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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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File "Korea" 17

FOREIGN RELATIONS, TRADE

SOUTH KOREA

NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR TO KOREA, POSSIBLE POLICY CHANGES VIEWED

Seoul WOLGAN KYONGHYANG in Korean May 87 pp 148-159

[Article by Kang Song-po: "An Interview With Ambassador Lilley"]

[Excerpts] What could be the significance of the "U.S. variable" on Korean politics? The two countries have maintained their relationship, which began as a blood-pledge relationship, with varying degrees, through important crises. Under such circumstances, the U.S. embassy plays the role of field headquarters. The commander of the headquarters is now Ambassador Lilley, who is newly appointed. What kind of man is he? Let's take another look at the depth of the Korean-U.S. relationship now centered on Ambassador Lilley.

Lessons from the Philippines

Despite the rapidly approaching transition point that could leave a significant mark in the history of Korean politics, the government and the opposition are increasingly adopting a firm attitude toward each other. Under such circumstances, it seems inevitable to pay attention to U.S. policies toward Korea.

This is because the power of the United States has been widely recognized, although no inquiries have ever been made as to how significant American influence has been, or whether American is capable of such power during this upheaval in Korean politics.

Someone might attempt to find circumstantial evidence of potential U.S. influence on its allied nations that are politically unstable, something similar to that of the Philippine revolution in February of last year.

In fact, world attention turned to Korea immediately after the Philippine incident. There was even wild speculation on "a sequel to the Philippine drama" in Korea. However many such speculations disappeared as it was confirmed that a large number of the Korean population, as a result of the remarkable success in the growth of the Korean economy, wanted stability.

Of course, lack of such speculation could be the result of a scornful perception expressed in a high-ranking U.S. official's speech: "Unlike the Philippines, there is no history of democracy in Korea. Thus a Philippine-style yellow revolution is impossible in Korea."

95 KILLED, 32 MISSING IN LANDSLIDES, FLOODS

SK230736 Seoul YONHAP in English 0718 GMT 23 Jul 87

[Text] Seoul, July 23 (YONHAP)--At least 95 people were killed and 32 others missing in landslides and floods triggered by heavy rainstorms that pounded central South Korea from late Tuesday night to early Thursday, the Central Disaster Relief Center reported Thursday.

As of 10 am (0000 GMT), 98 people were reported dead or missing in South Chungchong Province hit the hardest by the downpours. The victims included six dead or missing in Kangwon Province and two others in North Chungchong Province.

Heavy seasonal rainstorms that dumped up to 26 inches of rain during the past 3 days destroyed 1,481 houses and buildings, leaving 40,000 people homeless.

Relief center officials said that roads, railroad tracks, reservoirs, and embankments were washed out by the torrential rains, while some 65,700 hectares of farmland were inundated.

A preliminary estimate of property damage stood at 17.72 billion won (\$21.88 million: \$1 is worth about 810 won). South Chungchong Province suffered the most with damage estimated at 11.37 billion won, followed by North Chungchong Province (3.37 billion won) and Kangwon Province (2.03 billion won).

In South Chungchong Province, the Kum River's upper tributaries overflowed, forcing thousands of people in downstream areas to evacuate to higher ground.

Some 6,950 residents of 1,540 families in the towns of Sochun, Puyo and Nonsan took shelter in churches, schools, and other public facilities. Relief goods were dropped from helicopters.

Military helicopters were called out to rescue survivors trapped by the swollen downstream current of the Kum River. Helicopters rescued some 400 residents in the Sochun-Puyo area.

Railroad tracks collapsed at 55 locations, causing the suspension or limited operation of train service from Seoul to the southern and western provinces passing through the flood-stricken region.

About 112 people were injured Wednesday when a train carrying 650 passengers derailed in Chongwon, about 142 kilometers south of Seoul. The train ran off the track which had been crumpled by a landslide.

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19

Nevertheless, some people in the opposition circle seem to be hoping that the United States will provide some leverage for democratization in Korea.

In March, when Mr Kim Tae-chung was interviewed just before U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz was to visit Korea, he said: "I hope Secretary Shultz will mention three items when he meets with President Chon Tu-hwan."

The three items are as follows" first, America wants Korea to respect human rights in accordance with international and domestic laws on human rights; second, Korean military circles should remain neutral in political matters; and third, the Korean Government should allow a direct national referendum so that people can choose the political system they want. In response to this, a high-ranking U.S. official stationed in Korea said: "Mr Kim Tae-chung seems to believe that we will side with the opposition party at a climactic moment just as we did in the Philippines. But we cannot help telling him that the present conditions in Korea are far different from the Philippine situation."

After Secretary Shultz left Seoul, Mr Kim Tae-chung let loose with his complaints, saying: "America does not quite understand the hopes of the Korean people."

"Qualitative" Changes in U.S. Policies to Korea

Frequently, people suspect that American policies toward Korea have changed recently. In other words, when it comes to forecasting the political situation after February 1988, at which time President Chon's term expires, people tend to believe that America is increasingly leaning toward the opposition party. The following reasons can be cited:

First of all, there are frequent meetings between the U.S. ambassador to Korea and members of the opposition parties. Unlike former Ambassador Walker, the newly appointed Ambassador James Lilley has met with such opposition personnel as NKDP director Yi Min-u, the real opposition leader Kim Young-sam, and Cardinal Kim Su-hwan, and he plans to meet with Mr Kim Tae-chung, too.

Second, there was a speech by Mr Gaston Sigur, assistant secretary of state for East Asia and the Pacific, at the New York Korean-American Committee in February. In his speech, Mr Sigur stressed the civilian democratization of Korean politics.

Third, the U.S. State Department has shown a positive attitude in criticizing the conditions of Korean human rights. At the time of Pak Chong-chol incident in January, a spokesman at the State Department issued a "sharp" comment, which was unprecedented.

Fourth, at various U.S. Congressional hearings, high-ranking U.S. officials usually say: "Democratization is good for security." In March, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage said: "Korea and America are in the process of beginning a new cooperative relationship in security matters."

20

In addition, frequent passage of U.S. Senate resolutions relating to human rights in Korea supports the above beliefs.

High-ranking U.S. officials in Seoul acknowledge certain "methodological" changes, but they insist these changes are not substantive but qualitative. Although it is hard to grasp the precise meaning of these terms, concerned authorities believe that such a statement means a new change is being made to the extent the basic Korean-American friendship and the existing benefits remain intact.

It is a well-known fact that America is enjoying vast benefits from Korea, ranging from national security to the economy. (Of course, America also benefits Korea.) According to U.S. Secretary of Defense Weinberger, the importance of Korea, in terms of the global strategy of the United States has been recently raised from that of a major interest to a vital interest.

But the point is that the American viewpoint about Korea is gradually shifting from the usual government-centered point to a multilateral view of the general public. Public analysis of American interests in Korea has revealed various facts, such as some of those discovered during the Korean-American trade friction. It has also revealed that the concept of security concerning the Korean Peninsula is not only for Korea but is also in line with the American strategy for defense of the Pacific region. These facts awakened the Korean people to the reality that a certain number of profit-seeking conflicts do exist even between friendly nations.

As a result, even anti-Americanism sentiment was born, in which some people blamed America for such Korean tragedies as the Kwangju incident.

The image of the good old "Uncle Sam," who gave us food and taught us democracy 40 years ago, disappeared long ago. Also gone are the times when most problems between Korea and America could be resolved simply by the authorities in Washington, D.C., and Seoul. Thus, America could not help carrying out a more realistic and popular diplomacy, which ultimately might have caused "qualitative" changes in American policies to Korea.

In particular, Americans recognize that another round of political unrest in Korea not only will cause a tragedy in Korea but could also inflict a significant damage to America.

Significance of Assistant Secretary Sigur's Speech

In his speech in Honolulu on 29 October 1986 at a conference of Advisory Committee for Pacific/Asian Problems, Assistant Secretary of State Gaston Sigur said: "We encourage the democratic system not only for moral and ideological reasons but because our experience has taught us that democracy is the best prescription for political and economic stability in the developing countries."

Of course, he added: "America intends neither to interfere with domestic problems of Asian countries nor to direct their policy decisions. And it never

21

will." He added: "A transition to democracy is usually both complicated and subtle. And it can be carried out only through methods appropriate to the country's history, culture, and political realities."

Answers to how such a theoretical method can be applied to reality and what effect such a method could have on the conditions of the country in subject. In the case of Korea, if both the government and the opposition could successfully devise a joint revision of constitution, and if a new government could be established based on a national referendum, we need not listen to Americans for such advice.

A high-ranking American official in Seoul said: "In terms of the political situation in Korea, what America is really concerned about is that the political parties in Korea are unable to reach a mutual concession and that they ask America to provide 'solutions.'" He said clearly: "But America has no solutions either."

A more complete and declaratory expression of American policy to Korean is heard at a speech by Assistant Secretary Sigur at the New York Korean-American Committee.

