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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 9/5/2017

**File Folder** TERRORISM AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1984

**FOIA**

F2003-004

**Box Number** 112

SKINNER

527

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
210620	MEMO	MCFARLANE TO MEESE RE BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON TERRORISM (ANNOTATED)	1	8/15/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>5/19/2000 NLSF97-044 #3</i>			
210621	SUMMARY	RE TERRORIST ACTS	1	ND	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>5/19/2000 NLSF97-044 #4</i>			
210622	SUMMARY	RE COMBATTING TERRORISM	2	ND	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>5/19/2000 NLSF97-044 #5</i>			
210623	MEMO	NORTH TO MCFARLANE RE BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON TERRORISM	1	8/14/1984	B1
	<i>R</i>	<i>5/19/2000 NLSF97-044 #6</i>			
210624	MEMO	NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE DIALOGUE RE TERRORISM	1	8/10/1984	B1
210632	MEMO	CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SECURITY OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN NEW YORK	1	8/23/1984	B7(A) B7(E)

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

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B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
210625	MEMO	SOMMER TO POINDEXTER RE ARMACOST'S TALKING POINTS	1	8/31/1984	B1
210626	PAPER	RE GLOBAL TERRORISM: THE JUSTICE COMMANDOS OF THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE <i>PAR 9/5/2017 NLR-753-112-7-3-7</i>	20	9/1/1984	B1
210627	MEMO	NORTH TO SECRETARIAT RE ATTACHED LETTER (LETTER INCLUDED)	2	12/16/1985	B1
210628	PAPER	RE DEBRIEF ON AMBASSADOR'S OAKLEY'S MISSION TO BEIRUT	4	ND	B1

**The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing**

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## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: Records:  
Subject File

**Archivist:** kdb

**File Folder:** Terrorism Vol. II 1/1/84-8/31/84 [8404913] Box ~~91400~~ <sup>112</sup>

**Date:** 3/11/99

[August 1984]

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. <del>memo (4913)</del>	<del>Robert McFarlane to Edwin Meese, re Background material on terrorism (w/notations), 1p</del> R 5/19/80 ML5F97-044 #3	<del>8/15/84</del>	<del>P1, F1</del>
2. <del>summary</del>	<del>re terrorist acts, 1p</del> R # 4.	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1, F1</del>
3. <del>summary</del>	<del>re combating terrorism, 2p</del> R # 5	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1, F1</del>
4. memo	Oliver North to McFarlane, re same topic as item 1, 1p R # 6.	8/14/84	P1, F1
INTEGRATED 9/5/17		CAS	

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

*AW 9/5/17*

RECEIVED 11 AUG 84 11

DOCDATE 10 AUG 84

TO POINDEXTER

FROM NORTH

KEYWORDS TERRORISM

FRANCE

SUBJECT: DIALOGUE W/ THE FRENCH ON TERRORISM

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE:

STATUS X

FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

COMMENTS

REF#

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*(CIBx)*

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ACTION REQUIRED

DUE

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DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE

(C)

National Security Council  
The White House

System # 90871

Package # II

2

84 AUG 10 P 9: 00

1293

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>X</u>	
Bob Kimmitt			
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>N</u>
Situation Room			
<u>NORTH</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>I</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

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(Date/Time)

84 AUG 10 P 9: 00

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
210624	MEMO  NORTH TO POINDEXTER RE DIALOGUE RE TERRORISM	1	8/10/1984	B1

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4

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOC DATE 23 AUG 84

KEYWORDS TERRORISM

~~SUSPENSE~~

SUBJECT SECURITY OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN NEW YORK

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 27 AUG 84 STATUS S FILES 7A

FOR ACTION  
NORTH

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO  
DEGRAFFENREID  
FORTIER  
MAHLEY  
DORNAN

COMMENTS

REF# 8423387

LOG

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*FOIA*

F2003-004

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112

527

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
210632	MEMO  CHARLES HILL TO MCFARLANE RE SECURITY OF FOREIGN AIRCRAFT IN NEW YORK	1	8/23/1984	B7(A) B7(E)

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AS 9/5/17

RECEIVED 31 AUG 84 13

DOC DATE 31 AUG 84

TO POINDEXTER

KEYWORDS: FRANCE

TERRORISM

LIBYA

IRAN

SUBJECT: ARMACOSTS TALKING POINTS

ACTION: FOR INFORMATION

DUE: 01 SEP 84 STATUS IX FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

POINDEXTER

Kimmit  
Cobb  
North

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW )

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C SEP 04 1984 Poindexter noted

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mm 4

System # I

Package # 6555

RECEIVED 1322

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<u>I</u>	
Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>I</u>	<u>I</u>
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>		<u>N</u>
Situation Room			

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
210625	MEMO  SOMMER TO POINDEXTER RE ARMACOST'S TALKING POINTS	1	8/31/1984	B1

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8404913

TO MCFARLANE

FROM HILL, C

DOCDATE 19 JUN 84

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*CD 3/14/99*

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

**URGENT**

MEESE, E

SUBJECT. BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON TERRORISM FOR USE BY MEESE

ACTION: MEMO MCFARLANE TO MEESE DUE: 22 JUN 84 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

NORTH

DEGRAFFENREID

FORTIER

**URGENT**

COMMENTS

REF# 8417751

LOG

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( EF )

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
<i>Mcfarlane</i>	<i>X 8/14</i>	<i>For signature</i>		
	<i>C 8/15</i>	<i>Point developer - 2/1</i>		<i>ON</i>

DISPATCH *ed 8/15 KJ*

W/ATTCH FILE *PA* (C)

*27.*

~~SECRET~~

4913

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 15, 1984

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR EDWIN MEESE, III

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *JCF*

SUBJECT: Background Material on Terrorism

Please find in the attached notebook the background material on terrorism you have requested. It is important to note that the book contains classified as well as unclassified material. An extract of NSDD-138 (Combatting Terrorism) is provided for your use with Administration officials. We have numerous requests for this NSDD as a consequence of unauthorized media disclosures during late April. The NSDD has been verbally briefed to the House and Senate Intelligence Committees, the Foreign Affairs/Relations Committees, and the Armed Services Committees by NSC, State, Defense, CIA, and FBI. No copies of the NSDD have been provided. Throughout, we have sought to minimize the attention placed on pre-emptive covert activities in order to preclude adverse reactions which could constrain our options.

## Attachments

- Tab A - Global Terrorism Summary (U)
- Tab B - State-Supported Terrorism (U)
- Tab C - Use of Force Against Terrorist Acts (C)
- Tab D - Highlights of NSDD-138 (S)
- Tab E - Terrorism Questions and Answers (U)
- Tab F - Terrorism and Insurgency Definitions (U)
- Tab G - Bonn, Venice, and London Summit Declarations on Terrorism (U)
- Tab H - Fact Sheet on the President's Anti-Terrorism Legislation, April 26, 1984
- Tab I - Secretary Shultz address to the Trilateral Commission on April 3, 1984 (U)
- Tab J - Secretary Shultz address to the House Foreign Affairs Committee June 13, 1984 (U)
- Tab K - Secretary Shultz address to the Jonathan Institute on June 24, 1984 (U)
- Tab L - Terrorism Excerpt from Volume on Selected National Security Issues, August 1984 (U)

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Declassify: OADR


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E47-044-#3

NLS

BY MJH

NARA, DATE 5/19/00

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## GLOBAL TERRORISM IN 1983

### I. GENERAL PERSPECTIVE

- o There were 500 terrorist incidents in 1983, a slight increase over 1982. The Middle East, however, witnessed a 128% increase in the number of terrorist incidents over 1982. Fully one half of all international terrorist attacks were directed against the United States and France. In 1983, the highest number of persons were killed (652) and injured (1,273) by terrorists since we began keeping statistics in 1969.

- o GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1973-82</u>
W. Europe	37.2%	36.8%
Latin America	25.6	19.6
Mid East		
North Africa	22.8	21.6
Asia/Pacific	7.8	5.1
Africa	3.4	3.6
North America	2.4	9.4
USSR		
Eastern Europe	.8	1.3

- o Diplomatic and government personnel accounted for 48% of all the international victims of terrorism in 1983.

- o TARGETS BY TYPE

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1979-83</u>
Diplomatic	42.6%	43.5%
Military	18.4	11.8
Business	14.0	19.2
Other Government	5.6	4.4
Other	14.0	21.1


- o As high-level targets have become better protected, we have witnessed more and more attacks against lower-level victims, particularly diplomatic officers abroad. The assassinations of Commander Schaufelberger, Captain Tsantes, Leamon Hunt, two Turkish consuls, and a British Council officer, as well as unsuccessful attacks against a U.S. military man assigned to our Embassy in Athens and our Consul General in Strasbourg, bear stark witness to this new trend in terrorism.
- o Bombings accounted for 52% of all terrorist attacks in 1983. Bombings are cost-effective, indiscriminate, and frequently devastating in the number of victims and the consequent publicity produced. The bombing of our Embassy in Beirut (57 killed, 120 wounded), the bombings of the U.S. Marine and French barracks in Beirut (296 killed, 84 wounded), and the bombing of our Embassy in Kuwait (5 killed, 28 wounded) are notable examples of this devastating method of attack.

o INCIDENTS BY TYPE (U.S. Citizens Only)

	<u>1983</u>	<u>1973-82</u>
Bombings	96	1,196
Kidnapping	10	115
Assassination (includes attempts)	8	87
Hijackings	6	74
Armed Attack	24	73
Arson	36	-
Hostages	8	26
Other	3	212

- o The U.S. remains an attractive terrorist target with 271 Americans losing their lives to terrorists in 1983. This represents more American deaths from terrorism than were recorded in the preceding 15 years. We are a prime target because we have an extensive official and commercial presence overseas which is high in numbers of people and profile; our citizens and facilities are accessible and open to the public; our policies are opposed to the interests of many terrorist groups; and we often support governments which terrorists are attempting to bring down.





## STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM

### I. BACKGROUND

- o While not a new problem, support for acts of international terrorism by governments has increased recently. This support has taken the form of: logistical aid, provision of weapons and/or training, granting of safe-havens, use of diplomatic pouches and/or documentation, and--in some cases--actual targetting and/or provision of information about the selected target. Seventy attacks in 1983 can be attributed to this phenomenon.
- o Under the provisions of the Fenwick Amendment (Section 6 of the Export Administration Act of 1979), we periodically review all the information available to us and designate to Congress those countries which have "repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism." Currently, we have identified five countries as doing so: Iran, Cuba, Syria, Libya and the People's Republic of South Yemen. Countries designated as state supporters of international terrorism have applied to them a range of export controls designed to prevent licensing of exports which can enhance the military potential of those countries, or their ability to continue to support terrorist acts.

### II. FOUR SPECIFIC EXAMPLES

- o Syria and Iran played significant roles in encouraging Middle Eastern terrorism such as the bombing of the US Embassy in Beirut carried out by Iranian -- supported Lebanese Shi'ite radicals operating from Syrian-controlled territory.
- o Elements of the Al Dawa Party, trained by Iran, were responsible for the bombing of our Embassy in Kuwait.
- o Damascus has become the home for one of the most dangerous Palestinian terrorist groups, Black June headed by Abu Nidal, who has targeted US, Israeli, Jordanian, and UK interests.
- o North Korea perpetrated, using its own agents, a vicious bombing in Rangoon designed to assassinate the President of the Republic of Korea and his cabinet in October. The President escaped, but many high ranking officials of the ROKG and several Burmese died in the attack.





CONFIDENTIAL

THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST TERRORIST ACTS

I. HIGHLIGHTS

-- It is internationally accepted that a host country is responsible for protecting the personnel and facilities of other states that are located within its borders. This, however, does not preclude personnel of receiving states from defending themselves and their facilities against actual attacks or taking armed action when requested or consented to by the host country.

-- The commission of terrorist violence by one state against the personnel and facilities of another is clearly an unlawful use of force under the U.N. Charter; this includes instigating or assisting private groups or individuals in the commission of such acts.

-- The state which is the target of terrorist violence has the right, in accordance with Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, to act in legitimate self-defense including, if necessary, the use of appropriate force.

-- In extreme situations, a state may take forcible action to prevent an imminent attack if non-forcible means of preventing it have been exhausted or are not reasonably available.


-- Such use of force without the consent of the host state is entitled only when the host country is unable or unwilling to take effective action.


-- Acts of "retaliation" or "reprisal" are not justified by the principle of self-defense and the terms should not be used in explaining any use of force against terrorist activity.

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NLS FOI-044 #4  
BY mjn NARA, DATE 5/19/00

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## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

### I. GENERAL

Q. Why is state use of terrorism such a special problem?

A Where the state itself is using terrorism, it goes outside the normal rules governing international behavior. Diplomatic pressures are not very effective in getting a country to stop, as we saw in the Iran hostage situation or a few weeks ago with the People's Bureau case in London. States that work within the rules will always have a problem with states that do not, just as any society has a problem with its criminal element. When a group gets state support, that group is able greatly to extend its reach, to enhance its logistics, to use more sophisticated weapons, to move with greater anonymity and safety. In the military sense, state support for a terrorist group is a force multiplier, and the danger to targeted people and countries goes up accordingly.

Q. When you talk about an active defense, what do you mean?

A. You have to start with the fact that there is no one easy answer to the problem of terrorism. I don't know of any country that has a very satisfactory answer today. We have to protect our people from terrorist attacks. We have to work with other governments to do that, and we have to try to get the states that are supporting terrorism to stop. But when all that fails, and we still have the problem, we cannot just sit and wait to be attacked. We have to find ways to frustrate, interfere with and prevent terrorist attacks. If that involves the use of force, it will be carried out in accordance with our right of self-defense under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us something about the conclusions and recommendations made in the new NSDD number 138 signed by the President on April 3?

A. Mr. Chairman, As I understand it, the leadership of the committees primarily concerned with terrorism in both houses has been briefed in sessions jointly conducted by representatives of the key federal agencies concerned with the problem of terrorism. I am unable to add to that briefing, and I should not do so in any event in a public hearing.



Q. Would you be prepared to discuss the NSDD with the members of this Committee in executive session?

A. I believe, Mr. Chairman that such a briefing is best provided by the kind of team that did the original brief. The subject matter cuts across several different agency lines, and the Department really should not try to speak for the other agencies concerned. I would be happy to ask Ambassador Sayre and others who worked with him to discuss with you and others on the Committee any remaining issues that may be of concern.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you said that you had rather extensive discussions in London on how the allies plan to confront international terrorism. What exactly do you have in mind? Are we going to strengthen liaison and other activities on intelligence and at the police level? Are there any meetings of diplomats or lawyers already scheduled to discuss these problems?

A. I cannot be specific. We share intelligence with our friends and allies. We are in daily bilateral contact on a broad range of issues. Given the nature of the terrorist problem, however, we believe that we will be more effective if we work these matters out discretely either in bilateral or multilateral channels and take the legal action we consider appropriate in the circumstances. We are, of course, available to discuss these matters in executive session or to consult with any of you individually if you are seeking specific information.

