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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	Soviet purposes 3p R 01/23/02 NLSF2000-006/1 #67	5/24/83	P1/B1
2. report	p. 2 only re Andropov 1p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #68	n.d.	P1/B1
3. paper	re Soviet shipping 1p D 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #69	5/25/83	P1/B1
4. note	Weinberger to Clark re State memo 1p R 3/14/01 NLSF00-006/1 #70	5/27/83	P1/B1
5. memo	Comments on State's memo 2p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #71	5/25/83	P1/B1
6. memo	Clark to RR re US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps 2p R 12/19/05 M04-017 #8	n.d.	P1/B1
7. memo	Shultz to RR re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 2p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #73	5/21/83	P1/B1
8. paper	Cultural Exchange Agreement 1st page only 1p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 #74	n.d.	P1/B1
9. note	duplicate of document 4 1p R 3/14/01 NLSF00-006/1 #75	5/27/83	P1/B1
10. memo	duplicate of document 5 2p R 6/13/06 F00-006 #76	5/25/83	P1/B1

RESTRICTIONS

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File Folder US-SOVIET RELATIONS PAPERS WORKING FILE:
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ID Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
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6	MEMO	CLARK TO RR RE US SOVIET RELATIONS NEXT STEPS (#8)	2	ND
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MVH 3/18/08

Soviet "SU FILE"

There's nothing like a little ignorance put into too many words.
RR

Scowcroft Suggests Private U.S.-Soviet Talks

By Michael Getler
Washington Post Staff Writer

Official U.S.-Soviet relations are so bad, retired Air Force Gen. Brent Scowcroft said yesterday, that the two governments might have a better chance of easing tensions if they could turn to a new kind of private discussion altogether out of public view.

Scowcroft, who headed the presidential commission on the MX missile, on whose recommendations the House is expected to vote today, told reporters he was convinced that President Reagan "was sincerely interested in making progress in arms control" and that "he is prepared to make a deal." Scowcroft also said the Soviets seem "open at the present time to negotiations."

There is no progress in sight in the two sets of nuclear arms talks in Geneva, however, and Scowcroft said "my perception is that official relations are really very bad." In such an environment, he said, "it is not easy to get started" on an arms agreement despite what may be readiness on both sides.

"There are not a number of what I would call good contacts" between



By James M. Thresher—The Washington Post

The president with Scowcroft, who said he sees threat of nuclear war decreasing.

the two governments, he said. But "one way to break out of the considerable depths of suspicion would be to initiate some private kind of talks, away from the spotlight, where neither side has to worry about being perceived as caving in or making concessions, even as the one who requested such talks," he said.

Scowcroft, who had breakfast with reporters and met later in the day with Reagan, said the president clearly has "some emotional views about the Soviet Union and what it represents that are strong and fixed

and that he will never change. But he is also pragmatic . . . , and while he may not have a precise idea of a formula [for an arms agreement], he really does want to make progress."

Although some early administration rhetoric about nuclear weapons and war undoubtedly scared some people, Scowcroft said, it also was meant to correct earlier misperceptions that U.S. forces might be only a facade of strength. Scowcroft said he thought the Soviets were able to distinguish between actions and rhetoric in Washington and that

"rhetoric will not stand in the way" if an agreement is possible.

Reagan, he said, had become "more aware" of what "you can and can't get" from the Soviets in negotiations.

The Soviets, he said, are "defensive and apprehensive about this administration and partly as a result of that are reluctant to be making a gesture toward negotiations."

He said the Soviets, "at this stage in their history, are not a bellicose, aggressive power in the sense of high risk-taking. Quite the contrary." Although Moscow has no stake in maintaining the current world order, the Soviet leaders are "conservative, low-risk" people who tend to "recede when confronted with strength that they cannot avoid"

Scowcroft said he thought the threat of nuclear war, which is "unlikely" to begin with, is "declining fairly steadily." One reason is that 14 years of arms talks have helped each side get to know each other's capabilities better, he said.

"In a strange way," he added, the proliferation of each side's atomic arsenal has also made the "contemplation of a successful nuclear attack by either side more remote."

PRESERVATION COPY

TIES BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET VIEWED AS AT A LOW POINT

Experts Cite Rise in Tension as 2 Nations Trade Charges on a Wide Range of Issues

By HEDRICK SMITH
Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 23 — Soviet-American relations have reached one of the lowest points in a generation as the two nations trade recriminations over the Middle East, Central America, Afghanistan and missile deployments in Europe, according to many Government and academic specialists.

The specialists regard the three years since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 as a time of protracted tension, sharp and acrimonious charges, diplomatic stalemate and mutual suspicion. Soviet visitors as well as American officials speak warily of the prospects for "doing business" with the other side.

Talks on Grain Sales to Resume

President Reagan suggested last week that a meeting with Yuri V. Andropov could take place next year, and White House aides say that by sharply stepping up military spending and by speaking out forcefully against Moscow, Mr. Reagan has demonstrated resolve, bolstered American military strength and set the stage for what one official called "a new season" of more productive bargaining with Moscow.

Senior Administration officials take comfort in the fact that the two sides have agreed to start long-term negotiations on grain sales. They also forecast more active probing in the Geneva negotiations on European nuclear weapons and strategic arms as a result of adjustments in American positions.

11 Commissions Suspended

Apart from arms talks, however, most cooperative activities have been shrinking. The volume of Soviet-United States trade has fallen from \$4.5 billion in 1979 to \$2.8 billion last year, to the point where the United States now supplies only 20 percent of Soviet grain imports, compared with 60 percent in earlier periods.

The activities of eight official groups set up under the Carter Administration to work on a treaty to ban satellite warfare, ban nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean or develop a comprehensive underground test ban have lapsed. Eleven commissions set up a decade ago to work out exchanges in the fields of science and technology, seismic research,

health research and developments in space have all been suspended.

The downward trend began under the Carter Administration, but it has quickened during the Reagan period, in which a determined but unsuccessful drive was carried on to block the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe and to tighten curbs on Western trade with Moscow.

"I don't know of a time when our relations have been worse at an official level," one experienced unofficial Presidential adviser commented. "The mutual suspicions are very high. There's very little real dialogue going on. To cut through that will not be easy because I don't think either side wants to be seen coming to the other hat in hand."

"The atmosphere is bad," said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was a ranking specialist on Soviet affairs in the Nixon Administration. "The Soviets are trying to heat up the Middle East and talk people into greater anxiety about the missile deployments in Europe. They're ominous in their tone. The arms negotiations are stalemated, though the nature of these negotiations is that they take five, six, seven years to succeed. The Russians are playing hard to get."

'A Period of Stalemate'

"There have been periods of accommodation in the past and periods of sharp confrontation, but this is essentially a period of stalemate," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser to President Carter. "Both sides have openings which neither has exploited aggressively. They are like two weary boxers who have been slugging each other. They're hostile. They've backed off. They're not really talking to each other but they're not pressing each other on the ground."

Marshall Shulman, director of the Russian Research Center at Columbia University and former Soviet affairs specialist in the Carter Administration, compared the present climate to the cold war period and the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.

"Relations are on a low plateau — poor communications, tension, dismantling of cooperative activities, sharp rhetoric," Mr. Shulman said. "There aren't any signs for improvement in the near future."

"Indeed," he went on, "some factors could make relations worse — our nuclear force deployments in Europe and possible Soviet countermoves; second, the question of whether each side will deploy new strategic weapons systems; third, some third world event, say in Iran; fourth, the Middle East and particularly Syria. These add an element of unpredictability."

Kennan Takes Grim View

The grimmest assessment came from George F. Kennan, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who said recently that Soviet-American relations were in a "dreadful and dangerous state" and changes were needed to halt "a march toward war."

Others, like Prof. Adam Ulam of Harvard University, temper pessimism with the reminder that for all the obvious strains, the two superpowers have avoided the sort of head-to-head showdowns they experienced over Berlin in the cold war in the late 1940's and during the Cuban missile crisis. But, Mr. Ulam added, "things are more dangerous now because the Russians are more powerful and we are weaker."

One saving grace, several analysts said, is that both President Reagan and the new Soviet leadership are preoccupied with domestic economic problems that tend to make them less activist and adventurous abroad.

Moreover, the approach of the 1984 elections has engendered hope that the current stalemates will ease as President Reagan seeks to rebut criticism of his posture toward Moscow and arms control.

"There might be some moderation,"

N.Y.T.

5/24/83

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Professor Shulman said, "as the Administration gets closer to the 1984 election and concludes that there is political advantage in moving toward the center to take the peace issue from the Democrats."

Brent Scowcroft, the retired Air Force general who served as President Ford's national security adviser, said his recent informal contacts with ranking Soviet visitors indicated the Russians were interested in serious bargaining on arms control. The Russians, he told reporters at breakfast, are "open at the present time" for serious give-and-take but also are "defensive" and "apprehensive about this Administration."

"Official relations are really very bad and there are not a number of good contacts," the former general said. "One way to break out of that, considering the depth of suspicion if not antagonism, would be to initiate some private kind of talks without each side having to worry about caving in or making concessions — to attempt to clear away some of the underbrush. I wouldn't say that it can't be done through official channels, but it's more difficult."

During the Nixon years, Henry A. Kissinger, then national security adviser, engaged in what became known as exploratory "back channel" discussions with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, that developed breakthroughs for the formal arms talks.

This year, Secretary of State George P. Shultz has held several meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin. Some officials see those meetings as a potential opening, but others report that Mr. Shultz has proceeded "very carefully" and that these contacts have so far been less ambitious and promising than Mr. Kissinger's earlier venture.

"Shultz is a very capable guy but he's very careful," said one well-placed Reagan adviser. "He likes to master his agenda. I don't think he's comfortable with that kind of exploration."

Other officials contend, however, that

even if this is the case now, Mr. Shultz will step up his role in Soviet-American relations in the coming months.

Administration officials assert that Moscow cannot simply expect Washington to resurrect past agreements if they are unwilling to accept much of the burden for the current stalemate. The Russians, these officials charge, aggressively pushed pro-Soviet takeovers in Angola, Ethiopia, Southern Yemen and Afghanistan in the late 1970's, cut back sharply on the flow of Jewish emigration, took a tough line against dissidents and promoted the crackdown in Poland.