The position of the assistant secretary of state is equivalent to that of a bureau director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Korea, but most of the American policies that affect Korea are decided in the office of Assistant Secretary Sigur. The amount of time spent on Korean issues by Secretary Shultz, who deals with more than 150 countries in the world, is far less than what we think it might be.

Nevertheless, it was later said that the speech at the New York Korean-American Committee required approval by Secretary Shultz.

In his speech, Assistant Secretary Sigur urged a "creative method" aimed at a mutual concession between the political parties, while frankly suggesting a few of the core problems in political changes in Korea.

First of all, he mentioned tasks for a "civilian democratization" of Korean politics. He stressed: "Ever since the Korean war destroyed much of the civilian sector, the Korean military has served as one of the few important organizations that possess experience in managing a large, modern organization.... Today's Korean soldiers live in a new society where Korean people expect soldiers to devote themselves to their most important duty, which is to train themselves in the techniques needed to defend their country."

Then, he praised President Chon Tu-hwan desire for a peaceful transition of political power, while urging the opposition circle to "set aside personal ambitions and past criticism and complaint, and cooperate with each other for the future."

In conclusion, he said: "The United States has a firm commitment to protect Korea, and such a commitment will remain unchanged even if the U.S. Congress or the administration changes. At the same time, we will support South Korean efforts to reduce tensions with North Korea."

Korean Authorities in the U.S. Department of State

Since the speech by Assistant Secretary Sigur, the United States has relaxed its restrictions on meetings between its diplomats and North Korean diplomats, while proposing trade in medical supplies and food with North Korea. This could indicate something of importance.

Rumor has it that Assistant Secretary Sigur's speech was drafted by his longtime colleague, Professor Kim Young-jin, who is a Korean-American. Professor Kim had worked with ex-academic Assistant Secretary Sigur, who served as research director of the Sino-Soviet Affairs Department at George Washington University. It is said that Professor Kim, who coauthored "Asian Policies of Japan and America," still works as an adviser to Assistant Secretary Sigur's policy planning staff and that he sometimes works as a messenger on non-publicized policies.

Especially noteworthy was Deputy Assistant Secretary Clark's speech and behavior during his visit to Korea in November last year. Speaking of Korean politics, regarding constitutional revision, he is said to have mentioned several times that America will try to help establish a "middle ground!"

Although the precise meaning of the term is still unknown, some people think it might be related to the creative method mentioned in Assistant Secretary Sigur's speech.

Some people also try to relate the term with NKDP Director Yi Min-u's democratization-first principle.

It could be said that field headquarters that actually carries out American policies to Korea is the U.S. Embassy to Korea. The commander of the headquarters, of course, is the U.S. ambassador to Korea.

The 13th ambassador to Korea, James Lilley, who was appointed on 14 November 1986 after Ambassador Walker's departure, plays a relatively important role, compared with his predecessors, in that Korean politics is now approaching a turning point in its history.

Significance of "Conversational Diplomacy"

Ambassador Lilley's first 5 months certainly proved different from former Ambassador Walker's "quiet diplomacy." Either privately or during his inaugural address, Ambassador Lilley met with a broad range of people, including government ministers, government and opposition politicians, academics, journalists, and people in business circles. He even met with the chief editors of college newspapers and listened to them.

The most attention-gathering event of Ambassador Lilley's achievements thus far was his meeting with Mr Kim Young-sam is now at the forefront of politics as a leader of his newly created party, he was then merely a power holder in the opposition circle, which made it difficult for the U.S. ambassador to meet with him officially. Thus, the meeting between the U.S. ambassador and Mr Kim was itself an exceptional event.

23

The Kim-Lilley conference, which was held at Deputy Chief of Mission Lambertson's official residence, where only American interpreters were allowed, lasted 2 hours and 10 minutes. Of course, details of the meeting have not been disclosed.

Although this meeting was less honorable compared with Ambassador Lilley's meeting with NKDP Director Yi Min-u, which was held at the ambassador's official residence one day earlier, it is believed that fairly serious talks must have taken place.

Besides, Ambassador Lilley met frequently with former politicians of the government circle such as the former chairman of the DJP Kim Chong-pil and with people in religious circles such as Cardinal Kim Su-hwan.

Ambassador Lilley is reportedly planning to meet with Mr Kim Tai-chung, too. Rumors of their planned meeting have been circulating since the middle of February, but the meeting has reportedly been delayed because of a disagreement on location.

The U.S. embassy officials suggested a Kim-Lilley meeting at Deputy Chief of mission Lambertson's residence on 24 March in the form of Mr Lambertson's invitation, but Mr Kim Tai-Chung's side refused based on "status" issues, saying: "I had an important private meeting at the U.S. ambassador's official residence even under martial law in 1979."

However, when foreign news agencies quoted Assistant Secretary Sigur's speech as saying, "Mr Kim Tae-chung refuses to talk" because of location issues, a close associate of Mr Kim's looked displeased and said: "When did we refuse to talk?" And he said: "Since a meeting place is an issue of status, America should respect mutual formalities if it wants to study openly the real conditions of Korean politics." And he proposed Mr Kim's private residence, Ambassador Lilley's official residence, and a third location as a possible meeting place.

Aside from very basic stories, none of the details of the meetings between Ambassador Lilley and the opposition members is known. For example, at his dinner meeting with NKDP "My conception of democratization is in no way influenced by the cabinet system, and the NKDP's opinion on direct presidential election remains the same." And Ambassador Lilley reportedly said: "Director Yi's idea is right, but I don't understand why it is not accepted. I think America is in no position to interfere with democratization of Korea, which should be accomplished by Koreans themselves."

Measuring the Anti-American Sentiment

In relation with Ambassador Lilley's meeting with members of the opposition circle, THE ASIAN WALL STREET JOURNAL had an interesting article in its issue of 4 March.

According to the newspaper's report, which quoted high-ranking U.S. officials in Seoul, Ambassador Lilley urged the opposition members to "recognize the reality that the present government holds all the winning cards in this game (of constitutional revision)." In addition, Ambassador Lilley reportedly advised: "The present government is too strong for you to seize political power by force."

Neither can you expect the present government to hand over its power. Thus, in order to avoid a collapse of the whole system, you will have to take a compromise position and just wait until your time comes."

Such a plain expression that contains no florid languages could represent America's openhearted position toward Korean politics. In fact, America might not really understand why the government and the opposition circles in Korea always run to the extremes where no solutions can be found. The traditional climate and logic still remain in full force in Korea, where American-style rationalism cannot be fully accepted.

Officials at the U.S. Embassy say that the purpose of meetings between Ambassador Lilley and Koreans from all walks of life is to "gain an opportunity to convey our thoughts to them accurately while at the same listening to Koreans for their opinions on America and on Korean politics." It seems that part of the purpose is also to divert the anti-American feelings that exist among some radical students, which were confirmed during the incident in which the U.S. Information Office was seized.

Ambassador Lilley, who describes himself as an optimist, once commented lightly: "Anti-American feelings exist everywhere in the world." But it can be easily confirmed that a major part of his mission from Washington is to measure the depth of anti-American sentiment and to prevent its spread. It was also noticeable that officials of the U.S. Embassy have suddenly become busy since Ambassador Lilley's arrival.

Almost everyday, since the end of last year, the USIS has sponsored "private dinner meetings" between American officials and college professors, researchers, and college students. Reportedly, Ambassador Lilley usually attends these meetings, too.

In particular, at "night meetings," which took place at the residences of Deputy Chief of Mission Lambertson Public Affairs Office Deputy PAD Burleson, and political Councilor Dunlop, the invited Koreans were asked to keep quiet about details of the converstations. Ambassador Lilley did not always attend these night meetings, but he reportedly attended most of the meetings, that included students.

Dispute between Embassy and College Students

The U.S. embassy regularly sponsors a meeting every semester, and it invited the chief editors of college gazettes from 23 universities in Seoul on 15 January. But for the first time, the ambassador attended this meeting. Ambassador Lilley just listened most of the time, while USIS PAD Reid and Councilor Dunlop answered questions. It is said that details of the conversation consisted mostly of gauging the depth of the students' anti-American feelings and explanations from the American side.

According to student who attended the meeting, when students said, "America is responsible for the political illnesses in Korea, and the voice of 'Yankee, Go Home!' on campus is very strong," the embassy officials bluntly responded:

"Koreans deflect their frustrations toward America because their political situation has come to a deadlock." Also, the student introduced his own version of a highly delightful story. He said: "When a chief editor of a gazette, who is an economics major, said that the pressure on the Copyright Act issue is not even in his economics textbooks, an American official responded that there must be a difference between Korean economics and American economics. But the Americans were dejected when economics students asked whether Adam Smith and Keynes were Koreans." According to those who attended the meeting, the American answers were usually off the point, and the American officials tried to avoid difficult questions. Ambassador Lilley reportedly left the meeting in the middle of a dispute.

