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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 14, 1983

Dear Congressman Wolf:

Thank you very much for sharing with me the ideas of Mr. Andrew Ness on the problem of Marxist dialectics. The lack of knowledge of Marxist-Leninist ideology, vocabulary and logic is a problem that is growing increasingly widespread as our tendency to view the USSR and other communist powers through mirror images grows correspondingly. I agree wholeheartedly that Marxist dialectics must be studied more intensively if we are to deal effectively with the USSR and international communism in the near future.

I greatly appreciate your concern with this issue, and I commend Mr. Ness for his efforts to highlight one of the critical deficiencies in our dealings with the communist world. I have taken the liberty of passing this information on to the NSC staff member most concerned with this subject.

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable Frank R. Wolf
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

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May 6, 1983

Congressman Frank Wolf
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Dear Sir:

I wish to thank you for your courtesy and attention at our recent meeting. While I realize your opportunities to assist me are limited, I do, nonetheless, appreciate your willingness to circulate my ideas about the need to study a methodological approach to Soviet and communist behavior which will be far more valuable to our policy makers than anything which is now available to them.

I have been greatly concerned for some time that the allocation of more resources or huge appropriations for current programs are "off-track", and that while they may address the problems superficially, they do not and cannot get to the essence of the matter and cannot produce the kinds of results needed by our policy makers to deal effectively with the Soviet Union, China, or world communism.

As you may recall, in our meeting I cited some facts to show that there is a common consensus among Western analysts and scholars that we still do not understand what is going on in the Soviet Union, this despite millions spent to do so over the years by those both in the public and private sector. Former Soviet Ambassador W. Averill Harriman in October of last year stated that American ignorance of the Soviet Union "was very dangerous" and gave \$11 million to Columbia University to revitalize the study of this subject. Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was quoted as saying he was "appalled" at the paucity of Soviet scholars in the Department. A recent PBS broadcast conducted by Hodding Carter, former press secretary for Jimmy Carter, highlighted the fact that the media have been extremely unsuccessful in their efforts to penetrate Soviet realities. Newsmen Harrison Salisbury and Daniel Schorr, both of whom have served in Moscow, affirmed on the same show both the problems of covering the Soviet Union and the dismal press record in doing so effectively.

I mentioned to you that it was the opinion of some of us, based on our own work, that more money spent would not improve our ability to understand the Soviet Union because the problem lies in the methodological approach to communist reality and not in the allocation of more resources or huge appropriations for further and diverse research. I pointed out that the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, along with all other communist parties, has a specific method, one which they call the dialectical method, and which they say guides all their activities. That this method is vital to their political and revolutionary offensive can be established beyond all doubt,

and that they apply it consistently in their practical activities directed against the free world can be equally verified. Various communist leaders have referred to dialectics as a "weapon", as "the heart and soul of Marxism-Leninism", and as "our spiritual atom bomb." Its study has been too long ignored by our specialists and analysts.

Our research has confirmed this to be so, as it would for any serious scholar using primary source material and wishing to make the proper study. I suggested that for a very small sum our government could examine this method and verify for itself the fact that using it to analyze Soviet and other communist behavior would prove to be far superior to any other method or combination of methods now being used, and that it contains a high degree of predictive capability regarding Sino-Soviet intentions. I cited as an example the Polish crisis which erupted two years ago at which time, in the face of much contrary opinion, we said the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact countries would not enter Poland and cited a number of reasons. History has proved the accuracy of this observation.

Further, as I pointed out my institute was the only one employing Marxist-Leninist methodology to interpret Soviet and Chinese policies and actions, and that this method, which the Soviets and other parties say is the single most important weapon in their revolutionary arsenal, has been ignored and unstudied by our government and by analysts in the private sector. I then noted that a correct understanding of the method would make it possible for our policy makers to correctly understand and evaluate Soviet intentions. From this vantage point it would permit us to gain strategic and tactical initiative in a variety of ways and thereby put the Soviet Union and its supporters on the defensive.

I pointed out a glaring example of our deficiency which exists at the arms talks in Geneva citing a story about Lt. General Rowny's comments concerning Andropov. He is reported as saying: "If you'll excuse a pun, we're in for a trial by Yuri [Andropov]. This man really understands us and knows how to twist words. . . . You know, they preempt our words. It's like Alice in Wonderland. Words mean whatever they want them to mean." While certainly this this is only one of the more recent examples we have of our inability to deal with the Soviets, it is not the twisting of words which is the issue. The problem is that Rowny and our negotiators fail to understand the use of dialectical concepts -- indeed, they give the impression that they are not even aware of their existence. I believe I mentioned that no significant Soviet delegation goes anywhere in the world to negotiate anything without at least one dialectician in the group to evaluate proposals from this angle, while there is no single U.S. delegation which goes anywhere for discussions with the Soviet Union, China or to other socialist countries which has an understanding of the Marxist-Leninist dialectical method, and how it is used and applied by the communists to gain their ends. We cannot negotiate effectively if we do not have a basic understanding of how our adversaries approach the process.

The well-known Soviet scholar on American Affairs, G. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA Academy of Sciences of the USSR, stated the scope of the of the problem in clear and unequivocal terms a decade ago, and it is as applicable now as when he first voiced it:

The fact is that we are witnessing a world-wide collision of the two basic classes of modern society representing two social systems -- the capitalist and the proletariat. . . .

The fact that the pivot of the struggle has become the contradiction between the two world systems representing the two principal antagonistic classes of contemporary society. . . . Here the crucial point is that it is essentially an antagonistic struggle which leads not to any reciprocal drawing together or even the fusion of the two systems, as is maintained by the exponents of the 'convergence' theory, but to the victory of the most advanced system, socialism. (emphasis added).

This world view has been consistently supported by the highest level of Soviet leadership. There are no official Soviet statements indicating that they are interested in a permanent live-and-let-live situation with non-socialist/communist countries, or that a desire for harmony with our social system is a part of their policy formulations. Quite the contrary, it is "an antagonistic struggle" in which there will be only one victor.

Hopefully Mr. Wolf, you will understand my concern about our approach to the study of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. If we continue to ignore their basic methodology, we cannot interpret their actions correctly, and cannot, therefore, act correctly or efficiently in our own interests. If we are serious about the defense of our social system, we must give attention to the study and application of the "dialectical method." If we do not, the only result will be to continue to misinterpret Sino-Soviet intentions, thus leaving ourselves on the political defensive around the world and aiding the Soviets in their "antagonistic struggle" against us and others who do not share their outlook.

Senator Lugar has introduced legislation establishing a \$50 million trust fund from which the collected interest will be distributed by the National Council for Soviet and Eastern European Research to fund Soviet studies and encourage scholars in the field. Again, I urge that before more money be given to programs which have over the years have failed to provide the kind of methodology and answers needed to deal effectively with the Soviet Union, China, and the countries of Eastern Europe, full consideration should be given to the study of the dialectical method to determine its validity as a proper analytical tool for understanding Soviet or Chinese policies and intentions. Such study could be made for a very modest sum.

Sincerely yours,



Andrew Ness
President

REVOLUTIONARY DIALECTICS: THE METHOD TO WIN

LADIES AND GENTLEMEN:

I am sure some of you here today have read books and magazine articles on dialectical materialism, which is, as you know, the overall philosophy of the world communist movement. Most of our larger libraries have many books covering the subject to one degree or another.

What I am going to talk about is not dialectical materialism as such, but about the very specific and extremely important aspect of that philosophy called materialist dialectics which constitutes the laws and conceptual language of the world communist movement, and which is well understood and used by all properly trained high-level communists, whether they be Soviets, Chinese, or Nicaraguans.

However, before launching into my discussion of dialectics and the dialectical method, I should like to put it first into what I hope will be a useful perspective by sketching some broad historical developments which some of us believe have put us where we are today.

Since World War II, American foreign policy has responded to two vastly different features presented by the communist world. The first was that of the Stalin era, when American foreign policy, as well as that of our allies, was essentially successful because the communist threat to free Western institutions was clearly posed and recognized.

Our response was effective and assured because it conformed to the real nature of the communist offensive, which under Stalin was based upon a concept of "unity" in everything. Stalin did, in fact, lead a monolithic movement, and his basic form of struggle involved military threats and even outright aggression. Under Stalin's influence the general line of the International Communist Movement was undiversified, and it emanated from a single leading center, the Soviet Union.

The practical consequence of that monolith was, if you will, a corresponding monolithic anti-communist unity in the West, a unity so complete that America's allies willingly acknowledged the United States to be the leader of the free world, and accepted its military might as the principal deterrent to communist expansion.

The post-Stalin period has been far less successful for the West. This, in the opinion of some of us, is due to the fact that the communists have posed their threat in quite a different way, one which has led to a lot of doubt and confusion on our side about its true nature, even to the point where some have been led to ask whether a threat exists at all.

Briefly what happened was that 81 Communist parties met in Moscow in 1960 and set forth a comprehensive and unanimously accepted program of development and struggle for the years ahead, recognized that Stalin's monolithic approach no longer served the movement, and accepted the need to shatter the West's own anti-communist monolith. The slogan "unity in

diversity" evolved from this meeting, and from that time on the West began to see signs of division in the communist movement. Things didn't happen as they had under Stalin. On the communist side there was increasing flexibility in the way in which the fight against their enemies could be conducted.

On our side, however, we continued to act as though there was only a single form of communist unity, the kind which existed under Stalin. We saw signs of "independence" in their new diversity, and we began to see all the emerging arguments among communists as deviations from Marxism-Leninism--as a breaking down, and a breaking-up, of the communist world. We took their differences and divisions to mean that they no longer had unity. These perceptions became so distorted that former Secretary of Defense Elliot Richardson made a speech before the Advertising Council in 1969 in which he said, ". . . The unity of communist discipline or dogma is increasingly a phenomenon of the past. In fact, the term 'communist' now covers such a multiplicity of states, parties, and tendencies as to have little usefulness."

Unfortunately, our failure to recognize the form of struggle implicit in their slogan "unity in diversity" has had tragic consequences for us, and this will continue to be the case until we realize that the Communist world is both united and divided at the same time, but in a special way, a dialectical way.

Part of the difficulty may come from the communist language, which has been variously described as Aesopian, coded, occult, a problem of semantics. But whether stemming from language or substance the fact remains we have not solved the intellectual problems which the communists have presented to us.

Let me give a brief example. In early 1977, the Chinese put forth a comprehensive strategy for the final defeat of capitalism and, of course, the United States. It was, and still is called "The Theory of the Three Worlds." In essence, it provides an orientation for all Marxist-Leninist parties in their struggle against the United States through the formation of a world-wide front. The front is to be composed principally of third world countries, plus the progressives and communists in the second and first worlds. It is a specific plan about how to win the world without a war. As far as I can tell, it is still unstudied in the West.

I will mention still other examples as we go along.

As I indicated, my talk today is not about philosophy nor ideology, but about a concrete and scientific "method". It is a method with principles and laws which are used with precision, the results of which are quantifiable--and anyone thoroughly familiar with it can tell whether he is applying his ideology and methodology correctly. Dialectics is not an ambiguous doctrine, it is not something which communists use as some ex post facto cosmetic to justify actions already taken. In fact, it is more precise than most, if not all, of the social sciences, political and economic sciences, and such sciences of the mind as psychology, and it is at least as complicated to learn well as any of them. Communists spend years in higher party schools studying it. F. Konstantinov, a Soviet ideologist, said about its importance in a 1970 Kommunist article: "Without dialectics and historical materialism, Marxism does not and cannot exist."

The Soviets are well aware of Western disinterest in, if not aversion to, the dialectical method. In the 1963 edition of Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism, they said: ". . . Many scientists and philosophers in capitalist countries are to this day afraid of dialectics, do not know of it and do not study it, regard it with prejudice and take their cue from metaphysics."

Yet, I will state categorically that without an understanding of this method, their dialectical method, we cannot properly understand what the communists say or what they do, nor can we take consistent and effective counter measures in our own defense. It is precisely our failure to understand the way in which theory, practice and the dialectical method are integrated into revolutionary activity which has created intellectual and analytical problems for us, and has kept our crystal ball cloudy.

In essence, if it were not for the dialectical method we would not even have a problem with communism.

There is little doubt that the internal and external policies of the Soviet Union, China, and the other 12 countries which comprise the socialist camp, as well as the policies of the many fraternal parties around the world, pose serious analytical problems for Western scholars and analysts. I think two brief quotations may attest to this confusion. Shortly after World War II, Winston Churchill described Russia as "a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma," while in 1968 an editorial in the International Edition of the New York Herald Tribune commented upon our scholarship on China by saying, "Never before in the history of mankind has a subject of such great importance been less known by so many." The problem has been highlighted in newspaper headlines, with one Jack Anderson column entitled, "China Watchers Peer Through A Fog," and another labeled: "Kremlin Crystal Ball Cloudy To Experts." Thus it seems that no approach developed in the West thus far has consistently opened the door to dependable and accurate evaluation of communist reality.

There is no better more recent illustration of our failure to understand this problem after more than sixty years than the 11 million dollar gift by W. Averell Harriman to the Russian Institute at Columbia University in October 1982: its purpose, to promote American studies of the USSR.

Harriman, in presenting this gift, was reported in the New York Times as saying that American ignorance of the Soviet Union "was very dangerous." He said, "It is absolutely essential that this country know what is going on in the Soviet Union."

Newsweek magazine, in commenting upon Harriman's offer, cited still another example of the problem we face. I quote: "Former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was 'appalled' when he joined the government in 1977 and looked for Soviet experts. 'Not only was there a paucity of people within the government itself,' he remembers, 'but as I looked around at the academic world, what Soviet research that did exist had fallen on hard times.'"

Ladies and Gentlemen, in the period since Lenin took over more than 60 years ago, Western governments and private institutions have poured millions upon millions of dollars into diverse forms of research in an effort to understand the Soviet Union, China, and the political and economic philosophy of the

world communist movement. Mr. Harriman is now generously giving 11 million more. This is indeed an excellent opportunity to revitalize our research on this important subject. However, if those individuals and scholars chosen for this study continue to look at things through the lens of the past, and if they continue to ignore what the communists call the "heart and soul" of Marxism, the dialectical method, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that they will only reproduce the results of the past.

Now let us examine just a couple of simple analytical problems, before going on with a further discussion of the dialectical method.

One popular approach which some analysts have used for many years is the "thesis, antithesis, synthesis" approach, even though it has been long rejected by Marxist-Leninists.

