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Collection Name SIGUR, GASTON: FILES

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RBW 9/18/2009

File Folder KOREA 1983 (03/03/1983-04/10/1983)

FOIA

F07-057/1

Box Number 10

WAMPLER

8

ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
76109 MEMO	WILLIAM BREER THRU SHOESMITH TO WOLFOWITZ RE. CALL BY DIR.-GENERAL OF AMERICAN AFFRS. BUREAU	3	3/2/1983	B1
76110 MEMO	SIGUR THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE. SCHEDULE PROPOSAL	1	3/17/1983	B1
76111 MEMO	BREMER TO CLARK RE. REQUEST FOR APPT. W/RR FOR KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER	1	3/16/1983	B1
76112 BIO		2	8/25/1982	B1 B3
76113 PAPER	RE. NORTH KOREA	2	ND	B1
76114 REPORT	RE. SOUTH KOREA	15	4/1/1983	B1 B3
76115 LETTER	WEINBERGER TO CLARK RE. COURTESY CALL [COPY OF DOC. 76104]	1	2/15/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B

Korea
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OF STATE

S/S #

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)
POW 9/18/89

URGENT P 1: 48

MAR 3 PM 1 22
MESSAGE NO.

861

CLASSIFICATION **CONFIDENTIAL**

No. Pages 3

FROM: **William Brear**
(Officer name)

EA/K
(Office symbol)

27717
(Extension)

SITUATION ROOM
5315
(Room number)

MESSAGE DESCRIPTION Briefing memo for Courtesy Call by Park Kun Woo to NSC,
Friday morning.

TO: (Agency)	DELIVER TO:	Extension	Room No.
NSC	Donald Gregg	395-6173	298 OEOB
NSC	Dr. Gaston Sigur	395-4213	302 OEOB

+ NSC/S
[Signature]

MARKS: FOR: CLEARANCE INFORMATION PER REQUEST COMMENT

to LDX's earlier.

S/S Officer:

[Signature]

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Korea 5

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 14, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: GASTON J. SIGUR *GJS*

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings from Republic of Korea
President Chun Doo Hwan

Attached at Tab B is a birthday message to the President from President Chun Doo Hwan of Korea.

The President's letter thanking President Chun for his birthday greetings and a gift of roses is at Tab A.

Text has been approved by speechwriters.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward your memo to the President at Tab I.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I Clark memo to President
Tab A President's ltr to Chun
Tab B Chun's message to President

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Birthday Greetings to You From President Chun
Doo Hwan of Korea

Attached at Tab B is a birthday message to you from President Chun Doo Hwan of the Republic of Korea. President Chun also sent you 2 dozen long-stemmed red roses.

At Tab A is your letter thanking the President.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign your letter at Tab A.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab A Your letter to President Chun
Tab B President Chun's message to you

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. President:

Many thanks for your kind words and your most thoughtful gift of roses (which Mrs. Reagan enjoyed as thoroughly as I) on my birthday.

I am pleased to take this occasion to note with pleasure the strength and amity of the relationship between our countries.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

His Excellency
Chun Doo Hwan
President of the Republic of Korea
Seoul

8303815

EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
WASHINGTON, D. C.

KAM 83/23

February 4, 1983

Sir:

I have the honor to convey the enclosed cable message from His Excellency Chun Doo Hwan, President of the Republic of Korea, addressed to His Excellency Ronald W. Reagan, President of the United States of America.

I would be grateful, Sir, if you would be kind enough to forward the aforementioned to its high destination.

Please accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration.


Chang Hee Roe
Charge d'Affaires a.i.

The Honorable
Kenneth W. Dam
Acting Secretary of State
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

Enclosure: As stated

a

Seoul, Korea
February 4, 1983

HIS EXCELLENCY
RONALD W. REAGAN
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

THE ANNIVERSARY OF YOUR BIRTH AFFORDS ME THE OCCASION OF EARNESTLY ADDING MY OWN PERSONAL WISHES TO THOSE OF YOUR MANY FRIENDS, SUPPORTERS AND ADMIRERS IN AMERICA AND AROUND THE GLOBE.

MY FAMILY JOIN THE KOREAN PEOPLE IN SENDING YOU AND MRS. REAGAN OUR BEST FOR YOUR EXCELLENCY'S HEALTH. MAY DISCOURAGEMENT OF WHATEVER KIND A HEAD OF STATE IS PRONE TO FLEE FAR FROM YOU, LEAVING YOU ABLE TO DEVOTE YOURSELF HAPPILY AND SUCCESSFULLY TO LEADERSHIP WHICH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE AND THE FREEDOM-LOVING PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE WORLD EXPECT FROM YOU.

