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Archivist: smf/smf
 FOIA ID: F2000-006 (Skinner)
 Date: 12/18/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	Clark to RR re Brezhnev's letter 1p <i>R 6/12/06 F00-006#1</i>	5/22/82	P1/B1
2. letter	Unofficial translation Brezhnev to RR 5p <i>R " " #2</i>	5/20/82	P1/B1
3. memo	Bremer to Clark re Brezhnev's reply 2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1#3</i>	5/21/82	P1/B1
4. memo	Situation Room Note 1p <i>D 6/22/01 NLSF00-006/1 #4</i>	6/11/82	P1/B1
5. draft statement	re Soviet Union 4p <i>R 6/12/06 F00-006#5</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
6. draft paper	re US-Soviet Summit (page 4 only) 1p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1#6</i>	n.d.	P1/B1
7. report	re Andropov 41p <i>D 1/23/02 NLSF2000-006/1 #7</i>	9/82	P1/B1/B3
8. memo	Wettering to Clark re State memo 1p <i>R 6/12/06 F00-006 #8</i>	11/30/82	P1/B1
9. memo	re Next Meeting with the Soviets 2p <i>R 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1#9</i>	11/27/82	P1/B1
10. cable	100721Z Dec 82 8p <i>P 11/28/01 NLSF2000-006/1#10</i>	12/10/82	^{81/} P1/B1/B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
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 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TALKING POINTS

Judge Clark's Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin
Sunday, February 21, 1982

Q: US-Soviet Relations: Why is the Reagan Administration bent on a course which will destroy what is left of detente?

A: The United States took seriously the terms of detente, including those spelled out in the Helsinki Final Act, but it was disappointed to see that the Soviet Union repeatedly violated both the spirit and letter of detente (e.g., assistance to North Vietnam in its conquest of South Vietnam, invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet and Cuban troops in Angola and Ethiopia, interference in Poland, all this accompanied by a steady military buildup). The American people were deeply disappointed with this course and gave President Reagan a mandate to establish a more equitable relationship. We are always ready to negotiate our differences with the Soviet Union, but not on terms which allow the Soviet Union to claim, "What is ours is ours, what is yours is negotiable" (President Kennedy).

Q: Poland: Why is the United States interfering in the internal affairs of Poland and introducing aggressive sanctions against the Soviet Union?

A: As a signatory of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Final Act, the Polish Government has committed itself to the community of nations to respect human rights in its country. Martial Law violates

these rights in the grossest manner: to protest such acts is not to interfere in internal Polish affairs but to call on the Polish Government to honor its solemn international obligations. As concerns the Soviet Union, there exists incontrovertible evidence that it has precipitated with its pressures the imposition of Martial Law in Poland and played an active part in its implementation.

Q: Arms Control: Why does the United States pose unrealistic demands at the INF talks and postpone the opening of START? Does this not signify a lack of serious interest in arms negotiations?

A: Not at all. Our current proposals in Geneva are based on a fair assessment of the existing force structures of both powers. The Soviet approach rests, by contrast, on an entirely one-sided calculation of U.S. and Soviet theater weapons. The Soviet offer of a "freeze" on existing TNF would unilaterally favor its own side. As concerns START, we were quite prepared to proceed this spring when the Polish Government, under Soviet pressure, imposed Martial Law. Since strategic arms talks must take place in an atmosphere of mutual trust, the present time does not favor such negotiations.

Q: China: Why is the United States arming China against the Soviet Union?

A: We have been very cautious in meeting Chinese requests for arms, but Soviet global activities,

including those in Southeast Asia, are very menacing. We view with sympathy the anxieties of the Chinese Government over its security. Such military assistance as we plan for the PRC is purely defensive in nature.

NOTE

I would suggest that Judge Clark not involve himself in any political discussions with Dobrynin other than those that touch on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. He need not feel compelled to involve himself in discussion of such subjects as the Middle East and Central America where Soviet interests are not directly involved. To do otherwise would be to concede that the USSR has a right to participate in the solution of regional problems all around the globe.

National Security Council
The White House

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Joh

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Bud McFarlane	2	<i>[initials]</i>	
Jacque Hill	3	<i>[initials]</i>	
Judge Clark	4		<i>[initials]</i>
John Poindexter			
Staff Secretary			
Sit Room			

I-Information A-Action R-Retain D-Dispatch

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

Other _____

COMMENTS

President's marginal notes.
5/24
Dick Pipes. pls analyze
Pres notes + do memo
[signature]

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

INFORMATION

May 22, 1982

*I made some marginal notes
RR*

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *Bill*

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's May 20 Letter to You

Brezhnev's letter (Tab A) is a reply to your May 7 message and repeats some of the salient points of his May 18' Komsomol Congress speech. He says your May 9 speech causes "apprehension" and even doubts as to US seriousness in approaching negotiations.

He criticizes negotiations on "any one component" with "no connection to others" -- probably referring to bombers and cruise missiles -- and claims that the "substantial" reductions we propose would be substantial only for the Soviet side. Brezhnev again called for preserving "positive" achievements so far -- meaning the essential elements of SALT II. He also repeated his call for a quantitative freeze on strategic arsenals and limiting modernization as soon as START begins. This does not seem to be a precondition for talks, but only to "create favorable conditions" for them. Brezhnev agreed that the time and venue for START be discussed in the "near future" through diplomatic channels.

Brezhnev felt compelled to come back at you on the matter of restraint in international affairs by stating that the Soviets expect restraint on our part. While noting "incessant (US) attacks" regarding the Soviet Union, he claimed to be seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation. The tone of the letter is cool and correct by Soviet standards.

Attachment

Tab A Letter from Brezhnev

Prepared by:
William Stearman

cc Vice President
Ed Meese
Jim Baker
Mike Deaver

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Review May 21, 1988

NLS F00-006 #1

~~SECRET~~ BY SM/, NARA, DATE 6/12/06



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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82 MAY 21 P11: 44

May 21, 1982 WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Message from President Brezhnev

The Russian Charge delivered this afternoon the attached letter from President Brezhnev to President Reagan replying to the President's message of May 7 on the START talks. We will forward to you our analysis shortly.

L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated.

~~SECRET~~

RDS-1 5/21/02

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By amp NARA, Date 12/5/00

Dear Mr. President,

With regard to your message to me of May 7, 1982 I would like above all to emphasize that the Soviet Union - the correspondence between us being a clear testimony thereof - has been steadily and persistently calling on the United States to agree on joint measures aimed at effectively bridling the arms race, first of all, in nuclear weapons.

We have been proceeding from the premise that only by moving along this path is it possible to achieve the objective of preventing a nuclear war, which would become an irreparable tragedy for all mankind.

Life itself puts questions of limitation and reduction of strategic arms in the center of Soviet-American relations. We have always favored increasingly radical steps in this direction. And it is not our fault that the strategic arms limitation process was interrupted for a long period of time.

History does not confirm?

References made to this or that event on the international scene cannot justify the lack of readiness on the part of the U.S. to resolve the issue which you yourself justly call one of critical importance for our two countries and the world at large. And the special responsibility of our two countries and their leaders in this respect is certainly not a thing that has emerged today. That responsibility existed in equal measure one year ago, a year and a half ago. On our part we always proceeded from this premise.

How come the last 35 years?

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NLS FOO-006 # 2

~~SECRET~~
RDS-1 5/20/02

BY SMF 6/12/06

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

If the U.S. side has now come to understand the need to resume negotiations on the problem of strategic arms, that in itself is a positive fact.