This approach simply is not useful, and here is why! If, on a class basis we take as our thesis the bourgeoisie of the capitalist society, and as our antithesis the proletariat of the socialist society, what then is the synthesis of the two? The answer is that we would have some kind of hodge-podge social mixture comprising both classes living together. However, this is precisely what we have in capitalist countries at the present time, and the communists reject it. Why? Because they believe it is the historical mission of the proletariat to rule the world, and a co-mingling of the two classes would not be a victory for the world's proletariat, but a defeat. If we then apply this same logic on an international political level and substitute the words socialism and capitalism, we would again have a co-mingling, but in this case of two opposing societies, a "convergence," if you will, and this too would be a defeat for the communists.

What then do the Communists mean by synthesis? When communists speak of synthesis there is no disagreement among them, whether they be Chinese, Soviet, or others. Mao Zedong graphically described "synthesis" as a "swallowing up", a case where the bourgeoisie is synthesized or "swallowed up" by the world's proletariat. Thus, for Marxist-Leninists, the synthesis takes place by eliminating the bourgeoisie, the capitalist system, and our way of life.

The Soviet Union describes the process less graphically, but neither less precisely nor with different intent. They say synthesis dialectically unites the parts of a thing in "such a way that the whole is illuminated by the main and essential feature of the phenomenon." Since the "main and essential" feature for them must always serve a revolutionary purpose, the world revolutionary victory, their view too is that of a "swallowing-up."

I would like to cite still another example of a different kind of Western analytical approach. This one is known as "content analysis." Zagoria used it in part in his book, The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961, to analyze the then developing Sino-Soviet polemic. While useful, perhaps, to some Western scholars, it did little to define this polemic as understood and developed by the participants.

When using such methods to study Sino-Soviet and communist reality, I believe we can appropriately ask the following question: "Do the communists themselves use such methods to understand one another?" For example, when the Kremlin leaders receive an official party document concerning matters

of mutual revolutionary interest from the Chinese, do they then apply the "thesis-antithesis-synthesis" or "content analysis" method to understand it? And, when the Soviet communists communicate to the leaders of the Communist Party of China, do the Chinese leaders then sit down and do the same thing to determine what the Soviets are saying to them?

I think we can all agree that it is unlikely.

The question we should ask, I believe, assuming that we find all of our present approaches deficient, is whether or not there is a methodology which will enable us to understand and interpret communist revolutionary theory and practice as they do, and, if so, what it is and where we might learn it.

I suggest that logic leads us to examine materials which the communists themselves have produced to see if they contain any clues about how communists understand and inform each other. Such research would reveal that there is a common agreement among them as to the "key" or "method" for understanding what they say and do, and the research would further show that the "key" or method is materialist dialectics, and that this refers specifically and concretely to a particular kind of dialectics--their kind of dialectics, and no other.

What then do they mean by Marxist-Leninist dialectics?

The Soviet Dictionary of Philosophy says this about it: "Dialectics is the science of the most general laws governing the development of nature, society, and thought." That seems to take care of the theoretical aspect: it encompasses everything, and applies to everything. But how is it valuable to them? Again, the Dictionary tell us, "The strategy and tactics of the struggle for communism are framed to conform fully to the dialectico-materialistic world outlook." Thus, dialectics tells them their laws, plans, policies and actions, and how to apply them in practice to win the world for socialism and communism.

Sometimes at about this point skeptics who cannot contain themselves have interrupted to make some comment about the demise of communism, criticized such an all embracing philosophy and methodology as rubbish, and, usually with some flourishes, dismissed Marxist-Leninist dialectics for themselves, for all others, and for all time. Needless to say, this kind of unilateral negation has no impact upon the truth of the matter, nor upon the communists. Furthermore, it is precisely this view which the communists seek to foster via their own communications networks.

If, after all, dialectics is the "heart and soul of Marxism", their "spiritual atom bomb", their "sharp weapon", then it is useful to their objectives to have it dismissed as invalid and unimportant by those against whom it is directed. They can then use it with impunity, knowing that it is neither studied nor understood, and, that the "enemy", therefore, cannot respond correctly to what they do. I think a quotation from Mao Zedong aptly addresses itself to this point and that it has a quality of truth which transcends any revolutionary context.

Mao Said: "Unless you have investigated a problem you will be deprived of the right to speak on it. Isn't that too harsh? Not in the least. When you have not probed into a problem, into the present facts and its past history, and know nothing of its essentials whatever you say about it will undoubtedly be nonsense . . . You must investigate! You must not talk nonsense."

Certainly unstudied and unsupported negations of that which Marxist-Leninists agree is the most important aspect of their revolutionary lives, cannot help our discussion. I ask you to keep an open mind until I am finished.

How important is the dialectical method to them? Well, one of the most internally divisive wars in this nation's history, the Vietnam war, was won by the North Vietnamese and the combined unity of the world revolutionary forces because of their acceptance of and commitment to Marxism-Leninism, and the application of the dialectical method and concepts which are its heart and soul. As early as December 1970, well before our defeat in 1975, Pham Van Dong, then Premier of North Vietnam, taunted the leaders of this country in the following way. He said that North Vietnam could not lose the war because they had a secret, a secret which neither President Nixon, the White House, nor the Pentagon could uncover. Some of us have always believed that this "secret" was their knowledge and practice of Marxist-Leninist dialectics.

However, there was still the practical application of dialectics which was required for their victory in Vietnam. It was called "People's War," and it, like so many Marxist-Leninist concepts and ideas, received short shrift from our analysts, despite its key role in our defeat in Vietnam. Don't be deceived by the military sounding characterization of the title. It is not devoted exclusively to war, guerrilla activity, or insurgency. It is, on the contrary, a comprehensive plan which dialectically combines all forms of struggle which can be employed by the communists against their enemies, and it includes political, economic, social, cultural, intellectual, and all peaceful and non-peaceful forms of struggle. Yet, the political and revolutionary implications are virtually unstudied in the West, and cannot really be fully understood and developed without a thorough knowledge of dialectics.

I began this talk by pointing out that many books had been written on the subject of Marxism-Leninism, and I should like to add a further observation. If we examined the table of contents or the indexes of these books we would seldom find a mention of the dialectical method, and in none would we find an explanation of what this method is or how it is used. We can, in fact, conclude on the basis of our literature search that we in the West are woefully ignorant of this method.

To further substantiate this view, I would like to quote Professor G. D. Damien who wrote two articles on the subject of dialectics for the 1968 and 1970 editions of the University of Pennsylvania quarterly Orbis. There are many useful points in these two articles. I shall quote but a few. He said:

Despite a half century of communism in the USSR, the pragmatic West remains ignorant of the dialectical mode of conflict thinking and of the fact that communists use two modes of thought and reasoning: They understand and communicate with formal logic, but they reason with dialectics. The West understands, communicates, and reasons only with formal logic.

The political elite among our foreign policy makers apparently do not understand that dialectical analysis is of paramount importance to our security.

To the pramatic logician of the West, conflict is the most important dysfunctional component of the Sino-Soviet relationship: it is tangible precursory evidence of the ultimate failure of world communism.

But Damien then goes on to make this additional critical point:

Conflict-development is the most important functional, not dysfunctional, component of the Sino-Soviet relationship complex, not withstanding the fact that to the logical analyst this statement may seem absurd.

Damien states that Sino-Soviet arguments and tensions are an integral and positive part of the developmental relationship between the two communist powers. It is natural to their outlook and belief system, not foreign to it.

Two more thoughts from Damien are in order:

When Peking negates Moscow and Moscow negates Peking, this double negation is not destructive but constructive, for the law of negation of the negation operates as a precise mathematical multiplier of the negative and positive structural components and methodological aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship complex.

The logical Western mind does not understand that Sino-Soviet categorical conflict-development is salutary to the Sino-Soviet relationship.

While Damien's point of view obviously runs contrary to virtually all Western analyses of the Sino-Soviet conflict, his statements are quite support-able through dialectical logic. Where the vast majority of people in the Western world see the Sino-Soviet dispute as a divisive struggle for power filled with acrimonious debate between two communist giants, the fact remains that as the polemic is carried on between the two, as well as among the other communist parties, it can be said that from their viewpoint the real nature of their struggle is unifying. I would suggest that when the Chinese say, "to attack the Soviet Union is to defend the Soviet Union," they are, in fact, confirming precisely what Professor Damien said. The Soviets have made similar statements about the Chinese.

Is it possible that internal struggle actually helps the communists to improve themselves? Here is what Lenin said about it:

Without struggle there cannot be any sorting out, and without sorting out there can be no successful advance, and also no solid unity. And those who are now begining to struggle are by no means destroying unity. . . . open and direct struggle is one of the essential conditions for restoring unity.

Certainly the Sino-Soviet polemic of "open and direct struggle" conforms to Lenin's condition for maintaining unity.

Ladies and Gentlemen, let me now take a moment and get very technical, very precise, and, moreover, let me give you the "heart and soul" of Marxism and the dialectical method in just a few sentences. I can state without equivocation that if you understand these few sentences in all their implications you will find no mystery in Marxism-Leninism, no Aesopian language to decode, no semantical problems, and you will have a new appreciation and understanding of communist reality quite contrary to that which you may now hold.

Here is a succinct description of the dialectical method of analysis which appeared in Peking Review, on December 1, 1978. The ideas contained in this summary can be compared with a variety of Soviet texts, and one will find no discrepancies between the two.

[The theory of the unity of opposites] is the kernel of dialectics. The law of the unity of opposites is the fundamental law governing the development of the universe. The Marxist theory of the unity of opposites holds that there are contradictory, mutually exclusive, opposing tendencies or aspects in everything, that is, contradictions are inherent in everything.

The interdependence of the contradictory aspects present in all things and the struggle between these aspects determine the life of all things and push forward their development.

There is nothing that does not contain contradiction; without contradiction nothing would exist.

Contradiction consists of two aspects -- identity and struggle. The identity of contradiction, that is, the dependence of its two aspects on each other and their transformation into each other, is relative and conditional, while the struggle of the two aspects of a contradiction is absolute and unconditional.

The combination of conditional, relative identity and unconditional, absolute struggle constitutes the movement in all things.

Because the identity of contradiction is conditional, different conditions form contradictions of a different nature. Contradictions exist universally while at the same time each has its particularity. The universality of contradiction resides in the particularity of contradiction.

The struggle between opposites in contradiction is absolute, but the methods of resolving contradictions, that is, the forms of struggle, vary with the differences in the nature of the contradictions. Some contradictions are antagonistic while others are not, and so it is necessary to differentiate between the particular forms of the struggle of opposites in contradiction.

There it is, the "sharp weapon" and the "spiritual atom bomb" of the world revolutionary process. While it may seem to some of you to be gibberish, Marxist-Leninists firmly believe that its correct use, understanding and application will determine whether they will win or lose. The same might be said for us. However, I can assure you, that a thorough understanding of that which I have just presented would clarify for you aspects of communist reality in a way not previously perceived, and, more importantly, it would make it unnecessary to search any further for other methods or explanations. This is the key and their greatest revolutionary secret.

Fundamentally there are only two ways to view communist phenomena, policies, revolutionary behavior and actions. One is "their way" and the other is "not-their-way," or any other way. When reading the analyses about China and the Soviet Union which appear in the media, or indeed, by many of our best governmental and academic analysts, we get the distinct impression that they believe communists view reality in the same fashion as we do, that they are subject to the same constraints, follow the same logic--and, after all, "facts are facts" and must be the same for everyone.

However, the assumption that this is true, or mostly true, flies in the face of innumerable factual and contrary assertions by Marxist-Leninists themselves. For example, they say there are "two world outlooks", and that these are "opposite and opposing" outlooks. Without trying to define them for you, since they are well covered in the literature, I would like to comment upon the practical result of such a viewpoint.

If, as they say, their world outlook is different and the opposite of ours, then, I suggest, common sense tells us they are not going to perceive the same facts and reality in the same way we do. They don't, and I believe the examples in my talk will amply illustrate this.

Perhaps one of the single most useful concepts towards understanding dialectics which I can present to you in a non-technical way is the following: "Struggle" promotes development, and without struggle there is no development. This applies to everything--to all phases of man's existence. Understanding this in a broad sense can help explain a lot of Marxist-Leninist developments, even without a deep knowledge of dialectics.

Professor Damien was referring to struggle when he talked of "conflict thinking." And, as he so rightly pointed out, "struggle or conflict-thinking" is not a dysfunctional element for the communists, but the single most important element in the whole of their ideology. Everything is predicated upon it.

Thus, for communists to develop within a party they must struggle to become better communists, and this they do through the study of that which is correct, their orthodoxy, and by learning to fight against its opposite, revisionism. It is through the struggle to fight revisionism that they promote the orthodoxy of the movement. This is an internal manifestation of struggle. There are conflicts within a communist party, different members have different ideas, and these ideas will be basically right or wrong. Therefore, the form

of struggle which takes place inside the party to resolve their differences is criticism and self-criticism. This is enshrined in party constitutions.

Since the method is one used within the party to settle differences, it is also the unanimously accepted method for resolving differences between and among communist parties as well. The arguments and the discussions which take place among communist parties, including the Chinese and the Soviets, are in fact quite natural to their belief system, and, indeed, are the only way in which their differences can be resolved. As not only Lenin said, but as Professor Damien so correctly pointed out, such internal debates are natural, positive developments, "not withstanding the fact that to the logical analyst this may seem absurd."

Struggle also has an external aspect, that is, it applies also to the conflict between world capitalism and world socialism. However, here the form of resolution is quite different. Since this conflict is one between communists and their enemies, the way to resolve these differences is through revolution, and, in the last analysis, through violent revolution. What then is the content of dialectical struggle?

Ladies and Gentlemen, any dialectical struggle assumes two basic directions. It is always "for" something and "against" something at the same time. In dialectical terms these two aspects are present in every conflict, whether intellectual or physical. Therefore, in dialectical thinking, whatever communists are "for" they are always "against" its opposite and vice versa.

I wish to illustrate this point with a little story. Let us assume that we all go to the same church on Sunday, and let us further assume that we will be in attendance on each Sunday for a month. On the first Sunday of our common visit the minister states he will conduct a series of talks on the subject of sin. Indeed, for the entire month the minister talks about sin in all its various forms and with all its attendant evils. Moreover, during the various sermons he looks at us collectively and individually and points to us and calls us all sinners. He tells us the only way we can be saved is to fight against evil and sin. Indeed, he yells at us, perhaps even screams in order to emphasize his point.

