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WITHDRAWAL SHEET Ronald Reagan Library

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FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)

File Folder: U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:

Date: 12/18/00

Contains Originals (12)

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Clark to RR re National Security Priorities 2p R. 6/12/04 F00-606 # 90	6/14/83	P1/B1
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RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA]. P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY

June 14, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

RUL

FROM:

WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT:

National Security Priorities -- Where Are We Going and How Are We Going to Get There

By this time, you have undoubtedly surveyed the global possibilities for making significant gains -- for accomplishing something truly important -- in the next year. looking at the horizon there are some places where we are committed and must devote a lot of time and energy to simply holding your own, e.g., El Salvador. In other areas, we could take a lower profile without great risk, e.g., East Asia, but where the potential for opening a truly new direction of emphasis in U. S. foreign policy is very high. In still other areas, e.g., the Middle East, I believe we have lost a chance to achieve truly strategic gains, but could still lose a lot; consequently, we must stay engaged. Finally with regard to whether or not we stand to make any progress in US-Soviet relations, thoughtful men can make a case on both sides. expanding school of thought states that the U.S. is in the best position in thirty years to negotiate and get results with the Russians. They base this not only on the clear restoration of our military strength which you have set in motion (and which the Soviets know will leave them in second place within ten years), but also on the terribly important political base of support you have garnered in Europe in the last six months. Added to this, some point to the personal interests Andropov might have in outflanking his "softer" colleagues in the Kremlin by getting a summit at which a good arms control (read constraining U. S. arms) agreement is achieved.

The detractors say that it is too soon to expect to achieve real concessions from the Soviets; that we have sustained the conservative consensus for only two years and that the Russians will wait us out for at least another year.

I tend to side more with the former school -- that is, to go ahead to engage the Soviets in serious efforts to solve problems -- as long as we do it in a sensible way using our leverage sparingly and not being suckered.

CONFIDENTIAL/EYES ONLY Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS <u>F00-006</u> # 90 BY John, NARA, DATE 6/12/06 But before we go further to decide any of these issues, we must face the fact that if we try to make progress in all these areas -- East-West relations, the Middle East, the Pacific Basin and Central America -- we face the very real prospect of failing in all of them. We simply don't have the resources in this Administration -- no Administration does -to undertake four major national security campaigns simultaneously. For example, if you were to decide to make a major effort to make another step -- achieving autonomy for the West Bank -- in the Middle East this would require whomever you assign this task, to spend full time on it. The corollary is that the person would be unable to do anything else. Thus if George Shultz does that, he would be unable to work, say, on Central America. When Kissinger was trying to get a partial disengagement between Israel and Egypt in 1974, he was out of the United States for more than six months of the year. What happens to Central America while the Secretary of State is gone, much less to any hope of making progress with the Russians?

My point is that we need to: (1) Set some priorities -- what do you want to achieve; and (2) Divide the labor so that we apply our resources wisely. In addition to a division of labor we need to take a long look ahead to assure that your involvement is timed properly and planned in advance. Specifically, when should you travel? Where should you go? Why should you go there? In short, we should focus on your activities in a way that does not involve a travelogue to Asia simply because you have not been there, but because it is part of a plan. Most importantly, we should reach the spring of next year having achieved something specific to make the world a better place.

I have my own ideas on these matters. I believe, however, that rather than my sending them to you, all of your advisors would benefit from a closely held "strategic review of the bidding." At such a session, George, Cap, Bill and I could lay out our appraisal of what is within the realm of possibility in the next year and how we might go about dividing the labor and laying out a strategy for getting there.

George has asked to see you Wednesday afternoon. If you agree, I believe it would be worthwhile to ask that he, together with Cap and Bill if you wish, be prepared to discuss the big picture. Without this pause to get your sense of vision, I am afraid we will end up a year from now having "minded the store" but without much to show for it.

MA President, De would like your Comments before

THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 26, 1983

Dear George:

I am very conscious of frustration over the US-Soviet dialogue -- indeed, I share it. It is because I -- and I know, the President -- share your interest in getting results that I have wanted to assure that we -- and I include all those with a legitimate interest -- are all supporting you based upon a clear understanding of strategy and tactics. We hope through this letter to utilize an expeditious and existing process through which we can create this solid base of support so that you can proceed on an overall plan that holds promise of success.

Let me be more specific. It seems to us that the policy enunciated by the President in NSDD 75 is clear. Based upon its objectives, it seems worthwhile for us to translate it into specific priorities — what we are trying to achieve in their rank order — and then to forge a negotiating strategy which is based upon the judicious use of our several elements of leverage so that at the end of the day a year from now we will have achieved one or two extremely important goals en route to our objectives.

Regarding your negotiating strategy, there are no prejudgments against concluding these kinds of agreements, e.g., cultural or consulates; we only ask whether, as a matter of strategy, these ought not be put together with a comprehensive list of others which are bargained for with an overall sense of priorities so that they take on a strategic, and not merely a tactical and perhaps illusory quality.

As a separate but related matter, it is clear that some of the areas you will wish to negotiate involve by necessity the interests of other agencies. For example, the conclusion of a consular agreement has important counterintelligence considerations. We know you are conscious of this, but believe it is useful for you to have discussed the important considerations with Bill Casey before the talks get underway so that he, too, is au courant of what is going on and can be supportive. There are other examples but the point is clear. Other advisors to the President in the national security area need to understand our strategy.

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

34. . . .

In order to put us in a position for you to be able to step off with the full support of all (and as a corollary, not to have to worry about having your agreements undermined later by disaffected bureaucrats), we believe it would be worthwhile for you, me, Bill and Cap to get away (from phones) together for a period so that you could lay out your proposal on how we should proceed. Your presentation could include: what should we try to achieve in the way of solving problems in the next year and in what order (START, human rights, cultural, MBFR, regional security, etc.); what is our leverage, again in descending order of value; what are we willing to give up in exchange for our high-value goals and increased security.

I believe we could emerge from such a meeting with a consensus. Given the President's endorsement, you could move out with great latitude in implementation. It seems worth a try to me. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine another way. What do you think?

Sincerely,

William P. Clark

The Honorable George P. Shultz Secretary of State Washington, D. C. 20520

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

National Security Council (15/8) The White House

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1	U.SSOVIET RELATIONS
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3	WEDNESDAY, JUNE 15, 1983
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5	United States Senate,
. 6	Committee on Foreign Relations
7	Washington, D.C.
8	The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
9	Room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, the Honorable
10	Charles Percy [Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
11	Present: Senators Percy [presiding], Helms, Lugar,
12	Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, and
13	Cranston.
14	The Chairman: This morning, we warmly welcome the
15	Secretary of State and his colleagues for the opening of what
16	I consider to be among the most important hearings that $I_{\dot{i}}$
17	have participated in in the years that I have been on the
18	Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
19	It just so happens that I think they are one of the few
20	sets of hearings that we have delayed simply because at the
21	time that Secretary Shultz was scheduled to appear before the
22	Committee, he was requested by the President to proceed to
23	the Middle East, and at his specific request, we have held
24	over the hearings so he could personally testify.
25	He said he prepared his testimony. He wanted to deliver

- 1 his testimony, and felt very much like I did at Stanford
- 2 years ago, when I asked in the middle of the Vietnam War
- 3 whether or not they should not cancel the commencement
- 4 address because of the potential disturbances, and I said,
- 5 absolutely not.
- 6 And later, the President said, how were you so certain
- 7 when we were so uncertain? And I said, well, I prepared the
- 8 testimony, and I wanted to give it, and I have no place else
- 9 to give that speech anyway, so I decided to go ahead, and it
- 10 worked out all right, just as yours did the other day, Mr.
- 11 Secretary.
- 12 It is appropriate that our lead-off witness this morning
- 13 be Secretary of State George Shultz, whom we do greet as an
- 14 old and warm friend, a highly respected Secretary of State
- 15 from whom today we are asking for a very tall order.
- The subect of these hearings, the United States and the
- 17 Soviet Union, in an atomic and nuclear age, is one of the
- 18 most important subjects I think presented to mankind and to
- 19 history. How do these two superpowers, so-called, respond
- 20 and react with the kind of power that they possess? How can
- 21 we prevent miscalculation? How can we prevent what so many
- 22 young people are so cynical about occurring in their
- 23 lifetimes, the possibility of a nuclear war?
- The Committee understands that the Reagan Administration
- 25 does have a point of view on the Soviet Union, and it has

- 1 made no secret of some of the concerns that it has in our
- 2 relationship. The Administration clearly understands that
- 3 the Soviet Union is a powerful and a potentially dangerous
- 4 adversary with whom it is necessary to compete vigorously to
- 5 protect United States interests and the interests of the free
- 6 world.
- 7 The Committee would like to have the Secretary of State
- 8 explain the Administration's strategy for dealing effectively
- 9 with this challenge that we face.
- Now, the difference between a point of view and a
- 11 strategy is a particularly important one in this particular
- 12 case. The planet is not big enough to provide a quarantine
- 13 ward for the other superpower. Our self-interest requires
- 14 interaction with the Soviet Union on a broad spectrum of
- 15 business. Let me just cite three examples.
- 16 First, men and women everywhere, beginning with our own
- 17 citizens, look to us to make the world safer from the danger
- 18 of nuclear weapons. Every place I go in the world, and every
- 19 place in this country, that is the paramount issue everyone
- 20 places the responsibility on the United States for, to find
- 21 some way to make this world a safer world and free from the
- 22 dangers, the potential danger of nuclear weaponry.
- 23 Second, silence is the greatest enemy of human rights and
- 24 individual dignity. The American people require us to be
- 25 true to our heritage of speaking out and defending human

- 1 rights, and certainly the Administration has done that, and
- 2 has an outstanding Assistant Secretary in that regard.
- 3 Third, containing Soviet expansionism requires that we
- 4 find realistic and effective means to check it instance by
- 5 instance, and that we contribute significantly to alleviating
- 6 the poverty and social ills in which it thrives.
- 7 Mr. Secretary, the Soviet-American relationship is at
- 8 best a highly competitive one. We start, after all, from
- 9 different, entirely different values, but it has deteriorated
- 10 in recent years to the point where people are frightened by
- 11 the harsh rhetoric and by the lack of progress in reducing
- 12 nuclear weapons.
- So, our questions to you could be along these lines: How
- 14 might the U.S.-Soviet relationship evolve in the 1980's, in
- 15 your judgment? Can it be significantly improved? How much,
- 16 and how best can the United States influence Soviet policy?
- 17 How much and how best can arms control agreements restrain
- 18 the arms race and improve strategic stability between the
- 19 United States and the U.S.S.R.?
- 20 We will have a series of distinguished witnesses. Our
- 21 final witness in July will be Secretary Kissinger, former
- 22 Secretary of State. We will have as witnesses tomorrow -- we
- 23 have invited some of our former ambassadors to the Soviet
- 24 Union who have dealt directly with them.
- 25 Several are out of the country, but fortunately

- 1 Ambassador Averell Harriman will be with us tomorrow. Ers.
- 2 Harriman will also be testifying with Ambassador Harriman, as
- 3 they both met with Andropov, and also we will have Ambassador
- 4 Tom Watson, Jr., testifying, and I know that he has some
- 5 very, very strongly held views.
- 6 Again, a warm welcome to you, Mr. Secretary. We are
- 7 eager to hear what you have to say.
- 8 Senator Pell, I would like to call upon you for any
- 9 comments you would like to make.
- 10 Senator Pell: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
- I guess the reason for these hearings is the most
- 12 important objective that we face and the world faces, the
- 13 avoidance -- it may be a negative objective, but it is in all
- 14 our minds, is the avoidance of a nuclear war. Other wars we
- 15 can handle. Huclear wars, I feel, would be a little beyond
- 16 our ability to contain and to handle. It dwarfs all other
- 17 problems.
- 18 I think our Chairman just mentioned the effect on young
- 19 people of the looming cloud of nuclear war. I had a very
- 20 interesting experience in my state when I asked a group of
- 21 people, how many of you think you will live to see or be
- 22 incinerated in a nuclear war? People our age do not think so
- 23 very much, very rarely. But when you go to the younger
- 24 people, the college age kids and the high school kids,
- 25 usually more than half of their hands go up, and I think it

- 1 is they who have to carry the load in the future in any
- 2 case. I hope that they do grow up.
- Now, in my mind, the peril that we face is greater now
- 4 than it was three years ago, when this Administration took
- 5 over. I hope I am wrong, and I hope that your testimony will
- 6 show that I am wrong, but I think a very increasing crescendo
- 7 of rhetoric, somewhat subsided in the last few weeks,
- 8 admittedly, the departure of people who really, while of a
- 9 conservative cast, believed strongly and vigorously in arms
- 10 control, like Gene Rostow, or Tom Enders, who believed in the
- 11 two-track approach in Central America, has made us concerned
- 12 about what the real direction of the Administration is.
- 13 Again, I hope the testimony and the facts, which are most
- 14 important, will show that our situation is not worsening from
- 15 the viewpoint of the possibility of war.
- 16 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Pell.
- Mr. Secretary, if you would, please proceed.

