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## **Ronald Reagan Library**

Collection Name LAUX, DAVID: FILES

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File Folder

CHINA-FOREIGN RELATIONS-HONG KONG (11/20/82-

1/24/83)

**FOIA** 

M09-299/1

**Box Number** 

13

**COLLINGS** 

				11		
Docu	ıment Descriptio	n	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restric	ctions
RE HO	ONG KONG		1	11/20/1982	В3	
R	12/20/2017	M299/1				
RE HO	ONG KONG (P. 11	ONLY)	1	11/23/1982	B1	В3
PAR	12/20/2017	M299/1				
HONO	6 KONG 19367		3	11/23/1982	B1	
R	6/21/2012	M299/1				
STATI	E 329445		1	11/24/1982	B1	
R	6/21/2012	M299/1				
BEIJIN	NG 16123		1	11/27/1982	B1	
R	6/21/2012	M299/1				
STATI	E 333964		1	12/1/1982	B1	
R	6/21/2012	M299/1				
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RE HO	ONG KONG		2	12/1/1982	B1	В3
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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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CHINA-FOREIGN RELATIONS-HONG KONG (11/20/82-

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**FOIA** 

M09-299/1

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Document Description	n		Doc Date	Restrictions
102123Z DEC 82		2	12/10/1982	B1 B3
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STATE 351173		1	12/17/1982	B1
R 6/21/2012	M299/1			
RE HONG KONG		3	12/23/1982	B1 B3
D 12/20/2017	M299/1			
240353Z DEC 82		1	12/24/1982	B1 B2
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RE HONG KONG		2	12/30/1982	B1 B3
D 12/20/2017	M299/1			
RE HONG KONG		4	1/4/1983	B1
R 6/21/2012	M299/1			
121805Z JAN 83		1	1/12/1983	B1 B3
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121825Z JAN 83		1	1/12/1983	B1 B3
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FBIS 10

PRC TO RECOVER HONG KONG 'NOT LATER THAN 1997'

HK210054 BEIJING ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE IN CHINESE 0849 GMT 20 NOV 82

(EXCERPT) BEIJING, 20 NOV (ZHONGGUO XINWEN SHE) -- NPC STANDING COMMITTEE VICE CHAIRMAN LIAO CHENGZHI SAID WHEN MEETING A HONG KONG FACTORY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION DELEGATION HERE THIS MORNING: CHINA WILL RECOEVER SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG BY 1997 AT THE LATEST, AND HONG KONG WILL BE RULED BY HONG KONG PEOPLE. AFTER RECOVERING HONG KONG, CHINA WILL MAINTAIN ITS PROSPERITY AND STABILITY; HONG KONG'S SYSTEM WILL REMAIN, AS WILL THE INHABITANTS' WAY OF LIFE, AND ITS STATUS AS A FREE PORT AND FINANCIAL CENTER WILL BE UNCHANGED. WE ARE FULL OF CONFIDENCE OVER HONG KONG'S FUTURE.

LIAO CHENGZHI HOPED THAT FRIENDS IN HONG KONG INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PROMOTING HONG KONG'S PROSPERITY.

DOMINTIL

SPEAKING ON CHINA'S MODESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION, LIAO CHENGZHI SAID, SOME PEOPLE SAY THAT THERE ARE MANY POLITICAL CHANGES IN CHINA. THIS IS CORRECT, IF IT REFERS TO THE 10-YEAR PERIOD OF INTERNAL TURMOIL. BUT NOW, WE HAVE CONVENED THE 12TH PARTY CONGRESS, AND THE BASIC GUIDELINES HAVE BEEN LAID DOWN. I DO NOT THINK THEY WILL BE CHANGED.

THE RECEPTION WAS HELD IN THE JIANGSU ROOM OF THE GREAT HALL OF THE PEOPLE.

21 NOV 0146Z JHM/NB

DECLASSIFIED

NLRRM2911 # 92326

BY LW NARA DATE 12/20 7

Top Secret

HONG KONG: Increase

Increase in Visa Applications

The US Consulate in Hong Kong reports that the colony's uncertain future has produced a substantial increase in applications for and inquiries about foreign visas and passports. Applications in October for US nonimmigrant visas were up 42 percent over last year, and applications for immigrant visas also have risen rapidly. Hong Kong's 5.1 million residents now hold an estimated 150,000 valid US visas. Most residents are now ineligible for emigration to the UK, and immigration inquiries at the Australia, Canada, and Singapore Commissions in the colony have increased dramatically.

Comment: The inquiries and applications appear to be only contingency preparations. Many of the potential emigrants, who are largely from the colony's middle and upper classes, are hedging by obtaining second passports, particularly from Taiwan. Taipei would welcome an influx of capital from Hong Kong but would be wary of large-scale immigration.

EO 13526 3.3(b)(1)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.3(b)(6)>25Yrs

EO 13526 3.5(c)

11

23 November 1982

NLRR Magal 1 #92327
BY LW NARA DATE 12/20/17

Top Secret

# -SECRET

NLRR M299 # 92328

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

BY KML NARA DATE 6/21/12

AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9367 DTG: 231041Z NOV 82 PSN: 020094 PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 CSN: HCE866 TOR: 327/1219Z ANØØ39Ø8 FOB443

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4210

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 02 HONG KONG 19367

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PEPR, PINS, CH, HK,

UK

BRITISH DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG

STATE 325080

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

AS FORECAST IN AMBASSADOR HUMMEL'S REF MESSAGE, THE HONG KONG GOVERNOR, SIR EDWARD YOUDE, CALLED ME IN NOVEMBER 22 FOR A BRIEFING ON THE HONG KONG SITUATION. ASKING THAT THE INFORMATION BE HELD HE ECHOED EARLIER UK CONCERN OVER THE DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE. THE CHINESE HAD TOLD TIGHTLY. LIMITED LIMITED DEVELOPMENTS TO DATE. THE CHINESE HAD TOLD THATCHER THAT RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG IN 1997 WAS A NON-NEGOTIABLE PRINCIPLE. THATCHER'S ARGUMENT THAT HONG KONG'S CONTINUED PROSPERITY
REQUIRED A SUBSTANTIAL BRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE
HAD BEEN DISTURBINGLY MET WITH A CHINESE ASSERTION
THAT THEY ATTACHED GREATER IMPORTANCE TO SATISFYING
THE PRINCIPLE OF CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY THAN TO HONG KONG'S
PROSPERITY. SINCE THATCHER'S DEPARTURE, VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER ZHANG WENJIN AND CRADOCK HAD MET ONCE, WITH
ZHANG SUGGESTING THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS BEGIN WITH
A DISCUSSION OF "TRANSITIONAL APPANCEMENTS" LEADING A DISCUSSION OF "TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS" UP TO THE 1997 RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY. LEADING WAS EXTREMELY FUZZY ON THE MEANING OF "TRANSITIONAL ARRANGEMENTS". THE NEGOTIATIONS HAD BARELY ENTERED THE STAGE OF DISCUSSIONS ON WHAT TO DISCUSS. A NEW CHINESE FOREIGN MINISTER JUST COMING IN AND WITH ZHANG LIKELY ON THE WAY TO WASHINGTON, LONDON BELIEVED IT WOULD TAKE THE CHINESE CONSIDERABLE TIME TO GET THEIR ACT TOGETHER ON HONG KONG.

