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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Clark, William P.: Files
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File Folder: U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:
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Archivist: smf/smf
FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Dobriansky to Clark re Poland 2p R 6/12/06 F00-006 # 34	4/1/83	P1/B1
2. memo	Clark to Shultz re Poland 2p R " " # 36	n.d.	P1/B1
3. memo	Bailey, et al to Clark re Shultz memo to the President on new long-term Grain Agreement 3p R " " # 37	4/4/83	P1/B1
4. memo	Meeting with the President 2p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 38	n.d.	P1/B1
5. memo	Clark to the President re Current issues 3p R 12/20/05 M04-024 #1	4/6/83	P1/B1
6. memo	Clark to the President re proposed US-Soviet Exchange Agreement 3p R " " # 2	n.d.	P1/B1
7. memo	Secretary of State and Director USIA to RR re Promoting Political Change in the USSR 5p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 41	3/16/83	P1/B1
8. memo	Clark to President re Shultz memorandum re grain agreement 2p R 6/12/06 F00-006 # 42	n.d.	P1/B1
9. memo	Shultz to RR re Grain Agreement 2p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 43	4/1/83	P1/B1
10. memo	Lenezowski to RR re Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 2p R 12/20/05 M04-024 # 3	3/25/83	P1/B1
11. memo	Shultz to RR Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations 3p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 45	3/16/83	P1/B1
12. memo	Clark to RR re Poland: Next Steps 3p R 6/12/06 F00-006 # 46	n.d.	P1/B1
13. memo	Shultz to RR re Poland 2p R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 47	3/28/83	P1/B1
14. cable	281403Z Apr 83 3p P 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1 # 48	4/28/83	P1/B1 B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CLARK, WILLIAM: FILES

Withdrawer

CAS 4/5/2007

File Folder US-SOVIET RELATIONS PAPERS WORKING FILE:
CONTAINS ORIGINALS (5)

FOIA

M04-024

Box Number 8

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
5	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE CURRENT ISSUES (#1)	3 <i>MVH 3/18/08</i>	4/6/1983
6	MEMO	CLARK TO THE PRESIDENT RE PROPOSED US-SOVIET EXCHANGE AGREEMENT (#2)	3 <i>MVH 3/18/08</i>	ND
10	MEMO	LENCZOWSKI TO RR RE NEXT STEPS IN US-SOVIET RELATIONS (#3)	2 <i>MVH 3/18/08</i>	3/25/1983

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90419

1556

'83 APR -4 P1:28

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			<u>4/6</u>
Staff Secretary	<u>Tab I</u>	<u>sent to Pres.</u>	
Sit Room	<u>at 6930.</u>	<u>[initials]</u>	

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

Judge,
 You may want to fold this
into the other papers that we
 should get tonight on all of the
 issues. John This is essential

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4/4

Judge,

The next time Shultz
asks you about US-Soviet
Relations you might
consider asking him about
comments on the Pacific
Basin that we gave him
several weeks ago.

John

National Security Council
The White House

Package # 90345

'83 APR -4 A10 :00

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>K</u>	<u>A</u>
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	
Jacque Hill	<u>3</u>		
Judge Clark	<u>4</u>	<u>✓</u>	<u>A</u>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			<u>4/6</u>
Sit Room	<u>Tab I sent to Pres.</u>		
	<u>0930.</u>	<u>J</u>	
I-Information	<u>A-Action</u>	R-Retain	D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS

POLAND

Rather than sending a separate package on Poland now, I propose this be folded into overall memo that John Jenczowski is working on. J

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

April 1, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: PAULA DOBRIANSKY ⁽⁷⁾

SUBJECT: Poland: Next Steps

Secretary Shultz forwarded the President a memorandum on Poland (Tab A) which recommends the following course of action:

- Work out a package with the Allies which would tie rescheduling to a successful Papal visit, amnesty for the majority of political prisoners and an end to harassment of former Solidarity activists.
- Approach the Polish Government and stress the need for improved human rights performance. State our willingness to allow U.S. and LOT charters to carry Polish-Americans to Poland for the Pope's visit, if they are willing to take a parallel step of value to us.
- Raise the issue of Poland with Dobrynin so as to solicit Soviet assistance and permission for the Poles to reform their economy and move toward greater reconciliation.

State's proposed course of action addresses only short-term concerns via a "carrot/stick" approach. It is not a well-developed strategy which would advance our long-term interests in Poland -- overall liberalization (restoration of free labor unions, economic reform) and a more autonomous foreign policy. For these reasons, your memorandum to the President (Tab I) sets forth a strategy that both incorporates and modifies some of the elements recommended by State. The "NSC strategy" attempts to seize the initiative and fill the present policy vacuum by offering tangible quid pro quos to the Polish Government in exchange for serious concessions on their part.

At Tab II is a memorandum from you to Secretary Shultz indicating that State's proposals have been amended by the President. If you deem that an NSC meeting or a meeting among you, Shultz and the President is warranted, I will provide the appropriate talking points. However, a decision is needed soon if discussions are to begin with the Allies before April 11.

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

NLS F00-006 #34

BY AMF, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

^{MB} Norm Bailey, ^{JL} John Lenczowski, and ^{WR} Walt Raymond concur. Note that in State's memorandum, Ed Derwinski is cited as concurring with their recommendations -- this is not accurate. In fact, he disagrees with the proposal that we raise the issue of Poland with the Soviets and seek their assistance. Derwinski also cautions against heightened expectations as to what Polish concessions we may reap after a successful Papal visit.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the two memoranda at Tabs I and II -- to the President and Secretary of State Shultz.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments:

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Shultz's memorandum to the President, March 28
- Tab II Memorandum to Secretary of State Shultz

NSC/S PROFILE

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

ID 8390395

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 29 MAR 83 16

TO PRESIDENT

FROM SHULTZ, G

DOC DATE 28 MAR 83

sup 12/5/80

KEYWORDS: POLAND

SUBJECT: NEXT STEPS IN POLAND

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: STATUS S FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

~~DUR~~

LENCZOWSKI

MYER

DoBriansky

COMMENTS

REF# 8309031

LOG

NSCIFID

(B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE _____ (C)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SYSTEM II
90395
(ES/S 8309031)

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State

NLS F00-006 # 36

BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

SUBJECT: Poland: Next Steps

The President has asked me to respond to your analytical and suggestive memorandum of March 28 on next steps toward Poland. I completely agree with the basic thrust of your memorandum -- that we need to seize the initiative vis-a-vis Poland and fill the present policy vacuum. Your suggestion that rescheduling be tied to a successful Papal visit, and an end to the harassment of Solidarity activists, and that general amnesty should be sought for political prisoners, is good. I also agree with the suggestion that we approach the Polish Government. However, I would expand both of these ideas. ~~(S)~~

Although it is difficult to envision full restoration of the pre-martial law situation in Poland, the U.S. should nevertheless strive to promote economic reform and eventual restoration of workers' rights to form free labor unions. The current Polish Government is unlikely to embark on such a course in the near future, for it is still unsure of how firm is its control. However, the government realizes that long-term stability is impossible without economic recovery which is unlikely without serious economic reform.

In order to promote these developments and heighten the Polish Government's interest in eventual reform, I suggest that we approach the Poles with a private demarche -- presented not as a unilateral but as a multilateral Western gesture. (Before we approach the Poles, we should seek to secure West European compliance and commitment to this strategy. An emissary should be sent to discuss this plan with the Allies and present it to the Polish authorities.) If the Poles reject our private demarche, we will have secured in advance the Allies' agreement to maintain a unified policy toward Poland. We would present the Poles with the following package -- rescheduling of the Polish debt and Western support for Poland's IMF membership. The rescheduling would not entail any new medium-term credits; rather it would involve "recycling" 50 percent of the interest payment into short-term credits to finance vital commodity imports. The promotion of Poland's IMF membership would enable the Polish regime to acquire necessary financial management and assistance from an international organization rather than relying on individual efforts. The IMF involvement could also speed liberalizing reforms with a positive human rights spillover and maintain a neutral character. ~~(S)~~

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE
Declassify on: OADR

As a quid pro quo the Polish Government would be required to: hold a successful Papal visit, release all political prisoners (including detainees and those arrested under martial law provisions), and ensure a worker's right to work (cease harassment, frequent lay-offs and reinstate those fired). Also, as part of our opening bargaining package, we should reiterate that eventually a worker's right to form free labor unions be restored and a meaningful economic reform program be implemented. We would not require immediate implementation of either economic reform or free labor union restoration, as long as the Polish regime is prepared to make a private commitment to follow this course of action eventually. If the Polish Government is prepared to accept these conditions, it can obtain IMF membership and have its debt rescheduled. (S)

This "expanded" proposal is fully consistent with our stated conditions for improving U.S.-Polish relations. Also, even though the Europeans are determined to reschedule unilaterally if necessary, it appears that they want to avoid intra-alliance frictions and would like U.S. participation. Therefore, in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to Polish debt rescheduling, we should seek to obtain European support of our strategy toward Poland. If the demarche is accepted, it would temper present Polish repressive policies and provide hope for further liberalization. If rejected by the Polish Government, this initiative would forestall separate deals by our West European allies and enable us to sustain the present tough unified policy toward Poland. The Administration could then claim credit for demonstrating flexibility on an East-West issue and working together with the Allies. (S)

Finally, with regard to your third proposal, I see no reason as to why we should solicit Soviet assistance in improving U.S.-Polish relations. Given the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is unlikely that the Soviets will render any assistance and permit the Poles to take the necessary steps to reform their economy. Furthermore, they will misinterpret such a U.S. overture as indicative of an excessive eagerness on our part to improve overall U.S.-Soviet relations. Poland should be raised as an issue with the Soviets, but not in the context of seeking assistance -- for it will only be counterproductive. (S)

If this were to
be sent, it needs
to be de-personalized.

