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**Collection:** Clark, William P.: Files  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** Clark, William P.: Files  
**OA/Box:** Box ~~01044~~ 8  
**File Folder:** U.S.-Soviet Relations Papers Working File:  
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**Archivist:** smf/smf  
**FOIA ID:** F2000-006 (Skinner)  
**Date:** 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. cable	211516Z 15p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF 2000-006/1 #11</i>	1/21/83	<del>P1/B1</del> <b>B3</b>
<del>2. memo</del>	<del>Clark to RR re Prospects for Progress 4p</del> <i>R 6/12/06 F00-006 #12</i>	<del>2/4/83</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>3. memo</del>	<del>Lenzowski to Clark re Memorandum to the President 4p</del> <i>R " " " #13</i>	<del>2/7/83</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>4. memcon</del>	<del>Between RR, Shultz and Dobrynin 3p</del> <i>R 12/20/05 M04-024 #8</i>	<del>2/15/83</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>

### RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].  
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].

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B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 17, 1983

S.U. FILE

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT  
THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE  
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE  
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT  
AND BUDGET  
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE  
UNITED NATIONS  
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
DIRECTOR, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

SUBJECT: NSDD 75 on "U.S. Relations with the USSR" (S)

The President has approved National Security Decision Directive on "U.S. Relations with the USSR". A copy is attached for your information. This is a sensitive document; distribution should be made only on a need-to-know basis. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

  
William P. Clark

Attachment  
NSDD-75

cc The Director of ACDA  
The United States Trade Representative

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By smf NARA, Date 12/4/00

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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January 17, 1983

National Security Decision  
Directive Number 75

U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE USSR (S)

U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union will consist of three elements: external resistance to Soviet imperialism; internal pressure on the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism; and negotiations to eliminate, on the basis of strict reciprocity, outstanding disagreements. Specifically, U.S. tasks are:

1. To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by competing effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet Union in all international arenas -- particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical regions of priority concern to the United States. This will remain the primary focus of U.S. policy toward the USSR.
2. To promote, within the narrow limits available to us, the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. The U.S. recognizes that Soviet aggressiveness has deep roots in the internal system, and that relations with the USSR should therefore take into account whether or not they help to strengthen this system and its capacity to engage in aggression.
3. To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests and which are consistent with the principle of strict reciprocity and mutual interest. This is important when the Soviet Union is in the midst of a process of political succession. (S)

In order to implement this threefold strategy, the U.S. must convey clearly to Moscow that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the U.S. must make clear to the Soviets that genuine restraint in their behavior would create the possibility of an East-West relationship that might bring important benefits for the Soviet Union. It is particularly important that this message be conveyed clearly during the succession period, since this may be a particularly opportune time for external forces to affect the policies of Brezhnev's successors. (S)

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Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement

Implementation of U.S. policy must focus on shaping the environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in a wide variety of functional and geopolitical arenas and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship. (S)

A. Functional

1. Military Strategy: The U.S. must modernize its military forces -- both nuclear and conventional -- so that Soviet leaders perceive that the U.S. is determined never to accept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for Soviet leaders to initiate an attack. The future strength of U.S. military capabilities must be assured. U.S. military technology advances must be exploited, while controls over transfer of military related/dual-use technology, products, and services must be tightened. (S)

In Europe, the Soviets must be faced with a reinvigorated NATO. In the Far East we must ensure that the Soviets cannot count on a secure flank in a global war. Worldwide, U.S. general purpose forces must be strong and flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide variety of contingencies. In the Third World, Moscow must know that areas of interest to the U.S. cannot be attacked or threatened without risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures. (S)

2. Economic Policy: U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve strategic and foreign policy goals as well as economic interests. In this context, U.S. objectives are:

- Above all, to ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the Soviet military buildup. This requires prevention of the transfer of technology and equipment that would make a substantial contribution directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
- To avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet system.
- To seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of reverse leverage on Western countries based on trade, energy supply, and financial relationships.
- To permit mutual beneficial trade -- without Western subsidization or the creation of Western dependence -- with the USSR in non-strategic areas, such as grains. (S)

The U.S. must exercise strong leadership with its Allies and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade, building upon the agreement announced November 13, 1982 (see NSDD 66). This approach should involve efforts to reach agreements with the Allies on specific measures, such as: (a) no incremental deliveries of Soviet gas beyond the amounts contracted for from the first strand of the Siberian pipeline; (b) the addition of critical technologies and equipment to the COCOM list, the harmonization of national licensing procedures for COCOM, and the substantial improvement of the coordination and effectiveness of international enforcement efforts; (c) controls on advanced technology and equipment beyond the expanded COCOM list, including equipment in the oil and gas sector; (d) further restraints on officially-backed credits such as higher down payments, shortened maturities and an established framework to monitor this process; and (e) the strengthening of the role of the OECD and NATO in East-West trade analysis and policy. ~~(S)~~

In the longer term, if Soviet behavior should worsen, e.g., an invasion of Poland, we would need to consider extreme measures. Should Soviet behavior improve, carefully calibrated positive economic signals, including a broadening of government-to-government economic contacts, could be considered as a means of demonstrating to the Soviets the benefits that real restraint in their conduct might bring. Such steps could not, however, alter the basic direction of U.S. policy. ~~(S)~~

3. Political Action: U.S. policy must have an ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy over the repressive features of Soviet Communism. We need to review and significantly strengthen U.S. instruments of political action including: (a) The President's London initiative to support democratic forces; (b) USG efforts to highlight Soviet human rights violations; and (c) U.S. radio broadcasting policy. The U.S. should:

- Expose at all available fora the double standards employed by the Soviet Union in dealing with difficulties within its own domain and the outside ("capitalist") world (e.g., treatment of labor, policies toward ethnic minorities, use of chemical weapons, etc.).
- Prevent the Soviet propaganda machine from seizing the semantic high-ground in the battle of ideas through the appropriation of such terms as "peace." ~~(S)~~

B. Geopolitical

1. The Industrial Democracies: An effective response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial democracies, including stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. The U.S. must provide strong leadership

and conduct effective consultations to build consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreements. While Allied support of U.S. overall strategy is essential, the U.S. may on occasion be forced to act to protect vital interests without Allied support and even in the face of Allied opposition; even in this event, however, U.S. should consult to the maximum extent possible with its Allies. (S)

2. The Third World: The U.S. must rebuild the credibility of its commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on U.S. interests and those of its Allies and friends, and to support effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist Soviet pressures or oppose Soviet initiatives hostile to the United States, or are special targets of Soviet policy. The U.S. effort in the Third World must involve an important role for security assistance and foreign military sales, as well as readiness to use U.S. military forces where necessary to protect vital interests and support endangered Allies and friends. U.S. policy must also involve diplomatic initiatives to promote resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation, and an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and private sector initiatives for Third World countries. (S)

3. The Soviet Empire: There are a number of important weaknesses and vulnerabilities within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should exploit. U.S. policies should seek wherever possible to encourage Soviet allies to distance themselves from Moscow in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically. (S)

- (a) Eastern Europe: The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen Moscow's hold on the region while promoting the cause of human rights in individual East European countries. The U.S. can advance this objective by carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater degree of internal liberalization. U.S. policies must also make clear that East European countries which reverse movements of liberalization, or drift away from an independent stance in foreign policy, will incur significant costs in their relations with the U.S. (S)
- (b) Afghanistan: The U.S. objective is to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political, military, and other costs remain high while the occupation continues. (S)
- (c) Cuba: The U.S. must take strong countermeasures to affect the political/military impact of Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba. The U.S. must also provide economic and military assistance to states in Central America and the Caribbean Basin threatened by Cuban destabilizing activities. Finally, the U.S. will seek to reduce the Cuban presence and influence in southern Africa by energetic leadership of the diplomatic effort to achieve a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, or failing that, by increasing the costs of Cuba's role in southern Africa. (S)

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(d) Soviet Third World Alliances: U.S. policy will seek to limit the destabilizing activities of Soviet Third World allies and clients. It is a further objective to weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between them and the Soviet Union. U.S. policy will include active efforts to encourage democratic movements and forces to bring about political change inside these countries. ~~(S)~~

4. China: China continues to support U.S. efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet expansionism. The U.S. should over time seek to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordination with China, and to reduce the possibility of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. The U.S. will continue to pursue a policy of substantially liberalized technology transfer and sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within the parameters of the policy approved by the President in 1981, and defined further in 1982. ~~(S)~~

5. Yugoslavia: It is U.S. policy to support the independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia's current difficulties in paying its foreign debts have increased its vulnerability to Soviet pressures. The Yugoslav government, well aware of this vulnerability, would like to reduce its trade dependence on the Soviet Union. It is in our interest to prevent any deterioration in Yugoslavia's economic situation that might weaken its resolve to withstand Soviet pressure. ~~(S)~~

### C. Bilateral Relationships

1. Arms Control: The U.S. will enter into arms control negotiations when they serve U.S. national security objectives. At the same time, U.S. policy recognizes that arms control agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination with U.S. and Allied efforts to maintain the military balance, an important means for enhancing national security and global stability. The U.S. should make clear to the Allies as well as to the USSR that U.S. ability to reach satisfactory results in arms control negotiations will inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, and the difficulties in defining areas of mutual agreement with an adversary which often seeks unilateral gains. U.S. arms control proposals will be consistent with necessary force modernization plans and will seek to achieve balanced, significant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. ~~(S)~~

2. Official Dialogue: The U.S. should insist that Moscow address the full range of U.S. concerns about Soviet internal behavior and human rights violations, and should continue to resist Soviet efforts to return to a U.S.-Soviet agenda focused primarily on arms control. U.S.-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can serve U.S. interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for responsible behavior. Such contacts can