Our position of principle in favor of continuing such negotiations is surely well known to you. I can reaffirm that it has not changed. We agree that specific questions concerning the organizational aspect of those negotiations, including the time and venue for holding them, be discussed in the near future through diplomatic channels.

Speaking of the coming negotiations, one can be certain that a great deal of effort will be required to recoup for the time lost and the opportunities missed. But that must be done. Helpful in this respect can be, first, the preservation of whatever positive has already been achieved through the joint efforts of our two countries in the area of strategic arms limitation and, second, a genuinely serious willingness to seek a mutually acceptable agreement commensurate with the scope and significance of the truly historic task that stands before us.

In other words it is important that the negotiations be set on the right course from the very beginning, that they be conducted constructively without one side attempting to gain advantage in them at the expense of the other.

I deem it necessary to say it with all clarity, since the position with which the U.S., judging by your speech of May 9, is approaching the negotiations cannot but cause apprehension and even doubts as to the seriousness of the intentions of the U.S. side.

He must be kidding.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

After all, it is obvious that to isolate just any one component out of the totality of the strategic systems and to make it a subject of negotiations with no connection to the others, as you suggest, would inevitably lead to a distorted picture of the balance of forces between the sides. Thus, the "substantial" reductions the U.S. side is talking about on the basis of the picture it has itself presented would naturally be substantial only for the Soviet side.

*become
have the
most.
He means
imbalance.*

Only one thing would be the result of such a one-sided approach - an upsetting of the existing balance of forces and a breach of that very stability which the U.S. side is allegedly so anxious to ensure.

There should be no misunderstanding, Mr. President: this is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement. Besides, as you know, we are not the only ones who hold such a view.

We believe it is difficult to argue against the fact that, when it comes to matters touching upon national security, neither side can allow a tilt to be made in favor of the other and to the detriment of its legitimate interests. We are realists and do not expect that the United States would accept that. To an equal degree, it cannot be expected of the Soviet Union either. I consider it necessary to state this directly, with nothing omitted.

In your letter you mention that a possible agreement should be understandable and acceptable to the American people. But this does not make any more convincing the arguments for such an

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 4 -

approach which is clearly unacceptable to the USSR, to the Soviet people.

Taking this opportunity, I would like to say that I found it necessary also to express publicly in my speech on May 18, 1982 at the Komsomol Congress, our attitude toward such a one-sided approach and our opinion regarding the principles on which a genuinely fair and equitable agreement on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms should be based.

In doing so, I also stated the readiness of the Soviet Union to reach agreement with the United States to the effect that right now, as soon as the negotiations begin, the strategic nature of both countries be frozen quantitatively and that their modernization be limited to the utmost. Such agreement would, in our view, create favorable conditions for the negotiations and facilitate achieving the objectives therein. I would ask you, Mr. President, carefully to consider this proposal.

I have and it's an apple for an orchard.

I am convinced that the American people would understand and support an agreement between the USSR and the USA which would be based on the principle of equality and equal security, and which would meet the objective of mutual limitation and reduction of strategic arms, just as they have supported the previously reached agreements that you cited. Soviet people - and you can take my word for that - will resolutely support such an agreement.

How will they know? They haven't been told the truth for years.

And the last point. In our correspondence I have already spoken about to whom an appeal for restraint in international

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 5 -

affairs should be addressed. Since you raise that subject again, I shall only say, without repeating myself, that it is precisely of the U.S. that we, and indeed other countries, expect restraint and a constructive approach both to issues of bilateral relations and to fundamental international problems, above all to those related to limiting the arms race and strengthening common security.

We, of course, are giving and will continue to give a proper evaluation to unacceptable manifestations in U.S. policy as well as to the incessant attacks made regarding the Soviet Union. But we, on our part, have been seeking neither sharp polemics nor confrontation.

You may be assured, Mr. President, that a readiness to deal on an equal basis, to respect the interests of each other, and to develop mutual trust, will meet a most positive response on the part of the Soviet Union.

We will, as before, continue to do all we can so that people can look into the future with confidence and calm, without fearing for the threat of war which is not needed equally - I repeat, equally - either by the Soviet or the American people.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

*H-2 is a journal
of lengths.*

May 20, 1982

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National Security Council
The White House

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00 MAY 21 P 9: 20

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Jacque Hill	3	J	
Judge Clark	4		A
John Poindexter			
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Sit Room			

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cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver

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COMMENTS

Recommend putting in sat morn.
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~~Pres wants this folder~~
~~Shannon~~

attached at TAB B is state's
analysis need later don 5/22

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

May 21, 1982

~~SECRET~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

SIGNED

FROM: WILLIAM STEARMAN *WJ*

SUBJECT: Brezhnev's May 20 Letter to the President

At Tab I is a memorandum from you to the President which summarizes and analyzes Brezhnev's May 20 letter to the President (Tab A).

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I to the President.

Approve Disapprove

(Note: There is no one here this evening for concurrence.)

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum for the President
- Tab A Incoming letter from Brezhnev
- Tab B State's Analysis

~~SECRET~~

Review May 21, 1988

DECLASSIFIED
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997
By Smf NARA, Date 12/4/00



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

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82 MAY 21 P11: 40


MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSEWHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Brezhnev's Reply to the President's May 7 Letter

Soviet Chargé Aleksandr Bessmertnykh today gave Walt Stoessel Brezhnev's reply to the President's May 7 letter. The May 20 letter neither accepts nor rejects our proposed late-June date for beginning START. After self-righteously chastizing us for a year and a half of footdragging, however, Brezhnev does agree that diplomatic discussions should begin "in the near future" on the questions of time and venue for the talks. The Soviets probably do not want to appear to have jumped at our proposed date, but we expect they will ultimately agree to begin talks in the June-July period. Moscow may want to drag things out to permit a formal announcement when and if Gromyko and Secretary Haig meet in New York during the SSOD (probably the week of June 21). Bessmertnykh told Walt Stoessel that he hoped to have further instructions on Monday concerning a START starting date.

The bulk of Brezhnev's letter is devoted to an attack on our START proposal as presented in the President's Eureka speech, followed by a pitch in support of Brezhnev's May 18 proposal for a US-Soviet strategic weapons freeze. Brezhnev declares flatly that our proposal "is not a realistic position, not the path toward agreement." He claims that our approach, by singling out one aspect of the strategic equation (land-based missiles), would mean substantial reductions only for the Soviet side. He fails to acknowledge the President's subsequent assertions that "everything is negotiable," including bombers and cruise missiles, and the fact that the U.S. would have to make substantial cuts in sea-based missiles.

On the question of a freeze, Brezhnev makes the predictable argument that such an agreement would create "favorable conditions" for START negotiations, and calls on the President to give his proposal careful consideration. He makes clear that the proposal would limit modernization and not just freeze the number of strategic systems, which makes it all the more one-sided in the Soviets' favor.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary

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BY smf, NARA, DATE 11/28/01 ~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
RDS-1 5/21/02

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Bremer-Clark on Brezhnev's Reply to the President's May 7 Letter

Drafted: EUR/SOV: AVershbow ^N
5/21/82 x28040 (0248B)

Cleared: EUR/SOV: TWSimons, Jr. ^{N/A}
EUR: JDScanlan
EUR: RBurt ^{R/Burt}
D: WJStoessel, Jr. ^{Jr}

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

WC:

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OR 91

Since I want to discuss our plans & our continuing efforts to enhance the prospects for world peace, that is particularly necessary in view of the context?