"It would be easy to set up a summit and to move ahead if one essentially adopted the Soviet agenda of 'Let's have business as usual,'" said Richard Burt, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. "The Soviet position is that the U.S. needs to resurrect the series of agreements and relationships that emerged in the 70's, known collectively as détente."

"But we have concerns that need to be taken into account as well if a durable U.S.-Soviet relationship is going to emerge," Mr. Burt went on in a meeting with reporters. "We can't ignore the fact that there has been an increasing crackdown on different groups in the Soviet Union."

Some specialists contend the Administration is hampered because it lacks a top-level foreign policy-maker or strategist with the experience of Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Brzezinski or Mr. Scowcroft. Neither Mr. Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger nor William P. Clark, the national security adviser, has a background in Soviet affairs or strategic policy-making.

For specialized advice, officials say, the President draws indirectly on Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, a former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and close aide to Mr. Kissinger; Mr. Burt, a former specialist in national security affairs at the Institute for Strategic Studies; Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is a past director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a longtime Congressional aide experienced in arms control and Soviet affairs; and Robert C. McFarlane, the deputy national security adviser, a career marine officer who served several years on the National Security Council staff in Republican administrations.

Roles for 2 Junior Specialists

With the departure from that staff of Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian, responsibility for Soviet and East European affairs fell several months ago to two well-regarded but quite junior specialists, John Lenczowski and Paula Dobriansky.

Within the Administration, Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Burt have reputations as advocates of some flexibility in dealing with Moscow, whereas Mr. Iklé and Mr. Perle are known as proponents of toughness. Mr. McFarlane was the key figure lately in helping President Reagan work out the outline of shifts in his arms control positions with key members of Congress.

Outside specialists cite that sequence as symptomatic of the Administration's inadequate expertise in Soviet and strategic affairs. They note that the two new concepts now being incorporated into the President's strategic arms proposal originated outside the Administration.

The idea of raising previous limits on missile launchers to make way for a new single-warhead missile emerged from Democrats in Congress and was adopted by a bipartisan commission headed by Mr. Scowcroft. Another new idea, that of requiring each side to destroy two existing nuclear warheads for each new warhead on a new missile or submarine, came from Senators William S. Cohen, a Maine Republican, and Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat.

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*Beel & John: let's discuss
copies provided*

DCI
24 May 1983

An Assessment of Soviet Purposes

1. For over a decade the Soviets have sought to derive political, economic and propaganda benefits from bilateral dealings with the United States without in any way jeopardizing their ability to use whatever tactics would yield strategic advantages in Southeast Asia, South Asia, the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, southern Africa and Central America. They have successfully resisted any US effort to link bilateral dealings with restraints on their activities in these strategic regions.

2. The State Department's division of dealings with the Soviets into four elements, i.e., bilateral matters, human rights, arms control matters and regional matters, is a false division which plays into Soviet ^{*the aim of*} purposes keeping bilateral negotiations and regional negotiations decoupled. The reality is that both human rights and arms control are also bilateral negotiations. The Soviets have no concern for human rights except to play that issue to Western opinion and as the National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet Approach to Arms Control concludes, their interest in arms control is to retain the right to pursue their own strategic objectives while restraining the Western arms in two ways: first, to impose contractual restrictions, and secondly, to promote in the west a perception that the defense burden can be lowered because of a benign attitude and diminished threat from the Soviet Union. Dividing the dealings into four elements permits the Soviets to move in any one of the four and create a need for the West to respond in that area rather than in other areas which are more significant to Western interests.

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NLS F2000-006/1 #C7

3. The Soviets probably want a meeting and we should seek one but should not put the President in the position of begging for a Summit. We should not need to pay anything for a meeting. Our willingness to meet should be sufficient contribution on our part. Any significant agreements are not likely to be developed in a meeting this fall and attention should be directed to serious substantive discussions expressing our concerns about the relationships. The institutional State Department attitude is, let's find something to offer to the Soviets so we can get them to agree to a Summit.

4. We should take a leaf from our own book in Israel. The Secretary of State's warning to the Soviets on Israel and Syria has credibility because the Soviets believe we would use force to defend our interests and our allies. We don't need to offer anything; we don't need to promise anything. The warning itself has credibility. The State Department keeps insisting, as the Secretary has, that we ask something specific of the Soviets and in return for that we will offer them some cornucopia of goodies in the bilateral relationship. Soviet policy in the Third World does not work like that. It is not an add-on; it is not an adventuristic kind of policy conceived as a possible trade-off. It is a fundamental element of Soviet foreign policy. They will not forgo their activities, specifically or generally, in the Third World for anything we can promise -- including a major arms control agreement, as Jimmy Carter found out to his regret. Only the prospect of a strong US response can produce Soviet restraint, as in Iran and the Middle East.

5. I believe discussions with the Soviets should continue in Washington and in Moscow but that we should not permit them to be limited to bilateral matters. If we want to test them we need to test them on something of significance to us and to them. That means reducing the pressures in Central America or in southern Africa or some other area where our strategic interests are under

substantial threat.

6. What holds the best prospect for any progress is for the President to call in Dobrynin (and Hartman simultaneously should see Gromyko) to convey the following message:

-- The United States is interested in halting the continuing deterioration in US-Soviet relations.

-- To this end, the United States is prepared to undertake negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement and also on the opening of consulates in Kiev and New York City.

-- Beyond this, the President is considering attending the General Assembly at the UN this fall and, should General Secretary Andropov plan to be present, the President believes there would be some value in the two of them meeting privately at the UN to discuss issues of mutual interest.

-- At the same time, the United States wishes to ensure that there is no miscalculation or misunderstanding in an area of key strategic concern to the United States -- developments in Central America. The United States is prepared to defend and will defend its interests in this region, consistent with historical experience. The Soviet Union should be aware that the dispatch of modern fighter aircraft to Nicaragua or the dispatch of Cuban or other combat forces to Nicaragua is unacceptable to the United States and will not be permitted by it. Such deployments would be blocked by force.

For maximum impact, the President ought to make these comments to Dobrynin himself in the White House. It is worth remembering, however, that this continues a long line of American rhetoric for the last eight years. Push will come to shove and the United States will have to act. Side deals on the Third World are simply not in the cards.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 27, 1983

Memo For JUDGE CLARK

Dear Bill:

Attached are some comments with respect to the State Department memo proposing several new openings to the Soviets, which you and I have discussed.

Please let me know if you want anything more.



Attachments

83 MAY 27 P 9: 49

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SEC DEF CONTR No. X25729

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE EYES ONLY~~

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NLS F00-066/1 #70
BY LBJ, NARA, DATE 5/1/01

25 May 1983
03 MAY 27 9:48NLS F00-006 # 71 Comments on State's Memo onSECRET
SIC 100-100000BY omy, NARA, DATE 6/13/06 US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

1. The specific proposals of this memo come down to the following initiatives:

- a SecState visit to Moscow to be followed by an invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington;
- negotiations on a new Cultural Agreement; and
- opening of consulates in Kiev and New York.

2. Regarding the visit of SecState to Moscow, one should consider that SecState visited there at the occasion of Brezhnev's funeral. A better first step might be a Gromyko visit to Washington early in September. This makes the United States appear less as the petitioner. A SecState visit to Moscow as early as this summer could put pressure on the US--far more than on the Soviets--to produce results. It would be our Secretary who would be seen as having to come back with results if he goes all the way to Moscow at the President's initiative.

3. The Cultural Exchange Agreement was permitted to expire in 1979 as part of the Carter Administration's response to Afghanistan. Resuming negotiations toward such an Agreement could be misconstrued as our having forgotten and forgiven the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The memo points out that the asymmetry in the visits between the US and the Soviet Union is troublesome, but this point ought to be broadened. There is a disturbing lack of reciprocity favoring the Soviet Union in a wide variety of US-Soviet relationships. The Soviets have a larger Embassy staff and trade missions; their visitors generally have more access to the American people and the media; and their trade relationships with us (as George Schulz has pointed out in another context) is one-sided because they are a single government monopoly with a great deal of information about the US economy and US firms, while we have private firms competing with each other to do business with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the problem that a new Cultural Exchange Agreement is supposed to fix is much broader than cultural affairs. And even in the realm of cultural affairs, it cannot be fixed by such an agreement. What we need is more effective implementation of the tools we now have to enforce reciprocity, plus perhaps some legislative changes. We should therefore develop a framework for US-Soviet reciprocity in diplomatic,

business, cultural, scientific, and other such relations, and proposals on how to enforce it. Once we have such a framework in place, a new Cultural Exchange Agreement might well fit into it and accomplish its desired purposes.

4. A critical question on all these initiatives is timing. If there is a possibility of a summit next year or later this year, the agreement on the consulates and the signing of the Cultural Agreement (based on rigorous reciprocity) may be precisely the kind of limited substantive outcome that we need to hold in reserve, so as to keep open for the President the option of a summit. We should not get into a situation where a summit may be desirable for a variety of reasons, but achievable with a substantive outcome only by massive last-minute US concessions on arms control negotiations or other difficult issues. If a Cultural Agreement and consulates are the things the Soviets are perhaps more eager to get than we, these items could give us the leverage to avoid one-sided pressures on the President in conjunction with a summit.

5. The State memo omits the flat Soviet rejection of our proposal to negotiate verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We must not accept that turndown and go on to other business more convenient for the Soviets, such as cultural affairs and consulates. We should not be left dangling with an unverifiable treaty that we comply with; this would establish a bad precedent for other arms control. Hence, the verification negotiations on TTB ought to be part of any package of new initiatives.

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MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK
SUBJECT: U.S.-Soviet Relations: Next Steps

Issue: Should George Shultz meet with Ambassador Dobrynin next week to discuss the negotiation of a cultural agreement and the establishment of new consulates in New York and Kiev?

Facts: In several memos in the past month and in previous discussions with you, George Shultz has recommended the opening of new consulates in Kiev and New York and beginning negotiations on a new cultural exchange agreement. At the last meeting you had with Secretary Shultz on these and other bilateral issues, you agreed that these two issues be presented again with more elaboration of the pros and cons. At Tab A is such a memorandum from George Shultz to you.