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- 1 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY
- 2 OF STATE
- 3 Secretary Shultz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished
- 4 members of this Committee.
- 5 I appreciate the opportunity to meet with you and discuss
- 6 this subject of great importance. As you have suggested, it
- 7 has all sorts of dimensions to it that weigh on people's
- 8 minds. It is a subject that I have thought about a great
- 9 deal, of course.
- 10 The President has -- you might say that the President has
- 11 taken the time not only to talk with me about this, but he
- 12 has read through this testimony and made a few suggestions
- 13 which I found it possible to accept, and has signed off on
- 14 the testimony. So, I feel very confident in saying that I am
- 15 speaking not only for myself, but for the President in this
- 16 statement.
- 17 The management of our relations with the Soviet Union is
- 18 of utmost importance. That relationship touches virtually
- 19 every aspect of our international concerns and objectives,
- 20 political, economic, and military, and every part of the
- 21 world.
- 22 We must defend our interests and values against a
- 23 powerful Soviet adversary that threatens both. And we must
- 24 do so in a nuclear age, in which a global war would even more
- 25 thoroughly threaten those interests and values. As President

- 1 Reagan pointed out on March 31st: "We must both defend
- 2 freedom and preserve the peace. We must stand true to our
- 3 principles and our friends while preventing a holocaust."
- 4 It is, as he said, "one of the most complex moral
- 5 challenges ever faced by any generation."
- 6 We and the Soviets have sharply divergent goals and
- 7 philosophies of political and moral order; these differences
- 8 will not soon go away. Any other assumption is unrealistic.
- 9 At the same time, we have a fundamental common interest in
- 10 the avoidance of war. This common interest impels us to work
- 11 toward a relationship between our nations that can lead to a
- 12 safer world for all mankind.
- But a safer world will not be realized through good
- 14 will. Our hopes for the future must be grounded in a
- 15 realistic assessment of the challenge we face and i a
- 16 determined effort to create the conditions that will make
- 17 their achievement possible. We have made a start. Every
- 18 postwar American President has come sooner or later to
- 19 recognize that peace must be built on strength. President
- 20 Reagan has long recognized this reality.
- 21 In the past two years this nation -- the President in
- 22 partnership with the Congress -- has made a fundamental
- 23 commitment to restoring its military and economic power and
- 24 moral and spiritual strength. And having begun to rebuild
- 25 our strength, we now seek to engage the Soviet leaders in a

- 1 constructive dialogue -- a dialogue through which we hope to
- 2 find political solutions to outstanding issues.
- 3 This is the central goal we have pursued since the outset
- 4 of this Administration. We do not want to -- and need not --
- 5 accept as inevitable the prospect of endless, dangerous
- 6 confrontation with the Soviet Union. For if we do, then many
- 7 of the great goals that the United States pursued in world
- 8 affairs -- peace, human rights, economic progress, national
- 9 independence -- will also be out of reach. We can -- and
- 10 must -- do better.
- With that introduction, let me briefly lay out for this
- 12 Committee what I see as the challenge posed by the Soviet
- 13 Union's international behavior in recent years and the
- 14 strategy which that challenge requires of us. Then I would
- 15 like to discuss steps this Administration has taken to
- 16 implement that strategy. Finally, I will focus on the
- 17 specific issues that make up the agenda for U.S.-Soviet
- 18 dialogue and negotiation.
- 19 Together, these elements constitute a policy that takes
- 20 account of the facts of Soviet power and of Soviet conduct,
- 21 mobilizes the resources needed to defend our interests, and
- 22 offers an agenda for constructive dialogue to resolve
- 23 concrete international problems. We believe that, if
- 24 sustained, this policy will make international restraint
- 25 Moscow's most realistic course, and it can lay the foundation

- 1 for a more constructive relationship between our peoples.
- 2 It is sometimes said that Americans have too simple a
- 3 view of world affairs, that we start with the assumption that
- 4 all problems can be solved. Certainly we have a simple view
- 5 of how the world should be -- free peoples choosing their own
- 6 destinies, nurturing their prosperity, peaceably resolving
- 7 conflicts. This is the vision that inspire's America's role
- 8 in the world. It does not, however, lead us to regard mutual
- 9 hostility with the U.S.S.R. as an immutable fact of
- 10 international life.
- 11 Certainly there are many factors contributing to
- 12 East-West tension. The Soviet Union's strategic Urasian
- 13 location places it in close proximity to important Western
- 14 interests on two continents. Its aspirations for greater
- 15 international influence lead it to challenge these
- 16 interests. Its Marxist-Leninist ideology gives its leaders a
- 17 perspective on history and a vision of the future
- 18 fundamentally different from our own.
- 19 We are not so deterministic as to believe that
- 20 geopolitics and ideological competition must ineluctably lead
- 21 to permanent and dangerous confrontation. Nor is it
- 22 permanently inevitable that contention between the United
- 23 States and the Soviet Union must dominate and distort
- 24 international politics.
- 25 A peaceful world order does not require that we and the

- 1 Soviet Union agree on all the fundamentals of morals or
- 2 politics. It does require, however, that Moscow's behavior
- 3 be subject to the restraint appropriate to living together on
- 4 this planet in a nuclear age. Not all the many external and
- 5 internal factors affecting Soviet behavior can be influenced
- 6 by us. But we take it as part of our obligation to peace to
- 7 encourage the gradual evolution of the Soviet system toward a
- 8 more pluralistic political and economic system, and above all
- 9 to counter Soviet expansionism through sustained and
- 10 effective political, economic, and military competition.
- In the past decade, regrettably, the changes in Soviet
- 12 behavior have been for the worse. Soviet actions have come
- 13 into conflict with many of our objectives. They have made
- 14 the task of managing the Soviet-American relationship
- 15 considerably harder, and have needlessly drawn more and more
- 16 international problems into the East-West rivalry.
- 17 To be specific, it is the following developments whichi
- 18 have caused us the most concern. First is the continuing
- 19 Soviet quest for military superiority even in the face of
- 20 mounting domestic economic difficulties. In the late 1970's
- 21 the allocation of resources for the Soviet military was not
- 22 only at the expense of the Soviet consumer. It came even at
- 23 the expense of industrial investment on which the long-term
- 24 development of the economy depends.
- 25 This decision to mortgage the industrial future of the

- 1 country is a striking demonstration of the inordinate value
- 2 the Soviets assign to maintaining the momentum of the
- 3 relentless military buildup under way since the mid-1960's.
- This buildup consumed an estimated annual average of at
- 5 least 12 percent of Soviet GNP throughout this entire period,
- 6 and has recently consumed even more as a result of the sharp
- 7 decline in Soviet economic growth. During much of this same
- 8 period, as you know, the share of our own GNP devoted to
- 9 defense spending has actually declined.
- 10 The second disturbing development is the unconstructive
- 11 Soviet involvement, direct and indirect, in unstable areas of
- 12 the third world. Arms have become a larger percentage of
- 13 Soviet exports than of the export trade of any other
- 14 country. The Soviets have too often attempted to play a
- 15 spoiling or scavenging role in areas of concern to us, most
- 16 recently in the Hiddle East.
- 17 Beyond this, the Soviets in the seventies broke major new
- 18 ground in the kinds of foreign military intervention they
- 19 were willing to risk for themselves or their surrogates.
- 20 This has escalated from the provision of large numbers of
- 21 military advisers, to the more extensive and agressive use of
- 22 proxy forces as in Angola, Ethiopia, and Indochina, and
- 23 finally to the massive employment of the Soviet Union's own
- 24 ground troops in the invasion of Afghanistan. In this way,
- 25 the Soviet Union has tried to block peaceful solutions and

- 1 has brought East-West tensions into areas of the world that
- 2 were once free of them.
- 3 Third is the unrelenting efforts to improse an alien
- 4 Soviet "model" on nominally independent Soviet clients and
- 5 allies. One of the most important recent achievements in
- 6 East-West relations was the negotiation of the Helsinki Final
- 7 Act, with its pleiges concerning human rights and national
- 8 independence in Europe. Poland's experience in the past two
- 9 years can be considered a major test of the Soviet Union's
- 10 respect -- or lack of it -- for these commitments. Moscow
- 11 certainly remains unwilling to countenance meaningful
- 12 national autonomy for its satellites, let alone real
- 13 independence.
- 14 Elsewhere in the world, the coming to power of
- 15 Soviet-supported regimes has usually meant, as in
- 16 Afghanistan, the forcible creation of Soviet-style
- 17 institutions and the harsh regimentation and repression of
- 18 free expression and free initiative -- all at enormous human,
- 19 cultural, and economic cost.
- 20 Fourth is Moscow's continuing practice of stretching a
- 21 series of treaties and agreements to the brink of violation
- 22 and beyond. The Soviet Union's infringement of its promises
- 23 and legal obligations is not confined to isolated incidents.
- 24 We have had to express our concerns about Soviet infractions
- 25 on one issue after another -- human rights and the Helsinki

- 1 Final Act, "yellow rain" and biological warfare. We are
- 2 becoming increasingly concerned about Soviet practices --
- 3 including the recent testing of ICBM's -- that raise
- 4 questions about the validity of their claim of compliance
- 5 with existing SALT agreements. Little else is so corrosive
- 6 of international trust as this persistent pattern of Soviet
- 7 behavior.
- 8 This assessment of Soviet international behavior both
- 9 dictates the approach we must take to East-West relations,
- 10 and indicates the magnitude of the task.
- If we are concerned about the Soviet commitment to
- 12 military power, we have to take steps to restore the military
- 13 balance, preferably on the basis of verifiable agreements
- 14 that reduce arms on both sides, but if necessary through our
- own and allied defense programs.
- 16 If we are concerned about the Soviet propensity to use
- 17 force and promote instability, we have to make clear that we
- 18 will resist encroachments on our vital interests and those of
- 19 our allies and friends.
- 20 If we are concerned about the loss of liberty that
- 21 results when Soviet clients come to power, then we have to
- 22 ensure that those who have a positive alternative to the
- 23 Soviet model receive our support.
- 24 Finally, if we are concerned about Moscow's observance of
- 25 its international obligations, we must leave Moscow no

- 1 opportunity to distort or misconstrue our own intentions. We
- 2 will defend our interests if Soviet conduct leaves us no
- 3 alternative; at the same time we will respect legitimate
- 4 Soviet security interests, and are ready to negotiate
- 5 equitable solutions to outstanding political problems.
- 6 In designing a strategy to meet these goals, we have, of
- 7 course, drawn in part on past strategies, from containment to
- 8 detente. There is, after all, substantial continuity in U.S.
- 9 policy, a continuity that reflects the consistency of
- 10 American values and American interests. However, we have not
- 11 hesitated to jettison assumptions about U.S.-Soviet relations
- 12 that have been refuted by experience or overtaken by events.
- 13 Consider how the world has changed since the Truman
- 14 Administration developed the doctrine of containment. Soviet
- 15 ambitions and capabilities have long since reached beyond the
- 16 geographical bounds that this doctrine took for granted.
- 17 Today Moscow conducts a fully global foreign and military
- 18 policy that places global demands on any strategy that aims
- 19 to counter it. Where it was once our goal to contain the
- 20 Soviet presence within the limits of its immediate postwar
- 21 reach, now our goal must be to advance our own objectives,
- 22 where possible foreclosing and when necessary actively
- 23 countering Soviet challenges wherever they threaten our
- 24 interests.
- 25 The policy of detente, of course, represents an effort to

- induce Soviet restraint. While in some versions it
- 2 recognized the need to resist Soviet geopolitical
- 3 encroachments, it also hoped that the anticipation of
- 4 benefits from expanding economic relations and arms control
- 5 agreements would restrain Soviet behavior.
- 6 Unfortunately, experience has proved otherwise. The
- 7 economic relationship may have eased some of the domestic
- 8 Soviet economic constraints that might have at least
- 9 marginally inhibited Moscow's behavior. It also raised the
- 10 specter of a future western dependence on Soviet-bloc trade
- 11 that would inhibit western freedom of action towards the east
- 12 more than it would distate prudence to the U.S.S.R.
- 13 Similarly, the SALT I and SALT II processes did not curb the
- 14 Soviet strategic arms building, while encouraging many in the
- 15 west to imagine that security concerns could now be placed
- 16 lower on the agenda.
- 17 Given these differences from the past, we have not been
- 18 able merely to tinker with earlier approaches. Unlike
- 19 containment, our policy begins with the clear recognition
- 20 that the Soviet Union is and will remain a global
- 21 superpower. In response to the lessons of this global
- 22 superpower's conduct in recent years, our policy, unlike some
- 23 versions of detente, assumes that the Soviet Union is more
- 24 likely to be deterred by our actions that make clear the
- 25 risks their aggression entails than by a delicate web of

- 1 interdependence.
- Our policy is not based on trust, or on a Soviet change
- 3 of heart. It is based on the expectation that, faced with
- 4 demonstration of the west's renewed determination to
- 5 strengthen its defenses, enhance its political and economic
- 6 cohesion, and oppose adventurism, the Soviet Union will see
- 7 restraint as its most attractive, or only, option.
- 8 Perhaps, over time, this restraint will become an
- 9 ingrained habit; perhaps not. Either way, our responsibility
- 10 to be vigilant is the same.
- In a rapidly evolving international environment, there
- 12 are many fundamental ways the democratic nations can, and
- 13 must, advance their own goals in the face of the problem
- 14 posed by the Soviet Union. We must build a durable political
- 15 consensus at home and within the Atlantic Alliance on the
- 16 nature of the Soviet challenge. We must strengthen our
- 17 defenses and those of our allies. We must build a common
- 18 approach within the Alliance on the strategic implications of
- 19 East-West economic relations. And we must compete peacefully
- 20 and even more effectively with the U.S.S.R. for the political
- 21 sympathies of the global electorate, especially through the
- 22 promotion of economic dynamism and democracy throughout the
- 23 world. Finally, we must continue rebuilding America's
- 24 moral-spiritual strength. If sustained over time, these
- 25 policies can foster a progressively more productive dialogue

- 1 with the Soviet Union itself.
- 2 From the beginning of this Administration, the President
- 3 recognized how essential it was to consolidate a new
- 4 consensus, here at home and among our traditional allies and
- 5 friends. After 15 years in which foreign policy had been
- 6 increasingly a divisive issue, he believed we had an
- 7 opportunity to shape a new unity in America, expressing the
- 8 American people's recovery of self-confidence. After the
- 9 trauma of Vietnam, he sought to bolster a realistic pride in
- 10 our country and to reenforce the civic courage and commitment
- 11 on which the credibility of our military deterrent ultimately
- 12 rests.
- 13 The President also felt that the possibility of greater
- 14 cooperation with our allies depended importantly on a
- 15 reaffirmation of our common moral values and interests.
- 16 There were, as well, opportunities for cooperation with
- 17 friendly governments of the developing world and new efforts
- 18 to seek and achieve common objectives.
- 19 President Reagan also began a major effort to modernize
- 20 our military forces. The central goal of our national
- 21 security policy is deterrence of war; restoring and
- 22 maintaining the strategic balance is a necessary condition
- 23 for that deterrence. But the strategic balance also shapes,
- 24 to an important degree, the global environment in which the
- 25 United States pursues its foreign policy objectives.