3. ASIDE FROM INSISTING ON RESTORATION OF SOVEREIGNTY BY 1997, THE CHINESE POSITION WAS VAGUE. HOWEVER, ENOUGH HAD TRANSPIRED TO WORRY THE UK THAT THE CHINESE FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT A STROBRITISH ADMINISTRATIVE ROLE IN HONG KONG IS STRONG ESSENTIAL TO HONG KONG'S PROSPERITY. AN EDUCATION EFFORT WAS UNDERWAY WITH HONG KONG CHINESE IN THE AN EDUCATIONAL

FOREFRONT. RECENT CHINESE STATEMENTS GUARANTEEING HONG KONG'S SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SYSTEM WOULD BE PRESERVED FOLLOWING RESTORATION OF PRC SOVEREIGNTY SUGGEST BEIJING'S HEIGHTENED AWARENESS OF THE FRAGILITY OF CONFIDENCE HERE. CHINESE VERBAL GUARANTEES

- Same pitch the British made to us hang

# -SECRET-

### NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 02 OF 02 AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9367 DTG: 231041Z NOV 82 PSN: 020094

CARRIED NO WEIGHT WITH THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG, WHO WERE FAMILIAR WITH PRC POLICIES OVER THE YEARS. YOU'DE THEN REFERRED TO THE BRITISH REQUESTS IN WASHINGTON AND BEIJING FOR OUR HELP IN EDUCATING THE CHINESE.

I OBSERVED THAT THE DECISION OBVIOUSLY RESTED WITH WASHINGTON. CAREFUL CONSIDERATION WAS REQUIRED. THE PRC SEES US AS AN OBSTACLE TO REUNIFICATION WITH TAIWAN AND IT WOULD BE UNHELPFUL IF THE CHINESE PERCEIVED US AS TRYING TO DO THE SAME WITH HONG KONG. YOU'DE AGREED.

- 4. YOUDE NOTED THAT CHINESE LEADERS OFTEN RECEIVED PROMINENT, NON-OFFICIAL AMERICANS. ASIDE FROM THE QUESTION OF OFFICIAL U.S. INTERVENTION, THE UK WOULD WELCOME THE HELP OF THESE PEOPLE IN EDUCATING THE CHINESE ABOUT THE REALITIES OF HONG KONG. HE ASKED THAT I BRING TO HIS ATTENTION ANY SUCH AMERICANS HERE ENROUTE TO HIGH LEVEL MEETINGS IN BEIJING. HE WOULD WELCOME BRIEFING THEM ON THE HONG KONG SITUATION. I AGREED TO DO SO AND ALSO TO INFORM WASHINGTON OF THE UK'S INTEREST IN ENLISTING THE HELP OF PRIVATE AMERICANS. I SAID THAT IN THE FINAL ANALYSIS THE DECISION WOULD BE UP TO THE CONCERNED AMERICANS.
- 5. COMMENT: MY AGREEMENT WITH AMBASSADOR HUMMEL'S RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING OFFICIAL AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT HAS BEEN REGISTERED IN REFTEL. I WOULD HOPE THAT THE DEPARTMENT ACTIVELY PICKS UP ON THE GOVERNOR'S REQUEST ABOUT THE UTILIZATION OF PRIVATE AMERICANS. IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY AND SELECTIVELY HANDLED TO ASSURE THAT NO USG HAND WAS REVEALED, BUT IT COULD BE HELPFUL ON AN ISSUE INVOLVING SIGNIFICANT U.S. INTERESTS AND IT WOULD PUT US IN A RESPONSIVE LIGHT WITH THE UK.
- 6. I WOULD WELCOME THE DEPARTMENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO INFORM THE GOVERNOR THAT WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO GET PRIVATE AMERICANS TO DELIVER TO THE CHINESE THE MESSAGE DESIRED ON HONG KONG. SINCE MANY PROMINENT

AMERICANS CALL AT THE DEPARTMENT FOR BRIEFINGS PRIOR TO VISITING BEIJING, IT WOULD BE AN EASY MATTER TO SLIP IN SOME WORDS ABOUT HONG KONG.

7. WOULD APPRECIATE ACCOUNT OF UK REP DONALD'S

# -SECRET

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE Ø1 EOB185

AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9367 DTG: 231041Z NOV 82 PSN: 020095 AN003909 TOR: 327/1220Z CSN: HCE867

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4211

SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG 19367

NODIS

NOVEMBER 5 MEETING WITH SECRETARY AND OTHERS ON HONG KONG ISSUE.

DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT TO LONDON AND BEIJING. LEVIN BT

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

SECSTATE WASHDC 9445 ANØØ4882

DTG: 241726Z NOV 82 PSN: Ø22392 TOR: 328/1750Z

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EOB5Ø7

PRIORITY DE RUEHC #9445 3281749 P 241726Z NOV 82 ZFF6 FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 6101 AMCONSUL HONG KONG PRIORITY 8466

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 4428 WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY 8285

SECRET STATE 329445

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

PEPR. CH, HK UK TAGS

SUBJECT:

BRITISH DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG

KONG

REF: BEIJING 1584Ø, HONG KONG 19367

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE AGREE WITH YOUR COMMENT IN REFTEL THAT NOW IS NOT THE TIME FOR THE USG TO PLAY THE ROLE OF ADVOCATE FOR THE UK ON THIS ISSUE. SIMILARLY, DRAWING PARALLELS BETWEEN EVENTS IN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN STRIKES US AS DANGEROUS; AT THE NOVEMBER 5 BRIEFING THE SECRETARY TOLD THE BRITISH THAT WE SHOULD SEEK TO KEEP AS MUCH DISTANCE AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE HONG KONG AND TAIWAN ISSUES.

3. IN PREPARING FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT, WE STILL CONTINUE TO ASSESS THE HONG KONG SITUATION WITH A VIEW TO PREPARING APPROPRIATE TALKING POINTS. GIVEN THE PRESENT STATE OF RELATIONS, WE WILL DO SO ONLY ON A CONTINGENCY

THE SECRETARY OFFERED TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH THE BRITISH AGAIN BEFORE LEAVING FOR CHINA, BUT THIS SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS ANY FORM OF COMMITMENT ON OUR PART TO CARRY THE UK'S WATER.

- FOR BEIJING GIVEN THIS SITUATION, YOU MIGHT INFORM SIR PERCY THAT WE HAVE HIS POINTS A AND B UNDER CONSIDERATION, BUT WILL BE PREPARED TO LEND SUPPORT ONLY IF APPROPRIATE (ATMOSPHERIC) CONDITIONS OBTAIN. POINT IN OUR VIEW, IS A NON-STARTER.
- WE WILL APPRECIATE THE EMBASSY'S AND CONGEN'S ASSESSMENT OF PRC ATTITUDES TOWARD THE HONG KONG QUESTION AS WE MAKE TRIP PREPARATIONS.

REPLY TO HONG KONG 19367 IN PREPARATION. SHULTZ BT

> DECLASSIFIED NLRR M299 #92329 BY KML NARA DATE 6/21/12

SEGRET

# SECRET

92330

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE Ø1 EOB261

BEIJING 6123

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9713

SECRET BEIJING 16123

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PEPR, CH, HK, UK

SUBJECT: BRITISH DISCUSSIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG REF: STATE 329445

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I DELIVERED REPLY IN PARA 4 REFTEL TO BRITISH AMB CRADOCK NOV 26, ADDING FROM PARA 2 SECY SCHULTZ STATEMENT TO BRITS ON NOV 5 THAT WE SHOULD KEEP AS MUCH DISTANCE AS POSSIBLE BETWEEN HONG KONG AND TAIWAN ISSUES. I SAID THAT OUR JOINT OBJECTIVE IS TO HAVE A BENEFICIAL EFFECT ON PRC ATTITUDES, AND WE WOULD WANT TO BE REASONABLY SURE OF THAT RESULT, OTHERWISE THERE WOULD BE NO POINT IN SAYING ANYTHING. CRADOCK SAID HE AGREED WHOLEHEARTEDLY, AND DID NOT SEEM DISAPPOINTED BY OUR RESPONSE.

