

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Sigur, Gaston J.: Files
Folder Title: Korea (South) 1984 (3)
Box: RAC Box 10

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Sigur, Gaston: Files

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Korea (South) 1984 (2 of 5)

Date: 2/8/99

Box 90609 *RAC 20010*

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	#080848Z Mar 84, 3 p. <i>D NLSF95-033/2 #67</i>	3/8/84	P F1
2. Cable	#070933Z Mar 84, 2 p. <i>D NLSF95-033/2 #68</i>	3/7/84	P F1
3. Report	US-Korea Relations: Overview, 4 p. <i>P NLSF95-033/2 #69 6/22/00</i>	7/15/83	P F1
4. Cover Sheet	to Gaston Siguro, 1 p. <i>D 8/13/02 NLSF95-033/2 #70</i>	n.d.	P / P F1, F3
5. Report	re: Korea, 6 p. <i>D " " #71</i>	3/22/84	P F1, F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

Return to ~~H. Miller~~
Wilson

TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 9427

sup. 10

AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

Agreement Between the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
and the REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Amending the Agreement of
April 24, 1957, as Amended

Effected by Exchange of Notes
Signed at Seoul March 22, 1979

with

Exchange of Letters
Signed at Seoul March 14 and 22, 1979

and

Related Note



REPUBLIC OF KOREA

Air Transport Services

***Agreement amending the agreement of April 24, 1957,
as amended.***

Effected by exchange of notes

Signed at Seoul March 22, 1979;

Entered into force March 22, 1979.

With exchange of letters

Signed at Seoul March 14 and 22, 1979.

And related note.

The American Ambassador to the Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs)

EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

No. 77

March 22, 1979

Excellency:

I have the honor to refer to the negotiations held in Washington from September 18 to September 22, 1978 between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning air transport relations between the two countries, and to propose, on behalf of my Government, that the Memorandum of Understanding of September 22, 1978, a copy of which is hereto attached, be accepted as an amendment of the US-Korea Air Transport Agreement of April 24, 1957, as amended on March 26, 1971.^[1]

If your Government agrees to the foregoing proposal, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into effect on the date of your reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Enclosure

His Excellency

Tong Jin Park

Minister of Foreign Affairs

Seoul

W. Gleysteen ^[2]

¹ TIAS 3807, 7083; 8 UST 549; 22 UST 466.

² William Gleysteen, Jr.

[Footnotes added by the Department of State.]

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Delegations representing the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America met in Washington from September 18-22, 1978 to negotiate an expansion in the air transport opportunities for the airlines of both countries.

Because both Governments recognize the principle of fair and equal opportunity for their airlines as reflected in the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957, and

Because both Governments realize the importance of promoting an international aviation system based on fair competition among airlines, and

Because it is the intention of both Governments to make it possible for their airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public low prices, competitive services and increased opportunities for charter air services, and

Because both Governments wish to remove as many restrictions as possible and to afford opportunity for the greatest expansion of air services.

The two delegations agreed to recommend to their Governments that the following provisions be confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes, which would then constitute an amendment to the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957 (as amended).

1. Pro-Competitive Pricing Provisions

(A) "Price or Pricing" means the fare, rate or price and conditions or terms of its availability charged or to be charged by an airline or its agents for the public transport of passengers, baggage and/or cargo (excluding mail).

(B) The Parties desire to facilitate the expansion of international air transportation opportunities over the routes specified in the Route Schedule attached to the Agreement, as well as in charter air transportation. This objective can best be achieved by making it possible for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public a variety of service options at the lowest prices that are not predatory or discriminatory. To achieve this objective, each Party shall encourage individual airlines to develop and implement competitive prices. Accordingly, each Party shall allow airlines to set prices based on commercial considerations in the marketplace, and agrees that governmental intervention should be limited to prevention of predatory or discriminatory prices, protection of consumers from prices which are unduly high due to the abuse of dominant position, or protection of airlines from prices that are artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy or support.

(C) Each Party may require notification or filing with its aeronautical authorities of prices to be charged by designated airlines of the other Party. If such notification

or filing is required to be filed by either or both Parties, such notification or filing shall be required no more than forty-five (45) days before the proposed date of effectiveness in the case of passenger prices, and no more than sixty (60) days before the proposed date of effectiveness in the case of cargo prices. Each Party shall give sympathetic consideration to notifications or filings on shorter notice than set forth above as required to enable designated airlines to respond to competitive offerings. If either Party chooses to require a notification or filing of prices, these requirements shall not discriminate among the airlines of either Party and airlines of third countries. Neither Party shall require the notification or filing by a designated airline of the other Party or by airlines of third countries of prices charged by charterers to the public for traffic originating in the territory of that other Party.

(D) If either Party is dissatisfied with a price that is filed, proposed, or continued in effect for the carriage of scheduled or charter traffic between the United States and Korea, it shall notify the other Party as soon as possible. In the case of a proposed price, such notice of dissatisfaction shall be made to the other Party within 30 days of receiving notification or filing of the price. Either Party may then request consultations which shall be held as soon as possible, and in no event later than 30 days from receipt of the request.