The U.S. Embassy meetings with professors sometimes consisted of only those who have studied abroad in America, and sometimes consisted of only the purely domestic professors. Sometimes the invitation was based on ages and major subjects of interest, and sometimes the invitation was given regardless of such categories.

It was reported that the younger professors' interests were similar to the students' and that the younger professors sometimes raised harsh questions that threw the American side into confusion.

One professor said: "The person who takes a neutral position when there is a confrontation between the strong and the weak is, in fact, helping the strong." Since such a speech seemed to imply a hope that America would intervene in Korean Politics, the speaker was reportedly frowned upon. Most of the professors at the meeting seemed to be irritated by the meaningless discussions and the repetitious assertion of the American position.

According to a professor, the embassy officials said Koreans must decide the fate of Korea, and they kept asking what the professors thought the United States could do to help Korea.

The professor said: "Since I feel that they only want to steal our thoughts without revealing their own intentions, I no longer intend to participate in the meeting."

A USIS official hinted that the frequency of Ambassador Lilley's nightly meetings has recently slackened.

It means that Ambassador Lilley has gained a fairly good grasp of the real conditions in Korea through his concentrated meetings with Koreans over the period of 3-4 months. With that much understanding, he held his first press interview on 9 April.

Ambassador Lilley's First Press Interview Since His Arrival

At the domestic news conference, Ambassador Lilley, who had evaded requests for press interviews for various reasons, was careful about domestic affairs in Korea, but in general he provided clear answers with confidence.

When asked about his busy schedule of meetings with Koreans and about the existence of any American programs for Korean politics, he said: "Believe it or not, American policies toward Korea remain the same. There is no difference between official American statements and what's in their minds. First, we are committed to peace and stability in the Korean Peninsula, and second, we believe in free elections, democracy, and greater freedom of speech. In accordance with my assignments based on such policies, I am only keeping in a touch with a wide range of Koreans. I have no secret mission."

When asked about the present conditions of Korean politics, he reminded us that his old friend Assistant Secretary Sigur's speech at the New York Korean-American Committee represents the basic American position. And he said: "I am aware of the criticism that American officials tend to preach Korean affairs as if they were ministers, but we only speak as a friend who does not interfere directly with the political process. Violence and stubborn confrontations are undesirable for political progress."

In particular, when asked about the meaning of civilian democratization, which is producing a sharp reaction in political circles, he quoted Assistant Secretary Sigur's words, "Korea has now reached the age of civilian democratization." And he stressed: "But what we wanted to say was about an American experience. It is your job to learn from this experience and make it work."

When asked about countermeasures and the possibility of catastrophic events in case negotiations for constitutional revision fail, he displayed optimism, saying: "What could go wrong for the energetic people who flourished after rising against colonial rule and the devastating Korean war? Koreans in various fields have demonstrated a world-class quality. I don't think they will fail at all."

When asked, at last, why he has not met with Mr Kim Tac-chung, Ambassador Lilley said: "When the British Prime Minister Thatcher visited Russia, she met first with opposition member Dr Sahkarov, and then the next day she met with General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Gorbachev. What's the bid deal in it?"

During the press interview on 7 April, Ambassador Lilley said his family and brothers had once lived in Pyongyang in the 1930's, stressing his longtime relation with Korea.

Ambassador Lilley, who worked as a private citizen for about 3 years, including his duty as an aide to candidate Bush, returned to the government in 1981 as a specialist in East Asian affairs at the NSC of the White House, and worked as American liaison stationed in Taiwan for the period 1982-84. When he returned to the United States in 1984, he worked briefly as a consultant to the Otis Elevator Company and the Westinghouse Company. Then he returned to the Department of Defense as a consultant on international security. Since he was reassigned as the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for East Asia and the Pacific, Ambassador Lilley worked on issues concerning China, Australia, and New Zeland.

27

Ambassador Lilley studied Chinese classics after receiving a master's degree from Yale University in 1951, and he briefly lectured on Chinese economics at Johns Hopkins University in 1979.

Korea is his first assignment as ambassador. Handsome Ambassador Lilley, who is more than 6 feet tall, usually has a great sense of humor, and is fond of discussion, says an American professor who knows him well.

Since the end of 1985, when rumors started circulating regarding possible replacement of the U.S. ambassador to Korea, Mr Lilley and the present ambassador to Burma, Daniel O'Donoghue, consistently rose in popularity. It was later reported that at the end of July of last year, at the final stage of the selection process, wherein the Korean Government's agreement was requested for the appointment of a new ambassador, Ambassador Lilley was selected.

It is said that America has never consumed so much time to pick a U.S. ambassador to Korea in the whole process from selection of potential candidates to Senate confirmation.

During the Senate hearing, just before Ambassador Lilley was appointed, he said: "It would be premature for me to speak of what I would do. The activities of my past will speak for what I'll do in the future." Thus, he stated frankly that his commitment to human rights remains unchanged. However, he said subsequently: "I don't think the Senate resolution that links military aid with the extension of human rights in Korea is an effective solution." He contended: "Our interest in security of the Korean Peninsula and the political development of Korea are separate issues."

Based on such relatively realistic thinking, it is expected that the severity of discord between the Korean Government and the U.S. ambassador will lessen during Ambassador Lilley's term.

It's just that "only the time ticks away as usual" while difficult questions abound between Korea and America. Under such circumstances, we can logically conclude that Ambassador Lilley's "hope to work in Korea for a long time" could be easily upset.

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DAILY URGES PRUDENT APPROACH TO NORTH KOREA BY JAPAN

SK290636 Seoul CHUNGANG ILBO in Korean 27 Jul 87 p 2

[Editorial: "Japan's 'Overspeed' Diplomacy--Its Approach to North Korea"]

[Text] Pyongyang has recently started to court the LDP, Japan's conservative ruling party, while sending a peace overture to us.

Ho Tam, one of the high-ranking North Korean leaders who handles foreign affairs, has stated that North Korea would welcome the LDP leaders' visit, if the Japanese Government improves its policy on North Korea. At the same time, North Korea has decided to allow some Japanese to visit North Korea and Japanese family members to meet one another.

These North Korean moves are being made now, as South Korea seeks democratization via a political transition and unflinchingly prepares for the 1988 Seoul Olympiad.

Of course, we have no objection if Pyongyang and Tokyo improve their relations for the common international interests of this region based on the good-neighbor spirit of peace. However, we must never fail to realize the North's prime objective is to isolate South Korea and disturb our democratization and Olympiad.

We expect Japan to be even more prudent in renewing its relations with Pyongyang. This is because the question, beyond the short-term interest of Japan, is directly linked with the peace and stability of East Asia and with the question of our unification.

We cannot but note that Japan's relations with North Korea have frequently disrupted our fundamental policy and that this has created stumbling blocks to improving North-South relations.

We believe that Japan has not forgotten that most of the espionage and military equipment North Korea used in its infiltration and provocations against the South were Japanese products.

Today, through a positive initiative taken by Gorbachev, changes are being made in the northern triangular relations and this has begun to affect southern relations. The three southern countries, however, have worked out no specific countermeasures.

POLITICAL

file

SOUTH KOREA

20

PROFILE OF KIM POK-TONG, MAN BEHIND 29 JUNE AFFAIR

41070253 Seoul SINDONG-A in Korean Sep 87 pp 250-263

[Article by Kang Song-chaе, editorial staff member of the TONG-A ILBO, based partly on his interview of Kim Pok-tong in Seoul on 11 August 1987]

[Text] Urged Chairman No To Make the Epochal Decision

The time was early July: each day, people were pouring over their copies of daily newspapers from corner to corner as they found the contents as interesting as any absorbing novel.

It was in that period that THE NEW YORK TIMES, in its 7 July issue, carried a sonorous, thoughtful commentary worthy of the reader's attention; the commentary, even quoted by our domestic press, dealt with behind-the-scenes activities of our country's political and military sectors leading up to No T'ae-u's special declaration of 29 June.

What particularly caught the attention of our intellectual circles was the commentary's identification as the man behind the 29 June declaration of Mr Kim Pok-tong (age 54), a lieutenant general on the Army reserve, who has generally kept himself out of the mass media with one exception which occurred in May 1982 when he was named the president of the Korea Mining Promotion Corporation. The commentary read in part:

"The assumption is that DJP Chairman (then) No T'ae-u must have discreetly taken soundings of the military's reaction. Many politicians said that it was their understanding that Chairman No, in the course of making that effort, had received help from Mr Kim Pok-tong, who is his brother-in-law and fellow retired general officer as well.

"With regard to the nature of the help, these same politicians pointed out that it was not only to ensure the military's support but also to find out whether or not any active opposition was likely from the military."

The commentary simply touched on Mr Kim's role in probing the military's intentions, making no references to either his own view of the political situation or what specific influence he had had on Chairman No's decision.

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It is known, however, that Mr Kim, prior to the 29 June event, had met many times with Chairman No, who is his younger sister's husband, to stress upon No the urgency of the political situation.