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also be useful in driving home to Moscow that the costs of irresponsibility are high, and that the U.S. is prepared to work for pragmatic solutions of regional problems if Moscow is willing seriously to address U.S. concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions it would not otherwise secure. (S)

A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at Foreign Minister level facilitates necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership and helps to maintain Allied understanding and support for U.S. approach to East-West relations. A summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart might promise similarly beneficial results. At the same time, unless it were carefully handled a summit could be seen as registering an improvement in U.S.-Soviet relations without the changes in Soviet behavior which we have insisted upon. It could therefore generate unrealizable expectations and further stimulate unilateral Allied initiatives toward Moscow. (S)

A summit would not necessarily involve signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. Any summit meeting should achieve the maximum possible positive impact with U.S. Allies and the American public, while making clear to both audiences that improvement in Soviet-American relations depends on changes in Soviet conduct. A summit without such changes must not be understood to signal such improvement. (S)

3. U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges should be seen in light of the U.S. intention to maintain a strong ideological component in relations with Moscow. The U.S. should not further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed those exchanges which could advance the U.S. objective of promoting positive evolutionary change within the Soviet system should be expanded. At the same time, the U.S. will insist on full reciprocity and encourage its Allies to do so as well. This recognizes that unless the U.S. has an effective official framework for handling exchanges, the Soviets will make separate arrangements with private U.S. sponsors, while denying reciprocal access to the Soviet Union. U.S. policy on exchanges must also take into account the necessity to prevent transfer of sensitive U.S. technology to the Soviet Union. (S)

Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior

The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself cannot be accomplished quickly. The coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in which the Soviets may test U.S. resolve by continuing the kind of aggressive international behavior which the U.S. finds unacceptable. (S)

The uncertainties will be exacerbated by the fact that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process of political succession to Brezhnev. The U.S. will not seek to adjust its policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and negative) for the new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests. The U.S. will remain ready for improved U.S.-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of concern to it; the burden for any further deterioration in relations must fall squarely on Moscow. The U.S. must not yield to pressures to "take the first step." (S)

The existing and projected gap between finite U.S. resources and the level of capabilities needed to implement U.S. strategy makes it essential that the U.S.: (1) establish firm priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and (2) mobilize the resources of Allies and friends which are willing to join the U.S. in containing the expansion of Soviet power. (S)

Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be a strong military capable of action across the entire spectrum of potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., its Allies, or other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should deterrence fail. Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protection of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation with Allied and other states and greater utilization of their resources. This military strategy will be combined with a political strategy attaching high priority to the following objectives:

- Sustaining steady, long-term growth in U.S. defense spending and capabilities -- both nuclear and conventional. This is the most important way of conveying to the Soviets U.S. resolve and political staying-power.
- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong leadership in developing policies to deal with the multifaceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will require that the U.S. take Allied concerns into account, and also that U.S. Allies take into equal account U.S. concerns. In this connection, and in addition to pushing Allies to spend more on defense, the U.S. must make a serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent with U.S. military strategy and necessary force modernization plans, and should seek to achieve balanced, significant and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable armaments. The U.S. must also develop, together with the Allies, a unified Western approach to East-West economic relations, implementing the agreement announced on November 13, 1982.

- Maintenance of a strategic relationship with China, and efforts to minimize opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of the Soviet system. This must be a long-term and sophisticated program, given the nature of the Soviet system.
- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its position in Afghanistan. This will require that the U.S. continue efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a negotiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, the U.S. must keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet costs on the ground are high.
- Blocking the expansion of Soviet influence in the critical Middle East and Southwest Asia regions. This will require both continued efforts to seek a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to bolster U.S. relations with moderate states in the region, and a sustained U.S. defense commitment to deter Soviet military encroachments.
- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer-term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern Europe. This will require that the U.S. continue to impose costs on the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also require that the U.S. maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among East European countries.
- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This will require that the U.S. use a variety of instruments, including diplomatic efforts and U.S. security and economic assistance. The U.S. must also retain the option of using of its military forces to protect vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from the Soviet-Cuban connection. ~~(S)~~

Articulating the U.S. Approach: Sustaining Public and Congressional Support

The policy outlined above is one for the long haul. It is unlikely to yield a rapid breakthrough in bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic near-term victories in the U.S. effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pressure is likely to mount for change in U.S. policy. There will be appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more "normal" U.S.-Soviet relationship, particularly in a period of political transition in Moscow. ~~(S)~~

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It is therefore essential that the American people understand and support U.S. policy. This will require that official U.S. statements and actions avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. At the same time, the U.S. must demonstrate credibly that its policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive long-term basis for U.S.-Soviet relations. ~~(S)~~

*Robert Reagan*

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
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TAGS: PREL, PINR, PGOV, HU, UR, XG, XH

SUBJECT: ANDROPOV AND THE HUNGARIANS--A PRESENT-DAY PERSPECTIVE  
ON THE NEW SOVIET LEADERS

REF: 82 BUDAPEST 6727 (NOTAL)

1. (~~ENTIRE~~ TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY: MANY HUNGARIANS FEEL THAT THEY KNOW YURIY ANDROPOV WELL BECAUSE OF BOTH PAST AND PRESENT CONNECTIONS. THE CHARACTER OF THE NEW SOVIET LEADER CONTINUES TO BE A SUBJECT OF PREEMINENT INTEREST AND SPECULATION TO THEM. IN THE REFTEL WE CONCENTRATED MAINLY UPON THE CLUES TO BE DISCOVERED FROM ANDROPOV'S EXPERIENCES IN HUNGARY IN THE DRAMATIC PERIOD OF THE 1956 REVOLUTION. IN THIS MESSAGE WE SEEK TO DRAW TOGETHER VIEWS OF THE MAN FROM A MORE RECENT VINTAGE, AGAIN UTILIZING CONTACTS--ALL OF THEM DIFFERENT FROM THOSE IN REFTEL--WHO CLAIM EITHER DIRECT PERSONAL OR RELIABLE SECOND-HAND KNOWLEDGE. BECAUSE WE ARE DEALING WITH THE PRESENT, THERE IS A LACK OF OBJECTIVE, DOCUMENTARY SOURCES AGAINST WHICH TO CHECK THESE OPINIONS. OUR INTERLOCUTORS STILL OPERATE WITHIN THE OFFICIAL SYSTEM FROM WHICH THEY HAVE MUCH TO GAIN. SOME OF THEIR REMARKS ARE THUS NO DOUBT INTENDED TO INFLUENCE AMERICAN THINKING ABOUT THE SOVIET UNION IN WAYS CONSISTENT WITH WARSAW PACT INTERESTS. THERE IS, IN OTHER WORDS, NO LEAVENING INFLUENCE OF HUNGARIAN DISSIDENTS, CRITICAL INTELLECTUALS OR EXILES ABLE TO COMMENT BOTH KNOWLEDGABLY AND REASONABLY OBJECTIVELY ABOUT THE MAN AFTER HE RETURNED TO MOSCOW.

3. THE PICTURE OF THE NEW LEADER THAT EMERGES FROM THE DISCUSSIONS WE HAVE CARRIED ON IN RECENT WEEKS, HOWEVER, IS CONSISTENT WITH THE IMAGE OF THE MAN WE PERCEIVED ACTING ON THE TRAGIC STAGE OF HUNGARY'S QUARTER-CENTURY OLD HISTORY. ABOVE ALL, HE COMES

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THROUGH AS AN INDIVIDUAL OF CONSIDERABLE INTELLECT, ENERGY AND DECISIVENESS, A RELATIVELY SOPHISTICATED, HIGHLY PRAGMATIC LEADER WHOSE TASK, AS HUNGARIANS SEE IT, IS ESSENTIALLY TO "GET THE COUNTRY MOVING AGAIN" AFTER A PERIOD OF STAGNATION THAT RESULTED FROM BREZHNEV'S LENGTHY INCAPACITATION. HE IS EXPECTED TO CONCENTRATE UPON THE ECONOMY AND UPON THE PERSONNEL AND THE SPIRIT WITHIN THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE AND BUREAUCRACY. BECAUSE OF HIS AGE, HIS IS SEEN AS A TRANSITIONAL RULE, NOT IN THE SENSE OF A BRIEF HOLDING PERIOD UNTIL A NEW LEADERSHIP EMERGES, BUT IN THE SENSE THAT HE WILL BE ABLE TO SET THE COURSE FOR THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND POLICY THE ULTIMATE REALIZATION OF WHICH WILL REQUIRE MANY MORE YEARS THAN ANDROPOV PROBABLY HAS WITHIN HIM. BECAUSE OF HIS ACTIVIST NATURE, HOWEVER, HE IS SEEN AS ALSO LIKELY TO MOVE DECISIVELY IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, PARTICULARLY IN ARMS CONTROL, RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. AND EUROPE. IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, AS PROMINENT HUNGARIANS PORTRAY HIM PRIVATELY, HE IS VIEWED AS POTENTIALLY A MORE EFFECTIVE CHAMPION OF WARSAW PACT INTERESTS IN ANY ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH THE WEST THAN THE AILING BREZHNEV. HE IS ALSO REGARDED, HOWEVER, AS ONE WHO, BECAUSE OF HIS ABILITY TO WEIGH ALL ARGUMENTS AND DEFINE THE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS OF A SITUATION OBJECTIVELY, CAN BE A MORE COMPETENT PERSONALITY WITH WHOM THE WEST MIGHT HOPE TO STRIKE MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS BARGAINS. END SUMMARY.