The Parties shall continue to cooperate in securing the airline accounting information necessary for reasoned resolution of pricing consultations.

(E) Neither Party shall take unilateral action to prevent the inauguration or continuation of prices filed, proposed, or in effect for traffic between the United States and Korea. If a Party has expressed dissatisfaction with a price and requests consultations in accordance with Paragraph (D) of this section, the Parties shall meet and endeavor to reach an agreement. Prior to and during such consultations, the prices at issue shall go into effect as proposed, or continue in effect, as the case may be. After consultations, unless mutual agreement is reached between the Parties to disapprove the prices in question, they shall be introduced or continue in effect as filed or proposed. If the Parties agree to disapprove a price, both Parties shall use their best efforts to prevent the implementation or continuation of the price that was mutually disapproved.

(F) Any airline may, upon its effectiveness, immediately match any lower price filed, proposed, continued or offered by any airline for scheduled or charter traffic between the United States and Korea and between the territory of the other Party and third countries. For these purposes, the term "match" includes the right to meet a price, with either an identical or substantially similar price.

(G) Paragraphs (D), (E) and (F) above apply equally to prices of the designated airlines of either Party and of airlines of third countries carrying traffic between the United States and Korea. The phrase "traffic between the United States and Korea" as used herein and in paragraphs (D), (E) and (F) includes traffic carried on an intra-line or interline basis, including service via or beyond to third countries, for scheduled or charter air transportation.

(H) Notwithstanding paragraph (E) of this section, either Party may take action through December 31, 1979 to prevent the continuation of a price, if it continues to believe that such price is predatory, discriminatory, or an abuse of dominant position. Such action may only be undertaken following timely consultations with the other Party, pursuant to paragraph (E) of this section. It is understood that during such consultations such price shall be permitted to become effective in the case of a proposed price, or to continue in effect, in the case of an existing price. The Parties shall exercise their powers under this paragraph only in exceptional circumstances and in a manner consistent with paragraph (B) above.

2. Charter Air Services

(A) An airline or airlines of a Party designated for charter air services shall be permitted to operate charter

air services in accordance with the rules applicable to charter traffic now or hereafter published by the aeronautical authorities of the Party in which the charter traffic originated, or in accordance with waivers of such rules granted for appropriate reasons. When such rules of one Party apply more restrictive terms, conditions, or limitations to one, or more, of its designated airlines, the designated airlines of the other Party shall be subject to the least restrictive of such terms, conditions or limitations. Moreover, if the aeronautical authorities of either Party promulgate rules applicable to charter traffic which apply different conditions to different countries, each Party shall apply the most liberal rule to the designated airlines of the other Party.

(B) Each Party grants to the other Party the right for the designated airlines of that other Party to uplift and discharge international charter traffic in passengers (and their accompanying baggage) and cargo at any point or points in the territory of the first Party for carriage between such points and any point or points in the territory of the other Party, either directly or with stopover at points outside the territory of either Party or with carriage of stopover or transiting traffic to points beyond the territory of the first Party.

(C) Charter Traffic:

(1) originating outside the territory of both Parties; or

(ii) carried by an airline of one Party, originating in the territory of the other Party, and having a traffic stop beyond the territory of the first Party without an intermediate stopover in the territory of the first Party of at least two consecutive nights;

shall not be covered by this Understanding. However, each Party shall consider application by designated airlines of the other Party to carry such traffic on the basis of comity and reciprocity.

(D) Each Party shall minimize the administrative burdens of filing requirements and procedures on passenger or cargo charterers and designated airlines of the other Party.

(E) A designated airline of one Party proposing to carry charter traffic originating in the territory of the other Party shall comply with the applicable rules of that other Party.

(F) Neither Party shall require a designated airline of the other Party, in respect of the carriage of charter traffic originating in the territory of that other Party, to submit more than a declaration of conformity with the rules applicable to charter traffic of that other Party or of a waiver of these rules granted by the aeronautical authorities of that other Party.

(G) Notwithstanding paragraph (F) above, each Party may require that a designated airline of the other Party provide

such advance information with regard to flights as is essential for customs, airport, and air traffic control purposes.)))

(H) Designated airlines shall comply with established procedures in regard to airport slotting and shall provide prior notification of flights or series of flights to the relevant authorities if so required.

(I) Neither Party shall require prior approval of flights or notifications of information relating thereto by designated airlines of the other Party, except as provided in paragraphs (E), (F), (G), and (H) above.

3. Ground Handling Provisions

Each designated airline may perform its own ground handling in the territory of the other Party ("self-handling") or, at its option, select among competing agents for such services. These rights shall be subject only to physical constraints resulting from considerations of airport safety. Where such considerations preclude self-handling, ground services shall be available on an equal basis to all airlines; charges shall be based on the costs of services provided; and such services shall be comparable to the kind and quality of services if self-handling were possible.)