William P. Clark

J

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

April 4, 1983

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

URGENT ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: NORMAN A. BAILEY ^{7B}
JOHN LENCZOWSKI ^{SL}
DON FORTIER ^{DF}

SUBJECT: Shultz Memo to the President on a New
Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the
USSR

Secretary Shultz has written to the President (Tab A) recommending that he be authorized to announce to our Allies on April 11 and to Ambassador Dobrynin on April 12 our decision to negotiate a new long-term grain agreement (LTA) with the Soviets. The reasons given for wanting to do this are:

-- It is a political necessity.

-- To preempt the Percy/Dole Senate resolution calling on the President to negotiate a new LTA (scheduled for vote April 13 or 14).

-- We would gain credit with Congress and the public.

The memo sets forth a series of steps to deal with Allied and public criticism and proposes that Regan, Block, Baldrige, Weinberger and Brock be notified of the President's decision the same day (April 11) we notify the Allies.

We believe this to be part of the State Department's attempt to implement on a piecemeal basis Secretary Shultz's strategy memos on U.S.-Soviet relations of January and March. The memo further states: "The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's intentions on a step-by-step basis." This is indeed the intent of the strategy suggested by the earlier Shultz memos. But, whatever the merits of a new LTA, we do not see how it can be construed as a means of "testing" Andropov's intentions.

~~SECRET~~

SENSITIVE

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F00-006 H37

BY smf, NARA, DATE 6/12/86

Our principal reservation with the Secretary's proposal is that launching negotiations for an LTA at this particular moment does not seem to be in complete consonance with what we understand is the President's overall approach to U.S.-Soviet relations. It is our impression that the President wants an incremental process: some concrete progress on some of the smaller issues such as the Pentecostals; and if the Soviets are willing to concede something on such issues first, then we would return a Soviet favor by negotiating certain agreements with them. Then, having established a pattern of negotiating behavior which impresses the Soviets with our strength and ability to enforce reciprocity, we could approach them on larger issues like an LTA without suffering the consequences of negotiating like a supplicant from a position of weakness.

Additionally, the timing Shultz's proposal suggested is bad for the following reasons:

-- The President may announce soon Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements.

-- The East-West economic relations studies are in a delicate stage and grain sales are a red flag before the European bull.

-- Such an announcement is likely to impinge unfavorably on an harmonious economic Summit.

The most persuasive arguments for an LTA are domestic political and economic ones. So, if a decision is reached to proceed with this, it would be in spite of a variety of compelling foreign policy considerations.

Finally, at Bill Brock's urging, you have requested that the LTA issue be put on the SIG-IEP agenda, and it is scheduled for April 14. Of course, it can be taken off, but what explanation do we make to Brock? Indeed, what explanation do we give to all the Cabinet officials listed above when they are told on April 11 of a decision in the formulation of which they not only had no role but were not even given a chance to have a role?

If Shultz's proposal is approved, it would cause an uproar from other Cabinet members who have an abiding interest in this issue. This, in conjunction with the other foreign policy problems, could be damaging not only to the President, but to Secretary Shultz.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

That you sign the attached memo to the President (Tab A).

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

That you raise orally with the President the potential problems this proposal creates within the Cabinet and for the Administration as a whole.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I

Memo to President

Tab A Shultz Memo

**National Security Council
The White House**

Package # _____
 SYS II
 NO COPIES

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	ACTION
John Poindexter	1	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3		
Judge Clark	4	✓	I
John Poindexter	5		R
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			
<u>JACQUE</u>	5		R

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch N-No further Action

DISTRIBUTION

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other _____

COMMENTS



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT

APRIL 6, 1983 - 4:00 pm

PARTICIPANTS

Shultz

Clark

Baker

Meese

Dam

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F 2000-006/1 #38BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

The meeting dealt with both long-term and immediate short term relations with the Soviet Union. The President confirmed that he is prepared for a step-by-step effort toward a more constructive relationship with the Soviet Union if those steps are substantive and that the present game plan was to proceed in a manner consistent with a summit in early 1984, if circumstances warrant and substantive and significant results could be confidently expected. Working back from that date, it would be necessary to have a number of matters well in train in 1983, so that the summit could have some substance. The President agreed that one should be in a position so that if conditions warranted it, Secretary Shultz would be able to go to Moscow in mid-summer to meet with Gromyko and possibly Andropov. A Gromyko meeting with the President could then be held at the time of the U.N. General Assembly meeting in late September.

It was therefore agreed that Secretary Shultz should call in Dobrynin this week to express our satisfaction with the Pentecostalist events and to lay on the table four proposed courses of action:

1. Negotiation of a long-term grain agreement.
2. Conversations on arms control between Shultz and Dobrynin with Rowny present for START talks, Nitze for INF talks, and Abramowitz for MBFR talks. These would be probing discussions to see if any progress can be made at respective negotiation tables.
3. Probing discussions on regional issues (Afghanistan, Poland, Kampuchea, etc.) by Ambassador Hartman in Moscow.
4. Progress on our human rights agenda, particularly emigration of the remainder of the embassy Pentecostalists, Soviet Jewry emigration and Poland.

It was agreed that options papers would be prepared for the President on two other possible Dobrynin agenda items:

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

-2-

- (1) A cultural agreement in order to control Soviet access to U.S. audiences and to permit penetration of the closed Soviet society; and
- (2) Opening of consultates in Kiev and in New York.

In addition, it was agreed that State should immediately propose an options paper on current issues in Poland.

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET~~DECLASSIFIED
NLS M04-024#2BY CIS, NARA, DATE 12/20/05ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: A Proposed U.S.-Soviet Exchange AgreementIssue

Whether or not to convene an NSC meeting to discuss the negotiation of a new U.S.-Soviet exchange agreement, and utilization of a law that would ensure reciprocity in exchanges while helping to control the hostile intelligence presence.

Discussion

Secretary Shultz and USIA Director Wick have sent you a memorandum (Tab A) requesting that you authorize the Department of State and USIA to develop a draft exchanges agreement and a negotiating strategy for such an agreement with the Soviets. They argue that their recommendation stems from your directive in NSDD 75 to use educational, cultural, scientific and other cooperative exchanges to help promote positive political change within the USSR. Specifically they cite the NSDD's requirement that "an effective official framework for handling exchanges" be established and they interpret this to mean that we should negotiate a new exchange agreement.

An exchange agreement, if properly fashioned, may indeed help us promote change in the USSR. It may permit us to present exhibits, publications and films in the USSR as well as gain greater access to the Soviet media. The spark of Western ideas and of the products of Western culture may ignite a greater independence of mind among the Soviet citizens exposed to these things, and this, in turn, may help the process of political change.

State and USIA acknowledge that the current situation of no reciprocity is unacceptable. In the absence of an exchange agreement, the Soviets are making private arrangements and in this context are sending large numbers of KGB agents and other agents of influence into our country. To deal with this, State is working on getting a change in the visa law through Congress so that we can restrict the entry of such agents. In the meantime, State and USIA propose to use our anticipated ability to refuse visas as leverage in getting a satisfactory and reciprocal agreement with the Soviets.

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

NSC Staff Comment: There are a variety of risks involved in this proposal. First of all, negotiating a new exchange agreement would represent a repudiation of one of our Afghanistan sanctions against the Soviets. Lifting such a sanction would have the symbolic political effect of either recognizing the Soviet occupation as a fait accompli or signalling to the Afghan freedom fighters a decrease in our moral support. Secondly, negotiating new expanded ties with the Soviets risks raising false public expectations about increased detente and accommodation with the USSR.