Based on George's meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin, the memorandum identifies four broad topics for continued discussions with the Soviets: human rights, arms control, bilateral relations and regional issues. It asserts that some signs of flexibility by the Soviets in the human rights and bilateral areas have been detected. The memo also notes that we have to explore the prospect of moving forward in overall U.S.-Soviet relations and consider a potential trip to Moscow by the Secretary and/or inviting Foreign Minister Gromkvo to Washington. With these aims in mind, State proposes that George Shultz meet with Dobrynin next week to discuss a new cultural agreement and the establishment of consulates in Kiev and New York. State's memorandum does not reflect other agency views.

Discussion: I have serious reservations about the wisdom of State's specific recommendations to commence discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates with the Soviets at this time. The costs of undertaking these steps in the current international setting (Soviet intransigence on arms control talks, sabotage of U.S. peace efforts in the Middle East, new round of pressures on the Polish regime to repress the workers, etc.) are prohibitively high. In its present form and with its timing, these steps would especially manifest the Administration's engagement in a "creeping return to detente." If this impression was to set in, new pressures by the Soviets to modify our policies would follow.

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NLS M04-017 #8

BY ALL NARA DATE 12/19/05

An additional reason for not raising these issues next week, is the prospect that the Central Committee Plenum of the Communist Party to be held in June might shed some light on Andropov's power within the Politburo. In fact, if Andropov's authority is reinforced by his appointment as a titular head of state, in addition to being General Secretary, we might expect some additional movement shortly thereafter on arms control. This environment would be clearly more propitious for discussions on a cultural agreement and consulates.

Before these issues can be addressed, there is also a clear need to develop an overall operational strategy with your national security advisors as to how to implement the goals set forth in NSDD-75 (U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Union). That is, a clear and comprehensive, short-term/long-term approach must be developed to achieve NSDD-75 objectives. Specifically, with regard to a new cultural agreement, terms of reference must be drafted to address what kind of cultural agreement is being sought, how can we best ensure equal access to Soviet audiences, etc. Answers to such critical questions should be obtained before we approach the Soviets.

Finally, I have already requested that State produce an inter-agency approved paper on the pros and cons of a new U.S.-Soviet cultural exchange agreement and the establishment of new consulates for discussion at an NSC meeting scheduled for June 10.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTONMay 21, 1983 ⁸³ MAY 21 A 9: 12~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

TO: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: George P. Shultz ⁵³⁰⁵

SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

STATE DEPT
SITUATION ROOM

At your direction, I have embarked on a process of intensive dialogue with Dobrynin on the full range of US-Soviet issues; Max Kampelman has been engaged on sensitive Madrid issues; and Art Hartman has also had a role in Moscow. We have identified four necessary topic areas for discussion:

A. Human Rights: In this area there has been some movement. It began with your initiative to break the impasse in the Pentecostalist case, but in recent weeks the Soviets, in the context of reaching a CSCE agreement in Madrid, appear to have been moving toward us on other human rights issues of special concern.

B. Bilateral Relations: Dobrynin and I have reviewed outstanding issues in our bilateral relations to see where we might move to mutual advantage. In this area, our principal move was your proposal to begin negotiations for a new Long Term Agreement on grains. They knew we wanted an agreement, and they have now accepted the proposal.

C. Arms Control: Here the results of our discussions have been mixed. We have covered virtually every topic in your arms control negotiating program, and the Soviet responses have ranged from some modest movement on START, MBFR, and your recent CBMs proposals; through a serious but still unsatisfactory reply to our démarches on their tests of the PL-5 ICBM; to a blank wall on INF. At the same time, there is some momentum in our bilateral exchanges with the Soviets on nuclear non-proliferation (Ambassador Richard Kennedy will hold a second round of these consultations in Moscow in mid-June). As you know we are now reviewing our positions on some of the central arms control issues and, depending on what we decide, we may have more to say to the Soviets on these subjects.

D. Regional Issues: We have had a fair amount of dialogue with the Soviets on issues such as Afghanistan, but positive results have been meager. Our task remains to drive home to the Soviets the importance of progress on these issues if there is to be a meaningful and lasting improvement in our relations.

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- 2 -

Against this background, we are now in a position where we need to take further steps if we want to see whether a visit this summer to Moscow for meetings with Andropov and Gromyko, an invitation to Gromyko to Washington for a meeting with you at the time of the UNGA this fall, and ultimately a meeting between you and Andropov would be in our interest. I believe the next step on our part should be to propose the negotiation of a new US-Soviet cultural agreement and the opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York, as I suggested some months ago. Both of these proposals will sound good to the Soviets, but are unambiguously in our interest when examined from a hardheaded American viewpoint. I am enclosing copies of the options papers on these issues the Department earlier sent to Bill Clark.

In NSSD 75 on US-Soviet relations, you endorsed the idea that getting an adequate formal framework for exchanges is the only way to ensure reciprocity in cultural, academic and media contacts with the Soviets, and to penetrate the Soviet Union with our own ideology. To get it we need to negotiate a new US-Soviet cultural agreement with the Soviets, and that is what Charlie Wick and I have proposed for your decision.

The opening of U.S. and Soviet consulates in Kiev and New York would have the advantage of getting us onto new Soviet terrain while increasing the Soviet presence here only marginally. The Soviets already have a big UN Mission in New York, while our consulate in Kiev would be the first Western mission in the capital of the Ukraine. There is growing interest in a Kiev consulate in Congress and among American Jewish and Ukrainian groups. A U.S. presence in Kiev would also help us broaden our access to and ideological penetration of Soviet society.

In order to continue the dialogue process you have authorized me to pursue, I would like to propose to Dobrynin next week that we move forward with the cultural agreement and the consulates. So far it is the Soviets who have made most of the moves in the process, particularly on the LTA and human rights. It is now time for us to take some modest steps of our own. These steps are necessary (but obviously far from sufficient) ingredients to development of the possibility of a substantive meeting with real results between you and Andropov during your first term.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Cultural Exchanges Agreement: Options

As matters now stand, the Soviets have almost unlimited access to American media and other forums. And we have only limited means to penetrate the Soviet Union with our ideology. Our open society and the legal restraints on our ability to refuse visas to Soviet citizens except on national security grounds make this possible. We are fortunate that the Soviets since 1979 have chosen not to send performing artists here; otherwise, the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moscow Circus and similar major groups could be touring the US annually without any reciprocity for American groups in the USSR. There are indications that the Soviets are rethinking this policy and may start sending performers again. We currently have no means of ensuring reciprocity in this area, nor do we have leverage to gain Soviet agreement for us to conduct thematic exhibits in the USSR. Such exhibits, with American guides speaking Russian or other local language, have proven to be one of the most effective means of reaching thousands of Soviet citizens with the American message. For example, Vladimir Bukovsky has stated that he became a dissident when he visited the US Exposition in Moscow in 1959.

To increase our penetration of Soviet society through cultural exchanges, we need to consider the most effective means. We see three basic options:

1. Negotiate a new exchanges agreement, replacing the one that expired in 1979, that ensures reciprocity.

PROS: The exact form of an agreement would have to be worked out in interagency discussions to ensure that all USG interests would be considered. At a minimum, it would define the areas in which reciprocity must be provided, including the performing arts. We should be able to improve our access to influential Soviet circles by putting continued access to US audiences on a reciprocal basis. Exhibits would be an important part of an agreement, as would all other legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society. We would also require access to Soviet television.

CONS: This would involve negotiating a highly visible agreement and raise questions about how it conforms to our sanctions policy. It would cause speculation whether we are returning to a policy of detente.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
DECL: OADR

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90660 add-on

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

May 27, 1983

Memo For JUDGE CLARK

Bill M

Judge

J

Dear Bill:

Attached are some comments with respect to the State Department memo proposing several new openings to the Soviets, which you and I have discussed.

Please let me know if you want anything more.

Sy

Attachments

83 MAY 27 P 9: 49

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NLS F00-006/1 #75

BY NOJ, NARA, DATE 5/1/01

25 May 1983

SYSTEM II
90660 add-on

NL: Foo-006 #76

Comments on State's Memo on

BY JW, NAHA, DATE 6/12/06 ~~US-Soviet Relations: Next Steps~~

1. The specific proposals of this memo come down to the following initiatives:

- a SecState visit to Moscow to be followed by an invitation for Gromyko to visit Washington;
- negotiations on a new Cultural Agreement; and
- opening of consulates in Kiev and New York.

2. Regarding the visit of SecState to Moscow, one should consider that SecState visited there at the occasion of Brezhnev's funeral. A better first step might be a Gromyko visit to Washington early in September. This makes the United States appear less as the petitioner. A SecState visit to Moscow as early as this summer could put pressure on the US--far more than on the Soviets--to produce results. It would be our Secretary who would be seen as having to come back with results if he goes all the way to Moscow at the President's initiative.

3. The Cultural Exchange Agreement was permitted to expire in 1979 as part of the Carter Administration's response to Afghanistan. Resuming negotiations toward such an Agreement could be misconstrued as our having forgotten and forgiven the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The memo points out that the asymmetry in the visits between the US and the Soviet Union is troublesome, but this point ought to be broadened. There is a disturbing lack of reciprocity favoring the Soviet Union in a wide variety of US-Soviet relationships. The Soviets have a larger Embassy staff and trade missions; their visitors generally have more access to the American people and the media; and their trade relationships with us (as George Schulz has pointed out in another context) is one-sided because they are a single government monopoly with a great deal of information about the US economy and US firms, while we have private firms competing with each other to do business with the Soviet Union.

Thus, the problem that a new Cultural Exchange Agreement is supposed to fix is much broader than cultural affairs. And even in the realm of cultural affairs, it cannot be fixed by such an agreement. What we need is more effective implementation of the tools we now have to enforce reciprocity, plus perhaps some legislative changes. We should therefore develop a framework for US-Soviet reciprocity in diplomatic,

business, cultural, scientific, and other such relations, and proposals on how to enforce it. Once we have such a framework in place, a new Cultural Exchange Agreement might well fit into it and accomplish its desired purposes.

4. A critical question on all these initiatives is timing. If there is a possibility of a summit next year or later this year, the agreement on the consulates and the signing of the Cultural Agreement (based on rigorous reciprocity) may be precisely the kind of limited substantive outcome that we need to hold in reserve, so as to keep open for the President the option of a summit. We should not get into a situation where a summit may be desirable for a variety of reasons, but achievable with a substantive outcome only by massive last-minute US concessions on arms control negotiations or other difficult issues. If a Cultural Agreement and consulates are the things the Soviets are perhaps more eager to get than we, these items could give us the leverage to avoid one-sided pressures on the President in conjunction with a summit.