4. Fair Competitive Practices

Each Party shall take appropriate action within its jurisdiction to eliminate all forms of discrimination or

unfair competitive practices affecting the airlines of either Party, including, but not limited to, restrictions upon the sale of air transportation; the payment for goods, services or transactions, or the repatriation of excess currencies by airlines.

5. Multiple Designation

(A) Each Party shall have the right to designate airlines to exercise charter air services pursuant to section 2 of this Understanding.

(B) The right to designate another airline or airlines in addition to those already designated as provided for in Article 3 of the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957 (as amended) is hereby reaffirmed.

6. Route Description

(A) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Republic of Korea shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this paragraph:

(1) From the Republic of Korea via points in Japan to Honolulu^{1/} and Los Angeles.

(2) From the Republic of Korea to Anchorage^{2/} and New York City.^{3/}

(B) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions and to make scheduled landings in the Republic of Korea:

From the United States of America via intermediate points to points in the Republic of Korea and beyond.

(C) Each designated airline may, on any or all international air services and at its option, operate flights in either or both directions, serve points on the routes in any order, and omit stops at any point or points without loss of any right to uplift or discharge traffic otherwise permissible under this Agreement, provided the international air service begins or terminates in the territory of the Party which has designated the airline.

^{1/} With the exception of all-cargo/mail flights, all flights which serve Los Angeles shall also serve Honolulu until December 31, 1979, or until the Government of the Republic of Korea waives its right to take action under section 1.(H) above, whichever occurs first.

^{2/} Stopover privileges only.

^{3/} Effective January 1, 1980 or at such time as the Government of the Republic of Korea waives its right to take action under section 1.(H) above, whichever occurs first.

(D) Each designated airline may, on any or all flights and at its option, operate flights on any segment or segments of the routes described in paragraph (A) or (B) above without any limitation as to change in type or number of aircraft operated, whether or not traffic rights are available.

The Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to the American Ambassador)))

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

March 22, 1979

Excellency:

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Excellency's note of today's date which reads as follows:

"I have the honor to refer to the negotiations held in Washington from September 18 to September 22, 1978 between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Korea concerning air transport relations between the two countries, and to propose, on behalf of my Government, that the Memorandum of Understanding of September 22, 1978, a copy of which is hereto attached, be accepted as an amendment of the US-Korea Air Transport Agreement of April 24, 1957, as amended on March 26, 1971.

If your Government agrees to the foregoing proposal, I have the honor to propose that this note and your reply to that effect constitute an agreement between the two Governments which shall enter into effect on the date of your reply.

His Excellency
William H. Gleysteen Jr.
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary
of the United States of America
Seoul

TIAS 9427

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Delegations representing the Governments of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America met in Washington from September 18 - 22, 1978 to negotiate an expansion in the air transport opportunities for the airlines of both countries.

Because both Governments recognize the principle of fair and equal opportunity for their airlines as reflected in the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957, and

Because both Governments realize the importance of promoting an international aviation system based on fair competition among airlines, and

Because it is the intention of both Governments to make it possible for their airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public low prices, competitive services and increased opportunities for charter air services, and

Because both Governments wish to remove as many restrictions as possible and to afford opportunity for the greatest expansion of air services,

The two delegations agreed to recommend to their Governments that the following provisions be confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes, which would then constitute an amendment to the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957(as amended).

1. Pro-Competitive Pricing Provisions

(A) "Price or Pricing" means the fare, rate or price and conditions or terms of its availability charged or to be charged by an airline or its agents for the public transport of passengers, baggage and/or cargo (excluding mail).

(B) The Parties desire to facilitate the expansion of international air transportation opportunities over the routes specified in the Route Schedule attached to the Agreement, as well as in charter air transportation. This

objective can best be achieved by making it possible for airlines to offer the traveling and shipping public a variety of service options at the lowest prices that are not predatory or discriminatory. To achieve this objective, each Party shall encourage individual airlines to develop and implement competitive prices. Accordingly, each Party shall allow airlines to set prices based on commercial considerations in the marketplace, and agrees that governmental intervention should be limited to prevention of predatory or discriminatory prices, protection of consumers from prices which are unduly high due to the abuse of dominant position, or protection of airlines from prices that are artificially low because of direct or indirect governmental subsidy or support.

(C) Each Party may require notification or filing with its aeronautical authorities of prices to be charged by designated airlines

of the other Party. If such notification or filing is required to be filed by either or both Parties, such notification or filing shall be required no more than forty-five (45) days before the proposed date of effectiveness in the case of passenger prices, and no more than sixty (60) days before the proposed date of effectiveness in the case of cargo prices. Each Party shall give sympathetic consideration to notifications or filings on shorter notice than set forth above as required to enable designated airlines to respond to competitive offerings. If either Party chooses to require a notification or filing of prices, these requirements shall not discriminate among the airlines of either Party and airlines of third countries. Neither Party shall require the notification or filing by a designated airline of the other Party or by airlines of third countries of prices charged by charterers to the public for traffic originating in the territory of that other Party.

