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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Report	South Korea: Foreign Policy, 6 p. <i>P NLSF95-033/2 #57 6/22/00</i>	12/23/83	<i>RL F1</i>
2. Report	South Korea: The Domestic Situation, 6 p. <i>R 95-033/2 #58 6/22/00</i>	12/23/83	P1
3. Memo	To the Secretary of Defense, 1 p. <i>R MDI-009 #8 5/30/02</i>	n.d.	P1
4. Draft Letter	To President Chun, 1 p. <i>R 4/4/02 MDI-009 #9</i>	n.d.	P1
5. Cable	#171728Z Jan 84, 6 p. <i>D NLSF95-033/2 #61</i>	1/17/84	<i>RL F1</i>
6. Cable	#230719Z Jan 84, 3 p. <i>D NLSF95-033/2 #62</i>	1/23/84	<i>RL F1</i>
7. Note	To Sigur, 1 p. <i>D 8/13/02 NLSF95-033/2 #63</i>	1/31/84	<i>P1/P3 F1, F3</i>
8. Report	Re: South Korea's New Army Chief of Staff, 5 p. <i>D " " #64</i>	1/31/84	<i>RL F1, F3</i>
9. Note	To Sigur, 1 p. <i>D " " #65</i>	2/3/84	<i>P1/P3 F1, F3</i>
10. Report	South Korea: Strong Economy Boosting Chun's Prospects, 6 p. <i>D " " #66</i>	2/3/84	<i>RL F1, F3</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].


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→ Sigur
JK
[South] **Korea**



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs

October 1983



Official Name:
Republic of Korea

PROFILE

People

Noun and adjective: Korean(s). **Population** (1983): 40 million. **Annual growth rate:** 1.6%. **Ethnic groups:** Korean; small Chinese minority. **Religions:** Buddhism, Christianity, Shamanism, Confucianism. **Language:** Korean. **Education:** *Years compulsory*—6. *Number of students*—9,951,000. *Attendance*—of those eligible 91.65% attend middle school, 56.8% high school, and 13.9% college (1980). **Literacy**—over 90%. **Health:** 1 doctor/1,554 persons (1979). **Infant mortality rate**—32/1,000 (1982). **Life expectancy**—68 yrs. (1979). **Work force** (14,722,000, 1982): *Agriculture, forestry, and fishing*—30.6%. *Mining and manufacturing*—22.4%. *Services*—47%.

Geography

Area: 98,500 sq. km. (38,000 sq. mi.); about the size of Indiana. **Cities:** *Capital*—Seoul (1980 pop. over 8 million). *Other major cities*—Pusan (over 3 million), Taegu (1.7 million), Inchon (1 million), Kwangju (727,000), Taejon (651,000). **Terrain:** Partially forested mountain ranges, separated by deep, narrow valleys; cultivated plains along the coasts, particularly in the west and south. **Climate:** Temperate.

Government

Type: Republic, with power centralized in a strong executive. **Independence:** August 15, 1948. **Constitution:** July 17, 1948; revised 1962, 1972, 1980. **Branches:** *Executive*—president (chief of state). *Legislative*—unicameral National Assembly. *Judicial*—Supreme Court and appellate courts, Constitutional Court. **Subdivisions:** Nine provinces, four administratively separate cities (Seoul, Pusan, Inchon, Taegu).

Political parties: *Government party*—Democratic Justice Party (DJP). *Opposition parties*—Democratic Korea Party (DKP), Korean National Citizens Party (KNCP). **Suffrage:** Universal over age 20.

Central government budget (1983 projected): Expenditures, \$13.9 billion.

Defense (1983 est.): 6% of GNP; about one-third of national budget. **Armed forces** (1982): About 600,000 active.

Flag: Centered on a white field is the ancient Chinese symbol of yin and yang, a divided circle of interpenetrating red (top) and blue (bottom), representing the union of opposites. At each corner of the white field is a different trigram of black bars, symbols of the elements from the ancient pan-East Asian *I Ching* or "Book of Changes." Together, the yin-yang and the four trigrams represent eternal unity.

Economy

GNP (1982): \$65.944 billion. **Annual growth rate** (1961-81): 8%. **Per capita GNP** (1982): \$1,680. **Consumer price index** (1982 avg. increase): 7.3%.

Natural resources: Limited coal, tungsten, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and graphite.

Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries: 18.1% of 1982 GNP. *Products*—rice, barley, vegetables, fish. *Arable land*—22% of land area.

Manufacturing and mining: 35.3% of 1982 GNP. *Products*—Textiles, footwear, electronics, shipbuilding, motor vehicles, petrochemicals, industrial machinery.

Social overhead capital and other services: 46.5% of GNP.

Trade (1982): *Exports*—\$23.5 billion: textiles (\$5.4 billion); transportation equipment (\$3.4 billion), base metals and articles (\$3.1 billion), electrical products (\$2.1 billion), footwear (\$1.2 billion), fish and fish products (\$0.8 billion). *Major markets*—US, Japan, European Community, Middle East. *Imports*—\$24.3 billion: crude oil (\$6 billion), grains (\$0.9 billion), machinery (\$4.4 billion), chemicals and chemical products (\$1.8 billion), base metals and articles (\$1.7 billion), transportation equipment (\$1.4 billion). *Major suppliers*—Middle East, Japan, US.

Official exchange rate (October 1983): About 780 won=US\$1.

Fiscal year: Calendar year.

Membership in International Organizations

Official observer status at UN; active in many UN specialized agencies (FAO, GATT, IAEA, IBRD, ICAO, IDA, IFC, ICO, IMF, ITU, UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO) and other international organizations (Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee, Asian People's Anti-Communist League, World Anti-Communist League, Colombo Plan, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, Geneva Conventions of 1949 for the Protection of War Victims, Asian Development Bank, INTELSAT, International Whaling Commission, Interparliamentary Union, INTERPOL); official observer status in African Development Bank and Organization of American States.



GEOGRAPHY

The Republic of Korea (South Korea) occupies the southern portion of a mountainous peninsula, about 966 kilometers (600 mi.) long and 217 kilometers (135 mi.) wide, projecting southeast from China and separating the Sea of Japan from the Yellow Sea (known in Korea as, respectively, the East Sea and West Sea). Japan lies about 193 kilometers (120 mi.) east of Pusan across the Sea of Japan. The most rugged areas are the mountainous east coast and central interior. Good harbors are found only on the western and southern coasts.

South Korea's only land boundary is with North Korea, formed by the Military Demarcation Line (MDL) marking the line of separation between the belligerent sides at the close of the Korean war. The Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) extends for 2,000 meters (just over 1 mi.) on either side of the MDL. The North and South Korean Governments both hold that the MDL is not a permanent border but a temporary administrative line.

Seoul, the capital, is less than 48 kilometers (30 mi.) from the DMZ, near the west coast. Seoul's climate is hot and rainy in summer; winters are cold, dry, and windy, with generally light snowfall; mean January temperature is 5°C (23°F). Fall is traditionally Koreans' favorite season, with warm days, cool nights, and clear skies; such weather often lasts into mid-December.