Q: Is there any substance to Qadhafi's charge that the Central Intelligence Agency is backing Libyan dissidents attempting to overthrow Qadhafi's regime?

A: We had no prior knowledge of attacks against the Libyan government, nor were we involved in any way in the fighting last month in Tripoli.

Q: Is there any information available that Qadhafi's statement represents an actual threat to conduct terrorist attacks in the United States?

A: We reject Qadhafi's charge of U.S. involvement in last month's fighting in Tripoli. Qadhafi has again announced to the world that he is willing to use terrorism as an instrument of state policy. As you know, he has for some years deliberately supported terrorists as an extension of his own foreign policy. At this time, I have nothing to offer concerning any specific Libyan terrorist threat to the United States. We will, however, deal effectively and swiftly with any such acts in the United States.

Q. How would the United States deal with a problem such as the British had with the Libyan Embassy? Would we be unable to try in the United States a diplomat who committed such an act here?

A. Under the Vienna Convention diplomats have immunity from criminal prosecution. The remedy is to declare them persona non grata. When the Convention was written no one could contemplate that a sending state would so flagrantly abuse the immunity provided by the Convention. The international community has to address this problem. In the meantime, we have concluded that the police have a right to protect themselves and to return suppressing fire until they can take cover. We believe that is consistent with the doctrine of proportional response under international law. As we discussed in London, we will have to review this matter and develop better procedures and laws to deal with it.

## II. THE LEGISLATIVE PACKAGE

Q. How will the legislative package contribute to the fight against terrorism? Why is it necessary at this time?

A. The four bill package strengthens our ability to deal with terrorism through our criminal laws in a variety of ways. The two bills that implement international anti-terrorism conventions on aircraft sabotage and hostage-taking extend our criminal jurisdiction over these crimes and would strengthen our hand with allies and others in the international community who have already adopted strict legal measures in these areas. The bill on rewards will enable us to offer significant financial incentives to persons willing to provide information that would aid us in thwarting terrorist acts, bringing an incident to an end, or apprehending perpetrators of such acts. The bill prohibiting the provision of training and support to groups or states that engage in acts of international terrorism provides a legal basis to control activities which experience has shown are not sufficiently covered by existing law.

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NSDD 138 OF APRIL 3, 1984 ON COMBATting TERRORISM

I. HIGHLIGHTS

- o Basic purpose in view of increasingly heavy involvement of states in terrorism is to shift policy focus from passive to active defense measures and to require that resources be reprogrammed and/or obtained to support that policy focus.
  
- o Active defense requires significant increase in intelligence resources to pinpoint groups (or targets) that are actively considering strikes against us and to disrupt, confuse or otherwise preempt such strikes. All proposals must be in conformity with existing US law. Thus:
  - State is instructed to intensify efforts to achieve cooperation of other governments.
  
  - CIA is to intensify use of liaison and other intelligence capabilities and also to develop plans and capability to preempt groups and individuals planning strikes against US interests which it is to present to NSPG by May 31.
  
  - DOD is instructed to maintain and further develop capabilities to deal with the spectrum of threat options.
  
- o Active defense measures by the United States are expected to prompt retaliation and at least in short run to increase level of terrorist activity against us, including within United States. Accordingly,
  - State, DOD, Justice, Treasury, and CIA are to develop the full range of overt options to deal with terrorism.
  
  - State and Defense are instructed to accelerate defensive measures for personnel and facilities overseas including those of alerts, training, etc.
  
  - State and Justice are to present any legislation needed.

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--Justice and Treasury are to review defensive steps needed within US including coordination with state and local authorities. State is involved on foreign officials.

--IGT is to pull together this program including resource requirements of all agencies for all defensive measures and present plan to NSPG by May 31.

- o The foregoing is to be done by December 31, 1984 under existing organizational arrangements. In the meantime, the NSC is to chair an interagency review to consider whether any new organizational arrangements are needed to have a more effective effort.

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### III. TRAINING AND SUPPORT BILL

Q. Why do we need a bill like the Training and Support legislation?

A. What we are trying to stop is an individual or business under US jurisdiction selling training, intelligence, logistical and other similar support services to governments for the purpose of organizing hit squads or otherwise carrying out terrorist acts. This law is not intended to stand alone; it is part of a set with the Export Administration Act, and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. It closes the gap that we now have on selling training, intelligence and logistical support services to states that engage in terrorism.

Q. Is it correct that this bill grants the Secretary of State unprecedented powers?

A. No, the basic criticism is that this bill grants the Secretary of State too much discretion in the designation determination. Actually, the procedure used is little different than under the Arms Export Act and the Export Administration Act, both of which provide for a factual determination by the executive branch in the context of possible criminal penalties.

Q: What guidance does the bill provide to distinguish between terrorist groups, on the one hand, and legitimate insurgencies, on the other? Where would the contras fall under this distinction? The PLO? The IRA? (etc.)

A: The basis for a designation by the Secretary under the bill would be the acts or likely acts of international terrorism of an entity, not the legal status of that entity itself. The bill recognizes that acts of international terrorism may be carried out by a terrorist group, which by definition has no international legitimacy, by a foreign faction, which may or may not be a recognized insurgency, or by a state. "International terrorism" is defined in the bill, and the definition used is one that the Congress has already approved and enacted in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. I want to underscore here that there are important differences between terrorism and insurgency particularly respecting targets and methods. As this is proposed criminal legislation that, when enacted, will provide a basis for possible criminal prosecutions after formal determinations by the Secretary of State, I don't believe it would be appropriate for me to speculate about possible specific determinations the Secretary might make once this bill becomes law.

Q: Why are designations of specific countries or groups necessary at all? Why did the Administration draft this bill to require a determination of countries, factions and groups that support terrorism instead of merely specifying all the activities you are concerned about as crimes under U.S. law?

A: There were two primary considerations leading the Administration to choose the approach in the bill rather than broad criminal legislation. First, the activities that concern us in this bill are in the great majority of cases innocent commerce. While we wanted to stop them in cases where provision of these services posed a danger to lives, property or U.S. foreign policy interests, we saw no need to do so in a way that could generally interfere with peaceful trade. The point of the bill is not to prevent people from providing these services in general, but to prevent them from providing these services to entities that engage in international terrorism as spelled out in the bill. Second, because this legislation has as its primary purpose persuading particular countries and groups to stop practicing or supporting terrorism, it was our belief that this legislation would be a more useful tool in combatting terrorism if its effects were to be very precisely and publicly targeted on the offending countries and groups.

Q. What states do you have in mind adding to those already designated under the Export Administration Act?

A. The legislation would set up a specific procedure for designating states to which it would be illegal to provide training, logistical and other support services. This would include consultations with the Congress at that time. The procedures require the development of evidence to support any determination that I would make. It would not be appropriate for me to make any comments at this time either on those states already on the Export control list or those that might be designated under the proposed legislation. What I can say is that we know that states are supporting terrorist groups and are carrying out terrorist acts that threaten us around the world. The legislation will be helpful to the Justice Department in filling legal gaps.

Q: Why is there a requirement that specific U.S. interests be affected by these acts of international terrorism? Isn't all international terrorism inherently harmful to U.S. interests? Or are there going to be "good terrorists" and "bad terrorists" under this bill?

A: The enactment of a criminal prohibition is normally based on the notion that the society for whose benefit the law is enacted will suffer some identifiable harm resulting from the prohibited act. Without such a link, the basis for the criminal law becomes weakened. While we of course universally condemn any act of terrorism, it is not appropriate for us to legislate universally. It is simply a matter of confining U.S. criminal law to the protection of U.S. interests. By linking the bill's standards explicitly to U.S. interests, we provide a clear and strong basis for a U.S. criminal law in this area.

Q: Could the bill be used to prosecute people who donated money to a country or group that had been placed on the list? What about someone who raised funds for such a group?

A: The bill is not intended to cover people who simply donate money to a group or country that has been designated by the Secretary, or to a "front" group that acted as a conduit for funds to a designated entity. On the other hand, an individual who actively raised funds for a designated entity or for a "front" group for such an entity might be subject to the bill.

Q: Why can't much of the terrorist activity you are trying to reach with this bill be covered under existing federal law relating to conspiracy?

A: In order for a conspiracy to be a criminal offense under federal law, the act that is the aim of the conspiracy must itself be a federal criminal offense. As most of the acts addressed by the new bill are not currently federal offenses, the conspiracy law would not be applicable to them.

Q: Why is there a need for an exemption for official activities (new section 2331(i))?

A: The purpose of that section is to avoid any possible confusion or question as to the potential criminal liability of government officials or agents carrying out lawful and properly authorized activities. We believe there is a policy interest in providing assurance to government officials that they will not be held criminally liable for such activities carried out in good faith.

Q: We are particularly concerned about the vagueness of the phrase "act in concert with". This looks like the type of provision that could cause a chilling effect on the exercise of constitutionally protected rights such as free speech and free assembly. How strongly are you wedded to that formulation?

A: Our purpose in that section of the bill is to cover individuals who, while not actually becoming an official member of a designated foreign group or the armed forces or intelligence service of a designated foreign state, act for all practical purposes as a member of such an entity. We have no intention of interfering with any constitutionally protected rights.


Q: This legislation would produce some foreign policy problems and some additional restrictions on the liberties of Americans. Do the potential benefits--the numbers of people likely to be prosecuted and terrorist acts prevented--justify these costs?

A: We do not believe that potential foreign policy problems or controversy constitute a valid reason to shy away from taking vigorous steps to combat international terrorism. Nor do we have any intent to restrict constitutionally protected rights of Americans. There is no absolute constitutional right to provide training and support services to states or groups that engage in terrorism. Where the language of the bill causes concern on this point, we are prepared to look at modifications. We believe that the situation where Americans are free to sell their expertise and services to terrorist groups or states has gone on too long. We view the benefits of the bill not so much in terms of numbers of people prosecuted as in the establishment of legal controls on this type of activity, and the resultant message, both to those who would provide such services to terrorist entities and to those who would benefit from these services, that the United States is prepared to take serious legal measures against international terrorism.

Q: Would you be prepared to accept a requirement to consult Congress in the process of designating specific countries or groups under this law?

A: We feel that such designation is basically an executive responsibility, and that Congress's role should consist essentially in providing the guidelines for the executive determination in the legislation itself. At the same time, we recognize the interest of the Congress in these sensitive and important decisions, and would be willing to explore procedures for advance notification of designations to foreign affairs committees , along the lines of existing procedures in other laws.





## TERRORISM

Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for a political purpose to create a state of fear which will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating or causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior. A terrorist group does not need a defined territorial base or specific organizational structure. Its goals need not relate to any one country. It does not require nor necessarily seek a popular basis of support. Its operations, organization and movements are secret. Its activities do not conform to rules of law or warfare. Its targets are civilians, non-combatants, bystanders or symbolic persons and places. Its victims generally have no role in either causing or correcting the grievance of the terrorists. Its methods are hostage-taking, aircraft piracy or sabotage, assassination, threats, hoaxes, and indiscriminate bombings or shootings.

Terrorism is international when the victims, the actors, the location of a terrorist incident, or the means used to carry out the act involve more than one country.

## INSURGENCY

Insurgency is a state of revolt against an established government. An insurgent group has a defined organization, leadership and location. Its members wear a uniform. Its objectives are acquisition of political power, achievement of participation in economic or political opportunity and national leadership or, ultimately, taking power from existing leadership. Its primary interests relate to one country. Its methods are military and paramilitary. Its targets are military, both tactical and strategic, and its legitimate operations are governed by the international rules of armed conflict. It operates in the open, and it actively seeks a basis of popular support.





BONN DECLARATION

ADDENDUM TO ECONOMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE COMMUNIQUE

JULY 17, 1978

Following is an addendum to the communique as delivered by Chancellor Helmut Schmidt on terrorism on behalf of the Delegations:

THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT, CONCERNED ABOUT TERRORISM AND THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES, DECLARE THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL INTENSIFY THEIR JOINT EFFORTS TO COMBAT INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.

TO THIS END, IN CASES WHERE A COUNTRY REFUSES EXTRADITION OR PROSECUTION OF THOSE WHO HAVE HIJACKED AN AIRCRAFT AND/OR DO NOT RETURN SUCH AIRCRAFT, THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT ARE JOINTLY RESOLVED THAT THEIR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION TO CEASE ALL FLIGHTS TO THAT COUNTRY.

AT THE SAME TIME, THEIR GOVERNMENTS WILL INITIATE ACTION TO HALT ALL INCOMING FLIGHTS FROM THAT COUNTRY OR FROM ANY COUNTRY BY THE AIRLINES OF THE COUNTRY CONCERNED. THE HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENT URGE OTHER GOVERNMENTS TO JOIN THEM IN THIS COMMITMENT.

1981 Venice Declaration on the Taking of Hostages  
Subscribed to by the U.S., Japan, France,  
FRG, Italy, Canada and UK

Gravely concerned by recent incidents of terrorism involving the taking of hostages and attacks on diplomatic and consular premises and personnel, the Heads of State and Government affirm their determination to deter and combat such acts. They note the completion of work on the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and call on all states to consider becoming parties to it as well as to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons of 1973.

The Heads of State and Government vigorously condemn the taking of hostages and the seizure of diplomatic and consular premises and personnel in contravention of the basic norms of international law and practice. The Heads of State and Government feel it necessary that all governments should adopt policies which will contribute to the attainment of this goal and to take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts. They also resolve to provide to one another's diplomatic and consular missions support and assistance in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic and consular establishments or personnel.

LONDON ECONOMIC SUMMIT DECLARATION ON  
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, ISSUED JUNE 9, 1984

The heads of state and government discussed the problem of international terrorism.

They noted that hijacking and kidnapping had declined since the Declarations of Bonn (1978), Venice (1980), and Ottawa (1981) as a result of improved security measures, but that terrorism had developed other techniques, sometimes in association with traffic in drugs.

They expressed their resolve to combat this threat by every possible means, strengthening existing measures and developing effective new ones.

They were disturbed to note the ease with which terrorists move across international boundaries, and gain access to weapons, explosives, training and finance.

They viewed with serious concern the increasing involvement of states and governments in acts of terrorism, including the abuse of diplomatic immunity. They acknowledged the inviolability of diplomatic missions and other requirements of international law; but they emphasized the obligations which that law also entails.

Proposals which found support in the discussion included the following:

- closer cooperation and coordination between police and security organizations and other relevant authorities, especially in the exchange of information, intelligence and technical knowledge;
- scrutiny by each country of gaps in its national legislation which might be exploited by terrorists;
- use of the powers of the receiving state under the Vienna Convention in such matters as the size of diplomatic missions, and the number of buildings enjoying diplomatic immunity;
- action by each country to review the sale of weapons to states supporting terrorism;
- consultation and as far as possible cooperation over the expulsion or exclusion from their countries of known terrorists, including persons of diplomatic status involved in terrorism.