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NLRR M299 # 92330

BY KML NARA DATE 6/21/12

## UNCLASSIFIED

# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

PAGE 01 EOB5Ø9

AMCONSUL HONG KONG 9819 DTG: 011001Z DEC 82 PSN: 032311

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UNCLAS HONG KONG 19819

E. O. 12356: N/A TAGS: ECON, EGEN, ETRD, HK SUBJ: HONG KONG CUTS INTEREST RATE SUMMARY: THE HONG KONG ASSOCIATION OF BANKS (HKAB) DECIDED TO REDUCE LOCAL INTEREST RATES BY ONE PERCENTAGE POINT. THIS IS THE SECOND REDUCTION IN THREE MONTHS. HKAB'S DECISION WAS INFLUENCED BY HONG KONG'S DWINDLING EXPORT EARNINGS AND WIDENING TRADE DEFICIT, INTEREST RATE REDUCTIONS ABROAD, AND THE HONG KONG DOLLAR'S RECENT STABILIZATION AFTER A SHARP DEPRECIATION IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS. END SUMMARY.

1. THE LOCAL BANKING CARTEL-THE HONG KONG ASSOCIATION OF BANKS (HKAB) - LOWERED LOCAL INTEREST RATES ONE PERCENTAGE POINT, EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 29. THE PRIME RATE DROPPED FROM 12 TO 11 PERCENT. DEPOSIT RATES DROPPED FROM SIX TO FIVE PERCENT FOR PASSBOOK SAVINGS, 24-HOUR CALL ACCOUNTS, SEVEN DAY CALL ACCOUNTS, AND ONE WEEK AND TWO WEEK DEPOSITS. THE YIELD DROPPED FROM 8.5 TO 7.5 PERCENT FOR ONE MONTH DEPOSITS, FROM 8.75 TO 7.75 PERCENT FOR TWO MONTH DEPOSITS. FROM NINE TO EIGHT PERCENT FOR THREE MONTH AND SIX MONTH DEPOSITS, AND FROM 8.5 TO 8 PERCENT FOR NINE AND TWELVE MONTH DEPOSITS.

2. THE REDUCTION REFLECTS THE INTERNATIONAL TREND OF EASING INTEREST RATES. THIS IS HONG KONG'S SIXTH PRIME RATE CUT SINCE NOVEMBER 30, 1981, WHEN THE PRIME STOOD AT 17 PERCENT. THE LAST REDUCTION OCCURRED ON AUGUST 31, 1982 WHEN THE PRIME RATE DROPPED FROM 12.5 TO 12 PERCENT.

3. THE RATE REDUCTION CAME IN THE WAKE OF NEGATIVE ECONOMIC STATISTICS. HONG KONG'S DOMESTIC EXPORTS WERE DOWN SIX PERCENT IN BOTH SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER AS COMPARED WITH THE SAME MONTHS LAST YEAR. HONG KONG'S TRADE DEFICIT ALSO WIDENED TO REACH H.K. DOLLARS 886 MILLION (U.S. DOLLARS 134. Ø4 MILLION AT H.K. DOLLARS 6.61 EQUAL U.S. DOLLAR ONE ON DECEMBER 1) IN SEPTEMBER AND H.K. DOLLARS 156 MILLION (U.S. DOLLARS 23.6 MILLION) IN OCTOBER, COMPARED WITH H. K. DOLLARS 215 MILLION (U.S. DOLLARS 32.53 MILLION) AND H.K. DOLLARS 848 MILLION (U.S. DOLLARS 128.29 MILLION) RESPECTIVELY FOR THE CORRESPONDING PERIODS LAST YEAR. THE RATE CUT WILL PARTIALLY RELIEVE THE INTEREST BURDEN ON LOCAL MANUFACTURERS, ALTHOUGH A REAL RECOVERY DEPENDS ON FURTHER REDUCTIONS AND EXPANDED EXPORT DEMAND IN U.S. AND EUROPEAN MARKETS.

4. BANKERS HERE ORIGINALLY DELAYED THE REDUCTION BECAUSE OF CONCERN THAT ANY MOVE WOULD DRIVE THE LOCAL CURRENCY TO A NEW LOW. THE SOFTENING OF THE INFLATION RATE TO NINE PERCENT IN OCTOBER FROM TEN PERCENT IN AUGUST DISCOUNTED PART OF THEIR WORRIES. THIS MEANS THAT REAL INTEREST RATES WILL REMAIN RELATIVELY STABLE AT ABOUT TWO PERCENT.

5. THE HKAB WAS UNDOUBTEDLY ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT THE HONG KONG DOLLAR HAS STABILIZED AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IN RECENT WEEKS. SINCE NOVEMBER 15, THE BUYING RATE FOR U.S. DOLLARS HAS FLUCTUATED BETWEEN H.K. DOLLARS 6.610 TO H.K. DOLLARS 6.670 VERSUS ONE U.S. DOLLAR, AND THE SELLING RATE FOR U.S. DOLLARS

BETWEEN H. K. DOLLARS 6.625 TO H. K. DOLLARS 6.695 VERSUS ONE U.S. DOLLAR. PREVIOUSLY THE HONG KONG DOLLAR HAD WEAKENED SUBSTANTIALLY AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR. OVERALL, THE HONG KONG DOLLAR HAS DEPRECIATED SEVEN PERCENT AGAINST THE U.S. DOLLAR IN THE PAST TWO MONTHS.

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# NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MESSAGE CENTER

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E. O. 12356: TAGS. SUBJECT:

DECL: OADR

PEPR, CH, HK, UK


BRITISH DISCUSSIONS IN FUTURE OF HONG KONG

REF: HONG KONG 19367

- 1. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT.
- AT THE NOVEMBER 5 BRIEFING. THE BRITISH SAID THAT HONG KONG CHINESE BUSINESSMEN HAD BEEN INEFFECTIVE IN EXPLAINING THE HONG KONG SITUATION TO OFFICIALS IN BEIJING -- THEY BECOME TONGUE-TIED AS THEY APPROACH THE DRAGON THRONE. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT THE FORTHRUS. BUSINESSMAN MIGHT BE ABLE TO CONVEY HIS OWN PERCEPTIONS TO THE CHINESE, CONVEY THE IMPACT OF THE CURRENT UNCERTAINTY ON THEIR OWN TRADE AND INVESTMENT PLANS, AND SUGGEST THAT INVESTOR CONFIDENCE WOULD BE BOUYED BY THE MAINTENANCE OF U.K. ADMINISTRATION. THE FORTHRIGHT AND INVESTMENT
- YOU MAY INFORM THE GOVERNOR THAT WE ARE PREPARED TO BRIEF INFLUENTIAL PRIVATE AMERICANS HEADED FOR THE PRC,

ON A VERY SELECTIVE BASIS AND WITH MAXIMUM DISCRETION, ON OUR CONCERN THAT PRC OFFICIALS HAVE ONLY A DIM APPRECIATION OF THE NATURE OF INVESTOR CONFIDENCE. WILL SUGGEST TO THEM THAT, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE, WILL SUGGEST TO THEM THAT, SHOULD THE OCCASION ARISE,
THEY MIGHT EXPRESS THEIR CONCERNS AS PERCEIVED BY
THEMSELVES OR THEIR FIRMS; WE BELIEVE IT WOULD NOT BE
HELPFUL FOR THEM TO PARROT THE U.E. LINE. INASMUCH AS
THE APPEARANCE OF AN ORCHESTRATED U.E. -U.S. APPROACH
WOULD RISK INCREASING CHINESE IRRITATION, YOU MIGHT
SUGGEST TO THE GOVERNOR THAT BUSINESSMEN OF OTHER
NATIONALITIES, PARTICULARLY JAPANESE. COULD BE DISCREETLY APPROACHED FOR SIMILAR MESSAGE CARRYING. DAM