PEOPLE

Korea was first populated by a Tungusic branch of the Ural-Altaic family, which migrated to the peninsula from the northwestern regions of Asia. Some of these peoples also settled parts of northeast China (Manchuria), and Koreans and Manchurians still show physical similarities—in their height, for example. The Korean people are racially and linguistically homogeneous, with no indigenous minorities.

South Korea's major population centers are mostly in the Seoul-Inchon area of the northwest and in the fertile plains in the south. The mountainous central and eastern areas are sparsely inhabited. Between 1925 and 1940, the Japanese colonial administration in Korea concentrated its industrial development efforts in the comparatively underpopulated and resource-rich north, resulting in a considerable movement of people northward from the agrarian southern provinces. This trend was reversed after World War II, when

more than 2 million Koreans moved from the north to the south following the division of the peninsula into U.S. and Soviet military zones of administration. This southward migration continued after the establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948 and during the Korean war (1950–53). About 10% of the people in the Republic of Korea are of northern origin. With about 40 million people, South Korea has one of the world's highest population densities—much higher, for example, than India or Japan. North Korea has about 19 million people and a substantially lower population density. Expatriate Koreans live mostly in China (1.2 million), Japan (600,000), the United States (500,000), and the Soviet Union.

Language

Korean is a Uralic language, remotely related to Japanese, Mongolian, Hungarian, and Finnish. Although there are dialects, the Korean spoken throughout the peninsula is mutually comprehensible. Chinese characters were used to write Korean before the in-

vention of the Korean Hangul alphabet in the 15th century. These characters are still in limited use in South Korea; North Korea uses Hangul exclusively. Many older people retain some knowledge of Japanese from the colonial period (1910–45), and most educated Koreans can at least read English, which is taught in all secondary schools.

Religion

Korea's traditional religions are Buddhism and Shamanism. Buddhism has declined in influence from the heights it reached in the Koryo dynasty (A.D. 935–1292) but still commands the greatest number of adherents of any faith—about 16% of the population. Shamanism, the traditional spirit worship, is still widely practiced in rural areas. Although Confucianism remains the dominant cultural influence, its religious adherents are few and mostly elderly. Christian missionaries arrived in Korea in the 19th century and founded schools, hospitals, and other modern institutions throughout Korea. Today about 4 million Koreans, or 10% of the

Further Information

These titles are provided as a general indication of material published on this country. The Department of State does not endorse unofficial publications.

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For information on economic trends, commercial development, production, trade regulations, and tariff rates, contact the International Trade Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, Washington, D.C. 20230.

population, are Christian (about 75% Protestant)—the largest figure for any East Asian country except the Philippines.

HISTORY

According to legend, the god-king Tangun founded the Korean nation in 2333 B.C., after which his descendants reigned over a peaceful kingdom for more than a millennium. By the first century A.D., the Korean Peninsula, known as Chosun ("morning calm"), was divided into the kingdoms of Silla, Koguryo, and Paekche. In A.D. 668, the peninsula was unified under the Silla kingdom, rulership of which was taken over in 918 by the Koryo dynasty (from which is derived the name "Korea"). The Yi dynasty, which supplanted Koryo in 1392, lasted until the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910.

Throughout most of its history, Korea has been invaded, influenced, and fought over by its larger neighbors. Major Japanese invasions occurred in 1592 and 1597, and the Chinese attacked in 1627. To protect themselves from such constant buffeting, the Yi kings finally adopted a closed-door policy, which earned Korea the title of "Hermit Kingdom." Though the Yis showed nominal fealty to the Chinese throne, Korea was in fact independent until the late 19th century, when Japanese influence became predominant.

In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Japanese, Chinese, and Russian competition in Northeast Asia led to armed conflict. Having defeated its two competitors, Japan established dominance in Korea, annexing it in 1910. The Japanese colonial era was characterized by almost total control from Tokyo and by ruthless efforts to replace the Korean language and culture with those of the colonial power.

As World War II neared an end, the United States and the USSR agreed at Yalta that Japanese forces in Korea would surrender to the United States south of the 38th parallel and to the Soviet Union north of that line. This division of Korea was intended as a temporary administrative measure only. However, in 1946-47, the Soviet administration in the North refused to allow free consultations with representatives of all groups of the Korean people for the purpose of establishing a national government, and the United States and the Soviet Union subsequently were unable to reach agreement on a unification formula.

Korean Conflict

In the face of communist refusal to comply with the UN General Assembly resolution of November 1947 calling for UN-supervised elections throughout Korea, elections were carried out under UN observation in the U.S. zone of occupation, and on August 15, 1948, the Republic of Korea (ROK) was established there. The Republic's first president was the prominent Korean nationalist, Syngman Rhee. In September 1948, the Soviet Union established the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) in the North under Kim Il Sung, a former guerrilla, who by some accounts served during World War II as a Soviet army major. Although Kim claimed authority over the entire peninsula, the UN General Assembly, on December 12, 1948, declared the ROK to be the only lawful government in Korea.

The United States withdrew its military forces from Korea in 1949. On June 25, 1950, North Korean forces invaded the Republic of Korea. In response, the UN, in accordance with the terms of its charter, engaged in its first collective action through the establishment of the UN Command (UNC), to which 16 member nations sent troops and assistance. At the request of the UN Secretary General, this international effort was led by the United States, which contributed the largest contingent. The UN forces initially succeeded in advancing nearly to the Yalu River, which divides the Korean Peninsula from China, but there large numbers of "people's volunteers" from the army of the People's Republic of China joined the North Korean forces. In December 1950, a major Chinese attack forced UN troops to withdraw southward. The battle line then fluctuated up and down the peninsula until the late spring of 1951, when it stabilized north of Seoul near the 38th parallel.

Armistice negotiations began in July 1951, but hostilities continued until July 27, 1953, when, at the village of Panmunjom, the military commanders of the DPRK forces, the Chinese people's volunteers, and the UNC signed an armistice agreement. Neither the United States nor the ROK is a signatory of the armistice per se, though both adhere to it through the UNC. No comprehensive peace agreement has ever replaced the 1953 armistice agreement, which remains in force. A Military Armistice Commission, composed of 10 members, 5 appointed by each side, is empowered to supervise implementation of the terms of the armistice.

The armistice called for an international conference to find a political solu-

tion to the problem of Korea's division. This conference met at Geneva in April 1954 but, after 7 weeks of futile debate, ended inconclusively.

Postwar Developments

Syngman Rhee served as president of the Republic of Korea until April 1960, when university students and others, rioting in protest against irregularities in the presidential election of that year, forced him to step down. A caretaker government was established, the constitution was amended, and in June national elections were held. The opposition Democratic Party easily defeated Rhee's Liberals, and in August the new National Assembly named Chang Myon prime minister. Chang's politically democratic but administratively ineffectual government, the Second Republic, lasted until May 1961, when it was overthrown in an army coup led by Major General Park Chung Hee.

After 2 years of military government under General Park, civilian rule was restored with the advent of the Third Republic in 1963. Park, who had retired from the army, was elected president (he was reelected in 1967, 1971, and 1978). In 1972, a popular referendum approved the Yushin ("revitalizing") Constitution, which greatly strengthened the executive branch's powers. Key provisions included indirect election of the president, presidential appointment of one-third of the National Assembly, and presidential authority to issue decrees to restrict civil liberties in times of national emergency. Park subsequently issued several such decrees, the best-known of which, EM-9, banned discussion of false rumors, criticism of the constitution or advocacy of its reform, and political demonstrations by students.