GOD BLESS YOU, MR. PRESIDENT, AND MAY YOU REAP TRIUMPHANT SUCCESS IN YOUR NOBLE AND STEADFAST ENDEAVORS FOR PEACE, JUSTICE AND PROSPERITY THIS YEAR AND IN THE YEARS AHEAD.

MAY I ADD THAT I WAS MOST IMPRESSED AND GREATLY INSPIRED BY YOUR STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS ON JANUARY 25TH.

CHUN DOO HWAN
PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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	<i>Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>
76110	MEMO	1	3/17/1983	B1
	SIGUR THRU TYSON TO CLARK RE. SCHEDULE PROPOSAL			

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1765

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 17, 1983

SCHEDULE PROPOSAL

TO: WILLIAM K. SADLEIR, DIRECTOR
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS AND SCHEDULING

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

REQUEST: 15-minute courtesy call for Korean Minister
of Foreign Affairs Bum Suk LEE

PURPOSE: To underscore the importance this Administra-
tion attaches to the US-Korean relationship.

BACKGROUND: Foreign Minister Lee is a staunch supporter
of the closest ties between Korea and the
United States, and is one of the key figures
providing foreign policy advice to President
Chun. It is distinctly to our advantage to
enhance the prestige of Foreign Minister Lee.

PREVIOUS PARTICIPATION: None

DATE AND TIME: April 28, 29, May 2, 3.

LOCATION: Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS: Minister Lee, The President, Secretary George
Shultz, William P. Clark, Gaston J. Sigur

OUTLINE OF EVENT: 15-minute courtesy call

REMARKS REQUIRED: Brief talking points by NSC

MEDIA COVERAGE: White House photographer only

RECOMMENDED BY: State

OPPOSED BY: None

PROJECT OFFICER: Gaston J. Sigur

CONFIDENTIAL
Declassify: OADR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Sec.3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
BY NARA rw, DATE 9/18/09

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76111	MEMO BREMER TO CLARK RE. REQUEST FOR APPT. W/RR FOR KOREAN FOREIGN MINISTER	1	3/16/1983	B1

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76112	BIO	2	8/25/1982	B1 B3

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76113	PAPER RE. NORTH KOREA	2	ND	B1

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76114	REPORT RE. SOUTH KOREA	15	4/1/1983	B1 B3

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1983


1860
Sign
Korea

Dear Jim:

Thank you for sending me a copy of the CSIS Contingency Report #10 on Korea. This is a good study and, I believe, deals effectively with the dangerous situation that exists on the Korean Peninsula.

As you know, our Administration is fully committed to the support of our Korean allies. The President, you may recall, put it this way in his recent foreign policy speech to the American Legion, "Our ties with the Republic of Korea remain strong, as troops of our two nations jointly protect that divided land against threatened aggression from the north."

Sincerely,



Robert C. McFarlane
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

Mr. R. James Woolsey
Center for Strategic and
International Studies
Georgetown University
1800 K Street, N.W.
Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20006

mk

National Security Council
The White House

591

Package # 1860

'83 MAR 22 12:27

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>A</u>
Jacque Hill	_____	_____	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	<u>3</u>	_____	<u>D</u>
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____

Wilma Has Copy

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

35

MW

1860

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

March 21, 1983

SIGNED

Bud,

I was sent this report a couple of weeks ago by Seung Hwan Kim, the man who proposed it and who is a former student of mine at G.W. He is, in fact, coming in to discuss it with me on Wednesday, March 23.

I think the paper is a good one and quite sound in dealing with U.S. interests and policy options.


Gaston



Center for Strategic & International Studies Georgetown University
1800 K Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, DC 20006

Telephone 202 887-0200

with the compliments of

R. James Woolsey
Counsel, CSIS, and
Chairman, Contingencies Project

Our latest Contingency Report
is attached. Please let us
know if you have any comments.

Jim Woolsey

3/18

Bud,

Should Gaston Sigur prepare a brief
note back to Jim Woolsey for your
signature?

Yes No

Wilma

Oh, I can do aCR note
 Yes Not Necessary



1860
h

Center for Strategic & International Studies
Georgetown University • Washington DC

CSIS CONTINGENCY REPORT #10

March 10, 1983

**CONTINGENCIES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA:
CONFRONTATION OR PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE?**

This report reflects only the views of its author, Dr. Seung Hwan Kim, CSIS Research Associate, Korean and Northeast Asian Affairs.

