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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
210871	COMPUTER PRINTOUT	DESCRIBING TWO ATTACHED MEMOS (SAME TEXT) ALLEN TO SECRETARY HAIG RE IRAN	3	2/3/1981	B1

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

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TO HAIG, A

FROM ALLEN

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KEYWORDS: IRAN

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR STATUS OF 3 AMERICANS DETAINED IN IRAN

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TO NANCE

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM

LATIN AMERICA

STANS, MAURICE

USSR

METHVIN, EUGENE

SUBJECT: STUDY FOR USG RESPONSE TO INTL TERRORISM RE OFFICE OF PUBLIC SAFETY

ACTION: ALLEN SGD MEMO TO NANCE

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 18, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR BUD NANCE

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *R.V.A.*

SUBJECT: Sendings from Maurice Stans and Eugene Methvin

As luck would have it, two gentlemen whom I saw consecutively came to mention the role of the Office of Public Safety in the State Department in prior years.

The International Police Academy was a function of the Office of Public Safety, and was killed by Senator Church during the aftermath of Watergate.

The IPA was an important part of our arsenal of weapons to combat terrorism, especially since it sought to strengthen the internal security of less-developed countries.

It may well be that we should begin an effort to recreate an agency of this type, especially as a component part of a long-range positive policy for Latin America.

Please have the appropriate staff members review these materials and begin a preliminary study of this matter.

When our study has been completed, we will offer the subject as a topic for a National Security Council meeting.

cc: The Vice President
Ed Meese
James Baker

*2/19/81
dispatched by
JP*

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Review on 18 Feb 1987

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BY *CV* NARA DATE *9/8/17*

4

Eugene H. Methvin
8111 Old Georgetown Pike
McLean, Virginia 22101

February 18, 1981

MEMO TO: Dick Allen
FROM: Gene Methvin
SUBJECT: A Needed USG Response to International Terrorism

SUMMARY

A vital U.S. instrumentality in the struggle against terrorism, the Agency for International Development's Office of Public Safety-International Policy Academy structure, was destroyed by Congress in 1975 in response to KGB-DGI "disinformation" propaganda and the national mood of global withdrawal after the Southeast Asia disaster ("the U.S. police advisers are teaching torture techniques"). The International Police Academy (IPA), at least, needs to be revived for an effective USG response to the challenge of international terrorism and Soviet political warfare.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

You are no doubt generally familiar with the "Freedom Academy" history and concept, but let me review it briefly. It was an effort to fill the gap in our national security armamentarium between diplomatic protest and "sending in the Marines," the very crucial battleground of Soviet-supported communist political warfare for which our constitutional system has no institutional counterpart. Leninist and

Maoist doctrine confront non-communist societies with twin thrusts. In the urban setting there is the Comintern-style campaign of globe-girdling social demolition engineers building protests, mass demonstrations, strikes, riots and insurrection. (See, e.g., Jan Valin's 1941 classic Out of the Night.) In the rural setting the Maoist-style village infiltrators build the infrastructure of terrorism and guerrilla warfare. These thrusts were particularly vicious in the early 1960s in two major areas of insurgency, Southeast Asia and Latin America. In Vietnam we lost; in Venezuela we won.

The Venezuela victory was due in large measure to a Kennedy Administration initiative taken in response to the Freedom Academy proponents who approached the White House staff, Arthur Schlesinger and McGeorge Bundy. Two global developments reinforced the Freedom Academy advocates' arguments. One was the swiftly mounting guerrilla-terrorist campaign in South Vietnam, clearly designed to test the new Administration's mettle much as today's Salvador campaign is doing. When Nikita Khrushchev broke the nuclear weapons test moratorium in 1961 with impunity, but worldwide protests and rioting greeted the subsequent U.S. resumption of testing, President Kennedy was astonished. He sent Robert Kennedy on a global study mission to discover why the disparity. Robert Kennedy's report focused on the Soviet political warfare advantage of having indigenous communist parties whose leaders were trained in the Lenin School. One specific USG initiative in response was the creation of the International Police Academy (IPA) located in Georgetown, under the Agency for International Development; the small police-training element in AID was expanded into the Office of Public Safety.