The heads of state and government recognized that this is a problem which affects all civilized states. They resolved to promote action through competent international organizations and among the international community as a whole to prevent and punish terrorist acts.





For Immediate Release

April 26, 1984

## FACT SHEET

PRESIDENT'S ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION

The President has sent a message to Congress with a package of four separate bills to support a more systematic and strengthened effort to combat international terrorism. The President's message underscores the high priority his Administration places on actions to reduce the incidence of international terrorism, to protect Americans and American property from acts of terrorism, and to ensure that perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice.

The four separate bills are highlighted below.

o Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking. This bill would amend the Federal kidnapping statute to provide for Federal jurisdiction over any kidnapping in which a threat is made to kill, injure or continue to detain a victim in order to compel third parties to do or abstain from doing something. The bill is enabling legislation for the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which was adopted by the United Nations on December 17, 1979. At the time the President signed the instrument of ratification, the Congress was informed that the instrument would not be deposited with the United Nations until such time as enabling legislation had been obtained to permit full implementation of the convention.

o Aircraft Sabotage Act. This bill provides enabling legislation for the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. The convention was adopted in Montreal in 1971 and ratified by the United States in November 1972. The legislation deals with certain criminal acts relating to aircraft sabotage or hijacking and would help the United States to satisfy its obligations under international law.

o Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts. This bill would authorize the payment of a reward for information regarding acts of terrorism in the United States or abroad.

o Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984. This bill would enhance the ability of the Department of Justice to prosecute persons involved in the support of groups and states engaging in terrorism. The bill would prohibit firms or individuals from supporting or cooperating with such groups or states, as well as recruiting, soliciting, or training individuals to engage in terrorist activities.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

April 26, 1984

TO THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES:

I am sending to the Congress today four separate bills to attack the pressing and urgent problem of international terrorism.

In 1983 more than 250 American citizens were killed in terrorist attacks, the largest number in any year of record. In the wake of the tragic deaths of our diplomats and Marines, as well as French and Israeli soldiers in Lebanon, in light of the cynical murder of four South Korean cabinet officers and many others by North Korean terrorists in Burma, and as a result of the attack on our embassy in Kuwait, it is essential that we act immediately to cope with this menace and to increase cooperation with other governments in dealing with this growing threat to our way of life.

In the past fifteen years, terrorism has become a frightening challenge to the tranquility and political stability of our friends and allies. During the past decade alone, there have been almost 6,500 terrorist incidents. Over 3,500 people have been killed in these incidents, and more than 7,600 people have been wounded. American citizens have been the victims of more than 2,500 terrorist incidents. Of special concern to me has been the toll inflicted on our diplomats and members of the Armed Forces. I am also deeply concerned, however, about attacks against other American citizens, who have been the victims of forty percent of the terrorist incidents over the past decade.

In recent years, a very worrisome and alarming new kind of terrorism has developed: the direct use of instruments of terror by foreign states. This "state terrorism," starkly manifest in the recent dreadful spectacles of violence in Beirut, Rangoon, and Kuwait, accounts for the great majority of terrorist murders and assassinations. Also disturbing is state-provided training, financing, and logistical support to terrorists and terrorist groups. These activities are an extremely serious and growing source of danger to us, our friends and our allies, and are a severe challenge to America's foreign policy.

The protection of our citizens, our official personnel, and our facilities abroad requires the close cooperation and support of other governments. We depend on other governments to provide security protection to more than 250 United States diplomatic and consular posts abroad. We look to other governments to maintain the normal protections of law in their countries for our citizens living and traveling abroad and for our business representatives and business properties.

In 1983, this Administration sent to the Congress legislation to enable us to provide adequate protection for foreign officials in the United States. Not only is their protection essential to meet the obligations of the United States under international treaties, it is equally important to demonstrate to officials of other governments that they can count on full protection while they are in the United States.

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I also asked the Congress to provide legislative authority for anti-terrorism training, and in some cases equipment, to foreign governments in order to enhance cooperation with governments on whom we must depend for protection abroad. In my view, the more effective and knowledgeable local law enforcement officials and officers are, the greater will be their ability to provide the kind of security both they and we need. I commend the Congress for providing a two-year authorization for this program and an appropriation of \$2.5 million for 1984.

I am determined that my Administration will do whatever is necessary to reduce the incidence of terrorism against us anywhere in the world and to see that the perpetrators of terrorist acts are brought to justice. I believe it is essential, however, that the Executive branch, the Congress and the public clearly understand that combatting terrorism effectively requires concerted action on many different fronts. With trained personnel, effective laws, close international cooperation, and diligence, we can reduce the risks of terrorism to our people and increase the deterrent to future acts of terrorism.

Dealing with the immediate effect of terrorist violence is only part of the challenge, however. We must also assure that the states now practicing or supporting terrorism do not prosper in the designs they pursue. We must assure that international forums, such as the United Nations, take a balanced and practical view of who is practicing terrorism and what must be done about it. We must assure that governments that are currently passive -- or inactive -- respecting this scourge understand the threat that terrorism poses for all mankind and that they cooperate in stopping it. We must work to assure that there is no role in civilized society for indiscriminate threatening, intimidation, detention, or murder of innocent people. We must make it clear to any country that is tempted to use violence to undermine democratic governments, destabilize our friends, thwart efforts to promote democratic governments, or disrupt our lives that it has nothing to gain, and much to lose.

The legislation I am sending to the Congress is an important step in our war against terrorism. It will send a strong and vigorous message to friend and foe alike that the United States will not tolerate terrorist activity against its citizens or within its borders. Our legislative package consists of four separate bills, each of which is outlined below.

o Act for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Hostage-Taking

In September 1981, I signed the instrument ratifying the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which was adopted by the United Nations on December 17, 1979. The convention has not been implemented domestically through enabling legislation, however. This legislation would implement the 1979 convention. It would amend the Federal kidnapping statute to provide for Federal jurisdiction over any kidnapping in which a threat is made to kill, injure, or continue to detain a victim in order to compel a third party to do or to abstain from doing something. This is a common ploy of terrorists. At the time I signed the instrument of

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ratification, the Congress was informed that the instrument of ratification would not be deposited with the United Nations until enabling legislation had been enacted. To demonstrate to other governments and international forums that the United States is serious about its efforts to deal with international terrorism, it is essential that the Congress provide the necessary enabling legislation, so that we may fully implement the Hostage-Taking Convention.

o Aircraft Sabotage Act

The United States became a party to the Tokyo Convention, which covers certain offenses or acts committed aboard aircraft, in 1969 and the Hague Convention, concerning the suppression of unlawful seizure of aircraft, in 1971. The Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation was adopted at Montreal in 1971 and ratified by the United States in November 1972. The Montreal Convention requires all states party to it to establish jurisdiction over certain offenses affecting the safety of civil aviation.

The Congress has approved enabling legislation for the first two of these conventions but not for the Montreal Convention. This means that certain criminal acts related to aircraft sabotage or hijacking are not adequately covered by United States law. This gap in the law sends a false signal to terrorists, and it also indicates to other governments that we may not be as serious as we should be, and as in fact we are, in our efforts to combat international terrorism. Action by the Congress now would provide the basis for long-overdue implementation of this convention.

o Act for Rewards for Information Concerning Terrorist Acts

Current law authorizes the payment of rewards for information concerning domestic crimes but is outdated. Maximum rewards are inadequate, and terrorism is not specifically included as a basis for paying a reward. Moreover, there is no authority for the payment of rewards for information on acts of terrorism abroad.

The proposed legislation, which is modelled on an existing statute that allows payment of rewards for information concerning the unauthorized manufacture of atomic weapons, recognizes that payment of a reward in connection with acts of domestic terrorism raises a matter of law enforcement that is properly within the jurisdiction of the Attorney General, but that the payment of a reward in connection with an act of terrorism abroad poses a political and foreign relations problem within the jurisdiction of the Secretary of State. By increasing the amounts of fines that may be paid, and by authorizing rewards for information concerning terrorist acts committed abroad, this Act would markedly improve the ability of the Departments of Justice and State to obtain information leading to the freeing of hostages or the capture of the perpetrators of acts of terrorism. In passing this legislation, the Congress can further underscore the intent of the United States to take every appropriate and necessary step to protect its citizens and property from terrorist acts.

o Prohibition Against the Training or Support of Terrorist Organizations Act of 1984

The training and support of terrorist groups and activities by a number of states now using terrorism as an additional policy is both increasing and highly instr

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disturbing. The provision of assistance to countries that support terrorism and use terrorism as a foreign policy tool has thus become a matter of grave concern to national security. This Act, together with revised and strengthened regulations that the Department of State intends to issue shortly, would enhance the ability of the Department of Justice to prosecute persons involved in the support of terrorist activities and of states using terrorism. Enactment of this legislation would be a strong contribution to the effort to combat terrorism.

We must recognize that terrorism is symptomatic of larger problems. We must dedicate ourselves to fostering modernization, development, and beneficial change in the depressed areas of the world. We must renew our commitment to promoting and assisting representative and participatory governments. We must attack the problem of terrorism as a crime against the international community whenever and wherever possible, but we must strive to eradicate the sources of frustration and despair that are the spawning places and nutrients of terrorism.

The legislative proposals that I am sending to the Congress today will, when approved, materially benefit our Nation and help us to assist friendly countries. I believe that they are extraordinarily important, and I strongly urge that the Congress undertake their timely consideration and speedy passage.

RONALD REAGAN

THE WHITE HOUSE,

April 26, 1984.

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*Secretary Shultz*  
**Power and Diplomacy  
in the 1980s**

April 3, 1984



United States Department of State  
*Bureau of Public Affairs*  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the Trilateral Commission, Washington, D.C., April 3, 1984.*

Over 20 years ago, President John Kennedy pledged that the United States would "pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, in order to assure the survival and the success of liberty." We know now that the scope of that commitment is too broad—though the self-confidence and courage in those words were typically American and most admirable. More recently, another administration took the view that our fear of communism was "inordinate" and that there were very complicated social, economic, religious, and other factors at work in the world that we had little ability to affect. This, in my view, is a counsel of helplessness that substantially underestimates the United States and its ability to influence events.

Somewhere between these two poles lies the natural and sensible scope of American foreign policy. We know that we are not omnipotent and that we must set priorities. We cannot pay *any* price or bear *any* burden. We must discriminate; we must be prudent and careful; we must respond in ways appropriate to the challenge and engage our power only when very important strategic stakes are involved. Not every situation can be salvaged by American exertion even when important values or interests are at stake.

At the same time, we know from history that courage and vision and

determination can change reality. We can affect events, and we all know it. The American people expect this of their leaders. And the future of the free world depends on it.

Americans, being a moral people, want their foreign policy to reflect the values we espouse as a nation. But Americans, being a practical people, also want their foreign policy to be effective. If we truly care about our values, we must be prepared to defend them and advance them. Thus we as a nation are perpetually asking ourselves how to reconcile our morality and our practical sense, how to pursue noble goals in a complex and imperfect world, how to relate our strength to our purposes—in sum, how to relate power and diplomacy.

We meet this evening amid the excitement of America's quadrennial exercise of self-renewal, in which we as a country reexamine ourselves and our international objectives. It is an unending process—almost as unending as the presidential campaign season. But there are some constants in our policy, such as our alliance with the industrial democracies, as embodied in this distinguished gathering. This partnership—the cornerstone of our foreign policy for 35 years—itself reflects our ability to combine our moral commitment to democracy and our practical awareness of the crucial importance of maintaining the global balance of power. So I consider this an appropriate forum at which to share some thoughts on the relationship between power and diplomacy in the last two decades of the 20th century.

## The World We Face

By the accident of history, the role of world leadership fell to the United States just at the moment when the old international order had been destroyed by two world wars but no new stable system had developed to replace it. A century ago, the international system was centered on Europe and consisted of only a few major players. Today, in terms of military strength, the dominant countries are two major powers that had been, in one sense or another, on the edge or outside European diplomacy. But economic power is now widely dispersed. Asia is taking on increasing significance. The former colonial empires have been dismantled, and there are now more than 160 independent nations on the world scene. Much of the developing world itself is torn by a continuing struggle between the forces of moderation and the forces of radicalism. Most of the major international conflicts since 1945 have taken place there—from Korea to Vietnam to the Middle East to Central America. Moreover, the Soviet Union continues to exploit nuclear fear as a political weapon and to exploit instabilities wherever they have the opportunity to do so.

On a planet grown smaller because of global communications, grown more turbulent because of the diffusion of power—all the while overshadowed by nuclear weapons—the task of achieving stability, security, and progress is a profound challenge for mankind. In an age menaced by nuclear proliferation and state-sponsored terrorism, tendencies toward anarchy are bound to be a source of real dangers.

It is absurd to think that America can walk away from these problems. This is a world of great potential instability and great potential danger. There is no safety in isolationism. We have a major, direct stake in the health of the world economy; our prosperity, our security, and our alliances can be affected by threats to security in many parts of the world; and the fate of our fellow human beings will always impinge on our moral consciousness. Certainly the United States is not the world's policeman. But we are the world's strongest free nation, and, therefore, the preservation of our values, our principles, and our hopes for a better world rests in great measure, inevitably, on our shoulders.

## Power and Diplomacy

In this environment, our principal goal is what President Reagan has called "the most basic duty that any President and

any people share—the duty to protect and strengthen the peace." History teaches, however, that peace is not achieved merely by wishing for it. Noble aspirations are not self-fulfilling. Our aim must always be to shape events and not be the victim of events. In this fast-moving and turbulent world, to sit in a reactive posture is to risk being overwhelmed or to allow others, who may not wish us well, to decide the world's future.

The Great Seal of the United States, as you know, shows the American eagle clutching arrows in one claw and olive branches in the other. Some of you may have seen the Great Seal on some of the china and other antique objects in the White House or in the ceremonial rooms on the eighth floor of the State Department. On some of the older items, the eagle looks toward the arrows, on others, toward the olive branches. It was President Truman who set it straight: he saw to it that the eagle always looked toward the olive branches—showing that America sought peace. But the eagle still holds onto those arrows.

This is a way of saying that our forefathers understood quite well that power and diplomacy always go together. It is even clearer today that a world of peace and security will not come about without exertion or without facing up to some tough choices. Certainly power must always be guided by purpose, but the hard reality is that diplomacy not backed by strength is ineffectual. That is why, for example, the United States has succeeded many times in its mediation when many other well-intentioned mediators have failed. Leverage, as well as good will, is required.

Americans have sometimes tended to think that power and diplomacy are two distinct alternatives. To take a very recent example, the Long commission report on the bombing of our Marine barracks in Beirut urged that we work harder to pursue what it spoke of as "diplomatic alternatives," as opposed to "military options." This reflects a fundamental misunderstanding—not only of our intensive diplomatic efforts throughout the period but of the relationship between power and diplomacy. Sometimes, regrettable as it may be, political conflict degenerates into a test of strength. It was precisely our military role in Lebanon that was problematical, not our diplomatic exertion. Our military role was hamstrung by legislative and other inhibitions; the Syrians were not interested in diplomatic compromise so long as the prospect of hegemony was not foreclosed. They could judge from our domestic debate that our staying power was limited.