(D) If either Party is dissatisfied with a price that is filed, proposed, or continued in effect for the carriage of scheduled or charter traffic between the United States and Korea, it shall notify the other Party as soon as possible. In the case of a proposed price, such notice of dissatisfaction shall be made to the other Party within 30 days of receiving notification or filing of the price. Either Party may then request consultations which shall be held as soon as possible, and in no event later than 30 days from receipt of the request. The Parties shall continue to cooperate in securing the airline accounting information necessary for reasoned resolution of pricing consultations.

(E) Neither Party shall take unilateral action to prevent the inauguration or continuation of prices filed, proposed, or in effect for traffic between the United States and Korea. If a Party has expressed dissatisfaction with a price and requests consultations in accordance with

Paragraph (D) of this section, the Parties shall meet and endeavor to reach an agreement. Prior to and during such consultations, the prices at issue shall go into effect as proposed, or continue in effect, as the case may be. After consultations, unless mutual agreement is reached between the Parties to disapprove the prices in question, they shall be introduced or continue in effect as filed or proposed. If the Parties agree to disapprove a price, both Parties shall use their best efforts to prevent the implementation or continuation of the price that was mutually disapproved.

(F) Any airline may, upon its effectiveness, immediately match any lower price filed, proposed, continued or offered by any airline for scheduled or charter traffic between the United States and Korea and between the territory of the other Party and third countries. For these purposes, the term "match" includes the right to meet a price, with either an identical or substantially similar price.

(G) Paragraphs (D), (E) and (F) above apply equally to prices of the designated airlines of either Party and of airlines of third countries carrying traffic between the United States and Korea. The phrase "traffic between the United States and Korea" as used herein and in paragraphs (D), (E) and (F) includes traffic carried on an intra-line or interline basis, including service via or beyond to third countries, for scheduled or charter air transportation.

(H) Notwithstanding paragraph (E) of this section, either Party may take action through December 31, 1979 to prevent the continuation of a price, if it continues to believe that such price is predatory, discriminatory, or an abuse of dominant position. Such action may only be undertaken following timely consultations with the other Party, pursuant to paragraph (E) of this section. It is understood that during such consultations such price shall be

permitted to become effective in the case of a proposed price, or to continue in effect, in the case of an existing price. The Parties shall exercise their powers under this paragraph only in exceptional circumstances and in a manner consistent with paragraph (B) above.

2. Charter Air Services

(A) An airline or airlines of a Party designated for charter air services shall be permitted to operate charter air services in accordance with the rules applicable to charter traffic now or hereafter published by the aeronautical authorities of the Party in which the charter traffic originated, or in accordance with waivers of such rules granted for appropriate reasons. When such rules of one Party apply more restrictive terms, conditions, or limitations to one, or more, of its designated airlines, the designated airlines of the other Party shall be subject to the least restrictive

of such terms, conditions or limitations. Moreover, if the aeronautical authorities of either Party promulgate rules applicable to charter traffic which apply different conditions to different countries, each Party shall apply the most liberal rule to the designated airlines of the other Party.

(B) Each Party grants to the other Party the right for the designated airlines of that other Party to uplift and discharge international charter traffic in passengers (and their accompanying baggage) and cargo at any point or points in the territory of the first Party for carriage between such points and any point or points in the territory of the other Party, either directly or with stopover at points outside the territory of either Party or with carriage of stopover or transiting traffic to points beyond the territory of the first Party.

(C) Charter Traffic:

- (i) originating outside the territory of both Parties; or

- (11) carried by an airline of one Party, originating in the territory of the other Party, and having a traffic stop beyond the territory of the first Party without an intermediate stopover in the territory of the first Party of at least two consecutive nights;

shall not be covered by this Understanding. However, each Party shall consider application by designated airlines of the other Party to carry such traffic on the basis of comity and reciprocity.

(D) Each Party shall minimize the administrative burdens of filing requirements and procedures on passenger or cargo charterers and designated airlines of the other Party.

(E) A designated airline of one Party proposing to carry charter traffic originating in the territory of the other Party shall comply with the applicable rules of that other Party.

(F) Neither Party shall require a designated airline of the other Party, in respect of the carriage of charter traffic originating in the territory of that other Party, to submit more than a declaration of conformity with the rules applicable to charter traffic of that other Party or of a waiver of these rules granted by the aeronautical authorities of that other Party.

(G) Notwithstanding paragraph (F) above, each Party may require that a designated airline of the other Party provide such advance information with regard to flights as is essential for customs, airport, and air traffic control purposes.

(H) Designated airlines shall comply with established procedures in regard to airport slotting and shall provide prior notification of flights or series of flights to the relevant authorities if so required.