5. The State memo omits the flat Soviet rejection of our proposal to negotiate verification improvements for the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. We must not accept that turndown and go on to other business more convenient for the Soviets, such as cultural affairs and consulates. We should not be left dangling with an unverifiable treaty that we comply with; this would establish a bad precedent for other arms control. Hence, the verification negotiations on TTB ought to be part of any package of new initiatives.

FOREIGN REPORT, published by
The Economist, May 26

reforms, modest though they may be, are still being blocked by unenthusiastic party men who see their own power and privilege being put at risk. That is where Chernenko's remaining power lies. There have already been warnings of "factionalism" inside the party which suggests that the opposition has been strong.

Now Radio Liberty researchers in Munich have picked up new evidence. On May 19th Chernenko, who has not been seen in public since March 30th (although his picture and name appear in the right places), took the unusual step of publishing a short article through the Novosti Press Agency, in English, which appears to cross ideological swords with Andropov. The argument is over how close the Soviet Union is to a full-blown classless society. Not that far, argued Andropov in an article in *Kommunist*, the party journal, in March; pretty close, according to Chernenko's latest article.

In the code-language of Communist politics, the difference is vital. Andropov is using his ideological argument to back up his discipline and anti-corruption drive, while Chernenko is claiming to have his finger on the pulse of the ordinary working man—whose needs, he argues, should be attended to more closely. Chernenko implies that the party is in danger of losing touch with "the masses".

How far to squeeze Russia?

Disagreements over east-west trade still divide top officials of the **Reagan** administration. On the side of a more restrictive approach are President Reagan's national security adviser, **William Clark**; a hardline segment of the commerce department led by the assistant secretary for trade administration, **Lawrence Brady**; and the defence secretary, **Caspar Weinberger**, his under-secretary for policy, **Fred Iklé**, and his assistant secretary for international security affairs, **Richard Perle**. On the side of keeping east-west trade more open and constant, though not without limits, are the Central Intelligence Agency; the treasury; the trade representative, **Bill Brock**; the commerce secretary, **Malcolm Baldrige**; and the state department's top officials, including **George Shultz**, **Lawrence Eagleburger** and **Richard Burt**.

New light on the problem is cast by secret reports, which FOREIGN REPORT has obtained, on how the Soviet Union's Siberia-to-western Europe gas pipeline is now being built with big west European credits despite opposition from Washington.

In 1981, as the Polish crisis was growing, the Russians began closing major contracts for the Siberian pipeline. They struck hard bargains, fearing American sanctions. A copy of one contract obtained by FOREIGN REPORT shows that the Russians would not accept the usual "force majeure" escape clause, which excuses a company from penalties if the contract is prohibited by its government. Article 14 of the contract, for compressors, said: "Should licences . . . be cancelled by the competent authorities of sellers' or suppliers' countries before the completion of this contract . . . seller shall, for goods which cannot be exported to the USSR due to the non-existence of valid export licences, offer to buy alternatives which either need no export licence or for which such licences can be obtained."

The crisis in Poland got worse, and the Russians knew that time was running out. On December 12, 1981, the French firm Creusot-Loire's negotiating team was summoned to Moscow for two days of ministerial-level meetings. On December 13th, martial law was imposed in Poland. On December 14th, Creusot-Loire agreed to the

sale of chiller plants worth \$250m.

At the Versailles summit of non-communist leaders the following June, President Reagan hoped to get European support for an American economic squeeze on the Soviet Union, and apparently left thinking he had done so. Having discovered that he was wrong, he surprised his allies by expanding American sanctions to include European affiliates of the American companies involved, especially General Electric. The Russians reacted by calling several European executives of the contracting firms to Moscow in July, and threatening them with the imposition of the financial penalties built into the contracts if they did not resist Reagan's sanctions.

The following month, the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) sent a secret report to the president on the Siberian pipeline stating that American sanctions would do no more than delay it and make it more expensive; with equipment obtained in western Europe, the Russians could operate the pipeline at nearly 90% of capacity. There was nothing, the CIA said, the Americans could do about it.

At the White House, William Clark was unhappy about the CIA report and wrote a note to the CIA director, William Casey, asking him to reassess the agency's estimate of the Soviet Union's income from the pipeline. The CIA estimated \$5 billion a year in new hard-currency earnings from the pipeline; other agencies, said Clark, suggested an income of at least \$10 billion a year. The non-CIA estimates suggested that if two more were added, as planned, this could mean \$30 billion-\$40 billion a year in hard currency for the Russians by the end of the century. This, Clark thought, was a strong argument for a hard line against the deal. Clark also voiced fears that all three pipelines could supply over 50% of the west European market.

The CIA responded last October that west European countries were not interested in a trade war with the Soviet Union but that they might recognise that they had given the Soviet Union large financial subsidies and an important role in their energy supply. They might, therefore, agree to tighten restrictions on the sale of strategic goods to the Soviet Union, through the Coordinating Committee (Cocom), limit the terms and volume of government-backed credits more strictly, and develop other energy sources instead of the planned second and third pipelines.

Armed with this report, the secretary of state obtained from the allies a promise to study these issues if the American sanctions were lifted, and Reagan lifted them last November. The allies broadly agreed to postpone any new contracts with the Soviet Union on the second pipeline until four studies on economic relations with Russia were completed.

As a result of these secret studies, FOREIGN REPORT's sources say hardliners in the Reagan administration have given way somewhat on credit policy towards the Soviet Union but are fairly happy about the papers on the transfer of military-related technology to the Soviet Union. No hard decision has been taken on the second and third pipelines and there is nothing explicit in the studies obliging the west Europeans not to proceed. But the studies conclude that "over-dependence on a single source is not a good idea". There is a commitment to develop natural gas resources in the North Sea and in North America and projections of demand suggest that there will be no need for the second or third pipeline.

The Americans hope that logic will be allowed to take its course without another disagreement among the allies. But the hardliners in the administration have their reservations about this cautious approach.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

May 26, 1983

Dear George:

I am very conscious of frustration over the US-Soviet dialogue -- indeed, I share it. It is because I -- and I know, the President -- share your interest in getting results that I have wanted to assure that we -- and I include all those with a legitimate interest -- are all supporting you based upon a clear understanding of strategy and tactics. We hope through this letter to utilize an expeditious and existing process through which we can create this solid base of support so that you can proceed on an overall plan that holds promise of success.

Let me be more specific. It seems to us that the policy enunciated by the President in NSDD 75 is clear. Based upon its objectives, it seems worthwhile for us to translate it into specific priorities -- what we are trying to achieve in their rank order -- and then to forge a negotiating strategy which is based upon the judicious use of our several elements of leverage so that at the end of the day a year from now we will have achieved one or two extremely important goals en route to our objectives.

Regarding your negotiating strategy, there are no prejudgments against concluding these kinds of agreements, e.g., cultural or consulates; we only ask whether, as a matter of strategy, these ought not be put together with a comprehensive list of others which are bargained for with an overall sense of priorities so that they take on a strategic, and not merely a tactical and perhaps illusory quality.

As a separate but related matter, it is clear that some of the areas you will wish to negotiate involve by necessity the interests of other agencies. For example, the conclusion of a consular agreement has important counterintelligence considerations. We know you are conscious of this, but believe it is useful for you to have discussed the important considerations with Bill Casey before the talks get underway so that he, too, is au courant of what is going on and can be supportive. There are other examples but the point is clear. Other advisors to the President in the national security area need to understand our strategy.

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

In order to put us in a position for you to be able to step off with the full support of all (and as a corollary, not to have to worry about having your agreements undermined later by disaffected bureaucrats), we believe it would be worthwhile for you, me, Bill and Cap to get away (from phones) together for a period so that you could lay out your proposal on how we should proceed. Your presentation could include: what should we try to achieve in the way of solving problems in the next year and in what order (START, human rights, cultural, MBFR, regional security, etc.); what is our leverage, again in descending order of value; what are we willing to give up in exchange for our high-value goals and increased security.

I believe we could emerge from such a meeting with a consensus. Given the President's endorsement, you could move out with great latitude in implementation. It seems worth a try to me. Indeed, I find it difficult to imagine another way. What do you think?

Sincerely,



William P. Clark

The Honorable
George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

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Sincerely,

William P. Clark

The Honorable
George P. Shultz
Secretary of State
Washington, D. C. 20520

SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY

2. MEASURING ANDROPOV'S STRENGTH

Personnel changes at the plenum and Supreme Soviet meeting next week will be a key indicator of Andropov's political clout. The proceedings should quickly reveal whether Andropov has the power to exercise commanding political control or whether Chernenko and the stand-patters are frustrating his plans. The way Andropov and Chernenko share the limelight at the party plenum will provide another indication of their relative strength.

* * *

With respect to personnel changes, the "Presidency" could be:

- assumed by Andropov, which would give him protocol honors equivalent to President Reagan's;
- given to Nikolay Tikhonov, who would vacate the premiership for largely ceremonial duties and thus leave it open for Andropov's choice--presumably either Geydar Aliyev or CPSU Secretary Dolgikh; or
- left unfilled, which would mean that Andropov had failed to budge the Brezhnevites.

Longtime party personnel secretary Kapitonov, who has recently had his responsibilities shifted to light industry, might not keep his secretaryship. Yegor Ligachev, who replaced Kapitonov, might well become a CPSU Secretary. This would be a clear gain for Andropov and a sign that he was possibly ready to begin installing his own people as regional and local party leaders.

Arvid Pelshe's death leaves the Politburo with three fewer full members than it had 18 months ago. If Andropov is strong enough, he will probably add some of his own people to that body. For example, he might wish to name KGB Chief Chebrikov and thereby return to the pattern of the last ten years of having the defense minister, foreign minister, and KGB chief on the Politburo.

Belorussia traditionally rates a candidate member seat on the Politburo. However, Nikolay Slyunkov, successor to the late Belorussian leader Kiselev, lacks membership on the Central Committee, a prerequisite for Politburo status. Should Andropov push through Slyunkov's election to both bodies at once, it would be a tribute to his ability to override party rules.

