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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Lenczowski to Clark 1p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #98	6/23/83	P1/B1
2. bio	bio 2p D 1/23/01 NLSF 2000-006/1 #99	6/4/81	P1/B1
3. memo	Matlock to Clark re Summitry 2p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #100	7/7/83	P1/B1
4. note	re article in Le Point 1p R " " #101	7/13/83	P1/B1
5. memo	Matlock to Clark re Gelb Article 1p R " " #102	7/19/83	P1/B1
6. draft memo	Clark to RR re Summitry 6p R " " #103	n.d.	P1/B1
7. report	re Andropov (page 2 only) 1p R 11/28/01 NLSF 2000-006/1 #104	8/8/83	P1/B1
8. outline	re Soviet Union 7p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #105	n.d.	P1/B1
9. routing slip	1p R " " #106	8/16/83	P1/B1
10. memo	Clark to RR re Joint Commerce & State Recommendation re Licensing 4p P 6/13/06 F00-006 #107	8/15/83	P1/B1 ⁰³
11. paper	US-Soviet Relations: A Framework for the Future 6p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #108	n.d.	P1/B1
12. paper	Checklist of US-Soviet issues 6p R " " #109	2/18/84	P1/B1

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 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

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National Security Council
The White House

715

Package # nan log

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83 JUN 23 P 3: 49

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
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Jacque Hill	_____	<i>g</i>	_____
Judge Clark	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Staff Secretary	_____	_____	_____
Sit Room	_____	_____	_____
_____	_____	_____	_____

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

June 23, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI *JL*

SUBJECT: Mr. Aleksandrov-Agentov

WPC HAS SEEN

Mr. Aleksandrov-Agentov was a personal foreign policy advisor to Brezhnev and appears to have made a successful transition to a similar position with Andropov. (This might indicate both skill and political influence on his part). Because the Soviet system has a different decisionmaking process than ours, he does not exactly occupy a position analagous to yours. Nevertheless, he is the kind of advisor who may silently accompany his boss in meetings with foreign officials, and may serve in other professional staff capacities. How much influence he has is entirely a matter of speculation.

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NLS F00-006 # 98BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/13/88~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 125 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~

July 7, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JACK F. MATLOCK *JFM*

SUBJECT: Summitry: Casey's Memo of June 27

*Same
US-Sov file*

My reaction to Bill Casey's thoughtful comments are as follows:

(1) Meeting on fringes of UN: I think this has its dangers, but we must recognize that if Andropov decides to come to the UN, the President will have no alternative to meeting him. I doubt if Andropov would come without our encouragement, but if he should, we can minimize the negative fallout by making clear that (a) such a meeting is not a summit in the sense we have been using the term, but simply a courtesy due a major foreign chief of state coming to the U.S. on other business; and (b) such a meeting need not foreclose a proper, full-fledged summit if conditions make that desirable.

Whether we should encourage Andropov to come is a separate question, and at this point I would be inclined to advise against it since it would probably raise too many hopes and might well get in the way of INF deployments. However, we should keep the possibility of such a meeting in mind over coming weeks and say nothing publicly which would make it more difficult to manage it if future developments should increase the desirability. If at any point we decide for any reason that we want such a meeting, we should try to arrange it privately before issuing a public invitation.

(2) Soviet willingness to arrange Summit next year: I do not agree with Casey that there is "no way" the Soviets will agree to a summit in mid-1984. They, in fact, may be eager for one if Andropov's health holds. Their assessment of the likelihood of the President's reelection will be important, of course. Almost as important will be their assessment of the possibility of concluding any deal with the Reagan Administration, and one task of our diplomacy (public and private) over the coming months will be to make clear that we are willing to conclude mutually advantageous agreements.

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NLS FOO - 000 #100BY AMJ, NARA, DATE 6/13/06

Aside from these considerations, however, there is a deeper reason for the Soviets not rejecting a summit next year, even if they feel that it contributes to the President's reelection chances. This is that the Soviets prefer the known to the unknown and unpredictable; more importantly, they prefer an interlocutor who can deliver if a deal is struck to one who might be voted down by the U.S. Senate. Given their experience with Carter's vacillations--which they found maddening--they may well actually prefer a strong U.S. President to an unpredictable one. And they appreciate the fact that a President with strong anti-Communist credentials offers more long-term reliability as an interlocutor than one who is weak at home. In sum, paradoxical as it may seem, they may favor the President's re-election as the lesser of two "evils."

(3) Third Areas: Though they will never say so directly, I feel strongly that the Soviets do have a strong urge to indulge in geo-political horse trading. This is implicit in almost every frank conversation with them I can recall when dealing with "third area" questions. The fact is that they do not feel that they have "their" spheres of influence "nailed down." They know they are not there legitimately, but only because they have been able to force themselves on these areas. Therefore, legitimizing their position is of great importance to them. Since theirs are not true alliances (as ours are) they stand only to gain from the appearance of legitimacy. Conversely, we stand only to lose. For this reason, it is a policy we should reject. Any analysis of what they theoretically might accept in such a "trade off" session is not only beside the point, but dangerous.

(4) Linkage: I am not sure the Soviets have really taken on board the implicit linkage of their overall behavior and our ability to conclude major agreements. It is true that every postwar U.S. President has made the right noises (at times) on this point, but few have acted as if it is important, and this is what counts. In fact, the Carter Administration consciously and explicitly de-linked SALT-II from any other factor. (We did not even warn the Soviets regarding Afghanistan during the period between the Taraki coup in 1978 and the Soviet invasion in December 1979, which caused some Soviet officials to complain after sanctions were applied, "How were we to know it made any difference to you.?") Therefore, I consider it important to continue to make the linkage point, since I am not confident that it is really understood.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bud saw

[Signature]

SITUATION ROOM NOTE

July 13, 1983

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Article in Le Point on the "Walk in the Woods" Agreement

Embassy Paris reports the July 11 issue of the French weekly Le Point carries an article by Pierre Lellouche entitled "How Washington Was Had By Moscow in the Woods."

- o The general thesis of the article is that the Soviets, after rejecting a proposal they never had the slightest intention of accepting, artfully manipulated the gradual leakage of information to the Western press so as to make it appear that the U.S. had unreasonably rejected the offer out of hand. They thereby transformed their own intransigence into a deft diplomatic triumph at the expense of the U.S.

- o The article is carefully crafted to recapitulate and underline certain themes which our embassy recognizes as forming the core of Lellouche's own highly personal interpretation of this episode: e.g., the U.S. is ready to seek an accommodation with the Soviets behind the backs of our European Allies, the shortsightedness of entertaining a proposal to do without Pershings; the duplicity of the Soviets combined with the ease by which the USSR is able to manipulate the U.S. and its Allies through driving wedges between them; and the overeagerness in certain European quarters to believe the cynically artful Soviets at the expense of the Americans.

(C)

Paris 6054, PSN 44558

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BY SMJ, NARA, DATE 6/13/06

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 19, 1983

TO: Judge Clark

FROM: Jack Matlock *JM*

SUBJECT: Gelb Article in New York Times

Attached is a copy of the Gelb article in the New York Times of June 30, which I mentioned in my weekly report of July 8.

It is obviously made up of bits and pieces obtained from a number of sources. Nevertheless, despite some inaccuracies of detail, it does have most of the content of the recent exchanges. Equally damaging are the sections dealing with differences of opinion within the Administration on some of the issues. I have highlighted the sections which are alleged to come from White House or NSC sources.

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 4/13/06 *[Signature]*

Expanding Contacts With Soviet: Shultz and Dobrynin Make a Start

N. Y. TIMES: 6-30-83

1 of 2

By LESLIE H. GELB

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, June 29 — Secretary of State George P. Shultz and the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, have met privately almost a dozen times since the beginning of the year, and top Administration officials say President Reagan is now considering whether to broaden the contacts and press to meet with Yuri V. Andropov.

Officials said that although Mr. Reagan was now ready to explore areas of possible agreement, he was undecided between two strategies: seeking better relations piecemeal on individual issues or trying to negotiate an overall solution to disputes on trade, regional conflict, human rights and arms control.

Reagan Limits Agenda

The officials said the talks between Mr. Shultz and Ambassador Dobrynin were serious but that it would be inconsistent with that seriousness to give any details. But they also acknowledged that nothing concrete had been accomplished and that breakthroughs were not imminent.

These and other officials said that so far Mr. Reagan had given Mr. Shultz the flexibility to discuss anything with Mr. Dobrynin but had limited the actual agenda to the opening of consulates in New York and Kiev, cultural exchanges, renewal of a five-year grain agreement and exploring whether it would be useful for the Secretary to visit Moscow this summer.