The Korean peninsula is a highly inflammable region that a spark could ignite at any moment. North Korean belligerence may increase in the 1980s, depending on internal problems in the two Koreas and the changing strategic environment in Asia. At some point, the Soviet Union may possibly encourage offensive actions by North Korea to further its own interests.

The "worst-case" contingency would be high-intensity military conflict on the peninsula. One course of action open to Pyongyang is an all-out surprise attack to secure or destroy the Seoul area, with the option of seeking negotiations if the chances of liberating the rest of the South appear unfavorable.

An even more likely option for Pyongyang involves modified guerrilla warfare, with the simultaneous infiltration of large commando units into major cities in the South. If the South Korean command structure became paralyzed, Pyongyang could then initiate a major military offensive.

A Korean conflict would pose a grave threat to U.S. interests in Asia and to the security of Japan. U.S. military involvement in the conflict could jeopardize its relations with China and increase the risk of direct military confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets could choose this moment to exacerbate crises elsewhere.

U.S. interests lie in maintaining stability on the Korean peninsula, for which a strong U.S. military presence in Asia and continued close U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) cooperation are vitally important.

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KOREA AND THE MAJOR POWERS IN ASIA

The Korean peninsula is the strategic fulcrum of East Asia, where the interests of four major powers -- the United States, the Soviet Union, China, and Japan -- converge. In the twentieth century, two major Asian wars, the Russo-Japanese War in 1904 and the Korean War in 1950, embroiled East and West in military conflicts concerning Korea. The U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of 1954 and the defense treaty of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the DPRK-USSR treaty in 1961 demonstrate the principal powers' current strategic interests in Korea.

The United States

U.S. policy toward Korea focuses on maintaining a stable strategic and political situation, stressing the prevention of armed conflict between the two Koreas and the avoidance of hegemony by any major power on the peninsula. Conflict in Korea would pose a potentially grave threat to the security of Japan, to regional stability, and to U.S. interests. The presence of U.S. combat forces in South Korea is an important means of preserving stability on the Korean peninsula.

In the wake of rapid changes in the Asian strategic environment following Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s, the United States has not always followed a consistent policy in dealing with South Korea. Nevertheless, the fundamental U.S. goal has remained intact. The Reagan administration stresses the continuing importance of close U.S.-ROK cooperation for regional stability throughout the 1980s.

Japan

Japan shares a common interest with the United States in preserving stability and reducing tension on the Korean peninsula to promote its security and economic interests. Because of its constitutional restrictions and the absence of defense arrangements with either of the two Koreas, however, Japan heavily depends upon the United States for security in Korea. The Japanese leadership is reluctant to see the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

The Soviet Union

Soviet policy toward the Korean peninsula is governed more by concern about Sino-Soviet conflict and rivalry with the United States and Japan than by its bilateral relationship with North Korea. Despite its recent strategic-military offensive in Asia, the Soviet Union has provided only limited logistic and military support to North Korea since the mid-1970s, a posture that, in effect, is conducive to stability on the Korean peninsula. The Moscow leadership may have concluded that Kim Il-sung would not be a reliable client due to his opportunistic stance in the Sino-Soviet dispute.

CONFLICTING POLICIES OF THE TWO KOREAS

Under the influence of the major powers in Asia, South and North Korea each pursue active domestic and foreign policies. Since 1972, the two Koreas have been attempting to work for the reduction of tensions and ultimate reunification without outside interference. Their efforts at dialogue, however, have failed as a result of conflicting policies over the unification issue.

South Korea

The South Korean policy is based upon a "step-by-step" approach toward gradual integration by promoting cultural and economic exchanges during the initial stage and political negotiation at later stages. The position outlined by the South emphasizes greater security and the guarantee of stability as preconditions in the unification process. This concept is reflected in Seoul's military-strategic policy toward the North. South Korea's posture basically is defensive and reactive, stressing deterrence -- prevention of any armed conflict on the Korean peninsula. In effect, Seoul hopes for the recognition of the "two Koreas."

North Korea

Pyongyang, on the other hand, demands dramatic steps aimed at achieving immediate unification. The North Koreans declare that the prerequisites for unification include the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea, the scrapping of South and North Korean defense treaties with third countries, and the replacement of the armistice treaty of 1953 with a peace treaty. From Pyongyang's point of view, the U.S. military presence in Korea presents the main obstacle to unification and the primary threat to its security. As a result, since the mid-1970s, North Korea has sought bilateral talks with Washington, without South Korean participation, to negotiate its demands. The United States has rejected this offer. Instead, Washington has proposed the so-called "cross-recognition formula" -- recognition of the ROK by the USSR and the PRC in return for U.S. recognition of the DPRK -- which Pyongyang categorically rejects.

