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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 39054

CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)

REF: A. JCRC BKK MSG, DTG 061250Z JUL 85.
- B. JCRC BKK MSG, DTG 061330Z JUL 85.
- C. CDR JCRC MSG, DTG 051900Z JUN 85, PLUS AMENDMENTS.

1. (C) REF A MESSAGE PROVIDED A SUMMARY OF RESULTS OF THE JCRC/VNOSMP TECHNICAL MEETING HELD IN HANOI ON 3-6 JULY 85. REFERENCE B PROVIDED A LISTING OF 32 INDIVIDUALS ABOUT WHOM THE SRV SIDE PROVIDED NEW INFORMATION (INCLUDING THEIR PLANNED REPATRIATION OF THE REMAINS OF 26 OF THE 32 INDIVIDUALS). THIS MESSAGE PROVIDES DETAILS OF THE MEETING SESSIONS.

2. (C) ATTENDEES: THE U.S. SIDE WAS LED BY JCRC COMMANDER LTC [REDACTED] ALSO IN ATTENDANCE WERE LCDR [REDACTED] FROM JCRC HEADQUARTERS, MR [REDACTED] FROM THE ARMY CENTRAL IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY, AND LTCOL [REDACTED] CW2 [REDACTED] AND MR [REDACTED] ALL FROM THE JCRC LIAISON OFFICE IN BANGKOK. THE SRV SIDE WAS HEADED, AS IN THE PAST, BY MR CU DINH BA. ALSO IN

ATTENDANCE WERE MR NGUYEN CAN, DR VU NGOC THU, MR NGO HOANG, MR NGUYEN THE DANG (NEW), MR PHAM TEO, MR NGUYEN VAN HIEU (NEW), AND MR VU DANG DUNG AS INTERPRETER.

3. (C) AGENDA: TWO REGULAR MEETING SESSIONS TOTALING APPROXIMATELY 4 HOURS WERE HELD ON THE MORNING AND AFTERNOON OF 4 JULY. THE MORNING OF 5 JULY WAS DEVOTED TO CARRYING OUT A PRELIMINARY CRASHSITE SURVEY AT THE SITE (PREVIOUSLY VISITED) OF AN ALLEGED B-52 CRASH LOCATED APPROXIMATELY 15 KM NORTHEAST OF HANOI. THE VNOSMP HOSTED A DINNER FOR THE GROUP ON THE EVENING OF 4 JULY, AND THE U.S. SIDE RECIPROCATED ON THE EVENING OF 5 JULY.

4. (C) MEETING SESSIONS: FOLLOWING INITIAL INTRODUCTIONS ON BOTH SIDES, AND INTRODUCTORY REMARKS BY MR CU DINH BA (WHO NOTED THAT WE WERE MEETING ON THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE), LTC HARVEY PROCEEDED WITH THE PRESENTATION OF THE AGREED-UPON TALKING POINTS (REF C). MR BA PROVIDED RESPONSES TO SEVERAL OF THE TALKING POINTS AS FOLLOWS:

A. LIVE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM: BA AGAIN REPEATED THAT THE SRV HAS NO INTEREST IN KEEPING LIVE AMERICANS. ALLUDING TO THE STORY OF THE ALLEGED BLIND AMERICAN LIVING WITH TRIBAL PEOPLE IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS, BA CONFIRMED THAT NGO HOANG HAD GONE TO THE SOUTH AND HAD ALSO HEARD SIMILAR RUMORS. WHILE AN INVESTIGATION IS STILL UNDERWAY, HE SAID, THE VNOSMP HAS BEEN UNABLE TO LEARN THE SOURCE OF THESE STORIES. REGARDING THE CASE OF [REDACTED] THERE IS STILL NO NEW INFORMATION. AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE, BA THEN SURFACED A NEW CASE, STATING THAT HE HAD RECEIVED

A LETTER FROM AMCIT [REDACTED] (FOOD FOR THE HUNGRY, INTERNATIONAL). ACCORDING TO THE LETTER, [REDACTED] ALLEGED THAT THERE WAS AN AMERICAN LIVING FREELY IN VIETNAM WHO WAS MARRIED TO EITHER A VIETNAMESE OR FILIPINO LADY. BA PROVIDED NO FURTHER INFORMATION BUT STATED THAT THE VNOSMP WAS TRYING TO CHECK OUT THE STORY.

B. MITCHELL/NELSON MISIDENTIFICATION: BA STATED THAT ONLY ONE REMAINS HAD BEEN LOCATED AT THIS SITE, THOUGH AT THE TIME OF DISCOVERY OF THE REMAINS, TWO NAMES WERE FOUND. WE WILL CONTINUE SEARCHING, HE ADDED, AND IF ADDITIONAL INFORMATION IS LOCATED IT WILL BE PROVIDED. BA THEN CAUTIONED, HOWEVER, THAT HE BELIEVES SUCH A DEVELOPMENT IS UNLIKELY.

C. MATERIAL EVIDENCE CASES: BA MADE THE POINT THAT LOCAL PEOPLE HAVE SOMETIMES LOCATED EVIDENCE, AND SENT IT TO THE VNOSMP. IN SOME INSTANCES PEOPLE WHO ONCE KNEW THE PLACES OF BURIAL CAN NO LONGER LOCATE THE GRAVES. WHATEVER THESE PEOPLE TURN IN IS HANDED OVER TO THE U.S., BT

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 06 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 39054

CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)

SAID BA. AT THIS POINT LTC [REDACTED] COMMENTED THAT THESE STATEMENTS WERE INSUFFICIENT, AND THAT WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A REPORT WHICH EXPLAINED WHERE THE EVIDENCE WAS FOUND, WHEN, BY WHOM, UNDER WHAT CIRCUMSTANCES, WHY ONLY PHOTO-COPIES RATHER THAN ORIGINALS ARE AVAILABLE, ETC. WITHOUT SUCH INFORMATION, DOUBTS STILL REMAIN AND WE WILL SURELY CONTINUE TO ASK ABOUT THESE CASES. BA RESPONDED (AGAIN) THAT IF ANY NEW INFORMATION IS OBTAINED ABOUT THESE CASES, HE WOULD ADVISE THE USG.

D. THE [REDACTED] ACKNOWLEDGING THAT HE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROMISED A REPORT OF INVESTIGATION ON THIS CASE, BA EXPLAINED THAT HE HAD BEEN DELAYED BY THE DECISION TO CONCENTRATE THE SEARCH EFFORT IN THE HANOI/HAIPHONG AREA AND IN THE SOUTH. BA PROMISED TO SEND AN INVESTIGATIVE TEAM AND PLEDGED TO "TRY OUR BEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE" REGARDING THE [REDACTED] CASE.

E. PRELIMINARY CRASHSITE SURVEY: BA BEGAN HIS PRESENTATION BY STATING THAT THE JCRG TEAM HAD PREVIOUSLY BEEN PERMITTED TO VISIT THE SITE OF A B-52 CRASH IN WHICH THERE

WERE 2 SURVIVORS OF A 6-MAN CREW, WITH THE REMAINING 4 CREWMEN YET UNACCOUNTED FOR. NOTING THAT THE U.S. SIDE HAD PROPOSED A SURVEY AT A DIFFERENT SITE (REFNO 0501, A HELICOPTER CRASHSITE SOUTH OF VINH), BA DEDUCED THAT WE WERE NOT INTERESTED IN LOOKING FOR THE 4 UNACCOUNTED INDIVIDUALS. LTC [REDACTED] IMMEDIATELY TOOK EXCEPTION TO BA'S CONCLUSION. [REDACTED] EXPLAINED THAT WE CONSIDERED THE SRV OFFER OF A SITE SURVEY TO BE AN IMPORTANT ONE, AND POINTED OUT THAT GIVEN THE CHOICE WE WANTED TO CONDUCT A SURVEY WHERE WE WOULD HAVE THE MAXIMUM OPPORTUNITY TO GAIN USEFUL INFORMATION AND ACHIEVE GOOD RESULTS. [REDACTED] NOTED THAT WE HAD ALREADY VISITED THE ALLEGED B-52 SITE, THAT NOTHING WAS EVIDENT ON WHICH TO BASE ANY CONCLUSIONS, AND THAT THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LEARNING ANYTHING NEW AT THIS PARTICULAR SITE WAS VERY LIMITED. ON THE OTHER HAND, AFTER CAREFUL REVIEW, JCRG HAD SELECTED THE HELICOPTER CRASHSITE AS A SURVEY CANDIDATE BECAUSE IT SEEMED THERE WAS A GOOD CHANCE THAT EVIDENCE WOULD STILL BE LOCATED AT THE CRASHSITE, AND THAT A SURVEY COULD RESULT IN REASONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EVENTUALLY RESOLVING THIS SITE. LTC [REDACTED] THEN INQUIRED AS TO THE STATUS OF SRV CONSIDERATION OF THE PROPOSAL TO SURVEY THE HELICOPTER SITE. BA RESPONDED THAT THE SRV HAD AGREED TO PERMIT A SURVEY AT THE B-52 SITE, BUT THAT WE HAD MADE CLEAR THAT WE DID NOT CARE TO CONDUCT A SURVEY THERE. THIS IS WHY WE THINK YOU EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY OF RESOLVING THE 4 CASES, BA SAID. AGAIN LTC [REDACTED] REJOINED, ASKING BA NOT TO PUT WORDS INTO OUR MOUTH. [REDACTED] WENT ON TO AGAIN EXPLAIN THAT WE CONSIDERED THE SRV SURVEY OFFER AS A TREMENDOUS OPPORTUNITY AND THAT WE WANTED TO SELECT THE BEST LOCATION TO SURVEY WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE FAVORABLE RESULTS, FOR BOTH SIDES' BENEFIT. BA RESPONDED THAT THE SRV WAS PREPARED TO PERMIT A SURVEY AT THE B-52 SITE, BUT IF WE DID NOT WANT TO GO THERE WE COULD CONTINUE TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF GOING TO ANOTHER SITE IN THE FUTURE. NEVERTHELESS, HE ADDED, THE HELICOPTER SITE HAS NOT YET BEEN LOCATED, AND THERE WERE CONCERNS ABOUT SECURITY AT THAT LOCATION. [REDACTED] THEN NOTED THAT WE WERE NOT INSENSITIVE TO THE FACT THAT THE SRV HAD MADE PREPARATIONS FOR US TO CONDUCT THE SURVEY AT THE B-52 SITE, BUT OBSERVED THAT THIS WAS A WELL-KNOWN CRASHSITE IN CLOSE PROXIMITY TO HANOI AND THAT, FRANKLY, THE U.S. MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES WHO HAD VISITED THE SITE HAD EXPRESSED OPEN SKEPTICISM REGARDING THE SRV SURVEY OFFER IN LIGHT OF THE FACT THERE WAS NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE ON WHICH TO BASE ANY CONCLUSIVE SURVEY RESULTS. IN AN APPARENT ATTEMPT TO BRING THE DISCUSSION ON THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC TO A CLOSE, BA THEN STATED, ONCE AGAIN, "WE CONCLUDE YOU DON'T WANT TO MAKE A SURVEY AT THE GIA LAM (B-52) SITE AND THE SEARCH FOR THOSE FOUR MIAS IS CLOSED." LTC [REDACTED] IMMEDIATELY CALLED FOR ADJOURNMENT BT

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 03 OF 06 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 39054

CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)

OF THE MEETING UNTIL THE AFTERNOON. BA, SOMEWHAT SURPRISED OFFERED THE INFORMATION THAT IT IS PRESENTLY RAINING HEAVILY AT THE SITE OF THE HELICOPTER CRASH, THAT THE TERRAIN IS VERY DIFFICULT, AND THAT HE INTENDED TO FIRST SEND A TEAM TO THE SITE LOCATION. IN A WORD, HE SUMMARIZED WE ARE NOW CONSIDERING THE POSSIBILITY OF A SURVEY AT THE SITE YOU PROPOSED. THE MEETING WAS THEN ADJOURNED.

ON RESUMPTION OF THE MEETING AT 1400 HRS, LTC [REDACTED] FIRST REQUESTED A PRIVATE SESSION WITH BA. [REDACTED] THEN POINTEDLY EMPHASIZED TO BA THAT, BASED ON COMMENTS MADE BY THE VISITING MEDIA REPRESENTATIVES DURING THE EARLIER APRIL 85 VISIT TO THE ALLEGED B-52 SITE, THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE GOING TO BE VERY SKEPTICAL OF SRV MOTIVES AND WILL QUESTION THE SRV SINCERITY REGARDING THEIR INSISTENCE THAT THIS PARTICULAR SITE BE SURVEYED. BA WAS VERY RECEPTIVE BUT SAID THAT HIS SIDE FELT THAT THERE WERE MANY THINGS TO CONSIDER AND THAT HE HOPED WE WOULD AGREE TO THE SYMBOLIC IMPORTANCE OF CONDUCTING THE JOINT PRELIMINARY SITE SURVEY IMMEDIATELY. [REDACTED] AGREED TO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE STEP AND STATED WE WERE NOT UNMINDFUL OF THE

PREPARATIONS AND PLANS WHICH THEY HAD MADE. [REDACTED] CONCLUDED THAT HAVING EXPLAINED OUR PREFERENCES AND RESERVATIONS WE WOULD PROCEED WITH THE PRELIMINARY SITE SURVEY AS PROPOSED BY THE SRV.

