government which can enjoy the people's full support. But, unfortunately, there is now no such democratic government in the South. This is mainly because of United States support for the present military dictatorship. It is well-known that while enjoying little support from the Korean people, General Chun can maintain his power only with United States support. United States support has led to Japanese support. Such international support for dictatorship has seriously discouraged democratic elements in the military and among our people. Though the United States has justified its support of military dictatorship using maintenance of peace as an excuse, this stand has backfired and peace is now actually threatened because dictatorship has greatly destroyed our people's loyalty. There is also a growing anti-American feeling among our people because of United States failure to support the cause of democracy in the South. If the present situation continues, we can not avoid meeting a fate similar to that seen in Vietnam: The present feeble peace may not be maintained and South Korea may be communized by the North.

I am not asking the United States to restore democracy in our stead; we only ask that the United States not support military dictatorship but lend moral support to our democratic cause. With such moral support, we can achieve democratic government and work toward peace and eventually towards reunification.

As I said at the beginning of this talk, this church under the guidance of Rev. Coffin is a world-renowned force for peace. You base your belief and work for peace in God's love. I sincerely ask you to impress your government and the American people to support the Korean people's efforts. We can succeed with your help.

I thank you.