The Park era, marked by rapid industrialization and extraordinary economic growth and modernization, ended with the President's assassination in October 1979. Prime Minister Choi Kyu Ha assumed the presidency, as required by the constitution; his administration became the Fourth Republic. Choi immediately declared martial law to prevent disturbances in the confusion and uncertainty that marked the aftermath of the presidential assassination. The United States promptly reiterated its guarantee of the ROK's national security, lest North Korea try to take advantage of potential instability.

President Choi promised to hold early presidential elections and adopt a new constitution, but, by the late spring of 1980, he faced increasing demonstrations by campus activists and others. In

mid-May, tens of thousands of students took to the streets of the capital; the government responded by intensifying martial law. Universities were closed, many political leaders and dissidents were arrested, and political activity was prohibited. When demonstrations continued in the city of Kwangju, army special forces units stationed nearby moved into the city. Excesses by these units sparked reaction by civilians, with casualties on both sides. By Korean official estimates, 170 persons died in these clashes; unofficial sources give substantially higher figures. The special forces units were withdrawn from Kwangju, and several days later, other army units restored central government authority in a surprise operation marked by minimal bloodshed. This confrontation between citizens and troops, the only such incident in modern Korean history, left a wound that has proven slow to heal. For many Koreans, the Kwangju incident evoked a mixed reaction of sorrow over the bloodshed and fear that domestic chaos might tempt North Korea to invade.

The political struggles that followed Park's death were matched by a struggle for leadership within the army. In December 1979, Major General Chun Doo Hwan began to expand his power, removing the army chief of staff. The following April, he assumed the directorship of the principal national security service, the KCIA. Chun retired from the army in the summer of 1980, after being promoted to four-star general. In September, under the procedures prescribed in the Yushin Constitution, he was named president by unanimous vote of the national electoral college.

In an October 1980 referendum, a new constitution was adopted, marking the beginning of the Fifth Republic. While retaining key features of earlier constitutions, including a strong executive and indirect election of the president, the new constitution also limited the president to a single 7-year term. In early 1981, elections were held under the new constitution for a National Assembly and an electoral college; the latter elected President Chun to a 7-year term beginning in March of that year.

With the adoption of the constitution, governmental power was consolidated and stability gradually restored. Although martial law ended in January 1981, the government, under laws enacted during the martial law period, retained broad legal powers to control dissent. An active and articulate minority of students, intellectuals, clergy, and others have remained critical of the Chun government and from time to time have organized demonstrations

against it, but these actions have not had a major impact on the country's social and political stability.

Since the end of martial law, the government has pursued policies emphasizing social welfare, clean government, and "national reconciliation"—reduction of tensions between the government and its critics. It has purged a number of inefficient and dishonest officials and has relaxed rules on a broad range of subjects including military service, university admissions, foreign study and travel, and the national curfew. It has freed or reduced the sentences of more than 8,000 prisoners, including about 420 who had been detained for political reasons. The most prominent of the latter was opposition leader and former presidential candidate Kim Dae Jung, who was freed at Christmas 1982.

The government has taken other liberalizing steps as well, including the restoration of civil, political, and employment rights to some of its opponents. The National Assembly has gained gradually in assertiveness, although power remains concentrated in the presidency. President Chun, who is barred from succeeding himself, has pledged to hand over power to a successor when his term ends in 1988.

Principal Government Officials (October 14, 1983)

President—**Chun Doo Hwan**
Prime Minister—**Chin Eui Jong**
Deputy Prime Minister; Chairman,
Economic Planning Board—**Shin**
Byung Hyun
Minister of Foreign Affairs—**Lee Won**
Kyong
Minister of National Defense—**Yoon**
Sung Min
Ambassador to the United States—**Lew**
Byong Hion
Ambassador to the UN—**Kim Kyong**
Won
Speaker of the National Assembly—
Chae Mun Schick

The Korean Embassy in the United States is at 2320 Massachusetts Avenue NW., Washington, D.C. 20008 (tel. 202-483-7383; information office, 202-483-6892).

ECONOMY

The Republic of Korea's economic growth over the past 20 years has been spectacular. The nation has advanced in a single generation from being one of the world's poorest countries to the

threshold of full industrialization, despite the need to maintain one of the world's largest military establishments. Lacking natural resources, Korea has relied instead on its greatest asset, its industrious, literate people.

The division of the Korean Peninsula in 1945 created two distorted economic units. North Korea inherited most of the mineral and hydroelectric resources and most of the existing heavy industrial base built by the Japanese. The south was left with a large, unskilled labor pool and the majority of the peninsula's agricultural resources. Although both the North and South suffered from the widespread destruction caused by the Korean war, an influx of refugees added to the South's already burdensome economic woes. For these reasons, the ROK began the postwar period with a per capita gross national product (GNP) far below that of the North.

The ROK's meager mineral resources include tungsten, anthracite coal, iron ore, limestone, kaolinite, and graphite. There is no oil, and energy is a concern for government economic planners. The country has embarked on an ambitious program to build nuclear power plants; the first of these went into operation in 1978, and eight more are under construction or on order.

The ROK was self-sufficient in rice production in 1977, but rising demand and several disappointing harvests have since made it a net importer. Korea is the fourth largest market for U.S. agricultural products and one of our 10 largest trading partners—a marked change from a decade ago, when South Korea was a major recipient of U.S. foreign assistance (U.S. direct aid programs in Korea ended in 1980).

The nation's successful program of industrial growth began in the early 1960s, when the Park government instituted sweeping economic reforms, emphasizing exports and labor-intensive light industries. The government also carried out a currency reform, strengthened financial institutions, and introduced flexible economic planning.

From 1963 to 1978, real GNP rose at an annual rate of nearly 10%, with average real growth of more than 11% for the years 1973-78. While Korea's national production was rising throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the annual population growth rate declined to the current 1.6%, resulting in a 20-fold increase in per capita GNP in those two decades. Per capita GNP, which reached \$100 for the first time in 1963, now approaches \$2,000, far above that of North Korea.

Internal economic distortions, the political and social unrest that followed

the 1979 assassination of President Park, and the effect of world economic developments such as the drastic increase in world oil prices in 1979 triggered a severe recession in Korea in 1980. The economy recovered somewhat in the following 2 years, but it was not until the spring of 1983 and the strengthening of economic recovery in the United States that Korean economic performance began to take on the buoyancy of earlier days. Korea's economic planners have shifted their emphasis from high to stable growth; moreover, the economy is maturing. Double-digit growth will probably never be repeated, but long-term growth prospects remain extremely bright.

The continuing military threat from the North and the lack of foreign economic assistance require Korea to devote a third of its national budget to defense. In the face of the North Korean military buildup, Korea must continue these large defense expenditures while maintaining economic growth.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

South Korea is committed to the principle of peaceful settlement of international differences, a commitment best illustrated by its restrained response to a number of armed provocations over the past 15 years. These include the 1968

Blue House raid, the shooting down in September 1983 of a Korean Air Lines airliner by Soviet fighters, and the October 9, 1983 terrorist bombing in Rangoon, Burma, which killed six of the ROK's most valued leaders.