- 1 Therefore, decisions on major strategic weapons systems can
- 2 have profound political as well as military consequences.
- 3 As Secretary of State, I am acutely conscious of the
- 4 strength or weakness of American power and its effect on our
- 5 influence over events. Perceptions of the strategic balance
- 6 are bound to affect the judgments of not only our adversaries
- 7 but also our allies and friends around the world who rely on
- 8 us. As leader of the democratic nations, we have an
- 9 inescapable responsibility to maintain this pillar of the
- 10 military balance which only we can maintain.
- 11 Our determination to do so is an important signal of our
- 12 resolve, and is essential to sustaining the confidence of
- 13 allies and friends and the cohesion of the alliances. This
- 14 is why the Congress's support of the Peacekeeper ICBM program
- 15 has been such a valuable contribution to our foreign policy,
- 16 as well as to our defense.
- 17 At the same time, we have begun an accelerated program to
- 18 strengthen our conventional capabilities. We are pursuing
- 19 major improvements of our ground, naval, and tactical air
- 20 forces; we have also added a new Central Command in the
- 21 Middle East that will enhance our ability to deploy forces
- 22 rapidly if threats to our vital interests make this
- 23 necessary. To deter or deal with any future crisis, we need
- 24 to maintain both our conventional capabilities and our
- 25 strategic deterrent.

- We are also working closely with our allies to improve
- 2 our collective defense. As shown in the security declaration
- 3 of the Williamsburg Summit and in the North Atlantic Council
- 4 communique of just the other lay, we and our allies are
- 5 united in our approach in the INF negotiations in Geneva and
- 6 remain on schedule for the deployment of Pershing II and
- 7 ground-launched cruise missiles. That deployment will take
- 8 place as planned unless we are able to reach a balanced and
- 9 verifiable agreement at Geneva which makes deployment
- 10 unnecessary.
- Upgrading NATO's conventional forces is, of course, a
- 12 collective Alliance responsibility. At the NATO summit in
- 13 Bonn a year ago, the President and the leaders of the
- 14 Atlantic Alliance reaffirmed that a credible conventional
- 15 defense is essential to ensuring European security. We and
- 16 our allies will continue our efforts toward this goal. At
- 17 the same time, we have taken steps to ensure a more equitable
- 18 sharing of the burden of that defense. As a measure of the
- 19 value of such steps, we estimate that last year's agreement
- 20 with the Federal Republic of Germany on host-nation support
- 21 will cost about 10 percent of what it would cost to provide
- 22 the same capability with U.S. reserves or 3 percent of what
- 23 it would cost to provide that capability with active forces.
- 24 The Soviets apparently believe they can weaken or divide
- 25 the Western Alliance if they can dominate outlying strategic

- 1 areas and resources. To deter threats to our vital interests
- 2 outside of Europe, we are developing our ability to move
- forces, supported by our allies, to key areas of the world
- 4 such as Southwest Asia. The allies are also working with us
- 5 to contribute to stability and security in certain volatile
- 6 areas, including Lebanon and the Sinai.
- 7 In Asia we are modernizing our forces and are working
- 8 with our allies, especially Japan and Korea, to improve their
- 9 ability to fulfill agreed roles and missions.
- 10 The balance of power cannot be measured simply in terms
- 11 of military forces or hardware; military power rests on a
- 12 foundation of economic strength. Thus, we and our allies
- 13 must not only strengthen our own economies but we must also
- 14 develop a common approach to our economic relations with the
- 15 Soviet Union that takes into account our broad strategic and
- 16 security interests.
- 17 In the past, the nations of the west have sometimes
- 18 helped the Soviets to avoid difficult economic choices by
- 19 allowing them to acquire militarily relevant technology and
- 20 subsidized credits. Possible dependence on energy imports
- 21 from the Soviet Union is another cause for concern.
- In the past year, we hae made substantial progress toward
- 23 an allied consensus on East-West trade. The Williamsburg
- 24 Summit declaration stated clearly: "East-West economic
- 25 relations should be compatible with our security interests."

- 1 The NATO communique two days ago made a similar statement.
- 2 Our allies agree with us that trade which makes a clear and
- 3 direct contribution to the military strength of the Soviet
- 4 Union should be prohibited. There is also general agreement
- 5 that economic relations with the U.S.S.R. should be conducted
- 6 on the basis of a strict balance of mutual advantages.
- 7 Studies undertaken under NATO and OECD auspices have for
- 8 the first time laid the groundwork for common analyses. We
- 9 expect in time to draw common policy conclusions from these
- 10 studies. The communique of the OECD ministerial meeting on
- 11 May 9th and 10th declared that "East-West trade and credit
- 12 flows should be guided by the indications of the market In
- 13 the light of these indications, governments should exercise
- 14 financial prudence without granting preferential treatment."
- The United States seeks agreement that we not subsidize
- 16 Soviet imports through the terms of government credits.
- 17 Beyond this, we urge other western governments to exercise
- 18 restraint in providing or guaranteeing credit to the Soviet
- 19 Union, allowing the commercial considerations of the market
- 20 to govern credit.
- 21 Similarly, at the IAE ministerial meeting in Paris on May
- 22 8, it was agreed that security concerns should be considered
- 23 among the full costs of imported energy, such as gas; it was
- 24 agreed that countries "would seek to avoid undue dependence
- 25 on any one source of gas imports and to obtain future gas

- 1 supplies from secure sources, with emphasis on indigenous
- 2 OECD sources."
- 3 The fruitful cooperative discussions of these issues at
- 4 the OECD, IEA, Williamsburg, and NATO are only a beginning.
- 5 Economic relationships are a permanent element of the
- 6 strategic equation. How the west should respond economically
- 7 to the Soviet challenge will and should be a subject of
- 8 continuing discussion in western forums for years to come.
- 9 Since the 1950's, the Soviet Union has found in the
- 10 developing regions of the third world its greatest
- 11 opportunities for extending its influence through subversion
- 12 and exploitation of local conflicts. A satisfactory
- 13 East-West military balance will not by itself close off such
- 14 opportunities. We must also respond to the economic,
- 15 political, and security problems that contribute to these
- 16 opportunities. Our approach has four key elements.
- 17 I will just read a topical sentence, in the interest of
- 18 time. First, in the many areas where Soviet activities have
- 19 added to instability, we are pursuing peaceful diplomatic
- 20 solutions to regional problems, to raise the political cost
- 21 of Soviet-backed military presence, and to encourage the
- 22 departure of Soviet-backed forces. And then there are a few
- 23 examples listed.
- Second, we are building up the security capabilities of
- 25 vulnerable governments in strategically important areas.

- 1 That has a budgetary implication.
- Third, our program recognizes that economic crisis and
- 3 political instability create fertile ground for
- 4 Soviet-sponsored adventurism. Therefore, we need to help
- 5 people with their own development, as listed here.
- 6 Finally, there is the Democracy Initiative, an effort to
- 7 assist our friends in the third world to build a foundation
- 8 for democracy. I might say, it has been fascinating to me as
- 9 this project, which is very small, has gotten started, to see
- 10 the reaction to it. We held a meeting in the State
- 11 Department with people from various parts of the world on the
- 12 subject of free elections, and it was denounced by the Soviet
- 13 Union. The interesting thing was, they noticed it.
- I was struck by the fact that in Mr. Chernenko's speech
- 15 yesterday, one of the subjects he brought out was the
- 16 importance to them of destroying President Reagan's, in a
- 17 sense, ideological initiative. It seems we have their
- 18 attention. But I think if we can put competition on the
- 19 basis of ideological competition, of competition of economic
- 20 systems, we will walk away with it.
- 21 Together, these programs increase our political,
- 22 military, and economic strength and help create an
- 23 international climate in which opportunities for Soviet
- 24 adventurism are reduced. They are essential for the success
- 25 of the final element of our strategy -- engaging the Soviets

- 1 in an active and productive dialogue on the concrete issues
- 2 that concern the two sides. Strength and realism can deter
- 3 war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can open the
- 4 path toward lasting peace.
- 5 In this dialogue, our agenda is as follows: To seek
- 6 improvement in Soviet performance on human rights, which you
- 7 emphasized, Mr. Chairman, in your opening statement; to
- 8 reduce the risk of war, reduce armaments through sound
- 9 agreements, and ultimately ease the burdens of military
- 10 spending; to manage and resolve regional conflicts; and to
- 11 improve bilateral relations on the basis of reciprocity and
- 12 mutual interest.
- This is a rigorous and comprehensive agenda, and our
- 14 approach to it is principled, practical, and patient. We
- 15 have pressed each issue in a variety of forums, bilateral and
- 16 multilateral. We have made clear that the concerns we raise
- 17 are not ours alone, but are shared by our allies and friends
- 18 in every region of the globe. We have made clear that each
- 19 of our concerns is serious, and the Soviets know that we do
- 20 not intend to abandon any of them merely because agreement
- 21 cannot be reached quickly, or because agreement has been
- 22 reached on others.
- 23 Let me briefly review the state of our dialogue in each
- 24 of these areas.
- 25 Human rights is a major issue on our agenda. To us it is

- 1 a matter of real concern that Soviet emigration is at its
- 2 lowest level since the 1960's, and that Soviet constriction
- 3 of emigration has coincided with a general crackdown against
- 4 all forms of internal dissent. The Helsinki monitoring
- 5 groups have all been dispersed and their leaders hav been
- 6 imprisoned or expelled from the country. And the Soviet
- 7 Union's first independent disarmament group has been harassed
- 8 and persecuted.
- 9 We address such questions both multilaterally and
- 10 bilaterally. In such forums as the UN Human Rights
- 11 Commission, the International Labor Organization, and
- 12 especially the Review Conference of CSCE -- I might say where
- 13 Max Kampelman is joing a truly outstanding job -- we have
- 14 made clear that human rights cannot be relegated to the
- 15 margins of international politics. Our Soviet interlocutors
- 16 have a different view; they seek to dismiss human rights as a
- "tenth-rate issue," not worthy of high-level attention.
- 18 But our approach will not change. Americans know that
- 19 national rights and individual rights cannot realistically be
- 20 kept separate. We believe, for example, that the elements of
- 21 the postwar European "settlement" that were adopted by the
- 22 parties to the Helsinki Final Act in 1975 form an integral
- 23 whole; no one part will survive alone. Guided by this
- 24 conviction, we and our allies have held at the Madrid Review
- 25 Conference that movement in one "basket" of this settlement

- 1 -- such as the convening of a European disarmament conference
- 2 -- must be matched by progress in other "baskets," especially
- 3 human rights.
- 4 We insist on this balance because we believe that
- 5 international obligations must be taken seriously by the
- 6 governments that assume them. But there is also a deeper
- 7 reason that directly concerns the question of security.
- 8 In Europe, as elsewhere, governments that are not at
- 9 peace with their own people are unlikely to be on good terms
- 10 with their neighbors. The only significant use of military
- 11 force on the continent of Europe since 1945 has been by the
- 12 Soviet Union against its East European "allies." As long as
- 13 this unnatural relationship continues between the U.S.S.R.
- 14 and its East European neighbors, it is bound to be a source
- 15 of instability in Europe.
- We have been just as concerned about human rights issues
- 17 on a bilateral as on a multilateral basis. The need for
- 18 steady improvement of Soviet performance in the most
- 19 important human rights categories is as central to the
- 20 Soviet-American dialogue as ay other theme. Sometimes we
- 21 advance this dialogue best through public expressions of our
- 22 concerns, at other times through quiet diplomacy. What
- 23 counts, and the Soviets know this, is whether we see
- 24 results.
- Let me turn to arms control. We believe the only arms

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1
    control agreements that count are those that provide for real
    reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability
 3
    in the East-West balance. Success in our negotiations will
    not, of course, bring East-West competition to an end. But
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    sustainable agreements will enable us to meet the Soviet
    challenge in a setting of greater stability and safety.
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- 1 The United States is now applying these principles in an
- 2 ambitious program of arms control negotiations including INF,
- 3 START, MBFR, and the ongoing discussions in the U.N.
- 4 Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. If we can reach a
- 5 balanced agreement in the CSCE at Madrid, we woulkd be
- 6 prepared to participate also in a conference on disarmament
- 7 in Europe.
- 8 No previous administration has put so many elements of
- 9 the east-west military equation on the negotiating table. Y
- 10 ou are aware of the U.S. position in the various talks, so I
- 11 need not go into great detail. I will, however, touch on a
- 12 few main points.
- On the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks, START, the United
- 14 States has focused on the most destabilizing strategic
- 15 systems, land-based ballistic missiles. Our objective is to
- 16 strengthen deterrence while enhancing strategic stability
- 17 through reductions. The President has proposed reductions in
- 18 ballistic missile warheads by one-third. In presenting a
- 19 comprehensive proposal, he has indicated that all strategic
- 20 weapons are "on the table." Although our respective
- 21 positions are far apart, the Soviets apparently accept the
- 22 proposition that an agreemen't must involve significant
- 23 reductions. This is progress. We have recently undertaken a
- 24 full review of the U.S. position, which included an
- 25 assessment of the Scowcroft Commission's recommendations and