(I) Neither Party shall require prior approval of flights or notifications of information relating thereto by designated airlines of the other Party, except as provided in paragraphs (E), (F), (G), and (H) above.

3. Ground Handling Provisions

Each designated airline may perform its own ground handling in the territory of the other Party ("self-handling") or, at its option, select among competing agents for such services. These rights shall be subject only to physical constraints resulting from considerations of airport safety. Where such considerations preclude self-handling, ground services shall be available on an equal basis to all airlines; charges shall be based on the costs of services provided; and such services shall be comparable to the kind and quality of services if self-handling were possible.

4. Fair Competitive Practices

Each Party shall take appropriate action within its jurisdiction to eliminate all forms of discrimination or unfair competitive practices

affecting the airlines of either Party, including, but not limited to, restrictions upon the sale of air transportation; the payment for goods, services or transactions, or the repatriation of excess currencies by airlines.

5. Multiple Designation

(A) Each Party shall have the right to designate airlines to exercise charter air services pursuant to section 2 of this Understanding.

(B) The right to designate another airline or airlines in addition to those already designated as provided for in Article 3 of the Air Transport Services Agreement of 1957 (as amended) is hereby reaffirmed.

6. Route Description

(A) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the Republic of Korea shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions, and to make scheduled landings in the United States at the points specified in this paragraph:

- (1) From the Republic of Korea via points in Japan to Honolulu^{1/} and Los Angeles.
- (2) From the Republic of Korea to Anchorage^{2/} and New York City.^{3/}

(B) An airline or airlines designated by the Government of the United States of America shall be entitled to operate air services on each of the air routes specified, in both directions and to make scheduled landings in the Republic of Korea:

From the United States of America via intermediate points to points in the Republic of Korea and beyond.

-
- 1/ With the exception of all-cargo/mail flights, all flights which serve Los Angeles shall also serve Honolulu until December 31, 1979, or until the Government of the Republic of Korea waives its right to take action under section 1.(H) above, whichever occurs first.
 - 2/ Stopover privileges only.
 - 3/ Effective January 1, 1980 or at such time as the Government of the Republic of Korea waives its right to take action under section 1.(H) above, whichever occurs first.

(C) Each designated airline may, on any or all international air services and at its option, operate flights in either or both directions, serve points on the routes in any order, and omit stops at any point or points without loss of any right to uplift or discharge traffic otherwise permissible under this Agreement, provided the international air service begins or terminates in the territory of the Party which has designated the airline.

(D) Each designated airline may, on any or all flights and at its option, operate flights on any segment or segments of the routes described in paragraph (A) or (B) above without any limitation as to change in type or number of aircraft operated, whether or not traffic rights are available."

I have further the honour to confirm on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Korea that the above proposal is acceptable to the Government of the

Republic of Korea and Your Excellency's note and this reply thereto shall constitute an agreement between our two Governments which shall enter into force from the date of this reply.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Gyun Park".

Minister of Foreign Affairs

[RELATED NOTE]

**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA**

OZI- 238

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Korea presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to the amendment to the Korea-U.S. Air Transport Agreement of 1957, as amended, effected by an exchange of notes between their two Governments on March 22, 1979.

The Ministry has further the honour to notify the Embassy that, in accordance with the provisions of Section 6 of the Memorandum of Understanding attached to the said exchange of notes, the Government of the Republic of Korea waives its rights to take action under Section 1(H) of the said Memorandum of Understanding.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Embassy of the United States of America the assurances of its highest consideration.

Seoul, March 22, 1979



TIAS 9427

Korea

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 1, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR *Gast*

SUBJECT:

Request for Photo Opportunity with President
for Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry
Kum Jin-ho

The Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry, Kum Jin-ho, will be in Washington from March 4-8, leading a trade mission. He has requested a photo opportunity with the President through several sources, including State. State is not recommending such a meeting and I agree with their negative decision. The President met with the Korean Defense Minister and two foreign ministers last year. His meeting with the present foreign minister was only in December. There is no need for him to meet with another less important Korean Cabinet member at this time. Also, the Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry will be meeting with Baldrige, Brock and the Vice President. These appointments are sufficient.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward your memo to Fred Ryan (Tab I) telling him of this recommendation.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to Ryan
Tab A Incoming ltr

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR FREDERICK J. RYAN, JR.

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Request for Photo Opportunity with President
for Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry
Kum Jin-ho

The State Department has recommended against a meeting for the Korean Minister of Commerce and Industry with the President. Since the President has met with the Defense Minister and two Foreign Ministers of Korea during the past year, the latest such meeting having taken place only in December, 1983, State sees no benefit in having him see another less important Korean Cabinet member at this time. Also, Minister Kum will be meeting with the Vice President, Secretary Baldrige and Ambassador Brock. These opportunities would seem to be sufficient, given his visit here as head of a trade mission.

We agree with State's recommendation that no photo opportunity be provided with the President for Minister Kum.