Surely there would not be one among us who would not know that while the minister was talking against sin he was in fact promoting virtue. We would know this despite the fact that during the four weeks of sermons he never once mentioned the word virtue. It would be clear to us without being told. Further, when he called us sinners we would know he was not "against" us but "for" us. We would know he was clearly "against" the very bad aspects in our lives, yet would realize that he was trying to defend us through his attack on the negative aspects of our lives--those sins we might have committed as well as those which through carelessness, whim, or intent, we might yet commit.

Now I would like to add just one more factor to this scenario. Let us presume that it was possible for an outsider to have joined our congregation for the four Sundays. Let us further assume that this person was a total stranger to our value systems, knew nothing of our sense of morality, knew nothing of our outlook or thinking patterns, yet was still a person who could understand English. What impression could the visitor have? He would clearly have seen a constant attack upon the congregation, upon what he perceived must be the viewpoint of the congregation, and, very likely would have concluded that the minister and congregation have nothing in common; in effect, have no unity.

We knew that the minister was talking of virtue, the need to be virtuous, to practice and lead a virtuous life, but to one unschooled in our outlook, well, he could easily see just the opposite; he could see the preacher and the congregation as badly divided on a very important issue. He would fail to see, most likely, the unity which the apparent division was producing. This is, it seems to some of us, analagous to the view of many on the Sino-Soviet polemic. Failing to understand their method, we also fail to see how the attack can help them and the revolution.

We fail to see that, dialectically, the two most important opposite and opposing aspects in their ideology are one, their orthodoxy, and two, the revisionism which always threatens their orthodoxy. Virtue and vice, if you will.

And how is communist orthodoxy maintained and developed? Or any orthodoxy for that matter, Republican! Democrat! the Christian faith, or any belief system. In essence, all are maintained and developed in basically the same way as is communist orthodoxy. You promote your orthodoxy, the basic tenets upon which your faith or organization is based, by "fighting" and "struggling" against those ideas and elements which are hostile to it, and which, if considered, accepted and integrated, would have the practical effect of transforming your beliefs and organization into something else.

Marxist-Leninists promote their orthodoxy by struggling against its dialectical opposite, revisionism. This is a continuous struggle. In 1960, at their meeting in Moscow, the 81 Communist parties agreed that the single most important threat to their internal security and to the development of Marxism-Leninism was "revisionism", and they agreed they would combat it everywhere in all its manifestations in all parties. This they have done and are doing every day.

Thus, strange as it may seem, to the communist theoreticians, China's criticism of the CPSU actually helps the Soviet party to protect and develop its orthodoxy. The Soviet criticism of "Maoism," which is simply a euphemism for revisionism, helps the Chinese develop their Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy in the same way. The mutual struggle to improve through the elimination of errors is a revolutionary duty. It is also useful to note that the term "Maoism" was not originally a communist term. It was first introduced into the jargon of Marxism by several Harvard professors, whereupon communists seized upon it as still another tool with which to fight us and to add to the general confusion.

The problem is not much more complicated than I have suggested it, but the application of the method in practical terms is much more involved. This view can be substantiated fully with primary source material, and a knowledge of dialectics. The point is that struggle promotes their development--if you have their outlook.

This leads to an all too brief mention of the Sino-Soviet polemic and whether or not it is real. To discuss this polemic in all its manifestations would take far more time than is available to us. However, I can state that, dialectically, it is both real and yet it is not. Or, put another way, the Sino-Soviet dispute is not what it seems to most Western analysts to be; it is instead what it does not seem to be. My point is this: the polemic

is a unifying struggle conducted in accordance with a specific set of dialectical rules and principles. I don't want you to get the impression that it is a big fraud or conspiracy in the sense in which we would use those terms. Many of the arguments and criticism are about serious developments. However, it is, after all, a polemic, and it is in its essence a theoretical struggle designed to resolve revolutionary problems in a way complementary to that revolution. The polemic is not about disagreement over winning but about how to win. Unfortunately, taking its appearance for its dialectical essence works terribly to our disadvantage.

I should like now to talk a little about "criticism and self-criticism" as it relates both to struggle and the solution of internal problems among communists

Since Marxist-Leninists contend that there is nothing which does not contain contradiction and struggle, then it is perfectly natural, according to their logic, to find that struggle and contradiction should exist between party members and their leadership. The same applies between and among communist parties.

This is not, as some might think, some manic obsession with the idea of struggle, but is a method to resolve differences, and is accepted by all communist parties without exception, certainly including the Soviets and Chinese.

Communist ideologists have written extensively on the subject of criticism, and the Soviets have commented as follows:

Criticism and self-criticism is the force that reduces the possibility of errors. . . . It also brings out errors as they arise.

. . . The strongest weapon the party has to bring out the contradictions and eliminate them is criticism and self-criticism.

The Chinese have expressed themselves in the following manner:

Criticism and self-criticism is a method for resolving internal contradictions among the people and it is the only method. Beside it there is no other method.

Therefore, I think it is clear that to criticize is a Marxist-Leninist virtue. However, it is a special method for them. Basically there are two directions which it can take. One is destructive criticism, where the purpose is to destroy the object of the criticism, and the other is constructive, and here it is done in such a way as to improve the object of the criticism.

It is absolutely essential to understand that when this method is employed among communists they mean it to be an ideological struggle and not any other type of struggle. It is to serve to educate communists and the masses, to prevent errors from being made, and to correct those which are made. In this fashion individuals and parties can work to overcome their insufficiencies.

The Chinese have said this as well as anybody:

All problems of an ideological nature, all debatable questions among the people, can be settled by means of democratic methods, through discussions, criticism, persuasion and education: they cannot be resolved through coercive and authoritarian methods.

Even we use this method to some extent. A wife who criticizes her husband repeatedly for some real or imagined fault is usually trying to help him. However, the husband, not being a willing supporter of the method, considers it nagging. Of course, the same can apply when the roles are reversed. We are not unfamiliar with the role of criticism in our lives, but we do not often use it in a conscious fashion with the witting acquiescence of all concerned.

Let me set forth some of the key ideas related to this method and illustrate how they are applied in a practical way to serve the revolution and fight us.

Like everything else, the dialectical condition to promote the proper climate for the use of this method is divided into two.

In the first instance, there must be a conscious and conscientious practice of the method by each of the party members. In the second instance, each party member must understand that when he uses criticism against the party, or against individuals in the party, he is doing so from a desire for unity, and that the purpose of the criticism is both to benefit both himself and increase party unity.

The Chinese created the slogan: "unity-criticism-unity." This means that all communists start with a basic unity predicated upon the principles of Marxism-Leninism, criticize the negative factors of revolutionary development, and so arrive at a new, higher level of unity on a new basis. It is not a matter of either having unity or not having it. All Marxist-Leninists are unified on the principles of their ideology, but since conditions determine its practical applications, differences can arise as to how to apply their principles in a revolutionary situation. Thus, they argue not about their principles, but the best way to apply them. They are arguing about who has the best ideas for winning, and must, therefore, constantly seek to redefine the nature of their unity on such developments. This they do through dialectical struggle.

Ladies and Gentlemen, all communist debates and polemics are conducted in the same way, and we should not focus on or be carried away with the direction of "against", with those things about which they seem to be opposing each other. Rather, we should look at the direction of "for" and what it is they are trying to accomplish through the debate.

Despite the most acrimonious and hostile sounding language which the Soviets have used against the Chinese and vice versa, nowhere is there a single statement to the effect that one wishes to destroy the other. As a matter of fact, each admits the other is a socialist state. The criticism from one to the other is done with the idea of improving the revolutionary situation, and not making it worse.

Now, I have talked mostly about internal struggle within and among communist parties. Obviously struggle must also be conducted against the enemy. Let me comment most briefly on this very complex subject.

Since the communists want to win the world without a nuclear exchange, and since most communist leaders do not expect to see the communist victory in their lifetimes, they must, as they have said so many times in so many places, employ all forms of struggle against the enemy. This is the essence of "People's War" which I mentioned earlier. How many forms of struggle are there? If there were more time I might ask you to guess, but let me give you some idea. There are well over 250. In 1972 a Harvard professor of sociology and political science named Gene Sharp presented a background paper to a conference in Sweden. In this paper he listed 198 ways to fight a government without using violent means.

Now, if we add those to the many forms of violent struggle which exist such as guerrilla warfare, insurgency, war, riots, violent demonstrations, diverse forms of terrorism, assassinations, and more, we can see that a dedicated revolutionary force has a tremendous number of options with which to attack democratic institutions without resorting to the use of outside forces and without resorting to a real war between the principal countries of the two social systems, and I believe, very importantly, without the need for constant guidance by outside communist parties. The CPSU and the CPC, for example, do not have to direct the revolution of other parties because the ideology itself is the coordinating factor, and the forms of struggle to be used depend upon the concrete conditions in a given country, and these are best determined not by the Soviet or Chinese parties, but by the indigenous communist party.

However, dialectically, that is, from a Marxist viewpoint, all these different forms of struggle which are used all around the world really must be subsumed under the main form of struggle in the world today. Kapitsa, a leading Soviet theoretician/dialectician, has said that "peaceful coexistence" is the main form of struggle in the world today. Please notice, I said main form of struggle in the world today. Peaceful coexistence, in case anyone has any doubts, is not a condition for "peace", but a condition for the improvement of the "struggle."

The key terms are cold war, detente, and peaceful coexistence, and we have been yanked around on this lanyard for several decades. In the beginning there was the cold war. The communists were against this and worked diligently to transform this aspect of peaceful coexistence into detente. Why? Because under the conditions of the cold war the whole revolutionary process was stymied due to the effectiveness of the anti-communist unity in the West.

But, if there was a "cold war" there must be a dialectical opposite, and that was to be "detente." They anticipated that with detente as the leading aspect, the Western restraints would be eroded, thus increasing the opportunities for the revolutionary forces. In other words, "detente" was seen as a more efficient condition for developing the fight.

How important was this? Well, at a meeting of 75 Communist parties held in Moscow in June 1969, the communists agreed in a common document as follows: "The defense of peace is inseparably linked with the struggle to compel the imperialists to accept peaceful coexistence. . . ." This idea was further refined, but the interesting thing to some of us was that they did not believe that their approach had Western approval, and there was a need to compel its acceptance.

Was it possible that the Western leaders could be compelled by the communists to accept anything? Well, history shows the wait was not very long.

On 29 May 1972 President Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signed an agreement entitled, "Basic Principles of Relations Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States." The very first provision of that agreement reads in part as follows: "They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence."

Thus, by "being compelled" to accept a principle which the communists define as "the main form of struggle in the world today", and which is directed principally against the United States as the most serious threat to the success of world revolution, President Nixon gave the initiative to the Soviets in all peace offensives since that time. Why was this? Because the Soviets control the words "peaceful coexistence" and define its context.

However, since there is a "main form of struggle" in the world, peaceful coexistence, under which the struggle between the two social systems is conducted, there must also be main forms of struggle in individual countries where revolution is developing. In the case of the third world, the developing world, the main form is the "national liberation" struggle. It can be carried out either peacefully or violently, or as a combination of both.

In capitalist countries the "main form" is called "democratic reform." Basically, this approach is to transform the capitalist societies to socialism through a series of progressive steps. This involves changes in legislation and laws in democracies which will create conditions favorable to the revolutionary forces, enabling them to bring about still further changes. Here are but a few of the ideas which the Soviets have expressed on the subject:

The aim of democratic reforms is to fight monopoly, the chief obstacle on the way to remaking the society on socialist lines.

Essentially, there is no contradiction between radical democratic reforms and socialist revolution.

By this means the point will soon be reached beyond which the chain of democratic reforms grows into a socialist revolution.

How do the revolutionaries regard our laws? Well, Lenin said: "In a period of transition laws have only a temporary validity; and when a law hinders the development of the revolution, it must be abolished or amended."

Just one more interesting quote: "It is impossible to accomplish a socialist revolution without abolishing the legal system that embodies the will of the bourgeoisie. . . ."

When you relate these few ideas to the 250 or more forms of struggle which I mentioned previously, it is easy for us to see that the magnitude of the problem can be immense and the options for the communists manifold.

Another interesting theoretical and practical development is the "Focus Theory".

One of the most innovative attacks on the United States and Western democracies has been something which has long been a part of Marxist-Leninist doctrine, but which was given fresh impetus and direction by Mao Zedong and the Chinese "workers of philosophy." It is the "focus theory."

The term "focus," when used in a revolutionary sense, includes two very important points, a concentration and convergence of revolutionary energies, and an irradiation and expansion of these same energies to further develop the world-wide struggle. Joseph Stalin described pre-revolutionary Russia as the "focus" of all the contradictions of imperialism at that time, and, as a result of the concentration of the proletarian struggle for power, the first socialist revolution in man's history was successful.

In more recent times, the communists designated Vietnam and Indo-China as the focus of a world-wide struggle "for peace" and "against imperialism." On this basis the revolutionary forces around the world concentrated all their energy on the defeat of the United States in Indo-China.

The present "focus" of the world-wide struggle is the Middle East. The communists anticipated this "focus" as early as 1971, four years before the end of Vietnam.

How does the concept of "focus" serve revolutionary development?

One, it facilitates the communist struggle against the main enemy, U.S. imperialism.

Two, it aids socialist construction by providing an external unifying struggle for all revolutionary forces around the world based upon a clearly defined target.

Thus, a main or principal focus impels revolutionary action everywhere that U.S. interests exist.

Vietnam was a good example. In essence, we were not defeated militarily, but by the application of the "focus theory." How did this work? We were defeated politically by the development of a world-wide united front, combining all the revolutionary elements of the communist world and the anti-war progressives around the world, including the alignment of the American "Doves", and it was the combination of all this pressure on those who were disparagingly labeled "Hawks" which brought about a change in the willingness of the American government, its people, and its allies to support the war. This was the practical application of Mao Zedong's theory of "People's War."

This leads me to make the following observation. Despite the fact that the communists are working all around the world to limit our influence in order to pave the way for the revolutionary forces, they realize that it cannot be done in one swift stroke, and so, under certain conditions, they actually desire the American presence in certain areas. Why? In order to help develop a revolutionary "focus" in a given country or area.

Here is how it works. In the past year or so, I have noted two instances where the Chinese have seemingly been on our side in policy issues of interest to us, and, in fact, have encouraged us to undertake certain actions. On one occasion, they encouraged the United States to place troops in Southeast Asia. On the other occasion they said they were not surprised by the possible develop-

ment of the neutron bomb, and, as I recall, they even suggested it might be appropriate to position it in Europe. The reason they gave in both was to stop Soviet development. Thus to some it might appear that the Chinese are on our side against the Soviets, and this lends a certain credence to the idea of a "China card."