In South Korea's view, Pyongyang's approach is aimed at weakening the South by loosening its ties with the United States so that the North can unify the peninsula on its own terms. Indeed, over the past decades, North Korea's militant posture has changed little. As Pyongyang adopted a peace offensive toward the South in the early 1970s, it also launched a massive defense buildup. The North has laboriously dug a number of tunnels under the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), apparently to facilitate invasion. In addition, infiltrators have been constantly dispatched to the South.

THE KOREAN BALANCE

Military

At present, North Korea possesses a substantial advantage over the South in overall quantity of military equipment as a result of its intensive defense buildup during the past decade. It now allocates some 15 to 20 percent, perhaps more, of its GNP to military spending. Its 790 thousand-man armed forces (out of a population of 19 million) are highly disciplined. The stockpile of North Korean military equipment in major categories -- armor, artillery, ships, and aircraft -- is estimated to be more than twice that of the South. The North holds a clear military advantage, with offensive capabilities fashioned precisely to the battlefield's tactical contours.

Pressured by these initiatives in the North, South Korea has been expanding its military modernization program since the late 1970s, effecting substantial increases in its military budget (currently 6 percent of the GNP). Its 600 thousand-man armed forces (out of a population of 40 million) are well-trained. The South retains a qualitative advantage in military equipment, including aircraft and ground weapons. These are not sufficient to offset its quantitative disadvantages, however. The military imbalance between the two Koreas seems likely to continue throughout the 1980s.

Economic

South Korea, however, enjoys far more advanced economic and industrial capabilities than the North. In 1981 the South Korean GNP (U.S. \$63 billion) was more than four times that of the North (U.S. \$14 billion), and the total volume of the South's foreign trade was more than ten times that of the North. South Korean technology is far superior to that of the North in almost every field.

Both Koreas are suffering from economic difficulties in the wake of worldwide economic recession. High inflation, worldwide oil shocks, and uncertain supplies of other key raw materials all adversely affect South Korean economic growth and stability. Pyongyang's economic problems appear to be even more serious as a result of heavy defense expenditures, increasing foreign debts (approximately U.S. \$3.5 billion), and lagging technology.

Soviet and Chinese aid is not sufficient to enable North Korea to match South Korean economic and industrial advances. Under such circumstances, the question is "how long, and to what extent, can Pyongyang sustain the level of massive military spending that enable it to retain its advantage over the South?" It will remain one of the most important issues in the 1980s -- as will the following question: "What might the North do if it sees its window of opportunity closing?"

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Seoul -- Vice President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, and Secretary of State George Shultz -- served to confirm the importance of Korea to Washington and, in general U.S. approval of the course Chun Doo Hwan is taking.

Yet the potential for internal instability remains an important and threatening element in Seoul. A large opposition force has developed as a result of strict policies that were adopted as the current leadership consolidated its power; for instance, the imprisonment of political dissidents, the exclusion of dangerous political rivals from the political process, and the suppression of the Kwangju riots. Periodic protests by politicians against Chun's policies and the perennial uneasiness on university campuses reveal the undercurrents of potential unrest. In addition, a power struggle seems to have developed among Chun's political supporters -- his former colleagues from the Korean Military Academy, army leaders, and civilian government officials -- over issues relating to domestic and foreign policies.

Internal political stability in South Korea will depend on the success and duration of President Chun Doo Hwan and his policies. The army continues to be the backbone of the political system, and any decline in army support would immediately threaten the current leadership. Chun's ability to maintain domestic economic stability and fulfill the original political goals set forth since 1980 -- creation of a democratic welfare society, elimination of corruption and irregularities, growing freedom, and a peaceful transition after his seven years as president -- will be key issues. Beginning in the mid-1980s, issues involving the political succession will grow in importance. Will President Chun step down in 1988 as he promised, or will he extend his presidency? What kind of institutional arrangements will be created to make a peaceful transfer of power possible and to maintain internal stability if he decides to retire? Who will succeed him? The answers to these questions will greatly affect the degree of domestic political stability.

The North Koreans have always placed great emphasis on their concept of the favorable time, the so-called "decisive moment." This may occur in the 1980s. Continued unfavorable international economic trends could cause a sharp deterioration in the South Korean domestic economy, particularly high inflation and a decline in the living standard, which would in turn adversely affect internal stability.