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TIES BETWEEN U.S. AND SOVIET VIEWED AS AT A LOW POINT

Experts Cite Rise in Tension as
2 Nations Trade Charges on
a Wide Range of Issues

By HEDRICK SMITH

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, May 23 — Soviet-American relations have reached one of the lowest points in a generation as the two nations trade recriminations over the Middle East, Central America, Afghanistan and missile deployments in Europe, according to many Government and academic specialists.

The specialists regard the three years since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in December 1979 as a time of protracted tension, sharp and acrimonious charges, diplomatic stalemate and mutual suspicion. Soviet visitors as well as American officials speak warily of the prospects for "doing business" with the other side.

Talks on Grain Sales to Resume

President Reagan suggested last week that a meeting with Yuri V. Andropov could take place next year, and White House aides say that by sharply stepping up military spending and by speaking out forcefully against Moscow, Mr. Reagan has demonstrated resolve, bolstered American military strength and set the stage for what one official called "a new season" of more productive bargaining with Moscow.

Senior Administration officials take comfort in the fact that the two sides have agreed to start long-term negotiations on grain sales. They also forecast more active probing in the Geneva negotiations on European nuclear weapons and strategic arms as a result of adjustments in American positions.

11 Commissions Suspended

Apart from arms talks, however, most cooperative activities have been shrinking. The volume of Soviet-United States trade has fallen from \$4.5 billion in 1979 to \$2.8 billion last year, to the point where the United States now supplies only 20 percent of Soviet grain imports, compared with 60 percent in earlier periods.

The activities of eight official groups set up under the Carter Administration to work on a treaty to bar satellite warfare, ban nuclear weapons in the Indian Ocean or develop a comprehensive underground test ban have lapsed. Eleven commissions set up a decade ago to work out exchanges in the fields of science and technology, seismic research,

Continued on Page A8, Column 3

U.S.-Soviet Ties Viewed Widely as at Low Point

Continued From Page A1

health research and developments in space have all been suspended.

The downward trend began under the Carter Administration, but it has quickened during the Reagan period, in which a determined but unsuccessful drive was carried on to block the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Western Europe and to tighten curbs on Western trade with Moscow.

"I don't know of a time when our relations have been worse at an official level," one experienced unofficial Presidential adviser commented. "The mutual suspicions are very high. There's very little real dialogue going on. To cut through that will not be easy because I don't think either side wants to be seen coming to the other hat in hand."

"The atmosphere is bad," said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, who was a ranking specialist on Soviet affairs in the Nixon Administration. "The Soviets are trying to heat up the Middle East and talk people into greater anxiety about the missile deployments in Europe. They're ominous in their tone. The arms negotiations are stalemated, though the nature of these negotiations is that they take five, six, seven years to succeed. The Russians are playing hard to get."

'A Period of Stalemate'

"There have been periods of accommodation in the past and periods of sharp confrontation, but this is essentially a period of stalemate," said Zbigniew Brzezinski, who was national security adviser to President Carter. "Both sides have openings which neither has exploited aggressively. They are like two weary boxers who have been slugging each other. They're hostile. They've backed off. They're not really talking to each other but they're not pressing each other on the ground."

Marshall Shulman, director of the Russian Research Center at Columbia University and former Soviet affairs specialist in the Carter Administration, compared the present climate to the cold war period and the time of the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962.

"Relations are on a low plateau — poor communications, tension, dismantling of cooperative activities, sharp rhetoric," Mr. Shulman said. "There aren't any signs for improvement in the near future."

"Indeed," he went on, "some factors could make relations worse — our nuclear force deployments in Europe and possible Soviet countermeasures; second, the question of whether each side will deploy new strategic weapons systems; third, some third world event, say in Iran; fourth, the Middle East and particularly Syria. These add an element of unpredictability."

Kennan Takes Grim View

The grimmest assessment came from George F. Kennan, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, who said recently that Soviet-American relations were in a "dreadful and dangerous state" and changes were needed to halt "a march toward war."

Others, like Prof. Adam Ulam of Harvard University, temper pessimism with the reminder that for all the obvious strains, the two superpowers have avoided the sort of head-to-head showdowns they experienced over Berlin in the cold war in the late 1940's and during the Cuban missile crisis. But, Mr. Ulam added, "things are more dangerous now because the Russians are more powerful and we are weaker."

One saving grace, several analysts said, is that both President Reagan and the new Soviet leadership are preoccupied with domestic economic problems that tend to make them less activist and adventurous abroad.


Moreover, the approach of the 1984 elections has engendered hope that the current stalemates will ease as President Reagan seeks to rebut criticism of his posture toward Moscow and arms control.

Changes are needed in Soviet-American relations to halt a "march toward war," said George F. Kennan, former American Ambassador to the Soviet Union.



"The atmosphere is bad," said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a ranking Soviet specialist during the Nixon Administration. "There are all kinds of nasty things going on."

Associated Press



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Professor Shulman said, "as the Administration gets closer to the 1984 election and concludes that there is political advantage in moving toward the center to take the peace issue from the Democrats."

Brent Scowcroft, the retired Air Force general who served as President Ford's national security adviser, said his recent informal contacts with ranking Soviet visitors indicated the Russians were interested in serious bargaining on arms control. The Russians, he told reporters at breakfast, are "open at the present time" for serious give-and-take but also are "defensive" and "apprehensive about this Administration."

"Official relations are really very bad and there are not a number of good contacts," the former general said. "One way to break out of that, considering the depth of suspicion if not antagonism, would be to initiate some private kind of talks without each side having to worry about caving in or making concessions — to attempt to clear away some of the underbrush. I wouldn't say that it can't be done through official channels, but it's more difficult."

During the Nixon years, Henry A. Kissinger, then national security adviser, engaged in what became known as exploratory "back channel" discussions with the Soviet Ambassador, Anatoly F. Dobrynin, that developed breakthroughs for the formal arms talks.

This year, Secretary of State George P. Shultz has held several meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin. Some officials see those meetings as a potential opening, but others report that Mr. Shultz has proceeded "very carefully" and that these contacts have so far been less ambitious and promising than Mr. Kissinger's earlier venture.

"Shultz is a very capable guy but he's very careful," said one well-placed Reagan adviser. "He likes to master his agenda. I don't think he's comfortable with that kind of exploration."

"But we have concerns that need to be taken into account as well if a durable U.S.-Soviet relationship is going to emerge," Mr. Burt went on in a meeting with reporters. "We can't ignore the fact that there has been an increasing crackdown on different groups in the Soviet Union."

Some specialists contend the Administration is hampered because it lacks a top-level foreign policy-maker or strategist with the experience of Mr. Kissinger, Mr. Brzezinski or Mr. Scowcroft. Neither Mr. Shultz, Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger nor William P. Clark, the national security adviser, has a background in Soviet affairs or strategic policy-making.

For specialized advice, officials say, the President draws indirectly on Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, a former Ambassador to Yugoslavia and close aide to Mr. Kissinger; Mr. Burt, a former specialist in national security affairs at the Institute for Strategic Studies; Fred C. Iklé, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, who is a past director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, a longtime Congressional aide experienced in arms control and Soviet affairs; and Robert C. McFarlane, the deputy national security adviser, a career marine officer who served several years on the National Security Council staff in Republican administrations.

Roles for 2 Junior Specialists

With the departure from that staff of Richard Pipes, a Harvard historian, responsibility for Soviet and East European affairs fell several months ago to two well-regarded but quite junior specialists, John Lenczowski and Paula Dobriansky.

Within the Administration, Mr. Eagleburger and Mr. Burt have reputations as advocates of some flexibility in dealing with Moscow, whereas Mr. Iklé and Mr. Perle are known as proponents of toughness. Mr. McFarlane was the key figure lately in helping President Reagan work out the outline of shifts in his arms control positions with key members of Congress.

Outside specialists cite that sequence as symptomatic of the Administration's inadequate expertise in Soviet and strategic affairs. They note that the two new concepts now being incorporated into the President's strategic arms proposal originated outside the Administration.

The idea of raising previous limits on missile launchers to make way for a new single-warhead missile emerged from Democrats in Congress and was adopted by a bipartisan commission headed by Mr. Scowcroft. Another new idea, that of requiring each side to destroy two existing nuclear warheads for each new warhead on a new missile or submarine, came from Senators William S. Cohen, a Maine Republican, and Sam Nunn, a Georgia Democrat.

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ROBINSON HALL

May 23, 1983

Judge William P. Clark
Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Bill:

As you have requested, I enclose two documents: (1) an analysis of the speech delivered by Art Hartman at Harvard on May 16, 1983 (with the text of the speech attached), and (2) a brief memo on the qualifications required of an American Ambassador to Moscow.

The slight delay in submitting this material was due to my having to obtain a copy of the speech and (for reasons of security) doing my own typing.

All good wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Rich

Richard Pipes

May 23, 1983

Reflections on qualifications needed to fill the post of U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union:

An American Ambassador to Moscow can be one of two kinds:

(1) He can be an expert on the Soviet Union and Communism, by which I mean a person with good knowledge of the language, history and culture of Russia, with a thorough grasp of the theory and practice of Communism, and with considerable experience of dealing with Soviet officials.

(2) He may also be a person who, without significant expertise in Russian and Communist affairs, is nevertheless politically experienced and has the great asset of being personally close to the President. The Soviet leaders would treat such an Ambassador seriously, knowing that he has direct access to the President, consults with him frequently, and in some measure speaks for him.

It is hard to say which type is more effective, but it can be said that the worst kind of U.S. Ambassador in Moscow is someone who has neither qualification, ie. neither possesses expert knowledge nor has personal access to the President. The Russians will certainly tend to ignore such a diplomat.

May 23, 1983

Analysis of Ambassador Arthur Hartman's address, "Strength, Consistency and Constancy: The Basics for a Policy Toward the Soviet Union," delivered at the Russian Research Center on Monday, May 16, 1983.

It is difficult to define the thrust of the speech, in part because it lacks clear focus, and in part because it employs rather indirect language. To the extent, however, that a central theme does emerge it is that, while we must entertain no illusions about the Soviet system and its policies, we need to change our "perceptions" of the Soviet Union. In particular, we must (1) learn to appreciate Soviet concerns, (2) refrain from exaggerating the threat the USSR poses, and (3) develop a policy consensus which would stress both competitive and cooperative elements.