However, ladies and gentlemen, despite how it may seem to some or many, there is certainly another explanation, and one which makes more sense to some of us. It goes like this. We have to assume that the Chinese are revolutionaries-- there is no credible evidence to the contrary. Therefore, we have also to assume that they are acting in a revolutionary way to promote a revolutionary interest as they see it. Since they have a long-range goal which is incompatible with ours, we also have to assume that they are not making these suggestions to help us against their own interest.

What then might be the reason? In the case of the Far East, things have been very quiescent since the Vietnam war ended. Asian nations have developed, some making very rapid progress, and the peoples of these nations are reasonably happy. In short, it seems a difficult time for the communist parties in these countries to interest the masses in a revolutionary overthrow of their governments. How can this be changed? Well, stationing American troops in an Asian country would help. Here again would be concrete evidence of American imperialism, and a basis to mobilize the masses against the U.S. and the government which invited them in. Thus, the United States would become a basis for revolutionary development.

The case of the neutron bomb and Europe is fundamentally the same. While the apparent reason is for the U.S. to help defend the Europeans from the Soviets, the practical result of such a placement would be a tremendous mobilization of the anti-American, anti-nuclear, anti-war forces in Europe, and it would be directed principally against the U.S. It would further serve to increase our isolation in Europe, would make things more difficult in our dealings with European countries, and, in short, might serve the revolutionary forces far more efficiently than it would us. Look at the violence it recently produced when the idea was only discussed as a possibility.

Still another very important concept is that of the "negative example."

Probably one of the most creative and innovative revolutionary developments in the past few decades is that of "the teacher by negative example." It has had and is continuing to have devastating consequences for our country in the political, economic, cultural, and diplomatic fields. It is really a Chinese development, but it is soundly predicated upon Leninism.

Lenin used to talk of the "positive example" of communism and said that they would ultimately win through the positive example of socialism. The Soviets have persisted in this, and have said, for example, "The center of gravity deploys toward the methods of communist education, and persuasion through examples."

The Chinese, who are far and away the leaders in the development of ideology and dialectics, said that it was not enough to have a positive example. They said that for every positive example there is a negative example, and that to be correct both should be used to advance the revolution. In a 1958 Red Flag editorial, the Chinese made the following statement: "With the aim of injecting

In this article, China prepared the revolutionaries around the world for the coming visit of Nixon. They made their position on this leader of the imperialists very clear for everyone knowledgeable enough to understand the effort. Clearly we did not, and to this day, Nixon probably believes that he has a warm, friendly, and special relationship with the Chinese. I suggest that such a belief would bear careful reevaluation in light of history and the revolutionary nature of the Chinese.

What did the Chinese tell the revolutionary world about Nixon and their views of him? Among many interesting things, they said the following:

Of all the teachers by negative example, Nixon, the chieftain of U.S. imperialism, must be rated as the one who stands out the most.

Nixon is the top reactionary chieftain in the world today.

It is this Nixon who murders black and white people in America and rabidly orders troops and police to suppress the American people's revolutionary struggles.

Nixon is a war maniac.

The article goes on with equally unflattering statements and closes with the following commentary:

To be a fine teacher by negative example for the American people and the people of the world was naturally not Nixon's intention. But such is the dialectics of history. Nixon has become the revolutionary people's teacher by negative example and it looks as if he is going to continue to do so. He will continue to help millions of people awaken and finally bury U.S. imperialism.

Yet despite these harsh words, what did Nixon do in China?

Nixon signed the Shanghai Communique, which, in essence, affirmed China's sovereignty over Taiwan. The arch-enemy of the "peoples" of the world, of the revolutionary forces around the world, the leader of the strongest imperialist country in the world visited China, and in the process capitulated to the Chinese on Taiwan. Incredible? An American president actually undertaking an act of immense importance to the world revolution? It is incredible, but it happened, if we are to believe the Chinese viewpoint. Of course, when seen from our side, we thought it was important to us.

This leads me to a few final remarks on this complex subject. To all communists, the United States is a permanent negative example for all the revolutionary forces all around the world and will remain so until our final defeat and their final victory. It is for this reason we rarely ever see anything favorable about the United States appearing in any of the communist media, and it is for this reason that our greatest achievements in science and other areas rarely receive anything more than a passing comment.

The dialectical equation is this. The Soviet Union, and socialism as a whole, is a permanent "positive example." Thus, nothing adverse or too critical should ever be said about it or its activities.

The opposite of that is, of course, that the United States and capitalism are the permanent negative example for all the revolutionary forces around the world. Thus, virtually nothing complimentary can be said about the United States.

The practical result is that for those people who have yet to make up their minds, the Soviet Union always appears without warts. The United States can never appear devoid of warts.

This matter is far more complex than I have outlined, but I hope that it is sufficiently clear in its essence to see what a problem it poses for our side.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I have talked for quite awhile, and have barely scratched the surface. Also, I am afraid that to this point I may have only presented what seems to be a lot of theory, despite the fact I have talked about some real events and real consequences coming out of them. Now let me cite two practical examples of dialectics, one wherein we can use it to our advantage, and the other to illustrate how it can be used against us. The first is from my own experience, and the other is from that of Henry Kissinger.

My last governmental posting was as an advisor on political and security affairs at the United States Mission to the United Nations. When I took the assignment, I thought the United Nations was an excellent place to put to use a knowledge of dialectics as a way of gaining both support and initiative in that organization, and correspondingly, diminishing that of the Soviet Union. The following example might be insightful.

There are many pounds of resolutions introduced in the course of a U.N. General Assembly session. Some have real merit, some have none, and certainly many are introduced with the practical intent of embarrassing the United States.

On one occasion the Soviets decided it was time to introduce a resolution against "hegemony". Well, it seemed such a good idea to others that some "Third World" countries proposed one, as did the Chinese. While I don't specifically remember the texts of any of them, at least part of each resolution attacked some aspect of U.S. policy.

The Soviet Union's resolution was written to give the impression that it was against "hegemony" and was the champion of all those who opposed hegemony, particularly that which either directly or by implication could be attributed to the United States.

However, because of my knowledge of dialectics I knew that the Soviets were not only not against all forms of hegemony but in fact supported and advocated a variety of forms of hegemony. For example, the Soviets are for the hegemony of the proletariat over the bourgeoisie, the hegemony of socialism over capitalism, the hegemony of the Warsaw Pact countries over the NATO countries, for the ideological hegemony of Marxism-Leninism over any other world view or point of view. Many other examples could be cited. The Soviets, and all communists for that matter, are both "for and against" hegemony, depending upon the conditions. The condition is whether it helps or hurts the revolutionary advance.

I suggested to some ranking officials in our Mission that we simply take the Soviet resolution and expand it in such a way that they would have to reject our proposal, thus alienating them from those other countries willing to support it, but, more importantly, exposing the Soviet Union as actually "for" or supporting certain kinds of hegemony, and identifying specifically what kinds.

My suggestion was simply to add to the key paragraph something along the following lines: "Oppose all forms of hegemony without exception, to include political hegemony, the hegemony of one class over another, one belief system over another, and all forms of ideological hegemony." The Soviets would have had to reject this proposal because it would have gone against their basic ideological principles, thus leaving them standing naked on the issue. The same would have been true for the Chinese resolution. Time was not on our side and we were not able to develop the idea. The point I am trying to make, of course, is that without a knowledge of dialectics such a proposal could not even have been made.

In the next case, I believe the consequences of the lack of knowledge of dialectics is far more tragic, since it is at a much higher level.

I am taking this example from Henry Kissinger's book, The White House Years. While Mr. Kissinger must certainly rank as one of the best Secretaries of State in the history of our country, we must also admit it isn't possible for him to know everything and to have all the answers. He doesn't know dialectics, for example, and his descriptions of contacts with the Soviets, Chinese, and North Vietnamese are testimony to that fact. Previous research in his writings for another purpose verified for me that dialectics was not a science with which he was familiar.

I will take a few examples from his discussions with the Soviets and Chinese to illustrate my points and the difficulties that a few of us believe are created solely by a lack of knowledge of dialectical methodology. Because of the importance of Nixon's China initiative, I take most of them from the chapter entitled, "Nixon's Trip To China." There are many examples in the book which I could have used. These are but a few.

Early in his book, Kissinger makes a statement of a general policy principle. I think we must presume that he meant it as some sort of touchstone for his policy formulations and actions. He says: "If history teaches anything it is there can be no peace without equilibrium." Just fifty-five pages later he makes the following statements:

The most singular feature of Soviet foreign policy is, of course, communist ideology.

To the Soviet leaders, . . . struggle is ended not by compromise but by the victory of one side. Permanent peace, according to communist theory, can be achieved only by abolishing the class struggle and the class struggle can only be ended by a communist victory.

Soviet policy uses a vocabulary all its own. . . . Soviet proclamations. . . must be judged by this vocabulary.

I suggest that the first statement on the need for equilibrium is an incompatible approach to the Soviet-held viewpoint that only complete victory is acceptable. There are serious problems in this.

First off, I can't see the value in trying to promote equilibrium with individuals or nations who believe that there is a struggle between systems, and, as he stated the Soviet position, that the "Struggle is ended not by compromise but by the victory of one side."

The dilemma is essentially this: the negotiator who constantly seeks "equilibrium" as a form of political, economic, or military resolution will continually cede points to the other negotiator who believes that "disequilibrium" is an operational and diplomatic tool. On our side, we will always be looking to create a balance, and, with this viewpoint, we must often give away things to achieve it.

The communists, well understanding Kissinger's principle, will help it along by creating situations which produce tensions and then extract concessions from us in return for them to stop doing what they have no right to do in the first place. This produces a temporary equilibrium, and then the process starts up again somewhere else over something else. I suggest this has been our pattern since World War II.

I don't know how much comfort others may derive from this, but I can assure you that those of us who study dialectics find very little in the fact that history has taught Mr. Kissinger, as well as certain others in our policy establishments, that equilibrium is the condition for peace, while the same historical factors available to communist leaders has taught them that quite the opposite is true.

Now something from the Chinese side. Nixon's visit to China was of immense importance to the Nixon administration, and possibly even to this nation, though for some there may be good reasons to doubt it.

Let me summarize the preparations which Kissinger said were made for this historic event. These preparations, while extensive from one point of view, proved, I suggest, to have been less than adequate.

About the trip, Mr. Kissinger stated: "No president ever prepared himself as conscientiously." Nixon read voluminous briefing books, essays on agenda topics, excerpts of Kissinger's previous contacts with the Chinese, biographic summaries of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai, copious excerpts from articles and books by Western students of China, among them Edgar Snow, Ross Terrill, Denis Bloodworth, John Fairbanks, C.P. Fitzgerald, Stuart Schram, and Andre Malraux.

When some of us first noted a similar statement in Newsweek magazine about the time of the visit, our immediate reaction was that there was nothing wrong with the effort as far as it went, but that there were some glaring omissions, and certainly The White House Years has confirmed this.

In our view, one important omission was that there was not a single reference to indicate that Nixon had read anything which Mao Zedong had written. Certainly if he and Kissinger had read even a few of Mao's philosophical essays

they would have quickly grasped the problem they were going to have with the language and concepts in their encounters with the Chinese leaders. Indeed, I have not yet found a reference in his book to the fact that Mr. Kissinger had even made such a study. If he did, he clearly did not feel compelled to make it a significant point.

Yet knowledge that ideology would be important was certainly known to one of the writers upon whom the preparations were based. Professor John Fairbanks wrote in the July 1972 issue of Foreign Affairs that ". . . The problem of ideology . . . is the most difficult for an American to encompass. Indeed, ideology is the key to any understanding of China."

Despite this knowledge of the importance of ideology, our research has not established that a single advisor accompanying President Nixon on this trip had any serious knowledge of the single most important aspect of that ideology, the dialectical method.

With this brief commentary, let us ask again, "How effective was all this extensive preparation?" Some random quotations from Kissinger's chapter describe the Nixon party's contacts with the Chinese and permit us some insights.

One thing Kissinger makes very clear: Communicating with and understanding the Chinese was most difficult. Among his observations are the following. "Each remark by a Chinese official was a jigsaw puzzle." "Everything was seemingly motivated by a single intelligence."

Kissinger also talked of "Mao's elliptical phrases", and "many layered conversations", and his "usual indirect fashion". At one point in talking of efforts to reach agreements Kissinger used the phrase, "elliptical assurances", and commented that they were later repeated by Chou. I ask you, Ladies and Gentlemen, what is an "elliptical assurance" and what solace can we take from it?

Conversations with Zhou Enlai and other officials were apparently no clearer to him or others in the party. In his talks with other officials Mr. Kissinger says, "Phrases originally obscure to me were quoted," but he does not indicate they were any clearer when heard the second time. He says, "Conversations were conducted, especially on the Chinese side, with extraordinary indirection and subtlety."

In talking of Vietnam, Kissinger recounted a conversation with Zhou Enlai which he characterized by saying, "Zhou's treatment of Vietnam was a masterpiece of indirection." At another point on the same subject, Mr. Kissinger said, "We interpreted this to mean . . ." Again, the meaning of still another topic was unclear. I don't know about any of you, but for me, "indirect" and "elliptical" conversations do not seem to be very enlightening.

At one point Mr. Kissinger commented as follows: "The leaders of China were beyond ideology in their dealings with us." But at another point Kissinger said, "To Mao, communism was the truth."

Now, I would suggest that if Communism, which has an inseparable aspect of ideology in its practical content, was the truth for Mao, then it is difficult to imagine that the Chinese were at the same time "beyond

ideology" in their dealings with the President and his advisors. I think, moreover, that in the absence of knowing with certainty to the contrary, it would be prudent to act on the basis that the Chinese are still Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries as they have said for the past sixty years, and that deception through ideology was an indispensable component of their conversations and diplomacy. Or, put another way, it would be very imprudent to predicate one's negotiations on the basis that this was not the case.

Throughout history deception has been a consciously practiced form of struggle to gain the initiative over an enemy. Certainly communism is no exception to this rule, and dialectics is one of the most effective tools yet devised for using it. Dialectics is a deception because it is a method of fighting for which they have written the rules, have organized the structure in which the rules are applied, and, quite intentionally, have failed to give us, their designated enemies, a copy of the rule book. And without a knowledge of the rules we cannot hope to compete effectively.