South Korea has cast its lot with the West and the noncommunist world. It is active in international affairs and seeks to enhance its already impressive stature in the world community. Although not a member of the UN, South Korea keeps an observer mission, headed by an ambassador, at the UN General Assembly and participates actively in the work of many of the UN's specialized agencies.

Following the ratification in 1965 of a treaty normalizing relations between Japan and Korea, the two nations have developed an extensive relationship centering on mutually beneficial economic activity. Although the two countries' historic antipathy has at times impeded cooperation, relations at the government level have improved steadily and significantly in the past several years.

Korea's economic growth, energy requirements, and need for basic raw materials and for markets have given economic considerations high priority in the country's foreign policy. In light of these concerns, Korean diplomacy in recent years has concentrated on broadening its international base of support

within the Third World, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Middle East.

A recurrent theme in all phases of Korea's foreign relations is its perennial competition with the DPRK for world stature and recognition. In this effort, the ROK has been highly successful: while most countries recognize the reality of two Koreas, more maintain diplomatic relations with the ROK than the DPRK (117 versus 106, with 69 countries having relations with both). The South's network of international trading relationships is broader than the North's, and South Korea has been selected to host a series of prestigious international events, including the 1983 Interparliamentary Union conference, the 1984 International Monetary Fund and World Bank annual conference, the 1986 Asian Games, and the 1988 Summer Olympics (to be held in Seoul).

NEGOTIATING EFFORTS WITH NORTH KOREA

Throughout the postwar period, both Korean Governments have repeatedly affirmed their desire for reunification of the Korean Peninsula, but no direct communication or any other contacts took place between the two governments or their citizens except through the Military Armistice Commission, until 1971.

In August 1971, the DPRK and the ROK agreed to hold talks through their respective Red Cross societies with the stated aim of reuniting the many Korean families separated during the Korean conflict. Following a secret meeting on July 4, 1972, North and South Korea announced an agreement to work toward national reunification through peaceful means and to end the atmosphere of hostility that had formerly prevailed. Although officials exchanged visits, and regular communications were established through a North-South Coordinating Committee and the Red Cross, no substantive progress was made. The contacts quickly broke down and were finally terminated by the North. The breakdown of the talks reflected irresolvable differences, with Pyongyang insisting that immediate steps toward reunification be taken before discussion of specific issues and Seoul maintaining that, given the two sides' history of violence, any realistic approach to reunification must be a gradual, step-by-step process. The U.S. Government

Travel Notes

Customs: All travelers entering the ROK must have a visa, which may be obtained from a Korean Consulate. Tourist visas are good for 60 days. No immunizations are required of travelers from the US.

Transportation: International airports serve Seoul (Kimpo), Pusan (Kimhae), and Cheju Island. Extensive intercity air, rail, and bus service is available, as is an excellent network of local bus, taxi, and (in Seoul) subway services.

Telecommunications: Seoul is 14 time zones ahead of eastern standard time (13 hrs. during daylight-saving time). International direct-dial service is available to Korea's major cities. Internal telephone and telegraph services are good and are rapidly being modernized and upgraded.

Health: Health services are fair to good in most major cities. Many Korean physicians have been trained in Western medicine, and hospital services are adequate. Outside of the major hotels, water generally is not safe to drink.

Climate and clothing: Korea's temperate, four-season climate is like that of the eastern

US. People dress more conservatively than in the US.

Scenic attractions: The Yi dynasty palaces in Seoul—Kyongbok, Changdok, and Toksu—are recommended, as are the National Museum of Korea and the Korean Folk Museum. The folk village at Suwon, located less than an hour's drive from Seoul, is a fine example of a "living museum." Sorok Mountain and Cheju Island are popular scenic attractions, while Pusan and Masan are examples of a modern Korean port and industrial site. The southeastern city of Kyongju has many fine antiquities. English is widely spoken at major tourist sites and facilities in the principal cities; in other areas, English speakers may be less readily found.

Principal holidays: Businesses and the US Embassy may be closed on the following holidays—National Day (Independence Day), August 15; New Year, January 1-3; Foundation Day (commemorating the founding of the nation by the god-king Tangun), October 3; Hangul Day (commemorating the creation of the Korean alphabet in 1446), October 9; Chusok (harvest moon festival), date varies, usually in August or September.

shares the ROK Government's view on this important point.

Despite these setbacks, President Chun has repeatedly suggested a summit meeting with President Kim of North Korea to discuss any and all proposals; an agreement to normalize inter-Korean relations pending reunification; and other specific measures to reduce tensions and promote humanitarian and cultural exchanges. In his January 1982 proposals, President Chun for the first time addressed the central political issue. He proposed that the North and South organize a conference to draft a constitution for a unified democratic Korean republic. The ROK intends to present draft constitution and urges the North to do likewise. The ROK maintains that a dialogue should be based on de facto recognition of each other's existing political, social, and economic systems. Seoul supports the recognition of both Koreas by the major powers in the region (the United States, USSR, China, and Japan), and the admission of both Koreas to the UN, pending peaceful reunification. North Korea rejects these ideas and continues to insist on preconditions to any dialogue with the ROK—removal of President Chun and withdrawal of U.S. troops.

U.S.-KOREAN RELATIONS

The United States remains committed, as it has for the past 30 years, to maintaining peace on the Korean Peninsula—a commitment vital to the peace and stability of the entire Northeast Asian region. The United States agreed in the 1954 Mutual Security Treaty to help the Republic of Korea defend itself from external aggression. In support of that commitment, the United States maintains about 39,000 troops in Korea, including the Second Infantry Division and several Air Force tactical squadrons. To coordinate operations between these units and the 600,000-strong

Korean Armed Forces, a Combined Forces Command (CFC) has been established, headed by a U.S. four-star general who serves concurrently as Commander in Chief of the UN Command (CINCUNC). These U.S. forces effectively supplement the Korean people's ongoing and successful effort to deter aggression.

On Korean reunification, the United States believes that direct, government-to-government talks between the authorities of South and North Korea are necessary and that steps to promote greater understanding and reduce tension are needed to pave the way for reunifying the Korean nation. Because the United States believes that the fundamental decisions on the future of the Korean Peninsula must be taken by the Korean people themselves, it has refused to be drawn into separate negotiations with North Korea, as Pyongyang has suggested, on replacing the armistice agreement with a peace treaty. The United States stands prepared to participate in any discussions between the representatives of North and South Korea, if so desired by the two Korean governments and provided that both are full and equal participants in such talks.

Perhaps the most rapidly developing area in Korean-American relations is that of economics and trade. In 1982, Korea was the United States' ninth largest commercial partner, with a roughly balanced bilateral trade volume of nearly \$12 billion. The United States seeks further expansion of that trade, as well as Korea's support in the global battle against protectionism, greater access to Korea's expanding market, and improved investment opportunities for U.S. business. Korean leaders seem determined to manage successfully the complex economic relationship, and there appears to be widespread recognition in Korea of the benefits to be gained from greater U.S. private sector involvement in the country's development process.