SOURCES

4. THE MAN IN BUDAPEST WITH THE LONGEST CONTINUING AND PRESUMABLY MOST MEANINGFUL ANDROPOV RELATIONSHIP IS, OF COURSE, JANOS KADAR HIMSELF. WHILE WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO SPEAK DIRECTLY WITH THE HUNGARIAN LEADER, MANY HUNGARIANS FEEL ALMOST POSSESSIVE ABOUT ANDROPOV BECAUSE OF HIS LONG-STANDING TIES TO THEIR COUNTRY. (THEY STRESS THAT HE MAINTAINED OLD AND DEVELOPED NEW PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS WITH HUNGARIANS OVER THE LAST 30 YEARS). THEY ARE WILLING TO EXPRESS PRIVATE VIEWS. OUR CONTACTS INCLUDE (PROTECT) THE DIRECTOR

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OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S FOREIGN RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, MATYAS SZUROS, WHO SAW ANDROPOV FREQUENTLY WHEN HE WAS AMBASSADOR IN MOSCOW, HIS IMMEDIATE PREDECESSOR IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE JOB AND PRESENT EDITOR OF THE PARTY PAPER (AND DE FACTO POLITBURO MEMBER) JANOS BERECH; SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE MFA AS WELL AS A JUNIOR DIPLOMAT WHO KNOWS ANDROPOV'S SON; A PROMINENT JOURNALIST, SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE ECONOMIC ELITE WHO HAVE CLOSE TIES TO SOVIET COUNTERPARTS AND A SENIOR MFA THINK TANK MEMBER WITH REPORTEDLY GOOD CONNECTIONS BOTH WITHIN THE HUNGARIAN PARTY AND TO SUCH SOVIET BODIES AS THE INSTITUTE OF WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (IMEMO) AND ARBATOV'S U.S.A. INSTITUTE.

THE POLITICIAN

5. SOVIET AMBASSADOR BAZOVSKIJ TOLD THE AMBASSADOR THAT WHEN HE MET WITH KADAR LAST MONTH TO DISCUSS THE JUST CONCLUDED 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE SOVIET STATE CELEBRATIONS WHICH BOTH HAD ATTENDED, KADAR RECALLED THE SEPTEMBER VISIT TO BUDAPEST OF FINNISH PRESIDENT KOIVISTO. KADAR AND KOIVISTO REPORTEDLY TRADED ANDROPOV STORIES. KADAR SAID THAT "WE REALLY EDUCATED ANDROPOV IN 1956 AND MADE A POLITICIAN OUT OF HIM." THE FINNISH PRESIDENT'S QUOTED RESPONSE WAS THAT "OH, NO, WE EDUCATED HIM LONG BEFORE DURING THE WINTER WAR AND THEN ON THE KARELIAN FRONT." ACCORDING TO BAZOVSKIJ, KADAR READILY AGREED WITH HIS OWN MEDIATING COMMENT THAT "IT IS ENOUGH THAT HE HAS HAD SO DEEP A FINNO-UGRIC EDUCATION."

6. TO THE HUNGARIANS THIS MEANS MORE THAN THAT KADAR HAS CREDITS HE CAN USE WITH ANDROPOV TO KEEP TO HIS OWN COURSE OF ECONOMIC REFORM AND RELATIVE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL LIBERALIZATION. IT MEANS ALSO THAT THEY SEE ANDROPOV AS A MAN WHO HAS LEARNED SOMETHING OF THE NEED TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF THE OPINIONS AND NEEDS OF OTHERS, WHETHER OF SMALLER COUNTRIES WITHIN OR ON THE EDGE OF THE SOVIET POWER ORBIT OR OF OTHER POLITICAL

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FIGURES. "ANDROPOV," SAYS BEREZ, "IS SOMETHING OF A KADAR POLITICIAN WHO VALUES AND IS SENSITIVE TO THE NEED TO BUILD A CONSENSUS." THE EDITOR, WHO IS REPORTED TO BE ONE OF THE YOUNGER HUNGARIAN LEADERS FOR WHOM ANDROPOV HAS A HIGH REGARD, CLAIMS THAT BREZHNEV IN HIS EARLY YEARS ALSO HAD SOMETHING OF THIS QUALITY BUT THAT AGE AND ILLNESS CRIPPLED THIS ASPECT OF HIS CHARACTER. INDEED, BEREZ DATES THE SECOND AND FINAL PHASE OF BREZHNEV'S STEWARDSHIP TO DECEMBER 1974, AFTER WHICH HE WAS ALLEGEDLY UNABLE TO EXERCISE FULL-TIME LEADERSHIP. SUSLOV, ON THE OTHER HAND, WHO IS SEEN HERE AS FILLING MUCH OF THE RESULTING POWER VACUUM UNTIL HIS OWN DEATH IN EARLY 1982, WAS NOT REGARDED AS A LEADER IN THE KADAR MOLD. INDEED, SOME HUNGARIANS REGARD SUSLOV'S DEATH RATHER THAN BREZHNEV'S AS THE SEMINAL EVENT OF 1982.

7. A SECOND ASPECT OF THE HUNGARIAN REFLECTION PEOPLE HERE BELIEVE THEY DISCERN IN ANDROPOV IS HIS REPUTEDLY MODEST STYLE OF LIVING AND GOVERNING. BREZHNEV IS CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN FREE OF THE MALIGNANT ASPECTS OF THE CULT OF THE PERSONALITY LINKED WITH THE NAMES OF STALIN AND HIS HUNGARIAN IMITATOR RAKOSI. HE IS PERCEIVED, HOWEVER, AS HAVING FALLEN INTO A DOUBLE TRAP, AGAIN MOST NOTABLY IN HIS DECLINING YEARS. HE WELCOMED THE FACT THAT HIS PICTURES WERE WIDELY DISPLAYED THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION, NOTABLY IN BUREAUCRATS' OFFICES; HE AT LEAST TOLERATED FAIRLY OSTENTATIOUS HIGH LIVING IN HIS IMMEDIATE FAMILY AND OFFICIAL CIRCLE, AND SOME OF HIS PERSONNEL ACTIONS WERE TINGED WITH NEPOTISM AND CRONYISM. BY CONTRAST VFRP SDOWMSELF IS NOTABLY SHY OF MANNER AND RESERVED IN STYLE. HIS PICTURES ARE SEEN HERE RELATIVELY RARELY AND ARE NOT A STAPLE OF OFFICE FURNITURE. THIS ABSENCE OF PERSONAL OSTENTATION IS AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF THE RESPECT HE HAS GAINED FROM MANY HUNGARIANS. A NUMBER OF OUR CONTACTS SUGGEST THAT ANDROPOV COULD EASILY HAVE TAKEN THE PRESIDENCY OF THE SOVIET STATE IN NOVEMBER HAD HE WANTED AND THAT THE FACT THAT HE DID NOT DO SO INDICATES A PARTICULAR SENSITIVITY ON HIS PART RATHER THAN A FLAW IN HIS

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POWER BASE. ONE ALSO CLAIMS THAT HE HAS ACTED TO ENSURE THAT SOVIET OFFICIALDOM UNDERSTANDS THAT A PORTRAIT OF THE FIRST SECRETARY SHOULD NOT BE REGARDED AS AN OBLIGATORY WALL DECORATION. WE HEAR THAT ANDROPOV LIVES FAIRLY MODESTLY BY SOVIET STANDARDS, AND A YOUNG HUNGARIAN DIPLOMAT WHO ADMITS TO HAVING CULTIVATED HIM SAYS THAT THE YOUNGER ANDROPOV IS ALMOST SHY AND CAREFUL TO AVOID ANY IMPRESSION THAT HIS GOOD BUT NOT SPECTACULAR FOREIGN SERVICE CAREER IS UNDULY ADVANCED BY HIS FATHER.

8. THIS IS NOT TO SAY THAT ANDROPOV IS CONSIDERED BY HUNGARIANS WHO BELIEVE THEY KNOW HIM AS EITHER, IN CHURCHILL'S DESCRIPTION OF CLEMENT ATTLEE, "A MODEST MAN WITH MUCH TO BE MODEST ABOUT" OR AS A HUNGARIAN-STYLE REFORMER. EVERY COMMENTATOR USES DESCRIPTIVE WORDS LIKE "ENERGETIC" OR "DECISIVE", AGAIN WITH AN EXPLICIT OR IMPLICIT CRITICISM OF THE STYLE IN THE LAST BREZHNEV YEARS. LIKENISE THEY EMPHASIZE HIS PRAGMATISM AND THE IMPORTANCE OF DIFFERING NATIONAL TRADITIONS AND CIRCUMSTANCES. THEY SEE ANDROPOV AS ONE WHO WILL DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO ACHIEVE RESULTS WITHOUT REGARD FOR SIMPLISTIC LABELS OR EVEN IDEOLOGY. SUPPORTERS OF HUNGARY'S REFORMS PROFESS TO BELIEVE THAT SO LONG AS KADAR LIVES AND, SHOULD THAT COME TO PASS IN ANDROPOV'S TIME, BEYOND KADAR SO LONG AS THE COUNTRY REMAINS STABLE AND SUCCESSFUL, THEY HAVE MORE LEEWAY THAN EVER BEFORE TO CONTINUE THEIR OWN QUIET BUT POTENTIALLY FAR-REACHING LIBERALIZING COURSE. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY ARE QUICK TO POINT OUT, THIS IS A COURSE WHICH IS CONSISTENT WITH BOTH HUNGARIAN NEEDS AND THE COUNTRY'S MORE DEMOCRATIC, WESTERN TRADITIONS. THE SOVIET UNION'S SOCIETY IS MUCH MORE EASTERN AND ITS TRADITIONS MORE TOTALITARIAN AND CENTRISTIC. ANDROPOV IS NOT BELIEVED TO BE A MAN TO CUT ACROSS THOSE TRADITIONS BECAUSE OF PERSONAL PREDILECTIONS, AND HE IS DESCRIBED AS TOO INTELLIGENT NOT TO PERCEIVE THAT "MODELS" CANNOT BE APPLIED INDISCRIMINATELY UPON ANOTHER COUNTRY.