~~There has been~~ some confusion ~~voiced~~ regarding my response to President Brezhnev's recent proposal for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviets suggesting a reduction to the threat of nuclear destruction, I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

It would leave the Soviet Union in a dangerous position of nuclear superiority while doing nothing to lessen the danger inherent in the tens of thousands of nuclear warheads now in place.

Earlier in this century the civilized world abided by rules of warfare that protected civilian populations from attack. Then came World War II and the barbarious concepts of "total war"; a repudiation of civilization itself. Now in the name of national security military strategy is based on the ability to incinerate by the millions, men, women, children -- the non-combatants of the world.

possibly at this time later

Are we incapable of returning to that earlier level of civilization we had once achieved? (~~No nation can afford, in today's world, to unilaterally give up such weapons.~~) * We can however *these monstrous inhumane weapons* by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce ~~them~~ in number. *No single nation can afford to take such action unilaterally but together we can,* I will wholeheartedly support and work for this to achieve a verifiable ~~reduction and~~ an equitable balance *at a greatly reduced number.* *When that is achieved we can then talk about an end to further production.*

Today on the Western European front the Soviets have 900 nuclear warheads mounted on 300 intermediate-range missiles. ~~These~~ ~~are~~ capable of reaching all of Western Europe, North Africa and the Middle East. *Our allies have nothing in the way of a deterrent to this threat.* We ~~therefore~~ are building nuclear weapons requested

by our European Allies to be deployed in Western Europe *to provide such* a deterrent.

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Historical File

NLS FOO-006 # 5

BY AMJ, NARA, DATE 6/12/06

Last November I proposed ^(INSTEAD) the total elimination of these weapons -- ours and theirs. Our representatives are in Geneva trying to negotiate such an agreement.

Here at home we are making plans for talks with the Soviet Union aimed at a substantial reduction of long-range strategic nuclear missiles both here and in the Soviet Union. If this can be achieved there must be mutual verification so as to eliminate suspicion and doubt.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an undertaking we just might bring the world to an advance in civilization.

I'm pleased to endorse a measure now before the Congress - the ~~bill~~ resolution introduced by Sen. Jackson, ~~Warner & others~~ which calls for ~~the~~ substantial reduction in all nuclear weapons.

There has been some confusion voiced regarding my response to Pres. Brezhnev's recent proposal ~~for~~ for a moratorium on nuclear missiles. While I welcome any overture by the Soviet suggesting a reduction ~~to~~ the threat of nuclear destruction I do not believe his proposal went far enough.

It would leave the Soviet U. in a dangerous position of nuclear superiority while doing nothing to lessen the danger inherent in the 10's of 1000's of nuclear warheads now in place.

Earlier in this century the civilized world abided by rules of warfare that protected civilian populations from attack. Then came W.W.II and the barbarous concept of "total war", a repudiation of civilization itself. Now in the name of national security military strategy is based on the ability to incinerate by the millions, men, women, children - the non-combatants of the world.

Are we incapable of returning to that earlier level of civilization we had once achieved? No nation can afford, in today's world, to unilaterally give up such weapons. We can however by sensible, mutual agreement substantially reduce them in number. I will wholeheartedly support a work for this to achieve ~~an equitable~~ verifiable reductions and an equitable balance.

Today on the Western European front the Soviets have 900 nuclear warheads mounted on 300 ~~missiles~~ intermediate range missiles. These are capable of reaching all of Western Europe, No. Africa & the Middle East. We in turn are building nuclear weapons requested by our European allies to be deployed in Western Europe as a deterrent.

Last Nov. I proposed the total elimination of these weapons - ours & theirs. Our representatives are in Geneva trying to negotiate such an agreement.

Here at home we are making plans for talks with the Soviet U. aimed at ~~reducing~~ a substantial ^(over)

Probably
just this
line later

reduction of long range strategic nuclear missiles
both here & in the Soviet U. If this can be
achieved there must be mutual verification so as to
eliminate suspicion & doubt.

If the Soviets will cooperate in such an
undertaking we just might bring the world to
an advance in civilization.

5. US-Soviet Summit

Nakasone remembered that he had suggested to President Reagan that a summit might be useful between the US and the Soviets. However, Nakasone now thought

that there are some unfavorable factors for such a summit meeting. For one thing,

his information sources indicate that Andropov's power base is fragile, being limited to just the central ~~region~~ ^{region} ~~region~~ ^{region} In regions away from Moscow, observed

Nakasone, Chernenko's power is formidable, in addition to that of the military establishment. This puts Andropov in the precarious position, ^{thus he is} ~~not being~~ able

to respond to the US in negotiations. According to his information source,

Nakasone believes that the Soviets believe that the Reagan strategy is scoring a success. The Soviet leadership is ^{looking for} ~~grouping~~ to what to give and what to take

in their relations with the US. In this context, ^[West's] a collective peace offensive may be effective. Yet, as to when and how such an offensive should take place

awaits President's decision. Nakasone urged the President to build a "foothold for such peace offensive," pushing ahead with the strong position that the President

had thrust forward. Nakasone opined that the Soviet Union would not begin to seriously negotiate with the US till after Pershing II is deployed.

6. China

The primin noted that he was aware of the Commerce Secretary B-oldridge's, and of Secstzate Shultz's China visits.

Because he regards relations

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MEMORANDUM

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

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November 30, 1982

WPC HAS SEEN

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: FRED WETTERING *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: State Memo on US/USSR Meeting on Africa

On November 27 State forwarded a Bremer-Clark memo advising you that the third in a series of meetings between us and the Soviets on Africa is scheduled for December 7 in Moscow. Chet Crocker will meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Ilichev. (S)

This was an idea of former Secretary Haig which I thought then and continue to think disingenious. The original idea was to level with the Soviets as to what we are trying to do in Angola and Namibia and ask them to support our efforts or at least not oppose them. Since there is no conceivable reason for the Soviets or the Cubans to do so, they have naturally ignored this and made some efforts to block our attempts to get the Cubans out of Angola. (S)

State has now seized upon the installation of a new Soviet leadership as the new rationale for continuing these talks. From my non-Soviet expert position, it strikes me that the Soviets should regard this overture as either naive in the extreme or else malicious insofar as we are rubbing their noses in a possible Soviet reverse in Africa. Nonetheless, I appreciate that once such a round of talks begins it is difficult to end without sending the wrong signals. The NSC Staff was not consulted when these began last year, this meeting has already been scheduled with Moscow, and I would not argue that it be cancelled at this point. I do believe you should ask Secretary Shultz or Bud ask Deputy Secretary Dam as to the value of further such meetings once (if) we hear the results of this one. (S)

The following is Dick Pipes' comment: I think this proposal is almost as promising as the abortive Afghanistan negotiations - let them come to us. (S)

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BY [Signature], NARA, DATE 6/12/06

Done per WPC

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We should use for immediate need - WPC

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90962

82 NOV 29 All: 03

NOVEMBER 27, 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Next Meeting with Soviets on Southern Africa

We have carried out a continuing dialogue with the Soviets on southern Africa over the past year, most recently in Secretary Shultz's meeting with Gromyko October 4 in New York. AF Assistant Secretary Chet Crocker will meet with them next in Moscow December 7.