About the same time, Joe Bierne of the Communications Workers of America (AFL-CIO) independently came to similar conclusions about the need for a U.S. political warfare response, and he founded the American Institute of Free Labor Development (AIFLD) with funding from private companies, labor unions and the Agency for International Development. Its founding director was Serafino Romualdi, who learned the bitter facts of life in the strife between communists, fascists and constitutionalists in Italy of the 1920s. Romualdi was a personal friend of another refugee from dictatorship, Romulo Betaincourt, who lived in the Romualdi home in Washington during his years of exile. While the IPA and AIFLD did not constitute a full U.S. adoption of the Freedom Academy concept, they vastly increased national capability in responding to Soviet-backed political warfare. (The AIFLD was limited geographically to Latin America.)

In Vietnam we lost, in large measure because the enemy forces had contiguous supply from both China and Russia regardless of Moscow-Peking squabbling and because Leninist "revolutionary anti-militarism" political warfare disintegrated home-front morale and support. (The 1980 trial of FBI executives Mark Felt and Edward S. Miller revealed for the first time that the KGB played a direct role in coaching U.S. anti-war activists in Canada, including teaching bomb-making techniques and thus fostering the transition in 1969-70 from militant anti-war demonstration to terrorism.)

In Venezuela we won. Both the AIFLD and the IPA played a crucial role in the nation's victory over the Moscow-Havana cabal's campaign of guerrilla warfare and terrorism. That campaign was designed

to nudge the army into a takeover to prevent the presidential election of 1964 and set the stage for the kind of terror-guerrilla campaign that produced the Batista-Castro succession in Cuba. President Romulo Betaincourt, working desperately to build democratic institutions after the perez Jiminez dictatorship and in the face of communist terrorism, had full AIFLD help in building independent labor unions. This gave him a sufficient independent political base to persuade the army not to pull another coup. But a second crucial element of the effort was Betaincourt's success, with IPA help, in using the civil police to contain the terrorists. The IPA role was elemental: Spanish-speaking Los Angeles police officers installed a modern police communications system to permit the police to mount a rapid response to Caracas' university-based terrorists, riding forth in the sports cars to fulfill their pledge to "kill a policeman a day" until the election. Other AID police experts taught the Venezuelan police to use the shotgun in close-quarter urban combat, an effective counter-tactic new to the Latinos, who thought shotguns "are for killing birds." Soon the police were outscoring the terrorists in the body count, and the army decided to let the elections proceed. Venezuelans defied the terrorists' call for boycott and voted in droves, and Betaincourt turned over his office to his successor and thereby achieved the first constitutional transfer of power in the nation's history.

The State Department, protecting its bureaucratic "turf," always resisted the Freedom Academy concept, and it always regarded the AID's OPS-IPA structure as a kind of illegitimate stepchild. (On this latter aspect of the problem, a well-informed source is Ernest Lefever,

12

president of the Ethics and Public Policy Center, who did a major study of the OPS-IPA while at the Brookings Institution.) Hence, in 1975 State was content to throw the program to the wolves, chiefly in the persons of New York Times editors and Senators George McGovern and James Abourezk, who picked up and mouthed false Havana-inspired leftist charges that OPS-IPA advisers were "teaching torture" to local police to counter terrorists in Brazil, Argentina and Uruguay. See, for example, Ernest Lefever's 1973 analysis of the Costa-Gavras movie "State of Siege," which portrayed the 1970 Tupemaro kidnap-murder of IPA instructor and OPS adviser Dan Mitrione as the carrying out of a sentence imposed by a terrorist "court" after fair hearing and due process in which he was adjudged guilty of teaching Uruguay's police how to torture suspected guerrillas. (Synopsis attached.) See also the NYT op-ed piece of 6/11/79 by A. J. Langguth, "Torture's Teachers," which transparently and ingenuously relies on obvious DGI-KGB disinformation. (Copy attached.) This disinformation campaign successfully destroyed a crucial USG instrumentality against Leninist-Maoist political warfare because the McGovern-Abourezk combination in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was able to kill the IPA-OPS appropriation.