A TIME OF DECISIVE TRANSITION

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9. ONE OF THE SURPRISING THEMES IN MANY HUNGARIAN COMMENTS ABOUT ANDROPOV IS THE FACT THAT HE IS SEEN AS BEING IN A WAY A TRANSITIONAL LEADER. THERE IS NO SPECIAL CONCERN FOR HIS HEALTH. SZUROS, FOR EXAMPLE, ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANDROPOV HAS HAD ILLNESSES, ONE COMING AT AN UNSPECIFIED PERIOD WHEN BREZHNEV WAS EXPERIENCING ONE OF HIS MOST DIFFICULT HEALTH PROBLEMS. THIS ILLNESS SUPPOSEDLY PRODUCED A MARKED CHANGE IN ANDROPOV'S FACIAL EXPRESSION, BUT HE IS NOW EFFECTIVELY RECOVERED. THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL CEREMONIES WERE OBVIOUSLY AN ORDEAL FOR HIM, AND THE HUNGARIANS NOTED THAT HE APPEARED STRAINED DURING THEM. THEY FELT THAT HE LOOKED MUCH FRESHER AT THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY CELEBRATIONS. PHYSICALLY HE IS ON TOP OF HIS JOB, SZUROS SAYS, AND THE IMPORTANT POINT IS THAT HE IS MENTALLY FULLY ALERT.

10. NONETHELESS, THE HUNGARIANS NOTE THAT HE IS 68, AND SENIOR OFFICIALS CANDIDLY EXPECT THAT HE WILL IN THE NATURAL COURSE OF THINGS HAVE FEWER YEARS OF POWER THAN BREZHNEV OR PERHAPS EVEN KHRUSCHEV. BECAUSE HE IS DECISIVE AND AN ACTIVIST BY NATURE, AND BECAUSE HE IS OBJECTIVE ENOUGH TO BE AWARE OF HIS CHRONOLOGICAL LIMITATIONS, THEY EXPECT HIM TO MOVE QUICKLY TO LEAVE HIS STAMP UPON THE SOVIET STATE AND UPON HISTORY. BECAUSE THE PROBLEMS WITH WHICH HE MUST GRAPPLE ARE SO COMPLEX, THEY BELIEVE THAT HIS CONTRIBUTION WILL BE TO SET THE TRACKS FOR THE FURTHER EVOLUTION OF SOVIET SOCIETY AND POLICY. THIS, THEY POINT OUT, IS VERY IMPORTANT. AS NOTED ABOVE, THEY BELIEVE THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS BEEN DRIFTING FOR MANY YEARS. SUSLOV WAS NOT UNDULY DISRUPTIVE ABOUT HUNGARIAN REFORM BECAUSE OF THE PERSONAL CONNECTION WHICH ANDROPOV HAD PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE IN FORGING BETWEEN HIM AND KADAR. IN THE LARGER SCHEME OF THINGS, HOWEVER, HIS INFLUENCE WAS MORE BALEFUL. HE HAD BECOME IN RECENT YEARS, ACCORDING TO SZUROS, "VERY OLD, VERY RIGID, EVEN, I MIGHT SAY, SENILE." THE SOVIET UNION, AS ANDROPOV KNOWS, CAN NO LONGER AFFORD THIS TYPE OF

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RIGIDITY. THAT IS WHY, IN THE HUNGARIAN VIEW, ANDROPOV'S TENURE, EVEN IF RELATIVELY SHORT BY SOVIET STANDARDS, CAN BE DECISIVE BECAUSE HE WILL HAVE TO ENERGIZE IT TO MOVE IN ONE DIRECTION OR ANOTHER.

GRAPPLING WITH THE ECONOMY AND BUREAUCRACY--A TOUCH OF BONAPARTISM?

11. THE PREEMINENT PROBLEM WITH WHICH ANDROPOV WILL BE GRAPPLING IS, HUNGARIANS BELIEVE, THE SOVIET ECONOMY. AS A PROMINENT JOURNALIST PUT IT, HE IS THE RIGHT AND NECESSARY PERSON. ONLY HE AMONG THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP IS DESCRIBED AS HAVING THE SOPHISTICATION AND DRIVE TO COME TO GRIPS WITH THE SITUATION WHICH, IF ALLOWED TO DRIFT, CAN EVENTUALLY PRODUCE ECONOMIC CHAOS IN ALL OF EASTERN EUROPE WITH RESULTING SERIOUS IMPACT NOT ONLY UPON THE LOCAL COMMUNIST PARTIES BUT UPON EUROPEAN SECURITY.

12. IT WILL BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT, HOWEVER, FOR ANDROPOV TO GET A HANDLE ON THE LARGER PROBLEM OF THE ECONOMY. HE WILL FIRST HAVE TO ENSURE THAT HE HAS LIKE-MINDED PEOPLE IN KEY POSITIONS. THIS IS NOT, THEY SAY, SO MUCH A QUESTION OF PROTECTING HIS POWER BASE. WE DO NOT HEAR THE LINE THAT ANDROPOV IS INSECURE. RATHER IT IS THAT THE SOVIET SYSTEM HAS BECOME OVERWHELMINGLY INFESTED WITH DEAD WOOD. WHAT COULD BE CHANGED RELATIVELY QUICKLY IN A SMALL STATE LIKE HUNGARY (AND STILL REQUIRED AT LEAST A DECADE) CAN BE MUCH MORE TIME CONSUMING IN A LARGE STATE LIKE THE SOVIET UNION. MANY OF THESE PEOPLE, SZUROS EXPLAINS, "ARE FUNCTIONING ON ANOTHER TRACK." HE SAYS THAT ANDROPOV KNOWS THAT "THE RELATIONSHIP OF FORCES WITHIN THE PARTY MUST BE RESHAPED". SOMEHOW, PARTLY DUE TO BREZHNEV'S INCAPACITIES AND SUSLOV'S QUIRKS, THE TRADITION DEVELOPED THAT VIRTUALLY ANYONE WHO ACHIEVED A POSITION OF SOME INFLUENCE IN SOVIET SOCIETY HAD A SINECURE FOR LIFE. THIS, THE HUNGARIAN OBSERVERS FEEL, MUST AND WILL BEGIN TO CHANGE. IT

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IS SIGNIFICANT, SZURDS SAYS, THAT ONE OF ANDROPOV'S FIRST STEPS WAS TO FIRE THE MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION. THE LACK OF RAILWAY CARS, FOR WHICH THAT OFFICIAL BORE RESPONSIBILITY, WAS AN URGENT PROBLEM, BUT THE ACTION ALSO HAS SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE. HOUSECLEANING AND TEMPORARY ENHANCEMENT OF ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY THROUGH SUCH MEASURES AS THE DISCIPLINE CAMPAIGN NOW UNDERWAY WOULD THUS BE EARLY PRIORITIES.

13. ANDROPOV'S ALLEGED RELUCTANCE TO ASSUME THE PRESIDENCY IS ALSO VIEWED AS RELEVANT TO THIS INITIAL STAGE OF INVIGORATING SOVIET SOCIETY. BEREZCZ CLAIMS THAT ANDROPOV IS ATTEMPTING TO EDUCATE HIS COLLEAGUES IN THE IDEA THAT EACH JOB MUST BE SEEN FOR ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF THE STATE MACHINERY, NOT MERELY AS A CLAIM ON PRESTIGE AND PRIVILEGE. HE KNOWS THAT HE MIGHT NOT HAVE THE TIME TO GIVE ADEQUATE ATTENTION TO BOTH THE FIRST SECRETARYSHIP OF THE PARTY AND THE PRESIDENCY OF THE STATE. IF HE MUST CHOOSE, HE OBVIOUSLY PREFERS THE SUBSTANTIVE POWER OF THE PARTY ROLE TO THE LARGELY CEREMONIAL FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY, BUT HE WOULD WANT SOMEONE IN THE LATTER OFFICE WHO WILL FULFILL THOSE FUNCTIONS CONSCIENTIOUSLY AS AN EXAMPLE THAT ALL TOP POSITIONS REQUIRE PERFORMANCE AND THAT IF THIS IS LACKING, THE INCUMBENT WILL BE REMOVED. COMMENT: BEREZCZ DREW A PARALLEL HERE ALSO TO HUNGARIAN THEORY AND (PARTIALLY) PRACTICE, BUT HE SPECIFICALLY SAID THE PARALLEL SHOULD NOT IN THIS CASE BE TAKEN TOO FAR. THE HUNGARIANS HAVE GONE MUCH FARTHER, HE BELIEVES, THAN ANYONE ELSE IN EASTERN EUROPE IN TRYING TO CARVE OUT MEANINGFUL FUNCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO EXERCISE UNDER GENERAL BUT NOT DAY-TO-DAY GUIDANCE FROM THE PARTY. REFORM VOICES ARE NOW BEING RAISED TO INCREASE THIS SEPARATION OF ROLES AND EVEN TO TAKE SUCH STATE FUNCTIONS AS THE PARLIAMENT SOMEWHAT MORE SERIOUSLY. HE SUGGESTS THAT ANDROPOV IS CONSIDERABLY REMOVED FROM--AND SOVIET SOCIETY IS PERHAPS GENERATIONS REMOVED FROM--THESE IDEAS. END COMMENT.

14. HUNGARIAN OBSERVERS SEE THIS FIRST PHASE OF

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ANDROPOV'S EFFORTS TO GAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL OF THE SOVIET ECONOMY AS INVOLVING FAIRLY DRASTIC ACTION. THEY ARE SCATHING IN THEIR JUDGEMENTS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF CORRUPTION, PERSONAL BUT EVEN MORE IMPORTANT INSTITUTIONAL, WHICH THEY BELIEVE PERVADES THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THEY POINT OUT THAT A CRUCIAL ELEMENT OF HUNGARY'S ECONOMIC SUCCESS HAS BEEN ITS ABILITY TO MAKE INFORMATION ABOUT ACTUAL CONDITIONS OF WORK AND MARKET REQUIREMENTS WIDELY AVAILABLE SO THAT DECISIONS CAN BE MADE RATIONALLY AT ALL LEVELS. THEIR EXPERIENCES REVEAL TO THEM HOW DIFFERENT THE SOVIET UNION NOW IS.