We shouldn't underestimate the importance which they give deception. For example, Mao Zedong commented as follows: "Illusions and inadvertence may deprive one of superiority and initiative. Hence, deliberately to create illusions for the enemy and then spring surprise attacks upon him is a means, and an important means, of achieving superiority and initiative." Also, "In order to win victory we must try our best to seal the eyes and ears of the enemy, making him blind and deaf and create confusion in the minds of the enemy"

Let me give you two more brief examples to illustrate the problems we face with Marxist-Leninist language and concepts. To some of us it seems that part of our difficulty in understanding communist theory and practice is self-inflicted. That is to say that in our efforts to come to grips with this phenomenon over the years, we have built into our body of literature many wrong assumptions which have subsequently become accepted as truths. These so-called "facts," if you will, have often then served us as the underpinning of many of our analyses, leading inevitably to wrong conclusions and wrong policy decisions.

For example, those who have done any serious reading in the works of modern day Marxism-Leninism have seen Chinese statements similar to the following: "The Soviet revisionists have betrayed Marxism-Leninism." This statement is a very precise and accurate dialectical description of a communist problem of a very specific nature. However, some on our side have taken it to mean that other ideas are also implicit in it, even though the Chinese have never expressed such views. For example, is the statement which I have just made in any way identical with the following two statements? "The Soviet Union has betrayed Marxism-Leninism," or "the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has betrayed Marxism-Leninism." It might seem so, but for high-level Marxist-Leninists they are as different as day and night.

I know from my own experience that many analysts interested in Sino-Soviet relations have concluded that when the Chinese say they oppose "Soviet revisionists" this is also an indictment of the government and party. For some reason, despite all that the Soviets themselves have written on the problem of "revisionism", these analysts seem to have missed the point which the CPSU has made so often--that it, too, opposes "Soviet" revisionists, every

bit as much as do the Chinese, and that it is making every effort to identify such revisionists and take appropriate remedial action against them. Indeed, it is a fact that all communist parties oppose "Soviet" revisionists just as much as do the Chinese and the Soviets, and we can safely say that in the communist world, "Nobody loves a revisionist."

The principal point I wish to make is this: the problem of revisionism is a theoretical problem and not a practical one. While individuals in communist parties can be either witting or unwitting "revisionists," a communist party can never be "revisionist," and the Chinese are not talking of the CPSU when they talk of "Soviet" revisionists, but about the enemies of Marxist-Leninist orthodoxy.

To balance this view, let us take one more example from the direction of the Soviets to the Chinese. On many occasions the Soviets have commented as follows: "The Chinese Maoists seek hegemony over the communist movement." This, too, is a dialectical negation, and its principal purpose is to promote revolutionary development both within the movement and outside, just as is the Chinese criticism of Soviet revisionism. In much the same way as in the previous example, some on our side have interpreted this to mean that the Soviets consider the CPC and the government to be "Maoist," and that they seek hegemony over the movement. Of course, the Soviets have never said that the CPC or PRC seeks hegemony over the movement, and to conclude that the Soviets intend it to be so, although it has never been specifically stated, is delusive.

Moreover, the communists have borrowed the term "Maoism" from Western analysts and exploited it by making it a synonym for revisionism. Since we in the West use the term when speaking of the Communist Party of China and the Beijing government, the Soviet use of the term tends to confirm for us that they mean the same thing by its use as do we, when in reality they mean the antithesis.

On the other hand, in order to insure that the communist camp is not confused--although they don't mind confusion on our side, a March 17, 1976 TASS review of a book entitled Main Aspects Of The Problem Of China, stated that "Maoists" and Chinese communists are not the same thing, as many had assumed, but were opposites. According to the TASS review, "Maoism" is a theoretical problem within the communist movement of the same nature as revisionism. The review then went on to state: ". . . the task of exposing Maoism theoretically . . . continues holding an important place in the activity of Marxist-Leninists in ideology and theory."

The book's stress upon the ideological nature of Maoism without a complementary emphasis upon it as a "practical" problem also requiring attention indicated that the Soviets did not consider the Communist Party of China to be practitioners of "Maoism." Hence the review added: "The principled struggle against Maoism has nothing in common with any hostility to Chinese communists, to the Chinese people. . . ." Why then should there be a sustained and world-wide attack upon "Maoism" by communists everywhere? Again, the review provides the answer: "The struggle against Maoism helps communist parties get rid of opportunism and revisionism."

A brief aside: the same review in discussing Sino-Soviet relations and the Sino-Soviet "split" stated ". . . there is no intention to 'excommunicate' the Chinese from the world communist movement or the PRC from socialism."

Before closing, I should like to comment briefly on some of the foreign policy implications of my talk.

Our diplomatic effort has been largely one-sided in meeting a many-sided offensive. Our preoccupation with seeking military security has led us to organize military alliances, seek and support military bases abroad, and to develop mutual defense treaties, et cetera. This has often compelled us to deal with and support unpopular regimes, thus playing directly into the propaganda hands of the Soviets and the communist movement. Our fascination with the military threat makes us appear to many to be obsessed with the idea that force is the only way for solving political and socio-economic problems, and thus, in the eyes of many, we are seen as warmongers and oppressors who support repressive regimes and institutions. This image results in our moral and political isolation, and is grist for the Communists. Moreover, our policies are seen as out of touch with reality by our allies and would be allies, and they, therefore, tend to act separately and independently.

What I am suggesting is that our diplomacy does not now have the necessary tools to gain popular support for our foreign and military policies because these policies are not based upon a correct appraisal of the communist challenge. For the most part, our leaders cannot translate their desires and good intentions into efficient diplomatic conduct or political and economic action because wide sectors of our public opinion makers, as well as important elements in our political circles, are prevented from doing so through their failure to understand fully the nature of the communist offensive. And, it is our belief that the main reason they fail to understand it is because they do not understand the dialectical method upon which it is based.

Ladies and Gentlemen, I wish to restate what I have said before, and what I hope has become implicit from my remarks. The communists have a methodology which they practice with precision, and without it the world communist movement as it is today could not exist. This is not just my opinion nor that of others who are involved in the study of this science. The communists themselves have so stated.

Unfortunately for our side, fluency in the Russian or Chinese language, or the deepest scholarship in Soviet and/or Chinese studies, will not enable a single student to learn or understand dialectics. Just as one cannot learn well such subjects as chess, golf, bridge, astronomy, or physics by studying either unrelated or partially related subjects, so, too, one cannot learn Marxist-Leninist dialectics without giving specific attention to it.

I thank you for your attention, and will be glad to answer questions you may have in the few minutes remaining.

A PROFESSOR'S VIEW OF CONFLICT-DEVELOPMENT (DIALECTICS)

In the Winter 1968 edition of the quarterly Orbis published by the University of Pennsylvania, Professor George D. Damien wrote an article entitled, "On the Philosophy of Contradictions: The Sino-Soviet Dispute as a Case Study in Communist Conflict Thinking". In this article, and another which followed in a later volume of Orbis, Damien highlighted the problems for Western intellectuals and scholars interested in Marxism-Leninism, and stressed that without a comprehension of Communist dialectical method most analyses of their reality will fall far short of a correct interpretation of their global strategy. A few quotations should suffice to highlight his views.

IDEOLOGICAL POINTS

The uninitiated have a most difficult time understanding the normative and functional structure of communist political philosophy of contradictions in terms of applied dialectics.....

Dialectical logic is a complex and puzzling method of thought and reasoning. Applied dialectics, as a philosophy of contradictions, is elusive and deceptive. Above all, one should not mistake communist ideology for the communist dialectical conflict mode of thought and reasoning.

.....Plato asked his students to devote at least five years of their lives, from the ages of thirty to thirty-five, to the study of dialectics.....
(Communists devote much more to their study of Marxist-Leninist dialectics).

.....In the West, and particularly in the United States, hardly any attention is paid to dialectical logic. It is alien to the pragmatic Anglo-Saxon mode of thought.

Nevertheless, despite half a century of communism in the USSR, the pragmatic West remains ignorant of the dialectical mode of conflict thinking and of the fact that communists use two modes of thought and reasoning: they understand and communicate with formal logic, but they reason with dialectics. The West understands, communicates, and reasons only with formal logic.

It is the static identity of formal logic and common-sense thinking that permits the pragmatic West to state, in its wisdom, "United we stand, divided we fall!" Such wisdom, says dialectical logic, is empirical and therefore deceptive, because unity in terms of cooperation is a dialectical momentum;.....That is why, incomprehensible as it may seem, to static logical thinking, the present Sino-Soviet conflict-development is living macro-evidence that the dialectical version of the Western maxim would read: "Divided we stand, united we fall."

.....It is clear that thinking dialectically means visualizing Sino-Soviet conflict development as the essential form of progress for communism, though to the pragmatic West this statement seems preposterous.

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS

The political elite among our foreign policymakers apparently do not understand that dialectical analysis is of paramount importance to our security.

To the pragmatic logician of the West, conflict is the most important dysfunctional component of the Sino-Soviet relationship: it is tangible precursory evidence of the ultimate failure of world communism.

.....Witness the following statement by Zbigniew BRZEZINSKI while he was a member of the State Department's Policy Planning Council: "Communism is dead.....It is increasingly fragmented by conflicts." Obviously, even such a highly-placed specialist in Sino-Soviet affairs as Professor Brzezinski appears to be unaware of the fact that to the dialectical mind conflict is the essential form of progress, because it conditions the functional structure of the communist society, be it Soviet or Chinese.

Therefore, conflict-development is the most important functional, not dysfunctional, component of the Sino-Soviet relationship complex, not withstanding the fact that to the logical analyst this statement may seem absurd.

While the pragmatic mind conceives of politics and international relations as an art, to the dialectical mind politics is pre-eminently the science of and philosophy of conflict-development by categories or stages.

.....To the dialectical mind politics is impossible without an enemy, for it is the dialectical process of cooperation in dispute, of the friend becoming the enemy, and vice versa. That is why the Western logician cannot understand that Sino-Soviet categorical conflict-development is a normal phenomenon, and a striking illustration of the mechanism of conflict thinking and reasoning.

.....Sino-Soviet categorical conflict-development will not resolve itself into a "mechanical annihilation" of the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Sino-Soviet tension-controlled relationship has, between 1963 and 1968, clearly demonstrated that the dialectical process of mutual Peking-Moscow negation is constructive for communism. There is ample evidence over the last five years to show that Sino-Soviet dialectical negation has kept, and will continue to keep, the "positive aspects" of what it negates--all those operational components of the relationship which play a vital role in implementing global communist strategy.

When Peking negates Moscow and Moscow negates Peking, this double negation is not destructive but constructive, for the law of negation of the negation operates not only as a precise mathematical multiplier of the negative and positive structural components and methodological aspects of the Sino-Soviet relationship complex.

.....The logical Western mind does not understand that Sino-Soviet categorical conflict-development is salutary to the Sino-Soviet relationship.....

In another Orbis article dated Spring 1970 and entitled, "The Dialectical Structure of the Chinese Proletarian Cultural Revolution", Damien made the following points:

The first gross error is to mistake communist ideology for the communist dialectical mode of thought. Although a functional similarity and correlativity exist between them, they are two different things.

Communist leaders understand and communicate with formal logic, but they reason with dialectics. A noncommunist understands, communicates and reasons only with formal logic. Therefore, a noncommunist logician cannot comprehend the intricate conflict strategy of the dialecticians in Peking and Moscow unless he first knows the functional structure of the dialectical mode of thought and reasoning, and accepts as normative the concept that, "conflict is the essential form of progress".

Mao's political civilization is creating a new, dialectical species of man, born in conflict, living in conflict, developing in conflict. Mao's new man is one who thinks dialectically, whose mentality is specifically adjusted to visualizing of dual ascending and descending, categorical conflict-development as the essential law of human progress; and this mentality is alien to the West.

.....If the United States really wants to comprehend the abstruse operational micro-structure of conflict as the essential form of progress, our political elite must learn to "think differently". They must come to know and understand Mao's dialectical mode of conflict thinking and reasoning.....

Our great technological achievements are the magnificent product of the American scientific intellect. But our inability to understand and cope with the intricacies of communist conflict thinking will be translated into a complete failure of the American political genius if our political epistemology does not redress the situation in time.

It is clear from the foregoing quoted statements that Professor Damien does not regard dialectical thinking as only an intellectual exercise, but a practical tool applied consciously by the communists to advance their internal and external goals as defined in their principal writings.

The Method of Dialectical Analysis According to the Principle
of "One Divides Into Two"

The following is a thumbnail description of the dialectical method. However, after having studied it one cannot easily or automatically apply it since a great deal of complementary study is necessary to understand precisely how the terms are used in the analytical process.

One thing (anything or process) equals a unity of two opposite aspects that (a) co-exist and (b) transform themselves into each other; one is called the principal aspect and the other the secondary aspect. Contradictory development has a twofold cause: (a) external condition and (b) internal essence and change, which is manifested in (a) external forms and (b) internal change, which can be (a) quantitative and (b) qualitative. The qualitative character of any contradiction is given the integration of (a) universality and (b) particularity. The external form is manifested mainly in the principal contradiction and its inner nature in the principal aspect. There are two main kinds of contradiction: (a) antagonistic and (b) non-antagonistic.

ON DIALECTICS

It is evident that those who know the strategy of one kind of game can often apply its general principles to games of a similar character, and it is equally evident that to learn to play well an unfamiliar game one needs to study its rules, strategy and tactics. On the surface there is nothing very profound about that observation. People throughout the world play an immense variety of games, and take for granted that one who wishes to play will need to understand the fundamental principles and rules which underly it. It can then be assumed that those so prepared, given the objective and subjective resources, can then both compete in a game and expect to win it. In man's more normal pursuits few, if any, would knowingly enter into a game or contest without foreknowledge of how it is to be played since victory would be uncertain at best, and it would not likely be fun for those involved. However, this construction applies to games in which one is a willing competitor and participant. Obviously many games are played in which an individual may have no interest and the matter of the game's strategy and rules is then unimportant to him. Games that are lengthy, inordinately involved, costly in terms of time or equipment needed, require study, or which for one reason or another, one simply does not desire to play are similarly unimportant to a person. In most societies and for most people that would be the end of the matter. People are not normally involved in games they do not wish to play.

However, there are still other kinds of games which people play either individually or collectively which often involve one or more people unwillingly and/or unwittingly. The normal tendency for those involved unwillingly in games organized, led, and played by others, is to fight against such involvement, ignore the game, and pretend that because one is unwilling to participate he is then uninvolved. Those involved in games unwittingly are simply passive pawns who are moved, directed and manipulated, by forces of which they are unaware. If one then adds complicated rules to such a game, rules which the instigator deliberately makes obscure, hiding rules in many different places which require extensive reserarch to learn them, then, under these conditions, an individual would find it almost impossible to play the game even if he should desire to do so. If then, because of the way the opposition organizes the game and its rules, one cannot find the rules, he can neither understand how to play or win the game.