THE FULL MEETING WAS THEN RE-CONVENED AT 1415 HRS. LTC [REDACTED] OPENED WITH THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "AS I SAID THIS MORNING MY GOVERNMENT WELCOMED YOUR OFFER OF A PRELIMINARY SITE SURVEY. WE HAVE SELECTED A SITE, 0591 SOUTH OF VINH WHICH WE BELIEVED WOULD BE A VERY POSITIVE STEP FORWARD FOR BOTH SIDES. WE ARE NOT AS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT CONDUCTING THE PRELIMINARY SURVEY AT THE B-52 SITE IN GIA LAH DISTRICT. NEVERTHELESS, I BELIEVE WE UNDERSTAND YOUR POSITION--THAT MANY PLANS AND PREPARATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AND YOU HAVE CHOSEN A COURSE OF ACTION. THEREFORE WE WILL CONDUCT A PRELIMINARY SURVEY OF SITE 1955 (THE B-52) TOMORROW. WE ARE HOPEFUL THAT YOU WILL CONTINUE TO CONSIDER OUR PROPOSAL TO VISIT SITE 0591 WHEN THE WEATHER IMPROVES AND YOUR OWN PEOPLE HAVE VISITED THERE. I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOUR AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE TO CONDUCT SUCH A PRELIMINARY SURVEY IN THE FUTURE." BA REPLIED WITH THE FOLLOWING: "I CONSIDER AFTER OUR DISCUSSION THIS MORNING THAT WE HAVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING. WE TAKE NOTE OF THE HIGH VALUE YOU PLACE ON OUR ALLOWING A CRASHSITE SURVEY. I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU PREFER A SITE WHICH IS SIGNIFICANT TO YOU. I SHARE YOUR DESIRE. TOMORROW YOU WILL MAKE A PRELIMINARY SITE SURVEY. THIS WILL INDICATE THAT WE ARE MOVING FORWARD. AS I SAID, IN THE RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES, WE HAVE TO MOVE FORWARD. I TAKE NOTE OF YOUR DESIRE TO MAKE A SURVEY AT THE 0591 SITE. WE WILL HAVE TO RECONSIDER YOUR PROPOSAL. IT IS MORE IMPORTANT TO CREATE A FAVORABLE ATMOSPHERE THAN TO MAKE A CRASHSITE SURVEY AT ANOTHER SITE. OUR ATTITUDE IS TO SPEED UP. THEREFORE YOU SHOULD SHOW

COOPERATION. YOU SHOULD ALSO AVOID ANY ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS THAT WOULD POSE OBSTACLES. DO YOU HAVE ANY COMMENTS?" LTC [REDACTED] RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED WE NOW HAD AN UNDERSTANDING.

(NOTE: LATER DURING THE MEETING AND DURING SEVERAL INFORMAL SETTINGS, BOTH BA AND NGO HOANG ASKED FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION PERTAINING TO THE 0591 HELICOPTER SITE. THE U.S. TEAM RESPONDED THAT WE WOULD PREPARE A FOLDER ON THIS PARTICULAR SITE, AND WOULD FORWARD IT EXPEDITIOUSLY THROUGH THE SRV EMBASSY IN BANGKOK.)

F. INFORMATION REGARDING VIETNAMESE MIAS: MR BA LISTENED WHEN THIS PARTICULAR TALKING POINT WAS PRESENTED, ACCEPTED THE INFORMATION AND MAP WHICH WAS OFFERED AND SCANNED THEM QUICKLY, BUT HE MADE NO COMMENT WHATSOEVER BT

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CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)
REGARDING THIS PARTICULAR TOPIC.

G. THE B-52 CRASHSITE IN A POND IN THE NGOC HA AREA OF HANOI: BA COMMENTED THAT HIS OFFICE WILL INVESTIGATE THIS SITE AND PROVIDE INFORMATION IN THE FUTURE.

H. POLEMICS: POLEMICS AT THE TWO MEETING SESSIONS WERE MINIMAL, BUT BOTH BA AND NGUYEN CAN TOOK THE OPPORTUNITY TO LECTURE AT SOME LENGTH ON THE NECESSITY FOR THE U.S. TO AVOID ACTIONS OR STATEMENTS WHICH HINDER PROGRESS. BA SPECIFICALLY NOTED THAT THE VNOSMP/JCRC MEETING HAD BEEN ORIGINALLY PLANNED FOR JUNE. YOU PROBABLY KNOW WHY IT WAS POSTPONED, HE SAID. I DON'T KNOW YOUR REASONS, BUT AT THAT TIME THE U.S. TOOK SOME ACTIONS WHICH WERE NOT FAVORABLE TO CREATING A GOOD ATMOSPHERE, HE ADDED. HE REITERATED THAT THE SRV CONSIDERS THE MIA ISSUE TO BE A HUMANITARIAN ONE, BUT THAT RESOLUTION DEPENDS ON MANY FACTORS--MOST IMPORTANTLY THE ATTITUDE AND COOPERATION OF THE PEOPLE. THE WORK IS AT BEST VERY DIFFICULT, HE SAID, AND MANY ELEMENTS OF THE SRV GOVERNMENT ARE INVOLVED INCLUDING THE MINISTRIES

OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, AND PUBLIC HEALTH, ALL TRYING TO SPEED UP THE SEARCH. STATING HE WOULD LIKE TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINT CLEARLY, HE STATED THAT THE RECOMMENDATION PASSED BY THE U.S. CONGRESS TO GIVE 5 MILLION DOLLARS TO THE REACTIONARY FORCES IN CAMBODIA (SIC) DOES NOTHING TO STABILIZE THE SITUATION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA. BA ADDED THAT THE SRV HAD EXPRESSED THEIR DISPLEASURE REGARDING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S STATEMENT WHICH SLANDERED THE SRV ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND WHICH HAD LINKED THE MIA ISSUE TO NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS. THIS LINKAGE SHOWED THAT THE U.S. CONSIDERS THE MIA ISSUE TO BE A POLITICAL RATHER THAN A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE. BUT THE U.S. STILL UNFAIRLY EXPECTS THE SRV TO RESOLVE THE ISSUE ON A STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN BASIS. BUT DESPITE THESE OBSTACLES, THE SRV IS CONTINUING THEIR SEARCH EFFORTS AND HAS INCREASED THEM MANY-FOLD. I MYSELF HAVE RECENTLY VISITED SOME SITES, BA SAID, AND MR TEO AND MR HOANG HAVE LED TEAMS TO MANY LOCATIONS IN THE SOUTH. THOUGH THE LOCAL PEOPLE EXPRESS RELUCTANCE BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THE U.S. TO BE STILL HOSTILE TO VIETNAM, WE WILL CONTINUE THE EFFORT, HE CONCLUDED.

5. (C) RESULTS OF THE SEARCH EFFORT: EXPLAINING THAT THE VNOSMP HAD RECENTLY INCREASED ITS EFFORTS, BA PRESENTED A LIST OF 32 INDIVIDUALS ON WHOM INFORMATION AND/OR REMAINS HAD BEEN LOCATED. (SEE REF B FOR DETAILS.) AFTER EXPLAINING THE CONTENTS OF THE LIST, BA STRESSED THE TENTATIVE NATURE OF THE NAMES PROVIDED. HE THEN TURNED TO THE TOPIC OF REPATRIATION AND SUGGESTED THAT WE CONSIDER A REPATRIATION IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NEXT REGULAR MEETING. BA NOTED THAT IT WOULD TAKE 6-8 WEEKS TO GATHER THE REMAINS, AND THAT IN THE LATTER PART OF AUGUST AND THE EARLY PART OF SEPTEMBER EVERYONE WOULD BE EXTREMELY BUSY ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE CELEBRATION OF THE 40TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF VIETNAM. LTC [REDACTED] NOTED THAT, RATHER THAN DELAY SO LONG, IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN OUR WORK PACE WE SHOULD PLAN FOR ANOTHER MEETING AT AN EARLY DATE, THEN CONSIDER THE MEETING/REPATRIATION LATER ON. BA REPLIED THAT THE SRV WOULD "CALCULATE" A CONVENIENT TIME FOR THE REPATRIATION AND INFORM THE U.S. SIDE, BUT WOULD ALSO TRY TO EXPEDITE THE PROCESS.

6. (C) PRELIMINARY CRASHSITE SURVEY: ON THE MORNING OF 5 JULY THE U.S. TEAM WAS DRIVEN TO THE LOCATION, PREVIOUSLY VISITED IN APRIL 85, WHERE THE SRV CONTENDS A B-52 AIRCRAFT HAD CRASHED 15 KILOMETERS NORTHEAST OF HANOI. ALL OF THE VNOSMP MEMBERS, INCLUDING MR BA, ALSO ATTENDED THE EVENT. THE U.S. SIDE SYSTEMATICALLY PREPARED A MAP OF THE AREA IN QUESTION, INTERVIEWED A NUMBER OF LOCAL RESIDENTS REGARDING THEIR RECOLLECTIONS BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 05 OF 06 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 39054

CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)

OF THE EVENT, PHOTOGRAPHED THE ENTIRE AREA, AND RE-EXAMINED THE SINGLE PIECE OF AIRCRAFT WRECKAGE STILL AVAILABLE AT THE SITE. THE SRV ESCORTS PERMITTED THE JCRC TEAM TO ROVE AWAY FROM THE SITE AND QUESTION OTHER PERSONNEL IN AN ATTEMPT TO FIND WITNESSES AND GATHER ADDITIONAL DETAILS; HOWEVER, IT SEEMED THAT MANY OF THE INHABITANTS HAD BEEN EVACUATED FROM THIS PARTICULAR AREA AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT. THE RESULTS OF THE SURVEY WILL BE COMPILED, AND WILL BE AVAILABLE TO BE PRESENTED TO THE SRV DURING THE NEXT MEETING.

7. (C) MISCELLANEOUS INFORMAL ASIDES:

A. IN CONVERSATIONS WITH MR [REDACTED] BOTH NGO HOANG AND PHAM TEO REPEATEDLY REFERRED TO DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED WHILE SEARCHING FOR REMAINS IN THE SOUTH. THEY SPOKE OF ENCOUNTERS WITH LOCAL RESIDENTS IN THE AREAS WHERE THEY HAD SEARCHED, WHO WERE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING REMAINS FOR VISAS OR MONETARY REWARD. MR TEO SAID THAT THE VNOSMP IS CONSIDERING IMPLEMENTING A PROCEDURE WHEREIN

LOCAL RESIDENTS PROVIDING REMAINS WILL BE PRESENTED A CERTIFICATE OF APPRECIATION FROM THE SRV GOVERNMENT. BOTH TEO AND HOANG REFERRED SEVERAL TIMES TO SITUATIONS WHERE LOCAL RESIDENTS BECAME HOSTILE WHEN SEARCH TEAMS ATTEMPTED TO LOCATE REMAINS IN REMOTE AREAS.

B. INTERPRETER DUNG POINTED OUT THE BUILDING FORMERLY HOUSING THE AMERICAN CONSULATE IN HANOI AND SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE MAIN BUILDING WAS BEING USED BY THE "FATHER-LAND FRONT", HIS ORGANIZATION WAS USING SOME CONNECTING BUILDINGS, IMPLYING THAT THE VNOSMP HAD OFFICES THERE. DUNG ADDED THAT HIS ORGANIZATION HAD BEEN ALERTED IN EARLY 1979 TO MOVE FROM THE BUILDING IN ORDER TO PROVIDE OFFICES FOR THE U.S. PERSONNEL, BUT THAT THE ALERT NOTICE WAS CANCELED DUE TO UNSPECIFIED DEVELOPMENTS. DUNG SAID THAT MAYBE SOMEDAY THE U.S. MIA EXPERTS MIGHT HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO WORK IN THE BUILDINGS REFERRED TO BY HIM.

C. MR NGO HOANG SAID THAT SOME FORMER FRENCH MILITARY PERSONNEL ARE REMAINING IN VIETNAM AND THAT THEY HAVE MARRIED VIETNAMESE WOMEN. HOANG SAID THAT MOST OF THE MEN HAD ORIGINALLY COME FROM AFRICA AND NOW HAD JOBS WHERE THEIR PARTICULAR EXPERTISE WAS NEEDED. HOANG ADDED THAT MOST OF THE FRENCH MILITARY PERSONNEL HAD BEEN RETURNED TO FRANCE YEARS AGO AND THAT FINDING EMPLOYMENT FOR THEM IN VIETNAM HAD BEEN A DIFFICULT TASK.

8. (C) TRANSPORTATION DIFFICULTIES: AS IN THE PAST, DIFFICULTIES WERE ENCOUNTERED BY THE U.S. TEAM IN OBTAINING AIRLINE SEATS FOR THE TEAM'S RETURN TRIP FROM HANOI TO BANGKOK. INTERCESSIONS WITH LAO AIRWAYS ON THE PART OF VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS WERE INSUFFICIENT TO OBTAIN THE NECESSARY SIX SEATS; CONSEQUENTLY TWO MEMBERS OF THE

U.S. TEAM [REDACTED] WERE LEFT BEHIND IN HANOI, AND ARE EXPECTED TO RETURN TO BANGKOK ON 10 JULY. PRIVATELY ONE OF THE VNOSMP TEAM MEMBERS APPROACHED A JCRC MEMBER AND RHETORICALLY INQUIRED IF IT WOULDN'T BE EASIER FOR THE U.S. SIDE TO USE THE BANGKOK-BASED C-12 AIRCRAFT.

9. (C) COMMENT: IN THE COURSE OF SEVERAL PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS ON 4 AND 5 JULY, CU DINH BA SPOKE WITH LTC [REDACTED] OF THE SRV'S SINCERITY IN TRYING TO SPEED UP PROGRESS TOWARD SOLVING THE POW/MIA ISSUE. BA SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS MOST ANXIOUS TO MEET WITH A HIGH LEVEL OFFICIAL OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO DISCUSS MEANS OF MOVING TOWARD AN EARLY RESOLUTION. BA SAID THEIR DESIRE WAS TO HAVE CONTACT WITH AN INDIVIDUAL OF SUFFICIENT AUTHORITY TO MAKE DECISIONS AND GIVE COMMITMENTS CONCERNING THIS SPEEDED EFFORT. BA TOLD IN SOME DETAIL OF HIS OWN FIELD TRIP TO THE SOUTH ILLUSTRATING AND BT

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 06 OF 06 LIAISON BANGKOK TH 39054

CITE: CONFIDENTIAL 3413 JUL 85.

AMCONSUL HONG KONG PASS TO SECRETARY'S PARTY.

SUBJ: POW/MIA TECHNICAL MEETING IN HANOI - DETAILS (U)

EMPHASIZING HIS GOVERNMENT'S SINCERITY AND HIS OWN PERSONAL EMPHASIS. BA'S REPEATED STATEMENTS OF SINCERITY AND HIS DESCRIPTION OF A GENUINE ACCELERATION IN THEIR INTENSITY ("SEVERAL-FOLD") WERE A DEPARTURE FROM PREVIOUS MEETINGS. WHILE THE VIETNAMESE HAVE ALWAYS EMPHASIZED THAT THEIR EFFORTS ARE STRICTLY HUMANITARIAN, BA WAS MORE EMPHATIC THAN EVER. THE CONCRETE RESULTS ARE OBVIOUS, BUT QUITE ASIDE FROM THE DRAMATIC VIETNAMESE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THEIR RECOVERY OF 26 REMAINS, THE MEETING ACHIEVED A NEW LEVEL OF CORDIALITY AND GIVE-AND-TAKE AT THE CONFERENCE TABLE. BA'S STATEMENTS, ALTHOUGH LESS THAN A CLEAR COMMITMENT, STRONGLY SUGGESTED THAT THE VIETNAMESE WILL CONTINUE TO MOVE TOWARD A JOINT EXCAVATION OF A CRASHSITE AND TO CONSIDER ACTIVELY THE U.S. PROPOSAL TO DO THE PRELIMINARY SITE SURVEY SOUTH OF VINH.
DECL: OADR.