(1) Understanding "how the Soviets look at things" is very important" (p.8) in order to narrow a "perceptions gap" (p.10): "the deficiencies of perception... are not all on the Soviet side" (p.12). We should realize that while we fear Soviet expansionism, the Soviets, for their part, "profess to view things more defensively" in view of the fact that Russia since 1812 has (allegedly) been invaded from the West five times (p.8). The Soviets are also anxious that we are "seeking, through interference in their internal affairs, to change the status quo in their own country or in neighboring areas which bear the attachment to Soviet power with difficulty" (p.6).

(2) We are mistaken in thinking that Soviet leaders "spend every waking hour thinking how to do us in" (p.8). In fact, their "highest priorities" have to do with their internal problems (p.9). We should not, in order "to obtain the support of Americans and the public of our democratic allies" for defence programs, build "periodic crisis points that are sometimes unrelated to or perhaps exaggerate reality" (p.14).

(3) "We must deal with each other" (p.7). To that end, the speaker recommends a number of conventional strategies (strong

defence, arms control, restraining the USSR in the Third World, and stress on human rights) but specifically excludes the use of economic weapons: "an approach to the Soviet Union that emphasizes trade and other contacts (with the necessary strategic safeguards) offers better prospects for a more peaceful world than trying to seal the Soviets off from all dealings with us" (p.14).

In sum, Ambassador Hartman advocates a policy combining "competition and coexistence" (p.6), which are codewords for detente . He makes ~~no~~ allowance either for the changes which have occurred in the past several years in US-Soviet relations, nor for policies toward the USSR adopted by the Reagan Administration in the National Security Decision Directive on that subject.

STRENGTH, CONSISTENCY AND CONSTANCY --
THE BASICS FOR A POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION

NOVEMBER 16 OF THIS YEAR IS THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION. THE FACT THAT WE WILL MARK THAT ANNIVERSARY, RATHER THAN CELEBRATING IT, ALREADY SAYS A LOT ABOUT THE FIRST HALF-CENTURY OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. WILLIAM BULLITT, OUR FIRST AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW -- A MAN WHO WAS AN EARLY PROPONENT OF WHAT IS NOW CALLED DETENTE -- HAD THESE SOBERING WORDS TO SAY IN LOOKING BACK ON HIS MISSION: "WE WOULD NOT CHERISH FOR A MOMENT THE ILLUSION THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO ESTABLISH REALLY FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT OR WITH ANY COMMUNIST PARTY OR ANY COMMUNIST INDIVIDUAL."

BULLITT'S OWN PERSONAL ODYSSEY -- FROM YOUTHFUL ENTHUSIASM AND ACTIVISM TO FRUSTRATION AND BITTERNESS AND FINALLY TO DISILLUSION AND PESSIMISM -- IS A PRETTY GOOD ARCHETYPE FOR THE COURSE OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP AS A WHOLE. INDEED, THAT PATTERN HAS REPEATED ITSELF SEVERAL TIMES DURING THOSE 50 YEARS. IN FACT THERE IS NO COUNTRY IN THIS CENTURY WITH WHICH OUR RELATIONS HAVE BEEN MORE COMPLEX THAN SOVIET RUSSIA.

OUR RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA WERE COMPLEX EVEN BEFORE THE SOVIET PERIOD. CONSIDER, FOR EXAMPLE, THE IRONY THAT AUTOCRATIC RUSSIA UNDER CATHERINE THE GREAT WAS INSTRUMENTAL IN AIDING OUR 13 COLONIES AGAINST BRITAIN IN THEIR STRUGGLE FOR LIBERTY AND INDEPENDENCE. RECALL THAT DURING OUR CIVIL WAR THE RUSSIAN EMPIRE, WITH ITS MILLIONS OF SERFS, SUPPORTED THE NORTH IN ITS BATTLE OVER SLAVERY AND PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; AND THAT WE RETURNED THE FAVOR BY FIGHTING ON THE RUSSIAN SIDE DURING WORLD WAR I.

REMEMBER ALSO THAT OUR BILATERAL PROBLEMS PREDATE LENIN. LET ME CITE A PASSAGE WITH A CONTEMPORARY RING: "RUSSIA, FOR A NUMBER OF YEARS, HAS TREATED THE UNITED STATES ... BADLY ... HER DIPLOMATISTS LIED TO US WITH BRAZEN AND CONTEMPTUOUS EFFRONTERY AND SHOWED WITH CYNICAL INDIFFERENCE THEIR INTENTIONS TO ORGANIZE CHINA AGAINST OUR INTERESTS ... I SHOULD HAVE LIKED TO BE FRIENDLY WITH HER; BUT SHE SIMPLE WOULD NOT PERMIT IT. AND THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANAGING HER FOREIGN POLICY BETRAYED A BRUTALITY AND IGNORANCE, AN ARROGANCE AND SHORT-SIGHTEDNESS, WHICH ARE NOT OFTEN COMBINED." THAT WAS THEODORE ROOSEVELT IN 1905. AND IN 1911 THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PASSED A RESOLUTION CALLING ON THE PRESIDENT TO CUT OFF TRADE WITH THE RUSSIA OF NICHOLAS II BECAUSE OF ITS TREATMENT OF JEWS. THE ONE DISSIDENTING VOTE WAS CAST

BY A CONGRESSMAN, WHOSE NAME WAS NEITHER JACKSON NOR VANEK, WHO ARGUED THAT THE RESOLUTION WOULD HURT TRADE WITHOUT HELPING JEWS IN RUSSIA.

IN THE SOVIET PERIOD OUR BILATERAL ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP HAS ALWAYS BEEN PULLED BACK AND FORTH BETWEEN GREAT EXPECTATIONS AND BIG DISAPPOINTMENTS. IN 1918 -- SOME 50 YEARS BEFORE BREZHNEV'S DETENTE POLICY -- THE NEW SOVIET GOVERNMENT INVITED THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THE EXPLOITATION OF THE MARINE RICHES OF SIBERIA AND OF THE COAL RESOURCES OF THE UKRAINE, IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF RAILWAYS, AND IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET AGRICULTURE. OUR REACTION WAS, TO SAY THE LEAST, SLUGGISH. WE MEASURED THESE SOVIET ECONOMIC OFFERS AGAINST THE YOUNG REGIME'S PARALLEL CALLS FOR THE OVERTHROW OF OUR POLITICAL SYSTEM -- A CONTRADICTION, BY THE WAY, WHICH HAS NEVER BOTHERED THEM, AND STILL DOESN'T. THE U.S. POSITION WAS SUMMED UP IN A GOVERNMENT DIRECTIVE IN 1920 WHICH, WHILE REMOVING TRADE RESTRICTIONS, INSTRUCTED OUR DIPLOMATS TO TAKE NO ACTION WHICH "OFFICIALLY OR UNOFFICIALLY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSISTS OR FACILITATES COMMERCIAL OR OTHER DEALINGS BETWEEN AMERICAN CITIZENS AND THE SOVIET UNION."

ON A HIGHER LEVEL, PRESIDENT WILSON'S SECRETARY OF STATE, BAINBRIDGE COLBY, REMARKED IN THE SAME YEAR,

"THE PRESENT RULERS OF RUSSIA ARE NOT A GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH RELATIONS COMMON TO FRIENDLY GOVERNMENTS CAN BE MAINTAINED." EVEN BULLITT, A BUSINESSMAN HIMSELF, DREW UP THIS MELANCHOLY BALANCE SHEET FOLLOWING HIS AMBASSADORSHIP: "WE SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSION THAT OUR TRADE WITH THE SOVIET UNION MAY EVER BE STABLE OR PERMANENT. IT MAY BE CUT OFF FOR POLITICAL REASONS AT ANY MOMENT. THEREFORE, WE SHOULD NOT MAKE LOANS OR GIVE LONG-TERM CREDITS TO THE SOVIET UNION AND SHOULD ADVISE AMERICAN INDUSTRIALISTS AGAINST PUTTING IN EXPENSIVE AMERICAN MACHINERY TO PRODUCE FOR THE SOVIET MARKET."

DURING THE EARLY SOVIET PERIOD AND AFTER IT, HUMANITARIAN CONCERNS ALSO PLAYED A MAJOR ROLE IN THE U.S. APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION. HERBERT HOOVER'S FAMINE RELIEF OPERATION IN THE UKRAINE DURING THE 1920'S UNDENIABLY SAVED MANY LIVES. LEND-LEASE HELPED PRODUCE VICTORY DURING WORLD WAR II. BUT EVEN HERE THE SOVIET REACTION HAS BEEN MIXED -- AT TIMES SOME GRATITUDE ON THE ONE HAND BUT ALSO CONTEMPT THAT AMERICANS WOULD HELP AN IDEOLOGICAL ENEMY AND EMBARRASSMENT THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD HAVE TO ACCEPT CHARITY FROM A CAPITALIST LADY BOUNTIFUL.

YET THERE ARE OTHER ELEMENTS WHICH SHOULD HAVE STRENGTHENED THE COOPERATIVE SIDE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP. WE ARE BOTH CONTINENTAL POWERS, BUFFERED FOR THE MOST PART BY GREAT DISTANCES AND EXPANSES OF OCEAN. WE SHARE A FRONTIER TRADITION AS WELL AS A TASTE FOR GRANDIOSITY; PAUL BUNYAN UNDOUBTEDLY HAD A RUSSIAN GRANDMOTHER. AND THE ENORMOUS MILITARY ARSENALS WHICH EACH OF US HAS AMASSED HAVE EXERTED SOME RESTRAINING INFLUENCE AND, SO FAR AT LEAST, KEPT US SHORT OF DIRECT CONFLICT, THOUGH SOMETIMES THE MARGIN HAS BEEN TOO CLOSE FOR COMFORT.

ONE OTHER APPARENT SIMILARITY, HOWEVER, IS ACTUALLY A MAJOR BASIS FOR THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN US: THE FACT THAT WE HAVE BOTH HAD REVOLUTIONS WITH GLOBAL AND UNIVERSAL IMPLICATIONS. EACH TIME I SIT DOWN FOR A CONVERSATION IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE IN MOSCOW I AM STRUCK BY THE GULF CREATED BY OUR TWO REVOLUTIONARY TRADITIONS. WHEN THE SUBJECT IS HUMAN RIGHTS, THE AMERICAN SPEAKS FROM THE CONVICTION THAT "ALL MEN (NOT JUST ALL AMERICANS) ARE CREATED EQUAL;" THE SOVIET SPEAKS FROM THE FEAR OF INTERNAL SUBVERSION BY HOSTILE OUTSIDE POWERS AND THE POTENTIAL FOR REBELLION AGAINST SINGLE PARTY OPPRESSION.