The meeting takes place within a particular political context. The southern African negotiations themselves are now focused on obtaining Angolan agreement to Cuban troop withdrawal. It is not yet clear whether that is a decision the Angolans can make for themselves or whether the Soviets hold one key. Our previous sessions with the Soviets on southern Africa have been primarily informational briefings on our settlement effort, designed to induce a responsible approach on their part by denying them the ability to claim they were not informed.

Since Crocker has already met twice with his Soviet counterparts, another meeting would be compatible with the themes of consistency and steadiness which we are stressing in our contacts with the new Soviet leadership. It would also be further evidence of our intention to continue with all scheduled meetings and other diplomatic contacts during the transition period. This meeting would provide us an opportunity to draw the Soviets out on whether, and under what conditions, they might be willing to cooperate with our Angola/Namibia initiative. We could also make clear our readiness to respond positively to any constructive changes in Soviet behavior. This is a point we have been making both in the specific context of the Namibia/Angola issue and in our relations with Moscow more broadly.

For our part, we will continue to work with the area countries to achieve a political solution to the area's problems. But we should now probe Soviet willingness to play a constructive role in the southern African settlement process. Their response could be an indicator of whether the "new Soviet activism" means working with us on the regional issues of the agenda we have defined.

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
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Chet will be accompanied by Ambassador Hartman in Moscow and their meeting, coming only a few days before the NAC Ministerial, also provides us an opportunity to show the Europeans that we are pursuing specific problem-oriented discussion with the Soviets at this stage in Andropov's tenure. Southern Africa is a particularly appropriate area in which to be seen doing that since the Western Contact Group has a specific, collective interest in seeing that regional problem resolved apart from its East/West aspects.


L. Paul Bremer, III
Executive Secretary


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TAGS: PGOV, PINT, PEPR, HU, UR, XH
 SUBJECT: ANDROPOV IN HUNGARY -- AN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

1. ~~(C)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IT IS AS DIFFICULT TO FIND TRACES IN TODAY'S BUDAPEST OF THE YURIY ANDROPOV WHO SERVED AS THE SOVIET UNION'S AMBASSADOR AT THE TIME OF THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION OF 1956 AS IT IS TO VENTURE WITH ANY DEGREE OF CERTAINTY AN OPINION ON WHAT THOSE DRAMATIC TIMES MEANT FOR THE CHARACTER AND THE CAREER OF THE NEW KREMLIN LEADER. WE HAVE SOUGHT TO TRACK HIM AND THOSE EXPERIENCES THROUGH INTERVIEWS WITH SOME OF THE HUNGARIANS STILL LIVING HERE WHO KNEW HIM WELL THEN, AS WELL AS BY CONSULTING THE MEMOIRS OF OTHER HUNGARIANS LIVING OUTSIDE THEIR HOMELAND AND THE PUBLISHED LITERATURE. THE PICTURE THAT COMES THROUGH TO US IS OF A HIGHLY INTELLIGENT, ADAPTABLE MAN, NEITHER "REFORMER" NOR "CONSERVATIVE," WHO IS CAPABLE OF ANALYZING A SITUATION AND ACTING UPON IT. HIS WAS AN IMPORTANT BUT NOT DECISIVE ROLE IN HUNGARY'S DAYS OF TRAGEDY. OTHER, BIGGER MEN FROM THE

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POLITBURO WERE MAKING THE DECISIONS. BUT ANDROPOV PRESUMABLY GAINED THE HIGHEST MARKS FOR HIS RECOMMENDATIONS, AND HIS CAREER WAS ADVANCED BY A CALAMITY WHICH COULD WELL HAVE MEANT HIS RUIN. SOME OF THIS MUST BE ATTRIBUTED TO GOOD CONNECTIONS WHICH NO DOUBT WERE INDEPENDENT OF HIS HUNGARIAN ACTIVITIES, BUT SOME OF IT PROBABLY RESULTED FROM ASSESSMENTS HE SUBMITTED TO THE KREMLIN LEADERSHIP, THE VALIDITY OF WHICH WERE PROVEN BY EVENTS.

3. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO KNOW WHAT MADE THE STRONGEST IMPRESSION UPON ANDROPOV. HE WITNESSED A DEMONSTRATION THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MILITARY FORCE CAN BE APPLIED WITH BRUTAL EFFECTIVENESS. HE ALSO CARRIED BACK WITH HIM TO MOSCOW, HOWEVER, THE KNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIET EFFORTS TO IMPOSE A RIGID SINGLE PATTERN UPON OTHER STATES WITHOUT REGARD TO THE SENSITIVITIES OF THE PEOPLE CONCERNED OR THE POLITICAL REALITIES RISKS A HIGHLY VOLATILE NATIONAL REACTION. THE MAN THE HUNGARIANS BELIEVE THEY CAME TO KNOW A QUARTER CENTURY AGO AND HAVE CONTINUED TO SEE IN HIS INCREASINGLY MORE RESPONSIBLE KREMLIN MANIFESTATIONS, AT ANY RATE, IS ONE WHOSE MIND IS AT LEAST OPEN ENOUGH TO SEEK PACTS THAT DO NOT ALWAYS BUTTRESS PRECONCEPTIONS. SUCH A MAN MAY BE RELATIVELY ACCESSIBLE FOR SERIOUS DISCUSSION ABOUT WHAT COURSE OF ACTION IS REALLY THE ONE THAT IS MOST IN THE SOVIET NATIONAL INTEREST. END SUMMARY.

THE BACKGROUND

4. AS IS WELL KNOWN, ANDROPOV SPENT FOUR YEARS IN HUNGARY. HE CAME AS MINISTER, THE EMBASSY'S NUMBER TWO MAN, IN 1953, WAS PROMOTED TO AMBASSADOR IN 1954 WHEN HE WAS SCARCELY 40, AND RETURNED TO MOSCOW IN EARLY 1957 WHERE HE CONTINUED HIS INVOLVEMENT WITH HUNGARIAN AFFAIRS FIRST AS HEAD OF THE OFFICE WITHIN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE DEALING WITH EASTERN EUROPE AND, AFTER 1962, AS THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE SECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR RELATIONS WITH RULING COMMUNIST PARTIES. HIS DIRECT INVOLVEMENT WITH HUNGARY BECAME MUCH LESS. WE ARE TOLD, AFTER 1967 WHEN HE ASSUMED LEADERSHIP OF THE KGB.

5. MOST OF THOSE WHO KNEW HIM IN HUNGARY ARE NOW DEAD, OUT OF THE COUNTRY, OR OTHERWISE NOT INCLINED TO TALK TO WESTERNERS ABOUT THEIR RECOLLECTIONS OF THOSE DAYS. IN PREPARING THIS REPORT, WE SPOKE AT LENGTH (PROTECT) WITH ANDRAS HEGEDUS, WHO IS NOW A DISSIDENT MARXIST, BUT IN 1955-1956 WAS THE COUNTRY'S PRIME MINISTER, AND WITH IVAN BOLDIZSAR, A FORMER DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER, NOW AN ESTABLISHMENT INTELLECTUAL BUT IN THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE OCTOBER 1956 EXPLOSION EDITOR OF ONE OF THE BRASH JOURNALS CALLING FOR REFORM OF THE STILL STALINIST HUNGARIAN SYSTEM. WE HAVE DRAWN UPON INTERVIEWS BROADCAST BY RFE IN RECENT WEEKS WITH SEVERAL PARTICIPANTS IN THE EVENTS OF '56 WHO KNEW ANDROPOV AT THE TIME AND NOW LIVE IN THE WEST, INCLUDING SANDOR KOPACSI, THE FORMER POLICE CHIEF OF BUDAPEST, AND BELA KIRALY, THE COMMANDER OF THE HUNGARIAN NATIONAL MILITIA DURING THE REVOLUTION. WE HAVE ALSO CONSULTED MAJOR SECONDARY SOURCES, INCLUDING BRITISH HISTORIAN DAVID IRVING'S MASSIVE "REVOLUTION IN HUNGARY," WHICH APPEARED IN 1981, AND WHICH DRAWS UPON A NUMBER OF PRIMARY SOURCES NOT READILY AVAILABLE TO US.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