Since the 1950s, the U.S. relationship with the Republic of Korea has developed into one of our most important in Asia. The celebration in May

1982 of the centennial of Korean-American diplomatic relations and President Reagan's scheduled visit to Korea in the fall of 1983 underscore the special quality of U.S.-Korean relations and the determination of both governments to further develop that relationship.

Principal U.S. Officials

Ambassador—Richard L. Walker
CINCUNC—Gen. Robert W. Sennewald
Deputy Chief of Mission—Paul M. Cleveland
Counselor for Political Affairs—Thomas P.H. Dunlop
Counselor for Economic Affairs—Walter A. Lundy, Jr.
Counselor for Administrative Affairs—Gerald E. Manderscheid
Counselor for Public Affairs—Bernard J. Lavin
Consul General—Kenneth C. Keller
Counselor for Commercial Affairs—Norman D. Glick
Chief, Joint U.S. Military Advisory Group, Korea—Gen. Hugh Quinn

For subsequent personnel changes, consult *Key Officers of Foreign Service Posts*.

The U.S. Embassy is located at 82 Sejong-Ro, Chongro-ku, Seoul (tel. 722-2601; telex AMEMB 23108). The mailing address is: American Embassy, APO San Francisco 96301. ■

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~~(U)~~ SOUTH KOREA: FOREIGN POLICY^{1/}

~~(S/NF)~~ Summary



BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

The primary foreign policy goals of the Republic of Korea (ROK) are to rely on its own military might and close ties with the US to deter aggression from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), to increase the ROK's international prestige and influence vis-a-vis the DPRK, and to continue the South Korean economic miracle by promoting the export of goods and labor. Impressive records have been achieved in each of these areas, and future prospects are good, barring an outbreak of increased tensions or conflict on the Korean Peninsula.

South Korean efforts to broaden contacts with the USSR suffered a serious setback with Moscow's shutdown of Korean Airlines flight 007 on September 1 and the subsequent Soviet decision not to attend the Interparliamentary Union (IPU) conference in Seoul last October. The consequences for ROK-China ties as a result of the assassinations in Rangoon remain uncertain. It is also unclear whether the ROK in the wake of the two tragedies will attempt to revive its efforts with Moscow and Beijing in the near future. But South Korea will persist in its general objective of isolating North Korea and to this end eventually will renew efforts to wean both Moscow and Beijing away from strong support for Pyongyang.

* * * * *

^{1/} See also INR Report 739-AR, "North-South Korean Relations: The Prospects for Reunification" (~~SECRET~~/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT), December 19, 1983.

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United States

(U) Because of its vital security interests, the ROK will continue to put primary emphasis on its bilateral relationship with the US. Foreign military sales (FMS)--although a continuing irritant to the ROK because of the practice of some Members of Congress of using FMS renewal to attack Seoul's human rights record--are important to Seoul as an indicator of the US commitment. ROK defense authorities have sought US assurance of favorable terms for the long range.

(C) More general dependence on the US for markets and political tutelage has created a potential backlash in ROK domestic politics. Perceived US support of President Chun's regime and the US economic presence have caused flareups of anti-American sentiments four times in the last three years in the form of student demonstrations and attacks on US Cultural Centers such as Taegu. The ubiquity of US facilities in South Korea makes the US presence an obvious target. ROK Government policy under all of the postwar regimes consistently has emphasized the bilateral ties, however, and US influence will continue to shape both ROK domestic and foreign policy.

(S/NF) The ROK Government nonetheless will act independently from US policy in pursuit of what it deems its best interests.

South Korea refused the US request to participate in the multinational force (MNF) in Lebanon in 1982. ROK interests in good relations with Arab governments for political reasons as well as to support construction contracts and arms sales seem to dictate a more pro-Arab policy than that of the US.

USSR

(U) "Nordpolitik" is the term used by the late Foreign Minister Lee to liken his efforts to wider contacts with the USSR and its client states to the Ostpolitik of Willy Brandt. The policy began with initiatives taken by President Park in the mid-1970s and has been developed by President Chun and Foreign Minister Lee. The US has supported Nordpolitik since 1975 when Secretary of State Kissinger endorsed a proposal for "cross-recognition" (Soviet recognition of South Korea in exchange for US recognition of the North). Later, Seoul proposed Japanese recognition of Pyongyang in exchange for Chinese recognition of Seoul.

~~(S/NF)~~ Nordpolitik seems to be eclipsed for the present by the KAL shutdown, and ROK policy to seek contacts with the USSR may be thwarted for some time. Even after the incident, Seoul was willing to continue contacts but, by refusing to attend the IPU, the Soviets indicated that they would not reciprocate. Interestingly, they cited the hostility of the Korean population over the airline incident rather than ROK policy as their reason for staying away, implying that expanded relations might be possible in the future. The ROK Government has indicated that popular criticism of its initial restrained reaction to the shutdown is responsible for the present standdown in Nordpolitik.

~~(C)~~ The KAL shutdown had the secondary effect of permitting ROK diplomats to deepen contacts with a number of nonaligned nations in such international fora as the UN and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) where the incident was debated. The shutdown was an entrée for international concern and support. Although the issue was viewed by many countries as a bilateral conflict between the US and the USSR, involvement of the KAL airliner meant that ROK national interests also were concerned. Thus, although a tragedy for South Korea, the incident has elicited international sympathy which may be beneficial to the ROK's expanding diplomatic ties.

China

~~(S/NF)~~ Beijing currently seems receptive to broader contacts with the ROK, something Seoul strongly desires. While the Chinese continue publicly to endorse North Korean positions on reunification and withdrawal of US troops, they recently have made ~~_____~~ contacts with the ROK involving such issues as trade and the return of hijacked or defector aircraft. The Chinese seem to be interested in South Korean development strategies. Chinese officials have informed Seoul through intermediaries that ROK officials would be welcomed at UN-sponsored conferences in China. Some officials already have been issued visas for such conferences.

~~(C)~~ China will be constrained in its relations with the ROK by its desire to maintain good relations with Pyongyang. Chinese endorsement of Kim Chong-il as successor to his father, President Kim Il-sung, was an important gesture and, together with increased aid, may have given Beijing some additional scope for unofficial or clandestine contacts with South Korea. It is uncertain what effect the Rangoon bombing will have on Beijing's budding ties with the South or its links with the North.

Japan

~~(U)~~ ROK-Japan relations reached a high point when Prime Minister Nakasone traveled to Seoul to meet with President Chun in

January 1983. Before then, relations had been strained by several factors: controversy over revision of Japanese history textbooks dealing with the period when Korea was a colony of Japan, the ROK kidnapping from Japan of Korean opposition leader Kim Dae Jung in 1973, and differences over the terms of a Japanese aid package. Relations have been much improved by agreement on a \$4 billion loan program and by Nakasone's skillful personal diplomacy. Under the aid program, Japan will be involved in capital construction projects over the next seven years, a fact that should enhance prospects for generally good working relations, although occasional disagreements can be expected.

(C) Japan's active role in pressuring the Soviets over the KAL shutdown further improved the bilateral relationship, and Japan's sanctions against Pyongyang following the Rangoon incident could lead to a worsening of Japan's informal ties with the DPRK. Problems, however, could arise in Japan-ROK relations over Tokyo's relations with North Korea. Another potential problem is the Korean minority in Japan, which feels it has second-class status. The Diet's recent revision of immigration laws to allow more Koreans to become citizens should help the situation, but the basic problem of social discrimination is a difficult one that will not soon be solved.