Of course there were many senior individuals of the government and the ruling party whose hidden efforts contributed toward the issuance of the 29 June declaration. Prime Minister Yi Han-ki and former Prime Minister Sin Hyon-Hwak, who is Chairman No's senior alumnus from Kyongbuk High School, reportedly shared the belief that the way to resolve the situation was to adopt the system of direct presidential election and to pardon Mr Kim Tae-chung with his civic rights restored; they are said to have conveyed this view to Chairman No by a memorandum. Also not to be discounted are the open and hidden support rendered by Defense Minister Chong Ho-yong and DJP member of the National Assembly Yu Hak-song; it was Minister Chong who, before the 29 June declaration came out, had remarked, "Although he is being circumspect, Chairman No is a man capable of doing something big one of these days." Last but not least, one cannot leave out the pressure exerted by the United States in opposing the use of troops in order to control the situation and pressing for the democratization of South Korea. Quite possibly some might be more inclined to attach more importance to the role played by the United States.

Be that as it may, it seems out of the question to downgrade in any way the significance of the points stressed by Mr Kim when he called on Chairman No on 19 June, when troop mobilization was being viewed as a strong possibility.

Early that morning, according to an inside source, Mr Kim made an unannounced visit to Chairman No's residence at Yonhui-dong and told No generally as follows:

"Given the way more than 100,000 students and townspeople demonstrated late into last night in Pusan, it is ominous that demonstrations will turn more severe and the political situation more difficult. At this juncture, even if you withdraw the '13 April measure' and promise constitutional reform within next year, the people will simply laugh you to scorn. For, as you know, the government has already changed its mind many times on the question of whether the Constitution should or should not be amended. I therefore believe that the only way you can possibly bring public sentiment under control is to come up with some epoch-making move that will shock the people. One such move, which will take the people and the opposition by surprise, is to accept the system of direct presidential election and to pardon Mr Kim Tae-chung with full restoration of rights.

"Especially if Yi Han-yol, the young man who got hit by a tear-gas canister and has been hospitalized at the Yonse University Hospital since, should die, do you expect the aroused students to remain calm? Who can guarantee that they will not come storming over here (Chairman No's residence), which is so close to Yonse University? As a matter of fact, there is information indicating that some students are indeed planning such an attack.

11

"In this extraordinary situation, should troops be mobilized to quell student demonstrations, suppression might be possible for a short term but how do you plan to cope with the consequences of such a move? Many thinking people are concerned that the consequences might very well prove to be fatal to this nation. This is why I say that you must make a bold move--the kind which I outlined earlier. If needed, I can run errand for you; I can even obtain a signed statement from retired general officers, urging you to make such a resolute decision. I hope that you will give this matter careful considerations and come to an epoch-making decision as soon as possible."

Once Served as Chief Secretary to General Kim Chae-Kyu

The spirited discussion between the two men lasted so long that Chairman No was later than usual to leave for his office that morning, according to a source close to No.

It is said that the emergency plan for mobilization of the troops was officially called off about 4 pm that day. The decision reportedly was made at a party-government joint meeting held somewhere in Seoul, attended by Chairman No, Prime Minister Yi Han-ki, DJP Secretary General Yi Chun-ku, Defense Minister Yi Ki-paek and other cabinet ministers responsible for security matters. At that meeting, Chairman No and Prime Minister Yi reportedly argued for moderation, opposing the use of troops.

Subsequent to the "fateful" 19 June encounter, Mr Kim reportedly met with Chairman No a couple more times and urged him to make up his mind. It is also reported that he had met and had important talks with U.S. Ambassador Lilley prior to the "29 June" event. Rumor also has it that about 11 am on 9 July, the day when the funeral service was being held for Yi Han-yol, Mr Kim met with Cardinal Kim Su-hwan at the Hotel Royal in Myong-dong and exchanged views regarding the political situation.

In mid-July, in an effort to find out about details of the inside story behind the 29 June declaration, I requested an interview with Mr Kim Pok-tong, whom I have known since 9 years ago, only to be told, through his secretarial staff, that "he did not wish to see you at this time."

I had had two "off the record" discussions with him previously--once in the fall of 1984 and again in the summer of 1985. Emboldened by this past record, on 1 August I made another request for an interview, which resulted in a meeting on 11 August at a Japanese-style restaurant in the Map'o District of Seoul.

When we met, Mr Kim was still reluctant to grant an interview. I held firm by telling him, "In that case, I have no choice but to write up something on the basis of what I already know plus whatever else I can collect from those around you." He then compromised, saying "Instead of making this a formal interview, let us just talk about the old days while having lunch together."

32

I started off with a question on something which I had long been curious about:

[Question] "When Mr Kim Chae-kyu, the central figure in the '26 October' incident [1979 assassination of President Pak Chong-hui], was in charge of the Army Security Command, I understand you served as his chief secretary. When was it that you first met him?"

[Answer] "It was a sheer coincidence that led to my first meeting with Mr Kim Chae-kyu. I am afraid it is going to be a long story, but here it is. It all happened in the summer of 1966, when I was serving as chairman of the North Star Alumni Association, an organization of the graduates of the 4-year Military Academy.

"In late July that year, General Ch'ae Myong-sin, who was then the commanding general of the South Korean Forces operating in Vietnam, came home and made a courtesy call on President Pak Chong-hui at the Blue House. On that occasion, General Ch'ae allegedly told the president, 'I had taken with me to Vietnam some of the officers who are graduates of the 4-year Military Academy, believing that they were strongly patriotic and the embodiment of the military spirit; but, once we got out there, I found them to be not only inept in operational leadership but also quite cowardly.' General Ch'ae reportedly followed it up with a recommendation that the cadet training program of the Military Academy be reviewed.

"Perhaps it might have been just a rumor, not a factual account, but when I heard about it, it struck me as an unjust assessment to say things that sounded almost like blaming the academy graduates for all operational failures out there, even though it was quite possible that there were some inept ones among the so many academy-graduate officers who were sent to Vietnam mainly for combat experience.

"As chairman of the academy's alumni association, I racked my brains to figure out some way to restore our honor. Finally, I decided to hold a pictorial exhibit on the occasion of a joint athletic meet of the three service academies--an exhibit that will show the proof of combat braveries of the academy graduates who took part in the Vietnam War.

"Then I began collecting suitable pictures, some through the good offices of the then Ministry of Public Information and some more by mail from my academy classmates and juniors serving in Vietnam at the time. The collected pictures were enlarged to exhibit sizes. To put up these pictures for the exhibit, I needed plywood. I happened to know there was a large supply of plywood at the 6th Military District Headquarters; at that time, Maj Gen Kim Chae-Kyu was in command there, and his aide-de-camp was Captain Pak Hung-chu, who was later executed for his involvement in the '26 October' affair."

Pictorial Exhibit Brought the Two Men Together

Mr Kim went on to say that he, then a major, then telephoned Captain Pak, whom he had never met, and asked for an appointment with the commanding general. His account of the telephone conversation with Captain Pak is reconstructed verbatim below as I believe it is a good demonstration of the workings of the code of seniority among the academy graduates and also of the military cast of mind that has become the second nature of these men:

[Kim] "This is Major Kim Pok-tong calling. Listen, you are an academy graduate, are you not?"

[Pak] "Sir, I am, Sir!"

[Kim] "What class are you?"

[Pak] "An 18th-class graduate, Sir!"

[Kim] "I must see your commanding general about a pictorial exhibit on the Vietnam war. When can I do it?"

[Pak] "Sir, if you could come sometime tomorrow morning, I will see to it, Sir!"

[Kim] "Good. I will be there at 10 tomorrow morning."

When Major Kim entered the office of the commanding general of the 6th Military District at Yongdungp'o at the appointed hour the next morning, Maj Gen Kim Chae-Kyu was having a conversation with a classmate (the 2nd class) of his from the Military Academy days, Maj Gen Hyon Sok-chu (then chief of G-4, ROK Army Headquarters). That was, said Mr Kim, the first time he came face to face with Kim Chae-Kyu.

"Major Kim Pok-tong here, Sir, to see the commanding general of the 6th Military District"--with his self-introduction, he proceeded to explain his reason for coming, saying that he needed plywood for the pictorial exhibit and that the plywood would be returned as soon as the exhibit was over. Upon listening, General Kim willingly agreed to help.

It was then that General Hyon, who has been closely looking at Major Kim's name patch showing his name written in Korean script, spoke to Kim with laughter about his name; Major Kim responded in an appropriate manner:

General Hyon: "Ha-ha, so Kim Pok-tong is your name; the character 'pok' stands for 'happiness' and the character 'tong' means 'child'--it is a child's name, huh? How come you are displaying a child's name?"

Major Kim: "Sir, you read my name that way because it is written in Korean script, but actually in my case 'tong' stands for the character meaning

34

'east' and 'pok is the character meaning 'to repeat.' The character 'tong' is a generation indicator among the Andong line of the Kim clan. So, when it is written in Chinese characters, it is a fine name. Although you just made fun of my name, chances are you will remember my name for a long time to come. For that reason, too, my name is a good one."