6. ANDROPOV'S CHARM AND APPARENTLY OPEN AND CANDID DEMEANOR SEEM TO HAVE IMPRESSED EVERYONE. EVEN KIRALY, WHO IN RETROSPECT CONSIDERED THAT HE ALWAYS "PLAYED WITH FALSE CARDS," NOTED THAT ANDROPOV STOOD OUT WITH HIS ELEGANT CLOTHES AND THAT WHEN HE FIRST MET HIM HIS INITIAL IMPRESSION WAS THAT "WE ARE TWO MEN" WHO CAN TALK WITH EACH OTHER. KOPACSI

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RECALLED THAT "HE WAS ALWAYS QUIET SPOKEN AND WELL-DRESSED, ALWAYS POLITE TO THE LADIES, AN URBANE MAN, DIFFERENT FROM THE OTHER SOVIET BUREAUCRATS. HE DIDN'T WANT TO CLUB YOU DOWN IN DISCUSSIONS BUT RATHER TO TRY TO CONVINCE YOU." BOLDIZSAR RECALLED THAT HE WAS HIGHLY VISIBLE AT DIPLOMATIC RECEPTIONS BOTH BECAUSE OF THE GENIALITY OF HIS SMILE AND BECAUSE HE WAS WILLING TO SPEAK ENGLISH.

7. HEGEDUS' IMPRESSIONS OF WHAT MADE ANDROPOV DIFFERENT WENT DEEPER. HE VIEWED ANDROPOV AS ALMOST UNIQUE AMONG THE SOVIETS WITH WHOM HE DEALT FOR HAVING ARRIVED IN HUNGARY WITHOUT PRECONCEPTIONS. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE BRIEFING PAPERS HE HAD BEEN GIVEN TO READ IN MOSCOW MADE HIM AN EXPERT, AND HE SET ABOUT TO LEARN THE LOCAL SCENE BOTH THROUGH DISCUSSIONS WITH LOCAL LEADERS AND MEETINGS WITH WORKERS AND FARMERS. ANDROPOV'S MUCH VAUNTED KNOWLEDGE OF HUNGARIAN WAS AN EXAMPLE OF THIS. HE ATTEMPTED TO LEARN THE LANGUAGE AND DID COME TO SPEAK IT REASONABLY WELL. HE TOLD HEGEDUS HE WAS ASSISTED BY THE KNOWLEDGE HE PICKED UP OF KARELIAN, ONE OF THE FEW LINGUISTIC COUSINS OF HUNGARIAN, DURING HIS WAR-TIME SERVICE. HEGEDUS ACCOMPANIED HIM ON MANY OF THESE VISITS TO FACTORIES AND COOPERATIVES AND WAS A WITNESS TO HIS ABILITY TO GET ACROSS TO COMMON PEOPLE. OUR IMPRESSION IS, HOWEVER, THAT ANDROPOV, LIKE SO MANY FOREIGNERS, GAINED POINTS WITH THE HUNGARIANS MORE FOR TRYING TO LEARN THE LANGUAGE THAN FOR FLUENCY. HEGEDUS SAID THAT HE USUALLY TRANSLATED FOR THE SOVIET DURING THESE DISCUSSIONS.

IS HE AN INTELLECTUAL?

8. ONE SLIGHTLY PUZZLING FEATURE IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE ANDROPOV IMAGE WE HAVE PUT TOGETHER FITS WITH THE IMAGE OF AN INTELLECTUAL THAT SOME PRESS ACCOUNTS HAVE CONVEYED. BOLDIZSAR IN FACT DESCRIBED HIM AS AN INTELLECTUAL. BUT THIS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN BASED PRIMARILY ON THE FACILITY OF HIS MIND AND THE FACT THAT HE IS KNOWN, FOR EXAMPLE, TO READ WESTERN PAPERS SUCH AS THE HERALD TRIBUNE DAILY. THE YEARS LEADING UP TO THE OCTOBER 1956 EXPLOSION, PARTICULARLY THE FINAL MONTHS, FEATURED EXTRAORDINARY INTELLECTUAL FERMENT IN HUNGARY. YOUNG WRITERS LIKE BOLDIZSAR HIMSELF AND MANY OTHERS WHO SERVED AS ADVISERS TO IMRE NAGY PLAYED A VITAL ROLE IN CREATING THE CLIMATE WHICH MADE THE REVOLUTION POSSIBLE. YET BOLDIZSAR APPARENTLY SAW ANDROPOV ONLY AT RECEPTIONS, DID NOT KNOW HIM VERY WELL AND WAS NOT AWARE OF CONTACTS HE HAD MADE WITH INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES. HEGEDUS, HIMSELF AT THAT TIME CLOSELY ALLIED WITH RAKOSI, HUNGARY'S LITTLE STALIN, CLAIMS TO HAVE KEPT CLOSE PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS BASED ON UNIVERSITY TIES WITH MANY OF THE INTELLECTUALS IN THE INFLUENTIAL AND INCREASINGLY RADICAL "PETOFI CIRCLE," BUT HE ALSO COULD RECALL NO ANDROPOV INTEREST IN THIS DIRECTION. THE PICTURE WE GET, THEREFORE, IS OF AN INTELLIGENT BUT STILL FAIRLY NARROW MAN WHO CONCENTRATED ON TRADITIONAL POLITICAL AREAS--THE PARTY AND POLITICIANS-- AND NEITHER SHOWED MUCH INTEREST IN INTELLECTUALS FOR THEIR OWN SAKE NOR FULLY APPRECIATED AT THAT TIME HOW SIGNIFICANTLY INTELLECTUAL FERMENT COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO MEANINGFUL POLITICAL ACTION.

YOUNG EXPERT OR DECISION MAKER?

9. ANDROPOV ALSO STOOD OUT AT THE TIME BECAUSE OF HIS SELF-CONFIDENCE. HE CAME TO BUDAPEST AS A YOUNG MAN, AND WHEN HE LEFT, HE HAD NOT YET ACHIEVED EVEN CENTRAL COMMITTEE RANK. (HE WAS MADE A MEMBER OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE, OF COURSE, ONLY IN 1961 AND OF THE POLITBURO ANOTHER 12 YEARS LATER.) YET HE ALWAYS HAD ABOUT HIM, ACCORDING TO HEGEDUS, THE AURA OF A MAN WHO ALREADY HAD EXCELLENT CENTRAL COMMITTEE CONNECTIONS. THE SUGGESTION IS THAT HIS SELF-ASSURANCE ALSO

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CARRIED OVER INTO THE TYPE OF RECOMMENDATIONS HE FELT ABLE TO MAKE TO HIS SUPERIORS ABOUT EVENTS IN HUNGARY. HE WAS, HOWEVER, ONLY MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS, NOT BASIC DECISIONS. HEGEDUS RECALLED THAT HE WAS SEEN IN MOSCOW AS THE SOVIET EXPERT ON THE SPOT, BUT AT CRUCIAL MOMENTS MORE POWERFUL FIGURES INEVITABLY ARRIVED FROM THE KREMLIN. THE STORIES OF SUSLOV AND MIKOYAN SHUTTling BETWEEN MOSCOW AND BUDAPEST IN THE LAST WEEK OF OCTOBER 1956 AND TRAVELING THE STREETS OF THE HUNGARIAN CAPITAL IN SOVIET TANKS TO MEETINGS WITH IMRE NAGY ARE WELL KNOWN. AT EARLIER PERIODS OF INTERNAL POLITICAL CRISIS, HOWEVER, NOTABLY AT THE PERIOD LEADING UP TO RAKOSI'S SECOND FALL FROM POWER IN SUMMER 1956, SUSLOV AND MIKOYAN AGAIN WERE ON THE SCENE TO HANDLE THE DECISIONS OR PASS THE FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS BACK TO KHRUSCHEV AND THE POLITBURO.