BT

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EOB:

- THEY HAVE ALSO INDICATED THEIR DESIRE TO RESOLVE
THIS ISSUE WITHIN TWO YEARS -- ANOTHER WELCOME PLEDGE.
WE WILL FOLLOW UP WITH THE VIETNAMESE ON THIS MESSAGE.

-
END TEXT.
SHULTZ
BT

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FOR USIS; BEIJING FOR P&C; AIT FOR CIS;
CINCPAC FOR USIA ADVISER

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)

SUBJECT: STATEMENT IN HONG KONG

1. THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT WAS ISSUED IN HONG KONG
ON JULY 7, 1985, EMBARGOED UNTIL 4:30 PM HONG KONG TIME.

BEGIN TEXT:

- THE VIETNAMESE HAVE INFORMED US IN OUR TECHNICAL-
LEVEL MEETING IN HANOI, JULY 3-6, THAT THEY WILL
REPATRIATE THE REMAINS OF 26 INDIVIDUALS AND PROVIDED
MATERIAL EVIDENCE OR INFORMATION ON SIX OTHERS. WE
WELCOME THE VIETNAMESE ACTION IN OUR LATEST TECHNICAL
TALKS. WE LOOK FORWARD TO THIS TURNOVER, WHICH WOULD
BE THE LARGEST SINCE THE END OF THE WAR AND IN LINE
WITH PLEDGES MADE BY FOREIGN MINISTER THACH IN HIGH-
LEVEL NEGOTIATIONS ON THIS ISSUE SINCE 1982. WE ARE
APPRECIATIVE OF THIS CONCRETE DEMONSTRATION OF HIS EX-
PRESSED COMMITMENT TO ACCELERATE EFFORTS AND LOOK
FORWARD TO CONTINUED RAPID PROGRESS.

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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 10 SECTO 13030

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

FLWG HONG KONG 11735 SENT ACTION BANGKOK BEING
RPTD FOR YOUR INFO QUOTE:

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --
DRAFT FOR CLEARANCE

1. THE DRAFT TRANSCRIPT OF THE BRIEFING ON JULY 7
FOLLOWS FOR YOUR CORRECTIONS AND CLEARANCE. HONG KONG
IO DAVE MILLER'S PHONE NUMBER IS 5-8412265 RPT
5-8412265.

THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSCRIPT OF A BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS IN HONG KONG JULY 7,
1985, ON POW/MIAS.:

(BEGIN TRANSCRIPT)

Q: ...DOD MAY NOT HAVE TAKEN THE 13 OUT FROM LAOS
OUT OF THAT.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE -- YOU
SAID 2477 AND HE SAID 2464 -- THE DIFFERENCE THERE IS
THE 13 THAT WERE JUST IDENTIFIED OUT OF THE LAO
EXCAVATION.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YOU HAVE THE STATEMENT AND
(ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS) WILL SPEAK ON BACKGROUND
ATTRIBUTABLE TO U.S. OFFICIALS.

Q: ...TALKING OF EXCAVATIONS, WHAT HAPPENED IN
HANOI IN TERMS OF THEM AGREEING OR NOT AGREEING TO A
JOINT EXCAVATION OF THE PLANE SITE NEAR HAIPHONG?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: CAN YOU SPEAK TO THAT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY CONDUCTED A SURVEY OF THE
B-52 SITE THAT THEY HAD VISITED PREVIOUSLY IN APRIL.
SURVEYS ARE NORMALLY A PRECURSOR TO AN EXCAVATION AND
THERE'S NO REAL REASON TO DO A SURVEY UNLESS YOU'RE
GOING TO EXCAVATE IT, SO --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: COULD THAT BE --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: --THE JCRC WITH THE VIETNAMESE

AUTHORITIES.

Q: BUT THE VIETNAMESE DID NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT
AN EXCAVATION?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE DON'T HAVE A COMMITMENT TO AN
EXCAVATION BUT THEY DID AGREE TO AND HAD THE SURVEY.

Q: WHAT DOES THAT MEAN, "A SURVEY"?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THE JCRC SPECIALISTS GO OUT AND
LOOK AT THE SITE AND DETERMINE WHAT IT WOULD TAKE TO
EXCAVATE IN TERMS OF MANHOURS AND TERMS OF LABOR, THE
GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE AREA, AND THEN THAT'S THE BASIS
FOR THE LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS AND OTHER THINGS IN
CASE IT WILL BE EXCAVATED.

Q: WAS THAT A DISAPPOINTMENT...?

Q: WAS THERE A CONTINGENCY PLACED ON EXCAVATION;
IF WE DO SOMETHING, WOULD THEN...?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO.

Q: IS THE LACK OF A POSITIVE COMMITMENT TO A
JOINT SURVEY A DISAPPOINTMENT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO, THERE ARE VARIOUS WAYS TO
SOLVE THIS ISSUE AND THE FACT THERE'S A UNILATERAL
TURNOVER OF SO MANY REMAINS IS EXTREMELY POSITIVE. IF
THEY EXCAVATE THEMSELVES, IT'S FINE WITH US, JUST AS
LONG AS IT GETS DONE.

Q: CAN I GO BACK TO THAT QUESTION OF HOW MANY ARE
STILL MISSING IN VIETNAM AND HOW MANY ARE STILL
MISSING IN LAOS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I'LL GET THAT FOR YOU. WE'VE GOT
THAT MATERIAL TO HAND OUT. I'LL HAVE TO LOOK AT THOSE
NUMBERS; IF DOD HAS NOT SUBTRACTED THE 13, THEN THEY
WOULDN'T ADD UP.

Q: BUT ROUGHLY HALF OF THEM ARE IN VIETNAM-- OR A
LITTLE OVER HALF?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IN LAOS, IT'S CLOSE TO 600 AND IN
CAMBODIA --

Q: IT'S ABOUT 90?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YES, ABOUT 80-SOME AND 89 AND THE
REST ARE IN VIETNAM. THAT'S THE -- OKAY.

Q: AM I NOT CORRECT THAT THESE NUMBERS ARE ALL
THE NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WHOSE BODIES WEREN'T FOUND OR
WHO WEREN'T POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED, AND YOU KNOW
PERFECTLY WELL THAT YOU'RE NOT GOING TO EVER HAVE ALL
OF THEM ACCOUNTED FOR BECAUSE SOME OF THEIR BODIES ARE
IN JUNGLES AND OTHER THINGS, SO -- IS THAT RIGHT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE KNOW THAT. I MEAN, WE'RE
CLEAR ABOUT THAT. AND WE HAVE ASKED -- OUR REPEATED
CONCERN IS FOR THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. AND
WE KNOW THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING ISN'T GOING TO
BE ANYTHING CLOSE TO THE 2500, BUT IT WILL BE
SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN WHAT WE HAVE NOW.

Q: SO WHAT WOULD IT TAKE IN ORDER FOR THIS MATTER
-- FROM THE UNITED STATES' POINT OF VIEW -- TO BE
RESOLVED? HOW WOULD YOU EVER DETERMINE THAT YOU HAVE
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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

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BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A

SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT'S A LITTLE HARD TO SAY. TO SOME EXTENT I THINK THE ANSWER IS, YOU WOULD KNOW WHEN YOU HAVE IT. ONE THING WE DO KNOW IS THAT WE DON'T HAVE IT NOW. YOU CERTAINLY KNOW, AS WE KNOW NOW, THAT WE DON'T HAVE THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING AND YOU KNOW WHEN THERE ARE SITES THAT COULD BE EXCAVATED THAT ARE EXCAVATED, YOU KNOW WHEN THERE'S INFORMATION AVAILABLE THAT ISN'T GIVEN TO YOU AND AS WE PROCEED, IF WE -- I MEAN IT'S A LITTLE HARD TO PREDICT IT WITH PRECISION, BUT I THINK WHEN WE GOT THERE, WE WOULD KNOW IT.

Q: CAN YOU SEE THIS IN 2 YEARS? I MEAN, COULD YOU...?

Q: CAN YOU SEE THAT CONDITION BEING FULFILLED IN 2 YEARS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK WE COULD, YES. I MEAN, IT WOULD TAKE A LOT OF WORK TO DO IT -- FULLY; THAT QUICKLY.

Q: DO THESE STEPS BY THE VIETNAMESE PAVE THE WAY FOR SOME KIND OF PERMANENT U.S. DELEGATION IN VIETNAM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE HAVE SAID THAT IF THE VIETNAMESE WERE TO SUBSTANTIALLY ACCELERATE THE EFFORTS ON THIS ISSUE SO AS TO MAKE IT REALLY NECESSARY TO HAVE AMERICAN TECHNICAL PEOPLE IN VIETNAM ON A FULLTIME BASIS IN ORDER TO MAKE THE PROGRESS THAT THEY'RE PREPARED TO MAKE, THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO PUT AMERICANS IN VIETNAM ON A FULLTIME BASIS. WE'RE A LONG WAY FROM THAT -- I DON'T -- WE STILL DON'T KNOW WHAT THE VIETNAMESE ARE REALLY PREPARED TO DO IN THIS OFFER OF THEIRS TO RESOLVE IT WITHIN 2 YEARS. WE'RE GOING TO HAVE TO HAVE SOME VERY CAREFUL DISCUSSIONS WITH THEM AND WE'LL SEE AT THE END OF THAT WHAT THAT MIGHT MEAN IN TERMS OF AN INCREASED AMERICAN PRESENCE.

Q: WHAT MIGHT THE FIRST STEP BE TO HAVE THESE CONVERSATIONS WITH THEM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: OBVIOUSLY, THE FIRST STEP IS TO DEFINE VERY CLEARLY ON OUR SIDE WHAT A 2-YEAR SCHEDULE

MIGHT LOOK LIKE SO THAT WE KNOW THAT WE THINK NEEDS TO BE DONE IN ORDER TO ACCOMPLISH IT ON THAT KIND OF SCHEDULE AND THEN WE'VE GOT TO TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE VIETNAMESE TO SEE IF THEY'RE PREPARED TO MAKE THAT KIND OF PROGRESS. WE HAVE HAD THAT KIND OF DISCUSSION WITH THE VIETNAMESE PREVIOUSLY AND I DO WANT TO UNDERScore THAT BECAUSE THERE WAS AT LEAST ONE PRESS ACCOUNT THAT SAID THIS WOULD BE THE FIRST SUCH CONTACTS WITH THEM SINCE THE END OF THE VIETNAM WAR AND THAT'S NOT TRUE. IN FACT, WE'VE HAD -- I BELIEVE, 5 DIFFERENT MEETINGS WITH THEM -- HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS ON THIS SUBJECT JUST IN THE LAST 3 YEARS, 3 OF THEM IN HANOI AND THEY HAVE IN THE PAST LED TO SOME PROGRESS, THE KIND OF PROGRESS THAT WE'RE SEEING NOW; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE REGULAR TECHNICAL MEETINGS IN THE FIRST PLACE GREW OUT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS -- THE AGREEMENT TO INCREASE THEM FROM 4 A YEAR TO 6 A YEAR-- GREW OUT OF (OFFICIAL'S) MOST RECENT -- (OFFICIAL'S) MOST RECENT CONVERSATIONS WITH THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER IN HANOI IN FEBRUARY, AND PRESUMABLY, WE WOULD CERTAINLY PURSUE. SOMETHING AS AMBITIOUS AS REALLY GETTING THIS ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY IN 2 YEARS WOULD PROBABLY MEAN DISCUSSIONS -- SOMETHING ON THAT ORDER. I CAN'T GIVE YOU A TIME OR PLACE OR WHO WOULD CONDUCT THEM.

Q: I HAVE SEVERAL QUESTIONS ON THIS 2-YEAR BUSINESS.

Q: IT'S 5 HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS IN 3 YEARS OR WHAT? ADMIN OFFICIAL: WHAT IS IT -- WHEN WAS THE FIRST-- IT'S WITHIN THE LAST 3 YEARS.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WHAT? THE 5 MEETINGS? ADMIN OFFICIAL: YES. THEY STARTED IN, THE FALL OF '83 WAS THE FIRST ONE.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO. THE FALL OF '82.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: '82?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IN HANOI. THAT'S RIGHT. ARMITAGE.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT WAS -- FEBRUARY OF '83 WAS THE ARMITAGE MISSION TO HANOI, THE SECOND ONE. THAT'S THE ONE --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YES, FEBRUARY OF '84.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THE FIRST ONE WAS ARMITAGE'S MISSION TO HANOI WHICH WAS OCTOBER '82, THEN YOU HAD A MEETING WITH THACH IN NEW YORK IN THE FALL OF '83 --

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UNCLAS SECTION 03 OF 10 SECTO 13030

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: RIGHT.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: -- THEN ARMITAGE WENT TO HANOI IN
FEBRUARY OF '84; YOU HAD ANOTHER MEETING WITH THACH IN
THE FALL OF '84 AND YOU WENT TO HANOI IN FEBRUARY OF
LAST YEAR. THAT'S 5 TOTAL.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: RIGHT.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THIS STATEMENT SAYS THE
VIETNAMESE INDICATE THEIR DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS, AND
THEN "DASH DASH," "ANOTHER WELCOME PLEDGE." NOW, IS
THIS A DESIRE OR A PLEDGE OR QUITE WHAT IS THEIR
COMMITMENT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, THEIR NORMAL PATTERN IS TO
MAKE A STATEMENT LIKE THAT -- THEY MADE THE COMMITMENT
IN '84, FOR EXAMPLE, TO ACCELERATE PROGRESS ON THIS
ISSUE. THAT WAS EARLY '84. WE'RE NOW SEEING EVIDENCE
OF FULFILLMENT OF THAT PLEDGE. UNTIL THERE'S
FULFILLMENT, WE CALL IT A PLEDGE AND A COMMITMENT.

Q: OKAY. THEY DID MAKE A COMMITMENT TO DO THIS
WITHIN 2 YEARS AND THIS WAS TOLD TO THE TEAM THAT WAS
THERE?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT WAS TOLD LAST WEEK TO
FOREIGN MINISTER MOCHTAR WHO PASSED IT TO US AND THEN
HE ANNOUNCED IT PUBLICLY.

Q: HOW ABOUT TO YOUR TEAM THAT WAS IN HANOI? DID
THEY TELL THEM THAT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I DIDN'T SEE THAT --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I DIDN'T SEE THAT --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT COULD BE, BUT I DID NOT SEE
IT IN THERE.

Q: WHAT WAS THE --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: DID THEY REPEAT TO THE JCRC TEAM
THE DESIRE TO RESOLVE THIS 2 YEARS -- 2 YEAR THING?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I BELIEVE THEY DID --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK THEY DID. I THINK THAT

WAS THE LAST PARAGRAPH IN THAT MESSAGE WE GOT THIS
MORNING.