When Major Kim finished his unflustered, orderly response, the two generals looked at each other and shared a hearty laugh.

Perhaps it was because Major Kim's demeanor on that occasion favorably impressed General Kim Chae-kyu--at any rate, the general not only helped the major with plywood but also came to remember him long after that. That was how Major Kim was able to hold the pictorial exhibit for 3 days beginning 26 September at the Hyoch'ang soccer field while a joint athletic meet of the three service academies was being held there.

That chance encounter was the beginning of a lasting relationship between the two men; later, in August 1967, when he was given the task of creating a new ranger battalion, General Kim remembered the major well enough to pick him as the commanding officer of the new ranger battalion to be formed. At that time Kim Pok-tong, who had already been promoted to lieutenant colonel in November 1966, was serving as a front-line battalion commander with the 5th Division. By then, he was already one of the few who were on the fast track, pulling away from the majority of his academy classmates numbering some 150.

Commissioned as a second lieutenant in September 1955 upon graduating from the Military Academy--he was the eighth best student of that class, Kim Pok-tong and some of his classmates went to the Infantry School in Kwongju and received the basic curriculum; he then served as a platoon leader in the forward area for 1 year beginning spring of 1956; he was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant on 1 September 1957.

Love Marriage While in Kwangju

He fell in love with and married a girl--his present wife Im Kum-chu (age 52 now)--in the fall of 1958, when he was serving as a unit commander at the Kwangju Infantry School. At the time, Ms Im had graduated from a college and was teaching at Hwasun Junior High School.

He was promoted to captain in September 1960 and to major in September 1962. It turned out that only some 20 of his academy peers were promoted to major at that time ahead of the rest. Discontent arose within the group over what they perceived as ambiguity in the promotion criteria. An emergency general meeting of the academy's 11th graduating class was called, resulting in a decision to send a few representatives to see the Army's chief of staff and director of personnel with a recommendation that "appropriate steps be taken to have all members of the 11th graduating class promoted at the same time, even if this meant promotion delay of 1 year for

35

everyone." Kim Pok-tong was chosen as one of the representatives. No Tae-u, then a captain, was chairman of the 11th class alumni association.

Accordingly, Major Kim and other representatives of the group made daily visits to the residence of General So Chong-chol, personnel director of the Army, located at Chongpa-dong, on 3 consecutive days; each day they waited at the gate until almost the curfew time but all for naught--they failed to see General So.

[Question] "When were you officially appointed as chief secretary to General Kim Chae-kyu, the commanding officer of the Army Security Command?"

[Answer] "It was around May 1968; at that time, the ranger battalion, which I created, was being acknowledged as a strong force as good as any comparable unit anywhere. Perhaps it was in recognition of the motivation and passion with which I had been nurturing the ranger battalion which was assigned to the 6th Military District; anyway, not only was I appointed as chief of General Kim's secretariat but a while later I was also given a concurrent appointment as chief of the planning and organization staff with the authority over personnel and financial matters as well. When I was made chief of the commanding general's secretariat, the organization was still known as the Counterintelligence Corps; the name was changed to Army Security Command as of 1 October 1968."

[Question] "At the age of 35, you practically became the man of real power at the Security Command; I suppose there were quite a few episodes while you were there."

[Answer] "In those days, the Security Command was indeed the most powerful organization. Because of that, we were bombarded with countless requests for special favors from the commanding general's hometown folks, his relatives and in-laws, and others; how to deal with such requests was a troublesome question for more reasons than one. Finally, we designated the grandfather (General Kim's father) as the sole window through which all civilian petitions had to be channeled. After that, I visited him once a month, partly to deliver some money for his living and partly to listen to, and take care of if possible, the requests he had collected to that point. Requests such as 'please arrange transfer of so-and-so from this unit to that unit' posed not much of a problem--they could be arranged, somehow. But most of the requests were impossible to meet without violating laws and regulations. In those cases, I would carefully explain why I was helpless to do anything about them; the grandfather usually understood.

"Just when the problems were beginning to ease up quite a bit as a result of the centralized window system, one day I was told that a corporal, claiming to be a relative of General Kim's, was at the reception room demanding to see the general. He was advised to go to the general's residence to see him, but he would not budge. So I ordered to have the man brought to my office. A while later he came: the minute he opened my door I slapped his cheek and kicked the devil out of him, admonishing him

loudly that his kind of behavior was an act of disrespect and disservice to the elder. Then I chased him out.

"After that incident, the discipline and order around our headquarters improved in many respects--perhaps word had got around that even a relative of the commanding general's was shown no mercy when he tried to be unreasonable.

"About a month later, however, General Kim called me in and quietly lectured me: 'It is not that I do not understand why you did it--you wanted to uphold discipline and order. Still, why did you have to use force instead of having a good talk with him to make him understand!?' said the general.

"Looking back, even in those days, General Kim was a gentle and reasonable man, although he had occasional outburst of temper."

First One To Earn a Star Among His Peers

[Question] "Is it true that General Kim Chae-kyu always showed his due respect to General Yi Chong-chan, who had refused to obey President Syngman Rhee's order to dispatch troops to quell the 1952 political riot in Pusan in order to prolong his regime?"

[Answer] "He did so, indeed. General Yi Chong-chan once did him a great favor. From that point on, General Kim unfailingly treated General Yi with respect and courtesy, not only as a senior person in the Army but also as his personal teacher.

"General Kim was so attentive toward General Yi that he would not let even small details slip by unattended. Once he bought a set of golf clubs for General Yi as a gift. Later, he received word that General Yi was not playing golf at all; he immediately instructed me to prepare a letter in his name pleading General Yi to please play golf, and sent me down to Chinhae, where General Yi was at that time, to deliver the letter personally.

"I still remember how anxious General Kim was to make sure that I worded the letter in such a way to make General Yi instantly feel like going out to the golf course upon reading it and how I had to resort to all the rhetorical flourishes under my command in preparing that letter."

Then, in response to my question "Wasn't there any resistance or adverse reaction of any kind to your possessing such enormous authority over the personnel and financial matters--the two most important areas for the control of any organization?", Mr Kim gave me a candid account of the frictions that had existed between him and others such as a certain Brigadier General Mun, who was then the chief of staff of the Security Command. He followed it with a rhetorical question: "How could there not have been adverse reactions when I treated people in such a naughty way?"

31

In the end, he said, he ended up being sent to Vietnam as the security chief of the South Korean military contingent operating there: it was March 1969; he was a full colonel by then.

Before receiving the official assignment order, he continued, he made a last-ditch appeal to General Kim with these words: "If I had failed to properly support you, then it is a different matter; but if not, would you please reconsider my assignment to Vietnam?" But General Kim, with a troubled expression, strongly urged him to "go as planned because people are saying all kinds of things about you." So the fate was sealed: he packed and went to Vietnam. In retrospect, he said, he had gained many valuable experiences in matters having to do with power, organization, and interpersonal relations while serving at the Security Command.

Had To Establish His Noninvolvement in "26 October" Affair

Upon completion of his Vietnam tour of nearly 2 years as the security chief, Mr Kim Pok-tong came home in February 1971 and was reassigned to the 26th Division as a regimental commander. He earned his first star effective 1 January 1973.

Of the academy's 11th class graduates, the first ones to attain the rank of brigadier general were, in addition to Kim Pok-tong, Chon Tu-hwan, Son Yong-kil, and Choe Song-taek.

Subsequent to his promotion to a general officer, Mr Kim served in the following capacities: the cadet commander, Korean Military Academy (effective January 1973); G-3 staff officer, Headquarters of the Third Army (effective March 1975); and commanding general of the 5th Division (effective February 1977). In January 1979, he was appointed as assistant deputy chief of operations for the Blue House Guards Unit, replacing his brother-in-law General No Tae-u. By then he had already been promoted to a major general in January 1977.

Cha Chi-chol, director of the Blue House Guards Unit, made the most of high personal trust placed in him by the then President Pak. For instance, while holding that position, Cha put many alde general officers under his command; of this, people used to make such interpretive remarks as "It is Cha's complex that drove him to have many general officers work under him--the complex rooted in the fact that the highest rank he had achieved in his army career was captain."

In 1979, when the "26 October" incident broke, his past "special ties" with KCIA Director Kim Chae-kyu thrust Maj General Kim Pok-tong into the position of having to "clearly establish" his noninvolvement in the affair in front of the investigating authorities.

Sometime ago, on another occasion, I was with Mr Kim Pok-tong and the subject of "26 October" incident came up; at that time, I asked him this question:

3

"Supposing Director Kim Chae-kyu had confided in you in advance the action plan for the '26 October' plot, what do you think you would have done?" He appeared to ponder a while, then he gave me this answer: "This question, with nothing concrete to support it, is very difficult to answer; however, if it did happen, most probably I would have either joined him or reported him to the proper authorities--I do not believe I would have wavered in between."