From the creation of its small antecedent police training operation in 1955 until its abolition in 1975, the OPS was one of the most cost-effective USG activities ever; almost all costs were borne by host governments. At peak, OPS had some 450 advisers helping police forces with over a million men in 49 countries, and they helped train about 85,000 police annually. Its director, Byron Engle,

13

a former Kansas City cop, had helped the MacArthur command in Japan restructure and retrain the Japanese police, and he successfully introduced "non-lethal riot control" in many nations, resulting in major reductions in deaths and effectively countering Leninist martyr-making techniques. In its 12 years, the IPA in Washington graduated over 7000 foreign police officers of top rank from more than 80 nations; many alumni became heads of the police in their cities and nations. (Byron Engle, who headed OPS for most of its existence, is now retired in Bethesda and available for consultation.)

CONCLUSION

The Reagan Administration in order to mount an effective anti-terrorist response, needs to recreate the IPA-OPS structure. In view of our need to have a common locus for our own counter-terrorist forces, combining domestic police and military units, the logical organizational location would be under the Justice Department and FBI Academy structure, but with strong liaison with the State Department and U.S. Army Special Forces at Ft. Bragg.

We have not yet solved the problem of our own organizational structure for responding to terrorism, both domestically and globally. (A good resource person on this problem is Robert Kupperman.) Faulty command structure, resulting from inter-service rivalries, contributed crucially to the April 1980 disaster at "Desert One" in Iran; apparently there was no on-site traffic cop to keep Army helicopters from colliding with Air Force transports, an elemental oversight incomprehensible to this former Air Force pilot. And a total lack of military-civil police preparation and interface produced the ludicrous

Keystone Kops comedy during the March 1977 Hanafi Muslim seizure of three Washington buildings and 124 hostages, of Army and FBI people trying to train fat District of Columbia policemen to jump from helicopters onto rooftops, all because the Carter Administration did not want to "go military" during the 39-hour siege. Had we had to storm the buildings, as the British SAS had to do during the Iranian Arabs' seizure of the Iranian embassy in London in 1980, we would have had a bloody disaster. We cannot solve the IPA-OPS problem without also solving the domestic counter-terrorist organizational problem. But a correct solution will immeasurably strengthen all elements of USG response. It will provide for a smooth and continuous flow of intelligence and operational experience among all elements, international and domestic, so that cops from Atlanta and Los Angeles to Singapore and Abidjan and Buenos Aires will have up-to-date information on terrorist tactics and effective counter-tactics.

Attachments

Murder in Montevideo: the AID/Mitrione story

Effective, humane law enforcement can be a boon to developing nations but this U.S. AID adviser was murdered for enlisting as a "Servant of Freedom."



Dr. Lefever

by Ernest W. Lefever

At 4:15 a.m. on Monday, August 10, 1970, the body of a stocky, unshaven, 50-year-old man was found in the back seat of a stolen Buick convertible parked on Lucas Moreno Street in Montevideo, Uruguay. Blood was dripping through the floor board and running toward the curb. He was shot twice in the head and twice in the body. His eyes were bandaged. There were deep bruises at his left armpit close to a partially healed gunshot wound. His inner arms bore 16 needle punctures.

This twelfth murder victim and fifth kidnap victim of the Tupamaro terrorists was Dan A. Mitrione, a former police chief from Richmond, Indiana, a father of nine children who was a U.S. public safety adviser in Uruguay. He had been "tried" by a Tupamaro "people's court" and accused of being a CIA agent, of teaching Uruguayan police advanced torture techniques, and of organizing a campaign of repression against "revolutionary" leaders. For these "crimes" he was condemned to death.

Mitrione's kidnapping and murder brought headline attention to one of AID's smallest and least known activities—the public safety program—then advising the civil police in 27 countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Currently there are about 100 AID police advisers in 17 countries, including ten Latin American states. The program also provides police equipment and U.S. training for Third World police officers. It costs \$7.5 million a year, less than one percent of grant AID funds.

The public safety program has always faced some criticism in Latin America from Communist and other left-wing groups, especially those seeking revolutionary change by violent or other illegal means. These critics usually castigate U.S. policy across the board for being "imperialistic" and "repressive."

The Tupamaro charges against Mitrione and the police assistance program he symbolized have been given currency in a new pro-Tupamaro film, "State of Siege," directed by Costa-Gavras, the "Hitchcock of the Left," and filmed in Chile with the active cooperation of its Marxist president, Salvador Allende. The film, which Costa-Gavras falsely claims to be a "factually exact" documentary on the work, kidnapping, and "execution" of Dan Mitrione, has been aptly labeled a "melodramatic left-wing restaging of recent history," by Paul D. Zimmerman in *Newsweek*.