- 1 some thoughtful suggestions from the Congress.
- 2 One week ago, the President announced that he is willing
- 3 to raise the deployed missile ceiling in accordance with the
- 4 Scowcroft recommendations. He also announced that he has
- 5 given our negotiators new flexibility to explore all
- 6 appropriate avenues for achieving reductions. It is now up
- 7 to the Soviet Union to reciprocate ouir flexibility.
- 8 We have also tabled a draft agreement on
- 9 confidence-building measures that calls for exchange of
- 10 information and advance notification of ballistic missile
- 11 launches and major exercises. We want to move forward
- 12 promptly to negotiate separate agreements on these very
- 13 important measures which would enhance stability in a crisis
- 14 as well as symbolizing the common interest in preventing
- 15 war. Yet another effort to prevent misperception of military
- 16 activities on either side, and thus to lower the risk of war,
- 17 is the President's recent proposal to expand and upgrade
- 18 crisis communications between Washington and Moscow. Here,
- 19 too, we hope for early agreement.
- 20 In the negotiations on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces,
- 21 "equal rights and limits" between the United States and the
- 22 Soviet Union is one of our key principles. President
- 23 Reagan's proposal of November 1981 sought to achieve the
- 24 complete elimination of those systems on each side about
- 25 which the other has expressed the greatest concern, that is,

- 1 longer range, land-based INF missiles.
- We still regard kthis as the most desirable outcome. Yet
- 3 after more than a year of talks, the Soviets continue to
- 4 resist this equitable and effective solution. In fact, their
- 5 position has not substantially changed since it was first put
- 6 forward nearly a year ago. The proposal made by Mr. Andropov
- 7 last December would allow the Soviet Union to maintain its
- 8 overwhelming monopoly of longer range INF missiles while
- 9 prohibiting the deployment of even one comparable U.S.
- 10 missile.
- In an effort to break this stalemate, the President has
- 12 proposed an interim agreement as a route to the eventual
- 13 elimination of long range INF systems. Under such an
- 14 agreement, we would reduce the number of missiles we plan to
- 15 deploy in Europe if the Soviet Union will reduce the total
- 16 number of warheads it has already deployed to an equal
- 17 level. This would result in equal limits for both sides on a
- 18 global basis. Reflecting the concerns of our Asian allies
- 19 and friends, we have made it clear that no agreement can come
- 20 at their expense. We hope that in the current round of
- 21 negotiations, the Soviets will move to negotiate in good
- 22 faith on the President's proposal which was unanimously
- 23 supported by our partners at the Williamsburg Summit.
- In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions talks in
- 25 Vienna, NATO and the Warsaw Pact are discussing an agreement

- on conventional forces in Central Europe, the most heavily
- 2 armed region of the world, where Warsaw Pact forces greatly
- 3 exceed NATO's.
- 4 Last year the President announced a new western position
- 5 in the form of a draft treaty calling for substantial
- 6 reductions to equal manpower levels. Although the Soviets
- 7 and their allies have agreed to the principle of parity,
- 8 which is progess, progress has been prevented by inability to
- 9 resolve disagreement over existing Warsaw Pact force levels
- 10 and by problems of verification.
- In the 40-nation Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, the
- 12 United States has introduced a far-reaching proposal for a
- 13 comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, an agreement which
- 14 would eliminate these terrible weapons from world arsenals.
- 15 This initiative has been vigorously supported by our allies
- 16 and friends, as well as many nonaligned nations. Our
- 17 emphasis on the importance of mandatory on-site inspections
- 18 has been widely applauded. An independent, impartial
- 19 verification system, observed by and responsive to all
- 20 parties, is essential to create confidence that the ban is
- 21 being respected.
- In other areas, we have proposed to the Soviet Union
- 23 improvements in the verification provisions of two agreements
- 24 to limit underground nuclear testing. So far the Soviet
- 25 response has been negative. We have also initiated a

- 1 dialogue with the Soviets in one area where our respective
- 2 approaches very often coincide: nuclear non-proliferation.
- We should not anticipate early agreement in any of these
- 4 negotiations. The Soviets have their own positions, and they
- 5 are tough, patient negotiators. But we believe that our
- 6 positions are fair and even-handed and that our objectives
- 7 are realistic.
- 8 Let me turn now to regional issues which in the sweep of
- 9 things have historically been the matters that have been most
- 10 apsetting to our relationship to the Soviet Union.
- 11 Important as it is, arms control has not been and cannot
- 12 be the dominant subject of our dialogue with the Soviets. We
- 13 must also address the threat to peace posed by the Soviet
- 14 exploitation of regional instability and conflict. Indeed,
- 15 these issues, arms control and political instability, are
- 16 closely related. The increased stability that we try to
- 17 build into the superpower relationship through arms control
- 18 can be undone by irresponsible Soviet policies elsewhere. In
- 19 our numerous discussions with the Soviet leadership, we have
- 20 repeatedly expressed our strong interest in reaching
- 21 understandings with the Soviets that would minimize
- 22 superpower involvement in conflicts beyond their borders.
- 23 The list of problem areas is formidable, but we have
- 24 insisted that regional issues are central to progress. We
- 25 have made clear our commitment to relieve repression and

- 1 economic distress in Poland, to achieve a settlement in
- 2 southern Africa, to restore independence to Afghanistan, to
- 3 end the occupation of Kampuchea, and to halt Soviet- and
- 4 Cuban-supported subversion in Central America.
- 5 In each instance, we have conveyed our views forcefully
- 6 to the Soviets in an attempt to remove the obstacles that
- 7 Soviet conduct puts in the way of resolving these problems.
- 8 A couple of examples are listed.
- 9 As in our arms control negotiations, we have made it
- 10 absolutely clear to the Soviets in these discussions that we
- 11 are not interested in cosmetic solutions. We are interested
- 12 in solving problems fundamental to maintenance of the
- 13 international order.
- 14 It is also our view that Soviet participation in
- 15 international efforts to resolve regional conflicts, in
- 16 southern Africa or the Middle East, for example, depends on
- 17 Soviet conduct. If the Soviets seek to benefit from tension
- 18 and support those who promote disorder, they can hardly
- 19 expect to have a role in the amelioration of those problems.
- 20 Nor should we expect them to act responsibly merely because
- 21 they gain a role. At the same time, we have also made it
- 22 clear that we will not exploit, and in fact, are prepared to
- 23 respond positively to Soviet restraint. The decision in each
- 24 case is theirs.
- 25 The final part of our agenda with the Soviets comprises

- 1 economic and other bilateral relations. In our dialogue, we
- 2 have spelled out our view of these matters in a candid and
- 3 forthright way.
- As we see it, economic transactions can confer important
- 5 strategic benefits, and we must be mindful of the
- 6 implications for our security. Therefore, as I have already
- 7 indicated, we believe economic relations with the east
- 8 deserve more careful scrutiny than in the past. But our
- 9 policy is not one of economic warfare against the USSR.
- 10 East-west trade in non-strategic areas, in the words of the
- 11 NATO communique, "conducted on the basis of commercially
- 12 sound terms and mutual advantage, that avoids preferential
- 13 treatment of the Soviet Union, contributes to constructive
- 14 east-west relations."
- Despite the strains of the past few years in our overall
- 16 relationship, we have maintained the key elements in the
- 17 structure for bilateral trade. We have recently agreed with
- 18 the USSR to extend our bilateral fisheries agreement for one
- 19 year and have begun to negotiate a new long-term U.S.-Soviet
- 20 grain agreement. Our grain sales are on commercial terms and
- 21 are not made with government-supported credits or guarantees
- 22 of any kind.
- 23 As for contacts between people, we have cut back on
- 24 largely symbolic exchanges but maintain a framework of
- 25 cooperation in scientific, technical and humanitarian

- 1 fields. A major consideration as we pursue such exchanges
- 2 must be reciprocity. If the Soviet Union is to enjoy
- 3 virtually unlimited opportunities for access to our free
- 4 society, U.S. access to Soviet society must increase.
- 5 We have made progress toward gaining Soviet acceptance of
- 6 this principle as is indicated by the airing in Moscow this
- 7 past weekend of an interview wth Deputy Secretary Ken Dam.
- 8 Eight bilateral cooperative agreements are now in effect,
- 9 and exchanges between the Academies of Science continue, as
- 10 do exchanges of yong scholars and Fulbright fellows.
- 11 "America Illustrated" magazine continues to be distributed in
- 12 the Soviet Union in return for distribution here of "Soviet
- 13 Life," in spite of the absence of a cultural exchanges
- 14 agreement. Toward the private sector, we have maintained an
- 15 attitude of neither encouraging nor discouraging exchanges,
- 16 and a steady flow of tourists and conference participants
- 17 goes on in both directions. The number of U.S. news bureaus
- 18 in Moscow has actually increased in the last year.
- 19 Now let me say just a word about prospects. It is
- 20 sometimes said that Soviet-American relations are worse than
- 21 ever. Certainly the issues dividing our two countries are
- 22 serious. But let us not be misled by atmospherics, whether
- 23 sunny or, as they now seem to be, stormy.
- In the mid-'50s, for example, despite the rhetoric and
- 25 tension of the Cold War, and in the midst of a leadership

- 1 transition, the Soviet Union chose to conclude the Austrian
- 2 State Treaty. It was an important agreement which
- 3 contributed to the security of Central Europe, and it carries
- 4 an important lesson for us today. The Soviet leadership did
- 5 not negotiate seriously merely because western rhetoric was
- 6 firm and principles, nor should we expect rhetoric to suffice
- 7 now or in the future. But adverse atmospherics did not
- 8 prevent agreement; Soviet policy was instead affected by the
- 9 pattern of western actions, by our resolve and clarity of
- 10 purpose. And the result was progress.
- 11 There is no certainty that our current negotiations with
- 12 the Soviets will lead to acceptable agreements. What is
- 13 certain is that we will not find ourselves in the position in
- 14 which we found ourselves in the aftermath of detente. We
- 15 have not staked so much on the prospect of a successful
- 16 negotiating outcome that we have neglected to secure
- 17 ourselves against the possibility of failure. Unlike the
- 18 immediate postwar period, when negotiating progress was a
- 19 remote prospect, we attach the highest importance to
- 20 articulating the requirements for an improved relationship
- 21 and to exploring every serious avenue for progress. Our
- 22 parallel pursuit of strength and negotiation prepares us both
- 23 to resist continued Soviet aggrandizement and to recognize
- 24 and respond to positive Soviet moves.
- 25 We have spelled out our requirements and our hopes for a

- 1 more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union. The
- 2 direction in which that relationship evolves will ultimately
- 3 be determined by the decisions of the Soviet leadership.
- 4 President Brezhnev's successors will have to weigh the
- 5 increased costs and risks of relentless competition against
- 6 the benefits of a less tense international environment in
- 7 which they could more adequately address the rising
- 8 expectations of their own citizens. While we can define
- 9 their alternatives, we cannot decipher their intentions. To
- 10 a degree unequaled anywhere else, Russia in this respect
- 11 remains a secret.
- Her history, of which this secrecy is such an integral
- 13 part, provides no basis for expecting a dramatic change. And
- 14 yet it also teaches that gradual change is possible. For our
- 15 part, we seek to encourage change by a firm but flexible U.S.
- 16 strategy, resting on a broad consensus that we can sustain
- 17 over the long term whether the Soviet Union changes or not.
- 18 If the democracies can meet this challenge, they can achieve
- 19 the goals of which President Reagan spoke at Los Angeles:
- 20 both defend freedom and preserve the peace.
- 21 Thank you, Er. Chairman.
- The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, on behalf of the committee,
- 23 we thank you for a very comprehensive statement, probably the
- 24 most comprehensive statement on U.S.-Soviet relationships
- 25 that this committee has had for many, many years. It was

- 1 well worth the wait to have you return and be our lead-off
- 2 witness, and certainly it is a realistic statement, if not a
- 3 hopeful statement. But there are hopeful signs in it.
- 4 Certainly, when you call for a constructive relationship
- 5 with the Soviet Union on the final page, that is the goal and
- 6 objective, I think, of the American people and of this
- 7 committee, certainly, and our responsibility. And we do not
- 8 disagree at all. We agree with President Reagan's goal that
- 9 he outlined, that that is our job. It is the job that the
- 10 free world really looks to do, but also to preserve the
- 11 peace, and that means also the peace between ourselves and
- 12 our adversaries, despite our differences, which we are not
- 13 going to resolve those differences though we can try to
- 14 better understand each others' position, and certainly when
- 15 you have indicated, as you have, that, on page 9 of your
- 16 testimony, we are ready to negotiate equitable solutions to
- 17 outstanding political problems.
- 18 In preparing for these hearings, I did ask our top staff
- 19 involved with the Soviet Union, headed by our Chief of Staff,
- 20 Ed Sanders, to go to the Soviet Union to get their point of
- 21 view. We cannot have Soviets testifying before this
- 22 committee. No foreign nationals do. We did want to get as
- 23 up to date an impression of what they thought as we possibly
- 24 could. And I know that their report was abusive and
- 25 offensive to some people. But it was factual from what they

- 1 saw, and accurately reported. It did not reflect the views
- 2 of this committee or any member of the committee. It was the
- 3 staff report.
- 4 But without objection, I would ask that the report, or at
- 5 least major extracts from it, be incorporated at an
- 6 appropriate point in the record so that we can have that
- 7 point of view, just as I tried to update myself immediately
- 8 after the election of President Reagan in November of 1980,
- 9 by going to the Soviet Union and having with Ambassador
- 10 Watson nine hours of talks with Brezhnev, with Gromyko, with
- 11 Ustinov and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the latter meetings
- 12 being very unique but requested by me, and I did want the
- 13 opportunity to tell them and to hear from them what their
- 14 point of view was on the use of military power around the
- 15 world.
- And at some point I might try to insert extracts from
- 17 Ambassador Watson's cables that give some feeling for what
- 18 their attitude was then and what our attitude was, though I
- 19 did not at any time speak for the administration and made it
- 20 very clear I was there in my own capacity, not representing
- 21 the administration.
- 22 [The information referred to follows:]
- 23 [COMMITTEE INSERT]

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- 1 The Chairman: But your report today is a valuable
- 2 assessment, and our job now will be to try to work with you
- 3 to find activist, bold and creative answers, and in the
- 4 advice and consent responsibility we have by the
- 5 Constitution, no administration has sought the advice of the
- 6 Senate Foreign Relations Committee more frequently than you
- 7 have as Secretary and given us the chance to constructively
- 8 comment on positions. And you have listened more than any
- 9 Secretary in I think history, possibly, to our views. You
- 10 have not accepted them all, obviously, but you have been
- 11 thoughtful and careful in approaching us, in getting our
- 12 views, and we very, very much appreciate that.
- We will begin a ten minute guestioning period, and I
- 14 would ask as a first question one where I have had some
- 15 difference of opinion with the administration. I did not
- 16 disagree when I came back that the President shoul rush into
- 17 a meeting with the head of the Soviet Union, Brezhnev. I
- 18 felt there should be a reasonable period for preparation, but
- 19 I did grow somewhat impatient as time went on and there was
- 20 never a real effort. And finally, Secretary Haig did agree,
- 21 after many, many consultations on it, did agree in public
- 22 testimony that we would issue an invitation to Brezhnev to
- 23 meet with President Reagan. But it was too late then. He
- 24 was too ill, he could not come to New York to the U.N.
- 25 meeting. He could not meet with the President. So we missed

that opportunity.