Getting back to where I had left it off, I started to question him about his activities subsequent to the 26 October event; he merely said, "The time is not right yet for me to disclose such things, so please understand," after which he clammed up. So I switched the subject and asked him a few questions about matters related to the current political situation:

[Question] "Do you see a smooth road ahead for the democratization proclaimed by Chairman No?"

[Answer] "That is a good question. I am afraid there are too many variables. Anyway, looking ahead even based on the assumption that there are no discordant notes heard within the administration and the ruling party, if extreme labor-management disputes and violent student demonstrations should drive our society into chaotic conditions of the worst kind, democratization would not be able to make headway--not easily. That is what concerns me the most.

"Should the situation reach a point where social order can no longer be maintained by the use of normal police force, I think it will inevitably force the military to come into action.

"If the middle of such chaotic conditions a coup d'etat should occur, the consequences would indeed be grave. The coup leaders undoubtedly will remove all politicians of both sides--the ruling party as well as the opposition, and will attempt to establish a new political order; this, if happened, will touch off a fresh round of political vicious cycle.

"I will say, therefore, that all must exercise prudence in order to prevent this kind of chaos from becoming a reality."

Covert Contributions Should Be Changed to Overt Ones

At this point, in a very cautious tone, he expressed his private views regarding Mr Kim Tae-chung's upcoming visit to Kwangju:

"It has been said by the press that when Mr Kim Tae-chung visits Kwangju there will be waves of people, hundreds of thousands of them, welcoming him. I personally believe that it would be much better if he made the trip quietly rather than making it into such a hoopla.

39

"Even if Mr Kim Tae-chung went to Kwangju quietly and paid a visit to the Mangwol-dong graveyard, where the victims of the '18 May' uprising are buried, without a fanfare, the facts of his trip would surely be covered by the press. In that event, my feeling is that more people would credit him for having handled himself in a wise manner. I am saying this from the standpoint of a private citizen, not as the man in charge of a state-run corporation."

He impressed me as a man more astutely interested in political affairs than I had expected. So I tried another question on him:

[Question] "What are your views on the fundamental causes of the recent labor-management disputes and how they should be resolved?"

[Answer] "How can I possibly have the answer to such a complex and difficult issue? By way of an answer, let me quote from the remarks made to me yesterday by someone connected with the National Federation of Economic Organization.

"According to him, while in Japan corporations are returning 75 percent of their net earnings to the workers, in our country the ratio is a mere 49 percent. This ratio, he said, ought to be raised to 55 percent of thereabout and corporate managers must make an effort to make it so.

"Next, the main cause of the recent radicalization of labor-management dispute, he said, is the long-lasting suppression of the workers by those holding political power, but another factor no less important is the workers' perception of the corporate managers as a bunch of profiteers interested only in their own benefits and ambitions. It is this perception that has driven the workers to pursue their rights and interests through struggles rather than by moderate means; the result is the radicalization of the labor movement, he explained.

"For this reason, he continued, it is important to improve the image of corporate managers as part of the solution to the labor-management dispute. One way to facilitate this, he said with emphasis, is to stop the practice of levying a variety of off-the-record monetary contributions on the entrepreneurs and to start a practice of making such contributions on the record; this, he said, will foster a public realization that the entrepreneurs, too, are doing things in the interest of the nation and the society. For example, the government should publicly announce that corporation A contributed so much money toward national defense and the money was used to pay for so many tanks, or that company B's contribution was used to procure a warship--this is what he meant."

Expressed Opposition to the "12 December" Development

[Question] "What in your view are the intrinsic problems of our country and society?"

40

[Answer] "On one occasion some time ago, Professor Kim Chun-yop of Koryo University was debating with journalist Choe Sok-chae the question of what remedial steps should be prescribed for the prevalent malaise of our country. During the debate, Professor Kim cited five factors as the causes for the current chaos in our society: they included the problem related to our national ethos or spiritual fortitude that failed to clean out those elements who at one point or another had betrayed fellow countrymen and the nation; the question concerning the legitimacy of the regime in power; the problem of injustice and corruptions; and the problem of the gap between the rich and the poor. What he said struck a sympathetic cord in me.

"When these problems are set right or corrected one by one, I believe the chaos in our society will diminish gradually.

"If I may add one more thing: I hope that the me-oriented, egotistic propensity of our society be sublated by and by."

When I asked, "What is your view regarding political neutrality of the military?", he simply answered by saying, "I should think that the military ought to maintain political neutrality," without making any effort to elaborate on it. In addition to the extreme sensitivity of the question, he perhaps thought it was inappropriate for a man in charge of a state-run corporation to go beyond the basic principle in fielding such a question.

Mr Kim, who has consciously kept his action radius limited during these 5 years, ended our session with the following parting remarks, half to himself:

"I think I may be too much of an idealist. One may need to compromise with or, at times, even surrender to the reality, but I have been incapable of doing that. There have been times when I looked back and wondered whether I might not have vaguely pursued ideals when, in practical terms, I had no capacity to actualize such ideals of mine. Even so, I still believe that only when we have a society in which one may pursue achievable ideals can our country properly go forward as it should."

That Mr Kim indeed has an idealistic side has come through vividly, more than once, during the course of my investigation through people close to him of his post-"26 October" trail.

The "26 October" event took place when Mr Kim was serving as assistant deputy chief of operations for the Blue House Guards Unit. In early November, immediately after the state funeral for the slain President Pak, out of a strong sense of moral responsibility for the incident, Mr Kim reportedly submitted to the then Army chief of staff, General Chong Sung-hwa, a request for transfer to the reserve status. At a time when everyone's attention was wholly focused on the question of who will end up with the reins of government, he was the only one to submit a request for transfer to the reserve status; his request, it is said, was considered as extraordinary.

41

The request was turned down by Chief of Staff Chong, who decided instead to reassign him to the V Corps as deputy commander; Chong reportedly told him to take the non-pressure job and try to collect his thought. It was soon after he assumed the deputy corps commander's job that the "12 December" event occurred, which paved the way for the establishment of the Fifth Republic; it is no secret that Mr Kim expressed his opposition to that turn of events.

Had No Part in the National Security Committee

In December 1979, through the good offices of General Yu Hak-song, the then commanding general of the Third Army, Mr Kim was transferred to the Third Army as its chief of staff. At the first report of the uprising in Kwangju on 18 May 1980, Mr Kim reportedly advised General Yu that only police force should be used to restore order in Kwangju. This attitude of his, according to one source, even drew sarcastic remarks from some--remarks like "After all, his wife's family is in Kwangju; is it any wonder why he is saying such things?"

Soon thereafter, General Yu Hak-song was placed on the reserve and appointed as director of the KCIA (later renamed as the Security Planning Agency); about the same time, Mr Kim too was transferred to the Korean Military Academy as its superintendent. On 13 August, 1 month after becoming the academy superintendent, he was promoted to a lieutenant general.

According to later rumors, General Kim's personal preference was to become a corps commander, but he had to settle for the academy position, a job with no actual troops to command. It is also said that General Kim never had any part in the National Security Committee, and that he was a strong advocate of political neutrality on the part of the military.

This view of his on the military's role evolved into his desire to try to establish a new kind of relationship between the civilian and the military; it was this desire that, in the end, drove him to provide an active support to and actualizing the idea of holding a symposium on the theme of "The Military and National Development" under the academy's sponsorship--an idea proposed by General Yi Tong-hui, dean of the faculty at the academy (now 55 years old; retired from active duty and serving as president of Ch'ongju Teachers' College).

The symposium--a 2-day affair beginning 21 September 1981--was part of the academy's program commemorating the 33rd anniversary of the founding of the Army; 24 domestic and foreign scholars participated, making it a great success.

Sadness Marked His Retirement Ceremony

In his theme lecture delivered at the symposium, Professor Morris Janovitz (Chicago University), an authority in military sociology, stated as follows:

72

"In developing countries, there are many difficult problems to maintaining mutually harmonious relations between the civilian and the military. Some problems of this nature exist even in the United States. Before military service can become an integral part of civic education, much research covering many subject areas will have to be undertaken." On that premise, he went on to say, "For this reason, I believe that undertaking a comparative study of civilian-military relations in different countries will greatly facilitate the effort to resolve these problems."

Mr Ham Pyong-chun, who was then a professor at Yonse University (later became chief of the presidential secretariat; now deceased), gave a lecture on the theme of "The South Korean Armed Forces and National Development." In it, while not denying the contribution made by the military toward national development through the "16 May" action, he nevertheless made the following critical remarks:

"What is effective within the military may, by its nature, not be apropos for the civilian sector. For this reason, excessive intervention in the civilian affairs by the military could negate all the meritorious services rendered thusfar by the military.

"It is therefore important for the military to recognize the limits for its participation when considering its contribution to the future development of the nation. By the same token, it should be said that the key to a successful utilization of the military's varied experiences and wisdom toward acceleration of national development lies in the degree of cooperation by the military with the experts in other, nonmilitary sectors."