BERECZ, FOR EXAMPLE, TELLS US OF THE DISBELIEF WITH WHICH A JOURNALIST SENT BY HIS PAPER TO DO A STORY ON SOVIET AGRICULTURE CAME BACK AFTER VIEWING NOT ONLY OUTDATED MACHINERY BUT MANAGEMENT METHODS OF SOVIET FARMS. THE DIRECTOR OF HUNGARY'S HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL BABOLNA STATE FARM, WHO IS ALSO A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, REPORTS SIMILAR OBSERVATIONS. HE SPEAKS OF THE POULTRY FARMS WHICH BABOLNA HAS SET UP FOR THE SOVIETS NEAR UZHGOROD IN THE TRANS-CARPATHIAN UKRAINE WHERE EGG PRODUCTION IS ONLY 60 PERCENT OF EXACTLY EQUIVALENT FARMS ON THE HUNGARIAN SIDE OF THE TISZA RIVER. THE SOVIET WORKERS STEAL GRAIN MEANT FOR THE HENS AND ALSO MUCH OF THE EGG PRODUCTION. THE SHORTFALL IS COVERED BY MANAGEMENT WHICH FILES FALSE REPORTS. CORRECTION IS ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE BECAUSE THESE FARMS ARE THEN GIVEN AWARDS, BASED ON FALSE INFORMATION, FOR HAVING THE HIGHEST EGG PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET UNION.

15. TO HUNGARIANS (AND PERHAPS TO ANDROPOV AS WELL) THIS IS REMINISCENT OF THE SITUATION WHICH ONCE PREVAILED UNDER RAKOSI. THEY POINT TO THE POLITICAL BACARET PROGRAM BROADCAST HERE ON NEW YEAR'S EVE DURING WHICH THE PLANNING SYSTEM OF THE 1950'S WAS DESCRIBED: "THE PLANNERS WENT TO THE VILLAGE AND SPOKE TO THE PEASANT. THEY TOLD HIM THAT THE PLAN PRESCRIBED THAT HIS SOW HAD TO PRODUCE 14 PIGLETS. BUT THE SOW PRODUCED ONLY TEN. THE PEASANT GOT FRIGHTENED AND REPORTED 11. THE LOCAL PARTY SECRETARY IMPROVED THE

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STATISTIC TO 12, THE DISTRICT OFFICE TO 13, AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE APPARAT TOLD RAKOSI THAT THE 14 PIGLETS HAD BEEN PRODUCED AHEAD OF TIME. RAKOSI WELCOMED THE NEWS AND DECIDED THAT IN THAT CASE TEN COULD BE EXPORTED, AND WE WOULD EAT THE OTHER FOUR."

16. THIS KIND OF SYSTEM NEEDS POWERFUL MEDICINE IF IT IS TO BE CURED. ONE PROFESSOR, WHO IS A FORMER TECHNICAL DIRECTOR OF A MAJOR HUNGARIAN ENTERPRISE AND HAS JUST RETURNED FROM MOSCOW WHERE HE SPOKE WITH SOVIET COLLEAGUES, SAYS THAT THE ABOVE ANALOGY APPLIES AS WELL TO SOVIET INDUSTRY AS TO AGRICULTURE. THE STRUCTURE OF REPORTS BASED ON LIES FROM BOTTOM TO TOP OPERATES WITH THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE BRANCH MINISTRIES. HE GOES SO FAR AS TO RECOMMEND THAT A TOUCH OF "BONAPARTISM" IS REQUIRED. HE AND HIS COLLEAGUES SEE THIS IN WHAT THEY PERCEIVE AS ANDROPOV'S ALLEGED PLAN TO USE HIS OLD ORGANIZATION, THE KGB, IN A SORT OF SUPER GAO ROLE. THEY BELIEVE THAT ANDROPOV WILL SEEK TO HAVE IT AUDIT AND REVIEW THE ENTIRE CHAIN BY WHICH ECONOMIC ORDERS AND INFORMATION ARE TRANSMITTED IN BOTH DIRECTIONS BETWEEN MOSCOW'S POWER ELITE AND CENTRAL PLANNERS AND THE WORKSHOPS AND FARMS.

17. THE HUNGARIANS THUS DO NOT PROFESS TO SEE "LIBERAL" OR "CONSERVATIVE" IMPLICATIONS IN WHAT THEY EXPECT TO BE AN ENHANCED KGB ROLE UNDER ANDROPOV. IT IS RATHER THE BEST TOOL AVAILABLE TO ANDROPOV (MORE DISCIPLINED AND MORE INTERNALLY HONEST AS WELL AS FAMILIAR) IN AN EFFORT TO INTRODUCE THAT UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF ACCURACY INTO SOVIET MANAGEMENT WHICH THEY BELIEVE IS THE ESSENTIAL PRECONDITION FOR ECONOMIC REFORM. AT THE SAME TIME THEY EXPECT THAT SUCH A USE OF THE KGB WILL BE CONTROVERSIAL AND MEET DETERMINED RESISTANCE. ANDROPOV WILL NEED TIME. INDEED, BEREZC BELIEVES THAT AT LEAST A GENERATION WILL BE NEEDED, HOWEVER ANDROPOV APPROACHES THE PROBLEM, TO CHANGE FUNDAMENTAL ECONOMIC AND BUREAUCRATIC ATTITUDES WHICH HAVE AS MUCH TO DO WITH RUSSIAN HISTORY AND CULTURE AS PARTY MISMANAGEMENT. IT IS, NEVERTHELESS,

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IN THESE AREAS OF FUNDAMENTAL ATTITUDINAL CHANGES THAT THEY BELIEVE ANDROPOV WILL FIRST HAVE TO FIGHT, RATHER THAN TINKERING WITH ORGANIZATION CHARTS AND MECHANISTIC REFORMS (THOUGH MORE NEW IDEAS WILL BE FLOATED AND EXPLORED), IF HE IS TO PUT A LASTING IMPRINT UPON SOVIET LIFE.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

18. HUNGARIAN OBSERVERS TEND TO BE LESS VOLUBLE AND SPECULATIVE ABOUT ANDROPOV'S VIEWS ON THE U.S. AND ON EAST-WEST POLICY IN PART AT LEAST BECAUSE ANDROPOV SEEMS TO HAVE REVEALED LESS OF HIMSELF IN THESE AREAS BEFORE HIS ACCESSION TO POWER. THEY EXPECT THAT HIS CHARACTERISTIC DYNAMISM WILL, HOWEVER, ALSO BE EVIDENT HERE. WITHOUT SUGGESTING THAT ANDROPOV HAS ANY SECRET FEELINGS OF ADMIRATION FOR THE UNITED STATES, BEREZC BELIEVES THAT HE WOULD NOT NORMALLY FAVOR AN EFFORT TO ISOLATE THE SOVIET UNION AND EASTERN EUROPE FROM THE WEST. ON THE ONE HAND, ANDROPOV REALIZES THAT THE SOVIET UNION DOES NOT HAVE THE RESOURCES TO MAKE A POLICY OF ECONOMIC AUTARCHY REALISTIC. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE IS CONSIDERED TO BE SELF-CONFIDENT ENOUGH TO FEEL THAT THE SOVIET UNION CAN DO WELL IN POLITICAL INTERACTION WITH WASHINGTON AND OTHER CAPITALS. COMMENT: THIS OF COURSE DOES NOT PROJECT A GREATER SOVIET TOLERATION FOR EXCHANGES OF PERSONS AND IDEAS IN THE CLASSICAL HELSINKI BASKET THREE SENSE. END COMMENT.

19. AS LOYAL ALLIES, THE HUNGARIANS SAY THAT WHETHER THAT INTERACTION IS PREDOMINANTLY CONFRONTATIONAL OR WHETHER IT INVOLVES A HIGHER RATIO OF MUTUAL COOPERATION ON POLITICAL SUBJECTS WILL BE DETERMINED SUBSTANTIALLY BY HOW THE WEST RESPONDS. SPECIFICALLY, SZUROS CLAIMS THAT ANDROPOV'S ELEVATION "GUARANTEES" A MORE ENERGETIC SOVIET ARMS CONTROL POLICY. HE CONSIDERS ANDROPOV TO BE AN "ENLIGHTENED" MAN WHOSE PREFERENCE WILL BE TO REACH REASONABLE ACCORDS. HE PREDICTS THAT HIS DYNAMISM WILL ENABLE HIM TO ACHIEVE MORE MOVEMENT

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WITHIN THE SOVIET BUREAUCRACY AGAINST THOSE IN MOSCOW WHO REGARD ANY MOVE IN THIS AREA AS A UNILATERAL STEP." AT THE SAME TIME, THERE IS A SUGGESTION THAT IF THE WEST DOES NOT SHOW WHAT ANDROPOV WILL JUDGE TO BE SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN MOVING TOWARD MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION, THE NEW SOVIET LEADER, AGAIN BECAUSE OF HIS INTELLIGENCE AND SKILL, IS QUITE CAPABLE OF PLAYING THE ARMS CONTROL GAME FOR DISRUPTIVE POLITICAL PROPAGANDA MORE EFFECTIVELY THAN THE ELDERLY BREZHNEV. THE HUNGARIAN IMPRESSION IS THAT ANDROPOV'S PERFORMANCE AT THE WARSAW PACT'S PRAGUE SUMMIT DEMONSTRATES BOTH HIS INTENTION NOT TO LET HIS ECONOMIC PROBLEMS PRECLUDE AN ACTIVE FOREIGN AFFAIRS ROLE AND HIS ABILITY TO PLAY THAT ROLE EITHER CONSTRUCTIVELY OR FOR PROPAGANDA.