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I have urged now that we at the proper time meet with Andropov. I think it is dangerous in this kind of a world for the two leaders of the major superpowers not to sit down face to face, and I do not think they have to have, as it the Soviets have taken the position with me -- we need to do it like President Ford did, when we are ready to sign SALT I, as we did. I do not know if we are ever going to get to START I if we do not somehow get a better sense of direction from the two chiefs of state who have the ultimate responsibility. Though I respect the fact you have met a number of times with Foreign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Prime Minister Gromyko, and will have another, fourth meeting, coming up.

What can you tell this committee about the possibility of having a meeting not with the expectation that big agreements are going to be made, but that at least we will be absolutely certain that our President enunciates right from the top what our policies are and let them have the same opportunity to do that.

I do not know whether they will accept the invitation or not, but I would like to see us issue an invitation in the reasonable near future, not the end of next year. That is too late, in my judgment.

When can we look forward to a summit meeting with a properly prepared agenda but no high expectations and the

- 1 world put on notice, it is to gauge each other to be sure
- 2 there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding, and to try to
- 3 better understand each others' policies?

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Secretary Shultz: The President's view is that a summit
meeting could be a good thing. He is ready to have one if
the meeting is well prepared and if there is a high
probability of some significant outcome from it so that it is
substantive in nature. He fears that a meeting for the sake
of a meeting would raise expectations very high, and if all
that happened was that there was a meeting, it would do more
harm than good.

So there is in principle a readiness to have that meeting, but an operational requirement that it have a substantive content that is prepared and that can move forward.

I have gone through the very helpful and thoughtful, good staff report that you mentioned earlier and I notice in that report that they say basically this is the Soviet position as yell.

The Chairman: I realize it is the Soviet position. I have been told that directly. They want to wait until there is something to sign and celebrate on. I do not think we have got the time for that, and I want to ask you a personal question. In your own past experience ask one of the ablest and most experienced negotiators in American governmental

- 1 history, and in certainly the academic field, have you always
- 2 felt it necessary to be able to have an agreement signed and
- 3 sealed and ready to be delivered before the principles who
- 4 can make some of those basic lecisions have their first
- 5 meeting?
- 6 Secretary Shultz: Well, I do not think you have to have
- 7 everything precooked, but I think timing is a very
- 8 significant part of any negotiation, and certainly it is not
- 9 advisable to go rushing in with your top negotiator with an
- 10 agenda that is not structured and is not going to advance our
- 11 objectives properly. We need to be able to see our
- 12 objectives being advanced in any discussion in a reasonably
- 13 concrete way in order to make it desirable for the President
- 14 to engage.
- And I might say also that we do have many negotiations
- 16 going on with the Soviet Union, as I brought out in my
- 17 testimony, and we have to think about those fora and how to
- 18 advance things in those fora as well.
- 19 The Chairman: My own assessment is we are making very
- 20 little progress in those negotiations, and for that reason,
- 21 we need a stimulus. But we will carry on this dialogue, Mr.
- 22 Secretary, some other time.
- 23 I would like to insert in the record a letter that the
- 24 President sent to me. I think he sent a similar letter to
- 25 Senators Nunn and Cohen on the build-down. The President

- 1 stated in his May 12 letter that the mutual and verifiable
- 2 build-down proposal that his aiministration was now currently
- 3 proposing, and I believe most of my colleagues here have
- 4 cosponsored, is being currently examined, and the structure
- 5 and build-down proposal would facilitate a START agreement.
- 6 Can you give us some progress report on this effort to
- 7 design a specific build-down proposal?
- 8 And any of these questions that you want to turn to some
- 9 of your colleagues for or just fill in the record later on,
- 10 you certainly can.
- 11 Secretary Shultz: We believe the proposal is intriguing
- 12 and has a lot of interesting aspects to it. It is one of
- 13 those things that sounds simple and turns out to be
- 14 complicated as you look into it. It is being studied very
- 15 intensively in our process with urging from the President.
- 16 That is, he is pushing this group and has asked for a report
- 17 very promptly on the conclusions of what the group produces.
- 18 And if they do not produce a consensus of view, let's hear
- 19 what the different views are and what the different options
- 20 are as people see them.
- 21 So the subject is getting the President's attention, and
- 22 he is pushing the study process and will have displayed to
- 23 him the various considerations in a prompt way. There has
- 24 not been any conclusion reached however.
- 25 The Chairman: Right.

- 1 You mentioned in your testimony two treaties that have
- 2 not been ratified, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty and
- 3 the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. I have expressed over a
- 4 period of two and a half years my frustration about our
- 5 inability to get from the administration a specific go-ahead
- 6 on those treaties.
- 7 They have asked now, the Soviets, to look at verification
- 8 aspects of them, and we have had a rejection.
- 9 Is it not possible, and in view of the Soviet reaction to
- 10 the U.S. proposal to enhanced verification provisions of
- 11 these two treaties, to test their existing verification
- 12 provisions before adding to them, that we can think of some
- 13 other approach, exchange of letters that might be a
- 14 possibility, where we could actually get support from the
- 15 administration so that we could advise and consent and we
- 16 could finally ratify two treaties, one signed by President
- 17 Ford, one by President Nixon, now that have been languishing
- 18 before this committee for many, many years, and get some
- 19 action on those.
- 20 Is there not any way we could move them forward?
- 21 Secretary Shultz: Well, we are trying, and I agree with
- 22 you that it is not a good thing to negotiate treaties and
- 23 have them languish. They should be taken up and dealt with.
- The issue comes back to this problem of verification, and
- 25 treaties that are not readily verifiable poison the

- 1 atmosphere.
- I think on the question of whether or not some recent
- 3 Soviet ICBM tests violate SALT II or not, partly you can
- 4 scratch your head about the particulars of that, and partly
- 5 what it displays is the looseness of the treaty. And so I
- 6 think when you have something that is going to raise
- 7 questions in verification and also where, as I gather it,
- 8 techniques have become available since the treaty was
- 9 negotiated, that would improve verification, it makes sense
- 10 to go back and try to tighten it down a little bit.
- Now, the most recent test I think just yesterday or the
- 12 day before, I just read something about it yesterday, is an
- 13 example. As you know, in our current verification
- 14 procedures, we -- a blast goes off and we get data from it,
- 15 and what the data are, it is a probability distribution that
- 16 on the basis of this information, the most likely number is
- 17 X, and there is a probability distribution around it, and the
- 18 tail of the distribution on the high side is over double the
- 19 150 kiloton level involved, and the most likely in the
- 20 probability distribution is well above. However, the low end
- 21 of the tail is well within the limit.
- 22 So that poses a very hard issue of verification, and if
- 23 you can improve on that, it seems to me you are much better
- 24 off than to wind up saying well, are they cheating or are
- 25 they not cheating? And we do not have any way of saying.

- 1 That is the thing that has caused the President to go
- 2 back and go back and try to see if we could not improve the
- 3 verification process.
- 4 The Chairman: Just a concluding comment on those two.
- 5 In view of the fact that both President Nixon and Ford have
- 6 urged me to see that we do move forward to ratification of
- 7 these treaties, in view of the fact that many members of this
- 8 committee have urged that we do so as a symbol that we can
- 9 get something done, could we just ask for your pledge that a
- 10 best effort will be made to find a way somehow in the Shultz
- 11 fashion that we do these treaties and find a way to upgrade
- 12 the verification, but be able to do so in such a way that we
- 13 can finally ratify those treaties and complete our end of
- 14 it.
- 15 Secretary Shultz: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
- 16 The Chairman: Was that yes or no?
- 17 [General laughter.]
- 18 Secretary Shultz: Oh, yes, as I said, I think that if we
- 19 can have improved verification, we would want to go forward,
- 20 and we will reach around for ways to try to achieve it. But
- 21 it is a difficult problem, and I think that you do have to be
- 22 careful with treaties which are undertaken. After all, it is
- 23 a very serious matter, and the Senate votes on it and so on,
- 24 and then when it is all done you say, well, here is this
- 25 restriction, and a blast goes off and we cannot tell whether

- 1 it is within the restriction or not by an order of
- 2 magnitude. That is a big difference.
- The Chairman: And yet for the first time in the history
- 4 of our relationship, one of these treaties provides for
- 5 on-site inspection, which I think is in the interest of the
- 6 United States.
- 7 Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
- 8 Senator Pell.
- 9 Senator Pell: Thank you, Er. Chairman.
- 10 One of the concerns that I have is that with the
- 11 increasing closeness of these weapons -- for instance, I
- 12 believe the PERSHINGs will be able to reach a target n the
- 13 Soviet Union within a quarter of an hour or so -- that the
- 14 tendency will be for one side or the other to respond,
- 15 retaliate mechanically, so that if unfortunately there was an
- 16 electrical malfunction or a flock of geese or something of
- 17 that sort stimulated the sensitive antenna, there would be a
- 18 response without a human being getting in the middle.
- 19 Is it conceivable, or are you free to say in a public
- 20 session, is there such -- can you give us an assurance that
- 21 in the United States at least we would never let off a
- 22 nuclear weapon without a human being being responsible for
- 23 giving the command?
- 24 Secretary Shultz: Well, the President is the person that
- 25 carries around the key ingredients of command, and beyond

- 1 that, I think I would rather not make any comment. But I
- 2 agree with the implication or what I take it to be the
- 3 implication of you question, that work on what we call
- 4 confidence-building measures is important because those are
- 5 measures that tend to give people prior notification, keep
- 6 people informed, maintain some sort of contact about these
- 7 matters, and that is desirable.
- 8 And so I call your attention to the confidence-building
- 9 measures the President has put on the table in connection
- 10 with START, in connection with INF, and independently having
- 11 to do with the hot line and also in terms of possible crises
- 12 that might be caused if you found a nuclear weapon in the
- 13 hands of a terrorist or some crazy leader, so-called leader.
- 14 And those are matters that are very much worth working on.
- 15 Senator Pell: I know that in the incidents at sea, there
- 16 have been direct discussions between Soviet military, their
- 17 admirals and our admirals. It has worked out pretty
- 18 effectively.
- 19 Why is it that there seems to be a reluctance on their
- 20 part to engage in direct confidence-building measures between
- 21 their military and our military?
- 22 Secretary Shultz: That was one of the President's
- 23 proposals that Secretary Weinberger developed that there be a
- 24 military-to-military kind of direct communication link, and
- 25 we proposed -- there were four confidence-building measures

- 1 proposed. One was upgrading the hotline; another was the
- 2 crisis management that I have already mentioned. A third was
- 3 the military-to-military, and another was an embassy
- 4 communication link. The latter two the Soviets told us they
- 5 did not quite see any good purpose to them. They did not
- 6 foreclose discussion of them. On the first two they came
- 7 back and said they were interested in discussing them. So we
- 8 will proceed with those discussions.
- 9 I do not know why they rejected them.
- 10 Senator Pell: The door is not closed, though, on the
- 11 latter two?
- 12 Secretary Shultz: It is not closed. They were very
- 13 responsive. We made a proposal and they came back in due
- 14 time and said we are interested in two and we do not think
- 15 the other two are worthwhile. But they have not foreclosed
- 16 discussion of them.
- 17 Senator Pell: How soon -- this is a very tough question
- 18 on your crystal ball, I guess, but do you expect to see
- 19 within the next year or so, realistically, the outline of an
- 20 agreement at INF or at the START talks?
- 21 Secretary Shultz: My own thinking about that subject
- 22 goes like this. We should examine our positions always to be
- 23 sure that we have reasonable propositions on the table,
- 24 reasonable in the sense that we think they are in our
- 25 interests and protect our interests and at the same time are

- 1 demonstrably fair, and that we should be ready to engage in
- 2 the give and take of negotiation and discussion in a effort
- 3 to find an agreement. That is what we have control over, is
- 4 what we do.
- 5 What they do is hard to predict, so what we can say is if
- 6 we are reasonable in our approach and ready to engage in give
- 7 and take, an agreement is possible if they decide to behave
- 8 likewise. If they decide otherwise, it will not be.
- 9 I think we need to be very careful that we do not somehow
- 10 get ourselves in the position of feeling that it is very
- 11 important to get an agreement because, as you know, you are
- 12 an old negotiator yourself, Mr. Chairman -- you complimented
- 13 me -- but the minute you see the other guy really wants an
- 14 agreement, you have got him. And you can drive and drive and
- 15 drive. And we just must not jet in that position.
- 16 Senator Pell: Do you see any possibility or any merit to
- 17 the ideas of bringing together the INF and the START talks,
- 18 because if that happened, the question of the British and the
- 19 French would become relatively insignificant compared with
- 20 the whole ball of wax, and Mr. Nitze seems to be doing a
- 21 fairly effective job there. Maybe his energies could be used
- 22 in the whole.
- 23 Secretary Shultz: I think they are being conducted
- 24 separately; that is not an issue; and I think that is the way
- 25 to keep them.