This thesis, with its subtle emphasis on the possible counterproductive impact on national development arising from across-the-board intervention by the military, seems also to have been intended as a barb directed at an attitude then prevalent in the society that tended to overly downgrade the role being played by an elite group of men with military background.

Mr Yi Tong-hui, a fellow graduate of Mr Kim's from the academy's 11th class, expressed his view saying, "The time has come for the civilian sector of our society to study the military and for the military to accept the live values of the civilian sector." He then defined the significance of the symposium with these words: "In that context, this symposium marks the first-ever academic examination of the civilian-military relationship in South Korea." (Quotes are from "Oh The Men of 'Hwarang' Tradition!" authored by Yi Tong-hui.) ["Hwarang" refers to the young elite of the ancient Silla Kingdom, who were chosen for their good looks and bravery and were given special training not only in martial art but also in poetry and dance; they were given high positions in the King's service.]

At any rate, the symposium received a general assessment that it was a meaningful exercise. Before it was held, however, there had been direct and indirect attempts by the authorities to obstruct the holding of such a

symposium; that, it is said, had driven Academy Superintendent Kim to launch counterargument at times and to explode in anger at other times.

Mr Kim's personal disposition subsequent to the birth of the Fifth Republic gave rise to a flurry of wild rumors alleging his "imprisonment," "disappearance," and even "having been shot by an assassin." It was amid this kind of atmosphere that in late 1981 he was persuaded to retire from active duty and place himself on the reserve. His retirement ceremony was held on 15 January 1982 at the Military Academy.

That day, following the ceremony held in the auditorium of the academy, marking General Kim Pok-tong's retirement from active service as well as the change of superintendent, a quiet cocktail party reportedly was held, attended by some 30 guests and the staff and faculty of the academy.

It was during the cocktail party--so goes the story--that Mr Kim shed some tears, overcome by the emotion mixed with a sense of remorse of a man closing the book on his 30-year military career; that Madame Im, his wife, was soon sobbing; and that General Wickham, commanding general of the U.S. Eighth Army, and Mrs Wickham, both of whom had maintained deep friendship with General Kim, were also seen teary-eyed. But most of all, Madame Kim Ok-suk, the wife of No Tae-u who is now the DJP president, was heard sobbing the loudest, spreading sorrowful air all around her. Before coming to his retirement ceremony, General Kim had made a courtesy call on Army Chief of Staff Hwang Yong-si (now director of the Office of Inspection) at the Army Headquarters; while going through the formality of reporting to General Hwang of his retirement, General Kim was said to have made no effort to hide his running tears.

Once Around the Drill Field on Shoulders of Graduating Cadets

Early April, either the 1st or 2nd day of the month, Mr Kim received an invitation to the graduation ceremony of the Military Academy's 38th class. Since retiring, he had been leading a quiet life--doing nothing much other than reading; so he decided to accept the invitation, especially because he had had a hand in the training of the 38th class. On 6 April, the day of graduation, he arrived at the academy around 9:30 in the morning and observed the ceremony from his designated seat in the rear. About 2-3 minutes after the ceremony was over, one graduate rushed over to where Mr Kim was, saluted, and said in a loud voice, "The graduates are waiting to pay their respect to you, Sir, Mr Superintendent!" He casually followed the graduate to where other graduates were waiting in formation. No sooner did he arrive there than numerous graduates surrounded him and lifted him up on their shoulders. "Get me down!" said Mr Kim but to no avail.

Carrying Mr Kim on their shoulders, the graduates circled the drill field once, then put him down, and then requested him to give them a word of advice. Mr Kim reportedly obliged them with a brief, formal address of the standard variety, after which he bid them farewell. Later, several of the

graduates were subjected to an investigation but none of them punished because it was established that the whole affair was totally spontaneous in nature.

Remarks at Press Conference Caused a Stir

About a month later, the incredulously shocking Chang Yong-cha scandal broke, which involved fraudulent handling of bank drafts amounting to hundreds of billions of won. In its aftermath, President Yi Kyu-kwang of the Mining Promotion Corporation was removed from the job and replaced by Mr Kim.

It was on the morning of 13 May 1982 that Mr Kim received word of his appointment from Minister of Energy and Resources Yi Son-ki. At the time he was playing golf but was told to come to the ministry for a press conference. He tried to beg off, saying, "Who am I to deserve a press conference, anyway!?" But when told by the minister that the reporters were already standing by, he had no choice: he cut his golf game short, went to the ministry, and held a press conference. But, according to sources close to Mr Kim, the contents of the press conference, as was reported by newspapers, put Mr Kim in a difficult situation.

Responding to a reporter's question, "Did you think you would be returning to another official job?", Mr Kim had replied, "The decision was not mine, but as I had committed no major mistakes in the past, I thought I might be given an opportunity to do some more work."

What later became a point of contention was the part of reply where he had said, "...as I had committed no major mistakes." It reportedly made some to retort: "Does that mean that others have committed minor mistakes?"

Also, in response to another question during the press conference, "What was your guiding creed while you were in military service?", Mr Kim had replied: "I have always believed that truth lies in things that are ordinary. I believe that rewards are due for those who make earnest efforts within the bounds of common sense." The "...within the bounds of common sense" portion was said to have led to a misunderstanding; some reportedly accused him of having implied by that statement that there were in fact many things going on that were outside the bounds of common sense.

Mr No Tae-u, whose retirement from active military service with the rank of four-star general had preceded Mr Kim's by 6 months, was serving as minister of home affairs when Mr Kim became president of the Mining Promotion Corporation. Mr Kum Chin-ho (age 56; later became minister of trade and industry), another brother-in-law of Mr Kim's, was at the time serving as vice minister of trade and industry.

Mr Kim, who in the wake of the "26 October" incident strongly called for democratization more than mere stabilization, shied away from the usual social activities after assuming the presidency at the Mining Promotion Corporation; instead, he began devoting his time and energy to academic pursuit.

45

"I Trust You"--His Leadership Motto

In August 1982 Mr Kim completed the graduate course in business administration (the course intended for the highest-echelon managers) at Seoul University; following spring he enrolled for the graduate course in government administration at Yonse University, which he completed in August 1985 and earned a master's degree in foreign relations and security; he then completed in late 1985 the course for high-level policymakers at the graduate school for government administration, Yonse University; and in June 1987 he completed the course for the highest-level business managers at Koryo University's graduate school for business administration.

Despite his continued devotion to academic pursuit, there have been rumors in town, according to one version of which he is alleged to "have suffered a set-back in his career, indulged in heavy drinking, and completely ruined himself."

Since assuming the management responsibility at the Mining Promotion Corporation, Mr Kim has been dealing with his staff and employees based on his belief that only with a leadership approach of "I trust you"--a motto he had used as a guiding principle during his military days--and sincere human relations can one hope to generate awesome productivity from those working for him. As a result, there is a wide-spread feeling of friendship and affinity toward him among his many employees, and according to sources close to him.

Professor Hwang Chan-ho (Seoul University), who had served as a professor for many years at the Military Academy, had the following words of praise about Mr Kim, one of his old students: "Everywhere he went, he was very popular among his men--so much so that he acquired a reputation as a man who had managed to instill an air of harmony in all the military units he had ever served with."

National Assembly member Kim Sik (DJP), an old classmate of Mr Kim's at the academy, had a somewhat different recollection: "True Mr Kim enjoyed the trust and confidence of not only his classmates but his seniors and juniors as well; he was also a man of strong nerve--more than average; but, most of all, I recall him as a man of superior action power."

For a man of these reputed characters, Mr Kim has been leading an unusually cautious life since becoming the head of the Mining Promotion Corporation, limiting his outside contacts to only a small number of individuals. He even refrained from seeing Mr No Tae-u, his old classmate and brother-in-law. That he broke this pattern and has had several discreet meetings with Mr No Tae-u subsequent to the DJP convention held on 10 June seems to have been a reflection of his sincere concern about the political situation, unless checked, could very well lead to a catastrophe."

Incidentally, Mr Kim was shaken by a totally unexpected incident having a bearing on the political situation, which occurred subsequent to the issuance of the "29 June" declaration.

The shocking incident occurred in mid-July: one day, his third daughter Chi-su (age 20; a sophomore student at Ihwa Women's University) came home from school and faced him with this question: "Father, today at school I read 'big character posters' in which you were identified as one of the five traitors. How did this happen?" According to a source close to him, Mr Kim did not provide his daughter with any explanation one way or the other, but he seemed to be in a state of melancholy for a period of time following that incident. "That Mr Kim is not in any way involved with those of the leading power element is a fact well known to those who are in the position to know, is it not?" the same source asked, rhetorically.

Mr Kim has four daughters, no sons. The oldest daughter (Mi-hi) and the second one (Mi-kyong) are already married; the youngest one is a student at Hanyang University.