The Soviet response to this limited agenda is reported to have been cool, with Mr. Dobrynin telling Mr. Shultz it did not deal with "the big issues." Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko also spoke of the big issues in a speech two weeks ago when he said a summit meeting — which Mr. Shultz had not even suggested — would be useful only if it produced "major results."

The talks began after Mr. Shultz sent the President a memorandum in late March proposing wide-ranging, high-level contacts with the Soviet Union on trade, arms control, regional differences and human rights, leading eventually to a summit meeting. The President gave him the go-ahead.

Mr. Reagan approved Mr. Shultz's holding two sessions with Mr. Dobrynin in late March and early April on strategic arms limitations. The officials said that although Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger was told about the meetings, Pentagon officials skeptical of arms control were not involved in the preparations for them and were not told the results.

Officials said that last week the White House rejected a State Department recommendation for a National Security Council meeting to discuss the Shultz memorandum and a State Department "options paper," citing the difficulty of finding a date where all of the President's senior advisers could attend.

"It looked to us," one senior White House official said, "like Shultz's people were trying to get us involved in a process with Moscow without knowing themselves or making clear to us where that process was going; and once we were into it, the only result would be pressures on us to make compromises."

The Political Aspects

In the judgment of several Administration experts, Moscow is not going to give Mr. Reagan the political benefits of a summit meeting in a Presidential election year without something in re-

turn. By the same token, White House officials are drawn to the political benefits of improving Soviet-American relations and a summit meeting, but many still fear that it could boomerang.

The Shultz memorandum, written principally in the European Bureau of the State Department, was said to have dealt head-on with the political aspects of increased Soviet-American contacts, acknowledging that they would cause problems with some of Mr. Reagan's more conservative constituents.

But the memorandum also said, according to the sources, that Mr. Reagan's military buildup and toughness had turned the tide in world affairs, that he was now in a position to negotiate from strength and that failure to negotiate could give weight to political critics who say Mr. Reagan sees military might as an end in itself.

Mr. Shultz was playing back to Mr. Reagan the very arguments the President made to a group of his top aides in December, according to senior Administration sources. Then, the sources say, President Reagan said the United States would soon be in the best position it had been in in a generation to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

Senior Administration sources said the President was waiting for two things — greater alliance harmony on how to conduct East-West relations and Congressional backing on arms control. Those elements have fallen into place, the sources said, in view of the success of the Williamsburg economic meeting of the industrialized democracies, the election or re-election of conservative leaders in West Germany and Britain and Congressional endorsement of the MX missile.

Shultz's Approach to Talks

The approach to negotiations described in Mr. Shultz's memorandum was said to have been that Moscow should be required to make concessions on Poland, Afghanistan, the Middle East, Central America and human rights in the Soviet Union in return for Washington's altering its stands on trade, technology and arms control.

The assumption was that arms control was more in the Soviet interest than the American. One senior official said that whatever the content of the memorandum, Mr. Shultz thinks resolution of trade and technology disputes would largely benefit Moscow but that arms control, if "properly constructed," could be of equal benefit to both sides.

According to the officials, the memorandum did not indicate the positions to be taken in such negotiations. Instead, it laid out the road ahead in terms of a series of possible meetings: Shultz-Gromyko and Shultz-Andropov in July, Shultz-Gromyko at the United Nations in September followed by Gromyko-Reagan in Washington. In the past, Mr. Gromyko has almost automatically gone to Washington to meet with the American President, but he has not done so for two years.

State Department officials have indicated that a Shultz trip to Moscow this summer is far less likely now than was hoped in March and less necessary, given the frequent use of the Dobrynin channel.

Opponent of Summit Meeting

It is not entirely clear whether the Shultz memorandum specifically recommended a summit meeting. Most officials said yes and one said no. But one National Security Council staff member felt the recommendation was at least implicit and wrote a memorandum to William P. Clark, the President's national security adviser, arguing strongly against Mr. Reagan's meeting

with anyone who had called him a liar or, in his words, even being seen with Mr. Andropov when Soviet forces were killing Afghans and oppressing the Polish people.

Mr. Andropov said in a Pravda interview on March 25 that Mr. Reagan had told "a deliberate lie" in charging that Moscow had broken its pledge to freeze deployment of medium-range missiles aimed at Europe.

Mr. Clark was said to have forwarded this memorandum without written comment to Mr. Reagan along with the Shultz memorandum.

The test of Mr. Reagan's new attitude, the officials said, came two weeks ago when Mr. Shultz was preparing a statement on Soviet relations for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The draft noted that the United States was now strong enough to begin a "constructive dialogue," that endless confrontation was not inevitable and that "gradual change is possible." The officials said that several members of the National Security Council staff recommended changing or deleting those points but that Mr. Reagan specifically approved keeping them.

The Small Issues First

Senior Administration officials said that for the time being Mr. Shultz would concentrate on cultural exchanges and establishing new consulates. "The willingness to discuss specific issues and bring them to a successful conclusion is a small thing, but it signifies something bigger against the backdrop of the last two years of unadulterated tension," one senior official said.

Several Administration officials also felt it was significant that the White House, with or without Mr. Reagan's

knowledge, gave the green light to Mr. Shultz in March to hold talks with Mr. Dobrynin on strategic arms without Pentagon participation. Edward L. Rowny, the chief American negotiator at the Geneva talks, was present along with several Shultz aides.

Mr. Shultz was said to have read a long list of questions about the Soviet position — questions that can signal possible changes in the American position — at the first meeting, and Mr. Dobrynin was said to have given formal responses at the second meeting.

Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy, and Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense, the two key Pentagon officials dealing with arms control, were neither told of the meetings nor given the results.

Mixed Signals From Moscow

According to Administration sources, Mr. Perle and Mr. Iklé found out about the meetings inadvertently after seeing a memorandum that mentioned exchanges with Mr. Dobrynin.

The Soviet position is unclear to the Administration. On the one hand, Soviet comments have taken a tough turn. On the other hand, Moscow has just allowed a family of Pentecostals who had taken asylum in the American Embassy in Moscow for five years to emigrate and it has made several minor but positive changes in its position on strategic arms reduction.

Specifically, the Soviet delegation in

Geneva has dropped demands that the United States limit deployment of Trident submarines and the new Trident II missile and that cruise missiles launched from long-range bombers be restricted in range to no more than 365 miles.

American negotiators long regarded these as simply bargaining ploys, but the fact that they come at this time, along with the release of the Pentacostals, is being interpreted as a signal.

On a summit meeting, the officials said the strongest supporters of the idea were Nancy Reagan, the President's wife, and Michael K. Deaver, a close aide to Mr. Reagan. Edwin Meese 3d, the President's counselor, is said not to be opposed but has expressed concern about the consistency of the move with the last two years of Administration policy.

Nixon Trip Is Cited

Officials said that Mr. Clark, the national security adviser, had expressed concern about possible Soviet tricks at a summit meeting but had also spoken favorably about the way President Nixon handled the summit meeting in the Presidential election year of 1972.

Mr. Nixon went to Moscow in May 1972 to sign an arms control agreement and other accords before the campaign got into full swing. State Department officials are said to be saying that late spring of 1984 would be the best time for a Reagan-Andropov meeting. They are said to calculate that Moscow will not

agree to one before new medium-range American missiles are deployed in Europe in December and will probably use strong language against the United States for a few months thereafter. That would leave the late spring or early summer as the only opening before the Presidential conventions.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

This is earlier version
which has been revised.

Jim -

Jacque,

8/2/83

Put in Soviet file. This
version did not go to
the President.

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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NLS FOO-006 #103

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK 

BY smj, NARA, DATE 6/13/86

Subject: Summitry

I have submitted papers to you earlier pointing out the dangers of summitry in the absence of assurance that substantial progress can be made on issues of primary importance to us, and believe that the considerations set forth in them remain valid. However, public and Congressional pressures are building for a summit meeting, and although the rationale is often fuzzy and the premises mistaken, this is a political fact of life with which we must deal.

At this point it is clear that we are well on track in rebuilding our defense strength and in rallying our Allies on the most critical issues. Our economy is showing increasing signs of long-term recovery, and your position of leadership is strong and assured. Andropov, in contrast, is faced with a myriad of problems far more fundamental and intractable than ours. The basics, therefore, are moving unmistakably in our direction and our negotiating strength is stronger than it has been for many years. Our task is to manage the U.S.-Soviet relationship in a manner which will insure that these trends continue over the long term. In other words, we must insure the sustainability of our current policies.