Q: IS THIS THE KIND OF INITIATIVE THAT MIGHT
REQUIRE SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ TO GET INVOLVED IN
ANY WAY?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, OBVIOUSLY, HE'D BE INVOLVED
IN THE DECISIONS MADE ON --

Q: -- DIRECT TALKS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I DON'T THINK SO, NO.

Q: COULD WE TALK ABOUT THE POLITICS A LITTLE BIT
OF THIS? THE VIETNAMESE SEEMED TO BE INTERESTED IN
SPEEDING UP THE PROCESS NOW. TOWARD WHAT END AS FAR
AS YOU'RE CONCERNED?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I'M PRETTY RELUCTANT TO START
SPECULATING ABOUT THEIR MOTIVES. IN FACT, OUR MAIN
CONCERN IS TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THIS ISSUE AND LOOK
PARTICULARLY AT WHAT IS ACTUALLY -- WHAT ACTUALLY
HAPPENS AS OPPOSED AS TO WHAT MIGHT BE THE INTENTIONS
IN THE FUTURE. I CAN TELL YOU THAT THE ARGUMENTS THAT
THE INDONESIAN FOREIGN MINISTER HAS BEEN MAKING TO THE
VIETNAMESE HAVE BEEN ALL ALONG THE LINES OF, "IT'S
TRUE THE AMERICANS WILL NOT NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH
YOU UNTIL THERE'S A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA, BUT THIS,
TOO, IS AN OBSTACLE IN NORMALIZATION AND IT WOULD MAKE
A LOT OF SENSE FROM YOUR OWN POINT OF VIEW TO CLEAR
THIS OBSTACLE OUT OF THE WAY SO THAT WE COULD
CONCENTRATE ON HOW TO GET A SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA."
I WOULD ASSUME THAT SOME VERSION OF THAT LOGIC HAS
PERHAPS PREVAILED TO THE VIETNAMESE, BUT OF COURSE,
THAT ASSUMES THAT WE REALLY ARE ON THE VERGE OF MAKING
THAT KIND OF PROGRESS AND I THINK WE WANT TO BE
CAUTIOUS ABOUT -- WE CONSIDER THIS A WELCOME STEP, BUT
WE WANT TO BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT PREDICTING WHERE IT'S
GOING TO ACTUALLY LEAD UNTIL WE'VE HAD THE DISCUSSIONS

WITH THE VIETNAMESE AND UNTIL WE'VE ACTUALLY SEEN
THINGS START TO HAPPEN. THE TURNOVER -- NOT THE
TURNOVER, BUT THE INFORMATION THAT THEY CONVEYED TO
OUR TEAM IN VIETNAM CERTAINLY WOULD SUGGEST AN EARNEST
OF GOOD INTENTIONS, BUT AGAIN, WE HAVE TO SEE.

Q: WELL, JUST LET ME -- CAN I JUST FOLLOW THAT
UP? IF THERE WAS SOME SORT OF ACCOUNTING TO YOUR
SATISFACTIONS OF THE MIA'S, WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE
WILLING TO TAKE PART IN ANY KIND OF NEGOTIATIONS ON
THE SETTLEMENT IN CAMBODIA BEFORE THERE WAS A
NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH HANOI?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK OUR VIEW ON THAT WOULD BE
VERY MUCH A FUNCTION OF WHAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
WANTED US TO DO AND WE CONSIDER THIS AS FIRST AND
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UNCLAS SECTION 04 OF 10 SECTO 13030

DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
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SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL

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FOREMOST THEIR ISSUE. IT'S THEIR SECURITY THAT'S AT STAKE AND WE WANT TO TAKE OUR LEAD FROM THEM. IF THEY SAW A USEFUL ROLE FOR US TO PLAY, WE WOULD CERTAINLY CONSIDER IT. THE MOST USEFUL THING WE BELIEVE WE CAN DO, AND I THINK THEY BELIEVE THIS ALSO, IS TO MAKE IT CLEAR TO VIETNAM THAT NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AND ALL OF THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS TO VIETNAM THAT COULD FLOW FROM THAT, ARE DEPENDENT ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE, AND THAT IS ONE OF THE MAJOR PIECES OF LEVERAGE THAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE IN THIS EFFORT. WHETHER THEY WOULD WANT US TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY MORE ACTIVE WAY IN NEGOTIATIONS OR NOT IS SOMETHING THAT I THINK WOULD BE VERY MUCH A FUNCTION OF ACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCES AND SINCE THE NEGOTIATIONS AREN'T GOING TO BEGIN IN A SERIOUS WAY UNTIL VIETNAM SHOWS SOME REAL SIGNS OF FLEXIBILITY, WE'RE I THINK KIND OF SPECULATING ABOUT WHAT FORM THEY MIGHT END UP TAKING.

Q: MY NEXT QUESTION -- IS THIS THE LARGEST NUMBER OF REMAINS TO BE RETURNED AT ANY ONE TIME?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THE LARGEST SINGLE TURNOVER, THAT'S RIGHT.

Q: AND WAS THIS EXPECTED FROM PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: EXCUSE ME, I'VE USED THE WORD "TURNOVER" TWICE AND I'M MISSPEAKING. IT'S A PROMISE OF A TURNOVER WITHIN -- I THINK THEY HAVE INDICATED A TIME FRAME OF ROUGHLY 6 TO 8 WEEKS.

Q: IS THERE ANY EXPLANATION --

Q: ...THE LARGEST SINCE '75?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: SINCE THE WAR -- SINCE THE END OF THE WAR.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IT'S THE LARGEST SINCE THE END OF THE WAR, ISN'T IT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, SINCE THE END OF THE WAR.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: OKAY, THAT'S RIGHT.

Q: HAD YOU EXPECTED THIS OR WAS THIS UNEXPECTED FROM PREVIOUS TALKS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK WE HAD NO PARTICULAR REASON TO EXPECT IT.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YOU DID?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK IN THIS MEETING WE'D EXPECTED SOME CONCRETE RESULTS. THE MAGNITUDE OF WHAT WE GOT WAS UNEXPECTED.

Q: WHAT EXPLANATION DID THE VIETNAMESE GIVE THAT THEY HAVE FOUND THESE MANY MORE BODIES THAN BEFORE, OR DID THEY SAY?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY PREVIOUSLY ANNOUNCED THEY ARE SEARCHING FOR REMAINS AND INFORMATION AND THEY'VE UNCOVERED SOME FOR US.

Q: DID THEY SAY WHERE THESE PARTICULAR ONES CAME FROM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: JUST THE PROVINCES.

Q: DO YOU HAVE ANY SUSPICION AS TO WHERE THEY ACTUALLY CAME FROM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I WOULDN'T WANT TO SPECULATE. I JUST HOPE THEY FIND MORE AND BRING THEM OUT.

Q: DID THEY GIVE THE NAMES OF THESE PEOPLE TO THE TEAM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YES, WE DID, AND THE NORMAL SEQUENCE IS WHEN WE RECEIVE THE REMAINS BACK, THEY'LL GO TO THE CIL LAB FOR IDENTIFICATION THEN NEXT OF KIN NOTIFIED AND THEN THE NAMES ANNOUNCED PUBLICLY.

Q: THEY'VE GIVEN THE NAMES?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY HAVE.

Q: ARE ANY OF THESE PEOPLE WHO, AS I RECALL, THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE YOU KNOW THAT THEY KNEW SOMETHING ABOUT FROM OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES, REPORTED

FROM THE PEOPLE WHO WERE PRISONER OR ONE THING OR ANOTHER. ARE ANY OF THESE NAMES IN THAT CATEGORY OF PEOPLE THAT YOU KNEW THEY KNEW?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: PENDING POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION, WE CAN'T SAY FOR SURE, BUT SOME OF THEM DO CLEAR UP SOME KNOWN DISCREPANCY CASES IF IT'S REAL.

Q: WHEN THEY GIVE YOU NAMES OR HAVE GIVEN YOU NAMES IN THE PAST, HAVE THESE TURNED OUT TO BE THE PEOPLE WHO ARE THE REMAINS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THERE'S BEEN SOME -- A FEW ERRORS, BUT NORMALLY SPEAKING, THEY'RE PRETTY GOOD.

Q: WHAT DO YOU MEAN, "DISCREPANCY CASES"? DO YOU MEAN PEOPLE --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: PEOPLE THAT WERE KNOWN POW'S AND BT

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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
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DIDN'T RETURN. EITHER BY PHOTO OR BROADCAST THROUGH
RADIO HANOI OR PRAVDA, THINGS LIKE THAT.

Q: DO YOU HAPPEN TO RECALL WHAT THE NEXT LARGEST
TURNOVER OF REMAINS WAS? WAS IT 13 AND THIS IS TWICE
AS BIG OR -- ?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I'LL HAVE TO GET THE NUMBER.
SOMETHING --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: BALLPARK WOULD BE ABOUT 20,
WOULDN'T IT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL" YES, I WOULD SAY -- RIGHT AFTER
-- '75 WAS AROUND 20, I THINK.

Q: YES. AFTER THE WAR?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IT WAS RIGHT TOWARDS THE END OF
THE WAR.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE'LL TRY TO HAVE THE SPECIFIC --

Q: WAS THAT AFTER WE PULLED OUT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: FRANKLY, WE HAVE TO GET SOMEBODY
TO TAKE OUT OUR LIST. WE DON'T HAVE IT WITH US.

Q: WHEN WILL THE REMAINS OF THESE BE RETURNED?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE THINK 6 TO 8 WEEKS.

Q: SIX --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: 6 TO 8 WEEKS.

Q: THE AMERICANS --

Q: ALL IN ONE BUNCH?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: YES. THAT'S NORMALLY THE WAY
IT'S DONE.

Q: THEY ARE ALL AMERICAN SERVICEMEN, RIGHT? THE
BODIES?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY ARE ALL ALLEGED TO BE
AMERICAN SERVICEMEN. AGAIN, WE HAVE CIVILIANS
MISSING, TOO, AND THERE MAY BE --

Q: BUT THEY ARE ALL AMERICANS, RIGHT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: ALL AMERICANS.

Q: AND MOST --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: PENDING IDENTIFICATION. I MEAN,
THAT'S THE QUALIFICATION WE ALWAYS HAVE TO PUT ON
UNTIL WE'VE ACTUALLY EXAMINED THEM. THERE HAVE BEEN
ONE OR TWO CASES THAT HAVE TURNED OUT NOT TO BE.

Q: WAS THERE ANY MESSAGE SENT THROUGH THE
TECHNICAL TEAM ABOUT WHAT VIETNAM WOULD LIKE TO SEE
DONE ON THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE? THERE'S NO ATTEMPTED
LINKAGE THERE OR ANYTHING?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT DOESN'T COME UP AT ALL IN
THOSE FORUMS.

Q: DO YOU SEE ON THAT POINT -- DO YOU SEE ANY
CONTRADICTIONS OR DIFFICULTY IN ASKING VIETNAM AND
COOPERATING WITH VIETNAM TO INCREASE THE COOPERATION
IN THE PRISONER -- ON THE MIA FIELD AT THE SAME TIME
THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO BE READY TO
STEP UP ITS AID TO THE RESISTANCE FORCES FIGHTING
VIETNAM IN CAMBODIA? DO YOU THINK THAT'S GOING TO
CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH VIETNAM OR IS IT TWO TOTALLY
UNRELATED THINGS OR WHAT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO, WE AND VIETNAM HAVE AGREED
THAT THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE AND SHOULD BE
RESOLVED WITHOUT RELATION TO OUR DIFFERENCES ON OTHER
ISSUES. WHETHER THAT'S TOTALLY REALISTIC OR NOT ONE
CAN ARGUE ABOUT, BUT THAT IS, IN FACT, THE POSITION WE
HAVE BOTH TAKEN. WE BELIEVE STRONGLY IT IS A
HUMANITARIAN ISSUE AND SHOULD BE CLEARED UP; THAT, IN
FACT, I THINK, ATTEMPTS BY VIETNAM TO MANIPULATE IT
FOR POLITICAL ADVANTAGE ARE REALLY QUITE
COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE AND PERHAPS THAT IS SINKING IN;
THAT IN TERMS OF VIETNAM'S OWN INTERESTS, I WOULD
THINK, IN GETTING A FAVORABLE CLIMATE FOR CONSIDERING
ITS CASE IN A SETTLEMENT, CERTAINLY IT DOESN'T HELP TO
HAVE THIS ISSUE HANGING OVER THINGS. BUT WE HAVE

TRIED VERY HARD TO KEEP THESE TWO ISSUES SEPARATED, TO
CONVINCE THE ASEAN COUNTRIES THAT -- AND I THINK THEY
ARE CONVINCED -- THAT WE CAN DISCUSS THIS ISSUE WITH
HANOI AS A HUMANITARIAN MATTER WITHOUT BEING PUSHED
INTO CONCESSIONS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. AND,
FRANKLY, THE FAMILIES OF THE MISSING HAVE BEEN
WONDERFUL IN THAT REGARD. THEY ARE VERY ANXIOUS THAT
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PURSUE EVERY REASONABLE CHANNEL
FOR GETTING AN ACCOUNTING, AND QUITE INSISTENT ABOUT
THAT, BUT THEY HAVE NEVER IN ANY WAY PRESSURED US TO
MAKE POLITICAL CONCESSIONS IN ORDER TO MAKE PROGRESS.

Q: WHEN YOU ARE DOING THE TECHNICAL TALKS, DO YOU
EVER BRING UP ANY OF THE ALLEGED SIGHTINGS WITH THE
VIETNAMESE OR IS THAT NOT AN ISSUE THAT YOU DEAL
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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

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SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL

E. O. 12356: N/A
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DIRECTLY WITH THEM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT THE PROBLEM
OF POSSIBLY LIVE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM, PRINCIPALLY
ALONG THE LINES OF MAKING IT CLEAR TO THEM THAT IF
THERE ARE LIVE AMERICANS AND THEY WILL TURN THEM OVER
TO U, THAT WE WILL COOPERATE IN MAKING THAT AS
UNEMBARRASSING A QUESTION AS POSSIBLE AND THAT WE ARE
INTERESTED IN GETTING OUR PEOPLE BACK, NOT IN POINTING
TH FINGER --

Q: EVEN IF OUR PEOPLE DON'T WANT TO COME BACK? I
MEAN, THE SPECULATION IS THAT THERE MAY BE HALF A
DOZEN RUNNING AROUND IN THERE WHO HAVE NO INTENTION OF
COMING BACK?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, IT'S OUR STRONG FEELING
THAT THEIR FAMILIES ARE ENTITLED TO KNOW THEIR
CIRCUMSTANCES EVEN IF THEY DON'T WANT TO RETURN, AND --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: -- IT'S ALSO OUR POSITION WE
REFUSE TO CHARACTERIZE ANYONE BEFORE THEY COME OUT,
REGARDLESS OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SIGHTING.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK IT'S HARD TO MAKE A
JUDGMENT THAT SOMEBODY REALLY DOESN'T WANT TO COME
BACK WHEN HE ISN'T EVEN ABLE TO TALK TO THE PEOPLE WHO
HAVE THE STRONGEST INTEREST IN SEEING HIM RETURN.