The foregoing is analagous to the present political situation in which the free world finds itself today. The game is a world struggle for political supremacy. It is forced upon the free world by those who support a political and economic philosophy which demands of them that they undertake any and all forms of struggle against their opposition--their enemies--to attain that supremacy. In this game of world

politics the rules have been drawn up by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and further developed by the Soviet Union, China, and the other socialist countries which support their world view.

The rules they have developed for this game are couched in a difficult language, virtually foreign to those who do not understand it as do Marxist-Leninists, and the definitions and keys are hidden in the many writings of various communists, most notably Lenin and Mao Zedong. Equally hidden are the rules which tell how the language is to be used in a practical way to develop the game of "world struggle" and they are based on something they call the "dialectical method". All communists since Marx, Engels and Lenin have accepted dialectics as the most objective analytical tool for interpreting world events and "social situations" in general, and their "sharp weapon" for changing the world. Communists have repeated in many different ways Lenin's comment that dialectics is the "living soul" of Marxism. Lin Piao, once heir apparent to Mao Tse-tung, called dialectics a "spiritual atom bomb".

In December 1970 Pham Van Dong, Premier of North Vietnam, taunted the leaders of the United States when he stated that they could not lose the Vietnam war because they have a "secret", a "secret" that not President Nixon, the White House, nor the Pentagon could uncover.

Any close and regular reading of Communist writings would have revealed that dialectics was the secret. Additional reading would have also clarified that an imperfect understanding of dialectics and the dialectical method, results in an imperfect understanding of what they say and do. There is, therefore, a conscious effort on the part of the Communists to write in such a manner as to mislead and deceive the non-communist world, while at the same time informing and educating the communist world, promoting the world struggle, with precisely the same textual material.

In spite of the heavy communist emphasis on the need to understand dialectics and the dialectical method very few Western scholars have studied or sought to understand it. Similarly, they have not paid much attention to verifying and testing the communists' political and economic formulations to see if they actually apply their theory in practice. For example, Mao Zedong's basic writings, On Contradiction and On Practice still have not been dealt with seriously by non-communist elements in the West. Yet the proper study could help one to understand those communist actions which otherwise often seem incomprehensible; e.g., the role of Sino-Soviet polemic in advancing the revolutionary struggle against imperialism around the world; the meaning of otherwise puzzling slogans such as "unity in diversity;" "dare to go against the tide;" or how the Chinese ideological attacks on the CPSU

actually strengthen the CPSU and the communist movement. For the communists an understanding of the "dialectical method" is the only method to understand their world outlook and their reality, and it is the only method for them to analyze their problems in order to determine the correct political line and to assure themselves of ultimate victory.

The principle of one divides into two is the "most correct expression of dialectics," and it can be shown with absolute precision that communists employ this method in resolving their conflicts and contradictions. Yet virtually no one in the West outside Marxist-Leninist organizations has studied, explored, or explained the use of dialectics as a practical revolutionary weapon. More importantly, neither has it been explained how the communists actually apply the method in their revolutionary practice. In spite of contradictions between the Soviets and Chinese it can be shown through Communist texts that while the Chinese and Soviets are working to solve non-antagonistic contradictions between themselves, and are working to prevent them from becoming antagonistic, they are at the same time unified with all other communist parties in their fight against American imperialism as the principal external enemy in the world today. Their "fights," "squabbles," "polemics", however they may be referred to, are a natural consequence of their system and world outlook, accepted by them and

dealt with through the universally accepted method of "criticism and self-criticism" as the only method for resolving these differences. Therefore, they are united in their world struggle against the United States and imperialism, while at the same time they are working to resolve their own internal problems by criticizing each other, and proposing or serving as a "negative example" in order to resolve the problems. Each time a contradiction is resolved among Communists the previous basis of their unity has changed and they have a "new unity on a new basis", and on the basis of enhanced unity can fight the Western world better and more efficiently. Any cursory examination of the events and developments of communism since the polemic began will quickly indicate the problems between the two social systems, and show the free world capability to deal with them have become increasingly complex.

In their philosophical terms the Soviets and Chinese have an objective agreement on their mutual dialectical negation, and they deliberately provoke the dialectical division in the external form of organization of the communist world to mislead the non-communist world and to make believe that when the Chinese and the Soviets argue against each other on doctrinal points that there is serious disunity. But, in fact, and according to their own writings, it is not this mutual negation which is most important to them,

(except insofar as it serves to better define the struggle), but the unity which it continually promotes. They are unified on the important things; struggle against the United States as the leader of world imperialism; on basic documents of Marx, Engels, Lenin; on fundamental principles; hold a similar world outlook; use of the same practical tools to further the world revolution; et cetera. These two previously mentioned elements, division in the external organizational form of communism and the "misleading factor," are the two necessary conditions to make effective the simultaneous application of the method of "criticism and self-criticism" used in communist parties to resolve differences. These things are fundamental and objectively verifiable.

There is little question about the effectiveness of the Communist use of dialectical thought in creating problems for the Western world while at the same time furthering development of revolution in all countries around the world, including the United States. Many "scholars" do not understand it and ignore it. In one respect, dialectical thought has already defeated the Western intellectual world which has clearly and often shown a basic inability to understand it, correctly comprehend it, or even to accept its objective existence. This point is basic and significant for the Communists, because if those against whom the methodology is directed do not understand what they say, it is impossible

for one to understand what they do, and certainly more impossible to correctly anticipate their actions. Such a continuing ignorance is certainly the condition for the final defeat of the free world, and, unless Western intellectual circles grasp the fundamentals of the Communist outlook and expose its methods, they will always be in a defensive and passive mode, waiting to react, and with no changes to gain initiative.

NOTES ON THE DIALECTICAL WRITING STYLE

Failure to understand the dialectical meaning of communist ideological materials will inevitably result in an incomplete grasp of what a given communist document or essay seeks to convey.

In the world of a dialectician, written documents, statements and so on all reflect objectively existing "unities of opposites." Thus it is not enough simply to understand what a particular article supports, since that support at the same time implies a lack of support for or an attack against the opposite of the thing being supported. In the same manner, knowing what an article is attacking is not enough since the attack is simultaneously support for its opposing aspect within the framework of the given "unity of opposites." Stated simply, both what is supported and attacked, what is attacked and supported must be clearly understood before the complete meaning of such writing can be comprehended. In order to reach this all-round comprehension, the method of dialectics must be understood.

In their most general sense, all articles, documents, radio broadcasts and so on which emerge from China (and the Soviet Union and other socialist countries) are separate aspects of the ideological struggle against bourgeois metaphysics and its reflection in orthodox Marxist practice, revisionism. Thus articles dealing with the struggle against revisionism inside the socialist camp are aimed at eliminating the influence of bourgeois ideology on practicing Marxists. Similarly, the struggle between the dialectical materialist and metaphysical world views results in the weakening of the influence of the bourgeois metaphysics throughout the world. In both cases the goal is the same, the eventual elimination of bourgeois ideology.

The importance of this is that for Marxists ideological struggle is struggle between different conceptions of the objective world and thus takes place in the minds of men. This being the case, the only proper method which can be used to conduct this kind of struggle is that of "painstaking reasoning and not crude coercion." Thus the purpose of the great masses of material flowing out of China is to provide information and educate those who read it all, the final aim being to deepen their understanding of the ideological struggle. But because these articles (or any article for that matter) are subjective reflections of objective events, in order to understand their content, we must first understand by which mirror objectively existing reality is reflected in men's minds. Mao has thoroughly explained this problem in his essay "On Practice." It is with this understanding which Mao outlines in that essay that articles, speeches, et cetera are prepared.

The result of the way that knowledge comes to men, as outlined by Marx, Engels, Lenin and Mao, is essential to the correct understanding of the ideological struggle. It means we must come into personal contact with the ideological struggle, participate in it and, from this practice, we will gradually come to understand the essence of the ideological struggle and the nature of the articles which help develop it.

This, however, is not something which the scholar is able to do easily since the majority of his contact with this ideological struggle comes from the articles and documents written by the participants themselves. Thus the non-Marxist scholar cannot easily take a participatory role. Although the articles are reflections of the direct experience and practice of the participants, they are only indirect experience for the scholars, and the opportunity for verification through practice, the sole criterion of truth for a Marxist-Leninist, is very difficult, but even more necessary, because such indirect knowledge may often be incorrect. Most of the knowledge of the communist world comes to the non-Marxist scholar through indirect experience and this is derived to a large degree from communist documents. However, if the non-Marxist scholar attributes to these documents articles and speeches a character of absolute truth, when in fact they reflect only a partial truth, he will be consistently misled. Mao has said: "Words on paper are not reality." By this he means that one must be very careful in reading and accepting "words on paper" as truth without comparing it to the actual practice of those about whom it may be written. Mao does not put much faith in books and writings alone. Mao said: "If we believe all that books say, it is better to have no books."

A further complicating factor is that the dialectical method of analysis requires its practitioners to "be for one side against the other" in dealing with any given problem of contradiction. Thus, understanding only one side in an ideological struggle is not enough, since it is the struggle between both sides which informs one, and the documents and articles which reflect the struggle itself. With regards to this Mao commented: "If one believes everything in books, it is better not to read books at all.....Now when we say books we mean newspapers and periodicals, and "Internal Reference" is one of them. We cannot believe everything in them. When we listen, we must listen to both sides." (Wan-sui (1969) p.272) And in an additional comment about the one-sidedness of dialectical writing Mao said:

Some people say that in writing it is impossible not to be one-sided. There is something to this statement. What I have just said is a lot of Marxist thought which demands that everyone discard one-sidedness. This is not possible. Also it does not conform with reality. As a matter of fact, in making criticism, everyone speaks out in accordance with his own experience and standing on one side. (Wan-sui (1967), p. 142.)

How then are scholars to deal with such articles? In the same way as Marxists deal with them, first of all by realizing that these articles are particular aspects of a larger process, ideological struggle, and hence reflect only a part of the larger objective process. It is through the study of these particular articles that the necessary knowledge of the nature of the struggle itself can be gradually accumulated until the internal essence, the fundamental issues of the struggle are understood.

To do this both sides of the struggle must be studied. In the case of the Sino-Soviet polemic it is impossible to understand the internal essence of this struggle without a careful study of the ideological articles and pronouncements of both sides. To read only that which the Soviets produce, or that which the Chinese produce, is to be one-sided and cannot produce a definite answer as to the true nature of the polemic. For the scholar, this means "fighting the paper" and submitting the concepts contained in each article to comparison with the reality they are meant to describe. If they are accurate reflections objectively existing processes, they should be able to stand the test. In the instances, however, where a concept is found to incorrectly mirror objective fact, then it must be revised or even rejected wholly. The only criteria of truth is practice, and the only criteria of indirect experience is to test that experience against reality.

But what constitutes reality? In order to understand this, we must understand how a dialectician views reality, then, having attained this understanding, apply it to the testing of dialectical statements contained in the articles reflecting the ideological struggle. For Marxist-Leninists reality has a dual nature and all things and processes are always composed of sets of opposites which constitute that reality. Thus this duality must always be considered in reading and studying communist writings and pronouncements.

In addition, there is another important consideration in the Marxist style of writing. Marxist-Leninists frequently discuss problems in terms of conditions which do not in fact obtain. And if an analyst or scholar is careless in his work or unaware of the peculiar writing style, he will assume something to be true which may well not be so. For example, Mao, in discussing the victory of the Chinese people over the forces of imperialism in 1949, made this statement:

Just imagine! If the Soviet Union had not existed, if there had been no victory in the anti-fascist Second World War, if the Japanese imperialists had not been defeated, if the People's Democracies had not come into being, if the oppressed nations of the East were not rising in struggle and if there were no struggle of the masses of people against their

reactionary rulers in the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and other capitalist countries--if not for all these in combination, the international reactionary forces bearing down on us would certainly be many times greater than now. In such circumstances, could we have won victory? Obviously not. (SW IV, p. 416).

Here Mao posits a set of given conditions in which the liberation of China would have been impossible, but these conditions are imaginary ("Just imagine!"), they do not and did exist, and Mao's only motive in describing these theoretical conditions was to emphasize the great importance of the concretely existing conditions for the victory of Chinese revolution.

Dialectical writing, especially writing which is a part of ideological struggle, is filled with such examples of theoretical given conditions. This is particularly true when something is being criticized. Just as in the example taken from Mao quoted above, such criticism usually takes the form of, first, the establishment of a theoretical condition through the use either of the subjunctive mood or, as in the above example, through the use of an "if" or some similar clause which is used to express a condition, a supposition or a hypothesis; what follows is a statement of fact based on the hypothesis or conditions established through this technique. For example, two Soviet writers criticizing Mao's philosophical views made the following statement:

If in "On Contradiction" dialectical contradictions are regarded as a conspicuous contrast between two far-removed opposites, twenty years later Mao implies that they are anomalies. (N. Altaisky and V. Georgiyev, The Philosophical Views of Mao Tsetung, (Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1971), p. 111).

In a similar way, Lin Piao in the article "Long Live the Victory of People's War!" attacked the "Khrushchev revisionists" for their excessive stress on peaceful coexistence by first quoting Lenin with regard to the positive aspects of war and peaceful coexistence and then stating "If the arguments of the Khrushchev revisionists are to be believed, would not that make Lenin the worst of the 'bellicose elements'?"

In both of these typical examples, theoretical conditions have been established and conclusions based on these conditions have been drawn. The question which must be asked is whether or not the conditions which have been posited conform with objective reality. If they do not, then the conclusions based

upon them are incorrect and must be disregarded. On the other hand, if they do conform to objective reality, the conclusions can be accepted as correct. Thus, in both cases, the criticism must be compared with reality. In the case of the criticism of Mao's article "On Contradiction" this means we must investigate its contents to discover whether or not Mao does regard dialectical contradictions "as a conspicuous contrast between two far removed opposites." And in the case of Lin Piao's attack on the "Khrushchev revisionists" we must investigate their arguments concerning peaceful coexistence and war. By thus subjecting these theoretical conditions to the test of reality we'll either prove the theoretical conditions to be objective concrete conditions (if the conditions are proven correct) or we will prove that these theoretical conditions have no basis in concrete reality and do not reflect that reality. In the latter case, we may disregard the assumptions. Marxists are above all materialists, if a thing has no foundation in objective reality, then it does not exist.