Third World Diplomacy

(B) In its early years, the ROK tended to concentrate on relations with developed countries. Since Park's administration, however, the government has attempted to enhance its international standing and reduce that of the DPRK by influencing Third World regimes through political and economic diplomacy. To some extent, Seoul has been successful in holding the line against further North Korean encroachments on its international stature and even reversing support for the DPRK in some instances. For example, at the nonaligned summit in New Delhi last spring, a North Korean anti-ROK resolution was opposed by a number of delegations and had to be watered down to get through the plenary session. ROK-Third World diplomacy is part of a long, slow process of seeking to establish international legitimacy.

(C) Besides seeking to extend its influence in such international government-member organizations as the nonaligned movement and the UN (where the ROK like the DPRK has observer status), Seoul has used other avenues to build international influence. In 1982, it succeeded in being named as the venue of the IPU October 1983 meeting. Following the KAL shutdown, however, the Soviets and East Europeans decided not to attend. Whether this will have long-term deleterious effects on South Korea's international stature remains to be seen, but it at least temporarily set back ROK plans to develop a reputation for hosting international

meetings where countries of all political persuasions were welcomed. Seoul plans to host the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympics with the hope of participation by as many countries as possible, including the USSR and China.


~~(C)~~ Association of Southeast Asian Nations

President Chun visited ASEAN nations in 1981 in his second trip abroad as President (the first was to the US). ASEAN states generally have been more supportive of the ROK than have other Third World nations, partly because ASEAN's strategic position in Asia resembles that of the ROK and partly because of the growing economic strength of South Korea. The ASEAN states also have been relatively receptive to ROK economic overtures because South Korea represents an alternative to Japan in some fields.

Although Japanese firms still dominate Southeast Asian markets and provide the major share of investment, the Koreans can substitute for Japanese participation in low-technology joint ventures and increasingly will challenge the Japanese on the higher end of the technology scale. South Korea already has developed an indigenous microelectronics industry, and Korean researchers have designed a practical 64K RAM computer chip.

Middle East

~~(S/NF)~~ South Korea's Mideast policy is designed to expand its influence in that region. The Chun regime has shown lively interest in arms sales to a number of countries, including Iran, Iraq, and Jordan.



Until 1981, Baghdad was more friendly to North Korea because of ideological ties, but following the growth of DPRK arms exports to Iran, Baghdad cut off relations and made overtures to Seoul.

~~(C)~~ The Mideast also has been an arena for South Korean economic activity for several years since ROK construction firms began to win large contracts in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Libya in the late 1970s. Saudi Arabia is phasing out the Korean firms in favor of its own, but Lebanon may provide some opportunities when the conflict eases and reconstruction begins. Libya remains a fertile field for construction activity, despite its growing ties with North Korea (Qadhafi signed a treaty of alliance in Pyongyang last year. Earlier this year, a South Korean firm won a major irrigation project contract to develop the agricultural potential of Libya's coastal plains. Libyan military officials, recently visited Seoul to discuss possible arms purchases.

Africa

(U) African countries, generally only a potential market for Korean construction activity and exports, are important to the ROK more for political than economic reasons. Limited export sales have been made, including automobiles, but the low income and large debts of African nations make it difficult for South Korea to make inroads. North Korea has been more successful because of its capacity to offer weapons and training to radical African regimes. There are signs that South Korea has some potential for challenging the DPRK in this and other arenas, however: In some cases the ROK has been willing to offer economic aid in an attempt to outbid the DPRK.

(C) President Chun visited four African countries--Nigeria, Gabon, Senegal, and Kenya--in 1982. There are reports that construction technicians from six African countries are visiting South Korea for technical training and that Korean firms have bid on construction contracts in the Congo, Nigeria, Kenya, Senegal, and other countries.

(C) Korean business persons may be reluctant participants in African development, however; they reportedly have to be urged by the government to invest. South Korea increasingly may be able to overcome DPRK influence in Africa as regimes adopt development strategies that move away from dependence on military support toward a more productive approach based on construction of an economic infrastructure. South Korean firms, with their extensive experience in the Middle East, will be well positioned to move into this area.

(U) Latin America

To some extent, the South Korean presence in Latin America has paralleled that of the US: strong in Western-oriented countries but weaker in the nonaligned or Soviet-oriented countries. South Korea has held the line in most Central American and Caribbean nations--except Cuba, Nicaragua, and Guyana--and has overcome North Korean overtures to leftist South American regimes such as that in Bolivia. Although these countries are remote from Korea, they can provide important markets for South Korean exports and votes in international organizations. South Korea probably will continue to expand its influence in most of Latin America. North Korean influence in leftist Caribbean regimes currently is only of nuisance value.

Prepared by William McPherson, 632-0511

Approved by Louis G. Sarris, 632-1179

NSC-White House

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BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

ASSESSMENTS AND RESEARCH

(U) SOUTH KOREA: THE DOMESTIC SITUATION

Summary

(C) The recent dramatic events involving the Republic of Korea (ROK), while affecting primarily Seoul's international relations, also have impinged on the domestic scene.^{1/} The shutdown of the Korean Airlines 747 and the Rangoon bombing have generated popular emotion which may increase public support of the regime. Memorial services following the two incidents drew enormous crowds in condemnation of Soviet and North Korean atrocities. President Chun seems successfully to have rallied public opinion around himself in his accusations against the ROK's northern neighbors. President Reagan's visit bolstered ROK feelings of security and raised expectations of change in human rights and political development.

(C/NF) Although the mood may not last, the events probably have added an element of stability to the ROK's painful, prolonged, and continuing transition from military to civilian government. The former and active generals leading the Chun government, which has to overcome the legacy of its bloody suppression of the Kwangju riots of 1980, have gradually implemented limited moves toward liberalization. The 1980 Constitution provides a semblance of legitimacy to the government, and there are aspects of democratic opposition in the National Assembly.

(C/NF) But the latter are largely a facade, and the Chun government manipulates the opposition to perpetuate its power. As a result, some of the most effective opposition leaders have been

^{1/} (U) See also INR Report 744-AR, "South Korea: Foreign Policy" (SECRET/NOFORN), December 23, 1983.

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Report 745-AR
December 23, 1983

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hamstrung by political bans or forced exile, and the remaining party leadership is largely ineffectual. Opposition devolves to a few individuals and non-institutional groups, notably students whose potential for disruption of the system remains high. Prospects for a peaceful transition have been enhanced by Chun's firm public commitment to step down in 1988. The possibility is strong, however, that he will choose a successor amenable to continued control from behind the scenes; his brother would be an unpopular choice.

* * * * *

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Origins of the Chun Government

(C) Since 1961, South Korea has been ruled by military governments under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan. Both generals emerged from the political fluidity that followed the overthrow of Syngman Rhee by a student revolution in 1960. ROK military elites have come to regard civilian politics as chaotic and irrational in terms of domestic development and international power. As a result, the opposition under both Park and Chun has been tightly circumscribed and civil liberties have been strictly limited.