WHEN THE SUBJECT IS ACTIVITY IN THIRD COUNTRIES, WE CALL FORTH A TRADITION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT; THEY RATIONALIZE WITH APPEALS TO THE CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. WE EXAMINE THEIR CONDUCT -- AND INVITE THEIR EXAMINATION OF OURS -- IN TERMS OF A SYSTEM OF CONTRACTS KNOWN AS INTERNATIONAL LAW; THEY JUDGE US NOT SO MUCH FOR WHAT WE DO BUT FOR WHAT WE ARE. WE COMPLAIN THAT THEY ARE SEEKING THROUGH ILLEGAL MEANS TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO WORLD-WIDE; THEY COMPLAIN THAT WE ARE SEEKING, THROUGH INTERFERENCE IN THEIR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, TO CHANGE THE STATUS QUO IN THEIR OWN COUNTRY OR IN NEIGHBORING AREAS WHICH BEAR THE ATTACHMENT TO SOVIET POWER WITH DIFFICULTY.

I AM NOT A RELATIVIST BECAUSE I BELIEVE IN OUR REVOLUTION, OUR TRADITION, AND OUR DREAM, AND NOT IN THEIRS. YET IT REMAINS TRUE THAT AT THE HEART OF OUR PROBLEMS WITH THE SOVIET UNION IS A PARADOX -- THE PARADOX OF COMPETITION AND COEXISTENCE. AS USUAL, NOBODY DESCRIBED IT BETTER THAN TOCQUEVILLE, THOUGH HE WAS WRITING LONG BEFORE LENIN WAS BORN. "THERE ARE," HE SAID, "TWO GREAT NATIONS OF THE WORLD WHICH SEEM TO TEND TOWARD THE SAME END, ALTHOUGH THEY STARTED FROM DIFFERENT POINTS . . . THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS . . . THE AMERICAN . . . GIVES FREE SCOPE TO THE UNGUIDED EXERTIONS AND COMMON-SENSE OF THE CITIZENS; THE RUSSIAN CENTERS ALL THE AUTHORITY OF SOCIETY IN A SINGLE ARM; THE PRINCIPAL INSTRUMENT OF THE FORMER IS FREEDOM;

OF THE LATTER, SERVITUDE. THEIR STARTING POINT IS DIFFERENT, AND THEIR COURSES ARE NOT THE SAME; YET EACH OF THEM SEEMS TO BE MARKED OUT BY THE WILL OF HEAVEN TO SWAY THE DESTINIES OF HALF THE GLOBE."

ONE HUNDRED FIFTY YEARS LATER THAT PARADOX IS WEIGHTED DOWN AND MADE MORE DANGEROUS BY AN IDEOLOGY AND MILITARY POWER THAT GIVES OUR MAJOR RIVAL A CAPACITY AND WILL TO ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE ITS SYSTEM ON THE DESTINIES OF MANY NATIONS.

OUR COMPETING POWER, PARTICULARLY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE, AND OUR COMPETING IDEOLOGIES MAKE IT PERVERSELY NECESSARY, HOWEVER, FOR US TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER. THAT IS THE PARADOX OF COMPETITION AND COEXISTENCE. EVERY U.S. ADMINISTRATION SINCE WORLD WAR II HAS HAD TO SEEK APPROACHES FOR BOTH SIDES OF THAT PARADOX. TYPICALLY, WHEN THE COMPETITIVE ASPECT OF THE RELATIONSHIP SPILLS INTO CONFRONTATION, A CORRECTIVE IS APPLIED; THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS WAS FOLLOWED A YEAR LATER BY THE LIMITED TEST BAN TREATY. BUT JUST AS TYPICALLY, WHEN COEXISTENCE EXPANDS INTO COOPERATION, THAT TOO CANNOT BE SUSTAINED; DETENTE PROVED ILLUSORY BECAUSE POLITICAL LEADERS COULD NOT KEEP IT BALANCED AND TWO-WAY; AND IT WAS FOLLOWED BY THE COLDER PERIOD WE ARE NOW IN.

OF COURSE, THERE IS NOTHING AUTOMATIC ABOUT THESE OSCILLATIONS WHICH CHARACTERIZE COMPETITION AND COEXISTENCE. THEY ARE THE PRODUCT OF THE PERCEPTIONS AND THE ACTIONS OF EACH SIDE. I AM

IMPRESSED BY THE ENORMOUS ROLE PLAYED BY OUR PERCEPTIONS ABOUT EACH OTHER, OFTEN THE WRONG ONES. WE SEE THE SOVIET UNION AS ESSENTIALLY EXPANSIONIST -- A CAUSE AS WELL AS A NATION-STATE. SOVIETS, ON THE OTHER HAND, PROFESS TO VIEW THINGS MORE DEFENSIVELY, REMEMBERING THAT RUSSIA HAS BEEN INVADED FIVE TIMES FROM THE WEST SINCE NAPOLEONIC TIMES. IT DOESN'T MATTER VERY MUCH WHETHER THE UNFORTUNATE PEOPLE OF HUNGARY, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, OR POLAND HAVE BEEN THE VICTIMS OF OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE DESIGNS. BUT AMERICANS OUGHT AT LEAST TO UNDERSTAND HOW THE SOVIETS LOOK AT THINGS.

OTHER MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUND. NOT HAVING A SYSTEM WITH EITHER SEPARATION OF POWERS OR PROVISIONS FOR REGULAR PERIODIC CHANGES IN LEADERSHIP, THE SOVIETS EXPECT FROM US A MUCH GREATER CONSISTENCY ON POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION THAN WE SEEM ABLE TO PROVIDE. WE, ON THE OTHER HAND, TEND TO SEE THEIR HIGHLY CENTRALIZED CHANGE-RESISTANT SYSTEM AS REFLECTING, NOT SO MUCH CONSISTENCY OR CONTINUITY IN ANY POSITIVE SENSE, BUT IMMOBILISM, INFLEXIBILITY, AND A RELENTLESS PURSUIT OF EXPANSIONIST DOGMAS.

WE HAVE A PICTURE OF SOVIET LEADERS SPENDING EVERY WAKING HOUR THINKING ABOUT HOW TO DO US IN. SOME MAY. BUT MY READING OF CURRENT PRIORITIES IS THAT THE NEW LEADERSHIP KNOWS THAT IT HAS A CRITICAL PROBLEM WITH ITS SYSTEM. THEY ARE NOT GOING TO FALL ON THEIR FACES BUT THE SYSTEM IS NOT WORKING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND THE REFORMS TRIED ELSEWHERE IN THEIR EMPIRE ARE NOT DEEMED

SUITABLE BECAUSE THEY DEPART TOO DANGEROUSLY FROM RECEIVED COMMUNIST DOGMA. THESE ARE THE HIGHEST PRIORITIES FOR THE CHANGING GENERATION OF LEADERSHIP IN THE SOVIET UNION.

ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCE OF IDEOLOGICAL DEBATE, THERE IS ANOTHER BASIC MISPERCEPTION. EVER SINCE THE CREATION OF THE COMINTERN IN 1919 THE SOVIETS HAVE BEEN SAYING THE MOST OUTRAGEOUS THINGS ABOUT THE UNITED STATES AND WHAT IT REPRESENTS. NOR HAVE THEY AGREED TO ABATE THIS ATTACK DURING PERIODS OF DETENTE. WHEN MY FRIEND PRESIDENT GISCARD D'ESTAING - MISGUIDEDLY IN MY VIEW - PROPOSED A TRUCE IN THE WAR OF IDEAS SEVERAL YEARS AGO, HE MET WITH A BRUSQUE REFUSAL. YET NOW, WHEN AN AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION IS READY AND WILLING TO REPLY IN KIND, THE SOVIETS CRY "FOUL" AND ASK HOW THEY CAN DO BUSINESS WITH SUCH AN IDEOLOGICAL OPPONENT. JUST LAST WEEK I WAS STRUCK BY GENERAL SECRETARY ANDROPOV'S STATEMENT, WHICH I QUOTE: "WE BELIEVE THAT THE HISTORICAL COMPETITION OF OUR TWO SOCIAL SYSTEMS AND THE STRUGGLE OF IDEAS ARE A FULLY LEGITIMATE PHENOMENON, STEMMING FROM THE VERY FACT OF THE EXISTENCE OF SOCIALISM AND CAPITALISM."

WELL, WE BELIEVE IT, TOO. ALTHOUGH WE IN THE WEST WOULD PUT FUNDAMENTAL RIVALRY IN TERMS OF THE 18TH CENTURY CONCEPT - THAT MISSED TAKING ROOT IN RUSSIA - OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF HIS DESTINY NO MATTER WHAT ECONOMIC SYSTEM HE CHOOSES.

THERE IS ALSO A PERCEPTION GAP IN HOW WE LOOK AT THE CONTENT OF OUR FOREIGN POLICIES. WHILE WE MAY BOTH VIEW THE OBJECTIVE OF "PEACE" AS PARAMOUNT, WE MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS BY THAT WORD. FOR THE UNITED STATES A MORE PEACEFUL, STABLE WORLD IN THE NUCLEAR AGE REQUIRES NATIONS TO ACT WITH RESTRAINT, CURB ADVENTURISM IN THIRD COUNTRIES, AND BEHAVE WITH A MODICUM OF DECENCY TOWARD THEIR OWN CITIZENS - AS WELL AS BEING PREPARED TO ENTER INTO NEGOTIATIONS WHICH LIMIT ARMS COMPETITION BETWEEN THE MAJOR POWERS.