Q: WHAT ARE THE ODDS...?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: OBVIOUSLY, IF I MIGHT UNDERSCORE
ON THIS POINT, ONE OF THE THINGS IN THE PAST THAT HAS
DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS A REAL PROBLEM HERE, AND
THAT CAUSES PROFOUND ANXIETY FOR THE FAMILIES, IS THE
VERY WELL-KNOWN CASE OF PRIVATE GARWOOD WHO WAS THERE
FOR 6 YEARS AFTER THE END OF OUR INVOLVEMENT IN
VIETNAM DURING WHICH PERIOD THE VIETNAMESE WERE
DENYING THAT THERE WERE ANY AMERICANS STILL LEFT.
WELL, OBVIOUSLY, HE WAS THERE AND THERE COULD BE
OTHERS IN -- AND THAT IS FOR ANYONE WHOSE LOVED ONES

ARE STILL UNACCOUNTED FOR, OBVIOUSLY, AN ANNOYING
PROBLEM.

Q: IS THERE ANY WAY TO PUT ODDS ON THE LIKELIHOOD
THAT THERE ARE OTHER AMERICANS ALIVE IN VIETNAM.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE DON'T -- NO, I DON'T THINK YOU
CAN PUT ODDS ON IT AND WE DON'T TRY TO.

Q: WHAT ARE THE CREDIBILITY OF SOME OF THE
REPORTS, FOR EXAMPLE? YOU MUST --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THERE ARE A LOT OF REPORTS THAT
WE HAVE -- I MEAN, WE SPEND A LOT OF TIME IN GOING
THROUGH THESE REPORTS IN TRYING TO CHECK THEM OUT.
THERE ARE A LOT THAT CORRELATE IN THE END TO PEOPLE
WHO DID COME BACK -- SOME OF THEM CAME BACK IN THE '75
PERIOD, I GUESS. THERE ARE A LOT THAT SEEMED TO TURN
OUT TO BE FABRICATIONS, THEN THERE IS A LARGE NUMBER
THAT SEEM TO HOLD UP UNDER VARIOUS KINDS OF TESTS OF
ACCURACY. WE DON'T HAVE THE KIND OF EVIDENCE THAT
WOULD PROVE THERE ARE LIVE AMERICANS IN VIETNAM, BUT
WE ALSO HAVE TO ACT ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THERE MAY
BE, AND THAT IS HOW WE PROCEED, AND WE DON'T TRY TO
PUT A PROBABILITY ON IT.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: ONE OF THE PROBLEMS WITH
SIGHTINGS IS TIME AND SPACE FACTORS. IF A REFUGEE
COMES OUT IN 1984 AND HE SAW, FOR EXAMPLE, TWO
CAUCASIANS WHO HE BELIEVED TO BE AMERICANS IN A SAMPAN
BETWEEN (PLACE NAME) AND SOME VILLAGE, YOU OBVIOUSLY
CAN'T CONFIRM THAT AT THAT TIME, BUT HIS BACKGROUND
MAY CHECK OUT. HE MAY PASS A POLYGRAPH TEST AND
VARIOUS OTHER THINGS, BUT IT'S SOMETHING YOU CAN'T
FOLLOW UP AT THAT POINT IN TIME.

Q: IN THESE DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS EITHER WITH
MOCHTAR OR THE TEAM OR IN SOME OTHER WAY, HAS THERE
BEEN ANY INDICATION OF A VIETNAMESE INTEREST OR
MOVEMENT ON THE OTHER HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, THAT IS TO

SAY, THE RE-EDUCATION CAMP PEOPLE AND THE OFFER THAT
HAS BEEN MADE BY THE UNITED STATES TO TAKE SOME OF
THEM?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I GUESS THAT I'D HAVE TO SAY THAT
THE MOVEMENT LATELY HAS BEEN ALL BACKWARDS AND THE
MOST RECENT STATEMENTS FROM THE VIETNAMESE SUGGEST A
PRETTY INFLEXIBLE ATTITUDE ON THIS ISSUE. I DON'T
THINK THAT MEANS WE WANT TO DROP IT, BUT MOST RECENT
COMMENTS BY LE DUC THO BACK IN -- THE END OF APRIL, I
THINK -- THAT THEY WOULDN'T RETURN THESE -- LET THESE
PEOPLE GO AT ALL. I HOPE THAT'S NOT TRUE, BUT THAT'S
WHERE THE SITUATION IS NOW.

Q: THAT IS NOT DEALT WITH IN YOUR PRIVATE,
TECHNICAL TEAMS WHEN THEY GO?
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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

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SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: NO, THAT WE HAVE PRINCIPALLY DEALT WITH THROUGH OUR REFUGEE AFFAIRS PEOPLE. WE HAVE -- THE VIETNAMESE INSISTED THIS WAS NOT A UNHCR ISSUE AND WE SAID, OKAY, WE'RE WILLING TO TALK ABOUT THIS WITH YOU BILATERALLY AND WE HAVE DISCUSSED IT BILATERALLY ON A NUMBER OF OCCASIONS AND (OFFICIAL) DISCUSSED IT WITH FOREIGN MINISTER THACH IN --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: -- TWICE.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: TWICE, IN NEW YORK LAST FALL AND THEN AGAIN IN FEBRUARY, BUT THE TECHNICAL TEAMS ARE MADE UP OF MILITARY PEOPLE AT THE JOINT CASUALTY RESEARCH CENTER IN HONOLULU. THEY ARE REMARKABLE, REMARKABLE PEOPLE AND REMARKABLY COMPETENT AT THE JOB THEY DO, BUT THE JOB THEY DO IS RECOVERING MISSING AMERICANS AND THEY DON'T GET INTO OTHER MATTERS.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT'S A POINT, TOO. IF, ON A TECHNICAL PRESENCE IN HANOI, YOU'VE GOT TO KEEP IN MIND WHAT WE'RE TALKING ABOUT IS MID-RANK MILITARY PEOPLE DIGGING IN THE MUD, ESSENTIALLY. WE TALK ABOUT OFFICES AND PRESENCE AND ALL OF THAT -- WE'RE REALLY TALKING ABOUT EXCAVATING CRASH SITES AND OPENING GRAVES UP IN PLACES. IT'S NOT --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: BY THE WAY, JUST FOR THOSE OF YOU WHO ARE INTERESTED. BOTH OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS THAT DO SO MUCH OF THE BASIC WORK ARE IN HONOLULU. ONE IS THE JOINT CASALTY RESEARCH CENTER THAT TRIES TO CORRELATE INFORMATION, FIGURE OUT WHICH CASES ARE WHERE, AND HOW THEY MIGHT BE PURSUED. THE OTHER IS THE CASUALTY IDENTIFICATION LABORATORY THAT TRIES TO PIECE OUT THE IDENTITY OF REMAINS WHEN WE GET THEM BACK, AND I THINK BOTH OF THEM WOULD PROBABLY BE AMENABLE TO SHOWING SOME OF YOU THROUGH WHEN WE'RE THERE NEXT WEEK IF YOU'RE INTERESTED. WE COULD TRY TO SET THAT UP. THE JCRC IS ALL THE WAY --

Q: I DON'T THINK THEY'VE DONE MUCH ON THAT.
ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY HAVE NOT? OKAY. I SHOULDN'T PROMISE WHAT I CAN'T DELIVER.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THEY CAN TALK ABOUT THEIR METHODS, BUT IT IS, AFTER ALL, A MORTUARY, REALLY. THEY DON'T REALLY GET INTO A LOT OF NITTY-GRITTY.

Q: YOU MENTIONED 6 TO 8 WEEKS AS THE FIRST POSSIBLE TIME THAT WE MIGHT SEE THE REMAINS OF THOSE 26 INDIVIDUALS. ARE WE GOING TO WAIT UNTIL THEN BEFORE THERE ARE ANY HIGH-LEVEL TALKS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I WOULD SAY THAT WE WOULD PROCEED ON EXPLORING THE VIETNAMESE OFFER TO RESOLVE IT, THE ISSUE WITHIN TWO YEARS AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN. WE'RE NOT -- I MEAN, THE QUESTION OF, WE'D LIKE TO GET THESE REMAINS BACK AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN, TOO, BUT THERE -- THE TIMING OF THE TWO IS NO -- THERE'S NO CONNECTION BETWEEN THE TIMING OF THE TWO.

Q: DO YOU HAVE --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I WANTED -- THAT'S NOT A PREDICTION THAT ONE WILL HAPPEN SOON IN 6 TO 8 WEEKS.

Q: WHAT KIND OF LEVEL OF HIGH-LEVEL TALKS ARE WE TALKING ABOUT HERE?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, THE TALKS WE'VE HAD PREVIOUSLY HAVE BEEN WITH THE VIETNAMESE FOREIGN MINISTER. THEY HAVE BEEN CONDUCTED EITHER BY MR. CHILDRESS WHO'S A SENIOR MEMBER OF THE NSC STAFF OR BY RICH ARMITAGE, WHO IN THE FIRST INSTANCE WAS A DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE AND THEN THE SECOND TIME HE WENT, WAS AN ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE. SO, ROUGHLY, DICK'S AND MY LEVEL -- SOME PEOPLE CONSIDER THAT HIGH, SOME OF US DON'T, BUT ON THE VIETNAMESE SIDE, IT'S THE FOREIGN MINISTER WHICH IS UNQUESTIONABLY HIGH-LEVEL.

Q: WELL, THIS IS WHAT PUZZLES ME, BECAUSE DICK

WAS IN THERE, ARMITAGE WAS IN THERE, AND YET THE VIETNAMESE SPECIFICALLY SAID, "WE WANT HIGH-LEVEL TALKS". NOW, WHAT DO THEY MEAN BY THAT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I SEE WHAT YOU'RE SAYING, BUT I DON'T READ THAT INTO IT AT ALL. I'M SAYING IT'S ANOTHER HIGH-LEVEL MISSION.

Q: THEY SIMPLY WANT YOU TO GO BACK AGAIN?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: FOR INSTANCE, THEY ASKED FOR HIGH-LEVEL MEETINGS FOR DICK TO COME IN FEBRUARY AND IT TURNED OUT FOR THE REASON THAT THEY WERE PREPARED TO INCREASE THE FREQUENCY OF TECHNICAL MEETINGS. I DON'T THINK THERE'S ANY ISSUE ABOUT THE PAST LEVEL. I THINK THE POINT IS THAT MOCHTAR HAS GOTTEN THROUGH TO THEM WITH THE IDEA THAT, RATHER THAN DRIBBLING OUT

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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

USIA

BANGKOK PLEASE PASS USDEL SECRETARY IN BANGKOK FOR PA
JUDY O'NEILL \

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

EIGHT REMAINS A YEAR, THEY REALLY OUGHT TO MAKE AN EFFORT TO GET THIS ISSUE OUT OF THE WAY. THE BASIC QUESTION IS GOING TO BE WHETHER THEY'VE MADE THAT KIND OF DECISION OR NOT. IF THEY'VE MADE IT, THE LEVEL ON WHICH WE'VE SET UP THE PROCESS IN THE PAST WILL WORK IN THE FUTURE. IF THEY HAVEN'T MADE IT, NO LEVEL WILL SOLVE IT.

Q: I JUST HAD A QUESTION. HOW HAVE THEY TRIED TO INJECT POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS INTO THIS ISSUE IN THE PAST?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WE HAVE BEEN VERY CLEAR THAT WE WON'T PERMIT THAT AND SINCE THEIR POSITION, IN FACT, THEIR LINE HAS CONSISTENTLY BEEN THAT THIS IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE AND THEY'RE DOING EVERYTHING THEY CAN ABOUT IT. THEY HAVE AVOIDED SAYING THAT THIS IS TIED TO OTHER POLITICAL ISSUES. I'M SURE THAT IF THEY THOUGHT THEY COULD USE IT AS LEVERAGE, I IMAGINE THEY WOULD TRY AND OUR STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO PERSUADE THEM AND I THINK WE'VE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN THAT REGARD, THAT THAT'S NOT GOING TO HAPPEN AND THAT, AS I SAID, VERY IMPORTANT, THIS HAS BEEN THE ATTITUDE OF THE FAMILIES, THAT THEY ARE NOT GOING TO SIT STILL TO BE MANIPULATED THAT WAY, BUT THAT IN A NEGATIVE WAY, IT CAN COST THEM POLITICALLY IF THEY CONTINUE TO TAKE THE POSTURE THEY HAVE TAKEN.

Q: BUT THE VIETNAMESE HAVE NOT TRIED IT SO FAR AND YOU'VE TURNED THEM DOWN ON IT?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IN THIS ADMINISTRATION THEY'VE NEVER RAISED REPARATIONS, AID, TRADE, NORMALIZATION IN DIRECT TOUCH WITH THIS ISSUE AT ALL.

Q: THEY DID IN THE PREVIOUS ONE?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING IN THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION THE TALKS BROKE DOWN, IN FACT, ON REPARATIONS AND THOSE SORTS OF THINGS, BUT THEY'VE

NEVER RAISED IT WITH OUR ADMINISTRATION.