This means, among other things, that we must deal with the summit issue in a manner so that pressures for a summit do not erode our ability to maintain our defense programs or allied unity, particularly on the INF deployment issue. Our goal should be more ambitious than mere damage limitation, however. We should aim to use the summit issue in a manner which enhances our leverage rather than weakening it (which would be the case if we were forced by ill-founded public, Congressional or allied opinion to enter into an inadequately prepared meeting without clear objectives.) I believe that this can be done, provided that we are clear in our own minds about our objectives, avoid raising false public expectations, and pursue a purposeful, well-coordinated negotiating track over the coming months.

U.S. Objectives

Our confrontation with the Soviet Union is and will continue to be a protracted one. Summitry, to the extent we choose to

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indulge in it, should be viewed as just one instrument in a long-term, sustained effort. Although it is possible that a major breakthrough can be achieved within a year in some area of primary interest to us, this is far from certain and, indeed, does not seem likely. There are two basic reasons for this: (1) Despite the favorable trends running in our direction, the Soviet leaders will continue to balk at offering proof that our policy of strength pays off, and are likely to continue for some time to try to undermine our strength and determination rather than making the hard choices required; and (2) Andropov, even with his accession to the titular chief of state role, has probably not consolidated his position to the degree that he can force painful decisions on powerful interest groups.

Therefore, if there is a summit within twelve months, our most important objective will be to impress upon Andropov that our will and capacity to confront him successfully is firm and unalterable in the absence of a significant modification of Soviet behavior. This could prepare the ground for more significant Soviet concessions in 1985.

A second objective should be to obtain significant progress (though not necessarily formal agreements) in several of the areas of primary interest to us: human rights, Soviet restraint in third countries, arms reduction and confidence-building measures, and bilateral relations--particularly those aspects which strengthen our capacity to communicate with the Soviet public at large and thus to build pressure for a gradual "opening" of Soviet society.

A third objective should be to demonstrate--both to the more pragmatic elements of the Soviet leadership and to our own public--that we are in fact serious negotiating partners and that we are not making unreasonable demands in order to block settlement of disputes.

The Agenda

The agenda for any summit will be effectively shaped by the content of negotiations prior to it. Our negotiations, therefore, should cover, persistently and systematically, those issues on our list, whether they seem amenable to progress or not. For it is important to keep hammering at the themes important to us, whether or not there is a Soviet response. Prospects in the various areas vary, of course, as do the appropriate channels we should use. The following examples are meant to be illustrative rather than comprehensive:

-- Human Rights: Here the Soviets can make concessions regarding specific persons if they choose, but they are unlikely to make any in overall procedure. In my view, we can

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aim realistically to obtain the emigration of the Pentacostalists, the release and emigration of Shcharansky, at least some improvement in Sakharov's position (e.g. medical treatment in Moscow), and increased Jewish emigration. We should continue to use the Kampleman channel for most of this, and are likely to get the most from quiet diplomacy, backed up by publicity generated by private organizations and--as appropriate--support from allied and other governments (e.g., the Stoessel mission). We should offer nothing in return for these Soviet actions, other than an improved atmosphere.

-- Third Areas: These promise to be among the most contentious and intractable issues we must manage. The Soviet aim will be to draw us into a form of geopolitical horse-trading based on an implicit recognition of spheres of influence. (For example, they promise to ease off arms supplies to Central America in return for a free hand in Poland.) We must, of course, totally reject going down this path, since it ultimately would undermine our alliances and weaken the moral basis for our policies. Our leverage on these issues varies with the local situation; it is most powerful when political conditions in the area and the military balance act as a barrier to Soviet penetration and weakest when one or both of these barriers is absent. But while our most effective counter to Soviet adventurism must be defeating it on the spot, we should make it clear that irresponsible Soviet behavior is a major impediment to the whole range of U.S.-Soviet relations. "Linkage" in this general sense is a political fact of life, and we must not let the Soviets forget it.

It is difficult to say at this juncture what we can expect in this area from a summit, but as a minimum I believe we should have credible assurance that there will be no further dramatic Soviet or surrogate military moves to tip the balance in a regional situation. We should, of course, continue to probe Soviet intentions in each individual situation and be prepared to use the implicit leverage of an upcoming summit to push the Soviets toward a solution we favor.

-- Arms Reduction and CBM's: We should be able to make progress on some of the confidence-building measures we have proposed, but a real breakthrough in any of the three major arms reduction talks seems highly problematic, although possible. If we are to move toward a summit, however, we should use that process to pressure the Soviets to get more forthcoming proposals on the table, and should hold off agreeing to a summit until our positions have narrowed on at least some of the key issues. Presumably both sides must be able to say after the meeting that some significant progress was achieved in this area.

-- Bilateral issues: Here, we can reasonably expect some limited progress. If the Soviets agree to a cultural and

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information exchange agreement which enhances our access to the Soviet public it will be in our interest. Establishment of a consulate in Kiev would provide us with a window on the largest Soviet minority nationality and enhance our ability to exploit the potential nationalities problem. We may be able to achieve some greater access to the Soviet media, and possibly a cessation of jamming of VOA, as well as some minor improvements in the consular and travel areas. While none of these topics are likely to be suitable for extended discussion at a summit, the latter could provide some leverage for favorable results in negotiations preceding the meeting.

Is this Enough?

If the analysis above is accurate, it would seem that we can expect at this point only limited gains from a summit. So limited, in fact, that they might not justify the risk of public euphoria (some is inevitable, even if not encouraged) followed by a let-down and recriminations. For this reason, I believe we should continue to proceed cautiously and deliberately and avoid committing ourselves to a summit until our negotiations provide a clearer picture of how much give there is in Soviet positions.

There are other reasons for proceeding with caution. If the Pope's spectacular success in rallying the Polish people and humiliating Jaruzelski results in heavy-handed Soviet interference in Poland, it would, to put it mildly, make it difficult for you to meet Andropov. Also, we would want to be sure that the trial of the Pope's would-be assassin in Italy is unlikely to produce persuasive evidence of a "Bulgarian connection," since you will not want to sit down with a man whom the public believes--rightly or wrongly--to have taken out a contract on the Pope.

I believe that the Soviets want a summit, since it enhances their stature--at home and in the rest of the world--to be seen dealing as equals with the President of the United States. It is also useful to Andropov personally in consolidating his power internally to be accepted by you as an equal partner. They will not abandon the store to us for the privilege of a meeting, but they will pay something (in human rights cases and in access to their population) if we negotiate these issues skillfully and avoid making them a public test of strength. But in order to squeeze the maximum out of them, we must position ourselves so that we will not be seen needing a summit more than they.

The Soviets clearly recognize the danger of appearing over eager, and I believe this was behind Gromyko's June 21 statement accusing us of having "no constructive goals" and implying that we must change our policies to make a summit possible.

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How to Proceed

While we must be prepared to handle the matter in public with the same coolness Gromyko has shown, we should do what we can in diplomatic and private channels to probe Soviet flexibility. And if we can speed up this process without becoming the demandeur, we should do so.

I believe that Secretary Shultz's testimony on the Hill last ~~week~~ ^{MONTH} and his recent approach to Dobrynin, coupled with Kampelman's conversations in Madrid and our proposals in the arms reduction talks in Geneva and Vienna provide an appropriate start to the process of setting an agenda for a possible summit. At this point, my judgment is that what we have put on the table is appropriate, but that we should go no further on any matter of substance until the Soviets respond with something of their own. We should press for significant progress in each of the areas we have outlined, utilizing both formal diplomatic channels, and--whenever appropriate and potentially useful--special channels such as that through Kampelman and his KGB interlocutor.

In fact, as we enter into a more intensive dialogue with the Soviets, we should give careful thought to establishing a private channel for frank discussion of sensitive issues of a broader nature than those handled by Kampelman. I believe that such a channel can be useful provided we manage it in a manner so that the heads of key agencies in our own government and our principal negotiators are aware of the messages passed, and that discussion is shifted to formal channels before firm commitments are made.

In preparing for a possible summit, timing will be a factor almost as important as substance. On the one hand, we need to make clear to the Soviets that we are prepared to deal if they are and to give impetus to their sluggish policy making. On the other, it is important not to appear to be in a hurry lest our negotiating position be weakened.

If we do not take a step to force the pace of negotiations, the scenario would look something like the following:

- A. Continue diplomatic exchanges (Shultz/Dobrynin, Hartman/Gromyko) until late September.
- B. You and Shultz meet with Gromyko in late September, when he comes here for the UN session.
- C. Assuming these exchanges produce some progress, plan a Shultz visit to Moscow in December. (I think it important that he not go in October or November so as not to provide an excuse in Europe to delay scheduled INF deployments.)