- 1 Senator Pell: You would not want to see them combined.
- Secretary Shultz: No, sir.
- 3 We have said that as time passes, if there is no
- 4 agreement, our deployments will start on schedule and carry
- 5 through on the schedule, but we will be prepared to continue
- 6 the negotiations, and if, as the process of deployment is
- 7 going on, an agreement is reached, then that can be
- 8 accommodated in the deployment schedule, and we would like
- 9 nothing better than to wind up watching them detroy all their
- 10 SS-20s, and we will get rid of the deployment that we had
- 11 undertaken.
- 12 Senator Pell: On another subject but also concerning the
- 13 Soviet Union, do you believe anything can be done to change
- 14 the decline in the emigration of Soviet Jews permitted?
- 15 Secretary Shultz: I certainly hope so, and we bring that
- 16 up with them all the time. I think it is a -- you wonder why
- 17 it is a country wants people in it that do not want to be
- 18 there. But at any rate, we emphasize the importance that we
- 19 think that holds. We emphasize its relation to the Helsinki
- 20 Final Act, and we push on it. They, of course, regard it as
- 21 an internal affairs of theirs. But at any rate, it is very
- 22 high on our agenia, and it is at a pitifully low level right
- 23 now.
- 24 Senator Pell: A more general guestion. You and I both
- 25 know that we will never start pre-emptive war or pre-emptive

- 1 strike against the Soviet Union. Do they get accurate
- 2 reporting and pictures, do you believe, of our view? Do you
- 3 feel that you are able to talk in a very direct way with your
- 4 opposite number, or are they jetting a varnished view without
- 5 having a real knowledge of our own intentions, which are just
- 6 as important as our own capability?
- 7 Secretary Shultz: What view exactly is being transmitted
- 8 to the few people right at the top, of course, I do not
- 9 know. I think our society is open and it is quite easy to
- 10 see that our society is one that has peaceful intentions and
- 11 is not aggressive, and our record is also clear in that
- 12 regard.
- We have discussions with Soviet leaders, and we try to
- 14 make our views clear. I do have the impression that
- 15 transcripts get read. One little sidelight of the meeting
- 16 that the Vice President and I had, and Ambassador Hartman,
- 17 with General Secretary Andropov on the occasion of President
- 18 Brezhnev's funeral, after we got through with the general
- 19 meeting and, you know, you get up and stand around for a few
- 20 minutes. The Vice President said to Andropov, well, you and
- 21 I have something a little in common in our backgrounds. And
- 22 the General Secretary laughed. He said, that's right; he
- 23 said, we are the men of peace. Have you ever read the
- 24 transcripts of the discussions between Shultz and Gromyko,
- 25 because they are the men of war.

- But I think we have tried, and they also. I do not -- I
- am not capable of being really warlike. I am not that kind
- of a person. But I do try to be direct and frank with Mr.
- 4 Gromyko in our discussions and other discussions as well, and
- 5 he is equally so.
- 6 But the point that I make from that story is that
- 7 apparently the transcripts do get read.
- 8 Senator Pell: Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
- 9 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Pell.
- 10 Senator Helms.
- 11 Senator Helms: Thank you, Mr. Chairman
- Mr. Secretary, the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, although
- 13 it was not a negotiated treaty, seems to me nevertheless to
- 14 be the most important arms control agreement in history
- 15 because it settled the most dangerous nuclear crisis in
- 16 history.
- Now, early last year, the President of the United States,
- 18 the Director of the CIA, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
- 19 and the Under Secretary of Defense all stated publicly and
- 20 without any reservation whatsoever that the Soviets were
- 21 violating the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of 1962.
- Do you recall that?
- 23 Secretary Shultz: Well, I will take it as a fact, as
- 24 you --
- 25 Senator Helms: It is a fact.

- 1 Now, there is evidence that the Soviets already have
- 2 deployed in Cuba nuclear delivery capable BEAR bombers,
- 3 MIG-23 fighter-bombers. They have a strategic submarine base
- 4 with a nuclear warhead storage facility there in Cuba.
- 5 Now my question, Mr. Secretary, since the Soviets have
- 6 violated by the administration's own proclamation the most
- 7 important nuclear arms agreement in history, why really is
- 8 there any reason to believe that they will not seek to evade
- 9 or to violate a START agreement?
- 10 Secretary Shultz: Well, the question of a violation of
- 11 the Kennedy-Khrushchev accords is a question I will put on
- 12 the table without being in a position of wanting to respond
- 13 directly. But I think the question of violation of
- 14 agreements undertaken does pose a very important issue for us
- 15 in any subsequent negotiation, and what it says to us, it
- 16 seems to me, is that we should seek agreements that have a
- 17 very strong capacity for verification so that when it come to
- 18 execution of the agreements, we do not do it on the basis of
- 19 trust and confidence as you would in the many types of
- 20 settings, but we do it on the basis of structuring it in
- 21 terms of the relative interests and an ability to monitor
- 22 very closely whether or not it is being carried out.
- 23 Senator Helms: So what you are saying to me is that you
- 24 are going to take this into consideration in connection with
- 25 any negotiations.

- 1 Secretary Shultz: Yes, sir.
- Senator Helms: Let me go further.
- 3 During the past year there have been four high level
- 4 Soviet threats to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in the
- 5 Caribbean, or Central America, if the United States goes
- 6 ahead with GLCM and PERSHING II deployment in NATO this
- 7 coming December.
- 8 Now, Mr. Secretary, do you consider these threats to be
- 9 all the more provocative and arrogant because they came after
- 10 the top level U.S. statements that the Soviets were already
- violating Kennedy-Khrushchev?
- 12 What goes on here?
- 13 Secretary Shultz: Well, I think the pattern of Soviet
- 14 threats connected with deployments in Europe, you see not
- 15 only as what you mentioned in the Caribbean, but they issued
- 16 a number of threats just before the German election, and
- 17 interestingly, they shot one across the bow of the
- 18 Williamsburg Summit.
- 19 What they seem to produce by these tactics of threat is a
- 20 very strong reaction, and of course, the declaration on peace
- 21 and security at Williamsburg was not simply a response to
- 22 that threat; it had a deeper thrust to it, but the threat
- 23 played a part, just as I do believe the Soviet threat had an
- 24 impact, not the one they contemplated, on the German
- 25 election.

- 1 But to me, the most important thing that has been taking
- 2 place, particularly significantly in the last six months or
- 3 so, or most visibly in the last six months or so -- it has
- 4 always been there -- is the clear cohesion and unity among
- 5 the allies to stick with our program and schedule, and the
- 6 very conscious relation of that cohension and unity to the
- 7 values that we share, and the defense of those values is what
- 8 this is all about.
- 9 So I think there has been a kind of a re-emergence and
- 10 rebirth of these realizations, and at this point in time we
- 11 have genuine cohesion and unity, and the Soviet threats,
- 12 interestingly, have probably contributed something to that.
- 13 Senator Helms: Do you think our allies are taking what I
- 14 have been saying, this kind of thing that I have been saying,
- 15 into consideration in terms of supporting us?
- 16 Secretary Shultz: They I think look very carefully at us
- 17 as anyone does at someone that you are going to ally yourself
- 18 with and basically depend on, and ask themselves can we
- 19 depend on that country or that person or organization or
- 20 whatever it may be. And we certainly want to be a dependable
- 21 ally, and we are a dependable ally. I think the renewed
- 22 strength of the United States is a very important part of
- 23 this whole picture, and I do not mean simply renewed military
- 24 strenght, and I do not mean simply economic strength,
- 25 although those are very important elements.

- 1 But I do think there is a sense around the world that the
- 2 United States is back and we are not boisterous or whatever,
- 3 but nevertheless, self-confident, and we are clear in our
- 4 values, and we intend to stick with them.
- 5 Senator Helms: More importantly, do they understand that
- 6 the offers to negotiate within reasonable terms by the United
- 7 States are in good faith?
- 8 Now, here at home we have all the claptrap of protesters
- 9 who never say a mumbling word about what is going on in terms
- 10 of the Soviet Union, and I just do not want our foreign
- 11 policy to be misled, and I certainly do not want our allies
- 12 to be mislead on that point.
- 13 Secretary Shultz: Well, let me say that that is a
- 14 question that is always raised: Are you negotiating in good
- 15 faith? And we say we are. We do not think that the test of
- 16 good faith can be allowed to become an agreement because then
- 17 you undermine your capacity to negotiate. The test of good
- 18 faith is the reasonableness of the positions, the posture of
- 19 negotiating give and take capability; and I think with our
- 20 allies, we have been involved in an intense and rich process
- 21 of consultation. So they feel that they have had their oar
- 22 in, and the positions that have emerged are ones that have
- 23 been done jointly in a way, and they have been.
- 24 So that gives confidence that these are thoughtful
- 25 positions and their interests have been considered, and so

- 1 on. And I think that with the leadership, we are doing very
- 2 well in this regard, and obviously it is part of the tactic
- 3 in this negotiation of the Soviet Union to try to get across
- 4 the idea to various population groups that we are not
- 5 negotiating in good faith and therefore deployment should not
- 6 go on. That is their tactic, and of course, ours is
- 7 otherwise.
- 8 Senator Helms: All right.
- 9 One final question, . Mr. Secretary.
- 10 I have been seeking to obtain from you for several months
- 11 now the full materials relating to the Kennedy-Khrushchev
- 12 agreement. I have asked by mail, by letter to you, and I
- 13 have been in consultation with your associates on frequent
- 14 occasions about your appearing before the Western Hemisphere
- 15 Subcommittee of this Committee. I think, &r. Secretary, that
- 16 the American people deserve to have a full and open hearing
- 17 on the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement, what is in it, what is
- 18 not in it, what is being violated, what is not, and I think
- 19 they deserve to have, if you will forgive me -- and I say
- 20 this with all respect -- I think they deserve to have your
- 21 testimony, not somebody else's, yours.
- 22 So, Mr. Secretary, my question is, is it going to be
- 23 possible to persuade you to come before the subcommittee or
- 24 the full committee, if the Chairman wishes, to discuss the
- 25 Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement.

- Secretary Shultz: Well, you asked me that question, I
- 2 think, in my confirmation hearing, and I ducked a little
- 3 then. I will duck a little now. We have offered to have
- 4 Assistant Secretary Burt come and testify, but the best
- 5 is --
- 6 Senator Helms: He can come and testify with you, but I
- 7 want you to come.
- 8 Secretary Shultz: You want me.
- 9 Well, --
- 10 Senator Helms: What is the answer?
- 11 Secretary Shultz: It is tough. In the end I guess I
- 12 will do it, but I hate to do it, frankly.
- 13 Senator Helms: Why?
- 14 Secretary Shultz: Well, it is something somebody else
- 15 can do, and it is a -- there is a limit on the amount of
- 16 things that you can really come to grips with and master.
- 17 That is, you want a witness who can tell you all the ins and
- 18 outs, and I can get to do that, but -- well, if you want me
- 19 to, I will do it.
- 20 Senator Helms: Very well.
- 21 Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
- 22 Secretary Shultz: Do not pin me down to some particular
- 23 date right away because, I will tell you, my schedule is
- 24 tough.
- 25 Senator Helms: We will work it out.

- 1 Thank you, sir.
- The Chairman: I would like to say, Senator Helms, that I
- did assure Secretary Shultz that knowing the burdens placed
- 4 upon his office, which are immense, beyond anyone's
- 5 knowledge, that whenever we could obtain testimony from
- 6 someone else, that we would do so.
- 7 Now, he has agreed to appear, but I want you to have that
- 8 background, that I did make that agreement with him when he
- 9 became Secretary, as I did with Secretary Haig, because I
- 10 know the immense burdens placed upon your office.
- 11 Secretary Shultz: Probably I will not be able to testify
- 12 because the person that does the scheduling back in the
- 13 department will shoot me when I return for having agreed to
- 14 do it.
- 15 [General laughter.]
- 16 Senator Helms: Well, we will get you a bullet-proof
- 17 vest.
- 18 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Helms.
- 19 Senator Helms: Mr. Chairman, that is the first time I
- 20 have ever asked the Secretary himself to appear, and I
- 21 appreciate your agreeing to come.
- The Chairman: I noticed he had a few conditions on it,
- 23 though.
- 24 Senator Helms: Not many.
- The Chairman: Not many, no.

- 1 Senator Tsongas.
- Senator Tsongas: I yield to Senator Cranston.
- 3 The Chairman: Senator Cranston, Senator Tsongas has
- 4 yielded to you.
- 5 Senator Cranston: Thank you very much.
- 6 Mr. Secretary, I welcome you to this hearing. It is
- 7 certainly on a very important issue before our country, and
- 8 indeed, one that affects the fate of the world. I think the
- 9 American-Soviet relationship is the most important that has
- 10 ever existed between two peoples because never before have
- 11 two peoples had the capacity to not only destroy each other
- 12 totally, but quite possibly, to destroy the entire world, or
- 13 at least human life upon this planet.
- I agree with a great deal that you have said, and I want
- 15 to compliment you on the thoughtful and moderate tone of your
- 16 statement.
- I disagree with one point where you say on page 29,
- 18 important as it is, arms control has not been and cannot be
- 19 the dominant subject of our dialogue with the Soviets. I
- 20 know there are other issues that are of vast importance. You
- 21 cannot separate one from the other. As you state, we have
- 22 differences that are deep in philosophy and in purpose with
- 23 the Soviet Union, and in principle, and that really, our task
- 24 is to manage those relationships in ways that do not lead to
- 25 war, and it seems to me that arms control is the most

- 1 important aspect of all of this because that is a way to
- 2 contain the dimensions of whatever disputes we may have, that
- 3 they do not erupt into a nuclear conflict if that can be
- 4 avoided.
- 5 On page 21 you spell out the agenda in the dialogue. I
- 6 agree with that agenda. You state that strength and realism
- 7 can deter war, but only direct dialogue and negotiation can
- 8 open the path toward lasting peace, and I agree with you very
- 9 much on that point.
- 10 I agree with your criticism of Soviet behavior. That
- 11 behavior has certainly increased tension between our two
- 12 countries. I am glad that your statement contained nothing
- 13 labeling the USSR as the focus of evil in the world. I do
- 14 not think that that kind of rhetoric and sabre-rattling that
- 15 sometimes accompanies that kind of rhetoric on both sides can
- 16 contribute to the sort of a dialogue that can lead to an
- 17 understanding.
- 18 Having said that I agree with your criticisms of Soviet
- 19 behavior, and I of course do, those of us who are advocating
- 20 efforts to reduce the tensions between our two nations are
- 21 very cognizant of many Soviet actions that are foreboding and
- 22 threatening and alarming and highly unpleasant.
- Now, can you tell us what the United States, for its
- 24 part, has done to contribute to the tension that exists
- 25 between the United States and the Soviet Union?