In arms control, also, successful negotiation depends on the perception of a military balance. Only if the Soviet leaders see the West as determined to modernize its own forces will they see an incentive to negotiate agreements establishing equal, verifiable, and lower levels of armaments.

The lesson is that power and diplomacy are not alternatives. They must go together, or we will accomplish very little in this world.

The relationship between them is a complex one, and it presents us with both practical and moral issues. Let me address a few of those issues. One is the variety of the challenges we face. A second is the moral complexity of our response. A third is the problem of managing the process in a democracy.

## The Range of Challenges

Perhaps because of our long isolation from the turmoil of world politics, Americans have tended to believe that war and peace, too, were two totally distinct phenomena: we were either in a blissful state of peace, or else (as in World Wars I and II) we embarked on an all-out quest for total victory, after which we wanted to retreat back into inward-looking innocence, avoiding "power politics" and all it represented. During World War II, while single-mindedly seeking the unconditional surrender of our enemies, we paid too little heed to the emerging postwar balance of power.

Similarly, since 1945 we have experienced what we saw as a period of clear-cut cold war, relieved by a period of seeming detente which raised exaggerated expectations in some quarters. Today we must see the East-West relationship as more complex, with the two sides engaging in trade and pursuing arms control even as they pursue incompatible aims. It is not as crisis prone or starkly confrontational as the old cold war; but neither is it a normal relationship of peace or comfortable coexistence.

Thus, in the 1980s and beyond, most likely we will never see a state of total war or a state of total peace. We face instead a spectrum of often ambiguous challenges to our interests.

We are relatively well prepared to deter an all-out war or a Soviet attack on our West European and Japanese allies; that's why these are the least likely contingencies. But, day in and day out, we will continue to see a wide range of conflicts that fall in a gray area between major war and millennial peace. The coming years can be counted upon to generate their share of crises and local outbreaks of violence. Some of them—not all of



them—will affect our interests.

Terrorism—particularly state-sponsored terrorism—is already a contemporary weapon directed at America's interests, America's values, and America's allies. We must be sure we are as well prepared and organized for this intermediate range of challenges.

If we are to protect our interests, values, and allies, we must be engaged. And our power must be engaged.

It is often said that the lesson of Vietnam is that the United States should not engage in military conflict without a clear and precise military mission, solid public backing, and enough resources to finish the job. This is undeniably true. But does it mean there are no situations where a discrete assertion of power is needed or appropriate for limited purposes? Unlikely. Whether it is crisis management or power projection or a show of force or peacekeeping or a localized military action, there will always be instances that fall short of an all-out national commitment on the scale of World War II. The need to avoid no-win situations cannot mean that we turn automatically away from hard-to-win situations that call for prudent involvement. These will always involve risks; we will not always have the luxury of being able to choose the most advantageous circumstances. And our adversaries can be expected to play rough.

The Soviets are students of Clausewitz, who taught that war is a continuation of politics by other means. It is highly unlikely that we can respond to gray-area challenges without adapting power to political circumstances or on a psychologically satisfying, all-or-nothing basis. This is just not the kind of reality we are likely to be facing in the 1980s, or 1990s, or beyond. Few cases will be as clear or as quick as Grenada. On the contrary, most other cases will be a lot tougher.

We have no choice, moreover, but to address ourselves boldly to the challenge of terrorism. State-sponsored terrorism is really a form of warfare. Motivated by ideology and political hostility, it is a weapon of unconventional war against democratic societies, taking advantage of the openness of these societies. How do we combat this challenge? Certainly we must take security precautions to protect our people and our facilities; certainly we must strengthen our intelligence capabilities to alert ourselves to the threats. But it is increasingly doubtful that a purely passive strategy can even begin to cope with the problem. This poses a host of questions for a free society in what circumstances—and how—should we respond? When—and how—should we take preventive or preemptive

action against known terrorist groups? What evidence do we insist upon before taking such steps?

As the threat mounts—and as the involvement of such countries as Iran, Syria, Libya, and North Korea has become more and more evident—then it is more and more appropriate that the nations of the West face up to the need for active defense against terrorism. Once it becomes established that terrorism works—that it achieves its political objectives—its practitioners will be bolder, and the threat to us will be all the greater.

### The Moral Issues

Of course, any use of force involves moral issues. American military power should be resorted to only if the stakes justify it, if other means are not available, and then only in a manner appropriate to the objective. But we cannot opt out of every contest. If we do, the world's future will be determined by others—most likely by those who are the most brutal, the most unscrupulous, and the most hostile to our deeply held principles. *The New Republic* stated it well a few weeks ago:

[T]he American people know that force and the threat of force are central to the foreign policy of our adversaries, and they expect their President to be able to deter and defeat such tactics.

As we hear now in the debate over military aid to Central America, those who shrink from engagement can always find an alibi for inaction. Often it takes the form of close scrutiny of any moral defects in the friend or ally whom we are proposing to assist. Or it is argued that the conflict has deep social and economic origins which we really have to address first before we have a right to do anything else.

But rather than remain engaged in order to tackle these problems—as we are trying to do—some people turn these concerns into formulas for abdication, formulas that would allow the enemies of freedom to decide the outcome. To me, it is highly immoral to let friends who depend on us be subjugated by brute force if we have the capacity to prevent it.

There is, in addition, another ugly residue of our Vietnam debate: the notion, in some quarters, that America is the guilty party, that the use of our power is a source of evil and, therefore, the main task in foreign policy is to restrain America's freedom to act. It is inconceivable to me that the American people believe any of this. It is certainly not President Reagan's philosophy.

Without being boastful or arrogant, the American people know that their country has been a powerful force for good in the world. We helped Europe and Asia—including defeated enemies—rebuild after the war, and we helped provide a security shield behind which they could build democracy and freedom as well as prosperity. Americans have often died and sacrificed for the freedom of others. We have provided around \$165 billion in economic assistance for the developing world. We have played a vital facilitating role in the Middle East peace process, in the unfolding diplomacy of southern Africa, as well as in many other diplomatic efforts around the globe.

We have used our power for good and worthy ends. In Grenada, we helped restore self-determination to the people of Grenada, so that they could choose their own future. Some have tried to compare what we did in Grenada to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. We welcome such comparison. Contrast, for example, the prospects for free elections in the two countries. In Grenada, they will be held this year; in Afghanistan, when? Contrast the number of American combat troops now in Grenada 5 months after the operation with the number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan 55 months after their invasion. The number in Grenada is 0; the number in Afghanistan is over 100,000.

More often, the issue is not the direct use of American military power but military assistance to friends to help them defend themselves. Around the world, security support for friends is a way to prevent crises; it bolsters our friends so they can deter challenges. And it is a way of avoiding the involvement of American forces, because it is only when our friends' efforts in their own defense are being overwhelmed that we are faced with the agonizing decision whether to involve ourselves more directly. Security assistance is thus an essential tool of foreign policy. It is an instrument for deterring those who would impose their will by force and for making political solutions possible. It gets far less support in this country than it deserves.

Central America is a good example. The real moral question in Central America is not do we believe in military solutions, but do we believe in ourselves? Do we believe that our security and the security of our neighbors has moral validity? Do we have faith in our own democratic values? Do we believe that Marxist-Leninist solutions are antidemocratic and that we have a moral right to try to stop those who are trying to impose them by force? Sure, economic and social problems underlie many of these conflicts. But in El Salvador, the



communist guerrillas are waging war directly against the economy, blowing up bridges and power stations, deliberately trying to wreck the country's economy.

The conflict in Central America is not a debate between social theorists; it is one of those situations I mentioned where the outcome of political competition will depend in large measure on the balance of military strength. In El Salvador, the United States is supporting moderates who believe in democracy and who are resisting the enemies of democracy on both the extreme right and the extreme left. If we withdrew our support, the moderates, caught in the crossfire, would be the first victims—as would be the cause of human rights and the prospects for economic development. Anyone who believes that military support for our friends isn't crucial to a just outcome is living in a dream world. And anyone who believes that military support can be effective when it's given on an uncertain installment plan is not facing reality.

#### Accountability Without Paralysis

The third issue I want to mention is the question of how this country, as a democracy, conducts itself in the face of such challenges.

Over the last 35 years, the evolution of the international system was bound to erode the predominant position the United States enjoyed immediately after World War II. But it seems to me that in this disorderly and dangerous new world, the loss of American predominance puts an even greater premium on consistency, determination, and coherence in the conduct of our foreign policy. We have less margin for error than we used to have.

This change in our external circumstances, however, coincided historically with a kind of cultural revolution at home that has made it harder for us to achieve the consistency, determination, and coherence that we need. The last 15 years left a legacy of contention between the executive and legislative branches and a web of restrictions on executive action embedded permanently in our laws. At the same time, the diffusion of power within the Congress means that a president has a hard time when he wants to negotiate with the Congress, because congressional leaders have lost their dominance of the process and often cannot produce a consensus or sometimes even a decision.

The net result, as you well know, is an enormous problem for American foreign policy—a loss of coherence and recurring uncertainty in the minds of friend and foe about the aims and con-

stancy of the United States.

Particularly in the war powers field, where direct use of our power is at issue, the stakes are high. Yet the war powers resolution sets arbitrary 60-day deadlines that practically invite an adversary to wait us out. Our Commander in Chief is locked in battle at home at the same time he is trying to act effectively abroad. Under the resolution, even inaction by the Congress can force the president to remove American forces from an area of challenge, which, as former President Ford has put it, undermines the president even when the Congress can't get up the courage to take a position. Such constraints on timely action may only invite greater challenges down the road. In Lebanon our adversaries' perception that we lacked staying power undercut the prospects for successful negotiation. As the distinguished Majority Leader, Senator Howard Baker, said on the floor of the Senate 4 weeks ago:

[We cannot continue to begin each military involvement abroad with a prolonged, tedious and divisive negotiation between the executive and the legislative branches of Government. The world and its many challenges to our interests simply do not allow us that luxury.]

I do not propose changes in our constitutional system. But some legislative changes may be called for. And I propose, at a minimum, that all of us, in both Congress and the executive branch, exercise our prerogatives with a due regard to the national need for an effective foreign policy. Congress has the right, indeed the duty, to debate and criticize, to authorize and appropriate funds and share in setting the broad lines of policy. But micromanagement by a committee of 535 independent-minded individuals is a grossly inefficient and ineffective way to run any important enterprise. The fact is that depriving the President of flexibility weakens our country. Yet a host of restrictions on the President's ability to act are now built into our laws and our procedures. Surely there is a better way for the President and the Congress to exercise their prerogatives without hobbling this country in the face of assaults on free-world interests abroad. Surely there can be accountability without paralysis. The sad truth is that many of our difficulties over the last 15 years have been self-imposed.

The issue is fundamental. If the purpose of our power is to prevent war, or injustice, then ideally we want to discourage such occurrences rather than have to use our power in a physical sense. But this can happen only if there is assurance that our power would be used if necessary.

A reputation for reliability becomes, then, a major asset—giving friends a sense of security and adversaries a sense of caution. A reputation for living up to our commitments can, in fact, make it less likely that pledges of support will have to be carried out. Crisis management is most successful when a favorable outcome is attained without firing a shot. Credibility is an intangible, but it is no less real. The same is true of a loss of credibility. A failure to support a friend always involves a price. Credibility, once lost, has to be reearned.

#### Facing the Future

The dilemmas and hard choices will not go away, no matter who is president. They are not partisan problems. Anyone who claims to have simple answers is talking nonsense.

The United States faces a time of challenge ahead as great as any in recent memory. We have a diplomacy that has moved toward peace through negotiation. We have rebuilt our strength so that we can defend our interests and dissuade others from violence. We have allies whom we value and respect. Our need is to recognize both our challenge and our potential.

Americans are not a timid people. A foreign policy worthy of America must not be a policy of isolationism or guilt but a commitment to active engagement. We can be proud of this country, of what it stands for, and what it has accomplished. Our morality should be a source of courage when we make hard decisions, not a set of excuses for self-paralysis.

President Reagan declared to the British Parliament nearly 2 years ago: "We must be staunch in our conviction that freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few but the inalienable and universal right of all human beings." As long as Americans hold to this belief, we will be actively engaged in the world. We will use our power and our diplomatic skill in the service of peace and of our ideals. We have our work cut out for us. But we will not shrink from our responsibility. ■

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# Terrorism: The Problem and the Challenges

June 13, 1984



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is a statement by Secretary Shultz before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Washington, D.C., June 13, 1984.*

I welcome this opportunity to discuss with you the problem of international terrorism and the challenges it poses to our country. This subject was discussed thoroughly at the recent meeting in London of heads of state and government and by their foreign ministers. A declaration was issued on June 9 which my staff has made available to you. In that declaration, the leaders "... expressed their resolve to combat this threat by every possible means, strengthening existing measures and developing effective new ones." One of the points in that declaration called on each country to close gaps in its national legislation, and that is one of the reasons for my appearance today. First, however, I want to discuss with you the problem in general and why it is of such growing concern to the President and me.

Terrorism has been a growing problem since 1968 when our ambassador to Guatemala was assassinated. Terrorist incidents reached a plateau in number in 1979. The number of recorded attacks has not varied significantly since then. In 1983 there were more than 500 attacks by international terrorists of which more than 200 were against the United States. This was only the tip of the iceberg because there were at least as

many threats and hoaxes. These are a cheap way to create an atmosphere of fear, and they also absorb a substantial amount of our resources as well as those of the host governments. Beyond this are national or indigenous terrorist activities which probably exceed by a factor of 100 what we define as international terrorism.

This problem is not confined to any geographic area. Fortunately, inside the United States we experience relatively few incidents. The problem for the United States is primarily in other areas of the world. The largest number of incidents overall and against the United States occurs in Europe followed by Latin America and the Middle East.

## Why Are We So Concerned?

Let me summarize briefly.

- In 1983 more Americans were killed and injured by acts of terrorism than in the 15 preceding years for which we have records.
- The attacks in 1983 were unique in the sheer violence of them. From our point of view, the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and the Marine barracks in Beirut and of our Embassy annex in Kuwait. But we were not the only victims. There was the bombing at Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly airport in Paris, the murder of four members of the South Korean Cabinet in Rangoon, the bombing destruction of a Gulf Air flight in one of the emirates, and others.

- We have stepped up our training and are also conducting exercises for our personnel overseas on the types of terrorist incidents they might have to deal with. We have, for example, added segments in every appropriate course at the Foreign Service Institute on how to deal with such problems.

- The Congress approved last year a program which will permit us to train foreign law enforcement officers on how to deal with terrorist acts. We are actively engaged in implementing that program. Although this program is designed to help other governments deal with these problems as it affects them, it should also improve considerably the response from other governments when we need help at one of our posts.