> DECLASSIFIED NLRR M299 #92331 BY KML NARA DATE 6/21/12



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Collection Name	Withdrawer
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CHINA-FOREIGN RELATIONS-HONG KONG (11/20/82-	M09-299/1
1/24/83)	COLLINGS
Box Number	
13	11
ID Document Type	No of Doc Date Restric-
Document Description	pages tions
92333 CABLE	2 12/1/1982 B1
RE HONG KONG	В3

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 AMCONSUL HONG KONG Ø276 DTG: Ø9Ø7Ø6Z DEC 82 PSN: Ø29949 E08671 TOR: 343/Ø952Z CSN: HCEØ72

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SECRET SECTION Ø1 OF Ø2 HONG KONG 20276



EXDIS
NOFORN
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PDIP, CH, UK, HK
SUBJECT: UK-PRC PRIVATE CHANNEL INACTIVE AND
NEGOTIATIONS AT A STANDSTILL
REF: HONG KONG 14427

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY
ALTHOUGH THE TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE USE OF
THE PRIVATE UK-PRC CHANNEL SET UP HERE EARLIER HAVE
CHANGED, THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN LONDON REMAINS
RELUCTANT TO AUTHORIZE ITS USE BECAUSE PM THATCHER
CONTINUES PERSONALLY TO TAKE A HARD LINE ON THE
ISSUE OF SOVEREIGNTY. A WELL-PLACED SOURCE WHO
SET UP THE CHANNEL HAS BECOME INCREASINGLY
FRUSTRATED OVER THE LACK OF MOVEMENT IN THE TALKS
SO FAR AND SEES THE CONTINUING DISSUSSION IN THE
MEDIA OF PRC COMMENTS TO HONG KONG VISITORS AS A
SIGNAL THAT BEIJING TOO IS BECOMING IMPATIENT
WITH LONDON'S STANCE. THE BRITISH ARE ALSO REPORTEDLY
CONCERNED THAT CHINA MAY BE LOSING CONFIDENCE IN
THE TALKS AND GETTING THE WRONG IMPRESSION OF HONG
KONG CITIZENS' INTERESTS IN THE ULTIMATE FATE OF
THE COLONY.
END SUMMARY

3. ACCORDING TO A WELL-PLACED HONG KONG GOVERNMENT SOURCE, LONDON HAS NOT AUTHORIZED THE USE OF THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS CHANNEL WHICH HE ESTABLISHED HERE (REFTEL) WITH A NEPHEW OF LIAO CHENGZHI AS A MEANS OF TESTING THE WATERS ON MODALITIES OF A POST-1997 ADMINISTRATION. OUR SOURCE CLAIMS THAT FOREIGN MINISTER PYM HAS REFUSED TO PRESENT THE IDEA TO PM THATCHER BECAUSE OF HER STRONG REACTIONS TO THE FOREIGN OFFICE RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FALKLANDS ISSUE AND PYM'S CONVICTION THAT SHE WOULD DISMISS THE PROPOSAL BECAUSE OF HER VIEWS ON THE VALIDITY OF THE TREATIES AND BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY. THERE IS ALSO, ACCORDING TO OUR SOURCE, AN ONGOING DEBATE OVER WHAT TO SAY IN THE PRIVATE CHANNEL. ON THE ONE HAND, IT WOULD CLEARLY BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO SUGGEST THAT THERE BE LESS PUBLIC PRC COMMENT --

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THOUGH THIS IS LARGELY A PRODUCT OF HONG KONG
VISITORS FLOODING THE PRESS WITH THEIR IMPRESSIONS
OF CHINESE POSITIONS. BUT, WITHOUT A SPECIFIC.
MESSAGE OF THEIR OWN TO ADD TO BRITAIN'S STATEMENTS
DURING THE THATCHER TALKS IN SEPTEMBER, THE
GOVERNOR AND POLAD ARE HESITANT TO BEGIN TO USE
THE CHANNEL.

4. OUR SOURCE, ON THE OTHER HAND, BELIEVES IT IS IMPORTANT TO OPEN THE CHANNEL SO THAT THE PRESENTLY UNPRODUCTIVE FORMAL TALKS DO NOT REMAIN THE ONLY FORM OF SINO-BRITISH COMMUNICATION. HE ARGUES FURTHER THAT A REPACKAGING OF MRS. THATCHER'S VIEWS -- ALONG THE LINE OF LORD MACLEHOSE'S DECEMBER 3 SPEECH IN LONDON HONG KONG 20118) -- WOULD ALSO BE OF USE. BUT IT IS JUST THIS POSITION WHICH THE FOREIGN MINISTER FEELS CANNOT BE ADVANCED AT THIS TIME.

GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES ARE ESPECIALLY TROUBLED BY THE RECENT VISIT OF THE HONG KONG FACTORY OWNERS' ASSOCIATION DELEGATION AND THE FRECUENT, OUTSPOKEN COMMENTS OF ITS LEADER, HUANG JIAN, FOLLOWING THE DELEGATION'S MEETING WITH POLITBURO MEMBER/NPC VICE CHAIRMAN LIAO CHENGZHI. THE BRITISH HERE ARE CONCERNED ON TWO SCORES. FIRST, THEY ARE DISTURBED THAT CHINESE OPENNESS IN CONVERSATIONS WITH THE DELEGATION SUGGESTS BEIJING DISSATISFACTION WITH THE FORMAL TALKS AND BRITAIN'S POSITION ON SOVEREIGNTY (HONG KONG 2001). SECOND, THEY ARE CONCERNED THAT HUANG'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS ARE DECEPTIVE, SMOOTHING OVER MAJOR PROBLEM AREAS IN AN EFFORT TO REASSURE OR TO PUFF UP THE SELF-IMPORTANCE OF HUANG JIAN. THE BRITISH ARE AWARE, FOR EXAMPLE, FROM PHONE CALLS MADE BY THE DELEGATION MEMBERS FOLLOWING THEIR MEETING

13524 E. O. 12958 As Amended Sec. 3.3 (b)(l) 3.3 (b)(l)

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SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 HONG KONG 20276

WITH LIAO, THAT THOSE MEMBERS PLACED SELD ORDERS WITH THEIR STOCK BROKERS IN CONTRAST TO THEIR PURPORTED OPTIMISM OVER THE TALKS.

6. BRITISH AUTHORITIES HERE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE CHINESE ALSO MONITORED THESE CALLS. OUR OWN CONVERSATIONS WITH NCNA OFFICIALS AND OTHERS HERE HAVE INDICATED UTTER DISDAIN FOR HUANG AND HIS STATEMENTS FOLLOWING HIS CHINA MEETINGS. WE ARE ALSO AWARE THAT NCNA MADE AN EFFORT TO SILENCE HIM, AT ONE POINT CALLING HUANG IN TO URGE THAT HE NOT COMMENT FURTHER ON THE TALKS --ADVICE WHICH HUANG CHOSE TO IGNORE (HONG KONG 20038). OUR SOURCE'S CONCERN IS THAT THE PERFORMANCE OF HUANG AND HIS COHORTS CREATES A TOTALLY INCORRECT PICTURE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE AND EVEN ITS INTERESTS OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE AND EVEN ITS
BUSINESS CLASS. THE PRC IS ALREADY CONVINCED

THAT THE PROPERTY BARONS ARE A WORTHLESS LOT WHO -IN MARXIST TERMS -- ARE PURE EXPLOITERS, ADDING
NOTHING TO THE NET WORTH OF ANY PRODUCTION.