20. IN THIS CONNECTION, SZUROS SAYS THAT ANDROPOV IS STILL FACED WITH A NEED TO OVERCOME SOME INEXPERIENCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE AREA OF PRESENTATION AND COMMUNICATION. THE HUNGARIAN OFFICIAL IS SURPRISINGLY CRITICAL OF ANDROPOV'S PLOY IN CONNECTING THE NUMBERS IN HIS INF REDUCTION PROPOSAL TO FRENCH AND BRITISH FORCES. AS SZUROS SEES IT, EGON BAHR WAS CORRECT IN SUGGESTING THAT THERE WAS SOME REASONABLENESS IN THE CONCEPT BUT THAT IT WAS UNFORTUNATE FROM A PRESENTATIONAL POINT OF VIEW BECAUSE OF THE REACTION IT CREATED IN THOSE TWO COUNTRIES. SZUROS BELIEVES, HOWEVER, THAT ANDROPOV IS A QUICK AND WILLING LEARNER AND THAT HE WILL PICK UP THE SKILLS TO ENABLE HIM TO OPERATE IN THIS NEW TERRAIN MORE EFFECTIVELY.

21. COMMENT: IT OBVIOUSLY NEEDS TO BE KEPT CONSTANTLY IN MIND THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT NATURE OF OUR SOURCES FOR THIS SKETCH OF ANDROPOV THE LEADER MEANS THAT SOME OF THE ABOVE VIEWS ARE SELF-SERVING. OUR CONTACTS ARE NOT OVERLY INCLINED TO TELL TALES THAT ARE ENTIRELY OUT OF SCHOOL, AND THEY TEND TO VIEW ANDROPOV THROUGH AN OPTIC THAT MAY GIVE UNDUE EMPHASIS TO THEIR CLOSE BUT STILL LOCAL POINT OF VIEW. WE ARE STRUCK, HOWEVER, BY THE SIMILARITY OF THE CHARACTERISTICS THAT COME THROUGH IN BOTH OUR EARLIER

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EXCURSION INTO HISTORY AND THIS ATTEMPT TO PROBE THE IDEAS OF HUNGARIANS WHO KNOW OR BELIEVE THEY KNOW OF THE PRESENT-DAY ANDROPOV WHO SITS ATOP THE KREMLIN PYRAMID. THE COMMON THREAD APPEARS TO BE PRAGMATISM AND INTELLIGENCE. THE HUNGARIANS, THEMSELVES A SUPREMELY PRACTICAL AS WELL AS INTELLIGENT PEOPLE, THINK THAT THEY SEE A KINDRED SPIRIT IN ANDROPOV.

22. THEY HAVE WITNESSED THE DARK SIDE OF HIS CHARACTER, ARE UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT HE DOES NOT PLACE SOVIET STATE AND SOVIET PARTY INTERESTS ABOVE ALL OTHER CONSIDERATIONS, AND WOULD CERTAINLY NOT ARGUE WITH THE NOTION THAT HE CAN BE A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY. THEY DESIRE STRONGLY THEMSELVES TO BELIEVE THAT AN IMPROVEMENT IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS IS POSSIBLE IN THE NEAR FUTURE BECAUSE THEY CONSIDER THAT WITHOUT IT THEIR OWN CHANCES FOR CONTINUED EVOLUTIONARY LIBERALIZATION AND REFORM AND FOR SUCH A PROCESS EVENTUALLY TO TAKE HOLD IN OTHER PARTS OF EASTERN EUROPE WOULD BE DRASTICALLY REDUCED. THEIR IMAGE OF ANDROPOV MAY THUS CARRY ELEMENTS OF WILLFUL SELF-DELUSION. NEVERTHELESS, THEY APPEAR GENUINELY TO BELIEVE THAT ANDROPOV OFFERS A CHANCE FOR A FRESH START, BOTH TO THE SOVIET ECONOMY AND TO THE SUPERPOWER RELATIONSHIP.

23. THE ANDROPOV WHOM THEY SEE AS DESIRING TO GIVE FIRST PRIORITY TO THE HERCULEAN TASK OF GETTING THE SOVIET ECONOMY GOING AGAIN IS NOT, THEY WOULD BE UNANIMOUS TO SAY, A LEADER WHO CAN BE EXPECTED TO SEEK ACCOMMODATION UNDER COERCION. HE HAS TOO MUCH SELF-CONFIDENCE AND GREAT RUSSIAN PRIDE FOR THAT. THEY CONSIDER, HOWEVER, THAT HE IS MORE OPEN TO A CAREFUL EXAMINATION AND DISCUSSION OF ISSUES WITH A VIEW TO IDENTIFYING MUTUALLY ADVANTAGEOUS SOLUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS THAN HIS INTELLECTUALLY NARROWER PREDECESSORS. IT WAS INDEED SOMEWHAT UNEXPECTED TO US THAT WE HEARD SO LITTLE OF THE ARGUMENT THAT IN EFFECT THE WEST MUST HELP A DOVISH ANDROPOV AGAINST HAWKS WITHIN THE KREMLIN. INSTEAD THE EMPHASIS AGAIN AND AGAIN WAS UPON ANDROPOV'S ABILITY TO MAKE UP HIS OWN MIND AS TO WHAT WAS TRULY IN THE INTEREST OF THE SOVIET UNION

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AND TO WORK TOWARD IT ONCE HE HAD DECIDED WHAT THAT INTEREST WAS. AS SZUROS, WHO IS ONE OF THOSE WHO HOPES FOR A MORE EXTENSIVE U.S.- SOVIET DIALOGUE, PUT IT, ANDROPOV IS A MAN WHO NOT ONLY STATES CLEARLY WHAT HE WANTS. HE IS A MAN WHO LISTENS CAREFULLY TO THE VIEWS OF OTHERS. TO STRESS ANDROPOV'S ABILITY TO FIND HIS WAY TO SOLUTIONS WHEN HE IS CONVINCED THAT IT IS WORTHWHILE, SZUROS RECALLS THE NEW SOVIET LEADER AS ONCE SAYING THAT "MANY THINGS CAN BE DONE IN THE NAME OF SOCIALISM, EVEN HERESY, BUT RESULTS MUST JUSTIFY THEM."

24. A HUNGARIAN CONCERN GOES, HOWEVER, TO TIMING. THEY SEE THIS YEAR AS CRUCIAL, NOT ONLY FOR THE SPECIFIC DECISIONS WHICH MUST BE MADE IN SUCH AREAS AS THE GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS, BUT BECAUSE IN A WAY THE 68-YEAR-OLD NEWLY ANNOINTED FIRST SECRETARY STILL HAS A FRESH PAGE ON WHICH TO WRITE. HE IS AT THE TOP OF HIS MENTAL POWERS AND PERHAPS NEAR TO THE PEAK ALREADY OF HIS POLITICAL STRENGTH. IF HE DOES NOT ATTAIN RESULTS NOW, AT LEAST IN BEGINNING TO SET A MODIFIED DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURSE, THEN AS ONE CONTACT PUT IT, THOSE PICTURES MAY BEGIN TO GO UP ON THE OFFICE WALLS IN A YEAR OR TWO. THE IMMOBILITY WHICH HUNGARIANS FEAR THIS WOULD PRESAGE WOULD, THEY ARE CONVINCED, ULTIMATELY BE HIGHLY DETRIMENTAL TO SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN SOCIETIES, AND THE RESULTANT INSTABILITY AND UNPREDICTABILITY WOULD BE PREJUDICIAL TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY.  
BERGOLD

END OF MESSAGE

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*FD*

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE/EYES ONLY~~

February 4, 1983

DECLASSIFIED / RELEASED

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

*NLS F00-006 #12*

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK

BY *WPC*, NARA, DATE *6/13/06*

SUBJECT: The Prospects for Progress in US-Soviet Relations

Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in US-Soviet relations or not? The short answer is that we don't know; in part because of the change in Soviet leadership, but also because we haven't tried. There is a good reason for that. It was your view -- correctly in my judgement -- of the state of our relations at the end of the decade of the seventies that the Soviets may well have considered us a nation in decline and that before we could have any realistic hope of getting them to bargain seriously with us toward the resolution of the many problems before us, we had to make clear that we had reversed that trend. In short, we had to demonstrate that we still possessed the will and the capability to defend our interests and once more, to lead the free world. Toward that end you set out to restore our defenses, to reassure our allies, to solve our economic problems at home and in sum, to show by action that we were coming back and had to be taken seriously. At the end of two years it seems to me that you have succeeded and that there is a very solid basis for concluding that the Soviets may be reconciled to the fact that by the end of the decade we will have passed them again. The corollary is that now, at a position of maximum relative strength, they ought to cut the best deal that they can. In this respect, they are not unlike the Japanese in 1941. They -- like the Japanese -- have two choices. Either they can attempt to inflict a devastating military defeat upon us, or they can seek to restrain our military buildup through negotiation. Which of the two is the most appealing course can be argued. This memo proceeds from a fundamental judgement, borne of a reading of Soviet history and reinforced by recent military setbacks they have suffered (e.g., the woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon) that the Soviets will not risk a military conflict with us.

*We have tried.*

There are also internal incentives at play which could lead the new Soviet leader to conclude that an arms control agreement -- not just endless negotiation -- is in his personal interest. For example, Andropov came to power relying, like all

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of his predecessors, on the support of the military. Historically it has been necessary in the Soviet Union to give the military its due -- more spending -- in order to keep that support. But at times, the military has been willing to accept arms control as a reasonable alternative because it has constrained US defense programs in the process. Now, at a time when you have launched a solid rebuilding program, such an incentive is at hand. And as you have pointed out, the other pressing demands on the Soviet economy give him a separate set of reasons for cutting back the rate of increase in military spending. (Note: I do not intend to say that a significant real cut is likely -- at best we might achieve a reduction in the rate of increase.)