- We are carrying out security enhancement programs at all of our high-threat posts. We appreciate greatly the consistent support we have received from this committee in that effort.

- We have also taken steps to improve our ability to respond when incidents occur overseas. We have teams available to assist on crisis management, security, communications, and other matters.

- The cooperation of other governments often depends on how responsive we are on the security problems their diplomatic missions may have in the United States. The Congress has approved legislation which will assure that we have a comprehensive program to protect foreign officials, not only in Washington and New York City but other places in the United States. We are seeking funds for that program in the current budget.

- Finally, we are actively seeking to improve our capability to prevent attacks against our interests abroad. The London summit declaration discussed, among other things, "closer cooperation and coordination between police and security organizations and other relevant authorities, especially in the ex-

changes of information, intelligence and technical knowledge." And within the U.S. Government we are continuing to study other ways and means of deterring or preemptively dealing with a range of terrorist threats in conformity with existing law.

The legislation before you represents modest but necessary steps. They are essential steps because the problem will not go away: this is certainly not the last you will hear about the problem of terrorism.

But we need your help. The President and the Congress owe it to this country to do whatever is necessary to protect our people, our interests, and our most basic principles. ■

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# Terrorism: The Challenge to the Democracies

June 24, 1984



United States Department of State  
Bureau of Public Affairs  
Washington, D.C.

*Following is an address by Secretary Shultz before the Jonathan Institute's second Conference on International Terrorism, Washington, D.C., June 24, 1984.*

Five years have passed since the Jonathan Institute held its first conference on terrorism, and in that time the world has seen two major developments: one a cause for great distress; the other a reason for hope.

The distressing fact is that over these past 5 years terrorism has increased. More people were killed or injured by international terrorists last year than in any year since governments began keeping records. In 1983 there were more than 500 such attacks, of which more than 200 were against the United States. For Americans the worst tragedies were the destruction of our Embassy and then the Marine barracks in Beirut. But around the world, many of our close friends and allies were also victims. The bombing of Harrods in London, the bombing at Orly Airport in Paris, the destruction of a Gulf Air flight in the United Arab Emirates, and the Rangoon bombing of South Korean officials are just a few examples—not to mention the brutal attack on a West Jerusalem shopping mall this past April.

Even more alarming has been the rise of state-sponsored terrorism. In the past 5 years more states have joined the ranks of what we might call the "League of Terror," as full-fledged sponsors and supporters of indiscriminate—and not so indiscriminate—murder. Terrorist attacks supported by what Qadhafi calls

the "holy alliance" of Libya, Syria, and Iran, and attacks sponsored by North Korea and others, have taken a heavy toll of innocent lives. Seventy or more such attacks in 1983 probably involved significant state support or participation.

As a result, more of the world's people must today live in fear of sudden and unprovoked violence at the hands of terrorists. After 5 years, the epidemic is spreading and the civilized world is still groping for remedies.

Nevertheless, these past 5 years have also given us cause for hope. Thanks in large measure to the efforts of concerned governments, citizens, and groups like the Jonathan Institute, the peoples of the free world have finally begun to grapple with the problem of terrorism in intellectual and in practical terms. I say intellectual because the first step toward a solution to any problem is to understand that there is a problem and then to understand its nature. In recent years we have learned a great deal about terrorism, though our education has been painful and costly. We know what kind of threat international terrorism poses to our free society. We have learned much about the terrorists themselves, their supporters, their targets, their diverse methods, their underlying motives, and their eventual goals.

Armed with this knowledge we can focus our energies on the practical means for reducing and eventually eliminating the threat. We can all share the hope that, when the next conference of this institute is convened, we will look back and say that 1984 was the turning

point in our struggle against terrorism, that having come to grips with the problem we were able to deal with it effectively and responsibly.

### The Anatomy of Terrorism

Let me speak briefly about the anatomy of terrorism. What we have learned about terrorism, first of all, is that it is not random, undirected, purposeless violence. It is not, like an earthquake or a hurricane, an act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorists and those who support them have definite goals; terrorist violence is the means of attaining those goals. Our response must be twofold: we must deny them the means but above all we must deny them their goals.

But what are the goals of terrorism? We know that the phenomenon of terrorism is actually a matrix that covers a diverse array of methods, resources, instruments, and immediate aims. It appears in many shapes and sizes—from the lone individual who plants a homemade explosive in a shopping center, to the small clandestine group that plans kidnappings and assassinations of public figures, to the well-equipped and well-financed organization that uses force to terrorize an entire population. Its stated objectives may range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances to social and political revolution. International drug smugglers use terrorism to blackmail and intimidate government officials. It is clear that our responses will have to fit the precise character and circumstances of the specific threats.

But we must understand that the overarching goal of all terrorists is the same: with rare exceptions, they are attempting to impose their will by force—a special kind of force designed to create an atmosphere of fear. And their efforts are directed at destroying what all of us here are seeking to build. They're a threat to the democracies.

### The Threat to the Democracies

The United States and its democratic allies are morally committed to certain ideals and to a humane vision of the future. In our foreign policies, we try to foster the kind of world that promotes peaceful settlement of disputes, one that welcomes change without violent conflict. We seek a world in which human rights are respected by all governments, a world based on the rule of law. We know that in a world community where all nations share these blessings, our own democracy will flourish, our own nation will prosper, and our own people will continue to enjoy freedom.

Nor has ours been a fruitless search. In our lifetime, we have seen the world progress, though perhaps too slowly, toward this goal. Civilized norms of conduct have evolved, even governing relations between adversaries. Conflict persists; but, with some notorious exceptions, even wars have been conducted with certain restraints—indiscriminate slaughter of innocents is widely condemned; the use of certain kinds of weapons has been proscribed; and most, but not all, nations have heeded those proscriptions.

We all know that the world as it exists is still far from our ideal vision. But today, even the progress that mankind has already made is endangered by those who do not share that vision—who, indeed, violently oppose it.

For we must understand, above all, that terrorism is a form of political violence. Wherever it takes place, it is directed in an important sense against us, the democracies—against our most basic values and often our fundamental strategic interests. The values upon which democracy is based—individual rights, equality under the law, freedom of thought and expression, and freedom of religion—all stand in the way of those who seek to impose their will, their ideologies, or their religious beliefs by force. A terrorist has no patience and no respect for the orderly processes of democratic society, and, therefore, he considers himself its enemy.

And it is an unfortunate irony that the very qualities that make democracies so hateful to the terrorists also make them so vulnerable. Precisely because we maintain the most open societies, terrorists have unparalleled opportunity to strike against us.

### Terrorists and Freedom Fighters

The antagonism between democracy and terrorism seems so basic that it is hard to understand why so much intellectual confusion still exists on the subject. We have all heard the insidious claim that "one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter." Let me read to you the powerful rebuttal that was stated before your 1979 conference by a great American, Senator Henry Jackson, who, Mr. Chairman, as you observed, is very much with us.

The idea that one person's "terrorist" is another's "freedom fighter" cannot be sanctioned. Freedom fighters or revolutionaries don't blow up buses containing non-combatants; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't set out to capture and slaughter school children; terrorist murderers do. Freedom fighters don't assassinate innocent business-

men, or hijack and hold hostage innocent men, women, and children; terrorist murderers do. It is a disgrace that democracies would allow the treasured word "freedom" to be associated with acts of terrorists.

Where democracy is struggling to take root, the terrorist is, again, its enemy. He seeks to spread chaos and disorder, to paralyze a society. In doing so he wins no converts to his cause; his deeds inspire hatred and fear, not allegiance. The terrorist seeks to undermine institutions, to destroy popular faith in moderate government, and to shake the people's belief in the very idea of democracy. In Lebanon, for example, state-sponsored terrorism has exploited existing tensions and attempted to prevent that nation from rebuilding its democratic institutions.

Where the terrorist cannot bring about anarchy, he may try to force the government to overreact, or impose tyrannical measures of control, and hence lose the allegiance of the people. Turkey faced such a challenge but succeeded in overcoming it. Martial law was imposed; the terrorist threat was drastically reduced; and today we see democracy returning to that country. In Argentina, the widely and properly deplored "disappearances" of the 1970s were, in fact, part of a response—a deliberately provoked response—to a massive campaign of terrorism. We are pleased that Argentina, too, has returned to the path of democracy. Other countries around the world face similar challenges, and they, too, must steer their course carefully between anarchy and tyranny. The lesson for civilized nations is that we must respond to the terrorist threat within the rule of law, lest we become unwitting accomplices in the terrorist's scheme to undermine civilized society.

Once we understand terrorism's goals and methods, it is not too hard to tell, as we look around the world, who are the terrorists and who are the freedom fighters. The resistance fighters in Afghanistan do not destroy villages or kill the helpless. The *contras* in Nicaragua do not blow up school buses or hold mass executions of civilians.

How tragic it would be if democratic societies so lost confidence in their own moral legitimacy that they lost sight of the obvious: that violence directed against democracy or the hopes for democracy lacks fundamental justification. Democracy offers mechanisms for peaceful change, legitimate political competition, and redress of grievances. But resort to arms in behalf of democracy against repressive regimes or movements is, indeed, a fight for freedom,



since there may be no other way that freedom can be achieved.

The free nations cannot afford to let the Orwellian corruption of language hamper our efforts to defend ourselves, our interests, or our friends. We know the difference between terrorists and freedom fighters, and our policies reflect that distinction. Those who strive for freedom and democracy will always have the sympathy and, when possible, the support of the American people. We will oppose guerrilla wars where they threaten to spread totalitarian rule or deny the rights of national independence and self-determination. But we will oppose terrorists no matter what banner they may fly. For terrorism in any cause is the enemy of freedom.

### The Supporters of Terrorism

If freedom and democracy are the targets of terrorism, it is clear that totalitarianism is its ally. The number of terrorist incidents in or against totalitarian states is negligible. States that support and sponsor terrorist actions have managed in recent years to co-opt and manipulate the phenomenon in pursuit of their own strategic goals.

It is not a coincidence that most acts of terrorism occur in areas of importance to the West. More than 80% of the world's terrorist attacks in 1983 occurred in Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East. The recent posture statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it this way:

Terrorists may or may not be centrally controlled by their patrons. Regardless, the instability they create in the industrialized West and Third World nations undermines the security interests of the United States and its allies.

States that sponsor terrorism are using it as another weapon of warfare, to gain strategic advantage where they cannot use conventional means. When Iran and its allies sent terrorists to bomb Western personnel in Beirut, they hoped to weaken the West's commitment to defending its interests in the Middle East. When North Korea sponsored the murder of South Korean Government officials, it hoped to weaken the noncommunist stronghold on the mainland of East Asia. The terrorists who assault Israel are also enemies of the United States. When Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organization provide arms and training to the communists in Central America, they are aiding Soviet efforts to undermine our security in that vital region. When the Soviet Union and its clients provide financial, logistic, and training support

for terrorists worldwide; when the Red Brigades in Italy and the Red Army Faction in Germany assault free countries in the name of communist ideology—they hope to shake the West's self-confidence and sap its will to resist aggression and intimidation. And we are now watching the Italian authorities unravel the answer to one of the great questions of our time: was there Soviet-bloc involvement in the attempt to assassinate the Pope?

We should understand the Soviet role in international terrorism without exaggeration or distortion: the Soviet Union officially denounces the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Yet there is a wide gap between Soviet words and Soviet actions. One does not have to believe that the Soviets are puppeteers and the terrorists marionettes; violent or fanatic individuals and groups are indigenous to every society. But in many countries, terrorism would long since have passed away had it not been for significant support from outside. The international links among terrorist groups are now clearly understood; and the Soviet link, direct or indirect, is also clearly understood. The Soviets use terrorist groups for their own purposes, and their goal is always the same—to weaken liberal democracy and undermine world stability.

### A Counterstrategy Against Terrorism

Having identified the challenge, we must now consider the best strategy to counter it. We must keep in mind, as we devise our strategy, that our ultimate aim is to preserve what the terrorists seek to destroy: democracy, freedom, and the hope for a world at peace.

The battle against terrorism must begin at home. Terrorism has no place in our society, and we have taken vigorous steps to see that it is not imported from abroad. We are now working with the Congress on law enforcement legislation that would help us obtain more information about terrorists through the payment of rewards to informants and would permit prosecution of those who support states that use or sponsor terrorism. Our FBI is improving our ability to detect and prevent terrorist acts within our own borders.


We must also ensure that our people and facilities in other countries are better protected against terrorist attacks. So we are strengthening security at our Embassies around the world to prevent a recurrence of the Beirut and Kuwait Embassy bombings.

While we take these measures to protect our own citizens, we know that terrorism is an international problem that requires the concerted efforts of all free nations. Just as there is collaboration among those who engage in terrorism, so there must be cooperation among those who are its actual and potential targets.


An essential component of our strategy, therefore, has been greater cooperation among the democratic nations and all others who share our hopes for the future. The world community has achieved some successes. But, too often, countries are inhibited by fear of losing commercial opportunities or fear of provoking the bully. The time has come for the nations that truly seek an end to terrorism to join together, in whatever forums, to take the necessary steps. The declaration on terrorism that was agreed upon at the London economic summit 2 weeks ago was a welcome sign that the industrial democracies share a common view of the terrorist threat. And let me say that I trust and I hope that that statement and the specific things referred to in it will be the tip and only the visible part of the iceberg. We must build on that foundation.

Greater international cooperation offers many advantages. If we can collectively improve our gathering and sharing of intelligence, we can better detect the movements of terrorists, anticipate their actions, and bring them to justice. We can also help provide training and share knowledge of terrorist tactics. To that end, the Reagan Administration has acted promptly on the program that Congress approved last year to train foreign law enforcement officers in anti-terrorist techniques. And the President has sent Congress two bills to implement two international conventions to which the United States is a signatory: the International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages and the Montreal convention to protect against sabotage of civilian aircraft.

We must also make a collective effort to address the special problem of state-sponsored terrorism. States that support terror offer safehavens, funds, training, and logistical support. We must do some hard thinking about how to pressure members of the "League of Terror" to cease their support. Such pressure will have to be international, for no one country can exert sufficient influence alone. Economic sanctions and other forms of pressure impose costs on the nations that apply them, but some sacrifices will be necessary if we are to solve the problem. In the long run, I believe, it will have been a small price to pay.







## TERRORISM

### Issue:

How can the United States improve its deterrence of, protection against, and response to terrorist attacks?

### Objectives:

- Improve the effectiveness of legal instruments available to prosecute persons involved in terrorist activity.
- Improve international cooperation in combatting terrorism.
- Develop and build enhanced security and operational capabilities to prevent and respond to terrorist acts.

### Accomplishments:

- The Administration has submitted four bills to Congress which are designed to strengthen the legal instruments for dealing with terrorists.
- Western leaders at the London Economic Summit in June 1984 issued a declaration on international terrorism which includes a seven-point agreement on cooperative steps to be taken against terrorism.
- The President has issued a directive which, among other things, calls for:
  - Improved intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination.
  - Better security protection and awareness.
  - Preventive action to legally thwart terrorist attacks before they occur.
  - Improving response capabilities based on a cogent analysis of what responses are most likely to deter future attacks. (The directive explicitly rules out responding in kind, recognizing that this would hurt an open society far more than it would hurt terrorists.)