SHOULD THEY NOW SEE THE FACTORY OWNERS -- WHO IN
MARXIST TERMS AT LEAST ARE PRODUCERS -- OPERATING
IN A STRICTLY SELF-INTERESTED MANNER, OUR SOURCE
BELIEVES IT WOULD COMPLICATE THE EFFORTS OF
THOSE IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP WHO WISH TO PRESERVE THOSE IN THE CHINESE LEADERSHIP WHO WISH TO PRESERVE HONG KONG'S EXISTING ROLES AND A SEMBLANCE OF ITS PRESENT SYSTEM.

7. COMMENT
OUR SOURCE HAS GONE CONSIDERABLY BEYOND HIS
AUTHORITY IN TELLING US OF CURRENT INTERNAL UK
PROBLEMS ON THE SINO-BRITISH TALKS. HIS REMARKS
AND ALL REFERENCES TO THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIVATE
CHANNEL TO THE CHINESE SHOULD BE ABSOLUTELY
PROTECTED. WE ARE SYMPATHETIC TO HIS VIEWS
OF BET LING'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FEELING OF BEIJING'S MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE FEELING OF THE HONG KONG PEOPLE BASED ON LEADERSHIP MEETINGS WITH HONG KONG BUSINESSMEN BUT SEE NO IMMEDIATE WAY AROUND THIS IMPASSE. WILLIAMS

## -SECRET

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION Ø1 OF Ø3 LONDON 2737Ø

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, CH, HK, UK
SUBJECT: FUTURE OF HONG KONG: BRITISH STANCE
REF: (A) HONG KONG Ø2Ø415, (B) HONG KONG Ø2Ø276,

(C) HONG KONG Ø2ØØØ1, (D) HONG KONG Ø19898,

(E) HONG KONG Ø2Ø662

CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.

- THATCHER VIEWS BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG KONG AS NEGOTIABLE, THOUGH ONLY WITHIN THE CONTEXT
  OF AN OVERALL SETTLEMENT COOVERING FUTURE ADMINISTRATION,
  ECONOMIC ARRANGEMENTS, AND THE WELL-BEING OF THE PEOPLE
  OF HONG KONG, ACCORDING TO THE FCO WORKING LEVEL. FORMAL
  TALKS WITH PEKING HAVE MOVED SLOWLY WHILE THE PRC SHIFTED MFA STAFF AND CONDUCTED ITS PUBLIC CAMPAIGN ON BEHALF OF ITS OWN POSITION. OTHER THAN THE FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS AND CHINA'S PUBLIC MONOLOGUE, NO OTHER CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION IS CURRENTLY IN USE. HONG KONG IS NOT A DOMESTIC POLITI-CAL ISSUE IN THE UK, AND HAS DRAWN LITTLE PUBLIC ATTENTION SINCE THATCHER'S VISIT. END SUMMARY.
- 3. OPENING UP FOR THE FIRST TIME ON THE UK-PRC TALKS, THE FCO HONG KONG DESK OFFICER GAVE US A FULL RUN-DOWN DECEMBER 15. HE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR STRICT CONFIDENTIALITY AND THE FACT THAT HMG IS NOT BRIEFING OTHER COUNTRIES. REFLECTING THE TIGHT HOLD ON THIS ISSUE SINCE THATCHER'S TRIP, FCO OFFICERS IN EARLIER CONTACTS HAVE BEEN CAREFUL NOT TO GO BEYOND REFERENCES TO PUBLIC STATEMENTS AND TO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DONALD'S BRIEFING IN WASHINGTON.
- THE UK AMBASSADOR IN PEKING MET THREE PEKING TALKS: TIMES (TWICE IN OCTOBER, ONCE IN DECEMBER) WITH VICE FOREIGN MINISTER ZHANG WEN JIN BEFORE THE LATTER'S REASSIGNMENT AS AMBASSADOR TO THE U.S. ZHANG'S SUCCESSOR (YAO GUANG, FORMER AMBASSADOR IN PARIS) IS EXPECTED TO BE THE NEW INTERLOCUTOR, BUT TALKS ARE NOT LIKELY TO RESUME BEFORE THE NEW YEAR. CHINA'S RECENT CHANGE OF FOREIGN MINISTERS IS ANOTHER DELAYING FACTOR. HMG DOES

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NOT BELIEVE THAT HANDLING OF THE HONG KONG ISSUE WAS AN ELEMENT IN THE MFA PERSONNEL CHANGES. THOUGH TALKS HAVE THUS FAR BEEN ONE-ON-ONE, HMG IS NOT AVERSE TO WIDENING EITHER SIDE'S TEAM AT A LATER STAGE, POSSIBLY WITH THE HONG KONG GOVERNOR JOINING IN.

THE FCO DESCRIBED THE ATMOSPHERE OF THE TALKS AS "PLEASANT." IN EARLY SESSIONS, ZHANG STATED CHINESE WILLINGNESS TO CONDUCT TALKS, BUT ONLY ON THE PREMISE THAT CHINA WOULD RECOVER SOVEREIGNTY IN 1997. THE UK OBJECTED, AS THIS CONTRAVENED THE THATCHER-DENG AGREEMENT THAT THERE WOULD BE NO PRECONDITIONS. AT THE LAST SESSION THE UK STATED ITS WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS SOVEREIGNTY, BUT ONLY AS ONE ELEMENT OO A AACKAGE ADDRESSING ALL FACETS OF HONG KONG'S FUTURE. ZHANG SAID HE WOULD REPORT THIS TO THE NEW FOREIGN MINISTER AND LET THE BRITISH KNOW WHEN THE CHINESE WERE READY FOR THE NEXT SESSION. THE BALL REMAINS IN THE CHINESE COURT.

- 5. PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS: HMG SEES THE CHINESE PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AS AN ATTEMPT TO GRADUALLY ACCUSTOM THE HONG KONG PUBLIC TO THE IDEA OF A CHINESE TAKEOVER. THE FCO SEE NO POINT IN TRYING TO COUNTERACT THE PROPAGANDA AT THIS LEVEL, THOUGH THE UK HAS TAKEN SEVERAL PUBLIC STEPS (AS REF E POINTS OUT) TO REASSURE THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG OF ITS COMMITMENT TO THEM.
- 6. INTERMEDIARIES: THE UK IS ACTIVELY CONTINUING ITS EFFORTS TO EDUCATE THE CHINESE, BY ENCOURAGING A WIDE VARIETY OF HONG KONG AND FOREIGN BUSINESS PEOPLE TO EXPLAIN HONG KONG'S NEEDS TO PEKING. ACKNOWLEDGING THE RELUCTANCE OF THOSE FROM HONG KONG TO SPEAK CANDIDLY IN PEKING, THE FCO OFFICIAL SAID, "IT'S THEIR FUTURE: IF THEY AREN'T WILLING TO STAND UP FOR THEIR INTERESTS NOW, WHAT CAN THEY EXPECT?"

THE FCO FEELS THE CHINESE HAVE BEGUN TO UNDERSTAND MORE OF THE LEGAL/FINANCIAL COMPLEXITIES OF HONG KONG'S SYSTEM, AND SEEM TO REALIZE THAT IT MUST BE PRESERVED FOR HONG KONG TO CONTINUE TO PROSPER. THE PHRASE "TWO SYSTEMS IN ONE COUNTRY" AND THE WORD "CAPITALISM" ARE BT

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CONFIDENTIAL SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 27370

EXDIS NOFORN APPEARING MORE AND MORE FREQUENTLY IN PUBLIC AND SECRET PRC DOCUMENTS.