MADRID FOR CSCE DEL

USNATO ALSO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

ANDROPOV AT WORK

10. THE PICTURE OF THE TYPE OF ADVICE THAT ANDROPOV WAS FORMULATING IS MURKY. WE FOUND PARTICULARLY INTRIGUING, HOWEVER, THE FOLLOWING RECOLLECTION ATTRIBUTED BY IRVING TO A SOVIET OFFICIAL, VASSILY R. ZITNIKOV, WITH WHOM HE MET IN MOSCOW IN 1978 WHILE PREPARING HIS BOOK (THE TRANSLATION IS OUR INFORMAL ONE FROM THE GERMAN EDITION):

"WHEN I WAS A QUITE YOUNG DIPLOMAT, IN THE FIRST SEMESTER OF THE DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY IN SPRING 1957, THERE APPEARED TO OUR ASTONISHMENT THE FORMER AMBASSADOR ANDROPOV WHO GAVE US AN HOUR AND A HALF LECTURE OVER THE EVENTS IN BUDAPEST AND HIS ROLE IN THEM. ANDROPOV HAD ONLY SHORTLY BEFORE BEEN RECALLED FROM BUDAPEST. I AND THE OTHER TWENTY PRESENT WERE AMAZED. NO RECORD WAS KEPT OF WHAT WAS SAID. WITH AN ENERGETIC DemeanOR, ANDROPOV WENT ON: 'IN THE LIFE OF A DIPLOMAT ONE MUST BE PREPARED FOR EVERYTHING, SOMETHING LIKE THAT CAN ALSO HAPPEN TO YOU GENTLEMEN AS FUTURE AMBASSADORS'. HE LET US KNOW QUITE OPENLY THAT HE HAD MADE MISTAKES. HE WANTED TO SPEAK THE TRUTH ABOUT IT IN THIS SMALL CIRCLE.' 'TO ASCRIBE THE GUILT FOR THE REVOLUTION TO THE HUNGARIANS OR EVEN TO THE WESTERN POWERS ISN'T RIGHT,' ANDROPOV SAID. 'WE RUSSIANS ALSO HAVE TO BEAR A SHARE OF THE GUILT.'"

11. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ONE OF THE MISTAKES TO WHICH ANDROPOV WAS ALLUDING WAS HIS OWN APPARENT FAILURE TO APPRECIATE EARLY ENOUGH THE SIGNIFICANCE OF INTELLECTUAL DISSENT. IF SO, THIS MAY BE RELEVANT TO HIS LATER DEALINGS AT THE KGB WITH SOVIET DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS AND TO HIS PRESENT ATTITUDE TOWARD DISSENTERS. HEGEDUS, HOWEVER, SAID THAT HE ALSO HAD PONDERED THE QUOTATION AND HAD CONCLUDED THAT WHAT ANDROPOV PROBABLY CONSIDERED THE BIGGEST SOVIET MISTAKE, PRESUMABLY CONSISTENT WITH ADVICE THEN COMING FROM ANDROPOV, WAS THE DECISION TO DEPOSE IMRE NAGY'S FIRST MODERATELY REFORMIST GOVERNMENT IN 1955 AND ALLOW RAKOSI TO RETURN TO POWER WITH HEGEDUS HIMSELF AS PRIME MINISTER. HAD NAGY BEEN PERMITTED TO CONTINUE TO DO AWAY WITH THE STALINIST EXCESSES AND TO BEGIN IN A SMALL WAY SOME OF THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL REFORMS WHICH KADAR LATER INTRODUCED YEARS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, THE TRAGEDY OF 1956 MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED. AS IT WAS, THE LID WAS CLAMPED DOWN AGAIN AND PRESSURE BUILT UP TO AN EXPLOSIVE LEVEL.

12. THERE ARE INDICATIONS, HOWEVER, THAT ANDROPOV MUST HAVE REALIZED FAIRLY EARLY ON THAT A MISTAKE HAD BEEN MADE. BY THE FIRST HALF OF 1956, THERE WERE TWO GROUPS WITHIN THE HUNGARIAN PARTY THAT OPPOSED RAKOSI, ONE WAS FORMED

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AROUND IMRE NAGY, WHICH TENDED TO BE THE MORE RADICAL AND UNPREDICTABLE (BUT THE MORE POPULAR) BOTH BECAUSE OF THE PRESTIGE NAGY HAD AMASSED DURING HIS FIRST TERM IN OFFICE AND BECAUSE IT INCLUDED MANY OF THE ALREADY-MENTIONED DISAFFECTED INTELLECTUALS. THE OTHER WAS GROUPED AROUND THE THEN RELATIVELY OBSCURE, PURGED INTERIOR MINISTER WHO HAD EXPERIENCED RAKOSI'S JAIL CELLS AND WAS THEN PARTY SECRETARY OF ONE OF BUDAPEST'S DISTRICTS, JANOS KADAR. BOLDIZSAR RECALLED ANDROPOV AS SYMPATHETIC TO NAGY. HEGEDUS, FROM A CLOSER BUT ALSO A MORE PERSONALLY INVOLVED PERSPECTIVE, BELIEVED THAT ANDROPOV HAD LESS CONFIDENCE IN THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER.

13. AT ANY EVENT, IT WOULD APPEAR THAT ANDROPOV SPENT MUCH OF THE FIRST HALF OF THE YEAR LOOKING FOR THE PERSON OR PERSONS WHO MIGHT BE ABLE TO RESCUE THE HUNGARIAN PARTY'S SITUATION AND BEST SERVE SOVIET INTERESTS AND THAT DURING THIS PERIOD HE CALLED KADAR TO THE ATTENTION OF THE MOSCOW LEADERSHIP. ONCE AGAIN HIS VIEWS APPARENTLY REQUIRED CHECKING SINCE IRVING REPORTS, ALLEGEDLY ON THE BASIS OF NOW DECLASSIFIED AMERICAN GOVERNMENT MATERIALS, THAT SUSLOV WAS INTERVIEWING KADAR IN EARLY SUMMER 1956.