### Talking Points:

- During 1983, international terrorism took a terrifying toll in human life -- including 274 Americans who died in 393 separate incidents. In the U.S. six people died in 31 terrorist incidents. Terrorism poses an increasing danger to democratic societies, and to our way of life. It is an indiscriminate form of warfare being waged against the U.S. and its Western allies.

- In recent years we have seen the direct use of terror by foreign states. State terrorism accounts for the majority of terrorist murders and assassinations. Some states are providing training, financing, and logistical support to terrorists and terrorist groups. These activities are a growing source of danger to us and are a severe challenge to America's foreign policy.
- We seek to improve the ability of all the democracies to actively combat terrorism, to coordinate their actions, and to share information.
- Under Article 51 of the UN Charter, every sovereign nation has the right of self-defense. When we have credible evidence of an impending terrorist attack, the U.S. has the right and responsibility to confuse, disrupt, and prevent that attack.
- Terrorists are criminals. We expect our law enforcement agencies to protect us against terrorists and other criminals. American citizens, including diplomats and military personnel, have been the victims of forty percent of the terrorist incidents over the past decade. The fact that most attacks against Americans are occurring overseas does not reduce our responsibility to protect Americans -- the duty is no less clear, only more difficult.
- We will meet the challenge of terrorism head on. But in so doing, we must remain faithful to our democratic values, institutions, and laws.
- Two bills now pending before Congress would enable us to adhere fully to provisions of the Montreal Convention against aircraft sabotage and the UN Convention against taking hostages; another bill would provide the authority to pay rewards for information on international terrorist activities; a fourth bill would allow prosecution of those who assist states or groups to engage in terrorism.
- On July 23, 1983, the President issued a public statement urging international cooperation against terrorism, a subject he addressed again on September 17, 1983 in a message to European Chiefs of State and Heads of Government.

National Security Council  
The White House

*cdh*

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	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	<u>1</u>	<i>[Signature]</i>	
Bob Kimmitt		<i>[Signature]</i>	
John Poindexter	<u>2</u>		
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall			
Bud McFarlane			
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat			
Situation Room			

I = Information

A = Action

R = Retain

D = Dispatch

N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

*Good paper.*



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MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 14, 1984

~~SECRET~~ attached

SIGNED

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Background Information on Terrorism for Mr. Meese

Mr. Meese has asked for some background material on terrorism which can be used in both classified and unclassified discussions. The attached memo from you to Mr. Meese (Tab I) provides this information (Tabs A through L) which Bob Sayre at M/CT helped us to assemble.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memo to Mr. Meese at Tab I.

Approve           

Disapprove           

Attachments

Tab I - McFarlane Memo to Meese

Tab A - Global Terrorism Summary (U)

Tab B - State-Supported Terrorism (U)

Tab C - Use of Force Against Terrorist Acts (E)

Tab D - Highlights of NSDD-138 (S)

Tab E - Terrorism Questions and Answers (U)

Tab F - Terrorism and Insurgency Definitions (U)

Tab G - Bonn, Venice, and London Summit Declarations on Terrorism (U)

Tab H - Fact Sheet on the President's Anti-Terrorism Legislation, April 26, 1984

Tab I - Secretary Shultz address to the Trilateral Commission on April 3, 1984 (U)

Tab J - Secretary Shultz address to the House

Tab K - Foreign Affairs Committee June 13, 1984 (U)  
Secretary Shultz address to the Jonathan Institute on June 24, 1984 (U)

Tab L - Terrorism Excerpt from Volume on Selected National Security Issues, August 1984 (U)

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Declassify: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F92044#6  
BY MJR NARA, DATE 5/14/00



Directorate of Intelligence

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[Redacted]

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*These people can be expected to step up their activities if the Congress passes the Armenian Holocaust Resolution*

# Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (C NF)

A Research Paper

FBI Review Completed

~~Secret~~

GI 84-10148  
September 1984

Copy 441

DECLASSIFIED IN PART  
NLRR Crest  
BY CN NARA DATE 9/5/17

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**Intelligence Sources  
or Methods Involved  
(WNINTEL)**

**National Security  
Information**

**Unauthorized Disclosure  
Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

<b>Dissemination Control Abbreviations</b>	<b>NOFORN (NF)</b>	Not releasable to foreign nationals
	<b>NOCONTRACT (NC)</b>	Not releasable to contractors or contractor/consultants
	<b>PROPIN (PR)</b>	Caution—proprietary information involved
	<b>ORCON (OC)</b>	Dissemination and extraction of information controlled by originator
	<b>REL...</b>	This information has been authorized for release to...
	<b>FGI</b>	Foreign government information
	<b>WN</b>	WNINTEL—Intelligence sources or methods involved

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Directorate of  
Intelligence

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# Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (C NF)

A Research Paper

FBI Review Completed

This paper was prepared by the Terrorism Analysis Branch, Instability and Insurgency Center, Office of Global Issues. Information about the United States was provided by and coordinated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The paper was also coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Terrorism Analysis Branch, OGI, on  (u)

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GI 84-10148  
September 1984

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[Redacted] 25X1<sup>3</sup>

**Global Terrorism:  
The Justice Commandos of the  
Armenian Genocide (C NF)**

**Summary**  
*Information available  
as of 24 August 1984  
was used in this report.*

The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG) is a very efficient terrorist organization whose meticulous planning has allowed it to attack Turkish interests worldwide with virtual impunity. From its inception in 1975, JCAG has shunned connections to other terrorist groups or patron states, preferring to view itself as an elite cadre of freedom fighters, "un-uniformed soldiers," engaged in a war with Turkey for recognition of the Armenian genocide. JCAG's terrorist attacks are designed to force Turkey to admit responsibility for the deaths of about 1.5 million Armenians in 1915. (c)

The Justice Commandos' parent organization, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), is in competition with the other major Armenian terrorist group, the Marxist Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), for control of the Armenian revolutionary movement. The escalation of terrorist violence by ASALA since 1979 has convinced the ARF that it *must* step up terrorist activities to retain the membership of the young radicals who demand action against Turkey. (s)

JCAG and the ARF have the support of a segment of the worldwide Armenian community, which views the Justice Commandos as freedom fighters, not terrorists

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[Redacted]

Although JCAG has heretofore avoided and criticized attacks on non-Turkish targets, Armenian community perceptions that the United States is bowing to Turkish pressure to halt international investigation or recognition of the Armenian genocide may trigger JCAG terrorist violence against US interests

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[Redacted]

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Pressure to retaliate against Armenian terrorists may result in more attacks against Armenian communities worldwide.

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FBI Review Completed

## Global Terrorism: The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (C NF)

### Background to Armenian Terrorism

The Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide (JCAG), first appeared in 1975, but terrorism has intermittently held an important position in the cause of Armenian nationalism for nearly 100 years. The Armenian revolutionary movement and the terrorism it inspired grew out of the late-19th-century self-defense organizations developed by Armenians to protect themselves against victimization by Turks, Kurds, and Azeris. Modeled on Russian nihilist organizations—which advocated the use of intimidation, terror, and assassination—these paramilitary groups evolved into well-trained soldiery, influenced strongly by the revolutionary ideals promulgated by Russian social democrats. (u)

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) was one of the early nationalist revolutionary organizations. Founded in 1890, the ARF quickly developed a strong sense of national identity and fostered early dreams of an Armenian homeland—nonexistent since Armenia was conquered by the Ottoman Turks in the mid-13th century. The ARF produced the first real fighting units—*sedayihs*—volunteers who left home, lived off the land, and defended Armenian land and rights. The heroism, valor, and sacrifice of the early fighters provided a nucleus of values important to contemporary Armenian history. The ARF also provided a hero hierarchy around which the Armenian national consciousness was awakened and with which modern day Armenian terrorists have identified their exploits. Indeed, the *sedayih* oath to “kill the enemy or die trying” has served as a model for at least one recent suicide attack by Armenian terrorists in their attempts to gain international recognition of the genocide of 1915. (u)

Terrorism has been an important tactic of the ARF since its inception. The ARF's first success in gaining West European attention for the plight of Armenians massacred under the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid resulted from a terrorist act. On 26 August 1896, ARF terrorists seized the Ottoman bank in Istanbul and held it for 18 hours, thereby gaining guarantees

from Russia to press Turkey to promulgate reforms that favored the Armenians. The subsequent release of the terrorists and their safe conduct out of the Ottoman Empire provided a psychological victory for the ARF and a stimulant for the continued use of terrorist tactics. (u)

Nemesis, the shadowy predecessor of JCAG, was created by the ARF in 1921 to assassinate former Ottoman government officials it believed responsible for the massacre of 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians in 1915—an event that has become known as the Armenian genocide. While officially sanctioned by the ARF, these attacks were blood-feud killings carried out by Armenian assassins whose family members had been killed in the forced relocation march in 1915. Between 15 March 1921 and 25 July 1922, four principal figures in the defunct Ottoman government—including Minister of Interior Talaat Pasha—were slain by Armenians believed linked to Nemesis. ARF-sponsored attacks on Turkish Government officials ceased after the deaths of the officials most prominently linked to the genocide. The dispersion and subsequent assimilation of the Armenians after the massacres seemed to presage an end to terrorism. (u)

An isolated event in 1973 triggered the return to terrorism by Armenians. The revenge slaying of two Turkish diplomats in 1973 by an aged Armenian whose entire family had been slaughtered in 1915 captured widespread media attention (see inset) and provided inspiration to many young Armenians who were frustrated by the inability of the Armenian community to gain an international investigation of their claims against Turkey. (u)

This act of vengeance and the subsequent publicity surrounding a campaign to obtain his parole became the springboard for Armenian terrorism throughout



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**Gourgen Yanikian**

*On 28 January 1973, Gourgen Yanikian, a retired Armenian engineer haunted by memories of having watched while most of his family was slaughtered in Turkey almost 6 decades earlier, lured the Turkish Consul in Los Angeles and his aide to the Biltmore Hotel in Santa Barbara and shot them. At his trial Yanikian refused to acknowledge that his act had been criminal, claiming to have killed the diplomats in just retaliation for the deaths in 1915 of 24 of his family members. He also used the occasion to draw world attention to the Turkish massacre of 1.5 million Armenians and the dispersal of thousands of other Armenians throughout the world. (U)*



Figure 1. Gourgen Yanikian. (U)

the world. Between October 1973 and February 1975, Armenian terrorists claimed responsibility for three bomb attacks against Turkish facilities in the United States and the Middle East. They used a variety of names—the Yanikian Commandos, the Yanikian Group, and the Prisoner Yanikian Group—linked to the “martyr” Yanikian. The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)—in a communique announcing its creation in Beirut in 1975—acknowledged its debt to Yanikian, calling him the godfather of modern Armenian terrorism. It pledged to lead the struggle to gain an Armenian homeland and to retaliate against Turkey for the Armenian genocide (see inset). (U)

**The Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide**  
The rightwing Armenian terrorist group, the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, began its campaign of assassinations and bombings against Turkish diplomats in 1975. Stressing the narrow limits of its fight, JCAG has operated only against Turkish targets—usually diplomatic personnel and facilities. (C)

Police and intelligence agencies’ efforts against JCAG terrorism are hampered by the group’s professionalism. Only eight JCAG terrorists have been arrested in the nine years of JCAG’s activity. Despite the arrests of these eight, law enforcement and security officials have learned little about the identity of other JCAG members or the number of individuals involved in

terrorism. The stringent security practiced by the Justice Commandos—which includes armed bodyguards and automobile caravans for its leaders; strict compartmentation of operational planning; and the use of false, stolen, or “loaned” passports during operations—has made it difficult for traditional police methods to stop impending terrorist attacks or capturing terrorists after an attack. [REDACTED]

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The ethnic cohesiveness of the Armenian community and its inherent distrust of non-Armenians provide a distinct advantage for Armenian terrorists. In addition to a reluctance by most Armenians to talk to police, some segments of the community have rallied around arrested Armenian terrorists, providing financial and moral assistance. We suspect that a small portion of the Armenian community may also be involved in peripheral support to terrorist actions—including preoperational casing, weapons procurement, escape arrangements, and propaganda distribution. [REDACTED]

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**Organizational Structure.** Worldwide investigations of acts committed by JCAG since 1975 have determined that JCAG is a component of the ARF. The ARF political structure resembles a pyramid with individual chapters throughout the world forming its

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Figure 2. Flyer of political rally. (U)

**POLITICAL RALLY  
AND CONCERT**

to benefit the Los Angeles Five  
featuring  
in concert  
**KARNIG SARKISSIAN**  
**VIKEN YACUBIAN**

SUPPORT  
THE LA 5  
NEW JERSEY - NEW YORK  
LA 5  
DEFENSE COMMITTEE  
Sponsors  
BENEFIT CONCERT  
FOR LOS ANGELES FIVE  
Featuring  
KARNIG SARKISSIAN  
and  
VIKEN YACUBIAN  
Saturday February 25, 1984 8:30 p.m.  
at St. YAROSLAVITZ Church Hall  
461 Bergen Blvd. Ridgewood, N.Y.  
Hors d'oeuvres - bar - refreshments  
Donation \$10.00  
FOR RESERVATION CALL  
312-392-6019 201-641-2801  
ALL PROCEEDS TO GO TO LA 5 DEFENSE COMMITTEE

1984

at the City Center  
19310 Ford Road Mich., 5:00 p.m.

Hors d'oeuvres — — refreshments

**Donation: \$10.00**


ALL PROCEEDS TO GO TO LA 5 DEFENSE COMMITTEE

base.

**Figure 3**  
**Typical Armenian Assassination Attempt**

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A car with driver and diplomat is held up in traffic



Assassination teams  
· 1-3 members  
· 9 mm automatics

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**Modus Operandi of Attacks.** JCAG assassinations—15 have been successful since 1974—are meticulously designed to maximize the chance of success. Preliminary planning includes extensive surveillance of the target's movements and identification of an area where the victim is most exposed and vulnerable. It focuses on frequently used routes and aims to pinpoint a location where the victim is forced to stop or slow

for turns or traffic signals (see diagram). At least 12 JCAG assassination attempts have taken place when the victim was in a slowed or stopped automobile or when he was entering or leaving his home or office. (c)

All sites chosen for assassinations have included carefully chosen escape routes. The effectiveness of this meticulous planning has been reflected in the failure of police to capture JCAG terrorists at the scene or identify them through police investigation. Only the actions of bystanders on the scene resulted in the capture of one JCAG assassin—Haroution Levonian, arrested in Belgrade immediately after the slaying of the Turkish Ambassador in 1983. To date only three JCAG assassins have been arrested and stood trial. All three have been convicted. (S NF)

The analysis of eyewitness accounts of several JCAG assassinations reveals a uniformity in the techniques and type of perpetrator. The attackers are described as two or three men in their late teens or early twenties, often wearing jogging outfits to allay suspicion and frequently carrying two weapons to ensure the success of their mission. One or more of the attackers approaches the victim, fires several shots at the target, then steps in close to administer the coup de grace if necessary. Analysis of autopsy reports and forensic evidence indicates these attackers are skilled and practiced marksmen who are able to fire rapidly into small areas with remarkable precision. The weapons—untraceable in most instances—are left at the scene by the assassins, who flee to waiting escape vehicles, frequently driven by local supporters. (S)

Immediately after an attack, telephone calls to press agencies in cities throughout the world claim the attack for JCAG, frequently emphasizing the distinction between the Justice Commandos and their rival group, ASALA. Written communiques—usually forwarded to news agencies and wire services—provide elaboration on the attacks and reiterate Armenian demands. (c)

**JCAG Versus ASALA: A Deadly Rivalry.** The rivalry between the ARF and ASALA has existed since the creation of ASALA in 1975. ASALA's emphasis on terrorism to further the Armenian cause found a ready audience with young ARF members who could see no results from the ARF's political activities.