Finally, if such an agreement is signed, there is a likelihood that it will not contain the kinds of controls that will truly ensure reciprocity on all counts -- including ideological reciprocity. The Soviets are very sensitive to subversion, much more than we are. So it is problematical as to whether they will accept terms that are truly reciprocal. Thus the question arises, should we conclude an agreement that may not be entirely reciprocal in the interest of gaining some kind of limited penetration of Soviet society? To look at this question another way, it helps to examine an analagous situation: should we censor ourselves over the Voice of America so that the Soviets will find it acceptable and then stop jamming it?

Perhaps the advantages of some ideological penetration indeed do outweigh the disadvantages of such an agreement. However, State and USIA do not fully address what is perhaps the most serious problem here: that of the hostile intelligence and disinformation presence in our country. Although this memo alludes to passing a future law that would permit greater visa control, it ignores a law that is already on the books -- the Baker Amendment, a law that State has probably never told you about. Only recently did Charles Wick inform us about it.

The Baker Amendment would permit us to deny visas to all Soviet communists if we find that the USSR is "not in substantial compliance" with the Helsinki Final Act. Then the only Soviets permitted entry into the U.S. would be those specially granted visas. Today, our charges of Soviet Helsinki violations are all talk and no action. By invoking the Baker Amendment, we would impose one of the most effective measures at our disposal in controlling the KGB presence. Rather than waiting months for a new visa law to pass the Congress (if it ever passes), we could invoke the Baker Amendment now and get to work on these issues immediately.

We recommend, in any case, that some form of visa control be implemented before any agreement is negotiated with the Soviets. Otherwise, we will have little guarantee that we can effectively enforce real reciprocity.

RECOMMENDATION

<u>OK</u>	<u>No</u>	That before you approve the State-USIA request, you convene an NSC meeting to discuss the negotiation of an exchange agreement and the issue of invoking the Baker Amendment as a prerequisite to such an agreement.
___	___	

~~SECRET~~

II-90423

MEMORANDUM
DECLASSIFIED

NLS M04-024 #1

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

BY CAS NARA, DATE 12/20/65

~~SECRET~~

April 6, 1983

ACTION

FOR DISCUSSION WITH GEO. SHULTZ AT 4PM

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*

SUBJECT: The Menu of Current Issues in East-West Relations

We currently have before us several State Department proposals on East-West relations requiring decisions. Although you have received individual memoranda on each of these, we believe it would be useful for you to consider each in the broader context. The specific proposals are:

- To negotiate a new cultural exchange agreement with the Soviets (Tab 1);
- To negotiate a new Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the Soviets (Tab 2);
- To set up new consulates in New York and Kiev (a proposal contained in Tab 3);
- To adopt a new strategy for Poland, including: a linkage between debt rescheduling and a lifting of repression, an offer to the Polish regime to renew LOT (Polish airlines) charter flights, and an effort to seek Soviet acquiescence on a national reconciliation in Poland (Tab 4).

While these proposals have merit, taken together they may give the appearance of expanding ties and increasing cooperation, allowing the contention that we are tilting toward detente.

Each proposal forms a part of a broader set of issues. The cultural exchange question might be handled in tandem with the problem of enforcing reciprocity and controlling the hostile intelligence presence. The SIG-Intelligence is developing a broader set of options on part of this issue that will need high-level discussion. This is an issue on which our Allies are working seriously. Seven of our Allies have expelled Soviet agents this year alone.

The proposal for new consulates has been presented with virtually no pros and cons and we might discuss those today with George. Of all the proposals, this one gives the greatest appearance of expanded diplomatic ties and cooperation. Whether or not you proceed with it might depend on a careful balancing of the intelligence benefits versus the various disadvantages. The LTA proposal has not been

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Declassify on: OADR

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handled through the interagency process, and currently presents potential problems for us with our Allies. Finally, of the various proposals for Poland, any request for the Soviets' assistance must be placed in the context of the extreme unlikelihood that they would actually help us to bring about reforms in Poland; and the proposed renewal of LOT flights must be analyzed in terms of how the Soviets would perceive such a move: as yet another "first step" or olive branch extended by the US as if we were responsible for the tensions in US-Polish relations -- as if our sanctions were somehow mistaken and deserved to be retracted.

All of these proposals, of course, appear in an even more complex context. Other issues bearing on them are also coming up soon:

-- The whole problem of Soviet compliance with arms control agreements. The NSC staff is working on an options paper that will raise serious questions about how we are to deal with the Soviets in light of ever-increasing evidence that they have not been playing fairly. If indeed we raise the compliance issue, as I believe we inevitably must (given the mounting evidence), the prospect of conducting a whole new set of negotiations, expanded ties and cooperation may appear to be totally illogical and short-sighted. It gives the impression to the Soviets, our Allies and the American people that Administration is neither serious about treaty compliance nor capable of coordinating both right and left hands at the same time.

-- The wholesale Soviet rejection of your latest INF proposal. Apparently the Soviets must still believe that the correlation of forces is tilting so much in their favor that they can risk rejecting a proposal that at least today has won the support of our European allied governments. The only conceivable reason for this summary rejection is that they must feel that their disinformation, propaganda, and manipulation of Western public opinion has been so successful that they believe that they can stoke up enough public opposition to your proposal in the next few months to pressure Allied governments once again to call for a new, more satisfactory US INF proposal. The Soviets feel that they succeeded in doing this to your zero option and that they can do the same again.

-- Andropov has personally accused you of lying. This raises to new levels the temerity with which the Kremlin feels it can deal with the West. Although the Soviet propaganda machine regularly makes such accusations, the last time in anyone's memory that such an accusation was made by the Party boss was when the Soviets were in a position of relative weakness -- a position that was definitely perceived as such by the Kremlin itself. The difference today is that the Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces is tilted in favor of socialism worldwide -- especially in the most critical element in their view -- the political-ideological measurement. How you might handle this new Andropov accusation is at issue.

~~SECRET~~

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-- Georgi Arbatov, the well-known Soviet scholar-disinformation agent, has applied for a visa to come to the US for several weeks to attend conferences and utilize the US media for Soviet purposes. State ^{may} recommended granting him a visa despite the fact that the technical-legal circumstances of his visa application permit us to deny him one. His planned activities here are symbolic of the utter lack of reciprocity in these matters -- especially access to the mass media. This issue gives special impetus to deal with the legal mechanisms at our disposal to enforce real reciprocity.

-- Our effort to persuade the Pentacostalists to leave our Embassy. If the Soviets actually permit them to emigrate, it will be a victory for quiet diplomacy and the humanitarian cause of these beleaguered people. However, there are two dangers involved here: First is the possibility that the Soviet will not follow through. If this is the case, we must be prepared to inflict a sanction that must do justice to the pain that these poor people may have to suffer. Secondly, there is the danger that the Soviets may attempt to show the world what great liberals and humanitarians they are. This is standard practice most every time a communist regime lets somebody out of the gulag or permits someone to emigrate. This is a normal element of their strategy to deceive the West about their real intentions.

-- Finally, we have the defense budget, the MX, the nuclear freeze and Adelman votes coming up in Congress. How we conduct the overall US-Soviet relationship, including our assessment of how much a political as well as military threat the Soviets present, will have enormous bearing on each of these issues.

- All this is not to say that State's proposals should be rejected. For example, there is merit in a new exchange agreement so long as we utilize existing legal mechanisms first to enforce reciprocity and to gain negotiating leverage. There is merit to an LTA -- but for domestic, political and economic reasons. The question of new consulates may have some merits -- but pros and cons have yet to be aired.

In conclusion, NSC staff feels that all these issues must be discussed as part of the broader context. They also feel that things are moving much too fast and deserve more caution and coherent planning. Each issue has enormous public diplomacy implications which have not been adequately raised as yet. Since these public questions, both domestic and foreign, affect such things as the defense budget and our intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities, I feel that Defense, CIA and other relevant parties should be permitted some input into these decisions. Too much is at stake here to permit their absence.

Prepared by John Lenczowski

Attachments:

- Tab 1 Shultz Memorandum, March 16, 1983
- Tab 2 Shultz Memorandum, April 1, 1983
- Tab 3 Shultz Memorandum, March 16, 1983
- Tab 4 Shultz Memorandum, March 28, 1983

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Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz and USIA
Director Wick, March 16, 1983

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THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

SENSITIVE
SYSTEM II
90320

March 16, 1983

83 MAR 16 P11:

MEMORANDUM FOR:

THE PRESIDENT

From:

Secretary *WMS*
Director, U.S. Information Agency *BZW*

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

SUBJECT:

Promoting Political Change
in the USSR

NSDD-75 set as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of political change within the USSR. It noted that, along with radio broadcasting, our most important means for ideological penetration and promotion of democratization in the USSR are exchanges activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD stated that we should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, instead expanding those which can serve our objective of promoting change in the Soviet Union. It called for an official framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the Soviet people.