Q: YOU'RE SAYING THAT THE RESOLUTION OF THE POW/MIA ISSUE WOULD "IMPROVE THE ATMOSPHERE," ALLOW THE UNITED STATES TO HELP "IN PROMOTING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO CAMBODIA, ONE IN WHICH THE UNITED STATES, IF PART OF IT, WOULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM" -- THIS WAS THE PRESS CONFERENCE WITH THE ASEAN JOURNALISTS OR SOMEBODY. CAN YOU -- I MEAN, IS THIS A CORRECT EXPRESSION OF THE U.S. -- IS THIS QUOTATION CORRECTLY QUOTED AS WHAT THE U.S. ATTITUDE IS AS TO WHAT THE IMPACT OR RESOLVING THE MIA ISSUE WOULD BE? OR CAN YOU PUT IT INTO YOUR OWN WORDS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: ACTUALLY, I THINK THOSE ARE MY OWN WORDS, SO I HAVE TO LIVE WITH THEM, BUT I -- AND THIS IS A TRICKY ONE TO SAY -- MAY I PUT IT THIS WAY -- CLEARLY GETTING RID OF THIS ISSUE -- GETTING THIS ISSUE BEHIND US WOULD REMOVE MAJOR OBSTACLES TO NORMALIZATION. IN FACT, IT'S AN OBSTACLE TO PEOPLE EVEN THINKING SERIOUSLY ABOUT NORMALIZATION. BUT IT'S NOT A STEP ON A SORT OF INEVITABLE ROAD TO NORMALIZATION BECAUSE NORMALIZATION IN THE END STILL DEPENDS ON THE RESOLUTION OF THE CAMBODIAN ISSUE. BUT I THINK IN MANY WAYS OUR ABILITY TO PLAY A CREATIVE ROLE IN A SEARCH FOR A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT, IF THERE WERE ONE TAKING PLACE, AND I HAVE TO EMPHASIZE THAT IN THE FIRST PLACE REQUIRES SOME REAL DEMONSTRATION OF FLEXIBILITY FROM VIETNAM THAT WE HAVEN'T SEEN, BUT IF WE HAD A MORE ACTIVE NEGOTIATING PROCESS GOING ON AND WE WERE TALKING TO CONGRESSMEN ABOUT THE ROLE THE U.S. COULD PLAY, I THINK ONE OF THE FIRST QUESTIONS WOULD COME UP IS, "WHY THE HELL ARE WE EVEN THINKING ABOUT THIS WHEN THE VIETNAMESE HAVEN'T ACCOUNTED FOR OUR OWN PEOPLE?" SO, IT'S AN OBSTACLE THERE WHICH WE WOULD THINK WOULD BE IN EVERYONE'S BENEFIT TO CLEAR OUT OF

THE WAY, BUT IN THE END, NORMALIZATION IS GOING TO DEPEND ON A VERY DIFFERENT ATTITUDE ON VIETNAM'S PART WITH REGARD TO CAMBODIA. SO, IT'S -- I DON'T KNOW IF I'VE MADE IT ANY CLEARER OR JUST MUDDIED THE WATERS SOME. IT IS COMPLEX -- I CAN'T SAY THERE'S NO RELATION IN NORMALIZATION, BUT I DO WANT TO MAKE IT VERY CLEAR THAT AS WE HAVE MADE IT CLEAR TO THE VIETNAMESE AND TO THE ASEANS THAT NORMALIZATION IS DEPENDENT ON A CAMBODIAN SETTLEMENT.

Q: ON THAT POINT, SECRETARY SHULTZ WAS NOTABLY NEGATIVE TOWARD THE PROPOSAL BEING DISCUSSED BY ASEAN FOR PROXIMITY TALKS WITH A VIETNAMESE DELEGATION INCLUDING REPRESENTATIVES OF THE HENG SAMRIN GOVERNMENT. IF THE U.S. OPPOSES THAT, WHAT CAN IT SAY

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DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS AND EAP

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SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT

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JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

TO ASEAN WHICH HAS TAKEN THE LEAD, IF ASEAN WANTS TO
GO AHEAD ON THIS BASIS?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, MY UNDERSTANDING OF -- NOW
THAT YOU'VE ASKED ME THIS BEFORE AND I HADN'T HEARD IT
AND I READ THE TRANSCRIPT OF WHAT THE SECRETARY SAID,
AND I'VE TALKED TO HIM A LITTLE BIT ABOUT IT, BUT WHAT
HE WAS EMPHASIZING IS OUR STRONG CONCERN THAT WE NOT
HAVE A PROCESS OF LEGITIMIZES THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME
WHICH WE CONSIDER -- AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
THEMSELVES CONSIDER -- TO BE REALLY NOTHING MORE THAN
A PUPPET OF HANOI.

Q: WE WERE TOLD --

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THAT'S A CONCERN THAT I BELIEVE
IS SHARED BY THE ASEAN COUNTRIES AND I WOULD EXPECT
THAT THAT CONCERN IS GOING TO BE REFLECTED IN ANY
PROPOSALS THAT COME OUT OF A ASEAN CONSENSUS. WE MEAN
IT WHEN WE SAY WE RESPECT AND SUPPORT THEIR LEAD AND
WE WILL CONSIDER SERIOUSLY ANY PROPOSAL THAT THEY PUT
FORWARD. BUT I THINK THE CONCERN THE SECRETARY
UNDERScoreD IS AN ASEAN CONCERN AS WELL, AND IF
THEY'RE STILL IN THE PROCESS OF DISCUSSING THIS ISSUE,
AND I DON'T WANT TO PREDICT WHERE THEY'RE GOING TO
COME OUT, BUT FROM WHAT I KNOW ABOUT THEIR
DISCUSSIONS, THERE IS A LOT OF CONCERN AMONG THEM THAT
THIS BE DONE IN A WAY -- I THINK ON SIHANOUK'S PART AS
WELL, AND HE WAS INVOLVED IN THIS ORIGINALLY -- THAT
IT NOT BE DONE IN A WAY THAT LEGITIMIZES THE HENG
SAMRIN REGIME.

Q: YOU SAID THAT YOU'D LIKE TO EXPLORE THE
TWO-YEAR FRAMEWORK AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. IS IT
CONCEIVABLE THAT (OFFICIAL) WOULD GO TO HANOI AFTER
KUALA LUMPUR? I MEAN ARE WE TALKING IN TERMS OF THAT
QUICKLY AN EXPLORATION?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: I THINK REALISTICALLY WE'RE

TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING THAT IS SUFFICIENTLY A BIG
DEPARTURE FROM THE PACE OF PROGRESS TO DATE AND IF WE
START ON, AND I THINK WE WANT TO BE VERY SURE THAT WE
HAVE THE MEANS TO DO THE JOB AND THE TIME TO FIND, SO,
MY SENSE IS JUST GETTING OUR POSITION CLEAR IS GOING
TO TAKE MORE TIME THAN THAT. WE'LL OBVIOUSLY WANT TO
MOVE FORWARD AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN, BUT WE ALSO WANT TO
MOVE FORWARD CAREFULLY. I HAVE -- I MEAN, I'M
AVOIDING A PREDICTION, BUT I'M PRETTY CONFIDENT
(OFFICIAL) WILL NOT GO TO HANOI RIGHT AFTER THIS
TRIP. IT WILL TAKE MORE TIME THAN THAT.

Q: COULD YOU GIVE ANY GUESS -- I KNOW IT'S NOT --
YOU COULDN'T POSSIBLY BE PRECISE, BUT LOOKING AT 2400
UNACCOUNTED FOR, TO GET A FULL ACCOUNTING ARE WE
TALKING ABOUT A HUNDRED, SEVERAL HUNDRED, WHAT WOULD
YOU GUESS IT WOULD BE?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: ...THERE ARE -- NO, THERE ARE
VERY, VERY GOOD REASONS FOR NOT TRYING TO MAKE THOSE
SORT OF GUESSES AND CERTAINLY NOT TO NAIL THEM IN
CONCRETE BECAUSE THERE REALLY IS A VERY WIDE RANGE IN
POSSIBLE NUMBERS, AND WHETHER A PARTICULAR NUMBER IN
THE END SEEMS TO BE OF THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING
OR NOT IS GOING TO BE A FUNCTION OF MORE THAN JUST
WHETHER THE NUMBER IS SOMEWHERE IN THE TARGET ZONE AND
IT'S GOING TO DEPEND ON, AS I SAID, THE KIND OF WORK
WE SEE HAVING BEEN DONE. IF A LOT OF SITES HAVE BEEN
EXCAVATED AND EXCAVATED THOROUGHLY AND NO ONE HAS BEEN
TURNED UP IN THEM, THAT MIGHT BE MORE MEANINGFUL THAN
TWO SITES EXCAVATED IN WHICH 20 PEOPLE ARE TURNED UP,
BUT THERE'S A WHOLE BUNCH OF OTHER WORK THAT'S
UNDONE. I THINK IT -- THERE'S CERTAINLY A LARGE
NUMBER OF PEOPLE THAT WE KNOW IN THE HUNDREDS THAT
SIMPLY CAN'T BE ACCOUNTED FOR FULLY, EVER. BUT THE
RANGE ON WHAT MIGHT BE DONE IS SO LARGE THAT I THINK

IF WE SET OURSELVES A TARGET, IT REALLY BECOMES A
PROBLEM IN SOLVING IT.

Q: HOW MANY SITES ARE THERE THAT -- FROM THE U.S.
POINT OF VIEW THAT NEED TO BE EXPLORED?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: AGAIN, I THINK AROUND -- THERE'S
VIETNAMESE KNOWLEDGEABILITY THAT, IN OTHER WORDS, THEY
KNOW CERTAIN THINGS AND WE KNOW THEY KNOW THEM, AND
THEN THERE'S OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE WHICH GIVES US
ANOTHER BODY OF KNOWLEDGE AND WHEN YOU COMBINE THOSE
TWO YOU CAN COME UP WITH SORT OF A ROUGH, VERY ROUGH,
FEELING ABOUT WHAT SHOULD BE, BUT UNTIL THE VIETNAMESE
START NARROWING THAT GAP, THEN IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO
SAY WHAT IS THE FULLEST POSSIBLE ACCOUNTING. AND
THAT'S WHY (OFFICIAL) WAS SAYING BEFORE, "WE'LL KNOW
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HAVE HAD PREVIOUSLY, I BELIEVE.

Q: THANK YOU.

(END TRANSCRIPT)

YAKI UNQUOTE SHULTZ

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JUDY O'NEILL

E.O. 12356: N/A
SUBJECT: HONG KONG POW/MIAS BRIEFING TRANSCRIPT --

WHEN WE GET THERE". WHEN THEY CLEAR UP THE
DISCREPANCIES AND WE FULFILL FOR OUR PART WHAT WE KNOW
FROM OUR OWN INTELLIGENCE, THEN WE KNOW WE'RE GETTING
CLOSE AND I WOULD THINK THE COOPERATION WOULD BE SUCH
AT THAT POINT THAT OTHER THINGS WOULD COME TO LIGHT
THAT WE DON'T KNOW MAYBE THAT THEY DO.

Q: WELL, WOULD YOU HAPPEN TO KNOW HOW MANY MIA'S
THERE WERE FROM WORLD WAR II THAT WERE NEVER ACCOUNTED
FOR?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: WELL, SEVERAL THOUSAND, BUT THE
COMPARISON IS TOTALLY ERRONEOUS. WE HAD ACCESS TO THE
BATTLEFIELD.

Q: HOW ABOUT FROM THE KOREAN WAR?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THERE ARE 389, I THINK, STILL
LISTED POW FROM KOREA AND THAT'S QUITE A FEW THAT WERE
BURIED AND WE'VE RAISED THAT AT PANMUNJON. NOW,
THAT'S A SIMILAR SITUATION. WE DON'T HAVE ACCESS TO
NORTH KOREA.

Q: SEVERAL THOUSAND FROM WORLD WAR II AND 389
FROM KOREA?

ADMIN OFFICIAL: THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE LISTED
POW FROM KOREA AND THEN THERE WAS A COUPLE THOUSAND OR
SO -- POW FROM KOREA AND THEN A COUPLE OF THOUSAND
THAT WERE -- BODIES NOT RECOVERED THAT WERE PROBABLY
BURIED.

ADMIN OFFICIAL: CORRECT ME IF I'M WRONG ON THIS,
BUT I THINK THERE'S ANOTHER IMPORTANT DIFFERENCE, TOO,
AND THAT IS THAT OUR ABILITY TO IDENTIFY REMAINS HAS
IMPROVED SPECTACULARLY. THERE IS ONE UNKNOWN SOLDIER
FROM THE 56,000 IN VIETNAM AND, AS YOU KNOW, THERE ARE
THOUSANDS FROM KOREA, AND TENS OF THOUSANDS, I THINK,
FROM WORLD WAR II. SO, THE FACT THAT WE CAN IDENTIFY
EVERYBODY THAT COMES BACK CREATES A MUCH HIGHER
EXPECTATION ON THE PART OF THE FAMILIES THAN YOU WOULD

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING
ENROUTE FROM HONG KONG TO BANGKOK

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WE TALKED TO YOU ON THE FIRST LEG OF THIS TRIP. YOU WERE QUITE NEGATIVE ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF PROXIMITY TALKS INVOLVING THE THREE KHMER OPPOSITION GROUPS, AND THE VIETNAMESE DELEGATION WHICH MIGHT INCLUDE MEMBERS OF THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME. HAVE YOU CHANGED YOUR VIEW ON THAT AT ALL IN THE INTERVENING TWO DAYS?

A. NO.

Q. WHY DOES THE UNITED STATES, WHICH SUPPORTS PROXIMITY TALKS WITH THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT OF BABRAK KARMAL, OPPOSE PROXIMITY TALKS WHICH MIGHT INVOLVE THE HENG SAMRIN REGIME WHICH IS SUPERFICIALLY NOT A LOT

A. WELL, I'M NOT SO SURE THAT THE CONTRAST THAT YOU ARE PORTRAYING IS SO WITH THE AFGHAN TALKS.

Q. DO WE NOT SUPPORT THE PROXIMITY TALKS THERE?

A. WE ARE VERY MUCH IN SUPPORT OF PAKISTAN WHICH HAS ITS DOUBTS ABOUT THAT REGIME, OBVIOUSLY.

Q. BUT WE DO SUPPORT THE U.N. TALKS, RIGHT?

A. WE SUPPORT THE U.N. TALKS.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, YOU MEET WITH THE RESISTANCE LEADERS THIS AFTERNOON. LET ME ASK, IS THE RESISTANCE A FICTION? I ASK THAT BECAUSE THEY'VE LOST THEIR BASES IN CAMBODIA, THEY ARE DESCRIBED AS MILITARILY WEAK, MORALE IS SAID TO BE BAD, THERE IS NO STABLE COALITION, AND OF THE THREE THE KHMER ROUGE ARE THE MOST POWERFUL AND NOT A VERY ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE. IS IT A FORCE, IS IT A FACTOR, WHERE DOES IT GO?

A. WELL, IT IS CERTAINLY A FORCE AND A FACTOR; IT STANDS FOR THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLE OF CAMBODIA, IT HAS WIDE INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, IT HAS A CAPACITY TO ASSERT ITSELF. OBVIOUSLY IT HAS HAD ITS PROBLEMS RECENTLY, BUT IT HAS BEEN REVIEWING ITS STRATEGY AND ONE OF THE PURPOSES OF COMING TO THAILAND AS PART OF THE TRIP TO THIS PART OF THE WORLD, AND PRELIMINARY TO THE ASEAN MEETINGS, IS TO GIVE A SENSE OF THE SUPPORT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE ASEAN EFFORT AND FOR THE EFFORT OF THESE PEOPLE TO STAND UP FOR THE INDEPENDENCE AND FREEDOM OF CAMBODIA. SO, WE ARE EXPRESSING OUR SUPPORT FOR THEM. THEY CLEARLY HAVE

THEIR PROBLEMS, BUT THEY ALSO CAN DO POSITIVE THINGS AND WE WANT TO SUPPORT THEM.