14. THE LIMITED AUTHORITY ANDROPOV HIMSELF WIELDED IS DEMONSTRATED IN THE FALL OF RAKOSI. THE HUNGARIAN DICTATOR, IN A DESPARATE ATTEMPT TO SAVE HIS POSITION, PROPOSED TO HIS POLITBURO ON JULY 16, 1956 THE ARREST OF NAGY AND SOME 400-500 OTHER COMMUNISTS AND THE SUSPENSION OF MUCH OF THE INCREASINGLY OUTSPOKEN PRESS. THE POLITBURO ADJOURNED WITHOUT TAKING A DECISION, AND ANDROPOV WAS INFORMED. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR APPARENTLY SENT AN URGENT MESSAGE TO MOSCOW, WHICH BROUGHT MIKOYAN BY SPECIAL PLANE TO BUDAPEST WHERE, THE FOLLOWING DAY, HE TOLD RAKOSI THAT HE WOULD HAVE TO STEP DOWN. THE NAGY OPPOSITION, HOWEVER, WAS PRESERVED, NOT PROMOTED. ERNO GERO, PREVIOUSLY AN ALLY OF RAKOSI AND VERY MUCH AN OLD-STYLE DOCTRINAIRE COMMUNIST, BECAME FIRST SECRETARY. KADAR WAS MOVED FORWARD BUT ONLY TO BECOME ONE OF THE PARTY SECRETARIES AND MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO.

MADRID FOR CSCE DEL

USNATO ALSO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

15. IN RETROSPECT THIS COMPROMISE LOOKS LIKE ANOTHER MISTAKE SINCE KADAR WAS PLACED CLOSER TO BUT NOT IN POWER AND GERO WAS NOT DIFFERENT ENOUGH FROM KAKOSI TO HALT THE SLIDE INTO REVOLUTION. HEGEDUS PROFESSES NOT TO KNOW WHETHER ANDROPOV RECOMMENDED THE HALF-WAY MEASURE OR SOUGHT AT THAT TIME TO PUT KADAR IN CHARGE, BUT HE DOES SAY THAT ANDROPOV WAS PUSHING KADAR'S CASE AND THAT THE RECOMMENDATION TO BRING HIM INTO THE POLITBURO, IN THE CONTEXT OF THOSE DAYS, WAS A BOLD ONE. KADAR THUS BECAME THE FIRST OF THE NATIONAL COMMUNISTS IMPRISONED DURING THE EARLY 1950'S TO BE FULLY REHABILITATED AND RESTORED TO A POSITION OF MAJOR RESPONSIBILITY. IT IS AT LEAST CONCEIVABLE THAT PART OF THE REASON WHY ANDROPOV'S CAREER DOES NOT SEEM TO HAVE SUFFERED FROM THE FACT THAT "HIS" COUNTRY BLEW UP DURING HIS STEWARDSHIP IS THAT MONTHS BEFORE THE CRISIS HE WAS URGING A STILL CAUTIOUS MOSCOW LEADERSHIP TO RELY UPON THE MAN WHO, FROM MOSCOW'S LATER POINT OF VIEW, EVENTUALLY PROVED HIMSELF TO BE THE CORRECT CHOICE. IF SO, THE OBLIGATIONS THAT APPEAR TO BE SO DEEP BETWEEN KADAR AND ANDROPOV CUT TWO WAYS. EACH WAS OF CRUCIAL ASSISTANCE TO THE OTHER.

THE REVOLUTION COMES

16. DURING THE DRAMATIC DAYS OF REVOLUTION, ANDROPOV'S

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ROLE WAS CLEARLY A SECONDARY ONE. HE PASSED MESSAGES, SERVING AS A TRANSMISSION BELT BETWEEN THE NAGY GOVERNMENT AND THE KREMLIN. IN THIS FUNCTION HE CERTAINLY ACTED FOR A NUMBER OF DAYS AS A DECEIVER SINCE IT CAN BE ASSUMED THAT AT LEAST FROM NOVEMBER 1 HE WAS AWARE THAT HIS EXPLANATIONS TO THE ANXIOUS PRIME MINISTER ABOUT THE MOTIVES FOR SOVIET TROOP MOVEMENTS DID NOT HONESTLY REFLECT SOVIET INTENTIONS. THE NAGY CABINET'S OBVIOUS DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO BELIEVE HIS ASSURANCES PROBABLY HELPED, BUT HIS ABILITY TO CONVEY A SENSE OF CANDOR STOOD HIM IN CONSIDERABLE STEAD. ACCORDING TO KIRALY, HE WAS IN NAGY'S OFFICE IN THE PRE-DAWN HOURS OF NOVEMBER 4 STILL CONVEYING REASSURANCES EVEN AS SOVIET TROOPS BEGAN THEIR DECISIVE ATTACKS. KIRALY NOTED THAT ANDROPOV'S WILLINGNESS TO STAY IN WHAT WAS IN EFFECT THE ENEMY'S CAMP TO THE LAST MINUTE, WHEN HE COULD WELL HAVE BEEN IN PERSONAL DANGER, REVEALS ANOTHER SIDE OF HIS CHARACTER, NAMELY PHYSICAL IF NOT MORAL COURAGE.

17. A SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIAL, HOWEVER, EMPHASIZED THAT ANDROPOV THROUGHOUT WAS CARRYING OUT INSTRUCTIONS, NOT PULLING THE STRINGS. HIS VIEW IS BUTTRESSED BY THE FACTS THAT BOTH SUSLOV AND MIKOYAN ARE KNOWN TO HAVE VISITED BUDAPEST TWICE IN THE CRUCIAL FIRST WEEK AND THAT THE DECISION TO INTERVENE WAS TAKEN AFTER THEIR RETURN TO MOSCOW. ANDROPOV PRESUMABLY WAS NOT A DISSENTER FROM THE RECOMMENDATIONS THEY MADE, BUT IT IS INTERESTING THAT KHRUSCHEV, WHOSE MEMOIRS WERE WRITTEN WITHOUT ACCESS TO OFFICIAL RECORDS AND THUS MAY ALL THE MORE ACCURATELY CONVEY FUNDAMENTAL IMPRESSIONS IF NOT PRECISE DETAILS, DOES NOT EVEN MENTION A BUDAPEST COMPONENT TO THE SOVIET DECISION-MAKING PROCESS HE DESCRIBES AT LENGTH. THE PROBABILITY THAT ANDROPOV WAS NOT AT THE POWER CENTER DURING THE TRAGIC NOVEMBER DAYS IS INCREASED BY REPORTS UNEARTHED BY IRVING THAT HE PROFESSED, AGAIN APPARENTLY WITH CONVICTION, TO BE UNABLE TO ASSIST THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY ON RELATIVELY SMALL MATTERS IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE INVASION BECAUSE EVERYTHING WAS THEN IN THE HANDS OF THE SOVIET MILITARY.

18. ANDROPOV'S MOST IMPORTANT FUNCTION DURING THE REVOLUTION, THEREFORE, BEYOND PROVIDING DECEPTIVE COVER, WAS PROBABLY ONCE AGAIN TO IDENTIFY KADAR AS A MAN WHO COULD BE USED TO HELP BRING THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL AND THEN TO PERSUADE HIM ON THE DRAMATIC FIRST DAY OF NOVEMBER TO CAST HIS LOT WITH THE SOVIETS AND AGAINST THE NAGY GOVERNMENT OF WHICH HE WAS A MEMBER. THAT ANDROPOV STUCK TO HIS CHOICE OF KADAR AND WON HIM OVER ON THE SAME DAY AS KADAR, ACCORDING TO APPARENTLY SOLID ACCOUNTS, DEFIED THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO HIS FACE AND SWORE HIS READINESS TO FIGHT WITH HIS OWN HANDS AGAINST SOVIET TANKS. SPEAKS FOR ANDROPOV'S ABILITY TO ASSESS A SITUATION AND PURSUE HIS GOALS COOLY WITHOUT LETTING PERSONAL PASSIONS OVERLY INFLUENCE HIM. BOLDIZSAR RECALLS THAT ANDROPOV, HAVING WON KADAR OVER, ALSO PUT THE FULL WEIGHT OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP BEHIND HIM AT A KEY CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING IN DECEMBER 1956 WHEN HARDER LINE ELEMENTS IN THE HUNGARIAN PARTY SOUGHT TO TAKE OVER.