This paper recommends an approach to negotiating an official framework which would achieve a significantly higher level of reciprocity and ideological penetration of the Soviet Union by the United States.

Problem and Opportunity

Vladimir Bukovsky has written that he became a dissident when he visited the US National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959 -- the one at which Khrushchev and Nixon debated in a model US kitchen. But, we have had no US exhibits in the Soviet Union since 1979. We have allowed other ideologically effective aspects of the exchanges agreements to lapse as well. Thus, in the past three years we have dismantled much of what we had created.

One of the main advantages of those agreements was that they opened great fields of operation to us, such as exhibits, where we had a clear advantage over the Soviets. They also provided the means to obtain reciprocity. We now face a growing Soviet effort to work around us with private US institutions and individuals.

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NLS F2000-006/1 #41

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DECL: OADR

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

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Armand Hammer in partnership with Jerry Weintraub recently established an organization to bring Soviet cultural and other attractions to the US, with no known guarantee of reciprocity. We are also aware the Soviets are working with some other impresarios or individuals on possible performing arts tours, including a visit by the Moscow Circus this fall. The ready access that Soviet propagandists have to US media without reciprocity is well known. The Soviets arranged a series of Soviet film weeks at the prestigious Smithsonian Institution last fall.

Under current circumstances we have no ready means of enforcing reciprocity in such endeavors. The present visa law does not permit us to refuse visas for that purpose. The result is that, according to the FBI, there is an increasing percentage of KGB agents in the groups the Soviets are unilaterally sending to the U.S. We can better control this problem with a better handle on visa issuance. We are seeking changes to visa procedures that would permit us greater latitude in refusing visas for policy reasons. That could facilitate control over visits by obvious propagandists, but it would still be a clumsy weapon, poorly suited to dealing with highly visible cultural visits. We should, nevertheless, use our anticipated new ability to refuse visas as leverage to get a more satisfactory overall official exchanges framework permitting us to compete more effectively in the ideological conflict in which we are engaged.

Our previous exchanges agreements with the Soviet Union basically repeated the form and content of the first, concluded in 1958, and were never altogether satisfactory. In approaching a new official agreement we would review the old agreements and our current interests to determine what our negotiating targets should be without regard for what we may perceive as Soviet negotiating requirements. (We would, of course, prepare an estimate of Soviet positions as part of the preparations for negotiations.)

In developing our negotiating targets, our aim will be to improve our penetration of Soviet society. During the negotiations on a new overall framework for exchanges, we would concentrate on the following specific areas in which the U.S. has the clear advantage or in which, through enforcement of strict reciprocity, we need to offset a current advantage held by the Soviets:

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USIA Thematic Exhibits -- Our exhibits, when in the USSR, provide the U.S. Government its best opportunity to acquaint millions of people in all walks of life throughout the Soviet Union with the many aspects of American life: our democratic system, our foreign and domestic policies and our hopes and aspirations for peace and prosperity for all peoples of the world. As a communication medium, in contrast to radio broadcasting, our exhibits bring the Soviet people into a two-way face-to-face dialogue with our American Russian-speaking guides who staff the exhibits. The Agency's exhibits had such overwhelming ideological impact that the exchange of thematic exhibits under the previous official exchanges agreements became anathema to the Soviet authorities. Thus, it is clear that if the U.S. Government once again is to take advantage of this most effective ideological weapon against the Soviet Union, it will be able to do so only by adopting the same negotiating position we used during previous negotiations -- no USIA thematic exhibits, no official exchanges agreement.

Radio and TV -- Currently, Soviet propagandists have easy access to US media without reciprocity. We will insist on greatly improved access to Soviet nation-wide electronic media to reach the largest possible audience with our message. For example, we have in mind setting an annual minimum for US and Soviet appearances on political discussion programs on each other's television.

Publications -- The US has always enjoyed a clear advantage in the popularity and appeal of our Russian-language America Illustrated magazine in the Soviet Union compared with its Soviet counterpart in the U.S., Soviet Life. In fact, the note you sent Charlie with the "special introductory offer" for Soviet Life (mailer attached at tab A) illustrates how they have to push their product. Our magazine goes like hot cakes in the Soviet Union. Under a new agreement we would seek to negotiate a higher level of distribution of our magazine inside the USSR.

Educational and Academic Exchanges -- With these exchanges we reach elite audiences, build long-term contacts inside institutions producing future Soviet leaders and help build and maintain the base of US expertise on the Soviet Union.

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Performing Arts -- Performing groups presenting the finest of American theater, dance and music in modern, classical and popular genre can provide large numbers of Soviet citizens with a view of the exciting possibilities of free cultural development, a process denied by their system.

American and Soviet Films -- The Soviets have been able to put on film weeks in a number of major American cities, but we have received no reciprocity for this. Under a new exchanges agreement we would insist on reciprocal film weeks in the Soviet Union.

Access to Soviet Elites -- Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have almost unlimited access to our institutions, for which we will insist on reciprocity under the framework of a new agreement.

Should you decide to seek to negotiate a new framework for exchanges along the above lines, we will find the Soviets receptive in certain respects, although there will be a long fight on specifics. Soviet authorities believe that they derive political benefits from agreements with us. Ironically, they also know that official agreements serve a very practical purpose -- in their rigidly planned bureaucratic society official agreements make it easier to obtain the necessary budgets to finance the concrete expenditures encountered by the Soviet ministries and organizations engaged in exchanges-type activities in the US and the USSR.

A decision to move toward a new bilateral exchanges agreement with the Soviet Union will encounter some opposition as well as considerable support domestically. We will want to make the point to our public and the Congress that a new agreement enforcing reciprocity is to our great advantage (there is a strong constituency on the Hill for the exchanges.) In general, we believe that our Allies will welcome such a decision as further evidence of our willingness to deal seriously with the Soviet leadership. We will, of course, want to consult with the Allies before announcing any decision, to ensure that they fully understand our reasons and that they understand it is not a move to initiate a rapprochement with the USSR.

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If you agree with our view of the importance of building a new framework for conducting exchanges and enforcing reciprocity, USIA will develop, in cooperation with the Department of State and other interested agencies, a draft agreement and negotiating strategy. When that process is completed, we would then propose to you appropriate timing for an approach to the Soviets on opening negotiations.

Recommendation:

That you authorize us to develop a draft exchanges agreement and negotiating strategy.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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ACTION

NLS F00-006 #42

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

BY imp, NANA, DATE 6/12/06FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz Memorandum on a New
Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with the USSRIssue

Secretary Shultz has written you (Tab A) requesting that he be authorized to inform the Allies and relevant Cabinet members on April 11 and the Soviets on April 12 that we are now willing to negotiate a new LTA.

Discussion

Shultz argues that you should authorize this: (1) because it is "a political necessity," (2) to preempt the Percy/Dole Senate resolution calling on you to negotiate a new LTA, which is scheduled for vote April 13 or 14, and (3) you would gain credit with Congress and the public. He states that the decision must not be shared with the rest of the Cabinet or: ". . . we will have additional problems with the Allies and lose your impact on the Congress, the public and the Soviets."

The Shultz memo further states that: "The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's intentions on a step-by-step basis."

The foreign policy reasons for an LTA at this time are not compelling. Negotiating such an agreement now would mean that we were taking the first step to normalize relations with Moscow -- as if current East-West differences were our responsibility and not theirs. It was my understanding that you wanted the Soviets to take the first step -- if even a small one (e.g. the Pentecostals) -- as a precondition for considering any renewal of various existing agreements that the Soviets want badly. In addition, the suggested timing of

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DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

Prepared by:
Norman Bailey
John Lenczowski
Don Fortier

State's proposal will be likely to create serious problems with the Allies with reference to the on-going East-West economic relations studies and could even affect the Summit. It would clash with a number of your recent initiatives and with a possible announcement of Soviet violations of existing arms control agreements. Thus, the most compelling reasons for an LTA now are domestic, political and economic ones.

Finally, a possible new LTA is on the agenda of the SIG-IEP for April 14. It can be taken off the agenda but doing so will have to be explained as would keeping the decision from key Cabinet members until the same day it is announced to the Allies.

RECOMMENDATION:

OK No

That you disapprove the suggestion in the Shultz memo and agree to keep the LTA issue on its existing schedule.

Attachment
Tab A

Shultz Memo

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

April 1, 1983

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
 FROM : George P. Shultz *XPS*
 SUBJECT: New Long-Term Grain Agreement (LTA) with
 the USSR

The present one-year extension of the Long-Term Grain Agreement with the USSR expires September 30, 1983. As you know, I believe negotiating a new LTA has become a political necessity from many points of view. By moving now, you can take the initiative; receive credit with Congress and the American people; and make sure by our handling of the issue that our Allies and the Soviets understand how the move fits in our overall Soviet policy.