7. HOW UK SEES THE FUTURE: THATCHER'S PRIORITY IS TO "SEE HONG KONG ALL RIGHT" -- TO PROVIDE A CONTINUING, RELIABLE, TRUSTWORTHY SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT THAT WILL ALLOW THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG TO CONTINUE THEIR WAY OF LIFE UNDISTURBED. IF THIS CAN BE GUARANTEED, SOVEREIGNTY AND OTHER ISSUES ARE OPEN TO NEGOTIATION. THATCHER IS GENUINELY WILLING TO VARY THE OLD HONG KONG TREATIES AS SHE STATED IN HONG KONG. AS A LAWYER SHE HOLDS THE TREATIES AS STILL VALID -- BUT THEY ARE NOT SACRED. ON THIS QUESTION THE FCO OFFICIAL FELT LEHANE (REF A) HAD QUITE MISSED THE POINT. HMG IS THINKING IN TERMS OF A GRADUAL, PHASED HANDOVER OF FUNCTIONS TO HONG KØNG/PRC CHINESE. THE PERIOD OF TURN-PHASED HANDOVER OF FUNCTIONS TO HONG KØNG/PRC CHINESE. THE PERIOD OF TURNOVER COULD BEGIN AT ANY TIME AND END BEFORE, AT, OR
AFTER 1997 -- OR ITS END COULD EVEN BE LEFT TO FURTHER
NEGOTIATION. ALTERNATIVELY, A TURNOVER "NOTICE" MECHANISM
COULD BE SET UP. HMG IS OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS. DURING
THE HANDOVER PERIOD, CHINESE ADMINISTRATORS WOULD BE
INCREASINGLY BROUGHT INTO ADMINISTRATIVE ROLES, GRADUALLY
GAINING INCREASED EXPERIENCE AND UNDERSTANDING OF HONG
KONG'S COMPLEX SYSTEM KONG'S COMPLEX SYSTEM. WHILE MAINTAINING HONG KONG'S BASIC SYSTEM, THE UMBILICAL TIE TO LONDON COULD BE GRADUALLY DIMINISHED. FOR ETHE CHINESE SUGGESTION THAT HONG KONG HAVE ITS OWN FOR EXAMPLE, COURT OF APPEAL RATHER THAN REMAIN TIED TO THE LONDON COURT, IS REGARDED BY FCO AS FEASIBLE.
THE UK HAS NOT YET RAISED ANY OF THESE POSSIBILITIES WITH
THE CHINESE. IT HAS NOT USED ANY STALKING HORSES OR
CONFIDENTIAL, INFORMAL INTERMEDIARIES. THOUGH IT HAS REPEATEDLY SUGGESTED TO THE CHINESE THAT A NEW, "EQUAL" TREATY COULD SUPERCEDE THE OLD, "UNEQUAL" ONES, THE CHINESE HAVE NOT YET ACKNOWLEDGED THIS POSSIBILITY. REMAIN HOPEFUL, HOWEVER, THAT AN AGREEMENT CAN BE REACHED. THEY ARE NOT OVERLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE INITIAL SLOW PACE OF THE TALKS, POINTING TO THE LONG PERIOD WHEN CHINA REFUSED EVEN TO TALK ABOUT THE FUTURE.

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- UK DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS: THE UK ELECTORATE HAS NOT BEEN CONCERNED ABOUT HONG KONG. AS LONG AS THERE IS NO WAVE OF HONG KØNG IMMIGRANTS TO BRITAIN OR A SERIOUS SETBACK KOR HONG KONG. . ELATED BUSINESS AND BANKING, THATCHER DOES NOT ANTICIPATE THAT HONG KONG WILL BE FACTOR IN THE UPCOMING BRITISH ELECTIONS. SHE IS FOLLOWING THE QUESTION CLOSELY, HOWEVER, AND CONTINUES TO SEE A STREAM OF VISITORS FROM HONG KONG, PICKING THEIR BRAINS TO KEEP TRACK OF THEIR CONCERNS. OUR CONTACT DENIED THERE WAS ANY FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PM AND THE FCO OVER HONG KONG.
- REASONS FOR UK OPTIMISM, FINALLY, OUR RCO CONTACT LISTED FOUR "TRUMP CARDS" THAT FAVOR A POSITIVE OUTCOME TO THE TALKS:
- -- UK SOVEREIGNTY IS A POWERFUL BARGAINING CHIP.
- -- THE HONG KONG ECONOMY IS MUCH VALUED BY THE PRC.
- -- UK-PRC RELATIONS ARE GENERALLY EXCELLENT: COMMERCIAL.
- SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL TIES ARE GROWING.
  -- CHINA'S DESIRE TO ATTRACT TAIWAN BACK INTO THE FOLD
- CAN BE HELPED BY A SATISFACTORY HONG KONG AGREEMENT.
- FOLLOWING THE QUESTIONING IN THE PRESS HERE COMMENT: OVER THATCHER'S PUBLIC STATEMENTS DURING HER FAR EAST TRIP, HONG KONG HAS FEATURED VERY LITTLE IN THE MEDIA. HMG APPEARS TO WANT TO KEEP IT THAT WAY AND TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO TAKE HASTY POSITIONS IN THE FORMAL TALKS. THE BRITISH ARE WATCHING SUCH KEY INDICATORS AS THE HONG KONG INDEX, PROPERTY VALUES, INTEREST RATES, CURRENCY BT

PAGE Ø1 E 0 B 6 7 5

LONDON 7370 ANØØ5Ø87

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I D E N T I A L SECTION Ø3 OF Ø3 LONDON 2737Ø

EXDIS NOFORN FLOWS, AND CURRENCY EXCHANGE RATES, BEARING IN MIND THAT PURELY ECONOMIC AS WELL AS POLITICAL FACTORS PLAY A ROLE. THEY APPEAR TO BELIEVE THE VERY APPEARANCE OF UNHURRIED CONNIDENCE MAY BECOME A SIGNIFICANT TACTOR IN MAINTAINING HONG KONG'S STABILITY WHILE DISCUSSIONS TAKE THEIR LEISURELY COURSE. END COMMENT. LOUIS BT

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PAGE Ø1 OF Ø2 FOB255

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EXDIS/NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON - FOR PRINCIPAL OFFICER ONLY DECL: OADR E. O. 12356:

TAGS: XE, PINR, CH, UK, HK

INR'S EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC WEEKLY HIGHLIGHTS, SUBJECT: DECEMBER 12-18, 1982, REPORT NO. 47, SUPPLEMENT 1

#### SINO-BRITISH DISCUSSIONS ON HONG KONG

NEITHER CHINA NOR BRITAIN HAS YIELDED ON CONDITIONS FOR STARTING FORMAL NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG, AC-CORDING TO A KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE. THE CHINESE CONTINUE TO INSIST THAT BRITAIN ACKNOWLEDGE CHINESE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE COLONY BEFORE DISCUSSIONS BEGIN; THE BRITISH PREFER WORKING OUT THE DETAILS OF HONG KONG'S FUTURE ADMINISTRATION BEFORE CONSIDERING THE SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE.

DESPITE THIS APPARENT IMPASSE -- AND THE POSSIBILITY THAT MRS. THATCHER'S POSITION HAS HARDENED WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE 19TH CENTURY TREATIES AND HER MORAL RESPON-SIBILITY TO THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG--BRITISH OFFICIALS ARE ENCOURAGED THAT THE SERIOUS ATTENTION THE CHINESE ARE GIVING TO BRITISH PROPOSALS PRESAGES AN EVENTUAL WILLINGNESS TO BARGAIN. SPECIFICALLY, THE BRITISH ARE OFFERING TO "EDUCATE"
THE CHINESE ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE REALITIES OF GOVERNING
HONG KONG AND ARE SUGGESTING THAT FORMAL ARRANGEMENTS WORKED OUT BY LONDON AND BEIJING BE CODIFIED IN A CONSTITUTION

WRITTEN BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE OF HONG KONG.