His long academic pursuit over the past 5 years has got him deeply interested in social issues as well, but when it came to the question of how he might be envisaging the phase of his life yet to unfold, he remained closemouthed throughout the interview.

But when I heard him say, more than once, the words to the effect that "a perverted society that allows an anomaly to be viewed as a norm can be saved only when the process of democratization is accomplished," a fleeting notion came to me that he might possibly throw himself into the world of politics one day--if and when an opportunity presents itself.

9977/12851

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 9, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: JAMES A. KELLY 

SUBJECT: Message from the Minister of Defense, Republic of Korea

The Korean Defense Attache, General Yoon, delivered the message from his Minister that is at Tab A. It is provided for your information.

By copy of this memo, the Executive Secretary is requested to forward the congratulatory message to DOD, for reply following confirmation.

Grant Green concurs.

Attachment:

Tab A General Yoon ltr to Mr. Carlucci

OFFICE OF THE DEFENSE ATTACHE
EMBASSY OF THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
2320 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NORTHWEST
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20008

November 9, 1987

Dear Mr. Carlucci,

This is my pleasure to convey you a following cable message from Minister Chung, Ho Yong, Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea.


HIS EXCELLENCY FRANK C. CARLUCCI
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

MAY I EXPRESS MY HEARTIEST CONGRATULATIONS TO YOU ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA. ALL OF MY DEFENSE COLLEAGUES IN THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA LOOK FORWARD TO A CONTINUATION OF CLOSE SECURITY RELATIONS THAT HAVE LONG CHARACTERIZED OUR TWO COUNTRIES. IT IS WITH SINCERE ADMIRATION AND CONFIDENCE THAT I LOOK FORWARD TO WORKING WITH YOU IN THE FURTHERANCE OF MUTUAL SECURITY INTEREST. MY BEST WISHES GO WITH YOU FOR EVERY SUCCESS IN CARRYING OUT YOUR AWESOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR WORLD PEACE. WITH HIGH ESTEEM, SINCERELY, CHUNG HO YONG, MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,


Doug-Kyu Yoon
Major General, ROK Army
Defense & Military Attache

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 16, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR GRANT S. GREEN, JR.

FROM: JAMES A. KELLY *h*

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill S. 423 - Relief of Kil Joon Yu
Callahan

Attached at Tab I is a response from you to Rhett Dawson advising that the NSC has no objection to the subject legislation.

A.F.
Alison Fortier concurs.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you forward Tab I to Rhett Dawson.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I White House Staffing Memorandum, Green to Dawson
Tab A OMB Memo

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 11/16/87 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: 11/18/87

SUBJECT: S. 423 -- RELIEF OF KIL JOON YU CALLAHAN

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	FITZWATER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	GRISCOM	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DUBERSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	HOBBS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
MILLER - OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	HOOLEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BALL	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	KING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
BAUER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RANGE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CARLUCCI	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RISQUE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIBB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	RYAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CRIPPEN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	SPRINKEL	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
CULVAHOUSE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	TUTTLE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DAWSON	<input type="checkbox"/> P	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SS	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
DONATELLI	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS: Please provide your recommendation by close of business Wednesday, November 18th. Thank you.

RESPONSE: NSC has no objection to subject legislation.

Grant S. Green, Jr.
Executive Secretary

Rhett Dawson
Ext. 2702



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

13 NOV 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Enrolled Bill S. 423 - Relief of Kil Joon Yu Callahan
Sponsor - Sen. Kerry (D) Massachusetts

Last Day for Action

November 21, 1987 - Saturday

Purpose

To grant temporary residence status to Kil Joon Yu Callahan.

Agency Recommendations

Office of Management and Budget

Approval

Immigration and Naturalization Service
Department of State

No objection
No objection
(Informally)

Discussion

Kil Joon Yu Callahan is a 37-year old native and citizen of South Korea. Mrs. Callahan is ineligible under the United States immigration laws to receive a visa because of a conviction under Korean law in 1976 for the possession of approximately seven ounces of marijuana. Mrs. Callahan's husband of eight years and their five-year old son are both United States citizens. While the family resides together in Seoul, the Callahan's wish to enter the United States to join Mr. Callahan's family.

Letters contained in both the House and Senate Judiciary Committee reports on S. 423 indicate that the Callahan's child, an Amerasian, will likely face much prejudice because of his racial heritage, if the family remains in Korea. Neither committee report contains any evidence of subsequent drug abuse or other violations of law by Mrs. Callahan, and the reports contain numerous testimonials to her character and the desirability of permitting her to enter the United States with her husband and child.


S. 423 provides that Kil Joon Yu Callahan may be issued a visa and admitted to the United States for temporary residence if she applies within two years after the date of enactment of the enrolled bill, notwithstanding the 1976 conviction which would otherwise bar her from receiving a visa. The enrolled bill also

52

requires that she otherwise be admissible for entry into the United States.

In addition, the enrolled bill authorizes Mrs. Callahan's status to be adjusted, after two years, from temporary resident to permanent resident, if the Attorney General finds that Mrs. Callahan (1) has demonstrated good moral character, (2) has resided continuously in the United States since the date temporary resident status was granted, (3) has not been convicted of any felony or more than two misdemeanors, and (4) is otherwise admissible to the United States as an immigrant.

S. 423 passed both Houses by voice vote.


James C. Miller III
Director

Enclosures

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 20, 1987

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: JAMES A. KELLY 

SUBJECT: Replies to Messages of Congratulations

Proposed replies to messages of congratulations to you from Foreign Minister Choi of Korea and MITI Minister Tamura of Japan are at Tabs I and II. After signature we will forward the replies to the Department of State for transmission.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the letters at Tabs I and II.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

Tab I FCC ltr to FM Choi
Tab II FCC ltr to Min. Tamura
Tab III Incoming correspondence

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for your most thoughtful note on the occasion of my appointment as Secretary of Defense.

As you say, and as we discussed in October, the security relationship of the United States and Korea is critical to continued peace. As Secretary, you may be certain that I will keep this vital defense relationship among my highest personal priorities.

With appreciation and kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Kwang Soo Choi
Minister of Foreign Affairs
Seoul, Republic of Korea

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Dear Mr. Minister:

Thank you for your most thoughtful note on the occasion of my appointment as Secretary of Defense.

And, please accept my own warm congratulations on your reappointment as Minister of International Trade and Industry in the Cabinet of Prime Minister Takeshita.

As you say, and as we have discussed, the U.S.-Japan relationship is of critical importance, not only for the economic well-being of our peoples, but for their security and for world peace. As Secretary, you may be certain that I will keep the full importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship constantly in mind.

With appreciation and kindest personal regards,

Sincerely yours,

His Excellency
Hajime Tamura
Minister of International
Trade and Industry
Tokyo, Japan

Handwritten mark resembling a stylized 'N' or 'Z'.

SEOUL, 6 NOVEMBER 1987

THE HONORABLE
FRANK C. CARLUCCI
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE
UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, DC

DEAR MR. SECRETARY:

PLEASE ACCEPT MY HEARTFELT CONGRATULATIONS ON YOUR APPOINTMENT AS SECRETARY OF DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

I AM SURE THAT YOUR NEW APPOINTMENT WILL ALSO BE SUCCESSFUL WITH YOUR WIDE-RANGING EXPERIENCE IN MANY KEY POSITIONS OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY. AS WAS DISCUSSED AT OUR MEETING IN YOUR OFFICE LAST OCTOBER, THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND KOREA IS CRUCIAL TO PRESERVING PEACE IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND NORTHEAST ASIA AS WELL. I ALSO BELIEVE THAT OUR STEADFAST ALLIANCE WILL REMAIN AN ESSENTIAL PART OF OUR COMMON EFFORTS TO FURTHER STRENGTHEN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP.

WISHING EVERY SUCCESS IN YOUR NEW AND IMPORTANT POSITION.

SINCERELY YOURS,

KWANG SOO CHOI
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
REPUBLIC OF KOREA



*Minister of International Trade
and Industry*

Mr. Frank C. Carlucci III
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House Office
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W.,
Washington, D.C. 20500
U.S.A.

Handwritten signature or initials.

November 9, 1987

Dear Mr. Carlucci:

I wish to offer my sincerest congratulations on your appointment as Secretary of Defense.

It is with great pleasure that I am writing to inform you that I have been reappointed Minister of International Trade and Industry in the Takeshita Cabinet which succeeded the Cabinet of former Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone on November 6, 1987.

As I understand it, the decision to have me stay on as Minister and continue working on pending trade issues and other problems was made in the interests of maintaining continuity in Japan's external economic policy, especially in Japan-U.S. relations. I am happy to have this opportunity to deepen the friendship cultivated between us so far, and look forward to cooperating with you further in pursuit of our common goal -- the sound development of the world economy and international trade and investment.

I hope to see you again in the near future.

With my best regards,

Yours sincerely,

田 和 久

Hajime Tamura
Minister