The Administration faces increasing pressures for an LTA from the farm community, the grain trade, and the Congress. All of these sectors view an LTA as an important test of USG support for agriculture trade and the logical culmination of your agricultural export policy. Soviet reluctance to enter our markets, despite your statements on agricultural export policy, has only reinforced the belief that an LTA is essential in reestablishing the US as a reliable supplier. Senators Percy and Dole are now pushing a sense of the Senate Resolution, which calls on you to negotiate a new LTA. It is now scheduled to come to a vote on April 13-14.

I believe that we should move forward quickly on this issue. I recommend that you announce a decision on April 12th--thus moving before the Senate vote. In doing so, however, we must take care to manage a number of political problems that are sure to arise.

The Allies need to understand that this step fits into our approach to the current studies on east-west trade and our discussions with the EC on agricultural exports. I think this problem can be managed by informing them on April 11th that our grain sales will be on commercial terms and will not be subsidized, that the LTA will structure our grain trade to avoid export dependence on the Soviet market, and by reminding them that they are pursuing normal grain sales to the Soviet Union.

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NLS F2000-006/1 #43

BY amf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

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The Soviets will need to understand that we are taking this step as part of our strategy of testing the Andropov leadership's intentions on a step-by-step basis. If you agree, I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin in the context of our dialogue that this decision is a manifestation of your desire to work towards improved relations, provided the Soviets are willing to engage in give-and-take and to take similar positive steps. In recent bilateral grain consultations in Moscow, the Soviets affirmed their interest in a new LTA and suggested it could lead to increased purchases. Of course our negotiating leverage with the Soviets will be limited by the grain market glut, the Durenburger Amendment delivery assurance and the USSR's LTA's with Canada and Argentina; the PIK Program, however, works in our favor.

Our public needs to understand that we are not stepping back from our firm approach to Soviet misbehavior and our Afghanistan/Poland sanctions regime. We would point out to domestic and foreign audiences that our concerns about the USSR's behavior--including its military buildup, its geopolitical expansionism and its record of human rights violations--remain unchanged. However, the Poland sanction postponing LTA negotiations has already made our political point, and at considerable cost to the American farmer. It is unfair to make him continue to pay this price alone.

I recommend you authorize me to inform our Allies on April 11 that we are now willing to negotiate a new LTA. Bill Clark and I would inform Don Regan, Jack Block, Mac Baldrige, Cap Weinberger and Bill Brock the same day that you had decided to go ahead. I would inform Ambassador Dobrynin the next day. We also would inform key Senators and Congressmen that same day as well as issue a public statement. It is important that we keep this decision to the fewest possible people until April 11th or we will have additional problems with the Allies and lose your impact on the Congress, the public and the Soviets.

Approve: _____

Disapprove: _____

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RES. PET. HAS
BEEN REVIEWED.

Mr. Dresselhaus

Preparation to

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George Shultz in might

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attached two papers —
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WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONThe President has seen PDB~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

March 25, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: Next Steps in U.S.-Soviet Relations

DECLASSIFIED
NLS M04-024 #3
BY CK, NARA, DATE 12/20/05

The attached memorandum (Tab A) outlines Secretary Shultz's proposals for relations with the Soviets according to his understanding of your guidance at last week's meeting. His basic thrust is that both he and Ambassador Hartman should continue talks with the Soviets to press them on issues of special concern to us including human rights issues, arms control, regional issues and bilateral relations.

This memo represents a continuation of State's insistence on intensified U.S.-Soviet dialogue. However it appears to recognize a bit more explicitly than previous communications on this subject the dangers of being perceived as returning to "business as usual" with the Soviets. State thus reassures you that our public statements should continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet misbehavior.

With a couple of exceptions, State's proposals, if carried out discreetly and judiciously, may serve our interests in small but concrete ways. They may yield some very limited positive results. But we must be under no illusions: the Soviets will neither change their communist system to please us nor pull out of places like Afghanistan until they are forced to by exceedingly high costs. They may let the Pentacostalists or Shcharansky go, but their only real motivation for doing so would be to encourage the illusion in Western minds that bigger and better things can be accomplished (when the fact is that the kinds of things we really want cannot be accomplished without major political change in the Soviet system). Thus, certain concessions they might make to us are part of the general Soviet strategy of deception.

It is for this reason that the way we go about a dialogue with the Soviets, the way we handle it publicly, is the most critical question here. It is a very delicate balancing act. On the one hand, we want to appear reasonable, peaceful, and ready to deal with the Soviets in ways that minimize the possibility of war. On the other hand, this entails the enormous risk of raising false public expectations -- i.e., deceiving our own people about the possibility of achieving a true accommodation with communism.

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Since the number one theme of Soviet disinformation strategy is to make the West believe that true peace is possible with the USSR, we must be extremely wary about serving as accomplices to this Soviet deception. That is why it is encouraging to see State's acknowledgement that our public statements will continue to be tough. Nevertheless, I have my reservations about how State will handle all this. Its heart is in dialogue and detente and not in the kinds of public statements that are necessary to sustain public vigilance and support for our defense buildup. Unfortunately, whenever you tell the blunt truth about the nature of communism, too many people at State cringe in embarrassment. The issue here is that the truth is the only real weapon we have in our political competition with the Soviets, whose principal weapons are falsehood and deception.

The other great danger in the way we handle any limited dialogue is the kind of signal we may be sending to the Soviets. If we appear too eager to make concessions, or to pursue a greatly expanded agenda for talks, they will get the immediate impression that their manipulation of Western public opinion forced us into talks with them, and that we are weakening and they are getting stronger. We may not see things this way. But this is the way the Soviets look at it. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, they believed that their greater political and military strength had actually forced us into talks and negotiations with them. It was on the basis of these kinds of perceptions of U.S. weakness that they made many of their calculations to advance geopolitically worldwide.

I have strong reservations about State's two proposals for bilateral relations. The first, a new cultural agreement, seems innocuous enough. But the issue is part of a whole complex of questions that relate to reciprocity and controlling the KGB presence in our country. I will be sending you a more detailed explanation on this. But for now, we should not yet authorize any negotiations until the issue has been thoroughly aired at an NSC meeting. The second proposal is equally problematical: opening a U.S. consulate in Kiev and a Soviet consulate in New York. This also needs much further study.

Otherwise, so long as State's proposed talks are held very discreetly, with no public fanfare, no bragging about great accomplishments, I believe we can achieve the two political results we want: projecting our peaceful intentions and maintaining realism and vigilance with regard to the Soviet threat.

Prepared by:
John Lenczowski

Attachment:

Tab A Memorandum from Secretary Shultz, March 16, 1983

SYSTEM II
90316THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

March 16, 1983

TO: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: George P. Shultz *GPS*
SUBJECT: Next Steps in US-Soviet Relations

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F2000-006/1 #45BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

In accordance with your instructions, here is how I propose to proceed in our bilateral relations with the Soviets in the coming months. I will continue to report to you and seek your further guidance at each stage of the process.

Human Rights: We will continue to keep this issue at the top of our agenda with the Soviets, focusing on:

--The Pentecostalists: I will meet with Dobrynin this week to begin implementing the approach you have approved. Emphasizing that the recent Soviet response does not go far enough, I will press Dobrynin to permit the immediate emigration of the one member of the family (Lydia) who was evacuated from the Embassy in connection with her hunger strike last year. I will also give him our understanding of the Soviet statement concerning the Pentecostalists still in the Embassy, i.e. that they will be given permission to emigrate if they return to their home and submit applications. At this initial meeting, I will inform Dobrynin that I have discussed areas for possible progress in our bilateral relations with you, but will reserve further discussion of these for a later meeting.

--Shcharanskiy: I will continue in subsequent meetings to reiterate our strong interest in an early release of Shcharanskiy and indicate that we remain interested in the possibility of an exchange for him (as you know, there has recently been some movement on this score).

--Madrid: Underscoring our interest in a balanced outcome at Madrid, I will continue to reinforce Max Kampleman's suggestion that Soviet release of a number of prisoners of conscience would remove a major obstacle to a successful conclusion of the conference.

Arms Control: In my meetings with Dobrynin and in our other diplomatic contacts, we will stress our intention to continue serious negotiations at Geneva. Our arms control approach will continue to be based on the criteria you have established -- real reductions, equality, verifiability, and enhanced stability of the East-West military balance.