MADRID FOR CSCE DEL

USNATO ALSO FOR THE SECRETARY'S PARTY

19. FOR TEN YEARS AFTER HIS DEPARTURE FROM BUDAPEST, ANDROPOV IS BELIEVED BY HEGEDUS TO HAVE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT KADAR'S LINE. HE THUS WAS INFLUENTIAL IN GAINING SOVIET ACCEPTANCE FOR THE NEW ECONOMIC MECHANISM THAT KADAR AND HIS EXPERTS WERE PREPARING FROM THE MIDDLE '60'S. BOLDIZSAR ADDS THAT SUSLOV, WHOM ANDROPOV HAD INTRODUCED TO KADAR, ALSO THREW HIS SUPPORT INTO THE SCALES. IN THE CASE OF BOTH MEN, IT WAS PRESUMABLY LESS A MATTER

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OF BEING ADVOCATES OF THE PARTICULAR MEASURES WHICH THE HUNGARIANS DESIRED TO IMPLEMENT THAN OF BEING CONVINCED THAT THE LEADER THEY HAD IDENTIFIED AND WON ACCEPTANCE FOR IN THE POLITBURO COULD BE TRUSTED TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP HUNGARY FROM AGAIN BECOMING A SOVIET PROBLEM. KIRILENKO, ON THE OTHER HAND, IS DESCRIBED BY BOLDIZSAR AS THE LEADER WHOM IN THOSE DAYS HUNGARIANS ASSOCIATED WITH SOVIET DOUBTS ABOUT KADAR'S PERFORMANCE. BY THE TIME THAT THE HUNGARIAN REFORMS WERE ACTUALLY INTRODUCED, IN 1968, AND CZECHOSLOVAK REFORMS WERE BEING SUPPRESSED, ANDROPOV WAS IN HIS NEW KGB JOB WHERE HIS INFLUENCE ON DAY-TO-DAY EVENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE WAS PERCEIVED BY THE HUNGARIANS TO BE MUCH REDUCED.

20. COMMENT: OUR EXCURSION INTO HISTORY HAS LEFT US WITH AN APPROPRIATE WARINESS ABOUT HOW MUCH CAN BE EXTRAPOLATED INTO THE PRESENT. ONE OF OUR BEST SOURCES FOR MUCH OF THE ABOVE, HEGEDUS, ACKNOWLEDGES RUEFULLY THAT HIS OWN THOUGHT PROCESSES HAVE CHANGED GREATLY IN THE MORE THAN A QUARTER-CENTURY SINCE HE KNEW THE YOUNG ANDROPOV, AND IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE NEW SOVIET LEADER ALSO HAS CHANGED CONSIDERABLY. NEVERTHELESS, A FEW OBSERVATIONS DO SUGGEST THEMSELVES.

21. THE ANDROPOV WHOSE IMAGE WE HAVE GLIMPSED FROM HERE IS PROBABLY NO MORE A MACHIAVELLIAN TYRANT BECAUSE HE SAT IN THE SOVIET EMBASSY WHEN HUNGARY'S SPONTANEOUS POPULAR REVOLUTION WAS CRUSHED BY SOVIET TROOPS THAN HE IS A LIBERAL BECAUSE HE IS PERCEIVED BY MANY HUNGARIANS TO BE A FRIEND OF THEIR OWN REFORM COURSE. HE COMES THROUGH RATHER AS AN EXTREMELY INTELLIGENT, COMPETENT, HIGHLY POLITICAL MAN WITH A CAPACITY TO SEARCH OUT FACTS, DRAW CONCLUSIONS FROM THEM, AND ACT CONSEQUENTIALLY AND SOMETIMES BOLDLY UPON THEM. WE SAW NO SIGNS THAT HE BREATHED THE CHAMPAGNE AIR OF THE DANUBE LONG ENOUGH TO BECOME TRULY COMMITTED TO SIGNIFICANT ECONOMIC REFORM MUCH LESS OPEN TO THE VALUE OF COMPETING IDEAS AND INTELLECTUAL FREEDOMS GENERALLY. INDEED, IF THE PERSONAL BOND WITH KADAR WERE TO BE BROKEN BY DEATH OR DISABILITY, THERE MIGHT BE REASON TO SUSPECT THAT HIS TOLERATION LEVEL OF HUNGARIAN EXPERIMENTS WOULD CHANGE. ON THE OTHER HAND, AS ONE SENIOR HUNGARIAN PARTY OFFICIAL PERSONALLY COMMITTED TO EXPANDING THE REFORM HERE IN THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS ECONOMIC SPHERES TOLD US, IT IS SIGNIFICANT THAT ANDROPOV EXPERIENCED AT FIRST HAND NOT ONLY THE HUNGARIAN REVOLUTION BUT THE RAKOSI ERA AND THUS KNOWS HOW DANGEROUS IT IS FOR THE SOVIETS TO SEEK TO IMPOSE TOO RIGID A PATTERN OF THEIR OWN UPON THEIR ALLIES.

22. THE ANDROPOV WHO HAS BEEN REVEALED TO HUNGARIANS (AT LEAST THOSE WITH WHOM WE CAN DISCUSS THE SUBJECT CANDIDLY) IS ABOVE ALL A PRAGMATIC MAN WHO WILL JUDGE PERSONS AND EVENTS SHREWDLY AND WITHOUT MANY PRECONCEPTIONS TO SEE HOW THEY FIT INTO HIS ASSESSMENT OF SOVIET INTERESTS. THAT SOVIET NATIONAL INTERESTS WITH HIM WILL NATURALLY ALWAYS BE THE DECISIVE CRITERION IS ASSUMED AS A GIVEN. THAT HE CAN BE RUTHLESS AND DECEPTIVE IF HE JUDGES IT NECESSARY TO BE SO IS SOMETHING THAT MANY HUNGARIANS HAVE LEARNED FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCE. THEY HAVE ALSO LEARNED THAT MORE THAN MANY OTHER SOVIETS, HOWEVER, ANDROPOV IS RELATIVELY OPEN TO DISCUSSION AND SOPHISTICATED IN MAKING PRACTICAL JUDGMENTS AS TO HOW THOSE SOVIET INTERESTS ARE TO BE DEFINED. THE HUNGARIAN LEADERSHIP HAS MADE SOMETHING OF AN ART AT FINDING WAYS TO CONVINCING ANDROPOV OF RELATIVELY CONSTRUCTIVE WAYS TO ASSESS SOVIET INTERESTS. THIS LEADERSHIP HOPES THOSE LESSONS WILL BE CONSTRUCTIVELY LEARNED BY HUNGARY'S NEIGHBORS, PERHAPS EVEN PROVING USEFUL OUTSIDE OF EASTERN EUROPE, SINCE FOR KADAR'S HUNGARY THIS IS THE ONLY WAY FOR REFORM TO SURVIVE AND GROW AND FOR PEACEFUL CHANGE IN THE REGION TO BE ASSURED.

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