(C) During the period of political uncertainty following the 1979 Park assassination, Chun gradually acquired power through his direction of the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency) and support from the defense apparatus. He used this power to suppress demonstrations against the government, notably the bloody 1980 Kwangju riots against the military authorities. By August 1980, Chun had consolidated power, dictated a constitution, and assumed the presidency.

(C/NF) Despite Korea's facade of civilian rule, the Constitution permits Chun to continue military domination of domestic politics. Many of Chun's military colleagues are in positions of power, and the civilian ministers are subject to control from the military, largely through the Defense Security Command. Martial law provisions have been used to suppress opposition, primarily through limits on political activity and press guidelines. Earlier this year, Chun lifted the bans on 250 politicians; there are reports that he will release the restrictions on 300 more soon. But it remains to be seen how much freedom will be allowed. Press guidelines proscribe publication of many articles critical of the regime; for example, the press was prohibited for nearly two weeks in May 1983 from publishing news of dissident leader Kim Young Sam's hunger strike.

(C) Under the Constitution, the National Assembly has legislative powers to initiate policy, but these have been vitiated by the administrative power of veto. The legislature does not have a counterbalancing power to veto administrative policies or to overturn administrative vetoes. A majority of the members both of opposition and of government parties in the National Assembly have called for reforms to give them more power to determine the national budget and other national priorities. But Chun has been reluctant to relinquish power and continues to call for "purification" of politics before power is extended to civilian politicians.

(C/NF) Ironically, the Chun government itself is open to charges of corruption. Although the role of Chun's father-in-law in the Myongdong financial scandal has been hushed up, the first lady's uncle and aunt were convicted of involvement in the illegal operation of the curb market last year. Chun continues to advocate social morality, but his family's implication in these scandals reflects the tendency of Korean elites to take advantage of power for profit and will undermine Chun's legitimacy as a reform leader.

(C) Political and Economic Development

Many Koreans think that progress toward civilian rule is too slow. Even some of Chun's military colleagues seem to feel that he needs to extend more power to the opposition to bring Korea into the modern world. Concern about security vis-a-vis North Korea is always dominant in the military's thinking and tends to make it resistant to reform, but some of the younger officers (particularly graduates from the Korean Military Academy classes of the 1960s) are very much aware of internal pressures to liberalize.

Business leaders are concerned about overregulation of the economy. President Park's emphasis on planning was welcomed at a time of rapid development, but the more mature Korean economy of the 1980s is too large and complex for direct control from above. Chun has tended to retain economic control as firmly as political control. He does, however, make public commitments to both "political" and "economic development," recognizing that Korean politics will have to liberalize along with Korean economics.

Economic development has been the driving force for many social changes that will lead to a more democratic polity. Migration from rural villages to urban employment centers has led to development of a sophisticated electorate. Education is expanding rapidly as businesses seek trained workers. Although the labor movement is relatively docile, it has the potential for organizing popular pressures for change. So far, these pressures have been contained and, except for such notable examples as the Wonpung Textile case, the workers have generally accepted tight political and economic controls as necessary evils.

(C/NF) Opposition

More worrisome to government leaders are the individual and non-institutional forms of opposition, represented primarily by party leaders of the Park era and by students. Former party leaders Kim Dae Jung, Kim Jong Pil, and Kim Young Sam (the "three Kims") are outspoken critics of the government and potential leaders of new opposition parties.

Kim Dae Jung has been exiled to the US; Kim Jong Pil, recently returned from US exile, has been keeping a low profile; but Kim Young Sam remains active in Korea despite government bans. In May, Kim Young Sam began a three-week hunger strike which became a cause célèbre for dissidents. News of the hunger strike was suppressed for nearly two weeks; it was reported only when the National Assembly began to debate Kim's demands. The incident showed that the government does not have complete control over dissident activity. It was forced to hospitalize Kim to prevent his death, and human rights activists impinged on government treatment of the case by publicizing the case abroad.

Although the human rights groups--the churches in particular--are relatively nonviolent and somewhat insulated from government attack, the more violent students have had numerous clashes with the authorities. The 1980 Kwangju riots were led by students, and many demonstrations center on the anniversary observations of those events. In recent years, however, students have begun to focus more on campus issues. Given the pervasive government presence on Korean campuses, student demonstrations inevitably involve political issues, but they are now directed at such policies as the graduation quota. With the easing of this quota, the government has reduced the potential for violence and demonstrated that it can defuse student opposition without major system-wide political concessions.

Prospects for Peaceful Transition

(S/NF) Chun has publicly committed himself to step down in March 1988, the end of his current seven-year term, thus fulfilling a constitutional mandate. Although he probably will leave office on schedule, there is good evidence that he plans to manipulate the opposition and retain power through a designated successor. It is unlikely that the opposition parties will be allowed to develop sufficient power to present an effective challenge in either the National Assembly elections (expected in 1984) or the presidential elections of 1988.

(S/NF) In July 1983, the then presumptive successor, former Home Minister Roh Tae Woo, lost his cabinet post perhaps because of his strong disagreement with Chun over how to handle corrupt activity by Chun's father-in-law. Since then, speculation about an alternative successor has become intense. It is possible that new Home Affairs Minister Chu Young Bock will have that role, but some speculation centers on Chun's brother, Chun Kyung Hwan, head of the powerful New Communities Movement.

(C) The more important question for Korea's future is whether the transition will be peaceful. Twice in 20 years, an unpopular leader was overthrown by violence: Rhee by the 1960

student revolution, and Park by assassination in 1979. Since 1960 no civilian politician has remained in power for more than a year. Many Koreans expect difficulties in meeting expectations for a peaceful transfer at the end of Chun's term, but the chances for a smooth transition are better now than they were in the past. Chun has made some moves toward liberalization. Korea's international reputation has grown with its economic development, and it is hosting three major international meets during the next five years, culminating with the 1988 Olympics.

(C) Most likely Chun will want to demonstrate Korea's maturity through a peaceful transition just prior to the Olympics. The strength of pressures to liberalize, the military's degree of forbearance of democratic reforms, and the extent of tension on the peninsula will determine the possibility of further liberalization.

Prepared by William McPherson
632-0511

Approved by Louis G. Sarris
632-1179

WASHINGTON

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	Mr Delp	PM		632-3565
	Mr Childress		301	395-3576
	Mr Kimmit	301	30	
	Mr Gaston Sigur	302	302	395-6173
	NSC-5			

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REMARKS

For CMT and coordinator. Both the memo and let to Pres Chun would be for Pres. Reagan's signature. W. Knowles.

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Department of State Guidelines July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 2/4/99

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SUBJECT: Emergency Support of the Republic of Korea (U)

(8) In the event of an attack by North Korea on the South, the Republic of Korea (ROK) will require immediate logistical support. To expedite the needed support the Government of the United States and the Government of the Republic of Korea have signed two Memoranda of Agreement (MOA). These MOA's prescribe the procedures for the sale, in a military emergency of:

- (a) the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA);
- (b) U.S. peacetime stocks and war reserve materiel that can be made available to support the ROK's armed forces.