How then do Marxist-Leninists regard argumentation and polemics? The Soviets expressed the position of the movement quite clearly in their "Letter from the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CPC" dated March 30, 1963. In this letter they said: "We communists can argue between ourselves. But in all circumstances our sacred duty remains the education of the peoples of our countries in the spirit of deep solidarity with all the people's of the socialist community." They also added: "We realize that any moment, including the communist movement, is unthinkable without controversy." Therefore, the method of argumentation and the dialectical style of writing are all an integral part of an educational process which they regard as a natural consequence of their movement.

Therefore, one must be very careful in reading documents and insure that the dual nature of the arguments and statements is considered; and also that in describing conditions they may well describe conditions which do not exist, but which, if one reads carelessly, on a letter to the Soviets the Chinese said: "If the general line....is one-sidedly reduced to "peaceful coexistence".....this is to violate revolutionary principles..." This is, of course, true as stated and the job of the analyst is to determine whether or not it is true in fact. The same job exists for the Marxist-Leninist. Other such phrases which do the same thing are "Under the circumstances....." "If one avoids....." "If anyone does not pursue....." "On the basis....." "It will be 'Left' adventurism if the proletariat party should rashly launch a revolution before the objective conditions are ripe."

A LESSON IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

A conversation, or should we say a debate, between a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

Moderator: This evening we are fortunate in having a representative of the Central Committee of the CPC and a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU visiting with us. They will comment on the current international situation, particularly the need to avoid another world war. However, first each will make a short opening statement concerning their view of the world. Mr. Yang, would you please lead off.

Chinese : Chairman Mao Tse-tung states that the danger of war is increasing, but "revolution is the main trend in the world today". When we speak of revolution we speak of countries, nations, and finally the "peoples" of the world who want revolution.

When we speak of war, we speak of imperialism, its running dogs and lackeys, and the two superpowers who threaten war, the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R.....

Soviet : (Interrupting) The position of the Soviet Union on war is clear and well known. We support the Marxist-Leninist principles on war, and we work with all revolutionaries to implement these principles and to make socialism a reality. We cannot stand by and be maligned by this representative of Maoism.

It is the Maoists who foment war. It is their misguided application and outright betrayal of Marxist-Leninist principles which threaten to bring about world war and nuclear holocaust--a burning desire of all reactionaries and dogmatists.

Chinese : The position of Chairman Mao, our Party and our Government is perfectly clear. We are a socialist country and we oppose war. We are for nuclear disarmament. Chairman Mao has frequently asked the leaders of the Soviet Union to state that they will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, but the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union consistently refuses to do so.

Soviet : It is well known that the nuclear arms of the USSR are for purely defensive purposes. As a socialist country we are against war and can never launch an aggressive war, nor support anyone who does. We are against efforts by the imperialists to start a nuclear war. However, the imperialists continue to build up their armaments and we have an obligation to defend ourselves.....

Moderator: Gentlemen, this won't do! Please refrain from this kind of vituperation. What we wish to accomplish is to show some of the similarities in viewpoint, and some of the dissimilarities, and note areas of agreement so that we may understand your positions on current international problems.....

Soviet : (Interrupting heatedly) There is no way in which a communist can agree with a Maoist who believes that nuclear war is a good thing for mankind. Chairman Mao has said that even if hundreds of millions are killed in a nuclear war it will be the deathknell for capitalism and a victory for communism. We fail to see how a cinder in space is a victory for socialism.

Chinese : (Responding in a similar fashion) This is a typical revisionist trick to ascribe to another its own desire for war. How can the revisionists in the Soviet Union be against war? Everyone knows that the causes of war throughout history have been by imperialists and exploiters, whether slave, feudal, or capitalist.

In the current stage, there is no fundamental difference between a revisionist and a capitalist, both need wars to survive. Marx pointed this out and history has confirmed this truth. It is the Soviet Union which threatens war and wants to turn this planet into a cinder. It is the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union which fears the Marxist-Leninist principled stand of Chairman Mao and the CPC and the combined might of the socialist camp. The imperialists and modern day revisionists seek to lay the blame for nuclear war at the feet of our Chairman and our party. China will never be a superpower.

Soviet : It is precisely the Maoist failure to understand the role of the Soviet Union and the socialist camp in preventing an imperialist war. It is the principled stand for peace and detente led by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, supported and upheld by the entire socialist camp and other peace-loving peoples throughout the world, who are striving to prevent a world war.

As leader of the Maoist clique it is Mao Tse-tung's total emphasis upon armed struggle to the exclusion of all other forms of struggle which endangers the fabric of world peace and places it on the brink of war.

Chinese : This is another example of decadent revisionist trash. Remember it was the Brezhnev revisionist clique along with the help of the Cuban interventionists who moved blatantly into the Angolan peoples war of national liberation in a brazen attempt to seize the initiative from the other declining superpower in recolonizing Africa. The Angolan people will not stand for it, the Chinese people will not stand for it, the world forces for peace and socialism will not stand for it!

Soviet : It is the Maoist faction ruling the Chinese Communist Party that is running counter to the forces of peace and socialism and who are for superpower confrontation. It was the Maoist who first intervened in Angola and tried to turn the revolution around and who urged the imperialist superpower to support the reactionary faction of the Angolan peoples' revolution hoping to provoke a new world war and destroy detente.....

Moderator: Gentlemen! Gentlemen! We have run out of time.....

QUESTIONS FOR THE AUDIENCE

What are the Chinese for? What are they against?

What are the Soviets for? What are they against?

Who is the main enemy of world socialism?

What is the enemy of world socialism?

What are the similarities between the two views expressed above? Dissimilarities?

Who or what is the main supporter of another world war?

How are revisionism and maoism the same? How do they differ?

Who was the true villain in the Angolan peoples' war?

WHO ARE THE PEOPLE?

"To understand these two different types of contradictions correctly, we must first be clear on what is meant by "the people" and what is meant by "the enemy". The concept of people varies in content in different countries and in different periods of history in the same country."*

For Marxist-Leninists the concept of who constitutes the "people" in a particular country is different from the Western metaphysical view. When communists speak of friendship "among peoples" or "greetings from the people" they do not mean the entire populations of the country in question. In the words of the 1967 Moscow edition of A Dictionary of Philosophy, "Only with the abolition of exploitation of man by man in a socialist society does the concept "people" again cover the entire population, all its social groups".

When President Nixon visited China, Chou En-lai extended greetings from the Chinese "people" to the "people" of the United States, but he did not mean for his greetings to include the class enemies of communists, the capitalists, the counter-revolutionaries, the imperialists, the "enemies" of the people. Chou's view was in accord with Mao Tse-tung who stated:

At the present stage, the period of building socialism, the classes, strata, and social group which favour support and work for the cause of

*Mao Tse-tung, On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People, p.80. Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1956

socialist construction all come within the category of the people, while, the social forces and groups which resist the socialist revolution are hostile to or sabotage socialist construction are enemies of the people.

Hence, the "people" and the "enemies" are social contradictions "totally different in nature". The criterion for determining who are "among the people" is established through their objective interest and support of society's progress towards socialism. Precisely who or what constitutes the "people" at any given time depends upon the revolutionary conditions prevailing in society at the time. As the revolution advances in a non-socialist society, there is a constant realignment of class forces; hence, those who are the "people" in one circumstance, in one revolutionary situation, may include all, some or none of the previous group or groups in new and different conditions.

During the anti-Vietnam War effort of the late Sixties and early Seventies, for example, all progressive groups opposed to U.S. involvement (socialists, progressives, petit bourgeoisie, liberals, and even big bourgeois in some circumstances) were considered part of the "people". Mao Tse-tung put the American dilemma in perspective during the height of the Vietnam War, when he said:

"While massacring the people in other countries U.S. imperialism is slaughtering the white and black people in its own country. Nixon's fascist atrocities have kindled the raging flames of the revolutionary mass movement in the United States. The Chinese people firmly support the revolutionary struggle of the American people. I am convinced that the American people who are fighting

valiently will ultimately win victory and that the fascist rule in the United States will inevitably be defeated.

"The Nixon government is beset with trouble internally and externally, with utter chaos at home and extreme isolation abroad. The mass movement of protest against U.S. aggression.....has swept the globe."*

Government to government relations is seen by the Communists as different from people to people relations. Government to government relations is the essential mechanism for exercising the concept of "peaceful-coexistence" between the different social systems since military power of all countries is in the hands of the ruling class. Thus, embodied in the "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" we find communist foreign policy articulated as:

".....to strive for peaceful coexistence with countries of different social systems on the basis of the Five Principles and to oppose the imperialist policy of aggression and war; to support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples and nations against imperialism and colonialism....."**

With the added clarification that:

"The policy of peaceful coexistence.....has never been a policy based upon acceptance of the status-quo in international relations. It has been, and still is a two handed fighting weapon, with the one it drives back the aggressive forces of imperialism and war; with the other, it renders assistance in all aspects to the forces struggling for national independence and the nations that are progressing toward a socialist goal."***

Therefore, in Marxist parlance, governments do not represent

*Mao Tse-Tung, "People of the World, Unite and Defeat U.S. Aggressors and all their Running Dogs", May 20, 1970 Peking

**Liu Shao-chi, "Speech on the Occasion of the Fortieth Anniversary of the Funding of the Communist Party of China NCNA, Peking, June 30, 1961

***World Marxist Review, No. 10, October 1975

the people of their respective countries unless they embody the aspirations of the people's natural desire for revolution, and an end of "exploitation of man by man," i.e., socialism. From the communist viewpoint a government must support socialism and proletarian internationalism in order to represent the people. Capitalist systems do not fulfill this criterion.

Therefore, Western leaders must clearly understand that when the communist leaders fail to comment upon or to extend friendly greetings from their government to a non-communist government it is neither accidental nor an oversight. Nor should Western leaders construe friendly greetings from the "people" of a socialist system to the "peoples" of a non-socialist state as including the class enemies; clearly they do not. Thus, such statements have a dual meaning. Marxist-Leninists understand that "people" only means communists and their progressive revolutionary allies, while Western leaders and scholars are often disinformed by the same statement because they assume the communist use of "the people" is all inclusive when, in fact, for a Marxist-Leninist it is every bit as explicitly exclusive as it is inclusive.

NOTES ON THE ROLE OF VITAL AND NON-VITAL CENTERS IN REVOLU-
TIONARY DEVELOPMENT

Though the communists do not refer to themselves or their strategic concept in terms of vital and non-vital centers it does not make it incorrect to describe a theoretical proposition in such terms if it is done dialectically and if it helps promote the understanding of a given problem. The following "notes" are simply an effort to pose a problem in a dialectical manner, and, as events transpire, to test the postulations against practical political developments which may occur over a period of time.

Two Camps - Two Vital Centers

The communists have stated many times that there are two "opposite and opposing" camps in the world today, the socialist and capitalist, and that these two socio-political systems are locked in permanent struggle in which only one winner can emerge. The communists are firmly convinced of their ultimate victory because of their superior dialectical methodology, their advanced socialist system, and their transcendent global consciousness uniting the working class of the world in a common struggle to eliminate imperialist oppression and exploitation.

Thus, if there are indeed two camps each of which is composed of a number of supporting countries, then we can posit that each camp must contain a single vital center as well as one or more (many) lesser or non-vital centers.

The vital center in each camp is, in its essence, the single country upon whom the security of all the countries supporting either social system depends; in other words, the vital center is the principal defender of the whole camp. In strategic terms it means that a defeat of one vital center by the adversative social system would lead inevitably to the defeat of all those countries supporting that vital center and system. In practical terms the Soviet Union can be called the vital center of the communist camp when viewing the whole political process, and the United States is the vital center in the opposite camp.

Non-vital Centers

Non-vital centers are those countries which associate or identify with the leading country or vital center in each of the two camps. They are non-vital since the defense of the whole camp does not rest upon them, and they are non-vital since the political, economic or military loss of one or more of them to the other side would not mean the immediate domination of one camp over the other. However, at the same time, and under "certain given conditions", one or a combination of several non-vital centers may function as a vital center in the development of a specific program or activity which directly contributes to the positive development of the camp of which it or they are members.

A Revolutionary Application

The Soviet Union, as the communist camp's vital center, cannot develop the whole revolutionary process by itself since that process is extremely complex, involves a multiplicity of factors, and world-wide revolutionary victory is, therefore, not possible at "one stroke". In fact, the process is composed of various stages and sub-stages and must necessarily involve many other countries, diverse peoples, cultures, languages, and the transformation of these and other factors can only be accomplished "step by step". Thus, the revolutionary process is a long one, covering many years, and the lifetimes of many men. It is a gradual process and, because of that very gradualness, it is often seen by individuals unfamiliar with the details of its development as non-threatening and, therefore, a dismissable entity. It is a point of view that the communists carefully nurture since they are acutely aware that those who are alert to threats prepare for them. Therefore, when one examines the process he must include both the nature of the overall objectives of that process and the particular stage or sub-stage which may be on the world scene at any given time. To view the stages of development apart from the larger process to which they are related is myopic and will only produce distorted images of that which is being examined. In the same context, it must be borne in mind that no stage is ever more important than the overall or total process, and it is for this reason that communists can be seen as willing to sacrifice revolutionary elements

and, to do so in defence of the communist vital center, the Soviet Union, which is more important than the success or existence of any single or combination of non-vital centers in the socialist camp.

It is within the context of revolutionary stages and sub-stages that the non-vital centers in each camp may play a temporary but vital central role. For example, in the Vietnam war North Vietnam was the vital center for the conduct of that war, but this was still only a stage within the whole of the revolutionary process, and North Vietnam was still a non-vital center when considered within the framework of the overall revolutionary process. Presently North Korea is the vital center for the development of the struggle with South Korea for the control of the Korean Peninsula, but within the total picture it still remains a non-vital center. The point being made is that these struggles could not be resolved without the existence of a North Vietnam and a North Korea, hence, they are "vital" to the resolution of these contradictions, but they are also non-vital since the world communist movement could lose political control of them without seriously threatening the whole communist camp.