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Although this scenario might provide enough evidence of the prospects for a summit to permit a go/no go decision by the end of the year (for a summit around March or April), it would do little to raise the visibility of our negotiations or to increase pressure on the Soviets for quick decisions. Also, a Shultz visit immediately following INF deployments might not be acceptable to the Soviets.

With these considerations in mind, Ambassador Hartman has recommended that Shultz propose a visit to Moscow in July or early August, provided he can be assured of a meeting with Andropov. Hartman argues that such a visit would exert pressure on the Soviets to respond promptly to our latest proposals, give us the opportunity to explain the implications of our latest START proposals to Andropov directly (Hartman believes he has not really grasped their potential), and demonstrate to our public and the Allies that we are negotiating seriously.

These are powerful arguments in favor of an early Shultz visit to Moscow, but I am concerned over the impact of our taking the initiative in suggesting a visit before we have any forthcoming responses from the Soviets to our latest proposals. Obviously, we must make a decision on this very soon if the trip is to be possible at all, and over the next few days I shall be reviewing the pros and cons and exploring possible alternative ways to speed up the diplomatic process.

Public Handling

Until we have decided whether to proceed to the summit and have nailed down the arrangements with the Soviets privately, we should hold strictly to our current position (that one could be useful in the future if properly prepared), and avoid speculation on whether and when one might be possible.

We should also consider approaching key Senators and Members of Congress privately to encourage them to avoid pressing publicly for a summit, which only erodes our negotiating position in arranging one. (Percy's comments during the Shultz hearing, for example, were distinctly unhelpful.)

As we proceed with those negotiations you approve, it will be absolutely essential to avoid premature leaks. Therefore we will probably need to develop special "close hold" procedures to avoid wide dissemination of our negotiating plans in the bureaucracy. I expect to have some specific suggestions for you shortly on this subject.

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NLS F00-506 #105

BRIEFING OUTLINE

BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/13/06

I. INTRODUCTION

An attempt to describe how the Soviet leaders view the world and the implications of this for U.S.-Soviet relations. There is often a tendency to assume that the Soviets view the world as we would if we were sitting in Moscow. This is emphatically not the case, and today we shall try to explain some of the more important characteristics of Soviet thinking. John Lenczowski will discuss the nature of the Soviet system, Paula Dobriansky will take a look at how the Soviets view their international position and assess the threats to it, and Jack Matlock will describe the psychology of the Soviet leaders and discuss some implications for U.S. policy.

II. NATURE OF SOVIET SYSTEM, FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS AND STRATEGY (Lenczowski)The USSR as a Communist Power

- A. Distinction between a communist power and a traditional imperialist great power: limited versus necessarily unlimited objectives.
- B. Various influences encourage us to believe that USSR is no longer communist:
 - 1. Wishful thinking.
 - 2. Mirror imaging.
 - 3. Soviet disinformation.
- C. Inescapable fact: USSR must be communist because of the role of ideology in the system.
 - 1. Ideology as source of legitimacy.
 - 2. Ideology as key to internal security system: Emperor's New Clothes.
 - 3. A key index that this is so is to observe that ideology defines basic structure of society.
- D. Ideology and Foreign Policy.
 - 1. Ideology serves as frame of reference to view the world.
 - 2. Ideology defines international reality as struggle between two social systems: capitalism and socialism, a struggle inevitably to be won by socialism.

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2. USSR: ANDROPOV'S WORK STYLE

Andropov's record shows that he tends to favor incremental, long-term programs. He is unlikely to attempt revolutions from above as did Khrushchev, but he appears to be more purposeful than Brezhnev. Andropov may be able to push through a new program at the next party congress in 1986, but will probably not live long enough to pursue it until completion.

* * *

Andropov believes that the present Soviet economic system need not be changed radically, but can be made more effective if its problems are overcome at the working level. In this regard, the changes in factory management publicized on July 26 illustrate his gradualist approach. Instead of trying to use market forces to get plants to modernize, he has provisionally permitted a few parent ministries to subsidize plants for the production they lose while upgrading their equipment. If the model works, it will be applied more widely in 1985.

Another example of Andropov's approach is his most recent attempt to improve farm production. He has taken aim at agencies that handle farm equipment, and a July 22 decree specifies legal penalties for failure to properly repair such equipment, a chronic problem for Soviet agriculture over the past half century.

Andropov's policy in shifting key personnel has also been gradual, although the opposition of Brezhnevites may have made this the only possible course. Nevertheless, some recent personnel changes may help Andropov carry through his policies. The addition of Leningrad Party boss Romanov to the Secretariat, where he is in charge of industry, may have facilitated the July changes in industry and agriculture. Politburo member Gorbachev's recent acquisition of a role in senior personnel appointments, and the relegation of Party Secretary Kapitonov from handling senior appointments to dealing with consumer goods, may make it easier for Andropov to get regional party leaders to support his policies.

Andropov's gradualist style of accomplishing long-range goals served him well when he was younger and stronger, but now his age and physical condition may not leave him time to complete a long-term design. He hopes to incorporate the results of his current experiment in economic management into the next five-year plan (1986-90). He may be able to supervise the party congress in 1986 and to draft a new party program, but he will probably be unable to report to the subsequent congress on his accomplishments.

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3. Therefore ideology determines friends and enemies -- it sets an international standard of behavior.
4. Ideology presents a discrete set of strategies and tactics of revolutionary behavior.
5. Ideology sets a standard of measurement of correlation of forces: strategic decisions to advance or retreat are made on the basis of "scientific" assessments of the correlation of forces. Ideological strength or weakness is the key criterion.
6. Ideology serves as a weapon of political influence: an instrument of subversion and deception.
7. Foreign ideologies (and therefore any competing version of the truth) are the principal threats to the Soviet system.

Soviet Strategy

- A. Because USSR is prisoner of the ideology, its lies, and its predictions, it is compelled to try to fulfill those predictions. This means:
 1. Creating false appearances -- therefore a strategy of deception.
 2. Creating new realities, by exporting revolution.
- B. The principal means of Soviet expansionism is "ideological struggle".
 1. To win men's minds.
 2. To deceive those who cannot be won.
 3. Therefore propaganda, subversion and disinformation are the key features of Soviet foreign policy.
 4. Suppression of the truth is the ultimate objective -- self-censorship by Soviet adversaries is prelude to political uniformity.
 5. A principal effort: to define the acceptable vocabulary of international political debate -- both words and issues.
- C. Military power is the principal adjunct to this.
 1. It can forcibly create the new reality.

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2. It can serve to intimidate and accelerate the process of ideological subversion.
- D. Struggle between two systems as a protracted conflict.
1. Soviet control over the time frame of the conflict enables them to control timing of attack and choice of battlefield while permitting possibility of strategic retreat.
 2. Proper understanding of time permits strategy of attrition -- nibble at edges of Free World, never risk final showdown.
 3. Strategy of indirect attack:
 - A deceptive means of escaping culpability.
 - Use of proxies, front groups, agents of influence, etc.
 4. Strategy of monopoly of offensive.
 5. Strategy of psychological conditioning:
 - War-zone, peace zone.
 - Demarcation of scrimmage line.
 - Soviets have conditioned us to believe that peace zone is inviolable but war zone is not.
 - Therefore Soviets have developed a no-lose strategy: they have nothing to lose by continually trying to cross the scrimmage line.

III. SOVIET THREAT ASSESSMENT: THREATS, OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES (Dobriansky)

a. Zero-sum mentality: The U.S. poses the greatest threat to Soviet security as it is the main obstacle to the achievement of Soviet geo-political objectives. Ergo, Soviet foreign policy is generally designed to reduce and curtail the U.S. geo-political position. Moscow evaluates all international situations from one perspective -- whether they would detract or enhance the Soviet position vis-a-vis that of the U.S.

b. Soviet conception of a threat: In contrast to the Western conception of a threat -- an action which might undermine one's existing position -- the Soviet definition also includes any actions which might frustrate potential Soviet gains. As the Soviets strive for absolute security, any attempts to upset the current balance or Soviet gains are perceived by Moscow as a threat. There are two underlying reasons: (1) Soviet penchant for expansionism to

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solve security problems (2) Existence of democratic societies poses constant threat to domestic Soviet stability by providing an example of an alternative social and political entity. Public and private Soviet complaints indicate that U.S. ideological offensive is taken seriously and regarded as an important threat.

c. Role of military power in foreign policy: Soviet leaders regard military strength as the foundation of the USSR's status as a global superpower and as the most critical factor underlying successful Soviet foreign policy. Yet, concern about the danger of nuclear war has been a serious consideration in Soviet foreign policy decisions. Essentially, the nature of the Soviet dilemma has been how to wage a successful expansionist foreign policy without unduly increasing the risk of a nuclear war.