(5) The WRSA agreement (sub-para (a) above) is implemented upon declaration of Defense Condition II by the Commander-in-Chief of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command and a joint determination by the President of the United States and the Republic of Korea that large scale hostilities are underway or are imminent. The second MOA (sub-para (b) above), in addition to meeting the above conditions, requires the submission of an emergency notification to the Congress under the provisions of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act of plans to proceed immediately with sale of such stocks. This notification will be prepared and maintained by the Department of Defense for signature by the President when the emergency occurs. Necessary coordination with other agencies will be accomplished in advance. Implementing instructions, the proposed notification letters, and inter-agency coordination will be completed no later than 31 March 1984. Procedures for implementing both of these MOA should be tested during applicable ROK/U.S. exercises.

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ABRI to President for National Security Affairs

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NLS

MOI-009 #8

NARA, DATE

5/30/02

~~SECRET~~

The Honorable Chun Doo Hwan
President, Republic of Korea
Seoul, Korea

Dear Mr. President:

(S) I was pleased to hear that procedures have been agreed to by our Governments for implementing plans in the event of a military emergency that provide U.S. logistical support of Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces. These agreements include procedures for the transfer of the War Reserve Stocks for Allies (WRSA) and U.S. peacetime stocks and war reserve materiel that can be made available in the event of a military emergency.

(S) The WRSA agreement is implemented upon declaration of Defense Condition II by the Commander-in-Chief of the ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command and determination by you and me, or our successors, that hostilities on the Peninsula are underway or imminent. The second agreement in addition to meeting these same conditions requires me to send an emergency notification to the Congress. To insure this notification is carried out in a timely manner I have instructed the Secretary of Defense to prepare and maintain prepositioned letters that can quickly be dispatched to the Congress as necessary.

(S) I fully support the requirement agreed to in the second MOA for the ROK to develop a program for improving the ROK War Reserve stockpile. I assure you Mr. ~~President~~ ^{President} and the Administration ^{and} fully support this effort and will help in whatever way we can. Enhancing the combat capability of U.S. and allied forces is a matter of high priority for this Administration.

(H) I wish you, your family and the Korean people a happy, healthy, and prosperous New Year.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS M01-009 #9

BY CAJ, NARA, DATE 4/4/02

~~SECRET~~

Hon. Gaston J. Sigur
Special Assistant
The White House
Washington D.C.
U.S.A.

15 Jan. 1984

Dear Sir,

I am writing to express my sincere gratitude to you for your kind letter which, handed to me by your embassy here, has immensely encouraged me.

President Reagan's powerful image is still vivid with us. During his recent visit he has deeply impressed us with his inspiring and persuasive speeches. The message he meant to deliver to us is still very much alive in our memory inducing some earnest discussions in many quiet exchanges of views. In fact, I have met some government officials who, too, are in broad agreement with Mr. Reagan's positions.

It has been most unfortuate that little meaningful developments could have been made in Korea toward democracy primarily due to the attitude of ruling circles - past and present - which tended to discourage such developments under the pretext of promoting economic progress or fighting communist threats. As a matter of fact, however, even the people who are in power themselves must be well aware that the promotion of democratic cause could do very much in driving economic

development as well as fighting communism. This very simple yet very important fact has been disregarded for the mere purpose of strengthening and perpetuation of existing power base.

In 1945, at the end of World War Two, I chose journalism as my career. It was in the full conviction that freedom of expression constitutes the most important foundation of a democratic society. Ever since I had made that determination I have steadfastly dedicated my best efforts to this cause.

I am deeply convinced that as long as a genuine national consensus is secured on a broad basis as the people wholeheartedly participate in the national forum by exercising their right to the freedom of thought and expression, there should be little fear of communist threat from the north. This point, in my view, must be the basic factor in any consideration of our national security. When we would have our national security insured in such way, a really democratic Korea, as a striking instance of repudiating Domino theory, would become a credit to the American stand in this part of the world.


It is my strong belief that this basic and plan ideal of democracy must be pursued by all means because, in the long run, it is the only way that can secure our viability

as a nation. My personal impression is that we have an environment which more or less favorably work toward the realization of this prerequisite of democracy. Once it is realized here, Korea would become to embody an important lesson for the authoritarian military regimes in the non-communist world by proving that a free democratic society which treasures human rights is the best bet in promoting creative and willing participations of its people.

There is little doubt that the U.S. has been an important factor in our economic achievement. If so, why not the same constructive role in this important field. Here in Korea we are optimistic that Mr. Reagan's friendly advices will produce positive responses. Personally I believe his great influence coupled with his gratifying way of persuasion will do much in making our optimism a reality.

Again thanking you for your encouragement,

Very sincerely,



Kee Bong Chang
Former President & Publisher
The Shin-A Ilbo
1 Jung-dong
Seoul, Korea 100

Korea (South) 1984 (1)

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Meese

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 27, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM:

GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT:

Request from Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Korean National Assembly for a Meeting with the President

I see no reason why the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Korean National Assembly should meet with the President.

I have prepared a letter to Mr. Pong for your signature, with a copy to Ed Meese.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letter to Duwan Pong, turning down his request to pay a call on the President.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachment:

Tab A McFarlane ltr to Pong

Tab B Incoming

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Pong:

I, too, recall with great pleasure the dinner at the Blue House on the occasion of President Reagan's visit to your country. It was truly a memorable evening. The hospitality afforded the President and his party by President Chun and the Korean people could not have been exceeded in warmth and grace.

I am delighted to hear that you are planning to visit the United States shortly. Unfortunately, the President is extremely busy these days with commitments of long-standing and will not be able to see you. I know that you will be tied up during your Washington stay with Congressional appointments, but, if you have the time, a member of my staff, Dr. Gaston Sigur, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director of Asian Affairs for the National Security Council, would be most happy to meet with you. Your Embassy in Washington could make the appropriate arrangements for you, I am sure, should you wish.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

The Honorable Duwan Pong
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
National Assembly
Seoul, Korea

cc: Ed Meese

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3011

DUWAN PONG, CHAIRMAN



HYUNUK KIM	KYUNGKOO HUH
WONTAK PARK	PANSUL KIM
SANGCHO SHIN	CHISONG YOO
SEEUNG OH	HANYUL YOO
KUHNHO RHEE	YOONKI LEE
KYUNGSOOK LEE	JONGKI IM
SANGSUN LEE	THOKKYU LIMB
SEIKEE LEE	MANSUP LEE
YOUNGIL LEE	JUNGHOO KOH
JONGCHAN LEE	CHUNG SOO PARK
CHOONKOO LEE	
NAEHIUK JUNG	

JOOBONG KIM, STAFF DIRECTOR

대한민국국회

JAN 25 1984

NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SEOUL, KOREA

Jan. 18, 1984

Honorable Robert C. McFarlane
Special Assistant for National Security
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500
U. S. A.

Dear Mr. McFarlane:

It was such a memorable dinner at the Blue House that we all cherish the beautiful memory of President Reagan's visit to Seoul last December. To my delightfulness he is so well loved by the Korean people.

As Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I am greatly honored to have been granted an audience with His Holiness, the Pope on February 13.

Prior to that I am planning to visit some congressional leaders in Washington, D.C.

But, would it be possible for you to try to arrange for me to see the President for a few minutes at the White House ?

I have also written to Edwin Meese on this. Thank you.

Sincerely yours,

Duwan Pong
Chairman

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