- Secretary Shultz: Nothing.
- 2 [General laughter.]
- 3 Senator Cranston: You really believe we have done
- 4 nothing that contributes to the tensions between us?
- Secretary Shultz: They say, for example, that we are
- 6 contributing to the tension by the program of deployments of
- 7 PERSHINGs and GLCMs in Europe. I reject that argument
- 8 totally. Those deployments are a response to the massive
- 9 SS-20 deployments. They are not provocative on our part;
- 10 they are responsive on our part.
- 11 Our actions around the world have been the actions of a
- 12 helping hand, not aggrandizing our own power. It is simply
- 13 not the case that when we build our strength, given the
- 14 background, that that is a contributor to tension, unless you
- 15 say that the way to relieve tension is just to do whatever
- 16 they want, and of course, they would not be so tense, but a
- 17 lot of us would not like it very well to live under their
- 18 system.
- 19 Senator Cranston: We most certainly would be tense under
- 20 those circumstances. I do not guarrel with the partcular
- 21 example that you cite, but I do not know how we can negotiate
- 22 effectively with them if we are incapable of putting
- 23 ourselves in their shoes and seeing the world as they see
- 24 it.
- 25 Secretary Shultz: That is a different question. I agree

- 1 with you on that. We have to -- if you are going to
- 2 negotiate with somebody, you have to say to yourself, well,
- 3 how does this look and what, given their problem, will make
- 4 more sense, and so on. You have to do that.
- 5 Senator Cranston: It seems to me that interventions in
- 6 other countries by us -- and you would certainly not deny
- 7 that we have intervened in the affairs of other countries for
- 8 our purposes. Those who launched those interventions thought
- 9 that they served American purposes. The Soviets may have
- 10 viewed them as otherwise. It goes all the way back, long
- 11 before either of us or anyone in this room had any impact or
- 12 influence on American policy, to the first days of the Soviet
- 13 revolution when there was an American intervention at at
- 14 Archangel and other steps designed to seek to prevent the
- 15 Communists from taking over that seemed to serve the purposes
- 16 of America at that time. That is a part of our history that
- 17 is perhaps somewhat alarming to the Soviets. Our more recent
- 18 interventions in other countries to sustain the status quo,
- 19 no matter what that status guo, no matter how tyrannical on
- 20 the far right that status quo, no matter how brutal that
- 21 status quo, has led to concerns I think in other parts of the
- 22 world about how strong our commitment to freedom and
- 23 democracy is.
- 24 It is appropriate to criticize violations of human rights
- 25 in the Soviet Union. I do. So do you, and so do others.

- 1 But to not express concern about violations of human rights
- 2 in a similar vein wherever they occur seems to me to lead to
- 3 a sort of a hypocritical double standard which raises a
- 4 question as to how sincere our protestations are about
- 5 democracy and freedom. I know you believe in it deeply as I
- 6 do.
- 7 Secretary Shultz: Well, let's take chapter and verse
- 8 here. Let's go back in the post-World War II period. Let's
- 9 take Korea.
- 10 Did we intervene unjustifiably in Korea?
- 11 Senator Cranston: No, I do not think so.
- 12 Secretary Shultz: Are we in Korea now unjustifiably? I
- 13 do not think so. I think that was a necessary response on
- 14 our part to a Soviet effort to expand their boundary, in
- 15 effect.
- 16 Senator Cranston: The problem that I see is when we wind
- 17 up backing a right wing dictatorship in the hope that that
- 18 will prevent a left wing dictatorship from emerging, it often
- 19 fails to work. For example, in Cuba we backed Batista, we
- 20 got Castro. For example, in Nicaragua, we backed Somoza, put
- 21 him in power, and we wound up with the Sandinistas. In
- 22 Vietnam we backed totalitarian right wing Saigon, and we got
- 23 totalitarian left wing Hanoi.
- 24 Efforts more carefully tailored to producing a middle
- 25 ground result might be more successful, and I think that we

- 1 should not always view Communism as the source of all evil.
- 2 The problems -- they are evil. I have no question about
- 3 that. I want to be very clear on that point, but --
- Secretary Shultz: Can I quote you?
- 5 Senator Cranston: But the problems in Latin America did
- 6 not really begin in Moscow or Havana. They began with
- 7 poverty and degradation and violation of rights by right wing
- 8 dictatorships. People decided they did not want to put up
- 9 with that. The Communists move in as parasites on that
- 10 circumstance, trying to attain their own aims, their own
- 11 goals of power, and their own form of tyranny, and I think we
- 12 should seek to differentiate between the causes and the
- 13 parasite.
- 14 Secretary Shultz: I agree with that, and I said that in
- 15 my testimony on their, some of their behavior in the Third
- 16 World, and I agree with you that in Central America, for
- 17 example, the principal problems we have to address ourselves
- 18 to are the need for more democratic forms of government and
- 19 the need for economic development that has in it a capacity
- 20 to have that development widely shared.
- 21 However, we are never going to get those things if a
- 22 military action takes those countries over. So we have to
- 23 provide a shield, as Senator Jackson has said, to support and
- 24 make possible the key objectives that we have.
- 25 Senator Cranston: I know that you share that view. I am

- 1 glad that you do. And I hope that your influence is great in
- 2 moving us in policies that would fulfill the purposes
- 3 consistent with those goals.
- 4 It seems to me that our failure to ratify four treaties
- 5 that were negotiated with the Soviet Union relating to arms
- 6 control matters and nuclear tests has placed some burden on
- 7 us in negotiations with them to come up with approaches that
- 8 can be agreed to by both of us and then ratified in this
- 9 country.
- 10 Secretary Shultz: I agree with that wholeheartedly.
- 11 Senator Cranston: Thank you very much.
- 12 One final question.
- 13 I am concerned about the qualitative nature of the arms
- 14 race, the continuance to modernize which creates more and
- 15 more deadly, more and more destructive, more and more
- 16 accurate weapons, probably increasingly difficult to verify.
- 17 I am not sure how we stop that. I propose a freeze as a
- 18 beginning, and that is only the beginning of something much
- 19 more substantive, to reduce. I know that the administration
- 20 and you differ on the freeze.
- 21 How do we soon arrest the qualitative, modernizing aspect
- 22 of the arms race that threatens to get the whole arms race
- 23 out of hani?
- 24 The Chairman: Mr. Secretary, I know you have to leave at
- 25 12:15. We have four Senators left that have not asked any

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questions. If you could make it concise and fill it in for
    the record if you would like.
        Secretary Shultz: I think arms control negotiations can
    plan an important part of that. The reduction of tensions,
    as we see them through these various regional issues, can
    play an important part of that. The emergence of more
    respect for human rights everywhere, including in the Soviet
    Union, can plan an important part of that. And improved
    bilateral relations may play and important part.
10
        So if we can pursue this agenda creatively and
    effectively, I think it helps in that regard.
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        The Chairman: Thank you.
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        Senator Lugar.
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- 1 Senator Lugar: Mr. Secretary, I think your statement was
- 2 an extraordinary and comprehensive document covering really
- 3 all bases, and I am hopeful that it will be widely read and
- 4 witely shared, as I know you hope it is.
- 5 The question I have is a question that falls just on the
- 6 edges of the various other places you have tacked down. I
- 7 know you have been visiting with the foreign ministers of the
- 8 NATO nations recently, and tried to move them, as you have in
- 9 the past, toward more of a sharing of the global problems
- 10 that the Soviet Union presents, specifically, areas beyond
- 11 NATO, and at the moment, one such area which presents, I
- 12 think, a very formidable challenge is the problem of Syria
- 13 and the SA-5 missiles in particular, which apparently have a
- 14 high degree of Soviet involvement in personnel, maybe
- 15 physically on the ground as well as --
- 16 Secretary Shultz: They are. They are manning those
- 17 weapons, so far as we know.
- 18 Senator Lugar: And their intentions we are not certain
- 19 of, but it seems to me we face a situation you have taken a
- 20 look at not only from NATO but even more on the ground in
- 21 your shuttle diplomacy. What is to be our course in
- 22 attempting to face that challenge both from the standpoint of
- 23 the NATO nations and maybe our own response in the event that
- 24 difficulties ensue? And I am not certain from what source
- 25 they might, but clearly with a Soviet presence there, with a

- 1 volatile situation in Lebanon and in Syria, what will our
- 2 response be, first of all, in the event that Soviets are
- 3 involved with Israel in conflict, and to what extent will we
- 4 be able to draw upon our NATO alliance in either the shifting
- 5 of forces, the sharing of burdens, and various other ways, or
- 6 other responses, given the fact that they, too, have troops
- 7 on the ground as we have in our Marine component?
- 8 Secretary Shultz: That is a very thoughtful and deep
- 9 question. The NATO alliance, of course, addresses a certain
- 10 geographic area, and has a concept to it that is not global.
- 11 It is a limited concept, and so naturally you stay with that
- 12 concept within the NATO joint command and alliance
- 13 responsibilities as such. In the NATO discussions, it is
- 14 recognized that members of the alliance in varying degrees
- 15 for different parts of the world do have interests, and
- 16 sometimes ally themselves in one way or another in different
- 17 parts of the world, and that there are implications for NATO
- 18 when actions are taken or fail to be taken.
- 19 This has increasingly been recognized in the communiques,
- 20 the most recent one that we had in the meeting in Paris last
- 21 week, and the defense ministers also recognized that point.
- 22 So that the notion of efforts beyond NATO is present there.
- 23 You take the Lebanon situation as a good case in point.
- 24 There, there are UNIFIL forces, of course, from a variety of
- 25 countries, and the multinational force is composed of French,

- 1 Italian, U.S., and now British forces, so we are there, but
- 2 that is not a NATO exercise. That is an exercise of these
- 3 countries acting independently of NATO and in a sovereign
- 4 way, but nevertheless knowledgeably in terms of the NATO
- 5 responsibilities.
- 6 So I think the question you have raised is a deep one.
- 7 It is being addressed and worked at as we obviously have to
- 8 serve our global interests and others have to, too.
- 9 Senator Lugar: Let me just probe a bit further, because
- 10 I am deeply concerned, as I know you must be, that conflict
- 11 in that area could occur. We hope not at any moment, but
- 12 just simply we do not know why the Soviets have come in in
- 13 that way, why the Syrians have invited them specifically for
- 14 that purpose.
- 15 Secretary Shultz: I think we can speculate reasonably
- 16 accurately on those points.
- 17 Senator Lugar: Well, this has occurred. What is yor own
- 18 speculation?
- 19 Secretary Shultz: Well, obviously, the Soviet Union
- 20 gains a foothold in that part of the world through their
- 21 military presence. The Israelis, whatever, you can have all
- 22 kinds of arguments about the war in Lebanon. It did not cast
- 23 a lot of glory on the Soviet weaponry, and so they have new
- 24 weaponry in there, and as you pointed out, they are there,
- 25 they are manning those weapons, and it no doubt is an effort

- 1 on their part to restore their credibility and to have a
- 2 presence from the Syrian point of view. It gives them added
- 3 strength as they confront their problems as they see them.
- From our standpoint, I think it raises the risks in the
- 5 area, and we have said this directly to the Soviet Union,
- 6 that they are there, they are associated with the Syrians,
- 7 they are associated with the organized PLO fighters and
- 8 terrorists, but they are also associated with some Iranian
- 9 and PLO and other terrorist groups that are not necessarily
- 10 easy to control. So that raises the risks. And it also
- 11 points up the importance of pushing, as we are pushing, for
- 12 the evacuation of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We are
- 13 fully engaged in the effort to bring about Syrian withdrawal,
- 14 and working with the Lebanese.
- 15 And I might say that yesterday in the vote of the
- 16 Lebanese parliament we had an outstanding event, and we all
- 17 ought to take note of it and give President Gemayal some very
- 18 strong support and hand claps for bringing off the
- 19 ratification of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement, despite
- 20 strenuous efforts by the Syrians to disrupt it and by a
- 21 margin of -- well, we can look it up. I think there were
- 22 only two negative votes and four absentions, and 65 positive
- 23 votes. I think that was the vote. But anyway, it was a
- 24 demonstration of the widespread support for the agreement and
- 25 for the evacuation of all foreign forces in Lebanon.