Q. WHAT IS THEIR CAPACITY TO ASSERT THEMSELVES, THE PHRASE YOU USED?

A. WELL THEY HAVE MANY ADHERENTS, AND THOSE ADHERENTS HAVE A CAPACITY TO MAKE A MARK INSIDE CAMBODIA.
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

Q. MR. SECRETARY, CAN YOU GIVE US YOUR ASSESSMENT OF
THE VIETNAMESE DECISION TO REPATRIATE THE TWENTY-SIX?
DO YOU FEEL THAT THIS IS A REAL SIGNAL OF THEIR
SERIOUSNESS TO DEAL WITH THE POW/MIAS?

A. WELL, I HOPE IT IS. THEY HAVE SAID THAT THEY
WOULD LIKE TO GET THIS ISSUE CLEANED UP WITHIN A
TWO-YEAR PERIOD, AND WE CERTAINLY FAVOR THAT. THIS IS
KIND OF A DOWNPAYMENT, YOU MIGHT SAY, OF A SUBSTANTIAL
SORT, SO WE WELCOME IT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IF THE POW/MIA QUESTIONS WERE
SOLVED, WHAT IS THIS ADMINISTRATION PREPARED TO DO IN
TERMS OF DEALING WITH THE VIETNAMESE? WHAT EXACTLY
WOULD YOU OFFER THEM? WHAT DO YOU THINK THEY WOULD

A. WELL THE POW/MIA ISSUE IS A HUMANITARIAN ISSUE.
THAT IS OUR VIEW, AND THE VIETNAMESE HAVE STATED THEIR
VIEW SIMILARLY. SO IT'S A HUMANITARIAN PROBLEM AND
ISSUE, AND IF IT'S SOLVED, THAT'S ALL TO THE GOOD. IT
BASICALLY IS NOT PART OF OR RELATED TO OTHER ISSUES
THAT SEPARATE THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM.
Q. BUT IS THERE ANY GROUNDS THERE FOR SOME POLITICAL
MEETING OF THE MINDS, OR ISN'T THERE?

A. WELL, CERTAINLY. IF THE VIETNAMESE GET OUT OF
CAMBODIA AND LET THE CAMBODIAN REGIME THAT'S TRULY
REPRESENTATIVE OF CAMBODIANS EMERGE, THAT WOULD BE
WHAT WE'RE LOOKING FOR AND WHAT THE ASEAN COUNTRIES
HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, HOW SOON WOULD THE UNITED STATES BE
READY TO TALK TO VIETNAM TO SEE WHAT THEY HAVE IN MIND
ABOUT THE HIGH-LEVEL TALKS ON FINALLY RESOLVING THE
POW ISSUE?

A. WELL, I WOULD EXPECT WE CAN GET MOVING ON THAT
PROMPTLY. WE CERTAINLY HAVE EVERY DESIRE TO DO SO,
AND WE'RE QUITE WELL PREPARED TO DO SO. THE ISSUES
AND PROBLEMS ARE ALL TOO WELL KNOWN, AND JUST HOW
RAPIDLY PRECISE ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE MADE I DON'T KNOW,
BUT THERE SHOULDN'T BE ANY GREAT PROBLEM IN DOING THAT.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, WHY DO YOU THINK THE VIETNAMESE ARE
MOVING NOW TEN YEARS AFTER THE WAR, WHY NOW?

A. I DON'T KNOW. MAYBE THEY'RE MOTIVATED BY
HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS.

Q. WHAT ELSE DO YOU THINK?

A. I'M NOT GOING TO SPECULATE ABOUT IT. IT'S A
TRAGIC THING THAT THERE ARE SO MANY FAMILIES WHO DON'T
KNOW ABOUT THEIR FAMILY MEMBERS WHO ARE MISSING OR
KILLED OR POSSIBLE POWS IN VIETNAM. IT IS AN
EXCRUCIATING EXPERIENCE FOR THEM, AND THE SOONER IT IS
CLEARED UP THE BETTER, AND IF THE VIETNAMESE ARE
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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

PREPARED TO MOVE ON IT NOW, THAT'S ENOUGH FOR ME.
LIKE ANYBODY WE CAN SPECULATE ABOUT WHY THEY MAY DO
SOMETHING, BUT I DON'T HAVE ANY SUBSTANCE TO
CONTRIBUTE TO THAT DISCUSSION.

Q. YOU APPARENTLY ARE GOING TO ANNOUNCE AN INCREASE
IN MONEY THAT IS TARGETED TO BORDER VILLAGES. CAN YOU
TELL US WHY YOU ARE DOING THAT, WHAT YOU HOPE TO GAIN
WITH THIS, AND WHAT THE TARGETING IS DESIGNED TO
ACCOMPLISH?

A. WELL THE THAIS WHO LIVE ALONG THE BORDER HAVE
TAKEN QUITE A BEATING AS A RESULT OF WHAT'S GOING ON
INSIDE CAMBODIA, AND SO WE TRY TO BE HELPFUL TO THEM
IN ECONOMIC WAYS AND OTHER WAYS, AND WE HAVE DECIDED
TO INCREASE THE FLOW OF FUNDS IN THEIR SUPPORT

Q. SO IT'S JUST THE THAIS THAT YOU ARE...?

A. ACTUALLY, IF YOU LOOK AT THE PLAN FOR OUR TRIP
TOMORROW, AND I WOULD LIKE TO DESCRIBE THIS BUT I
DON'T PARTICULARLY WANT TO MAKE IT A BIG PUBLIC
DOCUMENT AS WE ARE GOING UP THERE, BUT PART OF IT IS
TO EXPRESS OUR SUPPORT FOR THE CAMBODIANS WHO ARE
DISPLACED. THEY ARE THE POPULATION OF CAMBODIA OR
PART OF IT, AND THEY WANT TO SEE A PEACEFUL CAMBODIA
WHERE THEY CAN LIVE, SO WE WANT TO EXPRESS OUR CONCERN
FOR THEM. PART OF IT IS GIVING A SENSE OF SUPPORT AND
SOME SUBSTANCE BEHIND IT FOR THE THAI VILLAGERS WHO
HAVE BEEN SO ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY ALL OF THIS. A
THIRD PART IS TO VISIT WITH THE THAI MILITARY FORCES
THEMSELVES, WHOSE CAPABILITIES WE HAVE BEEN SUPPORTING
AND STEPPING UP OUR SUPPORT FOR OVER THE LAST THREE OR
FOUR OR FIVE YEARS. FINALLY, THERE ARE PEOPLE IN
CAMPS, MANY OF WHOM ARE IN THE PROCESS OF PREPARING
THEMSELVES FOR EMIGRATION, AND THAT'S A PROGRAM THAT
WE'VE BEEN VERY ACTIVE IN FOR A LONG TIME. SO THERE
ARE THOSE FOUR PARTS TO THE PROCESS HERE, AND ONE OF
THEM IS RELATED TO YOUR QUESTION.

Q. MR. GOTTO FROM JAPAN IS EITHER IN HANOI OR HAS
JUST BEEN IN HANOI, APPARENTLY TALKING ABOUT REOPENING
JAPANESE AID TO VIETNAM. IS THAT A HELPFUL MOVE AT
THIS PARTICULAR POINT?

A. WELL I'M, NOT FAMILIAR WITH THAT MISSION. I KNOW
THAT THE JAPANESE HAVE, LAST YEAR FOR EXAMPLE WHEN WE
HAD THE ASEAN MEETING, I CAN'T RECALL PRECISELY THE
TERMS INVOLVED, BUT I REMEMBER THAT FOREIGN MINISTER
ABE BASICALLY SAID THAT IF VIETNAM WOULD DO WHAT THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS CALLED ON THEM TO DO, THEN
JAPAN IS PREPARED TO TRY TO HELP WITH THE NEEDS OF
VIETNAM FOR SUPPORT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. I DON'T
KNOW PRECISELY HOW THAT WAS TERMED, BUT THAT WAS THE
GENERAL IDEA, AND I KNOW THE JAPANESE HAVE HAD THAT
VIEW. BUT AS TO THE PARTICULAR MISSION YOU MENTIONED,
I'M NOT FAMILIAR WITH IT.

Q. WOULD IT BE HELPFUL AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME
SHOULD AN ALLY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OF ASEAN
BT

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LITTLE DIFFERENT.

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Q. ARE THEY GOING WITH YOU TOMORROW?

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A I CAN'T TELL YOU THE PRECISE COMPOSITION OF THE TRAVELING GROUP, BUT CERTAINLY THEY WILL BE REPRESENTED.

Q. YOU THEN HAVE A SPECIFIC MESSAGE OR WILL IT SIMPLY BE A GENERAL MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS?

OP IMMED
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A. WELL, I THINK WE WANT TO GIVE A GENERAL MESSAGE OF SUPPORT FOR THEIR EFFORTS THAT THEY ARE BATTLING FOR SOMETHING THAT'S VERY CLOSE TO THEM AND IMPORTANT TO THEM, BUT THE UNITED STATES AND A BROADER INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY STANDS BEHIND THEM. THAT'S THE MESSAGE WE WANT TO GIVE.

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0230

Q. WHAT DO YOU SEE AT THIS POINT WHEN VIETNAM IS SO STRONG MILITARILY AND THERE ARE SO MANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES BEING FLOATED AROUND LOOSELY BEING CALLED PROXIMITY TALKS, WHERE SO YOU SEE ALL OF THIS GOING IN TERMS OF VIETNAM? DO YOU SEE GREATER CONFLICT WITH OUR GIVING MORE DIRECT AID OR GIVING DIRECT AID TO THE REBELS, OR DO YOU SEE DIPLOMACY COMING INTO THE FRONT STAGE AS SOMETHING REALISTIC?

- INFO USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE
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A. I THINK THE OBJECTIVES THAT THE DEMOCRATIC RESISTANCE AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES HAVE HAD AND THE CHINESE HAVE HAD REMAIN OUR BASIC OBJECTIVES AND ARE SOUGHT IN WHATEVER MEANS WE CAN OBTAIN THEM, BUT AT LEAST IT WOULD APPEAR TO ME THAT IF YOU ARE GOING TO BE SUCCESSFUL IN NEGOTIATIONS YOU HAVE TO CREATE A SITUATION OF STRENGTH SO THAT THOSE YOU ARE NEGOTIATING WITH HAVE SOME REAL INCENTIVES TO NEGOTIATE. PARTLY THAT COMES NOT SIMPLY FROM THE MILITARY CAPABILITY OF THE RESISTANCE, BUT FROM THE FACT THAT AS IN MOST COUNTRIES, ANY COUNTRY, WHEN YOU ARE BEING OCCUPIED BY PEOPLE FROM ANOTHER COUNTRY THERE IS AN INNATE RESISTANCE TO THAT. AND THEN OF COURSE THERE IS THE FACT THAT VIETNAM ITSELF FALLS FURTHER AND FURTHER BEHIND ITS NEIGHBORHOOD, AND I DON'T KNOW THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE VIETNAM LEADERS APPRECIATE WHAT'S HAPPENING TO THEM. BUT, IF THEY BT

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

REOPEN ITS LINES OF CREDIT OR GIVE AID TO VIETNAM?

A. I DON'T THINK SO, NO.

Q. MR. SECRETARY, IS THIS THE FIRST TIME YOU WILL BE MEETING WITH RESISTANCE LEADERS, AND WHAT WILL YOU TELL THEM?

A. WELL I'VE MET WITH RESISTANCE LEADERS BEFORE IN THE UNITED STATES. I'VE MET SEVERAL TIMES WITH PRINCE SIHANOUK, WITH SON SANN, WITH THE YOUNGER PRINCE, AND SO I'VE HAD A SERIES OF MEETINGS WITH THEM, BUT THIS IS THE FIRST TIME I WILL HAVE MET THEM IN THE VICINITY OF WHERE THE ACTION IS. AND, IT'S ALWAYS THE CASE THAT SOMEHOW THE FLAVOR AND FORCE OF A MEETING IS A

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SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

LOOK AROUND AND THINK ABOUT IT AT ALL, WHAT THEY MUST
SEE IS THAT IN, LET'S JUST TAKE THE ASEAN COUNTRIES,
THEY'RE JUST OUTSTRIPPING VIETNAM AS JUST A MATTER OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND THE WELL-BEING OF THEIR
CITIZENS. SO ALL OF THESE THINGS TOGETHER, IT SEEMS
TO ME, WE NEED TO PUSH AS A BACKGROUND FOR WHAT IT
TAKES TO CONVINCE VIETNAM TO DO THE THINGS THAT THE
ASEAN COUNTRIES AND THE RESISTANCE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO
GET THEM TO DO.

Q. DID YOU SEE MOVEMENT FROM VIETNAM ON SOME OF THE
MIA QUESTIONS, MOST RECENTLY, AND SOME OTHER SIGNALS?

A. WELL, FIRST LET ME SAY AGAIN THAT THE MIA/POW
MATTER IS A SEPARATE MATTER. SO PUTTING THAT TO THE

SIDE, VIETNAM IS A MASTER IN CREATING A LOT OF
PRESUMED DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY AND THEN IN THE END
HAVING IT TURN OUT THAT THERE IS NOT THAT MUCH
SUBSTANCE THERE. OBVIOUSLY, PEOPLE NEED TO EXAMINE
DIPLOMATIC MOVES ALL THE TIME TO TEST WHETHER THERE IS
SUBSTANCE THERE OR NOT. BUT THE TRACK RECORD IS THAT
THE SUBSTANCE TURNS OUT TO BE PRETTY SPARSE WHEN YOU
LOOK AT IT, AND THAT'S WHAT LEADS PEOPLE ALWAYS TO BE
RATHER SKEPTICAL OF THESE MOVES. THAT DOESN'T MEAN
THEY SHOULDN'T BE EXAMINED; THEY SHOULD BE, BUT WITH A
HEALTHY DOSE OF SKEPTICISM.

Q. ON A BROADER LOOK AT THE REGION, SOME
COMMENTATORS HAVE NOTED SOME INTRIGUING SIGNS OF
POSSIBLE CHANGES IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD ASIA SINCE
GORBACHEV HAS TAKEN OVER. HE'S PUT FORTH A NEW ASIAN
SECURITY PLAN WHICH EVIDENTLY...