ASALA's propaganda organ, *Armenia*, fueled the rivalry by publishing interviews with ex-ARF youths who had been involved in ASALA operations as well as criticisms of ARF refugee programs that helped Armenians to relocate rather than attempt to return to an Armenian homeland. Claims by ASALA to terrorist attacks conducted by JCAG have further heated the enmity between the two groups. Successful attacks by one group often have prompted attacks by the other. Frequent bursts of internecine street fighting—[redacted] in 1982—have prompted members of each group to provide information to police and security authorities about the other. [redacted]

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ASALA's taunting criticism of JCAG's terrorist tactics—"cowardly hit-and-run assassinations with little fear of capture"—which began appearing in the Armenian press in 1982 and 1983, may have stung the ARF to vary its tactics. On 27 July 1983 a group of Armenian terrorists, identifying themselves as members of the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA), attempted to take over the Turkish Embassy in Lisbon. Circumstantial evidence—including links to the ARF-sponsored Armenian Relief Society, which claimed the bodies of the terrorists—indicates that the ARF probably ordered the attack. We suspect the Embassy seizure, which resulted in the deaths of two Turks and five terrorists, was intended to be a lengthy hostage situation aimed at garnering extensive publicity. It followed by less than two weeks a spectacular ASALA bombing at Orly Airport in Paris—which killed nine and injured 60 and received considerable publicity in the world press. [redacted]

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We doubt this rivalry between the ARF and ASALA will abate, and it may even increase in intensity. In a letter to the *Armenian Reporter* in December 1983, ASALA cited recent ARF criticisms of ASALA as a tactic to gain control of the Armenian community and threatened violent retaliation against the ARF. This struggle for control of the Armenian revolutionary movement may prompt further changes in tactics by both groups and could trigger more indiscriminate violence. [redacted]

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
**The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia**

The second prominent Armenian terrorist organization, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), is a Marxist group with links to Palestinian terrorist groups and Middle Eastern patron states. Like JCAG, ASALA demands an Armenian homeland and official Turkish recognition of the 1915 genocide. (U)

ASALA was formed in January 1975, advocating an armed struggle to achieve the liberation of Armenia and to improve the lot of the "exploited classes." ASALA sharply criticized the ARF for its lack of progress in furthering Armenian goals and provided an alternative to radical young Armenians who embraced ASALA's terrorist ideology. (U)

ASALA initially conducted attacks, mainly bombings and assassinations, solely against Turkish targets. After the capture of three of its members in 1980 in Switzerland and France, however, ASALA—using covernames such as Orly Group and 3 October Organization—began retaliatory attacks against other countries who held ASALA militants.

ASALA terrorist attacks in 1983—the June machine-gun attack in the Istanbul bazaar and the July bombing of the Turkish Airlines counter at Orly Airport in Paris—indicated a growing pattern of indiscriminate violence aimed at garnering maximum publicity. This trend has provoked fragmentation within ASALA; one splinter group, the ASALA Revolutionary Movement, insists on limiting its attacks to its traditional enemy, the Turks. (U)



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ASALA's organization and tactics are profiled in detail in *DI Research Paper GI 84-10008/EUR 84-10004* [redacted] January 1984, The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia: A Continuing International Threat. (C NF)

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Figure 4. Armenian commemorative service. (U)

# "A Moment to Reflect"

A commemorative service for  
The Lisbon Five  
Hosted by the following AYP-YOARF chapters:



Chicago Ararat Chapter  
January 21 at 7:30 p.m.  
Armenian All Saints Apostolic Church  
Shahnazarian Hall  
1701 North Greenwood Avenue  
Glenview, Illinois

Detroit Kopernik Tandourjian Chapter  
January 28 at 8:00 p.m.  
Armenian Community Center  
of Greater Detroit  
19310 Ford Road  
Dearborn, Michigan


Washington Sevan Chapter  
January 15 at 8:00 p.m.  
Soorp Khatch Church  
4906 Flint Drive  
Chevy Chase, Maryland

Providence Varantian Chapter  
January 22 at 12:30 p.m.  
Sts. Vartanantz Church Hall  
402 Broadway  
Providence, Rhode Island

New York Hyortik and  
New Jersey Arsen Chapters  
January 29 at 3:00 p.m.  
Sts. Vartanantz Church Hall  
461 Bergen Boulevard  
Ridgefield, New Jersey

*The Turkish Response.* The fanaticism of Armenian terrorism has strengthened the Turkish Government's public refusals to make concessions or political gestures to Armenian nationalists. Turkey has consistently denied any responsibility for the massacre of the Armenians in 1915. While admitting that deaths occurred, Turks cite attacks by bandits and the ravages of economic deprivation as the cause. (U)

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Turkish Government efforts to underscore the plight of Turkish victims of Armenian terrorism and generate support for Turkey's position have largely failed. The European press has tended to side with the Armenians in the matter of the genocide and has not focused attention on the Turkish victims of Armenian terrorist attacks. Media campaigns—particularly in France—that sympathetically depict the Armenian claims have hurt relations between Turkey and its European allies.



Turkey's frustration over Armenian terrorism has led to intensified diplomatic efforts to obtain international assistance against Armenian terrorism. Since the late 1970s, Ankara has periodically approached the United States, NATO, and West European countries to request improved information sharing and increased physical protection for Turkish diplomatic facilities. Increased intelligence exchanges and protective measures on an international scale have failed to halt Armenian terrorism. Public expressions of sympathy by several West European governments for the Armenian cause and the perceived reluctance of them to provoke retaliation from Armenian terrorists have apparently fueled Turkish suspicions that the West Europeans are doing far less than they could to thwart Armenian violence against Turks. (C)

The continuation of Armenian terrorist violence has resulted in increasing domestic political pressure on the Turkish Government to deal more effectively with the terrorist threat.



*Armenian Terrorism in the United States.* Armenian terrorism is not confined to Europe and the Middle East, but has become an increasing problem in the United States in the past two years. Most Armenian terrorism in the United States since 1980 can be linked to the Armenian community in southern California. Analysis of evidence gathered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) indicates that the US

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Figure 5. Armenian demonstrators, May 1982. (u)



Washington Post ©

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leadership of JCAG is in Los Angeles. FBI investigations also indicate that suspected JCAG members in Los Angeles have been informed of JCAG attacks conducted elsewhere. Forensic evidence has linked the Los Angeles organization to JCAG bombings in New York. FBI investigation has also determined that the attempted bombing of the honorary Turkish consul in Philadelphia on 22 October 1982 was planned by JCAG members in Los Angeles. Six of the eight JCAG members arrested worldwide have been apprehended in California [redacted]

**Political Initiatives.** The success of Armenian terrorism can be measured in the resurgence of expatriate community efforts to redress their grievances. Public terrorist trials, particularly in Los Angeles and Paris, have repeatedly focused attention on Armenian grievances and provided public forums for Armenian efforts to publicize the genocide. Concern is growing within the Armenian communities that the impact of these trials—and the sacrifices of the “freedom fighters”—will be lost if the momentum of the new wave of nationalism cannot be translated into political gains. (u)

Worldwide political organizations—linked to both JCAG and ASALA—are also attempting to exploit for political ends the extensive publicity generated by

terrorist actions. The ARF has created its own political action committee, the Armenian National Congress, to orchestrate political initiatives regarding the Armenian cause. The ARF is attempting to return to the Socialist International and establish closer relations with socialist parties to elicit support for the Armenian cause. ASALA, too, was active behind the scenes in organizing the Second International Armenian Congress in July 1983, which drafted a constitution for a permanent organization to lead the Armenian Diaspora. (c)

Armenian communities in North America and Western Europe now appear to be turning to political organizations in individual countries to push for recognition; in the United States they have organized direct mailing campaigns to stimulate pressure for Congressional resolutions to acknowledge the genocide and to cancel US aid to Turkey. Armenian communities worldwide are exploring international avenues, such as asking the European Community Court of Justice for reparations for losses stemming from the Diaspora and successfully petitioning the United Nations to reopen deliberations on Paragraph 30 of the Human Rights Commission on the Prevention of Genocide. [redacted]

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Other grassroots organizations have appeared in the past 10 years to assist these political initiatives. Groups such as the Society for the Recognition of the Genocide Committed Against the Armenians have embarked on a wide range of activities—including development of a film series documenting testimony from genocide survivors and publication of a series of historical books explaining the genocide—to aid the campaign for international recognition of the genocide. These groups help organize and participate in worldwide demonstrations and rallies on 24 April every year to commemorate the genocide and to encourage the Armenian community to rededicate itself to the struggle. [redacted]

These international political initiatives are beginning to show concrete gains. At least in part as a result of these efforts, the United Nations has scheduled deliberations during the summer of 1984 on Paragraph 30—referring to the existence of the Armenian genocide—for possible inclusion in the United Nations Human Rights Commission report on preventing genocide. Armenian groups have been successful in having candidates for office in the United States sponsor several resolutions before the US Congress concerning the genocide and Armenian grievances against Turkey, including one that would curtail US aid to Turkey. (C)

**Outlook**

We anticipate no early end to Armenian terrorism. We doubt that any of the Armenian political initiatives being undertaken—even if successful—will have a long-term ameliorating effect on the violence. Armenian terrorism is rooted in the frustrations of an ethnic group that feels terrorism offers it the best chance of ultimately achieving its goals. The refusal of the Turkish Government to acknowledge the genocide will continue to antagonize the worldwide Armenian community and may provide impetus for even more terrorism within the Armenian Diaspora. [redacted]

Neither stepped-up law enforcement nor intelligence activities have noticeably deterred Armenian terrorist capabilities. Although the Justice Commandos have suffered some serious setbacks in the past two years— [redacted]

**The California Connection**

California's large Armenian population has been largely responsible for making it the focal point for Armenian terrorism in the United States. Following the genocide, thousands of Armenians settled in the San Joaquin Valley of California and quickly became assimilated. A second wave of Armenian immigrants, who arrived from the Middle East over the past 10 years, have proved, however, to be a destabilizing force. According to numerous open-source articles [redacted] these immigrants have been radicalized by the violent political instability of Turkey in the 1970s and the Middle East—following the Lebanese civil war and the Israeli invasion of Beirut—as well as exposure to the Palestinian model of politics and terrorism. (C NF)

Fired by a resurgent Armenian nationalism and an enhanced sense of identity, these newer immigrants attempted, at first unsuccessfully, to spur the older, politically passive Armenian community into action. According to academic and press articles, both cultural and economic differences—between a disproportionately wealthy group of third-generation Armenians and newly arrived, destitute immigrants—hindered unified political action by the California Armenian community. (U)

The killing of the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles in January 1982 proved to be the catalyst that unified both segments of the Armenian community. Extensive publicity surrounding that assassination focused US attention on Armenian grievances against Turkey but, more importantly, directed Armenian attention to its neglected cultural heritage. Numerous press sources have reported that, in the eyes of the older generation of Armenians, the assassination demonstrated that terrorism obtained results whereas the peaceable efforts of 69 years had failed. To the young, third-generation Armenian-Americans, the terrorists represented romantic figures who did more than merely talk about the genocide. Various open sources note that, while most Armenians recognize that terrorism alone can never solve the Armenian questions and gain justice for the Armenian cause, many Armenians have become convinced that, if it had not been for the use of violence, no one would be aware of Armenian grievances. (U)

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Figure 6. Armenian memorial service. (U)

we do not believe these reversals will curtail JCAG terrorist activities. We believe the support from the Armenian community for terrorism creates a threat to Turkish diplomatic facilities and personnel worldwide that will preclude most counterterrorist efforts. [redacted]

[redacted]

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25X1

To date, the Justice Commandos have not attacked US interests despite the arrests of six JCAG members in the United States. We note that ASALA's targeting of only Turkish diplomats changed radically to include retaliatory attacks against other governments when they began arresting ASALA members. According to FBI analysis, JCAG may conduct retaliatory attacks against US targets if it comes to feel that the United States is restricting JCAG's activities as a result of Turkish political pressure [redacted]

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## Appendix A

### Modern Armenian Terrorism: The Historical Background

The intense passion that inspires modern Armenian terrorism is rooted deeply in centuries of conflict between Armenians and Turks. Armenia has not existed as an independent state since the mid-13th century, when the Ottoman Turks conquered the area which now comprises parts of Turkey, Iran, and the Soviet Union. Although given some measure of autonomy—in exchange for passive political loyalty—the Armenians were always considered by the Turks as *zimmi*, a Turkish term meaning tolerated infidels. The delicate balance of interests between the Muslim Turks and the Christian Armenians was shattered by the rapidly escalating decay of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 19th century. (U)

The collapse of the Ottoman Empire played a key role in creating the conditions that resulted in large-scale massacres of Armenians by Turks in the late 19th and early 20th centuries—and which, in turn, spawned the current blood feud being waged by some Armenians. The decline of the Ottoman Empire had encouraged European involvement in Turkish affairs. Simmering discontent by minorities throughout the empire proved a readily exploitable avenue for foreign intervention. This foreign involvement, coupled with religious antagonism and deep-seated economic jealousy of minorities, including the Armenians, focused Turkish anger and repression on the Ottoman minorities, particularly the Armenians. Moreover, Armenians—who had frequently looked to Russia for guarantees of protection under the umbrella of Christianity—became convenient scapegoats. The oppression came to a head during the years 1890 to 1915 under the Young Turk regime, which blamed Armenians for the inevitable disorders and upheavals that were resulting from centuries of Ottoman decline. (U)

The date of 24 April 1915—when the leaders of the Constantinople Armenian community were rounded up by the Turks and sent away to their deaths—is commemorated annually by Armenians worldwide in remembrance of the Armenian genocide. This date marked the beginning of mass deportations to the desolate Syrian wilderness of Deir al-Zor (Dayr az Zawr), which stripped central Turkey of its Armenian

population and resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of Armenian men, women, and children. Estimates from foreign observers of the death toll range from 600,000 to 1.5 million Armenians, who died as a result of Turkish and Kurdish attacks, starvation, and privation. (U)