Attachment:

Tab A Incoming letter from R. Gray



February 28, 1984

Mr. Frederick J. Ryan, Jr.
Director of Scheduling
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

RECEIVED
FEB 28 1984
SCHEDULING
OFFICE

Dear Fred:

The Republic of Korea's Minister of Commerce & Industry, Kum Jin-ho, would like a very brief meeting with the President next week for the purpose of delivering a personal message and letter from his President Chun Too Huan. Minister Kum is Korea's chief delegate to the 11th Annual Korea - U.S. Minister's Meeting in Washington, leading a trade mission authorized to sign contracts for \$3 billion in American goods.

Minister Kum will be in Washington March 4 through March 8, meeting with Secretary Baldrige and Congressional leaders. I thought his brief meeting with the President would be a photo opportunity with value, demonstrating the Administration's determination to send as much trade to the Far East as we bring in.

If you ascertain a meeting is possible, I would be grateful to know soon.

Best,

1729

National Security Council
The White House

URGENT

84 FEB 29 P 4: 00

System # I

Package # _____

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bill Martin	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	<u>1</u>	<u>IC</u>	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____

(Date/Time)

Staff to Sign for action

*Prepare recommendation, coordinated with State & Commerce
RMK -> Ryan
due 3/1/84*

Korea

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 2, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT M. KIMMITT

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR^{G.S.}SUBJECT: Letter to President from Korean Federation of
Los Angeles Re His Recent Trip to Korea

Mr. John C. Moon, of the Korean Federation of Los Angeles, wrote to the President regarding his recent trip to Korea, and other current topics (Tab B). State has drafted a response for signature by a White House staff member (Tab A).

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward your memo to Sally Kelley (Tab I).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Kimmitt memo to Kelley
 Tab A Draft response to Mr. Moon
 Tab B Incoming letter

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

MEMORANDUM FOR SALLY KELLEY

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT

SUBJECT: Letter to President from Korean Federation of
Los Angeles Re His Recent Trip to Korea

Attached at Tab A is a draft response, for signature by a White House staff member, to Mr. John C. Moon who wrote the President on behalf of the Korean Federation of Los Angeles regarding his recent trip to Korea, and other current topics.

Attachments:

Tab A Draft response to Mr. Moon
Tab B Incoming letter

DRAFT REPLY

Dear Mr. Moon:

Thank you for your very kind letter of November 18 to President Reagan regarding his trip to Korea and the situation there.

As you point out in your letter, recent events, especially the murderous North Korean attack in Rangoon, lead one to believe that the Republic of Korea and its people are prime targets for Pyongyang's aggression. We share your abhorrence of Rangoon and the shooting down of KAL Flight #007. As President Reagan said on November 12, "The loss of 269 innocent lives in a defenseless airliner and the absence here today of some of (Korea's) finest public servants has written in blood the differences between systems which respect human life and those which rely on force to attain their ends." The basic purpose of the President's visit was to reaffirm the ties between the United States and Korea, including our commitment to safeguard Korea's national security. Our government has supported the Republic of Korea in efforts to bring the perpetrators of these atrocities to account.

Mr. John C. Moon,
Elected President,
Korean Federation of Los Angeles,
981 South Western Avenue,
Los Angeles, California.

You may be sure that U.S. support for the Republic of Korea is firm, and that we will work with the people and government of the Republic of Korea to protect freedom and maintain peace. President Reagan's visit is a sign of that strong support.

Thank you again for your words of appreciation. I wish you and the other members of the growing Korean community every success.

Sincerely,

187655
8400988

3K
Los Angeles

KOREAN FEDERATION OF LOS ANGELES
981 S. Western Ave.,
Los Angeles, CA 90006
(213) 732-3593/0192

November 18, 1983

Mr. Ronald Reagan
President of the United States
White House, Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

The South Korean People of Southern California wish to personally welcome you back from your recent visit to the Republic of South Korea. Through our local newspapers and television stations we have been able to follow your visit to our native land almost step by step. We were pleased to see the courteous manner in which our fellow Koreans received you and Mrs. Reagan and the warm reception accorded you wherever you traveled throughout the country.

The Korean people living in Southern California have gathered today in Ardmore Park in that portion of Los Angeles known as Korea Town in a public demonstration of support for your visit. We join with you in condemning the barbarous acts of the North Korean government and its agents in causing the death of 17 South Korean government officials while visiting the neutral third world country of Burma and to offer prayers for our fallen comrades.


Recent events would lead one to believe that the Republic of South Korea and its people are prime targets for Communist terrorist activities. The recent shooting down of an unarmed civilian South Korean jet liner by the Soviet Union coupled with the loss of many of South Korea's most abled government officials in Burma has saddened us greatly. However, it has also made the South Koreans more resolute in our determination to stand up to these Communists and their henchmen and to meet them head on. Our weapons against them are made of courage, resolution and freedom - courage in the face of danger, resolution in the face of adversity and freedom in the face of tyranny. There is no parallel for courage, there is no equal for resolution and there is no substitute for freedom.