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DECL. OADR

Regional Issues: In accordance with our overall policy of probing Andropov for new flexibility on regional issues, we will continue to raise these issues with the Soviets. Because we do not wish to fall into the old pattern of conducting most of our exchanges through Dobrynin, our principal interlocutor with the Soviets on these issues will continue to be Art Hartman. I believe that in coming months Art should test the Soviets on the following regional issues:

--Middle East: Art should meet with senior MFA Officials for a discussion of the Middle East, as he has done on two recent occasions. These exchanges represent a low-cost means of keeping the Soviets at bay on this issue and, of course, would not touch upon more sensitive aspects of our diplomacy. They also give us a means of reiterating our concerns about unhelpful Soviet behavior, such as the export of SA-5s to Syria.

--Afghanistan: Art should also be instructed to keep the pressure on Moscow by reiterating our basic position on Afghanistan -- something we have not done in detail since Andropov became General Secretary. Following the visit of UN SYG Perez de Cuellar to Moscow this month and the next round of UN-sponsored talks in Geneva next month, we will again assess whether there is more we can do, together with the Pakistanis and Chinese, to press Moscow on Afghanistan.

--Southern Africa: We are carefully considering whether further US-Soviet dialogue would advance our Namibia/Angola initiative and our broader objectives in the region. If this review suggests that more exchanges would be in our interest, I would anticipate that Art would be our principal channel of communication on this issue as well.

Bilateral Relations: In this area, we will move deliberately and cautiously, looking at each step in terms of our interests and the requirements of our overall policy approach. In accordance with your guidance, I will in subsequent meetings with Dobrynin indicate our willingness to take two steps that are in our interest:

--Negotiation of a new cultural agreement to enforce reciprocity and enhance U.S. ideological penetration of the Soviet Union itself;

--Opening of a U.S. consulate in Kiev to establish a new U.S. presence in the Ukraine.

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- 3 -

As for the existing bilateral agreements which come up for review/renewal over the next year, we will examine carefully each agreement on its merits to ensure that any action we take is clearly in the U.S. interest. The first of these is the Fisheries Agreement where we are already under pressure from Congress and U.S. fishing interests to negotiate a new agreement with expanded joint venture fishing activities -- steps which would rescind elements of our Afghanistan and Poland sanctions regime. I will be sending you a recommendation on this issue shortly.

As I suggested in our recent discussions, the long-term grains agreement is a special case requiring careful handling. I will shortly be sending you a recommendation on this matter.

High-level Dialogue: As noted above, I will be implementing your instructions in meetings with Dobrynin, focusing first on the Pentecostalists, and then addressing other issues in subsequent meetings. I will instruct Art Hartman to pursue his contacts with the Soviet MFA on regional issues. If these discussions indicate that a meeting before the next UNGA between Gromyko and me would be in our interest, I will have further recommendations on timing and venue.

Public Handling: As we proceed, it will be essential that our public statements on US-Soviet relations continue to emphasize our concerns about Soviet behavior -- their military buildup, geopolitical expansionism, and human rights violations. Against this background of Soviet behavior, we must continue to stress the necessity for a renewal of American economic and military strength. It must be equally clear that we have no intention of returning to "business-as-usual" in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union -- there must be significant concrete changes in Soviet behavior.

Our public statements should also emphasize that we intend to continue the dialogue with the Soviet Union which we began at the outset of this Administration on the full agenda we have established. We should continue to emphasize our intention to negotiate in good faith in the START and INF talks. But we should also underscore that we have engaged the Soviet Union in discussion of human rights, regional issues, and our bilateral relations. While continuing to stress the continuity of our policy of realism, strength, and dialogue, we can proceed with confidence to take limited steps in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union where it is in our interest to do so.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

NLS F00-006 #46

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

SUBJECT: Poland: Next Steps

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 6/12/06Issue: U.S. policy toward Poland

Facts: George Shultz forwarded you a memorandum (Tab A) which recommends several policy options vis-a-vis Poland. The memorandum identifies the most immediate problem which has to be addressed - Polish debt rescheduling. The Paris Club of Allied and neutral creditors of Poland will convene a meeting on April 11 to discuss this issue. At this time, the Europeans might break the ranks and opt for separate rescheduling talks with the Poles. As George notes, already the EC has publicly called for rescheduling without any human rights preconditions. In view of these circumstances, State's memorandum recommends the following course of action:

- Work out a package with the Allies which would tie rescheduling to a successful Papal visit, amnesty for the majority of political prisoners and an end to harassment of former Solidarity activists.
- Approach the Polish Government and stress the need for improved human rights performance. State our willingness to allow U.S. and LOT charters to carry Polish-Americans to Poland for the Pope's visit, if they are willing to take a parallel step of value to us.
- Raise the issue of Poland with Dobrynin so as to solicit Soviet assistance and permission for the Poles to reform their economy and move toward greater reconciliation.

Discussion: State's proposed course of action addresses only short-term concerns via a "carrot/stick" approach. It is not a well-developed strategy which would advance our long-term interests in Poland -- overall liberalization (restoration of free labor unions, economic reform) and a more autonomous foreign policy. While I agree with State's first proposal that rescheduling be tied to a successful Papal visit (whereby the Polish regime does not pose any obstacles either before or during the visit) and an end to the harassment of Solidarity activists, general amnesty should be sought not just for the majority of

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Declassify on: OADR

political prisoners, but for all. I also agree with the second proposal that we should approach the Poles -- but with a different package (see below, Alternative Strategy). That is, the Administration should not relax any restrictions on LOT flights to the U.S. at this time. Although resumption of flights would be a small step, it would be quite symbolic. Ergo, no U.S. sanctions should be relaxed until the Polish Government makes enough progress on human rights and the restoration of free labor unions. Finally, I see no reason as to why we should solicit Soviet assistance in improving U.S.-Polish relations. Given the current state of U.S.-Soviet relations, it is unlikely that the Soviets will render any assistance and permit the Poles to take the necessary steps to reform their economy and move toward reconciliation. Furthermore, they will misinterpret such a U.S. overture as indicative of an excessive eagerness on our part to improve overall U.S.-Soviet relations. Poland should be raised as an issue with the Soviets, but not in the context of seeking assistance - for it will only be counterproductive.

Alternative Strategy; Although it is difficult to envision full restoration of the pre-martial law situation in Poland, the U.S. should nevertheless strive to promote Polish economic reform and the eventual restoration of workers' rights to form free labor unions. The current Polish Government is unlikely to embark on such a course in the near future, for it is still unsure of how firm is its control. However, the government realizes that long-term stability is impossible without economic recovery which is unlikely without serious economic reform.

In order to promote these developments and heighten the Polish Government's interest in eventual reform, I suggest that we approach the Poles with a private demarche -- presented not as a unilateral but as a multilateral Western gesture. (Before we approach the Poles, we should seek to secure West European compliance and commitment to this strategy. An emissary should be sent to discuss this plan with the Allies and present it to the Polish authorities.) If the Poles reject our private demarche, we will have secured in advance the Allies' agreement to maintain a unified policy toward Poland. We would present the Poles with the following package -- rescheduling of the Polish debt and Western support for Poland's IMF membership. The rescheduling (not specified by State) would not entail any new medium-term credits; rather it would involve "recycling" 50 percent of the interest payment into short-term credits to finance vital commodity imports. The promotion of Poland's IMF membership would enable the Polish regime to acquire necessary financial management and assistance from an international organization rather than relying on individual efforts. The IMF involvement could also speed liberalizing reforms with a positive human rights spillover and maintain a neutral character.

As a quid pro quo the Polish Government would be required to: hold a successful Papal visit, release all political prisoners (including detainees and those arrested under martial law provisions), and ensure a worker's right to work (cease harassment, frequent lay-offs and reinstate those fired). Also, as part of our opening bargaining package, we should reiterate that eventually a worker's right to form free labor unions be restored and a meaningful economic reform program be implemented. We would not require immediate implementation of either economic reform or free labor union restoration, as long as the Polish regime is prepared to make a private commitment to follow this course of action eventually. If the Polish Government is prepared to accept these conditions, it can obtain IMF membership and have its debt rescheduled.

The key to this strategy is to seize the initiative and fill the present policy vacuum by offering tangible quid pro quos to the Polish Government in exchange for serious concessions on their part. This proposal will be fully consistent with our stated conditions for improving U.S.-Polish relations. Also, even though the Europeans are determined to reschedule unilaterally if necessary, it appears that they want to avoid intra-alliance frictions and would like U.S. participation. Therefore, in exchange for U.S. acquiescence to Polish debt rescheduling, we should seek to obtain European support of our strategy vis-a-vis Poland. If the demarche is accepted, it would temper present Polish repressive policies and provide hope for further liberalization. If rejected by the Polish Government, this initiative would forestall separate deals by our West European allies and enable us to sustain the present tough unified policy toward Poland. The Administration could then claim credit for demonstrating flexibility on an East-West issue and working together with the Allies.