Death statistics alone fail to illustrate both the magnitude of the loss and the effect on the survivors. Armenian scholars claim that nearly every Armenian household lost relatives in the massacres. The disrupted existence of the survivors in the years immediately after the massacres forced the internalization of the pain and suffering. Few Armenians forgot, however, and, as the immigrant press began to develop in countries where the survivors had fled, the genocide became the primary topic. Sixty-nine years after the event, the genocide is still referred to in the Armenian press, along with demands for international recognition of Turkey's role in the slaughter. (U)

Turkish historians have routinely dismissed Armenian accounts of the atrocities of 1915 as propaganda. They cite the anger of local Ottoman bureaucrats over alleged Armenian treason in aiding Russia during the First World War as the reason for any excesses which occurred during the deportations. Moreover, Turkey disavows all responsibility for the policies of the Ottoman regime. (U)

Testimony and evidence from numerous international sources—missionary, press, and diplomatic, especially the reports of the US Ambassador to Turkey, Henry Morgenthau—have influenced historians that the massacres occurred. The point of contention has been whether it was an organized, government-directed genocide or a series of spontaneous outbreaks of racial violence. International attempts to investigate Armenian allegations of genocide have been consistently thwarted by the Turkish Government. (U)

The denial of the genocide by Turkey has provided a powerful stimulus for modern Armenian terrorism. The ARF has been uniquely qualified to lead Armenian efforts to gain international recognition of the Armenian genocide. Efforts of the ARF in 1915 to organize and direct the few pockets of resistance against the Turks have become imprinted in the Armenian psyche through literature, art, and music, providing the ARF with powerful emotional leverage over the Armenian Diaspora today. (U)

The dispersion of Armenians following the massacres of 1915, however, spawned a generation free from Armenian violence against Turkey. The survivors' struggle to relocate, rebuild their lives, and overcome economic deprivation supplanted the desire for revenge. Traumatized by the massacres and frequently discriminated against by the communities where they settled, Armenian immigrants hastened to lose all traces of their Armenian background. This assimilation resulted in a temporary rejection by many Armenians of Armenian culture, language, and politics. (U)

A series of events in the period after World War II spurred the Armenian Diaspora to a recovered sense of national identity. The appearance of the term "genocide" during the Nuremberg war trials in 1946 awoke bitter memories within the victims who had survived the events of 1915. The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 96 on 11 December 1946—identifying and condemning genocide as a crime under international law—and the demand of the Convention on Genocide in 1948 that states punish those responsible for committing genocide provided an international basis for Armenian claims against Turkey. These milestones, combined with changing international political attitudes toward ethnic and minority movements and their problems of identity, stirred Armenian hopes for legal redress of their grievances against the Turks. (U)

Armenian political activism received its first important stimulus from events surrounding the publication of the United Nations Human Rights Commission Report on Preventing Genocide. Paragraph 30, referring to the Armenian genocide, ' was removed at the insistence of the Turkish Government. A statement of the Special Rapporteur claimed that no proof existed that the genocide of Armenians occurred. Despite intervention by the United States, the USSR, France, and others, subsequent attempts to restore Paragraph 30 have been unsuccessful to date. (U)

This denial of the massacres without a hearing in any international forum sharply radicalized the diaspora. Lacking a state to present its case to international organizations, Armenian communities tried to create media interest in their cause. They had little success, however, until Armenian terrorist activities began to garner publicity. (U)

' "Passing to the modern era, one may note the existence of relatively full documentations dealing with the massacre of Armenians, which has been described as "the first genocide of the 20th century." ' (U)

29

**Appendix B**

**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,  
October 1973-June 1984**


Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
<b>1973</b>			
26 October	New York City, United States	Yanikian Commandos	Smoke bomb sent to Turkish Consulate
<b>1974</b>			
26 October	New York City, United States	Yanikian Commandos	Bomb sent to Turkish Consulate
<b>1975</b>			
20 January	Beirut, Lebanon	Prisoner Karekin (Gourgen) Yanikian Group	Bomb discovered at World Council of Churches office
20 February	Beirut, Lebanon	Yanikian Group	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
22 October	Vienna, Austria	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador and driver
24 October	Paris, France	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador
<b>1976</b>			
28 May	Zurich, Switzerland	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Consulate and a Turkish bank
<b>1977</b>			
14 May	Paris, France	New American Resistance * (NAR)	Bombing of Turkish tourism office
9 June	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican
<b>1978</b>			
3 January	London, England	NAR	Bombing of Turkish bank
	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Bombing of apartment of a Turkish Embassy counselor
2 June	Madrid, Spain	ASALA and JCAG	Assassination of brother, wife, and chauffeur of Turkish Ambassador to Spain
6 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
17 December	Geneva, Switzerland	NAR	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
<b>1979</b>			
January	Madrid, Spain	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways and TWA offices
8 July	Paris, France	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish tourism office and Turkish labor attache's office
12 October	The Hague, Netherlands	JCAG	Assassination of son of Turkish Ambassador
9 December	Rome, Italy	NAR	Bombing of El Al and British Airways offices, injuring nine
22 December	Amsterdam, Netherlands	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Airlines office
	Paris, France	Commandos of Armenian Avengers (probably JCAG)	Assassination of Turkish press attache
<b>1980</b>			
19 January	Spain	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways, TWA, Swissair, and Sabena Airlines offices (JCAG later denied responsibility)

**A Chronology of Armenian Terrorism,  
October 1973-June 1984 (continued)**

Date	Location of Attack	Group/Name Used	Incident Description
1 February	Brussels, Belgium	NAR	Bombing of Aeroflot and Turkish Airlines offices
	Paris, France	NAR	Bombing of Soviet information office
6 February	Bern, Switzerland	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador
17 April	Rome, Italy	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish Ambassador to the Vatican
6 October	Beverly Hills, United States	JCAG	Firebombing of Turkish Consul General's residence
12 October	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Music City Tours
	New York City, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish mission to the United Nations
1 December	Paris, France	JCAG	Bombing of British Airways, Lufthansa, and Sebena Airlines offices
17 December	Sidney, Australia	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish General Consul and bodyguard
<b>1981</b>			
2 April	Copenhagen, Denmark	JCAG	Attempted assassination of Turkish labor counselor
13 June	Anaheim, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Anaheim convention center
20 November	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
<b>1982</b>			
28 January	Los Angeles, United States	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Consul General
22 March	Cambridge, United States	JCAG	Bombing of Turkish Consulate
8 April	Ottawa, Canada	ASALA and Armenian Liberation Front (probably linked to JCAG)	Attempted assassination of Turkish Commercial Counselor
24 April	Cologne, West Germany	NAR	Attempted bombing of Turkish bank
	Dortmund, West Germany	NAR	Bombing of Turkish bank
4 May	Boston, United States	JCAG	Assassination of the honorary Turkish consul
27 May	Ottawa, Canada	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish military attache
7 June	Lisbon, Portugal	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish attache and wounding of wife, who later died
9 September	Burgas, Bulgaria	Combat Units of Justice Against Armenian Genocide (probably JCAG)	Assassination of Turkish administrative attache
22 October	Boston, United States	JCAG	Attempted bombing of honorary Turkish Counsel (alleged member of JCAG arrested aboard aircraft in Boston)
<b>1983</b>			
9 March	Belgrade, Yugoslavia	JCAG	Assassination of Turkish Ambassador to Yugoslavia
14 July	Brussels, Belgium	ASALA, JCAG, and ARA	Assassination of Turkish administrative attache
27 July	Lisbon, Portugal	ARA	Takeover of Turkish Embassy, which resulted in killing of hostages and deaths of five terrorists
<b>1984</b>			
20 June	Vienna, Austria	ARA	Car bomb assassination of Turkish labor attache

\* Analysis of the types and nationalities of targets, locations, and forensic evidence indicates the NAR may also be a cover name used by the ARF in claiming attacks against Turkish targets.

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


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~~Secret~~

NSC/S PROFILE

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ID 8406621

35

RECEIVED 07 SEP 84 08

TO MCFARLANE FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 06 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

AM

OAKLEY, ROBERT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED MTG FOR OAKLEY W/ POINDEXTER ON TERRORISM

14 Sep

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 10 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES PA

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FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

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SMITH, ETC

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The White House

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John Poindexter	3	J	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	4	WHL - has ey	
Bud McFarlane	5	M	A
Bob Kimmitt			
NSC Secretariat	6		N
Situation Room			

I = Information    **A = Action**    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP Meese Baker Deaver Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

Bud knows Bob from his service on the NSC staff (1974-76).

If the French want to talk in Nov., I will also go there as well as London. J

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 6, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Proposed Meeting with Ambassador Robert Oakley

On September 10, 1984, Ambassador Robert Sayre will depart and Ambassador Robert Oakley will officially assume the title of Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism at the Department of State. Ambassador Oakley would like to meet with you and ADM Poindexter on a "get-acquainted" basis for approximately 10-15 minutes. He will be departing the U.S. on Friday, September 14, for the London Summit "follow-up" conference and then on to Paris to arrange for November U.S.-French bilaterals.

A bio on Ambassador Oakley is attached at Tab A.

RECOMMENDATION

1. That you and ADM Poindexter agree to meet with Ambassador Oakley before his scheduled trip.

Approve RCM Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

2. That ADM Poindexter agree to meet with Ambassador Oakley during this time period, if your scheduled does not allow.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment

Tab A - Bio on Ambassador Robert Oakley



BIOGRAPHIC SKETCH

ROBERT B. OAKLEY

Director of the Office for Counter-terrorism  
and Emergency Planning

Robert B. Oakley became Director of the Office for Counter-terrorism and Emergency Planning on September 10, 1984. From December 1982 until August 1984 he served as United States Ambassador to the Somali Democratic Republic. From November 1979 through August 1982 he served as Ambassador to the Republic of Zaire. Until his appointment to Zaire, he had been serving as the Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of the East Asian Bureau with an area of responsibility that included the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Viet Nam, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. Prior to that he was the Senior Staff Member for the Middle East on the National Security Council Staff from 1974 through 1976.

Ambassador Oakley was born in Dallas, Texas on March 12, 1931, and was raised in Shreveport, Louisiana. After graduating from Princeton University in 1952, he became a naval intelligence officer and served on the staff of the Commander of the Naval Forces of the Far East, in Yokosuka, Japan, for over two years. He attended graduate school at Tulane University before entering the Foreign Service in 1957.

His assignments have included service in Khartoum, Abidjan, Viet Nam, Paris, U.S. Mission to the United Nations and Beirut. He received the Department's Meritorious Honor Award in 1963 for his work in United Nations Political Affairs.

He is married to the former Phyllis Elliott, also a Foreign Service Officer. They have two children who are college students.



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ID 8406868

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

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TO POINDEXTER

FROM HANNAY, D

DOCDATE 12 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

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Val II  
# 9/14/85*

SUBJECT: LTR TO POINDEXTER FM HANNAY RE COUNTER TE

SECRET

ACTION: APPROPRIATE ACTION

DUE: 17 SEP 84 STATUS S FILES

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FOR CONCURRENCE

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<i>Document Description</i>				
210627	MEMO	2	12/16/1985	B1
NORTH TO SECRETARIAT RE ATTACHED LETTER (LETTER INCLUDED)				

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- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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ID 8406892

RECEIVED 15 SEP 84 09

TO MCFARLANE

FROM NORTH

DOCDATE 14 SEP 84.

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

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*Smith, W*

SUBJECT: CALL TO ATTORNEY GENERAL RE TERRORISM LEGISLATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 17 SEP 84 STATUS X FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

MCFARLANE

COMMENTS

REF# LOG NSCIFID ( DW )

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National Security Council  
The White House

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Bob Kimmitt	<u>2</u>	<u>K</u>	
John Poindexter	<u>3</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
Tom Shull			
Wilma Hall	<u>4</u>		
Bud McFarlane	<u>5</u>	<u>my letter</u>	<u>Anton.</u>
Bob Kimmitt	<u>6</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	
NSC Secretariat	<u>7</u>	<u>[Signature]</u>	<u>N 9/17</u>
Situation Room	<u>[Signature]</u>		<u>[Signature]</u>

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_  
(Date/Time)

As I understand it one of the problems is the haughty approach that Justice uses in general in dealing with the Congress. We really need to get the AG to take an interest in getting the bills passed by cooperating (over)

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

September 14, 1984

6892  
Hess and  
Conroy  
bill  
to AG's  
see

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT: Call to Attorney General William French Smith regarding Terrorism Legislation

Done 9/17  
by Ollie  
m  
9/17

This afternoon ADM Poindexter, Amb Bob Oakley, and North met to review our next steps on the terrorism issue. As you know, Oakley is our new Director, Office of Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning at the State Department. He replaces Bob Sayre as the Chairman of the IG/T.

Oakley urged that you call the Attorney General to press him <sup>on</sup> the terrorism legislation. It looks as though we have a good chance for passage of at least 3 of the 4 bills we have pending. Unfortunately, Justice is not providing all the assistance they could in this effort.

The talking points at Tab I are for your use in trying to stimulate Justice support for this effort.

RECOMMENDATION

That you use the talking points at Tab I in your call to the Attorney General.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachment  
Tab I - Talking Points



TALKING POINTS

EFFORT TO GET PASSAGE OF TERRORISM LEGISLATION

In talks with Congressional leadership it appears we still have a fair chance in this session to get passage of three of the Administration's anti-terrorism bills, the two implementing bills (for the Montreal Convention against aircraft sabotage and the United Nations Convention against hostage taking) and the rewards bill.

The momentum on international cooperation to combat terrorism that we have built up in the Economic Summit group is very important to maintain, and we think the example of Congressional action on these bills will help. It is particularly important to have a good legislative showing in light of the September meeting of terrorism specialists in London next week, and the meeting of Foreign Ministers in New York on September 27.

To get that done, it is essential to work closely and quickly with House Judiciary, particularly the Hughes Crime Subcommittee to arrange hearings, move the bills out of committee, and get them to the floor. State has been working hard on this. Hughes and Sawyer are agreeable to giving it a try, but they want to be assured that the Administration has its act together. In particular, they want firm assurance from Justice of its support.

We understand Justice has indicated willingness to work to get the bills passed and to send up a witness to support Administration appearances when necessary, probably this coming week. A call from you to Rodino not later than Monday would be very helpful.

AG

On the fourth bill, the HFAC alternative draft to the original prohibitions against training and support for terrorism bill, the House Foreign Affairs Committee now plans to consider the bill further and may go immediately to markup next week.

46

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

RECEIVED 27 SEP 84 09

TO PRESIDENT

FROM MCFARLANE

*av 9/5/17*

DOC DATE 26 SEP 84

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

LEBANON

OAKLEY, R

SUBJECT: DEBRIEF OF AMB OAKLEY MISSION TO BEIRUT

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.