Separate from these military/economic incentives in Andropov's mind are the personal political realities. He is not yet President and it is reasonable to ask why. Is it not because he faces competition? Before his accession there was speculation that Chernenko was a strong contender for the top position. He is still a prominent player with his own following. Chernenko is a Brezhnev protege and generally labeled as a detentenik. There is still a certain attractiveness among Soviet intellectuals for this approach and Andropov cannot dismiss their power and influence. For this reason there is considerable incentive for him to outflank them with an agreement of some kind.

Against this view one can paint the well-known image of Soviet single-minded militarism which requires eternal confrontation without even the suggestion of compromise. My point is that it is irrelevant to debate which view is correct for as long as we keep our guard up. More importantly what do we have to lose by trying to open some doors? Two years ago I wouldn't have said that for indeed at that point, we had a lot to lose; we would have appeared to be supplicants, rushing into a very tough card game with no winners. But that's no longer true. We're on the march, and Andropov knows it.

So what should we do? The first question is where should we concentrate our effort -- on what subject do we and they have an overlapping interest in an agreement? The answer seems to me clearly arms control and more specifically the INF talks. There is also some promise in START but that can wait. On INF, we have a schedule -- the clock is running -- and it gives us substantial leverage and imputes a sense of urgency in Moscow.

The next question is how to open the dialogue. Should we use traditional diplomatic channels either in Moscow or in Geneva or try a private channel. The latter seems to me preferable and perhaps unavoidable. The reason it is preferable is because Andropov likes secrecy -- indeed he has made a career out of it. It also makes it easier for him to manage his internal bureaucracies. The same factors apply in our government for different reasons. It has become virtually impossible for us

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to keep the substance of our negotiations private once they are circulated within the government. And we have a separate but related problem. This concerns the very deeply-felt ideological bias which exists within your Administration against arms control. This small group of professionals -- centered in the Defense Department -- believes that arms control generically is bad. To be fair we have a legacy of 12 years experience which supports their claim. In gross terms, the military balance has worsened during the SALT era. But I think that we must have the maturity to understand that much of the reason for our failure in the past has to do with our inability to keep the "stick" as powerful as the "carrot" owing to post-Vietnam and Watergate vulnerabilities. In short, just because we came out badly in the past doesn't mean that we will suffer the same fate again. We have to be tough negotiators and sustain our defense buildup. But back to the point, these individuals will resist any serious negotiation and if given the opportunity, will undermine it with leaks. Consequently a private channel may offer the only means to proceed.

Concerning what is to be said, there is a good reason not to be so anxious as to lay out an entire proposal in the first overture. Rather it would be better to make the first contact with a short letter expressing in serious tones your recognition that our relations appear to be evolving toward renewed confrontation. It would express your acknowledgement that we will no doubt continue to disagree on fundamentals, but that this should not be allowed to abort our common interest in maintaining peace and, where possible, resolving problems. You might then note that you view Andropov's accession as an occasion on which perhaps a new page can be turned in US-Soviet relations and that if he is so inclined you want him to know that you are seriously interested in making real progress toward reducing the level of nuclear arms. If he is interested, you would welcome his reply in the same channel.

With regard to how that message would be sent, there are several choices. We could use the hotline. While the circle of awareness within the Soviet Union is small for such messages, we cannot be sure that it would not include some who Andropov would rather not include. If our objective is to allow Andropov the maximum latitude as to whom he chooses to involve, we should seek the personal delivery to him of your letter by a trusted individual. There are various options on this score; suffice to say that it can be done without great risk of compromise.

Once that contact is made with Andropov it is possible that he will reply and ask that talks be opened. At that time he will indicate his interlocutor. If it is Dobrynin, then it would be my recommendation that we have him open talks with George Shultz but here in the

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White House (in the Map Room with total privacy as has been done in the past). From there we would see what develops.

Launching such an undertaking holds some risks. If made public it would engender criticism from the right on general principles and from a disaffected bureaucracy as well. Still on the whole I believe it would be worthwhile because it would make clear that you are not ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union; it would show that you are at least willing to try. To assure the substantive quality of the talks and assure their ultimate supportability, you would include as the back-stopping group for this effort, the statutory members of the NSC (the Vice President, the Secretaries of State and Defense), the Chairman of the JCS, Bill Casey and your National Security Advisor.

Mr. President, it seems to me that we have reached a point where you must decide where you will invest your time and political capital in the next two years. You may be able to accomplish two or three truly lasting things in foreign affairs. In my judgment, forging peace in the Middle East and securing an arms control agreement with the Soviets represent the best and most exigent opportunities. You may have other thoughts. The purpose of this memo is to raise one possibility and, thereby, stimulate a discussion at your convenience, during which we can begin to lay out a strategy. I have discussed this with no one.

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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~SECRET~~ SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

February 7, 1983

INFORMATION

DR

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: JOHN LENCZOWSKI

SUBJECT: The Memorandum to the President on U.S.-Soviet Relations

If I may be blunt about it, this memo is seriously flawed and contains recommendations that are not in the interests of U.S. security. The assumptions underlying its analysis are at best questionable and at worst (which is most of the time) faulty. Among these are:

- The assumption that the U.S. is as responsible as, if not more responsible than, the USSR for U.S.-Soviet tensions and differences. This is implicit in the assertion that "we haven't tried" to see if better U.S.-Soviet relations are possible. It is also implicit in the author's statement that it would be politically useful to prove to the world that the President is not "ideologically against solving problems with the Soviet Union" (as if he has not done so already in his INF and START proposals).
- The assumption that the Soviets believe that "we are on the march again" -- i.e., that our military buildup is on track, will inevitably overtake them in a few years, and is forcing them to come to arms control accords with us. Apparently the Soviets cannot see the efforts in our Republican Senate to cut back that buildup (which, in any event, will not match the concurrent Soviet buildup).
- The assumption that since the Soviets are at a position of maximum relative strength vis-a-vis the U.S., they are in the best position possible to negotiate an arms control agreement and therefore have a real incentive to do so. This is half-true. The Soviets will always negotiate an agreement that restrains U.S. defense programs. But they will never cut a deal that serves U.S. interests in any meaningful way unless they are forced to do so. We have not forced them whatsoever. In fact, in the only arena where we could plausibly make a case that we are forcing them -- the INF deployments in Europe -- the Soviets are the ones who have us up against the wall, and they know it.

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NLS F00-006 #13

BY Amf, NARA, DATE 6/12/86



- The assumption that the Soviets have something to fear from the U.S. defense buildup, and that our impending INF deployment imposes on them a "sense of urgency." This assumption is based on a mirror-image perception of the Soviet Union -- a perception that is totally false. The Soviets know that there is no military threat coming from the U.S. They know that when the U.S. was really anti-communist in the 1950s, we would not even help the Hungarian freedom fighters. They know that there is even less of a political constituency today to do anything similar, much less threaten the USSR itself.
- The assumption that the Soviets have "suffered recent military setbacks" (the "woeful performance of their hardware in Lebanon"). Need it be said that the Soviets have not suffered any setbacks?
- The assumption that these "setbacks" reinforce their policy of not risking military conflict with us. The only reason why they don't want to risk military conflict with us is that they do not need to take such risks. Their political strategy is doing quite a good job of eroding the strength of the West, while pursuing their policy of attrition in the Third World.
- The assumption that there are "interest groups" in the USSR and that the military is one of these. This is expressed in relation to the military's support of Andropov (as if such support were analagous to constituent group support in the U.S.) and its alleged willingness to engage in arms control talks at this stage (as if there are other times when it is against such talks). This whole theory assumes that the military wants something different than what the Party wants, i.e., more military spending, and that the military is usually a force opposed to detente. This theory has serious flaws (such as a lack of evidence to support it). It is, once again, a mirror-image-based theory that ignores mountains of evidence to the contrary (not the least of which is the total infiltration of the military by Party political commissars who maintain strict political controls). This theory further ignores all the evidence that the military has a major interest in pursuing the policy of detente -- both to restrain U.S. defense programs and to acquire Western technology which permits them to maintain, without reform, their command economy, which in turn allows them to keep the highest priority on military spending. (The other flaws of this theory require more lengthy explanation.)
- The assumption that the Soviets have domestic economic reasons (like ours) to cut back their military spending. This is another mirror-image fallacy that has little or no evidence to support it. The Soviets are perfectly willing to starve their own people (witness the current pervasive rationing system and malnutrition) to retain military superiority.

- The assumption that there is a conflict between proponents and opponents of detente, and that the "detenteniks" (a label the author ascribes to Chernenko) are falling all over each other in a competition to see who can be more detentist vis-a-vis the U.S. There is utterly no evidence to show this. Nor is there any evidence to show that we can help Andropov in his domestic political position by reaching an agreement with him (except, perhaps, if we make so many concessions that he can boast of his unique negotiating skills to his comrades). (I can explain elsewhere at greater length why the proponents-opponents of detente theory is false.)
- The assumption that we can easily sustain our defense buildup while engaging in the kind of negotiations with the Soviets that the author recommends. The author ignores the fact that a respectable case can be made to demonstrate that the entire arms control process makes it very difficult to convince the people that a defense buildup is necessary or that we even face any kind of threat from our negotiating "partners".
- The assumption that negotiating through a private channel serves U.S. security interests. It is the Soviets, in fact, who are the greatest proponents of private channels. The author's comments on this subject almost suggest that he trusts Andropov more than he trusts our most security-minded people at DOD. In fact Andropov himself could not have written a better recommendation to the President.
- The assumption that we and the Soviets have a "common interest in maintaining peace." This assumption, as formulated here, which is a truism when it refers to avoiding nuclear war, nevertheless tends to equate the U.S. and the USSR politically. It tends to ascribe blame for tensions if not equally, then largely on the U.S. It fails to explain how murdering a million Afghans represents a "common interest in peace."
- The assumption that we are dealing with an individual, Mr. Andropov, who has individual discretion to make major policy changes. (This assumption is reflected in the author's view that Andropov's accession to power represents a new opportunity for better relations.) The fact is that we are dealing with a system where individuals have little impact or discretion. If Andropov were to deviate measurably from the Party line as defined by the system, he would represent a threat to his colleagues, who would oust him as they did Khrushchev. To operate from this assumption is to entertain the illusion that Andropov has it within his power to pursue a genuine policy of accommodation with

the U.S. It is to believe that the possibility exists that Andropov might really turn out to be something other than a Communist. To believe that individuals (as opposed to the system) can really make a significant political difference is the first step in the process of wishful thinking about the nature of Soviet communism.