RECOMMENDATIONS

OK NO

That the Administration pursue a "new" policy approach toward Poland.

- — a. As outlined in the NSC strategy , or
- — b. As outlined by State.

Prepared by:
Paula Dobriansky

A

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 28, 1983

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MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

From: WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

George P. Shultz *WPS*

Subject:

Poland: Next Steps

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

NLS F2000-006/1 #47

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

As we discussed, there is a need to become more active on Poland. We are in danger of losing control over our Allies and our contact with the Polish people.

On the Allied front, the EC on March 1 publicly called for rescheduling the Polish debt without human rights preconditions. The Danish Parliament this week voted to break ranks on Polish sanctions. The Paris Club (Allied and neutral creditors of Poland) will hold a key meeting on April 11 which will focus on the rescheduling issue. We must have a position ready for that meeting if we hope to hold off further erosion.

On the Polish front, the major upcoming development is the Pope's visit June 16-22. Like the Pope's visit in June, 1979 (which played a key role in the rise of Solidarity), this could become something of a turning point -- with a resurgence of nationalism and political awareness on the part of the average Pole. It could lead to gradual reconciliation and reform, or it could result in continued repression. I think we have an opportunity to help push things toward reconciliation in Poland by taking actions in three areas.

o First, I propose going to the Allies now, prior to the April 11 meeting. We would attempt to work out a package which would tie rescheduling to a successful Papal visit, plus amnesty for the majority of political prisoners and an end to harassment of former Solidarity activists. These are the conditions the Solidarity in exile leadership told us were most important to them. We need to preserve Allied unity in order to maximize our leverage.

o Second, we would approach the Polish government. We would stress the need for improved human rights performance in order for us to move ahead in bilateral relations. Noting the Polish government's stated commitment to enhanced freedom of travel, we would state our willingness to allow US and LOT (Polish airline) charters to carry Polish-Americans to Poland for the Pope's visit this summer. Before proceeding with even this small step, we would ask what the Polish government is prepared to do in return. We have received a number of signs recently that they want to work with us.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

DECL: OADR

o Third, I think it is time to bring the Soviets directly into the picture. They are behind most of the repression in Poland and can move things toward reconciliation if they want to. In particular, I would propose adding Poland to the agenda in my talks with Dobrynin. I would point out to him: that we know Poland is a major problem for the USSR; and that we are prepared to improve our relations with Warsaw if the Soviet Union will permit the Poles to take the necessary steps to reform their economy and permit a greater measure of reconciliation.

We must expect some domestic criticism in implementing any program. However, this strategy clearly links human rights progress to Allied and US actions. Furthermore, if we begin to move ahead with the Soviets, while permitting our relations with the Poles to deteriorate further, we will come in for even stronger domestic criticism. And we need to stop the erosion in the U.S. presence and programs in Poland or we will lose the contacts with the Polish people it has taken us decades to build. Ed Derwinski is with us on the steps I have outlined above, and believes the Polish-American community can be brought on board. He is willing to work actively to generate support for this strategy on the Hill, among the Polish-American leadership and with the press.

Recommendations

A. That we immediately begin discussion with the Allies on tying rescheduling to the outcome of the Papal visit plus amnesty for the majority of political prisoners and an end to harassment of former Solidarity activists.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

B. That we call in the Poles, informing them that a significant improvement in our bilateral relations depends on improved human rights performance, and noting that we are prepared to take a small step to facilitate freedom of travel and the Pope's visit if the Poles are prepared to take a parallel step of value to us.


Approve _____ Disapprove _____

C. That I begin to include Poland in my private discussions with Dobrynin.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

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NLS F 2000-006/1 #48

BY amp, NARA, DATE 11/28/01

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BUDAPEST 2659
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E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, HU
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH JANOS KADAR
1. ~~40~~ ENTIRE TEXT
2. FOLLOWING UP A BRIEF CONVERSATION ON APRIL 4, WHEN KADAR AND I SPOKE GENERALLY ABOUT HAVING A PHILOSOPHICAL TALK SOME-TIME, HE RECEIVED ME FOR ALMOST THREE HOURS ON APRIL 27 AND COVERED SEVERAL TOPICS.
3. SOVIET LEADERSHIP
PLEASED BUT A LITTLE EMBARRASSED BY RICHLY ADORNED WESTERN MEDIA PORTRAYALS OF HIS CLOSE FRIENDSHIP WITH ANDROPOV, KADAR ADMITTED HE DID IN FACT KNOW THE NEW GENERAL SECRETARY VERY WELL AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WENT BACK TO THE MID-FIFTIES. HOWEVER, HE SAID IT WAS A MISTAKE TO CREDIT ANDROPOV WITH SELECTING HIM IN NOVEMBER 1956. THAT CHOICE HE SAID SHOULD BE ATTRIBUTED TO MIKOYAN, WITH KHRUSHCHEV AND SUSLOV BEING STRONGLY OPPOSED AT THE TIME. KADAR SAID WHEN HE AND KHRUSHCHEV REALLY BECAME CLOSE FRIENDS IN LATE 1957--EARLY 1958, THEY JOKED ABOUT THIS. KADAR SAID THE WEST ALWAYS HAD A KEY CHARACTERISTIC CONFUSED BETWEEN KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV--ALTHOUGH KHRUSHCHEV HAD SURFACE EBULLIENCE, IT WAS BREZHNEV WHO WAS THE EMOTIONAL ONE AND WHAT PRUDENCE EXISTED IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY UNDER BREZHNEV, AND KADAR THOUGHT THERE WAS MUCH, WAS DUE TO COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP CONTROLS ON BREZHNEV COUPLED WITH BREZHNEV'S GROWING PHYSICAL INCAPACITY AFTER 1974. BUT ANDROPOV IS VERY DIFFERENT FROM EITHER OF THEM, MORE RATIONAL AND MORE FORMIDABLE THAN BOTH HIS PREDECESSORS: KADAR SAID, "IF YOU ARE LOOKING FOR AN OPPONENT, ANDROPOV WILL BE AWESOME BUT IF YOU ARE LOOKING FOR A PARTNER, HE WILL BE REASONABLE." HE PORTRAYED ANDROPOV IN COOL, RATIONAL TERMS AND IMPLIED HIS FRIENDSHIP WITH HIM WAS OF A DIFFERENT QUALITY, SOMEHOW LESS PERSONAL AND JOVIAL THAN IT HAD BEEN WITH THE PREDECESSORS. INTERESTINGLY, THERE ARE PICTURES OF KHRUSHCHEV AND BREZHNEV IN KADAR'S OFFICE, BUT NONE OF ANDROPOV.
4. COMMENT: I HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT KADAR IS A LITTLE NERVOUS ABOUT STORIES THAT HE IS THE ONLY ONE OF THE EE LEADERS WHO FULLY PASSES MUSTER WITH ANDROPOV, AND THAT HE SOUGHT WITH ME SOMEWHAT TO GENERALIZE AND DEPERSONALIZE THE IMAGE OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITHOUT LOSING THE ADVANTAGES OF HAVING ITS

EXISTENCE FULLY APPRECIATED. (END COMMENT)

5. SOVIET COMMAND AND CONTROL:

KADAR SET OUT TO GIVE ME A LITTLE POLITICAL SCIENCE LESSON ON HOW THE SYSTEM WORKS. HE SAID IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO ASSERT THAT THE SOVIETS DID NOT EXERCISE SIGNIFICANT CONTROL OVER ASPECTS OF EACH EE GOVERNING STRUCTURE, BUT THIS IS OVERESTIMATED IN THE WEST. HE HAD NOT CLEARED OUR MEETING WITH ANDROPOV. HE STRESSED OVERWHELMING SOVIET INVOLVEMENT IN DEFENSE MATTERS AND ALL BUT ADMITTED TO MY QUESTION THAT THERE WERE NOT REALLY NATIONAL COMMAND AUTHORITIES IN THE VARIOUS EE CAPITALS THAT COULD

INTERPOSE THEMSELVES IN TIMES OF CRISIS BETWEEN THE SOVIET GENERAL STAFF AND THE INDIVIDUAL NATIONAL STAFFS. "THE WARSAW ALLIANCE" HE SAID "IS A SINGLE ARMY".