AS PART OF THOSE ARRANGEMENTS, THE BRITISH WANT TO AP-POINT THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR (THE GOVERNOR WOULD BE A HONG KONG CHINESE) AND ALL OTHER ADMINISTRATORS. THIS WOULD LEAVE THE BRITISH IN CONTROL OF DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS, A SITUATION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED IS UNACCEPTABLE. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE, SITUATION THAT THE CHINESE HAVE ALREADY INDICATED 10 C.

ACCEPTABLE. ACCORDING TO ANOTHER KNOWLEDGEABLE SOURCE, THE
CHINESE CONTINUE TO PUSH THE CONCEPT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE ZONE (SAZ). ENVISIONING THE DEPARTURE OF THE BRITISH
AND THEIR REPLACEMENT BY LOCAL CHINESE IN ALL AREAS OF ADMINISTRATION. STILL, BEIJING MAY BACK AWAY FROM THIS STAND
IF HONG KONG RESIDENTS FAIL TO ACCEPT CHINESE ASSURANCES
THAT NOTHING WILL CHANGE IN HONG KONG AFTER 1997. BY ACCEPTING A ROLE FOR THE BRITISH EXPATRIATES WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE SAZS, FOR EXAMPLE, THE CHINESE HAVE DEMONSTRATED
THAT THEIR INTRACTABLE RHETORIC ON SOVEREIGNTY DOES NOT
PRECLUDE FLEXIBILITY ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IT IS UNCLEAR, PRECLUDE FLEXIBILITY ON SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES. IT IS UNCLEAR, HOWEVER, WHETHER FLEXIBILITY CAN BE TRANSLATED INTO CON-FIDENCE. (RGOLDBERG) DAM

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Box Number 13	11
ID Document Type	No of Doc Date Restric-
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92338 CABLE	3 12/23/1982 B1
RE HONG KONG	В3

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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
Collection Name	Withdrawer
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File Folder CHINA-FOREIGN RELATIONS-HONG KONG (11/20/82-	<i>FOIA</i> M09-299/1
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Document Description	pages tions
92339 CABLE	1 12/24/1982 B1
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	B3

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1/24/63)	COLLINGS
Box Number	
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ID Document Type	No of Doc Date Restric-
Document Description	pages tions
92340 CABLE	2 12/30/1982 B1
RE HONG KONG	В3

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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# Economic Research Department JANUARY 1983

CHEMICALBANK

### HONG KONG

The Hong Kong economy has been hit by the negative effects of world recession and uncertainties concerning the future political status of the colony. The modest recovery we expect in the U.S. economy in early 1983 will not benefit Hong Kong until at least second-quarter 1983. Domestic activity in Hong Kong has waned, with investor confidence reduced by liquidity strains and exports suffering from slack foreign demand. Hong Kong's economic growth for 1982 is estimated at less than half the 1981 rate. On the brighter side, inflation has slowed substantially and Hong Kong's trade and current account deficits have narrowed. Activity should pick up somewhat in second-half 1983, but growth is unlikely to match the very rapid rates of recent years.

### Growth

Hong Kong's real GDP growth rate decelerated significantly in 1982, reflecting the effects of recession abroad and some concern over Hong Kong's future. Inconclusive talks between U.K. and PRC officials about the future administration of Hong Kong created uncertainty which resulted in sharp short-term declines in the stock market and the value of the Hong Kong dollar and led to some temporary strains in the financial market. Whereas in 1981 Hong Kong experienced strong domestic demand and export growth, these sources of stimulus slowed in 1982 and are unlikely to revive until around mid-1983. Private consumption expenditures grew more slowly in 1982, and the stimulus provided by the property and stock markets in 1981 was absent. Land prices are declining, and there is an oversupply of apartment and office space. The manufacturing sector, the largest employer in Hong Kong, has been negatively affected by weak overseas demand for Hong Kong exports.

Investment by the government in public housing and in large projects like the Mass Transit Railway has grown rapidly, but lower-than-anticipated revenues are likely to lead to Hong Kong's first budget deficit since FY1974/75 (ending March 31). Hong Kong's financial and service sectors are performing relatively well. In 1983 Hong Kong's economic growth should accelerate to about 5½% as the pickup in activity abroad increases demand for the colony's exports and boosts manufacturing production. The financial and service sectors, however, will continue to be the major growth sectors. Public spending is likely to be constrained by lower revenues from land sales, traditionally the government's single largest revenue source, and uncertainty about Hong Kong's future will persist.

### Inflation

Hong Kong's inflation rate decelerated substantially in 1982. Money supply growth slowed, domestic demand was weaker, property prices and rents declined, and inflation abroad decelerated. For 1983 we expect inflation to slow further to about  $9\frac{1}{2}\%$ . Although increased economic activity in second-half 1983 and continued weakening of the Hong Kong dollar will create upward pressures on inflation, the rate will be reduced by sluggish demand in the first half of the year and by weakness in rents and property prices.

#### Labor

Hong Kong's employment situation has deteriorated somewhat over the past year, but unemployment is still at a very low rate of about 3½%. The recession is most evident in the manufacturing sector, where employment apparently did not increase in 1982 and real wages have been growing very slowly. In the services sector, employment and wages have continued to rise. Over the medium term, wages in the financial and services sectors can be expected to continue outpacing those in manufacturing.

### External Sector

Since late 1981 the effects of weak external demand have become evident in Hong Kong's external accounts. The colony's exports and imports experienced sharply slower growth in 1982 in Hong Kong dollar terms (about 3½% and 3%, respectively) and declined in U.S. dollar terms—due to the Hong Kong dollar's depreciation. The greater slowdown in imports than exports resulted in a smaller trade deficit in both currencies. No significant pickup in export growth is expected until at least second—quarter 1983. Import growth, however, is also likely to accelerate, resulting in a somewhat larger HK\$ trade deficit. The depreciation of the colony's currency will probably result in unchanged exports and imports in U.S. dollar terms.

The invisibles surplus is estimated to have declined slightly last year. Earnings from shipping and other services are unlikely to have shown much improvement, given the generally depressed world economy. Net tourism earnings probably decreased as foreign travel by Hong Kong residents grew at least as rapidly as tourism to the colony. In 1983 service earnings may rise somewhat, but net tourism receipts are likely to decline again. Although the current account deficit should be stable, it is likely that capital outflow will increase from pre-1982 levels because of investor nervousness, but this should level off in the medium term as the future of Hong Kong is more clearly defined.

	1966-73 (annual	1973-80 average)	1981	<u>1982</u> e	forecast
Real GDP (% change) Consumer Prices (% change)	9.1 7.7	9.4 8.4	11.0 15.0	3.5 10.5	5.5 9.5
	1979	1980	1981	<u>1982</u> e	1983 forecast
		(billion	U.S. do11	ars)	10166436
Exports Imports (c.i.f.)* Trade Balance (Adjusted)** Net Services and Transfers Current Account Balance	15.2 17.2 -2.1 1.6 -0.5	19.7 22.4 -2.7 1.6 -1.1	21.8 24.7 -3.1 1.6 -1.5	20.7 23.3 -2.6 1.5 -1.1	20.7 23.3 -2.6 1.5 -1.1

<sup>\*</sup>Including imports of water

<sup>\*\*</sup>Adjusted to account for imports of gold for industrial and commercial use.