FOR THE SOVIETS, THE LAST ITEM - ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS - IS THE ONLY ONE THAT REALLY COUNTS, AND THEY CLAIM THAT IT MUST BE CONSIDERED INDEPENDENTLY OF THE OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP. THE FATE OF SALT II SHOULD HAVE CONVINCED THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP THAT ARMS CONTROL CANNOT TAKE PLACE IN A VACUUM. UNFORTUNATELY IT HAS NOT CONVINCED THEM. AFGHANISTAN AND POLAND ARE NOT DIVISIBLE FROM OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

FINALLY, I WOULD LIKE TO REFER TO ONE OTHER ASPECT OF THE PERCEPTION GAP - HOW EACH OF US MOBILIZES SUPPORT FOR OUR POLICIES. IN THE SOVIET UNION THE PROCESS OF CONSENSUS-BUILDING IS DONE ENTIRELY BEHIND THE WALLS OF THE KREMLIN AND A WALL OF SECRECY, SINCE PUBLIC OPINION DOES NOT COUNT FOR MUCH EXCEPT AS IT IS MOLDED BY THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP. WITH US, PUBLIC DEBATE IS ESSENTIAL TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A VIABLE OUTCOME ON VIRTUALLY EVERY MAJOR ISSUE FROM THE MIDDLE EAST TO STRATEGIC ARMS. YET I HAVE DISCOVERED THAT IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR MY SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS TO UNDERSTAND THE ROLE OF THE CONGRESS AND OF PUBLIC OPINION AS A WHOLE. THEY WELCOME THESE ELEMENTS WHEN - AS WITH THE FREEZE MOVEMENT - IT SEEMS TO WORK AGAINST ADMINISTRATION POLICIES WHICH THE SOVIETS DISLIKE. BUT THEY FAIL TO UNDERSTAND THAT OPINION IN CONGRESS AND OF THE PUBLIC ARE ESSENTIAL

TO ANY GENUINE AMERICAN CONSENSUS ON HOW THE BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FITS INTO THE SEARCH FOR A MORE STABLE AND PEACEFUL WORLD.

THIS BRINGS ME TO THE MAIN POINT I WANTED TO LEAVE WITH YOU TONIGHT - THE NEED FOR THE UNITED STATES TO DEVELOP A MEANS TO PURSUE A POLICY OF STRENGTH, CONSISTENCY AND CONSTANCY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION. THE DEFICIENCIES OF PERCEPTION WHICH I HAVE DISCUSSED ARE NOT ALL ON THE SOVIET SIDE. WHAT WE AMERICANS NEED, IT SEEMS TO ME, IS A BETTER APPRECIATION OF THE SOVIET CHALLENGE AND ITS HISTORICAL ROOTS, A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF THE TOOLS (AND NOT JUST MILITARY ONES) FOR MEETING IT, AND A CONSISTENT, PUBLICLY ACCEPTED STRATEGY WHICH CAN REDUCE THE UPS-AND-DOWNS WHICH HAVE BEEN A FEATURE OF OUR APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION SINCE WORLD WAR II. EVEN AS THE IMPORTANCE OF OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION BECOMES MORE CLEARLY UNDERSTOOD BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, THE RATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF THAT RELATIONSHIP BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT. TO THE EXTENT THAT THE SOVIET ISSUE BECOMES THE MAIN FOREIGN POLICY ISSUE IN EVERY PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN (AND CAMPAIGNS FOR NOMINATION AS WELL), THE TIME FOR DOING CONSTRUCTIVE BUSINESS WITHIN EACH FOUR-YEAR FRAMEWORK IS CORRESPONDINGLY REDUCED.

AND THE SOVIETS ARE TEMPTED TO TAKE TACTICAL AND DANGEROUS ADVANTAGE OF DIVISIONS WHICH THEY ASSUME ARE SIGNS OF WEAKNESS.

THIS IS NOT A PLEA THAT OUR POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION BE INSULATED FROM THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND LEFT TO THE EXPERTS. NOR IS IT A CRITICISM OF ANY PARTICULAR ADMINISTRATION SINCE THE WAR. IN FACT IT IS A NATIONAL PROBLEM WITH ROOTS WHICH GO DEEPLY INTO OUR HISTORY AND THE UNDERSTANDING OF THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE ITSELF.

ALL OF US WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS OF FORGING A FOREIGN POLICY IN THE POSTWAR PERIOD HAVE SEEN THE SUCCESSES COME WHEN BIPARTISAN AGREEMENT IS REACHED ON FUNDAMENTALS AND WHEN THIS CONSENSUS IS EXTENDED TO THE ALLIANCE OF FREE NATIONS. WE CAN ARGUE OVER TACTICS AND MEANS BUT IF WE ACHIEVE A GENUINE UNDERSTANDING OF BASIC PRINCIPLES OUR ABILITY TO MAINTAIN OUR STRENGTH AND PURSUE POLICIES WITH CONSISTENCY AND CONSTANCY WILL BE FREED FROM THE BUFFETINGS OF THE NORMAL DEBATE ON TACTICS.

IT SEEMS TO ME IN THE RECENT EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS THAT WE ARE ONCE AGAIN REACHING THAT CONSENSUS POINT THAT IS SO ESSENTIAL TO A SUCCESSFUL POLICY.

WE APPEAR IN OUR DEBATES ON POLICY TOWARD THE SOVIET UNION TO BE UNITING AROUND A FEW SIMPLE PROPOSITIONS:

- THAT WE NEED A STRONG DEFENSE AGAINST SOVIET POWER;
- THAT ARMS CONTROL IS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN REDUCING TENSIONS;
- THAT RESTRAINT IN THIRD AREAS IS A NECESSARY ELEMENT OF A DESIRABLE U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP;
- THAT HUMAN RIGHTS CANNOT BE SEPARATED FROM OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP;
- AND THAT AN APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION THAT EMPHASIZES TRADE AND OTHER CONTACTS (WITH THE NECESSARY STRATEGIC SAFEGUARDS) OFFERS BETTER PROSPECTS FOR A MORE PEACEFUL WORLD THAN TRYING TO SEAL THE SOVIETS OFF FROM ALL DEALINGS WITH US.

THE TRICK, WHICH HAS ELUDED POLICY-MAKERS FOR DECADES, IS TO MAKE SUCH PROPOSITIONS AS THESE INTO MORE DETAILED ACTION PLANS AND THEN TO WEAVE THEM INTO A CONSISTENT NATIONAL STRATEGY. HOW, FOR EXAMPLE, TO OBTAIN THE SUPPORT OF AMERICANS AND THE PUBLIC OF OUR DEMOCRATIC ALLIES FOR ADEQUATE, LONG-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAMS WITHOUT BUILDING PERIODIC CRISIS POINTS THAT ARE SOMETIMES UNRELATED TO OR PERHAPS EXAGGERATE REALITY.

THE SINE QUA NON FOR THIS IS AN INFORMED, CONFIDENT PUBLIC OPINION WHICH CAN SEE THE LONG-TERM INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CAN BE COUNTED ON NOT TO BE TEMPTING TERRITORY FOR THE DEMAGOGUES. THIS LEADS ME TO MY FINAL POINT: THE ROLE OF INSTITUTES LIKE THE HARVARD RUSSIAN RESEACH CENTER.

STALIN ONCE REMARKED THAT "CADRES DECIDE EVERYTHING" AND FOR ONCE HE HAD A POINT. PRODUCING A CADRE OF PROFESSIONALS IN ANY FIELD IS NOT A SIMPLE TASK; AS YOU KNOW BETTER THAN ANYBODY, IN THE SOVIET FIELD THE OBSESSIVE PROTECTION OF INFORMATION IN THE SOVIET UNION MAKES THE STUDY OF THAT COUNTRY AN UNCOMMONLY DIFFICULT TASK. WE NEED A MIX OF QUALIFIED EXPERTS WHO SEEK FACTS, ANALYZE TRENDS AND PRESENT ISSUES BOTH FOR SPECIALISTS AND INFORMED LAYMEN. WE ALSO NEED GOOD POSITIONS IN GOVERNMENT, BUSINESS AND ACADEMIC INSTITUTIONS FOR THE PRODUCTS OF OUR TRAINING. FOR WHILE IT IS TRUE THAT FUNDING FOR SOVIET STUDIES HAS DROPPED 70 PERCENT FROM 1965 TO 1980, SO TOO HAVE THE NUMBER OF PLACES FOR QUALIFIED EXPERTS. THIS IS ONLY PARTLY DUE TO DECREASED FUNDING. UNFORTUNATELY, WE TEND TO BE "FADDIST" IN OUR APPROACHES EVEN TO SO VITAL A FIELD AS SOVIET STUDIES.

THAT IS WHY THE ROLE OF THE CENTER IS SO IMPORTANT. THERE IS SIMPLY NO SUBSTITUTE FOR THE CAREFULLY NURTURED EXPERTISE

OF CENTER FELLOWS IN THE LONG PROCESS OF INFORMING OURSELVES AND TRAINING OUR FUTURE SPECIALISTS. AND BEING A NON-SOVIET SPECIALIST MYSELF, I CAN ATTEST TO THE VALUE OF SPECIALISTS ON MY OWN EMBASSY STAFF. MOST OF OUR BEST OFFICERS ARE EITHER PRODUCTS OF THE EXCHANGES PROGRAMS OR FORMER EXHIBIT GUIDES (WE CURRENTLY HAVE 11 OF THEM). AND NEARLY ALL OF THESE SPECIALISTS HAVE BEEN TRAINED BY INSTITUTIONS LIKE YOURS.

THAT GIVES ME A SPECIAL REASON TO SPEAK WARMLY ON BEHALF OF YOUR WORK. BUT THERE IS A LARGER REASON, WHICH LEADS BACK TO THE NEED FOR AN INFORMED PUBLIC OPINION. INSTITUTIONS LIKE THE RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER ARE NECESSARY BECAUSE IT IS THEY WHO PUT THE WORD "INFORMED" BEFORE THE WORDS "PUBLIC OPINION." YOUR CENTER IS A VITAL NATIONAL RESOURCE, BECAUSE IT CONTRIBUTES THE MOST ESSENTIAL INGREDIENT - KNOWLEDGE - TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF A NATIONAL CONSENSUS WHICH WE WILL NEED IF WE ARE TO DEVELOP A VIABLE AND STABLE APPROACH TO THE SOVIET UNION. THAT, ABOVE ALL, IS WHY YOU DESERVE OUR GENUINE APPRECIATION AND OUR CONTINUING SUPPORT.

AND NOW LET ME LEAVE YOU WITH A CONUNDRUM PUT BY THE MARQUIS DE CUSTINE IN 1839: "I DON'T BLAME THE RUSSIANS FOR WHAT THEY ARE. I BLAME THEM FOR PRETENDING TO BE WHAT WE ARE!"