Soviet Assessment of Current International Environment/Projected Trends

a. U.S.: Despite domestic opposition, budgetary pressures and Intra-Alliance tensions, the Soviets expect that the U.S. is likely to sustain its present foreign and defense policies (i.e., MX, INF, etc.) which seeks to curtail Soviet expansionism.

b. Western Europe: Despite Intra-Alliance tensions, the peace movement, etc., the Soviets do not realistically expect a break up of NATO, and believe that Western European governments would continue to follow (by and large) the U.S. lead on major security issues.

c. Third World: Soviets anticipate exceleration of the process of disintegration, anarchy triggered by economic stagnation, border and resource disputes and the lack of stable political organizations. They anticipate many Third World crises which will present both opportunities and threats to Soviet security. Soviet concern is that a newly assertive U.S. bent on stemming Soviet expansionism would intervene in a future Third World conflict.

Regional Geographic Assessments: Threats/Opportunities
(Countries are listed in order of priority from Soviet perspective)

a. Eastern Europe: Only area which offers no opportunities, only potential threats;

b. Western Europe: European military capability is minimal threat in short term, but with U.S. support it is a significant military threat. Substantial ideological/political threat, moderate opportunities.

c. Asia: High threat/high opportunity; East Asia -- China, Japan, Korea -- growing security threat; main option

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= containment; Southeast/Southwest Asia - opportunities, of immense strategic value.

d. Middle East: Moderate Threat/Moderate Opportunity; do not anticipate dramatic successes.

e. Africa: Low risk/low threat/moderate opportunities; no dramatic successes; recognition of gains and losses.

f. Central America: High risk/low threat/high opportunities; creation of strategic diversion -- tying up U.S. resources, distracting U.S. attention from other critical areas, generating U.S. domestic cleavages.

IV. PSYCHOLOGY OF SOVIET LEADERS (Matlock)

A. Some widespread characteristics

- Communist ideology, Russian traditions and the imperatives of ruling a highly bureaucratized, multinational empire are fused in the thinking of the leadership.
- The legitimacy of the rulers rests entirely on the ideology; they must cling to it even if they do not fully believe it.
- Their first priority is preserving their system; their second is expanding their power, so long as it does not conflict with the first.
- Legitimacy and status are extremely important to them and comprise an important foreign policy objective. This contributes to an acute sense of saving face.
- Their attitude is fundamentally totalitarian: citizens are viewed as property of the state, allies as puppets (or else they are not really allies).
- They take a long-term view and do not accept defeats as permanent. A defeat in one area is viewed as a challenge to find other means to achieve the same objective.
- They are persistent bargainers, adept at exploiting time pressures on the other side, but willing to strike deals rapidly if they feel compelled to.
- They are often prisoners of their own ideological proclivities and thus misjudge the effect of their actions on others.

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--They are much more preoccupied with the United States than we are with them.

B. Soviet view of Reagan Administration

--Soviets cautiously welcomed the President's election because they were fed up with Carter and thought a Republican president might return to the Nixon-Ford policies.

--When they realized in early 1981 that there would be no return to "detente," they played with the idea of "waiting out" the Reagan Administration, in the hope that it would only last four years.

--They have been surprised and impressed by the President's ability to get his defense programs through, keep unity in the alliance, and get the economy moving again. At the same time, they have experienced a series of foreign policy defeats and growing economic difficulties at home.

--There are signs now that they are reassessing their foreign policy. They may feel overextended, and in need of some reduction of tension to allow more attention to domestic problems. They seem convinced that the President is likely to be reelected, and if so must be asking themselves whether it might not be better to deal with him before rather than after his reelection.

--Given their preoccupation with U.S.-Soviet relations, they may well exaggerate the political benefits to the President in dealing with them. This could lead them to overplay their hand.

IV. IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY

A. The struggle is long-term. There are no quick fixes. This means that we must devise a strategy which can be sustained for a decade or, probably, more.

B. Two broad options in theory:

1. Unrelenting pressure on the Soviets; and
2. Negotiation of specific differences on basis of strength, with follow-up to keep

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gains permanent rather than temporary.

Only the second seems sustainable in a democratic society, but it requires a recognition that agreements are only stages in the struggle, not the end of it.

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RELEASER

PRIORITY

DEX #

DTG

192120Z

ROUTINE

TTY #

FROM/LOCATION/

1. O. TYSON SANTA BARBARA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. ADMIRAL POIN DEXTER TOR / 19 2136Z

INFORMATION ADDRESSEES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1.

2.

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

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RELEASER

DTG 161645Z AUG 83

FROM/LOCATION/

1. CHARLES TYSON SANTA BARRARA

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

1. MILAIDE FOR THE PRESIDENT / TOP: 161144Z AUG 83

INFORMATION ADDRESS/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Decision to be announced Sat.

I believe in answering this we should point out we are still opposed to licensing other oil & gas equipment which does involve high technology. Pipe layers do not and are available from a number of other countries.

RR

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
BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/13/06

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

System II
90890



August 15, 1983

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: Joint Commerce and State Recommendation to
Eliminate Licensing Requirement for the
Export of ██████████ to the
Soviet Union ██████████

FOIA(b)(3)

Issue

Should the licensing requirement for the export of ██████████ be lifted at this time and on an individual basis?

FOIA(b)(3)

Facts

At the end of last month, I received a recommendation from Secretaries Baldrige and Shultz on the above issue (Tab B). I discussed this matter with you at the time emphasizing that ██████████ has routinely had the ability to sell ██████████ to the USSR since you lifted the sanctions in November 1982 and that all licenses have been examined with a presumption of approval. The processing time reportedly takes between 30 to 90 days. ██████████ had such a license approved in January 1983. The licensing procedure for ██████████

FOIA(b)(3)

FOIA(b)(3)

██████████ was imposed in response to the jailing of Anatoly Scharansky and Alexander Ginzburg in 1978. (Scharansky recently had his fifth anniversary in continued incarceration.) It also serves as a mechanism to monitor and, if necessary, interrupt such sales when warranted by egregious Soviet foreign policy actions or human rights abuses.

We are informed that the Soviets are pressuring ██████████ to seek removal of this licensing requirement, probably under the threat of holding down its ██████████ purchases. This is a similar Soviet tactic to that used with our grain

FOIA(b)(3)

Prepared by:
Roger W. Robinson

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By *mf*, NARA, Date 6/13/06

exporters concerning their demand for uninterrupted supply assurances. The Soviets understand well that these extortionary tactics used with our grain exporters and now U.S. manufacturers of oil and gas equipment contribute to the erosion of your discretionary authority to exercise national security and foreign policy controls. They have also probably timed this initiative to further undermine the Administration bill on renewal of the Export Administration Act (EAA) and our on-going review of multilateral controls on certain oil and gas equipment in COCOM.

Due to my concern over these serious national security implications of adopting such a recommendation at this time, I referred the matter to the SIG-IEP for interagency review. My August 4 memo to the members of the SIG cited these implications as including: potential public perception of a deliberate unilateral signal being sent to the USSR on the heels of the announced LTA, and willingness "in principle" to enter into discussions on rescheduling the Polish debt; ability to hold our position concerning the EAA renewal; potential impact on the COCOM exercise examining multilateral controls on oil and gas equipment; and effect on the overall positive momentum of our East-West economic work programs.

Prior to the SIG-IEP meeting on this issue yesterday, my staff made an extensive and constructive effort to forge an interagency compromise that would address these serious concerns, while also avoiding the public affairs problem of singling out one company for preferential treatment that would be immediately sought by other U.S. manufacturers of similarly licensed oil and gas equipment. Defense has agreed to sharply reduce the turnaround time on the processing of these types of licenses from the present 30-90 days to as little as three days. This would greatly assist the competitive positions of this entire category of companies but still preserve our licensing requirements pending clarification of the COCOM exercise and EAA. Commerce annually reviews licensing procedures across-the-board in December and at this time a more informed decision could be taken concerning the appropriateness of continuing these licensing requirements for [redacted] and other companies. FOIA(b) (3)

This compromise was offered at the SIG but was rejected by State, Commerce, Agriculture, OMB, STR, and Treasury in favor of immediate elimination of the licensing requirement for [redacted] alone. The opposing agencies were DOD and NSC. FOIA(b) (3)

Attached (Tab A) is a memo to me from Secretary Regan summarizing the outcome of the meeting and outlining the pros and cons presented by Secretary Baldrige at the outset of the meeting. In my view, this is a very balanced assessment.