In this fashion, in practical ways, the communist non-vital centers can be and are used for direct intervention with both the vital and non-vital centers of the non-communist world, are supported by the whole of the communist camp in such actions, and revolutionary goals and objectives can be achieved without involving, and thus protecting, the vital center of the communist

camp, the Soviet Union. A few examples will suggest many more: the Berlin blockade, the Berlin wall, the Vietnam war, the Pueblo affair, the Mayaguez affair, the Korean war, all involved a non-vital center of the socialist camp with the vital center of the non-communist camp, the United States. At the same time, non-vital centers of the communist world are simultaneously and frequently intervening and directly threatening the non-vital centers of the free world. For example, almost immediately upon taking over South Vietnam in 1974 the new Vietnamese government sought out issues with which they could confront Thailand, the pressure has continued into the 1980's, and Thailand is persistently confronted by a refugee problem, guerrilla forces ideologically and politically hostile to it, a North Vietnamese army in Cambodia, and faces the prospect of the development of still more problems all of which will have a destabilizing effect on Thailand and will lead to serious problems for that government in a few short years. Cuba, also a non-vital center of the communist camp, has been an active surrogate for the defense of the vital center of the communist camp, the Soviet Union, by undertaking necessary revolutionary actions supporting the world revolutionary process and involving political and military activities which the vital center of the communist camp could not undertake without serious and damaging repercussions. With such development it has been very difficult for the vital center of the free world to mount an adequate response, and clearly no single free world non-vital center has demonstrated sufficient willingness or strength to assume a surrogate

defense role of the free world camp. Since this communist approach has proven so successful it can be expected that further communist expansion will come about in a similar manner.

From an ideo-strategic point of view, the problem for the communist world is to develop its world-wide revolutionary offensive against the vital center of the free world while not directly involving the vital center of the communist world, and the principal method for so doing is to use the communist non-vital centers of the free world. Congruent with this approach is the need to develop this offensive in such a way as to offer maximum protection to the vital center of the communist camp, the Soviet Union. To help insure this protection the Soviet vital center must not appear to be an antagonist in any confrontation, but must always appear conciliatory, friendly, peace-loving, promote harmony and stability in the world, etcetera. Thus, the communist vital center will be perceived as a positive influence for good in the world while the United States, as the vital center of the "imperialist" camp will be portrayed as against such things and, therefore a "permanent negative example".

It is imperative that the communist vital center appear to be restrained in its actions and contacts with the non-communist vital center in order to thus restrict its initiatives. World leadership must always be seen as resting with the communist vital center while the free world vital center must always be seen to be on the defensive and thus ineffective, indecisive and incapable of acting efficiently in the interest of the free world camp. In practical terms the inept portrayal of the vital

center of the free world will be developed through a series of diverse attacks from the non-vital centers of the communist world against both the vital and non-vital centers of the non-communist world, and done in such a way as to virtually eliminate a satisfactory response from either or both the vital and non-vital centers of the free world. For example, for the immensely powerful United States to respond to a threat perpetrated by a communist non-vital center somewhere in the world will have largely negative consequences since the propaganda value portraying the imperialist bully as oppressing a national liberation struggle, for example, is immense. Even in the case where a threat from the left may be manifested by radical elements against the vital center of the free world, the United States, within a free world non-vital center such as Iran, e.g., the 1979 taking of American embassy officials as hostages, has clearly demonstrated that the United States vital center can be prevented from taking appropriate or effective action in its own interest. In spite of the fact that the majority of the world's countries condemned the taking of the hostages, the United States was condemned for actions which it undertook to force the release of the hostages, and further the condemnation was every bit as severe when the United States finally concluded it could only "wait it out" which served to show the United States was weak, ineffectual, impotent, and incapable of acting in its own interest even against a country which itself was in virtual chaos.

It may be asked how does the Soviet invasion/intervention of Afghanistan fit into this question, or Soviet intervention years earlier in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The answer is that it does not. From the Soviet view they are dealing with a fraternal communist party and a socialist oriented state, and Afghanistan must be considered as a political supporter of the world socialist system (at least for the time being), and, in terms of these remarks, a non-vital center of the socialist world.

Role of the Sino-Soviet Polemic

This subject is far too complex to discuss in these notes, but contrary to popular belief and conventional academic wisdom, the Sino-Soviet polemic actually helps to defend the vital center of the communist world, the Soviet Union. Since the non-communist world sees the Sino-Soviet polemic as a serious ideological, a practical and perhaps even a permanent division, instead of a unifying struggle conducted dialectically which results in a constant and permanent development of positive factors between these two communist parties, the non-communist vital center and its supporters are thus restrained and often fail to take actions or undertake initiatives which they would consider if they were not otherwise convinced of the divisive nature of the so-called "split".

The general attitude in the non-communist world is that the communist world is disintegrating, and if it can wait long enough the communist camp will collapse from its own internal feuding,

thus making many hard decisions unnecessary. Dialectically Sino-Soviet efforts to consciously promote the polemic is to simultaneously curb the vital center of the free world, the United States, and the non-vital supporting countries in that camp. By preventing the free world from acting through the ongoing development of a polemical argument, the communist world is free to develop its revolutionary struggle throughout the world with an ease and freedom which would not otherwise be possible if the free world understood the dialectical nature of unity and struggle between China and the Soviet Union.

The Sino-Soviet polemic should not be seen, however, as being played exclusively for the non-communist world since, it has, in fact, an extremely important and vital educative role in the communist movement. How this aspect is developed is not germane to these "notes" and will not be further explained.

Theoretical Example of an Ultimate Application

If we were asked to visualize the ultimate example of the use of a communist non-vital center against the vital center of the free world the following scenario provides a harrowing one.

Let us imagine that a non-vital communist center develops atomic weapons and the means of delivering them from its territory to the United States. This non-vital center, theoretically acting upon its own initiative, then threatens the United States and levies demands which could range from the freeing of political prisoners, transformation of the economy to a socialist one, all the way to complete capitulation. The other socialist

countries would, of course, stand aghast at such a threat, but would at the same time be powerless to act against a fraternal socialist country which is free, independent, sovereign, and acting in accord with its own interests. The options for the non-communist vital center, the United States, is to threaten the small communist country in return with total annihilation. However, before this happens the United States will ask the vital center of the communist camp, the Soviet Union, to intervene in order to prevent a possible nuclear holocaust. The Soviet Union will, of course, agree to do so. Consultation between the threatening non-vital center of the communist camp will ostensibly take place after which the Soviet Union will inform the United States it can do nothing and will recommend that the United States meet the terms of the threatening country. At the same time, the Soviet Union will make it clear it cannot stand idly by, and, in concert with the whole of the communist world, will not permit a nuclear strike against a non-vital center of the communist camp.

Thus, a situation could develop where the United States as the vital center of the free world is under threat of nuclear blackmail from a non-vital center of the communist world, cannot respond without inviting possible nuclear retaliation from the Soviet Union, and cannot hold the Soviet Union and the communist camp in anyway culpable since they will actively deplore the threat while being powerless to interfere in the internal affairs of a friendly and independent nation. Without either an agreement

to terms of capitulation, depending upon what is asked, the free world stands to lose its vital center while the vital center of the communist world would remain unthreatened and unscathed, and final world-wide communist victory would be assured.

The reader can easily supply his own options and scenarios to resolve this dilemma.

A COMMENTARY ON COMMUNIST LEADERSHIP

Kremlin Succession

V. Zorza wrote an article on Kremlin succession which appeared in the Sunday edition of the Washington Post on June 3, 1979. It was fatuous at best, just column inches of speculation with the conclusion that if his scenario should come true Brezhnev's death could herald a change in both detente and Salt. Is such analysis generally useful in understanding Soviet reality? I suggest it is not.

Historically Zorza's views seem predicated upon a firm belief that individual leaders in communist parties, Brezhnev in the case of the CPSU, rules the party and not the other way around--such was true under Stalin and so it must still be true. With such a viewpoint no issue can ever be bigger and more important to the party than it is to the leader of the party. In the case of Brezhnev Salt and detente are not then necessarily important to Soviet Union and the party per se, but are important to the party because they are important to Brezhnev. We are left with the implication that these issues may not transcend Brezhnev's death. This seems a patently ridiculous assumption and any serious research will verify that Brezhnev's demise will not alter the Soviet outlook on the value of either Salt or detente.

Zorza does not seem to address himself to the common recognition among communist leaders that they are involved in a world-wide revolutionary struggle for socialism, for the defeat

of capitalism and imperialism, the victory of which they do not necessarily expect to see in their lifetimes, and in which such figures as Marx, Lenin, Stalin and Brezhnev are but transient voices of a permanent revolution, who are always a part of the whole process but never eclipse it.

G. Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA Academy of Sciences of the USSR, made the nature of this struggle clear in his book, War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations, when he said: ".....the pivot of the struggle in international relations has become the contradiction between two world systems representing the two principal and antagonistic classes of contemporary society..... Here the crucial point is that essentially it is antagonistic struggle which leads not to any reciprocal drawing together or even the fusion of the two systems, as is maintained by the exponents of the "convergence" theory, but to the victory of the most advanced system, socialism....." (Emphasis added).

The protracted nature of this conflict is long recognized by the Soviets who attribute the essence of the present policy of peaceful coexistence to Lenin's fertile political mind. Detente and cold war are two aspects of the policy of peaceful coexistence. The cold war was a way of fighting between the two social systems which had negative consequences for the socialist camp since it had the practical result of mobilizing the anti-communist forces around the world, served as a basis for their anti-Sovietism, and kept the countries opposing communism in a relatively high state of military preparedness.

The cold war obviously was not a state of war, but a state of heightened tension under the doctrine of peaceful coexistence which served the West more efficiently than it served the communist countries since it was highly effective in preventing the development of revolution in various parts of the world. It was for this reason the Soviets and its communist allies sought to eliminate the cold war as an instrument of Western policy and to replace it with the other aspect of peaceful coexistence, detente. For some years it was a principal of socialist foreign policy to work to "compel" the West to accept detente. As far as the United States was concerned this came about with the signing of an agreement between Brezhnev and Nixon in Moscow in May 1972.

The point is that Brezhnev's death is irrelevant to detente because the Soviets want and need detente in order to have the time to develop all forms of struggle against the West. Detente means the communist countries are gaining the time they need to accomplish their revolutionary goals while at the same time preventing the mobilization of an effective anti-communist deterrent.

M. Rozental in a Novosti publication, "The Dialectics of the Present Epoch", circa 1966, states: "The world socialist system will proceed through the breaking away of separating countries from the imperialist system.....It is a complex process, taking place in many stages, in which separate countries break away from the world imperialist system.....Since it is a process of separate countries breaking away it is

natural that the capitalist and socialist systems should co-exist in the world for sometime." Cold war had to be eliminated as a form of struggle between the two systems and detente established in order to facilitate the breaking away of countries one by one from the Western alliance. Thus detente is a factor for the Soviet Union independently of Brezhnev's views on it and will remain as a condition for the Soviet Union's revolutionary development regardless of who succeeds Brezhnev.

Zorza talks of differences in the CPSU as though he regards them as an unusual phenomenon. That this seems to surprise him suggests he must expect a constant affirmation of unity on all issues by the members of the central committee of the party. The fact that Marx, Lenin and others have constantly stressed the value of internal struggle as an aspect of party democracy and the means to better promote internal and external developments of the CPSU seems lost on Zorza. In addition, the fact that criticism and self-criticism are institutionally and constitutionally enshrined as the only method for resolving differences in the party also seems to have little meaning for Zorza. The question should not be whether or not differences exist within the leadership, it is natural that they should, but more importantly one should look to see if the leadership is resolving its differences in accordance with a commonly accepted methodology. If they are then there is little reason to become excited about the fact that differences exist.

Without commenting further upon other of Zorza's "profundities" it seems one can get to the heart of the matter very quickly by asking another question" Does it really make any practical or political difference to the United States and other Western countries who takes over from Brezhnev, and, if so, are there conditions under which it is important? However, before citing relevant conditions for concern certain other factors must first be stated.

It is clearly established there are differences among Soviet leaders, but even without knowing their precise nature it is certain that whatever they may be and however they may be expressed it is done within the parameters of Marxism-Leninism. Moreover, one can safely assume that all CPSU leaders are revolutionaries, all believe in the messianic cause of Marxism-Leninism, and all are working for that cause--"the victory of the most advanced system, socialism," Thus differences, if they can be precisely identified, are one-sidedly in support of their historic Marxist goals.

What then is the essence of argumentation among Soviet leaders no matter how acrimonious it may appear? In the final analysis leadership conflicts must be over the best policies and methods, strategy and tactics, to achieve their inseparable internal and external revolutionary goals. One can assume that no leader in the CPSU seeks to destroy his party and thus his differing views are offered to strengthen the party. As internal conflict develops among Soviet leaders the one who emerges victorious will be the one who has persuaded the majority of

the other leaders that he has the best program for successfully developing the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy objectives. Thus, while identifying successors may be an interesting intellectual exercise in the West, and while it offers some writers an opportunity to show their erudition, serves as a useful media filler, there is little real practical value in such speculation. Even if Zorza's analysis should prove accurate, there is no assurance that either Salt or detente would be in danger. The Soviet position on these two issues, for example, will be determined by the existing conditions at the time the decision must be made, it will be a party decision based upon whether Salt or detente serves or hurts the revolutionary development at home and abroad, and will not be based upon a unilaterally arrived-at decision by a new leader against the wishes of the party.

There are perhaps two conditions under which it would be useful to identify a potential successor to Brezhnev. In the first instance, it would be useful to know if one or more individuals on the central committee of the party would actively advocate and promote the use of atomic weaponry as a means to resolve the struggle between capitalism and socialism once in power. The second condition making it worthwhile for us to know Brezhnev's successor in advance would be if it were possible to identify an individual who actively promotes a policy calling for a convergence of capitalism and socialism, who advocates a return to full capitalism in the USSR because social practice has shown that it is a superior economic system, who

recommends an indefinite live-and-let-live policy between the two competing social systems, or who otherwise would offer policies which are at variance with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. This would be useful to know in hopes we could propose and develop policies which would a Soviet leader with such an outlook. Of course, both conditions represent wishful thinking at its highest level.

The purpose of the debate on differences in the Soviet Union is to find the best ways and means to accomplish their objectives. It can be reasonably assumed that whomever it may be that ultimately replaces Brezhnev as party leader the debate which put him there will have established that he among the rest was the most persuasive in detailing a program for defeating imperialism and capitalism and promoting world revolutionary interest. Unless there is change in the CPSU, a change so radical that it permits revisionist thought and practice at the highest level of the CPSU, Brezhnev's successor will continue to promote the same goals as did Brezhnev, and he will show the same allegiance to the documents of the various party congresses as did Brezhnev; and it is in this sense that it is unimportant to know who will replace Brezhnev since nothing will change in the outlook of the party which will be favorable to the West and unfavorable to the CPSU and the Soviet state. Regardless of the successor chosen he will promote the "line". Whether it is a moderate line, a hard line or soft line, makes little difference since all are aspects of the same thing, "the line". The permanent direction of this line has been indelibly spelled out, the destruction of capitalism and imperialism

and Brezhnev's successor will promote this destruction just as vigorously as did he. What difference does it make to the West who it is that follows Brezhnev?