6. ON ECONOMIC MATTERS, HE SAID, THINGS ARE MUCH LOOSER. ALTHOUGH MEMBERSHIP IN CEMA NATURALLY IMPOSES SOME KEY CONSTRAINTS, EACH COUNTRY IS FREE TO GO ITS OWN WAY TO A DEGREE NOT IMAGINED IN THE WEST. HE TOLD OF THE SUMMIT IN BERLIN IN THE SUMMER OF 1980 WHEN GIEREK HAD TO BACK DOWN ON HIS PRICE INCREASES. KADAR SAW BREZHNEV FOR HIS BILATERAL RIGHT AFTER GIEREK, AND BREZHNEV TOLD HIM THE POLES HAD THEMSELVES IN A MESS OVER THEIR PRICING POLICY AND WERE BEGGING FOR INCREASED SOVIET ASSISTANCE. KADAR SAID HE WAS ABOUT TO GO AHEAD IN HUNGARY WITH THE LARGEST PRICE HIKE EVER, NINE PERCENT, BUT THOUGHT THE GROUND HAD BEEN WELL PREPARED. BREZHNEV WAVED ASIDE THE DETAILS AND SAID, "DO AS YOU WISH; YOU KNOW WHAT YOU ARE DOING".

7. I ASKED ABOUT FOREIGN POLICY AND KADAR SAID THAT WAS SOMEWHERE IN BETWEEN DEFENSE AND ECONOMICS BUT THERE WAS VERY SIGNIFICANT SCOPE FOR INDIVIDUAL COUNTRIES TO GO THEIR OWN WAY ON ISSUES NOT VITAL TO THE SOVIETS.

8. COMMENT: KADAR STARTED THIS SHORT COURSE TO PERSUADE ME HOW LIGHT IS THE SOVIET HAND ON EE, BUT CURIOUSLY IT CAME OUT DIFFERENTLY. THE IMAGE WAS OF A PERVERSIVE SOVIET CONTROL MECHANISM WITH THE FREEDOM COMING WHEN THEY ELECT NOT TO USE IT. IN KADAR'S CASE THEY MAY TRUST HIM ENOUGH TO LET HIM ALONE, BUT HE KNOWS THE MACHINE IS KEPT WELL OILED IN CASE IT NEEDS TO BE SWITCHED ON. (END COMMENT).

9. EASTERN EUROPE:

KADAR TOOK ME THROUGH A HISTORY OF THE REGION WHICH WAS INTERESTING FOR ITS STRONG MARXIST-LENINIST BIAS, IF HE REALLY BELIEVES IT. ALL EE STATES WERE FEUDAL, AND AGRARIAN UNTIL 1945. THEY HAD NO EXPERIENCE, FOR BETTER OR WORSE, WITH BOURGEOIS DEMOCRACY BUT HAD TRIED EVOLUTIONS WHICH, LIKE AMERICAN SLAVE REBELLIONS BEFORE 1860, GOT LITTLE ATTENTION IN THE HISTORY BOOKS. THE REPUBLIC OF COUNCILS (THE 1919 COMMUNE) WAS HUNGARY'S EFFORT. IT WAS HOME GROWN, COMING AT A TIME WHEN THE BOLSHEVIK ARMY WAS 1500 KILOMETERS AWAY FIGHTING FOR ITS OWN LIFE, AND HAD TO BE PUT DOWN EXTERNALLY BY ENTENTE FORCES UNDER FRENCH COMMAND. 1945-48 HE DESCRIBED AS A PERIOD OF POLITICAL ASSASSINATIONS WITH THE SOVIET ARMY PLAYING A POLITICAL ROLE ONLY TO PREVENT A CIVIL WAR WHICH WOULD SURELY HAVE BROKEN OUT WITHOUT IT.

10. INTERESTINGLY, IN KADAR'S VIEW OF HISTORY IT WAS ONLY AFTER 1948 THAT THE EE'S BEGAN TO DISPLAY REAL NATIONAL IDENTITIES AND DIFFERENCES, AS THEY ADJUSTED--DIFFERENTLY-- TO MEMBERSHIP IN THE SOCIALIST COMMONWEALTH. HE OUTLINED THE HORRORS OF THE RAKOCZY PERIOD AND HIS OWN IMPRISONMENT AND SAW 1956 AS BOTH A NATIONAL TRAGEDY AND A RELEASE, ALBEIT BLOODY, FROM THE DEFORMITIES OF RAKOCZY. THINGS HAD NOT COME OUT SO WELL IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA OR POLAND WITH NEITHER COUNTRY HAVING HAD A SUFFICIENTLY WRENCHING DRAMA TO BREAK WITH THE PAST. HE SAID THE HUNGARIAN PEOPLE WOULD NEVER TOLERATE A REGIME LIKE HUSAK'S AND WOULD FIND THE POLITICAL PREDOMINANCE OF THE MILITARY IN THE POLISH SOLUTION DISTASTEFUL, ALTHOUGH HE WAS VERY GRATEFUL TO THEM FOR SAVING POLISH SOCIALISM.

11. COMMENT: IN KADAR'S EDUCATION, EVERYTHING BEFORE 1945 IN EE IS PROLOGUE. REAL HISTORY BEGINS WITH THE LIBERATION AND HAS AS ITS TASK TO DO IN A FEW YEARS WHAT WESTERN EUROPE BEGAN IN 1750. I SPARRED WITH HIM IN THIS AREA TO SEE IF HE REALLY BELIEVES HIS PRESENTATION: I THINK HE DOES.

12. HUNGARY: (ECONOMICS)

KADAR SAID HUNGARY IS DETERMINED TO CONTINUE THE REFORM. CONSUMERS MUST EVENTUALLY PAY THE FULL COST OF EVERY PRODUCT; THE MARKET, NOT THE PLAN, MUST DOMINATE; AND AS SOON AS POSSIBLE HUNGARY WOULD HAVE "REAL MONEY" (CONVERTABILITY). HE SAID THAT "SOME MAY NOT CALL THIS SOCIALISM, BUT WE DO" HE THOUGHT THE OTHERS, PARTICULARLY THE SOVIETS, WOULD COME UP WITH SERIOUS REFORMS--PROBABLY SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM HUNGARIAN ONES--IN THE NEAR FUTURE. HE WAS BULLISH ON CEMA AND THE CEMA SUMMIT WHICH HE HOPED, BUT WAS NOT SURE, COULD COME ON SCHEDULE "ABOUT THE TIME OF WILLIAMSBURG".

13. COMMENT: KADAR HANDLED THE CONCEPTS VERY PROFESSIONALLY,

MAKING SURE I UNDERSTOOD THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE TRADE BALANCE AND THE CURRENT ACCOUNT. HE IS CLEARLY EDUCATED IN ECONOMICS AND WELL VERSED IN THE NUMBERS. RECENT OBSERVATIONS THAT HE DOES NOT INTEREST HIMSELF IN ECONOMICS AND LEAVES THAT TO SUBORDINATES ARE, ON THE BASIS OF THIS CONVERSATION, SIMPLY UNTRUE. (END COMMENT)

14. POLITICS

KADAR MADE THE NOW CUSTOMARY PITCH FOR MORE DEMOCRACY IN HUNGARY AND STATED HIS COMMITMENT TO THIS WITH SOME ENTHUSIASM. HE DOES NOT OBSCURE THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY FOR HIM, SAYING THAT ALL CHANGE WILL BE WITHIN THE SYSTEM. HE LEAVES NO DOUBT THAT HE BELIEVES DEMOCRACY CAN ONLY EXIST IF THE PARTY, RETAINS ITS LEADING ROLE.

15. CONCLUSION:

I AM NOT SURE WHAT REALLY PROMPTED THIS LONG MEETING, AS KADAR DOES NOT SEE AMBASSADORS AND THERE WAS NO OBVIOUS OCCASION FOR THIS DISCUSSION. I ASSUME THAT AFTER THE IMPORTANT CENTRAL COMMITTEE PLENUM, KADAR WANTS TO PUT TO REST PRESS SPECULATION THAT HE WILL RETIRE AND HE ALSO WANTS TO LET IT BE KNOWN THAT HUNGARIAN POLICY WILL BE AS UNCHANGING AS ITS LEADERSHIP. THE FACT OF OUR MEETING WAS GIVEN PROMINENT ATTENTION IN THE HUNGARIAN MEDIA.

16. KADAR LOOKS EXCELLENT. PREVIOUSLY I HAVE SEEN HIM IN THE EVENING AND THIS MEETING WAS AT 11:00 A. M. WITH THAT BEING TAKEN A CCOUNT OF, HIS COLOR WAS VERY GOOD, THE BEST I HAVE SEEN, AND HIS EYES WERE CLEAR AND ALERT. WHILE SMOKING TWO PACKS OF CIGARETTES AND CONSUMING TWO SCOTCHES, HE CARRIED MOST OF THE CONVERSATION WITH ANIMATION AND WAS CLEARLY HAVING A GOOD TIME. IF HE WISHED TO MAKE ME JUDGE HE WOULD BE AROUND A LONG TIME, HE SUCCEEDED.

BERGOLD
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