Discussion

Given the high visibility of this issue, its symbolic importance to our broader foreign policy objectives, and the likelihood of harmful misinterpretation of this action by the press and public, I judged it necessary to permit you to review this proposed recommendation. Today's misleading press report on yesterday's SIG meeting is attached (Tab C), and we are told the press will be giving this considerably heavier play tomorrow as they are focusing on an epilogue for the initial leak on the Shultz/Baldrige recommendation which appeared on page one of the New York Times on August 2 (Tab D).

Although the majority of the agencies on the SIG-IEP are now recommending the immediate elimination of the licensing requirement for [REDACTED] are undoubtedly monitoring this decision with interest, I continue to believe that the best course of action would be for you to call for a significant speed up on the processing of licenses for all oil and gas exploration and production equipment that we do not control for national security reasons or propose for multilateral controls and that you order a review to be completed by year end to determine the appropriateness of continued foreign policy controls on oil and gas exploration and production equipment. Should a recommendation emerge (as is likely) to remove licensing requirements, it would apply to all affected companies and avoid the charge of preferential treatment for one company. It would also give us time to clarify where we stand in the COCOM exercise and with the EAA renewal.

FOIA(b) (3)

Recommendations:

OK No

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1. Accept the Commerce/State recommendation to eliminate the licensing requirement immediately for [REDACTED] which was also supported by the majority of the SIG-IEP members.
2. Call for a significant speed up to be implemented immediately in the processing of all licenses for oil and gas equipment which we do not control for national security reasons or do not propose for multilateral controls and order that a review be completed by year-end to determine the appropriateness of our foreign policy controls on oil and gas equipment. This review would include State, Commerce, DOD and NSC. DOD supports this approach.

FOIA(b) (3)

3. Order an NSC meeting to discuss this issue with the Cabinet and make a decision at that time.

Attachments

- Tab A Regan Memo
- Tab B Baldrige/Shultz Memo
- Tab C August 12 New York Times Article
- Tab D August 2 New York Times Article

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U.S. - Soviet RelationsNLS FOO-006 #108A Framework for the FutureBY SM, NARA, DATE 6/13/06

What are the prospects for U.S.-Soviet relations in 1984? What should be our approach?

I. Premise

Chernenko's selection as General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party may provide an opportunity to put our relations on a more positive track. Even before Andropov died, there were signs that the Soviets were accepting the necessity for an intensified dialogue. Now they have started to diminish their hostile rhetoric somewhat and have indicated a readiness to examine privately proposals for solving some problems.

As a Soviet leader, Chernenko has many initial weaknesses. He may have come to power as the head of a relatively weak coalition, and his freedom to maneuver may be severely circumscribed. His public image is not strong, and he may well turn out to be only a brief transitional figure. Nevertheless, he probably does not view himself in that light, and we can assume that he will attempt to consolidate his power and put his own stamp on history. In that effort, an ability to improve relations with the United States would be an important asset to him, and to be seen publicly dealing with you as an equal would bolster his image greatly in the Soviet Union. In short, he needs you more than you need him, and he knows it.

This does not mean that he can sell the store. Crucial strategic decisions will continue to be made by a collective--essentially the same collective which ran things under Andropov. But it is likely that this collective had already begun to recognize the need for the Soviet Union to adjust some of its policies before Andropov died, and Chernenko's accession could hasten that process. The change of the face at the top could make it easier to adjust policies, implicitly blaming past failures on the "previous administration."

To say that these things could happen is, of course, not the same as saying that they will, or even that the odds favor them happening. The Soviets still harbor a deep and fundamental hostility to your Administration, are tough and cynical bargainers, and will be reluctant to do anything that they believe would facilitate your reelection and vindicate your policy of strength.

Your reelection is of strategic importance for the United States in establishing an effective long-term policy for dealing with the Soviet threat. This means that we must stress in public your call for dialogue and your desire to reduce tensions and solve problems. Tangible progress and a summit that produced positive

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results could be helpful if the Soviets decide to bite the bullet and adjust their policies sufficiently to make this possible. But if they continue to resist realistic negotiation, you must be in a position by late summer or fall to make clear that this is their fault, not yours.

For the next few months, however, we should carefully avoid raising public expectations for a summit or any specific accords with the Soviets. To do so would gravely weaken our negotiating leverage with the Soviets, and leave a public impression of failure if they refuse to deal with us realistically. In private, however, we should promptly begin to explore the possibilities for moving ahead in some important areas, and to test Chernenko's willingness and ability to meet at least some of our legitimate concerns. If we play our cards right, we may well be able to induce Chernenko to pay something in advance for the improvement in relations and summit which would be very helpful to him personally.

On the Soviet side, one principal argument against meeting our concerns in some important areas is likely to be that your policy is so hostile that no accommodation is possible, and any attempt to negotiate seriously would only result in Soviet concessions without a deal. It is, therefore, in our interest to make it clear that we will negotiate seriously if the Soviets are willing to meet our legitimate concerns. Such a posture would not only maximize whatever chances exist for major agreements in 1984, but would provide a sound basis for rapid progress in 1985, if the Soviets are unable to get their act together until then, or if they hold back for fear of helping you get reelected. We should not, of course, attempt to stimulate their interest by making prior concessions of substance. This would only encourage them to continue on their track of trying to get concessions from us without making any of their own. Indeed, our aim should be to obtain some prior concessions from them, particularly if you are to agree to a summit. In this regard we should recognize that there are doubtless limits on what Chernenko can deliver; he can hardly pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan or make major decisions of strategic significance. But he can deliver on such matters as human rights cases and Jewish emigration if he wishes.

All of this suggests that we should move rapidly to put more content into the dialogue, and to search for more efficient modalities. We should stick to the broad agenda set forth in your January speech, but need to concentrate particular attention on issues where the Soviets can find a direct interest in responding. Regarding modalities, we need channels which permit off-the-record frankness and which are isolated from leaks.

While concentrating on communicating with the leadership (whoever that may be at a given moment), we should also expand opportunities for more broad and effective contacts with a wider public, particularly persons now in their forties and fifties (the successor generation).

II. The Substance

It is difficult to predict where on our four-part agenda progress might be possible. In 1983 the Soviets sent a signal in the human rights field by releasing the Pentecostalists; this year it could be somewhere else. So we should keep pushing on all fronts, while keeping public expectations low unless and until something concrete materializes.

A. Regional Issues

In our dialogue with the Soviets on regional issues, it will be difficult at this stage to strike direct deals. Thus, our near-term objective would be to engage them in a frank interchange regarding the dangers of given situations. Such a discussion would massage Soviet amour propre by treating them as equals (of sorts). It might also serve to alert us and them to particularly delicate aspects which should be taken into account in policy making. Being seen in consultation with the Soviets on these issues helps allay public anxieties and can increase leverage with other parties. Conceivably, the process could lead to reciprocal unilateral actions which might defuse particularly dangerous aspects of regional conflicts, although this is likely to occur only if relations in other respects improve.

The regional issue most likely to attract genuine Soviet interest is the Middle East -- Lebanon specifically. At this stage, we should steer away from tactical discussions and asking them to do favors, i.e., UNIFIL. Our objective should be to use a larger strategic discussion to stress the danger of events spiraling out of control of either of us and producing an Israeli-Syrian confrontation which would have serious dangers for both of us.

There is also room for a broad discussion of European issues, where we could drive home some of the dangers for Soviet policy of their present "splitting" tactics. And in general we believe our emphasis on greater Soviet restraint in unstable regions indicates more routine, substantive exchanges among experts on various regions.

B. Arms Control

START is the most important of the issues between us, and the one most likely to interest the Soviets in substance. Here, our objective should be to stimulate their interest in defining a common framework for further negotiations. Even if they are moving toward a START/INF merger, there are many pros and cons, and they are clearly unsure of where they want to go. It would be to our advantage to get back into dialogue and even back to

the negotiating table. Even if an agreement should elude us, the very existence of START negotiations which offer hope of successful conclusion can exercise a moderating influence on Soviet behavior in other areas. By laying out some more specific ideas on a START framework we can hasten their deliberations, and perhaps be back in a serious dialogue by this summer (as a number of Eastern European leaders predict).