A. THAT'S AN OLD ASIAN SECURITY PLAN.

Q. WELL, THIS ONE APPARENTLY INCLUDES CHINA INSTEAD
OF EXCLUDING CHINA. THAT'S THE INTERPRETATION AT
LEAST OF SOME. HE IS INDICATING MUCH MORE INTEREST IN
THE REGION, AND THERE IS SOME INTERPRETATION THAT
NAMING THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER IS PREPARING TO PUT A
BIGGER EMPHASIS ON ASIA. HE'S MADE COMMENTS ABOUT
WANTING TO IMPROVE HIS RELATIONS WITH CHINA, SO ON AND
SO FORTH. DO YOU SEE THE SOVIETS AS BEING IN A
POSTURE OF INCIPENT CHANGE TOWARD THEIR POLICIES IN
ASIA? HOW DO YOU ANALYZE WHAT THEY SEEM TO BE DOING
OR GETTING READY TO DO?

A. I THINK IT'S REALLY NOT POSSIBLE TO TELL JUST WHAT
KIND OF CHANGES, IF ANY, THEY MAY HAVE IN MIND. THE
EFFORT TO SHIFT THEIR RELATIONSHIPS WITH CHINA A BIT
IS, AT LEAST RHETORICALLY, NOT NEW WITH GORBACHEV. I
DON'T KNOW THAT YOU CAN SAY THAT A NEW FOREIGN
MINISTER IS A SIGNAL ABOUT SOMETHING IN ASIA: THAT
VERY MUCH REMAINS TO BE SEEN, WHAT THE NEW FOREIGN
MINISTER'S VIEWS ARE AND PRIORITIES ARE. MY OWN
PERSONAL FEELING IS THAT ASIA IS AN IMPORTANT AND
INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT PART OF THE WORLD FROM AN
ECONOMIC POINT OF VIEW, OR SECURITY POINT OF VIEW, AND
THAT'S BEEN REFLECTED ON OUR POLICIES FOR SOME TIME.
BT

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E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

OBSERVATION REALLY, AND SO IT WOULDN'T
SURPRISE ME IF THE SOVIETS SCRATCH THEIR HEADS AND
COME TO THE SAME CONCLUSION BUT, IF SO, I DON'T THINK
THE EVIDENCE FOR IT IN TERMS OF SOMETHING BRAND NEW IS
THERE. THEY HAVE BEEN RATHER CONSISTENTLY INCREASING
THEIR MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE REGION AND USING THE
BASES IN VIETNAM, CAM RANH BAY IN PARTICULAR, SO WE
SEE THAT, BUT THAT'S A DIFFERENT KIND OF THING THAN I
THINK YOUR QUESTION IS REFERRING TO. THANK YOU.
Q. (INAUDIBLE)

A. THE INTERMIXTURE OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
GRAPPLING WITH THE DEBT ISSUES, THAT'S PRINCIPALLY A
LATIN AMERICAN PROBLEM, OUR OWN DEFICIT, FISCAL
DEFICIT THAT IS, AND THE NEED SOMEHOW TO DEVELOP A

STRATEGY OR HOW TO HANDLE THE THREATS TO THE FREE
WORLD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. HOW TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF
THE OPPORTUNITIES. I THINK THE THREAT OF
PROTECTIONISM IS A VERY GREAT THREAT. AND A LOT OF
PEOPLE IN OUR CONGRESS SEEM READY TO JUST GO WILD ON
THE SUBJECT AND WHAT THAT WILL GET US, WITHOUT ANY
DOUBT, IS A RETURN TO THE KIND OF CONDITIONS OF THE
1930S. IT IS SUICIDAL. I THINK PEOPLE NEED TO
RECOGNIZE WHAT IS HAPPENING AND DEVELOP A STRATEGY TO
BEAT IT. AND, THAT'S ONE OF THE THINGS I WANT TO TALK
TO PEOPLE OUT HERE ABOUT BECAUSE THEY HAVE A HUGE
STAKE IN IT AND THEY ARE ALSO VERY SMART.

Q. HOW ABOUT ABE? DO YOU THINK HE'LL GET SOME...?

A. ABE IS, JAPANESE HAVE BEEN WORKING ON IT. I MADE
SOME CALCULATIONS THAT I HAVE BEEN PONDERING, I DON'T
KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THEY MEAN. BUT, IF YOU SAY, HERE'S
THE AMOUNT OF TWO-WAY TRADE OF COUNTRY X OR REGION X,
AND HERE'S THE AMOUNT OF CHANGE IN THE TRADE
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHETHER IT WENT
FROM A SURPLUS TO A DEFICIT OR A DEFICIT TO A BIGGER
DEFICIT OR WHATEVER, SAY IN THE LAST TWO OR THREE
YEARS. I EXPRESS THAT AS A PROPORTION. IT TURNS OUT
THAT THE PROPORTION REPRESENTED BY JAPAN IS
APPROXIMATELY THE SAME AS THE PROPORTION REPRESENTED
BY ASEAN OR BY THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY OR BY THE LATIN
AMERICAN COUNTRIES. WHAT THAT TELLS YOU IS, THAT
WHILE OUR TALK AND DISCUSSION IS ALL ABOUT OPENING
JAPANESE MARKETS, THAT'S NOT REALLY THE PROBLEM. THE
PROBLEM IS A MORE GENERAL ONE BECAUSE IT'S SPREAD
AMONG ALL THESE PARTS. SO IF WE'RE GOING TO TACKLE
THE PROBLEM, WE HAVE TO IDENTIFY WHAT IT IS AND THEN
TACKLE IT IN TERMS OF THOSE GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.

NOT, IN OTHER WORDS ASSUME THAT THIS PROBLEM ARISES
BECAUSE OF THE RULES OF TRADE. THE RULES OF TRADE
NEED TO BE LIBERALIZED, NOT MADE LESS LIBERAL AND
THAT'S IN OUR LONG TERM INTEREST. BUT WHAT'S HAPPENED
THE LAST TWO OR THREE YEARS IS NOT A MEASURE OF ANY
MAJOR CHANGE IN THE RULES OF TRADE, IT'S SOMETHING
ENTIRELY DIFFERENT. THAT'S WHAT WE HAVE TO FOCUS ON,
THAT'S
WHAT WE HAVE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH IN OUR POLICY IF
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TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

WE'RE GOING TO GET SOMEWHERE AND NOT HAVE A PROBLEM
MISIDENTIFIED AND THEREFORE HAVE A PRESCRIPTION FOR IT
THAT IS WRONG, AND WHICH CAUSES LONG-RUN PROBLEMS THAT
WE HAVE A GREAT STAKE IN AVOIDING. HAVING SAID ALL
THAT, I HAVE MY IDEAS WITH OUR FRIENDS IN JAPAN,
EUROPEANS, AND SO ON. AND MOSTLY WITH OURSELVES.

Q. IF THE RULES OF TRADE HAVEN'T CHANGED, WHAT HAS
CHANGED? WHAT'S CAUSED THE CONDITION YOU JUST
MENTIONED?

A. I PUT THEM DOWN IN A SPEECH AT PRINCETON A COUPLE
OF MONTHS AGO, AND I'VE BEEN SORT OF MULLING THAT OVER
SINCE, AND IT'S BEEN QUITE INTERESTING TO ME THAT
WHILE THERE HASN'T BEEN MUCH DISCUSSION OR ATTENTION

TO THAT SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, IT'S BEEN VERY
WIDELY READ ABROAD, AND THE JAPANESE WANT TO TALK
ABOUT IT, AND THE ASEAN COUNTRIES WANT TO TALK ABOUT
IT, A LOT OF AMERICANS WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT; IT SEEMS
TO HAVE HIT HOME AS A STATEMENT ABOUT THE PROBLEM. SO
I'LL BE INTERESTED IN TALKING ABOUT THAT MORE, BUT I
THINK OUR FISCAL DEFICIT IS A BIG PROBLEM FOR US AND
IT IS A BIG PROBLEM IN THE WORLD, AND WE DAMN WELL
BETTER DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT.

Q. YOU TALKED ABOUT THESE PROPORTIONS, AM I CORRECTLY
UNDERSTANDING YOU THAT A SIMILAR PHENOMENON IS TAKING
PLACE IN U.S./JAPANESE TRADE RELATIONS THAT HAS TAKEN
PLACE BETWEEN JAPAN AND ITS TRADING PARTNERS IN
SOUTHEAST ASIA AND ELSEWHERE, IS THAT WHAT YOU WERE
LEADING TO?

A. NO, NO THAT WASN'T IT. THIS IS JUST A QUICK
CALCULATION THAT'S BEEN MADE AND PROBABLY IT NEEDS TO
BE LOOKED AT AND THE BASE PERIOD LOOKED AT AND SO ON.
BUT, I JUST SAID TO MYSELF LET'S TAKE 1982 AND 1984,
OUR TRADE DEFICIT WITH JAPAN, LET'S SAY IN 1982 WAS X,
WHATEVER IT WAS. IN 1984 IT WAS Y, SO THE SWING WAS
Z. NOW LET'S TAKE Z AND COMPARE THAT WITH THE TOTAL
JAPANESE TWO WAY TRADE AND GET A PROPORTION; THAT
TURNS OUT TO BE ABOUT 21 PERCENT. NOW LET'S TAKE THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY AND LET'S MAKE THE SAME
CALCULATION, AND THAT PROPORTION TURNS OUT TO BE
APPROXIMATELY THE SAME. LET'S TAKE LATIN AMERICA AND
MAKE THE SAME CALCULATION, THE PROPORTION TURNS OUT
TO BE APPROXIMATELY THE SAME. LET'S TAKE ASEAN, A
SMALLER TOTAL VOLUME OF TRADE BUT STILL A SUBSTANTIAL
AMOUNT, THE PROPORTION TURNS OUT TO BE APPROXIMATELY
THE SAME. WITH CANADA, WHICH IS OUR BIGGEST TRADING

PARTNER BY A GOOD BIT, THE PROPORTION IS A LOT LESS.
BUT AT ANY RATE, IN LOOKING AROUND FOR WAYS TO
IDENTIFY WHAT IS REALLY OUR PROBLEM, I THOUGHT THAT
CALCULATION WAS KIND OF AN INTERESTING ONE BECAUSE IT
GAVE A MESSAGE THAT THE PROBLEM STEMS FROM THINGS THAT
AFFECT EVERYBODY, NOT JUST ONE PART OF THE WORLD. BUT
AS I SAY, IT MAY BE THAT IF I'VE GOT THE WRONG BASE IT
ISN'T BECAUSE OF A JUDICIOUS CHOICE OF BASE, IT'S JUST
THAT WE'VE HAD THIS GREAT GROWTH IN OUR DEFICIT IN A
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AT IT. BUT, IF WHATEVER RESTRICTIONS ON THE JAPANESE MARKET DISAPPEARED TOMORROW, OUR TRADE DEFICIT WOULD NOT DISAPPEAR. THIS SUDDEN BIG SURGE IS NOT CREATED BY SOMETHING THAT CHANGED IN OUR TRADE RULES WITH JAPAN. HAVING SAID THAT IT DOESN'T MAKE IT ANY LESS IMPORTANT TO TRY TO OPEN THOSE TRADING ARRANGEMENTS.
SHULTZ
BT

OP IMMEDIATE
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DE RUEHOK #3035/08 1900700
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OPS CENTER PLEASE PASS NSC FOR MR. MCFARLANE AND WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. SIMS

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E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP (SHULTZ, GEORGE P.)
SUBJECT: THE SECRETARY'S ON THE RECORD BRIEFING

BIG HURRY, AND SO I TRIED TO TAKE THE YEARS THAT EXPRESSED THAT. WE WILL BE MULLING THIS OVER AND I HOPE THAT OUR DISCUSSIONS HERE AND IN THE ASEAN, IN ADDITION TO BEING ABOUT CANNED TUNA AND THINGS LIKE THAT, CAN ALSO BE REFLECTIVE ABOUT SOME OF THE BROADER COURSES. I KNOW THE THAIS WANT TO TALK ABOUT IT, AT LEAST SO I'M TOLD; I LOOK FORWARD TO IT.

Q. YOU SAID THE U.S. HAS BEEN SHOOTING AT THE WRONG TARGET BY PUTTING SUCH AN EMPHASIS ON TRYING TO OPEN THE JAPANESE MARKET?

A. NO, I THINK IT'S VERY IMPORTANT TO TRY TO OPEN THE JAPANESE MARKET, AND WE'VE HAD SOME SUCCESS IN DOING THAT, IT'S JUST GOING TO BE A PROBLEM TO KEEP WORKING

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PAGE 01 AMCONSUL HONG KONG 1927 DTG: 100650Z JUL 85 PSN: 039409
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DEPARTMENT PASS TO USTR

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, HK, XC
SUBJECT: ASIAN TRAVEL OF USTR CLAYTON YEUTTER

1. WE HAVE HEARD THAT USTR YEUTTER MAY BE PLANNING A TRIP TO SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE NEXT FEW MONTHS.
2. IF YEUTTER'S SCHEDULE PERMITS, WE BELIEVE HE WOULD FIND A STOPOVER IN HONG KONG MOST USEFUL, BOTH BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT EXCHANGES OF VIEWS ON TRADE ISSUES WITH SENIOR HKG OFFICIALS AND BECAUSE IT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR HIM TO BECOME ACQUAINTED FIRST-HAND WITH ECONOMIC CONDITIONS AFFECTING OUR TENTH LARGEST TRADING PARTNER. ON OVERALL TRADE POLICY, HONG KONG'S MAINTENANCE OF OPEN MARKETS IS VERY MUCH IN KEEPING WITH THE U. S. VIEW OF HOW LDCS SHOULD STRUCTURE THEIR MARKETS. ON MULTILATERAL ISSUES, HONG KONG PLAYS AN INDEPENDENT ROLE IN THE GATT, AND MAY SOON BE SPONSORED FOR FULL MEMBERSHIP BY THE UK (WITH CHINESE ASSENT). ONE OF THE FEW LDC SIGNATORIES OF THE MTN CODES THAT EMERGED FROM THE LAST ROUND OF TRADE TALKS, THE HKG HAS RECENTLY BEGUN DISTANCING ITSELF FROM OTHER LDCS IN ITS SUPPORT FOR A NEW TRADE ROUND.
3. A STOPOVER HERE NEED NOT BE LONG; ONE OR TWO DAYS ADDED TO EITHER THE BEGINNING OR THE END OF A TRIP WOULD BE SUFFICIENT. IF YEUTTER WILL BE ABLE TO STOP IN HONG KONG, PLEASE ADVISE. LEVIN
BT

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