- 1 Senator Lugar: Mr. Secretary, our position in the
- 2 two-track talks has been one of asking the Soviets to destroy
- 3 SS-20 missiles. We want them to destroy all of them. We
- 4 have given them the option of destroying some of them. Is
- 5 there any evidence whatever, and if not evidence, even
- 6 supposition that the Soviets have any intent of destroying
- 7 any of the SS-20's? At least all rhetoric thus far has been
- 8 that they might move them. That, of course, has antagonized
- 9 the Japanese, and may have constituted a foreign policy
- 10 blunder on the part of the Soviets in their reticence to
- 11 destroy these weapons, but as we approach these negotiations,
- 12 do you have any reasonable grounds to hope that the Soviets
- 13 would in fact destroy the first SS-20?
- 14 Secretary Shultz: Only the general notion that when
- 15 confronted with strength and letermination, and deprived of
- 16 the alternative of derailing the deployments through their
- 17 political efforts, they might regard arms control and less
- 18 spending on military and so on as more desirable for their
- 19 purposes, but we do not have any strong indications in the
- 20 negotiations. I think there have been some hints around the
- 21 edges that maybe they would destroy a missile rather than
- 22 move it, but that is by no means laid out, and it is not on
- 23 the negotiating table.
- 24 Senator Lugar: It may state the obvious, but a freeze
- 25 position from that standpoint would leave all the SS-20's in

- 1 place presumably, and as a result, be a non-negotiable
- 2 situation as far as the Soviets are concerned in perpetuity.
- Secretary Shultz: A freeze right now in the INF area
- 4 would be a hell of a deal for the Soviet Union. It would be
- 5 a terrible deal for us and for our allies.
- 6 Senator Lugar: Thank you very much.
- 7 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Lugar.
- 8 Senator Tsongas?
- 9 Senator Tsongas: Mr. Secretary, following on Senator
- 10 Lugar's point, comparing the Syrian missile sites issue and
- 11 the Middle East generally with Nicaragua, El Salvador,
- 12 Central America generally, which of those two do you believe
- 13 is the most volatile and is more likely to raise the
- 14 possibility of U.S.-Soviet confrontation?
- 15 Secretary Shultz: Well, they are both volatile areas,
- 16 and they both contain risks, and I think the stakes are high
- 17 enough that we need to be engaging ourselves fully in both
- 18 areas. I do not know that it is worthwhile to argue whether
- 19 one is more important than the other.
- 20 Senator Tsongas: But in terms of a risk factor for a
- 21 U.S.-Soviet confrontation, you see them as equally risky, the
- 22 same probability of superpower confrontation?
- 23 Secretary Shultz: I think both represent big problems,
- 24 and big problems for us, and the risks are great in both
- 25 areas. The consequences, the possible consequences are

- 1 sobering, and as I say, I think both merit full attention.
- 2 do not know how to put them on a scale and weigh them very
- 3 well, and I do not know that we need to do that. What we
- 4 need to do is recognize how tremendously important both are.
- 5 Senator Tsongas: In a discussion with a previous
- 6 questioner, you said that you are uncertain as to what view
- 7 of the United States was being transmitted up to the key
- 8 people in the Soviet leadership. Would not a summit be the
- 9 best way of getting around that guestion?
- 10 Secretary Shultz: Well, if it is prepared well enough,
- 11 and there is a substantive outcome, that is possible. It can
- 12 be a constructive thing, as I have said. But I think just a
- 13 sort of general discussion, to have no special drive to it,
- 14 could very well dash hopes rather than do anything that is
- 15 reassuring. I think Senator Pell's point was well taken that
- 16 people are troubled, and so if you are going to do something
- 17 you want to do something that gives genuinely and
- 18 realistically the basis for some reassurance. And if you do
- 19 something that only winds up disturbing them more, I do not
- 20 think that is constructive. So that is a concern.
- 21 Senator Tsongas: Well, you can understand -- you made
- 22 reference to the fact that you have to have unity at home.
- 23 think that is true, but unless something happens, you are
- 24 going to be the only Administration going back to the fifties
- 25 that either did not negotiate a treaty with the Soviets or

- 1 met with them. I mean, everybody else thought there was some
- 2 value to face-to-face negotiation. You are going to end up
- 3 as the only Administration that did not see them.
- 4 Secretary Shultz: So be it. I do not think we want to
- 5 get ourselves in a position where -- I do not say others did
- 6 this. Do not misunderstand me. But we do not want to get
- 7 ourselves in the position of feeling that we do not want to
- 8 be the only Administration that did not make an arms control
- 9 agreement, and therefore let us go make one. That is no way
- 10 to approach it. We should only be ready to make one if it is
- 11 substantively sensible from our standpoint, and if we are not
- 12 able to make one, well, then, that is the way the chips fall.
- Senator Tsongas: That may be true, but the refusal to
- 14 meet, I think, does not wash among the American people.
- Secretary Shultz: There is no refusal to meet. We are
- 16 meeting the Soviet Union in a wide variety of fora
- 17 constantly. The President has repeatedly stated his
- 18 readiness to meet with the Soviet leader on the basis of a
- 19 well-prepared agenda and the possibility of something
 - worthwhile coming out of the meeting. So there is no refusal
- 21 to meet at all.

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- 22 Senator Tsongas: Let me just say, I think part of the
- 23 reason we were so enthusiastic and remain so as to your
- 24 appointment is that you understand very well how you meet
- 25 with people and negotiate. You certainly neutralized all of

- 1 us by coming into all of our offices without an agreement in
- 2 hand. I would just argue for the same approach with
- 3 Andropov.
- 4 Mr. Chairman, we have sat here for two and a half years
- 5 and raised issues like arms control, Namibia, peaceful
- 6 nuclear explosions, et cetera, and the response is, well, we
- 7 are working on it, and we are hopeful that something can be
- 8 worked out. We meet again six months later, and we get the
- 9 same response.
- 10 I think this Committee clearly does not share the
- 11 Administration's view that the Nixon-Ford treaties, threshold
- 12 test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions, are inadequate, and
- 13 I think that we fail in our responsibility to simply raise it
- 14 all the time and jet these non-responses and then look
- 15 forward to the same thing next year. I think the Committee
- 16 should holi hearings, bring these treaties up, let us hold
- 17 hearings, put it on the agenda, and force the Administration
- 18 to come before the American people and explain specifically
- 19 what is your objection, and to explain why Nixon-Ford
- 20 treaties are unacceptable, because they have managed to put
- 21 the issue off, and I would suggest that probably 99 percent
- 22 of the American people have probably no idea that these two
- 23 treaties are sitting here, and the reason they do not know
- 24 about it, I think, basically, is our responsibility.
- 25 So, I would urge the Chairman and the ranking minority

- 1 leader to look at the possibility of bringing that up. I
- 2 would hate to sit here for four years and not have at least
- made an effort to get those treaties out. Let us talk about
- 4 them. Let us see what the problems are. SALT II, I feel the
- 5 same way, but I think those are more arguable. The
- 6 Nixon-Ford treaties, especially because of the on-site
- 7 inspection provision, are enormously important in principle,
- 8 and I would hope that the Committee would hold hearings. Let
- 9 us put it on the agenda, and at least get it out of the
- 10 Committee to give the Administration an incentive to move on
- 11 this matter.
- 12 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Tsongas. We will
- 13 discuss that in some detail with Director Adelman this
- 14 afternoon, as you perhaps know. We will make every effort to
- 15 try to work this out with the Administration. I am all for
- 16 improved verification, and I am well aware of the fact that
- 17 we are concerned about breach of treaties that have occurred,
- 18 and we know that they have occurred in some cases with the
- 19 Soviet Union, and have pointed out clearly to them two and a
- 20 half years ago that those breaches that have occurred, the
- 21 anthrax situation that we had, their failure to follow
- 22 through on the consultation required by our treaties, is a
- 23 setback. They put all the blame on our back, and I said,
- 24 SALT II was not our blame exactly. I do not know whether it
- 25 would have been confirmed or not, but certainly your movement

- 1 into Afghanistan made the discussion of it impossible, and it
- 2 was President Carter and Robert Byrd, the majority leader at
- 3 that time, that said we could not even discuss it because of
- 4 their actions in Afghanistan.
- 5 Senator Kassebaum?
- 6 Senator Tsongas: Mr. Chairman?
- 7 The Chairman: I am sorry. I thought you were finished.
- 8 Senator Tsongas: No.
- 9 Those treaties are before our Committee, so irrespective
- 10 of the Administration's responsibility, we have our own. I
- 11 think we should put that on the agenda and raise it, and I
- 12 would hope that the Committee would see fit to do that.
- 13 Let me raise one final question in response to Senator
- 14 Cranston. You said, we have done nothing to raise tensions
- 15 with the Soviets, and you have also said that it is good to
- 16 put yourself in the position of your negotiator adversary and
- 17 try to sense what their view is. If you were a Soviet, and
- 18 you were asked the same question, what have the Americans
- 19 done to aggravate tensions, what would a Soviet legitimately
- 20 felt response be?
- 21 Secretary Shultz: What they are saying right now to
- 22 people who go to Moscow is that the prospect of deployment of
- 23 U.S. Pershing II's and cruise missiles in Europe is raising
- 24 the tensions, and so on and so on, and this is a provocative
- 25 act, and so forth. I mean, that is what they are using as an

- 1 illustration. And why is that? I pointed that out in my
- response to Senator Cranston as something that it seems to me
- is not provocative on our part unless you have a definition
- 4 of provocation that precludes self-defense. But you asked
- 5 for what they would say. That is what they are now saying.
- 6 They are concentrating on those deployments. That is a very
- 7 focus of attention on their part.
- 8 Senator Tsongas: Do you think that the testing of the
- 9 F-15 antisatellite system this fall is a wise effort without
- 10 even trying to negotiate with the Soviets away that Star Wars
- 11 issue?
- 12 Secretary Shultz: I think we have to develop our own
- 13 strength and capabilities certainly in the kind of world we
- 14 live in.
- 15 Senator Tsongas: Why not at least sit down and talk to
- 16 them before we test?
- 17 Secretary Shultz: I am at something of a disadvantage in
- 18 answering that guestion, but I think the fact is the
- 19 technical situation is such that it is hard to see just where
- 20 you would go in such discussions. The area is much more
- 21 unexplored than other areas of weaponry that are discussed or
- 22 technological development. "
- 23 Senator Tsongas: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
- 24 The Chairman: Thank you, Senator Tsongas.
- 25 Senator Kassebaum?

- 1 Senator Kassebaum: Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you.
- 2 I appreciate your statement, and I hope you will forgive me
- 3 for my foghorn voice, but I just wanted to ask you a couple
- 4 of things. I think you will certainly agree that we need a
- 5 substantive arms control agreement rather than just any
- 6 treaty, and you mentioned that the negotiators had a new
- 7 flexibility. There are a couple of suggestions that have
- 8 been made up here that I think could be supplementary
- 9 agreements to a certain extent that would in no way prejudice
- 10 more in-depth, longer, larger agreement. One would be a
- 11 moratorium on testing of all MIRV'ed ICBM's that have been
- 12 developed since May, 1979. This would encompass the modified
- 13 SS-18's and 19's, and of course the solid fuel missile that
- 14 the Soviets have just begun to test, and our MX.
- 15 It seems to me one of the merits is that it is easily
- 16 verifiable, it does not require long negotiations, it is
- 17 something that can be accepted or rejected. If we propose
- 18 it, if they would agree, then it goes into effect. Another
- 19 suggestion that has been made up here is a resolution
- 20 introduced by Senators Nunn and Levin that calls for an
- 21 exchange of military personnel between the Soviet Union and
- 22 ourselves. These are just a couple of things that I think,
- 23 given the nature of the situation, might be worth exploring,
- 24 and I would like you to comment briefly.
- 25 Secretary Shultz: Well, we need to explore constructive

- 1 ideas. I think we have to be careful on testing, that we do
- 2 not propose something that would be disadvantageous to us,
- 3 given the fact that over the past ten years or so, the Soviet
- 4 modernization effort has been stronger than ours, and we are
- 5 in the process of modernization essentially to regain ground
- 6 that we lost, so to the extent that a testing moratorium made
- 7 it harder for us to engage in the modernization that we need,
- 8 it would be a problem, but at any rate, the idea certainly
- 9 needs to be thought about, just as military exchanges, or
- 10 that is a more expanded version in the sense of what we
- 11 propose to the Soviet Union, which was a military to military
- 12 type communications link, and as I said earlier, while they
- 13 said they did not see any benefit to that, they did not say
- 14 they would not discuss it, but they certainly did give a
- 15 negative response, but these are all things in the nature of
- 16 confidence-building measures that perhaps -- that we are
- 17 pursuing.
- 18 We have a lot on the table, and we need to keep thinking
- 19 about these things, and trying to bring some to fruition.
- 20 Senator Kassebaum: [Presiding] Thank you.
- 21 We have a vote on.
- 22 Senator Pell: Maiame Chairman, I just want to
- 23 interpolate that I strongly support the suggestion of the
- 24 Senator from Massachusetts that we have hearings on those two
- 25 treaties, and my own suggestion that we bring up the genocide

- 1 treaty simultaneously.
- 2 Senator Glenn: Mr. Secretary, I am sorry I could not be
- 3 here earlier. I was tied up on some other things on the
- 4 floor, and I could not get here any earlier, but in the area
- 5 that the Chairman just mentioned, and we are going to have to
- 6 run here, so we just have a minute, I hope we are taking
- 7 cognizance of the verification problems on the new proposals
- 8 being made in Geneva now. Those seem to me to be at the
- 9 heart of whether we are going to be able to have not only the
- 10 past treaties that have never been ratified here, but the new
- ones, the numbers of warheads, for instance, proposed whole
- 12 new levels, magnitudes of difficulty in verification that I
- 13 hope are being male a part of those negotiations also.
- I had wanted to ask about some of that this morning. But
- 15 maybe we could have a brief comment. We all are going to
- 16 have to run and vote right now, so we do not have much time.
- 17 Secretary Shultz: I think your point is well taken, and
- 18 it is being addressed.
- 19 Senator Glenn: [Presiding] All right. That is a good
- 20 short answer. Good. Thank you. I guess I am the last soul
- 21 left here.
- The Committee will stand adjourned subject to the call of
- 23 the Chair, I guess.
- 24 [Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the Committee was adjourned,
- 25 to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]