MBFR is important not because an agreement is likely this year or next, but because we have an opportunity to demonstrate that we are serious in our negotiating intent: that concessions on their part will evoke corresponding moves on ours. Our opening position at the next round is thus crucial in conveying the overall message that we are prepared to negotiate seriously.

On INF, we should do nothing other than reaffirm our position that they should return to the negotiating table. If the Soviets propose some combination of INF and START, we should examine their ideas carefully. The CDE, the CD in Geneva and bilateral talks on CBM's such as the hot line will have a higher profile than hitherto, but can be expected to yield only modest results in the absence of progress on larger issues.

C. Human Rights

While the Soviets will continue to make any discussion on human rights difficult, we should persevere. Last year the Soviets did move on the Pentecostals in the context of improving relations, and we are once again hearing from official Soviets that they see some improvement. We should continue to focus on major cases like Shcharansky, Sakharov and Orlov, and on the need to reopen Jewish emigration. This is an area where deals may be possible if arranged through private, off-the-official-record contacts. If movement in other areas indicate that a summit would be useful, we should push hard for human rights improvements as a precondition.

D. Bilateral

In the bilateral area, Secretary Shultz' meeting with Gromyko opened up a number of possibilities. Gromyko responded positively to the need to examine specific measures to prevent another KAL. Since then, the Soviet representative at ICAO has proposed a US-Japan-USSR group to look at such measures. We have developed a set of specific measures. Our objective should be to reach agreement on these measures this year.

We also should take steps which improve our direct communication and contact with the people in the Soviet Union -- to give practical effect to your own stress on talking directly to the people in your January 16th speech and again in the State of the

Union. That is the objective of a consulate in Kiev (strongly supported in recent letters to the Congress and the Administration by Ukrainian-American organizations) and a cultural exchanges agreement.

By moving forward ourselves in these two areas now, we can help to channel in sensible directions the upsurge of interest across the country in greater people-to-people contacts and limit exploitation by the Soviets. Also to avoid naive groups dominating this area, we should try to establish a mechanism for better guidance and coordination of private efforts. This could be used to encourage those with a tougher-minded track record in dealing with the Soviets, i.e., the American Council of Young Political Leaders.

Some in Congress are interested in inviting a delegation of Supreme Soviet members this year. This could be a way for us to meet possible successors to Chernenko, such as Gorbachev. However, we will want to weigh carefully the risks of negative exploitation.

In other areas of possible bilateral cooperation, the Soviets have not responded formally to our space rescue proposal but informal indications are not promising. There are a variety of other areas of cooperation which could be pursued should we decide to do so.

III. Channels

There are a number of channels we should be utilizing.

We should continue the correspondence with Chernenko, but recognize that it is unlikely that he will be candid, both out of fear his letters will be leaked and in order to protect his negotiating positions. Nonetheless, it is one means of being certain that our views are getting through to the leadership without distortion. And it could help to provide some momentum. Chernenko's letter to you of February 23 made it clear that he accepts the need for an intensified dialogue, but he did not alter any substantive Soviet positions. Your reply can be used to press some of the key points on our agenda.

We also should hold early and regular exchanges between Secretary Shultz and Dobrynin and between Hartman and Gromyko on the full range of our concerns.

On the critical START issue, in the absence of negotiations in Geneva, the Secretary's talks with Dobrynin will be the main channel. As a parallel process we should consider sending a special emissary to Moscow. His mandate would be not to negotiate but to explain; a man like Brent Scowcroft would be able to set forth our views more fully and directly than passing through Dobrynin.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
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If there is sufficient movement, we should consider another Shultz-Gromyko meeting.

Finally, we should consider some other forms of dialogue. As noted earlier, on regional issues like the Middle East our specialists should meet. In addition, we should consider sending a group of middle-level policy officials to Moscow to cover a broad range of subjects and touch base with key Soviet organizations, including the Central Committee. And military-to-military discussions are a possibility: discussion of such matters as strategic doctrine or comparison of each other's threat assessments might be useful topics.

IV. Timetable

The following timetable is possible:

--Shultz/Dobrynin within a week to 10 days: further on START framework and propose some of other consultations.

--Hartman/Gromyko: propose Middle East discussion by specialists and/or discussions by policy planners.

--Scowcroft: Brief him on our approach to use privately during his planned trip to Moscow beginning March 8.

--Another Shultz/Gromyko meeting: we should not push for this yet but wait and see how other issues develop. If the Soviets seem interested, we could try to arrange a meeting in May or early June. We also should consider whether to invite Gromyko to Washington to see you when he is here in September for the UNGA.

V. Bureaucratic Preparation

If the Soviets do begin to deal more seriously in areas of interest to us, we must be able to move rapidly in order to sustain momentum. This may require some adjustment of our bureaucratic procedures to make quick decisions possible. It would be useful to clarify as many immediate issues as we can, and to "pre-position" approved negotiating plans, to be used as developments warrant. A list of the more important U.S.-Soviet issues with summaries of their status is attached.

February 18, 1984

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

CHECKLIST OF US-SOVIET ISSUES:
STATUS AND PROSPECTS

NLS F00-006 #109

I. ARMS CONTROL

BY Smf, NAHA, DATE 6/13/86

START: Status. Soviet deferral of resumption reaffirmed by Gromyko in Stockholm, but with Vice President, Chernenko called nuclear arms control major area for positive US-Soviet discussion. Soviets know we have new things to say on START in restricted channels (Dobrynin pressed Hartman to volunteer Thursday).

Prospects. If Framework presented to Soviets soon, some possibility of getting detailed confidential discussion underway over next few months (though they may continue to insist on something on INF/FBS as precondition to serious talks).

INF: Status. Soviets continue fixated on U.S. INF, and refuse resumption without some expression of U.S. "willingness to return to the situation that existed before deployments;" in Stockholm Gromyko shied away even from quiet discussions in restricted channels. Prospects. Near-term chances of renewed separate INF talks minimal. Gromyko pointed toward inclusion of U.S. INF systems in any resumed START talks, was informed that any negotiation dealing with GLCMs and P-IIs must also deal with SS-20s.

MBFR: Status. Talks to resume March 16. President's letter to Chernenko said we are prepared to introduce some new ideas and to be flexible on data if Soviets flexible on verification.

Prospects. Difficult to be too optimistic on these long-running talks, but some forward movement seems possible by summer assuming early Allied agreement on new proposal enabling us to respond to Soviets soon.

US-SOVIET CBMs: Status. January session moved us forward on upgrade of Hotline, but Soviets most reluctant on some of our more ambitious proposals. Soviets appear interested in principle in nuclear terrorism discussions. We are now coordinating USG proposal with Allies before going to Soviets. Prospects. Follow-on session on communications CBMs tentatively set for April; basic Hotline upgrade agreement possible by early summer. Could talk with Soviets on nuclear terrorism within a month assuming Allied support firms up; would not move multilaterally until some agreement with Soviets.

CDE: Status. Early sparring in Stockholm with basic NATO and Soviet approaches still far apart, and Soviets pushing declaratory measures such as Non-Use-of-Force Treaty; NATO seeks substantive notification measures. Prospects. We should pursue private dialogue underway in Stockholm. Realistic compromise proposals may be months or even years off without high-level political decisions, i.e. a package with points satisfying both sides.

NON-PROLIFERATION: Status. Third round of highly technical and essentially non-political bilaterals just concluded in Vienna; both sides see them as valuable mechanism for policy coordination in this area. Prospects. Soviets have proposed and we are ready to agree to another session for December.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS: Status: Secretary Shultz announced to the CDE that we will be presenting a draft CW treaty in coming months; once State and ACDA competing versions are reconciled, a text will be submitted for interagency clearance. OSD opposes concept of such a treaty, but has proposed US-Soviet bilateral verification discussion. Prospects: Final treaty will not be ready for CD submission before April at the earliest; we may wish to pick up bilateral discussion proposal in interim.

NUCLEAR TESTING: Status: Soviets have turned down our proposals to discuss verification before ratification of 1976 TTBT treaty every time, and believe they have the propaganda high ground in calling for discussion only after it is ratified. Prospects: An interagency group is studying further approaches to the Soviets. One option involves ratification of TTBT in exchange for Soviet consent to on-site verification of a few nuclear calibration tests. Some agencies oppose any change in our position on basis of our non-compliance report to Congress.

ASAT ARMS CONTROL: Status. Soviets probably intend to make this major issue and Tsongas Amendment may prevent our testing the U.S. ASAT system absent talks with Soviets. Basically very little possible on this now until fundamental verification problems resolved. Some confidence-building measures are now being discussed within the USG and could be proposed for discussion with Soviets. Prospects: Proposals for CBMs or prohibiting certain acts could be discussed once USG study completed, but would be of less interest to Soviets than ASAT ban.

MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS: Status. Little dialogue between military establishments except in Incidents-at-Sea context, and we have held back from proposing regular exchanges between Weinberger and Ustinov or Chiefs of Staff. Prospects. A proposal of a Weinberger-Ustinov or Vessey-Ogarkov meeting could be made whenever we deem appropriate. Ex-CJCS David Jones plans to visit Moscow as member of Dartmouth Group delegation in March. Soviets, however, are likely to be extremely cautious until some progress made on other issues.

II. REGIONAL ISSUES

MIDDLE EAST: Status. Talking with Soviets here and Moscow, and Soviets negotiating with French on UN role in Lebanon.

Prospects. Soviets unlikely to do much to help us in Lebanon, but nervous about Syrian-impelled confrontation with us. Could acquiesce in UN role and possibly eventual Syrian withdrawal in return for commitments on U.S. and Israeli forces. Further discussion in Shultz-Dobrynin and Hartman-Gromyko channels could be useful to avoid miscalculation.

AFGHANISTAN: Status. Soviets dug in for long term, but feeling pressure. Talks under UN auspices may resume in April. Pakistan welcomes US-Soviet bilateral contacts as supporting its efforts, but last US-Soviet "experts'" talks in Moscow in July 1982.

Prospects. As pressure on the ground rises, Soviets may look to further cross-border incursions on Pakistan, to UN process and/or to direct talks with us as safety valve. We could make some points about role of guarantors in overall settlement that included withdrawal timetable if we wished to probe their longer-term intentions and prove we support UN process.

SOUTHERN AFRICA: Status. Steady progress now on South African disengagement from Angola, and discussions on shape of final settlement continue with some prospect for success, but Soviets could still block either through SWAPO or in Luanda. Chet Crocker talked with Soviets three times in 1982, but not since.

Prospects. Sending Hartman in with an update could give Soviets a better feel for the dilemmas they face.

KAMPUCHEA: Status. Soviets combine support for Vietnamese occupation of Kampuchea with more active policy vis-à-vis ASEAN states, and item has not ranked high in bilateral dialogue.

Prospects. No immediate prospects of inducing the Soviets to decrease aid to Hanoi.

III. HUMAN RIGHTS

EMIGRATION/ANTI-SEMITISM: Status. Decline in levels of Jewish and other emigration continues, with last year's Jewish total about 3% of 1979 figure. Perennial topic in high-level meetings since 1981; latest "representation lists" on divided families and spouses and U.S. nationals handed over to Gromyko's deputy in Stockholm; Secretary raised anti-Semitism with Dobrynin after Stockholm; Bronfman visit to Moscow now uncertain.

Prospects. Return to large numbers unlikely, but Soviets could make some gestures -- through quiet diplomacy or to public figures -- in election year, and numbers could rise slightly as function of overall atmosphere in relationship.

SOVIET DISSIDENTS: Status. Andropov era saw rounding up and sentencing of all but a handful of Soviet dissidents. We raise these issues at regular intervals, including at Stockholm, but Sakharov still in Gorkiy, Orlov is going to internal exile after finishing seven-year sentence, and Shcharanskiy is still in jail. Prospects. Again not good, although, again, gestures are probably more possible under Chernenko, and we should encourage through quiet diplomacy.

IV. BILATERAL ISSUES

MARITIME BOUNDARY: Status. We offered a 50-50 split in the disputed territory in the Bering Sea. January negotiations in Washington complicated by unacceptable new Soviet position claiming additional areas for their exclusive economic zone and continental shelf rights. Prospects. New round is expected but not yet scheduled for near future. If Soviets move off their new position, an agreement would be possible within a few months at most. If they dig in, there will be extended negotiations.

KAL SAFETY MEASURES: Status. Discussions have begun in Montreal with Soviets and Japanese on installation of beacons, improved communications, and designation of emergency landing fields in the Soviet Far East along KAL 007 route. Prospects. Soviets have proposed US-Soviet-Japanese experts' group and signalled willingness to take concrete air safety steps under the ICAO umbrella. Action should be possible, but Soviets will remain wary of accepting even implicit responsibility for shutdown, and results could take months.

KIEV AND NEW YORK CONSULATES: Status. Advance teams preparing for the formal opening of consulates under 1974 agreement were withdrawn as an Afghanistan sanction; now we have no official presence in Ukraine, while Soviets continue activities in New York out of their UN Mission. Last summer both sides agreed to move forward again, but progress ended with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm, noting timing must be right. Prospects. A negotiating strategy is awaiting NSC approval; Soviets say they are ready to open consulates at any time; talks could resume immediately; agreement could be reached and TDY advance teams could perhaps be in place by summer. Detailed arrangements could delay formal opening for some years.

EXCHANGES AGREEMENT: Status. We allowed US-Soviet cultural exchanges agreement to lapse after Afghanistan. Programs dropped off in both directions, but Soviets can arrange tours through private U.S. organizations, so we cannot exact reciprocity in the absence of agreement. We cannot mount USIA travelling exhibits in the Soviet Union, and Soviets now blocking Hartman's efforts

to run cultural programs out of his residence. Two sides agreed in principle in July to begin negotiations, but movement stopped with KAL; Secretary reiterated agreement in principle to Gromyko in Stockholm. Prospects. Draft proposal is far advanced, but would require high-level approval. It would probably take some months to negotiate agreement, but might be completed this year.

CONSULAR REVIEW TALKS: Status. First round of talks aimed at alleviating some of our ongoing visa and other consular problems with Soviets recessed in May after FBI refused to agree to additional entry point by sea at Baltimore (in addition to San Francisco) in return for two new points offered by Soviets (Brest and Nakhodka). Prospects. If FBI lifts veto on Baltimore, talks could resume at any time and produce balanced package of useful small housekeeping steps.

SIMULATED SPACE RESCUE: Status. Proposed to Soviets in late January. They have yet to respond. Prospects. Soviets have not appeared enthusiastic to date. We need response soon if there is to be any hope of making simulated rescue flight this summer.

COAST GUARD SEARCH AND RESCUE TALKS: Status. Soviets agreed just before KAL to discuss S&R procedures with senior Coast Guard officials, looking perhaps toward an agreement on coordination of search operations in Bering Sea. They deflected our December efforts to set up a meeting. Prospects. Soviets would probably agree now. Discussions and a possible agreement could be impressive following our well-publicized frictions during the KAL search and rescue operation.

PRIVATE/CONGRESSIONAL CONTACTS. Status. Already an upsurge of interest in expanding people-to-people contacts; some in Congress want to invite a Supreme Soviet delegation this year. Prospects. To limit exploitation by Soviets, we might encourage tougher-minded experienced groups like American Council of Young Political Leaders to visit. Supreme Soviet visit could attract major Soviet figure to U.S.

LONG-TERM ECONOMIC AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. 10-year agreement, which has some utility in facilitating U.S. business efforts in Moscow, expires in June. Prospects. U.S. could propose renewal in the next few weeks. The Soviets would probably accept.

JOINT COMMERCIAL COMMISSION: Status. A scheduled meeting was cancelled as an Afghanistan sanction, and this official, cabinet-level body has thus not met since 1978. Prospects. We could propose meeting later this year, assuming we have had a positive response on other economic steps.

FISHERIES AGREEMENT RENEWAL: Status. Extended twice under this Administration and up for renewal in July, this agreement has allowed a joint fishing venture that benefits U.S. fishermen. Soviets have not been allowed to fish directly in U.S. waters since Afghanistan. Prospects. Approval of an 18-month extension would permit improved planning by U.S. fisherman. USG could consider giving the Soviets a direct fish allocation at any time.

CURRENT AGREEMENTS: Status. There are US-Soviet cooperative agreements in force on the environment, health (including artificial heart research), housing, and agriculture that have functioned at low levels, partly because of the political atmosphere and partly because of restrictions on high-level US-Soviet contacts. Soviets interested in reviving these exchanges and giving them appropriate leadership. Prospects. Agreements could be given additional content by USG side with the participation of higher-ranking U.S. officials.

NEW BILATERAL AGREEMENTS: Status. A number of agreements were allowed to lapse after Afghanistan, some of which would be in our favor to renegotiate. They include the areas of space, transportation, and basic sciences and engineering. Prospects. Soviets are on record as favoring renewal and expansion of agreements, and these cases, affected agencies also new agreements. Transportation could be renewed by exchange of notes we had partially carried out before KAL. Others would take some time to develop proposals and negotiate agreements.