We join in your condemnation of these barbarous acts, these gross murders, this senseless carnage. Your recent visit to our native land in face of these heinous crimes and their attendant dangers speaks greatly of the courage of you, Mrs. Reagan and all the American people. Your trip to the 38th Parallel to the very doorstep of the enemy in the DMZ was a clear and public message to the Communists of the determination of the American and South Korean peoples to meet the Communist challenge

wherever it may rear its ugly head. More recently you demonstrated the resolution of the American people against Communism by the action taken in Grenada in ridding that nation of foreign powers, including North Korean agents, who were trying to expand their Communist doctrine in the Western Hemisphere.

The South Korean people of Southern California join with you in your efforts to bring about peace and in your prayers that peace may be accomplished without bloodshed.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John C. Moon". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned above the typed name and title.

John C. Moon
Elected President
Korean Federation of Los Angeles

Korea (south) 1964 (2)

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1-2 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

1950

Signer
CEW

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 13, 1984

Korea

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: ROGER W. ROBINSON *RWR*

SUBJECT: Letters from President Reagan to Heads of State of China and Korea

Secretary Regan is going to head the U.S. delegation to the fourth session of the U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee in Beijing the week of March 19. He will meet with Premier Zhao while in Beijing and with President Chun of Korea during a stop there. Attached are suggested letters from the President to Premier Zhao (Tab A) and President Chun (Tab B) which Secretary Regan would like to hand deliver. The speechwriters have cleared the texts of the letters.

Since Secretary Regan will be leaving early Saturday, March 16, we will need to have the signed letters back by Friday afternoon.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I forwarding the suggested letters for signature.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

G Gaston Sigur, *DJ* Dave Laux and *D* Doug ~~W~~ ~~M~~ ~~I~~ ~~N~~ ~~N~~ concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memo to President
- Tab A Letter to Zhao
- Tab B Letter to Chung

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Premier:

I wish to take the opportunity afforded by Secretary Regan's visit to China to re-emphasize the importance I attach to improving U.S.-China relations. It is my strong conviction that a close, stable, and enduring relationship between our two nations will best serve the interests of the American and Chinese people and the world as a whole.

I believe we agree that there is a major potential for expansion of our ties. Working together, our governments can ensure that this potential is fully realized. The U.S.-China Joint Economic Committee can play an important role in this regard, as it has in the past.

At this fourth meeting of the Joint Economic Committee, Secretary Regan and his delegation will be discussing many of the economic issues that you and I touched upon in Washington. I trust that these discussions will contribute to the positive dialogue we have initiated.

I look forward to seeing you again and resuming our dialogue on these matters during my visit to Beijing next month.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Zhao Ziyang
Premier of the State Council
of the People's Republic of China
Beijing

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

I am delighted to have had the opportunity to visit your country last November. I will long remember the bright and hopeful faces of the Korean people. The strong and friendly bond that exists between our two countries is an important component of American foreign policy and serves the interest of the people of both nations. Above all, this relationship is essential to our common goals of world peace and stability. I am confident we will continue to strengthen these ties.

In this regard, Secretary of the Treasury Donald Regan is visiting your country at my request to follow up on the economic aspects of my visit. I am certain that these discussions will be highly beneficial to both countries.

I anticipate that the meetings will be successful, and look forward to continued progress in our special bilateral relationship.

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Chun Doo Hwan
President of the Republic
of Korea
Seoul

DECLASSIFIED

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1987
By dlb NARA, Date 2/8/99

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS #95-033/2 #69 US-KOREA RELATIONS: OVERVIEW

By CAS, NARA, Date 6/22/00

US-Korea relations are basically sound. Confidence in our security commitment, shaken by the plans of the Carter Administration to withdraw US forces, has been restored. The profoundly damaging impact of the Korea-related scandals of the late seventies has largely dissipated. President Chun's difficult and sporadically violent consolidation of power following the assassination of President Park in 1979, while not fully accepted by a significant minority in Korea (or their supporters in this country), has been generally accommodated. Economic relations with Korea have grown in importance. Significant policy issues nonetheless remain in all these areas, and will need to be addressed in connection with the President's visit.

Security. The alliance between the US and Korea has been successful in its central aspect: deterring war for nearly thirty years, despite a heavily armed and threatening North Korea. The threat is undiminished, and in fact has grown substantially in recent years, resulting in a significant military imbalance in favor of the North. The ROK and we have sought to redress that imbalance through a substantial Korean force modernization program, requiring large annual amounts of Foreign Military Sales credits, and measures to improve the capabilities of US forces. Our continuing inability to discern with confidence North Korean intentions, and the proximity of the demarcation line to Seoul, combine to produce one of our most demanding warning problems. We would have little time to react to a North Korean attack, and hence must maintain a high level of readiness. We have seen no indication of a shift in North Korea's basic strategy and therefore see little prospect for a reduction of tension on the peninsula or a dialogue between North and South. In view of the profound effects war in Korea would have for the stability of Northeast Asia and our broader interest, the maintenance of peace and security on the peninsula remains our fundamental policy goal, and is one that requires constant attention.