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	50	_	
AGR	COM	FRB	FROM : AMCONSUL HONG KONG DATE: 04 Jan 1983
INT	LAB	TAR	SUBJECT: HONG KONG STEEL MAGNATE ON MEETING WITH LIAO CHENGZHI
TR	хмв	AIR	REFTAGS: CH, HK, UK, PEPR, PINT, PINR
ARMY	CIA	NAVY	€-0. 12356: DECL: OADR
OSD	USIA	NSA	SUMMARY
			A RELIABLE MEMBER OF THE HONG KONG FACTORY OWNERS DELEGATION
			TO BEIJING HAS CONFIRMED MANY OF THE POINTS THE GROUP LEADER
	ć., .		HAD EARLIER MADE TO CONGENOFFS CONCERNING LATE NOVEMBER DISCUSSIONS WITH NPC VICE CHAIRMAN LIAO CHENGZHI. LIAO
DIS	T:		EMPHASIZED THAT AFTER THE PRC REGAINS SOVEREIGNTY OVER HONG
CG	£		KONG IN 1997, BRITISH ADMINISTRATION WILL END, AND THE
XO POL	-6		GOVERNMENT WILL BE LEFT TO HONG KONG CHINESE. THE PRC HAS
EC-			EXERCISED SOME CAUTION IN PUBLICIZING LIAO'S REMARKS, PERHAPS BECAUSE THE TOP LEADERS HAVE NOT YET MADE FIRM DECISIONS ON THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG OR BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WISH TO
EXS			THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG OR BECAUSE THEY DO NOT WISH TO
CON	S	100	DEDTUDD EVELTABLE HOME VONCEDO
DLO			FERTORB EXCITABLE HONG KONGERS.
FBI USI		4	POLOFF RECENTLY MET WITH LOCAL STEEL MAGNATE FRANK PONG TO DISCUSS HIS LATE NOVEMBER MEETING WITH NPC VICE CHAIRMAN LIAO CHENGZHI AS A MEMBER OF THE HONG KONG FACTORY OWNERS
CHR	ON		POLOFF RECENTLY MET WITH LOCAL STEEL MAGNATE FRANK PONG TO
		2	DISCUSS HIS LATE NOVEMBER MEETING WITH NPC VICE CHAIRMAN
1	1		LIAO CHENGZHI AS A MEMBER OF THE HONG KONG FACTORY OWNERS
	4.		DELEGATION PONG FOOK DETAILED NOTES ON THE MEETING AND
		*	SEPARATELY BRIEFED POLOFF AND THE BRITISH POLITICAL ADVISOR'S
			OFFICE ON LIAO'S REMARKS. THE BRITISH HAVE VOUCHED FOR
			PONG'S RELIABILITY, EXPLAINING THAT THEY HAVE INDEPENDENT CONFIRMATION OF PONG'S VERSION OF THE MEETING WITH LIAO.
1163	16 .1 .1	11 34	THE PONG FAMILY EVIDENTLY HAS A FAIRLY CLOSE RELATIONSHIP
13 J.	n 13	í M	WITH LIAO, WHO FREQUENTLY ENTERTAINS FRANK PONG'S PARENTS AT HIS HOME.
FAL	ORC/L	A/W	NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
			CONFIDENTIAL FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
4 4 1 3 4 3 4			FORM DS 202
Drafted	by:		Contents and Classification Approved by:
Clearan	. (		POL: TEONG/JSTROTZ/LJ ACG: RLWILLIAMS POL: HEMEINHEIT

THE BRINK OF DEPRESSION. (COMMENT: WE DOUBT WHETHER SUCH ASSURANCES CONCERNING CHINA'S ECONOMIC PROSPECTS CARRIED MUCH WEIGHT WITH THE HONG KONG CAPITALISTS. END COMMENT.)

WHILE VERY DEFINITE ON CHINA'S EVENTUAL GOAL TO ASSUME ADMINISTRATION OF HONG KONG, LIAO WAS VAGUE ON SPECIFICS AND DID NOT GIVE CLEAR ANSWERS TO THE DELEGATION'S QUESTIONS CONCERNING PASSPORTS AND CURRENCY IN THE POST-THE VICE CHAIRMAN MERELY REPLIED THAT HONG 1997 ERA. KONGERS WOULD BE TREATED LIKE OTHER OVERSEAS CHINESE FOR PURPOSES OF TRAVEL, AND THAT SUITABLE SOLUTIONS TO OTHER QUESTIONS WOULD EVENTUALLY BE WORKED OUT. AS FOR PROPERTY OWNERSHIP, LIAO EXPLAINED THAT INDIVIDUALS COULD HAVE TITLE TO THEIR HOMES BUT THAT THE LAND WOULD BELONG TO THE STATE. (COMMENT: PONG DID NOT CONFIRM HUANG JIAN'S REPORT THAT THE HONG KONG AND SHANGHAI BANK AND CHARTERED BANK COULD CONTINUE TO ISSUE CURRENCY UNDER PRC RULE OR THAT BEIJING WOULD TRY TO CHANNEL FUNDS AWAY FROM SPECULATIVE ACTIVITIES AND TOWARD INDUSTRY. END COMMENT.) DESPITE THE LACK OF SPECIFICITY, MOST MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION WERE OPTIMISTIC ABOUT HONG KONG'S FUTURE AFTER TALKING WITH LIAO AND BE-LIEVED THAT BEIJING WOULD PROCEED RATIONALLY IN NEGOTIATIONS WITH LONDON.

PONG SENSED THAT OTHER PRC OFFICIALS WERE MORE RELAXED WITH THE GROUP AFTER LIAO HAD EXPLAINED THE PARTY LINE TO THE DELEGATION. PONG WAS PARTICULARLY IMPRESSED WITH THE HOSPITALITY OF A TIANJIN VICE MAYOR, WHO LIKE LIAO, PREDICTED THAT HONG KONG WOULD NOT BE FULLY INTEGRATED WITH CHINA FOR ANOTHER 100 TO 200 YEARS. THIS OFFICIAL ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING A FAVORABLE INVEST-MENT CLIMATE AND ECONOMIC STABILITY AS WELL AS INSURING THE WELFARE OF HONG KONG'S 5.5 MILLION CHINESE.

COMMENT: THE CHINESE HAVE REPORTED LIAO'S STATEMENTS WITH CONSIDERABLE CAUTION, REVEALING ONLY SOME OF THEM IN THE LOCAL PRC AFFILIATED PAPERS AND GIVING NO CLUE OF HIS REMARKS IN THE MAINLAND PRESS (HK 20001). THE LOCAL XINHUA OFFICE ALSO ASKED DELEGATION LEADER HUANG JIAN TO REFRAIN FROM PUBLICIZING LIAO'S COMMENTS, BUT THE BUSINESS-MAN WAS NOT TO BE SILENCED. REFLECTING DISPLEASURE WITH THE UNRULY HONG KONGER, A XINHUA REPRESENTATIVE IN A PRI-VATE CONVERSATION WITH CONGENOFF CAST ASPERSIONS ON HUANG JIAN'S VERACITY (HK 20038).

BEIJING'S CAUTION IN PUBLICIZING LIAO'S REMARKS MAY SUGGEST THAT THE VICE CHAIRMAN'S COMMENTS WERE INTENDED FOR A SELECTED AUDIENCE AND DID NOT REFLECT CONCRETE DECISIONS CONCERNING THE FUTURE OF HONG KONG. DA GONG BAO PUBLISHER FEI YIMING TOLD CONGENOFFS THAT LIAO WAS NOT THE LEADING

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13	11
ID Document Type	No of Doc Date Restric-
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92342 CABLE	1 1/12/1983 B1
121805Z JAN 83	В3

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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