At the same time, it is possible that Seoul could be suffering from serious political tensions. In view of the 1988 Seoul Olympic games and the military threat from the North, the South Korean leadership may attempt to extend Chun's term for a few years in order to ensure political stability and security beyond 1988. There is also a significant possibility that Chun will try to make some of his reliable supporters the leaders of the country to secure his policies. Either way, South Korean political leaders are likely to step up efforts to exert their political influence behind the scenes as the designated time for President Chun's retirement approaches. These developments will not only intensify the power struggle among potential leaders in general and Chun's followers in particular, but could also arouse strong popular resistance, possibly leading to internal disturbances. The North Koreans could attempt to exploit such a situation.

An All-Out Attack

The worst case contingency involves the eruption of high-intensity conflict in Korea as a result of a North Korean attack. Broadly speaking, there are two possible options open to the North if it decides to take military action against the South. The first option would be an all-out, surprise attack with numerically superior ground and air capabilities aimed at securing or destroying the Seoul area. Pyongyang would then have the option of seeking negotiations with the United States if the chances of liberating the rest of South Korea appeared to be unfavorable. Given the fact that Seoul is so close -- only 40 kilometers away from the DMZ -- a blitzkrieg appears to be a tempting prospect. Such an attack is most likely to occur if the United States withdraws its ground forces from South Korea as part of its global strategic policy, or if major crises in other parts of the world seriously constrain the U.S. military capability to support the South. In the event of a major East-West crisis in Western Europe and/or the Persian Gulf region, substantial U.S. resources in the Western Pacific may be transferred to those regions, depleting the strategic reserve previously designed to reinforce South Korean defenses in case of a North Korean attack. On the other hand, if stability prevails elsewhere and the U.S. commitment to South Korean defense remains intact, the blitzkrieg contingency is less likely; the combined U.S.-ROK forces could roll back a Northern offensive.

CONSEQUENCES

Open North Korean aggression would provoke a strong South Korean reaction, which could lead to major military confrontation on the Korean peninsula. Conflict in Korea would lead to significant dilemmas for four principal powers in Asia -- the United States, Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.

The United States is bound by the U.S.-ROK mutual defense treaty of 1954 to come to South Korea's defense. However, such action could jeopardize the U.S. relationship with the PRC as well as run the risk of direct U.S.-Soviet military confrontation.

Japan is unlikely to get involved directly in the Korean conflict. The Japanese, however, would be seriously concerned if that conflict touched off regional or global war with the superpowers' participation. The Soviet Union and its proxies may adopt a concerted coercive diplomacy toward Japan to prevent it from supplying logistic support to the United States and South Korea. In particular, U.S. use of military bases in Japan could be an important issue. Nevertheless, Japan cannot tolerate a Communist victory in the conflict.

China would be also caught in a dilemma. Under the Sino-North Korean defense treaty of 1961, Peking has an obligation to provide Pyongyang with military and economic support. But Chinese support for North Korea could inevitably threaten Peking's relations with the United States. Peking would have three possible options in the event of conflict: taking a neutral position with no action, putting external pressure upon Pyongyang to restrict its military action, or supporting North Korea. The most likely course for China is to provide North Korea with limited logistic and military support, while seeking to prevent aggravation of its relations with the United States.

The degree of Soviet involvement will determine the nature of the conflict. Moscow, as in the early 1950s, might value a large-scale conflict in Korea as a means of distracting the United States, exacerbating Sino-U.S. relations, and reinforcing its presence in the region. Yet, the Soviet leaders would be concerned about the possibility that such a situation could embroil the Soviet Union directly in the conflict and create pressure for Japanese remilitarization. Whatever the level of hostilities, the Soviet Union will attempt to obtain maximum strategic benefit from the Korean situation.

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U.S. forces were to become deeply involved in a Korean conflict, the Soviets or their proxies might choose this moment to exacerbate crises elsewhere.

In addition, the United States should seek to restrain North Korean military operations. North Korean logistical routes can be interrupted by blockading major Northern ports; diplomatic pressure should be placed upon the Soviet Union and the PRC to end military support to the DPRK; and collective international economic and political sanctions against Pyongyang should be pursued through multilateral organizations, particularly the United Nations.

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Koreoff

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

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4-1-83

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL JOHN STANFORD
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Korean Minister of
Defense YOON Sung Min

In response to Secretary Weinberger's request (Tab A) for a meeting between the President and Korean Minister of National Defense YOON Sung Min while he is in Washington 14 and 15 April, arrangements have been made for a photo opportunity (5 minutes) for Mr. Yoon with the President on April 14th at 4:30 p.m.

The National Security Council will need briefing materials for the President by Friday, April 8th.

Michael O. Wheeler
Staff Secretary

Attachment:
Tab A Weinberger memo to Clark

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Declassify: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
Sec. 3.4(b), E.O. 12958, as amended
White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2006
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B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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