In view of this Administration's staunch record of support for our security commitment, we do not anticipate major problems in this area during the President's discussions. The President will, however, need to be prepared to respond to several specific Korean interests and concerns:

-- Security Assistance. We provide Foreign Military Sales credits to Korea, to assist ROKG efforts to pursue a force improvement plan designed to narrow the North's military lead. The necessity to operate under Continuing Resolutions, combined with Congressional earmarking of funds and competing priorities

~~SECRET~~


DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

elsewhere, have resulted in shortfalls for Korea which are of great concern to the ROKG. We will want to assure Chun that we will continue to do what we can to obtain adequate FMS appropriations, but at the same time avoid raising his expectations. We should also try to de-emphasize the political importance of security assistance in Korean eyes, making the point that security assistance levels should not be regarded as an indicator of the strength of the US commitment.

-- Korean Interest in a "Strategic" Relationship: While the US commitment and troop presence is strategically important, in the sense that the maintenance of peace on the peninsula is essential to the security and stability of Northeast Asia, our forces in Korea, and the commitment itself, are directed toward the threat from North Korea, not the broader Soviet military challenge. The Koreans would like to add a more explicit strategic dimension to the relationship,

 with the President.

Chun could raise this issue

-- North Korean Perceptions: While it is important for the President to affirm our commitment to the security of the ROK, this should be done in a way that will not contribute to North Korean paranoia and result in higher tension on the peninsula. The ROKG tendency will be to emphasize North Korean bellicosity and the solidity of our alliance in countering it. Without denigrating the threat, we should stress the defensive nature of the US-ROK security relationship and our hope that the danger of military confrontation can gradually be reduced.

Political Stability and Development in the ROK. It is in this area that the performance of the ROKG has often been both

~~SECRET~~

inadequate and controversial. Because his rise to power was marred by violence and signalled a continuation of military domination, President Chun's government has faced continuing difficulties in winning broader popular acceptance, and Korean political life continues to be characterized by confrontation between the government and a small but active element of the opposition. Despite some notable progress (e.g., the release from prison of the leading Korean dissident, Kim Dae Jung, and a partial lifting of a ban on political activity by officials of the Park era), the opposition remains dissatisfied with the degree of government control of political life, and skeptical of possibilities for future liberalization of the present strongly authoritarian system. It seems likely that unless the pace of change increases, tension will rise. Political stability could be threatened.

Moreover, as the guarantor of Korean security and its sole ally, the US inevitably is associated in the minds of many Koreans with the ROKG and the entire range of its policies (an impression the government often seeks to foster). Anti-government sentiment has increasingly taken on anti-American overtones, sharpening the basic dilemma we have long faced in Korea: how to preserve security on the peninsula while avoiding identification with the repressive aspects of a government allied with us in that task.

Thus, it is important that we continue to encourage further steady progress in the area of political liberalization, and to make clear the importance we attach to a credible and peaceful transfer of power at the end of Chun's term in 1988, when he has announced that he will retire. The President's visit provides an opportunity to do this, without offending ROKG sensibilities.

Economic Relations. Korea's dramatic economic growth over the past two decades has transformed the country from one of the least developed in Asia to the 25th largest economy in the world. Because Korea's economy is traditionally export-led, global recession impacted heavily on it over the past two years. It nonetheless has performed extraordinarily well, registering more than 5 percent real growth in 1982. As the Korean economy has grown, its importance as a market and supplier for the US has increased accordingly. Two-way trade exceeded \$11 billion in 1982, making Korea our ninth largest trading partner worldwide, and unique among our major Asian trading partners in that our bilateral account was essentially balanced.)

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

In addition to the uncertainties attendant to heavy dependence on exports, Korea faces the complex task of shifting from a heavy industrial base to a higher technology economy if it is to remain competitive. This second stage of economic development will be more difficult to reach than the impressive industrialization achieved to date and, given global economic realities, the phenomenal growth rates of the 60s and 70s are unlikely to recur. Continued steady growth is, however, essential, both to support the required heavy military expenditures (6% of GNP), and to contribute to political stability among a populace by now accustomed to rising standards of living.

Despite these potential problems, the policy issues posed for us in this area stem basically from success, e.g.: we seek greater access to Korean markets; a liberalized investment climate for American business; our fair share of Korean purchases of major equipment (e.g., aircraft, nuclear power plants); and the successful management of recurring sectoral trade problems. The President's visit will enable us to make a number of points in all these areas, and in general to encourage an increasingly mature and responsible Korean role in the management of interational economic issues, commensurate with its growing economic importance.

July 15, 1983

~~SECRET~~

Korea (south) 1984

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.