With so many questionable or false assumptions, this memo proceeds from a most shaky base. What aggravates its soundness even more is that many of these assumptions are deliberate disinformation themes that the Soviets use to confuse Western policymakers. The original question posed by the memorandum -- "Is there a possibility of achieving a constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations?" remains not only unanswered but not seriously examined. The key question here is not even addressed, namely, "constructive change in U.S.-Soviet relations" according to whose definition of "constructive"? What is "constructive" for the Soviets is not necessarily constructive for U.S. national security.

What this memorandum recommends, in effect, is that the U.S. act to improve relations with the USSR on Soviet terms. It asks us to accept as true the charge that the U.S. is substantially if not largely responsible for the arms race and that the Soviets have as much to fear from us as we from them. It denies that the President's zero-option proposal is a good faith arms control proposal, in spite of the fact that by itself it represents a concession to the Soviets in strictly military terms. It is overly sanguine about our defense buildup and our political will to defend ourselves and lead the Free World. Indeed the President has demonstrated his own will to do so -- but can we say as much for Congress, most of the probable Democratic presidential candidates or various important East-West trade constituencies? Or speaking of the electorate as a whole, what conclusions have the Soviets reached when they viewed the victory of the nuclear freeze initiative (a Brezhnev proposal, after all) in every state referendum where it appeared? It would appear that any attempt to make the kinds of negotiating concessions recommended by this memo would only solidify in Soviet minds their view that the political-moral-spiritual strength of America as a whole is not as great as the election of President Reagan would have had them believe.

The author concludes with the notion that a U.S.-Soviet arms agreement would be a lasting accomplishment for the President in foreign affairs. However, he fails to warn the President that previous agreements have not been such jewels in crowns of his predecessors. A Middle East peace would indeed be a feat. But nowhere is the President's Democracy Initiative mentioned -- or his related efforts to upgrade U.S. public diplomacy and make America strong and respected again. Indeed these are the real feats this President is accomplishing -- and they stand on the solid ground of strengthening U.S. interests and values and not the shaky ground of problematic compromises with an adversary that has shown no evidence of changing its avowed purpose of destroying our civilization.

Feb 1983

Mr President:

While I do not concur  
in all points of this staff  
memo, it provides a basis for  
discussion — hopefully deering some  
of your unscheduled time today —  
to discuss "next steps." Do you  
wish to meet on this?

WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

Bill

Bill

Yes this is something to talk about although I have some serious reservations about some of these suggestions. I don't know that we can talk about it today - with a press conf. taking place tonight.

Ran

NOTE: I am not certain that the above note was the  
WC note attached to the JL paper when  
taken to the President via the usher.

jh



EYES ONLY FOR JUDGE CLARK - Shultz/Dobrynin - 2/15/83  
and The President

THE WHITE HOUSE

PRESERVATION COPY



TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

Participants: President Reagan  
Secretary Shultz  
Ambassador Dobrynin  
Date and Time: Tuesday, February 15, 1983 - 5:15-6:45 pm  
Place: The Residence, The White House

The meeting between the President and Ambassador Dobrynin went on for about an hour and three-quarters. In his opening comments, the President said that personal channels often needed to be established in order to have things happen and that as far as he was concerned, the Soviets could look upon me, Shultz, as the personal channel.

It was spirited throughout and the entire time was spent on content as distinct from pleasantries of one sort and another. The time can be divided into segments.

1. The President expressed his readiness to see important problems we have with the Soviet Union addressed and resolved so reasonable solutions can be arrived at. He made it plain that he was talking about genuine content and not simply words of good feeling. It seemed to me that he was very convincing in the way he expressed himself. Dobrynin responded that while he didn't realize that he would have this opportunity to see the President, he had been instructed by Andropov to say through any meeting with the President that Andropov's view was similar.

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE

BY CIS, NARA, DATE 12/20/05

2. After Dobrynin reviewed the scope of issues that confront us, running from arms control to regional issues (the only one he mentioned was the Middle East) to bilateral issues, the discussion moved into the INF Talks and then the START Talks. For one-half to three-quarters of an hour, the President and Dobrynin engaged each other on these subjects and, without reviewing the arguments used, it must have been apparent to Dobrynin that the President was quite well informed and, while reasonable, very tough-minded. The President has a very nice way of stating his point of view, but he made it quite clear. He also made it clear through the content of the discussion that he was ready to work for constructive solutions.

3. The President developed at considerable length the reasons why human rights issues were important to him: on the basis of the human beings involved on the one hand; on the other, the political impact in the United States of treatment that would not be tolerated here in any way and the difficulty of managing a relationship with the Soviet Union when such practices were so visible and nothing was done about them. There was a considerable discussion of the Pentacostalists in the Embassy. Dobrynin's only argument was that if people who came to an Embassy found that was the way out of a country, then the Embassy would be overwhelmed; and the President asked Dobrynin why it was that they were so anxious to keep people in the country who wanted to leave. The President developed his own point of view that this was a subject that he was perfectly ready to work at quietly and that results would be greeted with appreciation

but not with any sense of victory. He expressed his opposition to the Jackson-Vanik approach to this subject.

4. In the end, there was a considerable amount of time spent on the one hand in reviewing the scope of issues before us and in saying to each other that it was important to find operational ways to implement the desire of both the President and the General Secretary to solve problems reasonably and to the restatement of just that intention.

5. It seemed to me that Dobrynin was clearly impressed with this development. He was surprised that it happened. He said that he was honored, and it was a privilege to be received by the President. He commented that it just might <sup>possibly</sup> positively have been a historic occasion -- that whether we were talking about two years or six years, in either case it was quite possible to get things accomplished and that he would give Andropov a full and detailed report of the entire conversation.

In my discussion with Dobrynin after we left the President, Dobrynin picked up on the personal channel and suggested that a meeting between Shultz and Gromyko between the UN sessions would be a necessity if this relationship were to develop and that I ought to consider a trip to Moscow at some point so that I could have a lengthy session with Andropov. He also mentioned that when Gromyko comes for the UN session, we should consider returning to what he regarded as the traditional Gromyko call on the President.

PRESERVATION COPY

Shank  
RR

January 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William P. Clark

Subject: The Truth and The Strength of America's Deterrent

The Soviets make all their strategic decisions--whether to advance or retreat--on the basis of their assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of their opponents. The key element in this assessment is the adversary's strength of moral-political conviction--i.e., his will to use force if necessary to defend his vital interests. In practice, as the Soviets see it, this means the willingness of their opponent to speak plainly about the nature and goals of communism.

The Soviet system depends for its survival on the systematic suppression of the truth. This is done by imposing the ideological Party line to justify totalitarian rule and serve the internal security system by setting the standard against which deviationism is measured. Loyalty to the regime is thus determined by the capacity to affirm the falsehoods of the ideology. All must say that the USSR is a "workers' state" when it is not. Everyone must be a good courtier and tell the naked emperor that he is wearing nice clothes. The Soviets extend this principle to the world. Thus, the key feature of "Finlandization" is for the target country to censor itself--if not to lie outright, then at least to remain silent. In fact, the Soviets measure their dominance or influence over another country by that country's willingness to accommodate the USSR by censoring itself.

As the Soviets see it, to tell the truth about the USSR is to risk igniting their internal security threat--the threat of mass popular resistance to the ideology, as in Poland. Thus, their highest priority is to jam our broadcasts and to intimidate and induce NATO governments to "tone down their rhetoric" and censor themselves. Gromyko's main mission in his talks with Haig was to get us to do just that.

When stating that the Soviets will "lie," "cheat," and "commit any crime" to further their goals, you lifted a partial veil of self-censorship we had imposed on ourselves for some 15 years. In doing so, however, you showed the Soviets that we have the moral strength and political support to say that the emperor has no clothes and to withstand the protests of the Soviets and the "courtiers" in the media and elsewhere. Thus, by simply telling the truth, you incalculably strengthened the credibility of our military deterrent. All our weapons mean little unless the President shows he has the will to use them with the conviction that America has something worth defending. Normally, it has taken an act of considerable force to demonstrate this will. President Ford used the Mayaguez incident; President Nixon used bombing attacks in Vietnam to impress this on the Soviets. Yet, you did it in a non-military way--by having the courage to tell the truth about the Soviets. So long as our leaders deliver this message, the Soviets will know that we are not spiritually weak, that we are not Finlandized and that we have not permitted wishful thinking to obscure a clear understanding of Soviet intentions. They will be less inclined to make major strategic advances based on calculations of American weakness.

Prepared by: John Lenczowski  
Prospective replacement  
for Dr. Richard Pipes

Mr. President: ~~AVE~~

19 Feb 83  
1700 hrs

I attach the memorandum of conversation between Sec. Skultz and Amb. Dobrynin; spent the afternoon with Skultz, Eagleberger, Ender and Bud developing the attached points on Salvador. By Monday we will complete for your review:

- regional command in Panama or Key West
- increased military and intelligence presence
- military aid short of combat - war power act.
- new ambassador

WILLIAM P. CLARK, JR.

Bill