Dr. Lefever is a senior fellow in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution, currently focusing on U.S. policy toward the Third World. Among his books are *Ethics and U.S. Foreign Policy* and *Spear and Scepter: Army, Police, and Politics in Tropical Africa*. He is a contributing editor of *Freedom At Issue*.

The film aside, the charges of the Tupamaros and other Latin leftists against U.S. police assistance deserve an honest response. Public safety advisers have been accused of supporting repressive regimes, teaching or condoning police torture, and interfering in the internal affairs of other countries.

Mitrione's background and temperament hardly prepared him for the James Bond role his critics cast for him—"a CIA agent" directing the Uruguayan police in brutal and repressive activities. Discharged from the U.S. Navy in October 1945 as an Aviation Machinist's Mate, First Class, he joined the Richmond, Indiana police force as a patrolman and by 1956 became its chief. In Richmond, he was deeply involved in youth and other community activities. Like more than 6,000 other American police executives, Mitrione took a 12-week course at the National FBI Academy, but he never worked for the FBI or the CIA.

In 1960 he joined AID as a professional police adviser, spending seven years in Brazil, two years as an instructor in AID's international Police Academy in Washington, D.C., and a final year in Uruguay.

He arrived in Montevideo in mid-1969 to serve as chief of the public safety effort begun four years before. The four-man program focused on improving administration, training, investigation, radio communication, mobility, and humane crowd control. He and his three colleagues worked under an open contract between AID and the Uruguayan government and their activities were reported in the press. Mitrione was particularly interested in establishing a country-wide VHF-FM radio net and in improving police performance in the provinces through regional training courses.

"Dan was a staunch family man," recalls Cesar Bernal, a fellow police adviser in Uruguay, "and unusually compassionate. He earned the affection and respect of the Uruguayans. Brutality was foreign to his nature. He never carried a gun, convinced that no one—even the Tupamaros—would harm him." This is the typical picture of those who knew him.

A "marshmallow" state

Uruguay 1969 was not a reactionary police state as pictured by the Tupamaros. It was one of the most democratic and open societies in the world. Its president and parliament were popularly elected. Its two major parties and political groups to the right and left were free to debate, criticize, publish, and organize. The 37,000-member Communist Party had representatives in parliament and published a widely circulated daily newspaper.

Uruguay had no death penalty, the maximum sentence for any crime was 30 years, and the prisons were run by the Ministry of Culture and Education. Though the economy was stagnant, the per capita income was twice that of Brazil and more evenly distributed. The government operated one of the world's most comprehensive welfare systems.

With one of the most permissive governments of modern times, Uruguay was a marshmallow state. Liberty lapsed into license. The Communist Party and other radical groups took advantage of this vulnerable situation to press their self-serving demands through strikes and violent demonstrations.

The most notorious group was the Tupamaro Liberation Front, a small paramilitary terrorist organization similar to the Weathermen in America and the Black September fighters in the Middle East. In 1970 there were fewer than a thousand Tupamaros, with about 150 in prison or awaiting trial. Impatient with the present, the Tupamaros turned to terror to embarrass and overthrow the democratic regime. Their social goals were not clear, but they seemed to want a revolutionary order a la Castro or Mao.

Like the terrorist in Colombia, Venezuela, and Argentina, the Tupamaros were an odd mixture of idealists, romantics, nihilists, misfits, and common thugs. They pursued their immediate aim of social demolition through bank robberies, auto theft, arson, bombing, kidnapping, and murder. They killed their first policeman on December 16, 1966, shooting him in the back with a sub-machine gun. By May 1973 their murder victims numbered 45. They intimidated witnesses to their crimes and officials by threats which were carried out often enough to make them credible.

In the early years the Tupamaros enjoyed a temporary Robin Hood image, but they never gained the support of even a significant minority of the Uruguayan people. At the zenith of their influence, the political faction nearest their view polled 4.3 percent of the popular vote.

The day after Mitrione's murder a Uruguayan Communist leader denounced the terrorists as "insane maniacs." In 1971, Moscow called them "petty bourgeois, pseudo-revolutionaries" and "rollicking, loud-mouthed thugs" using "gangster tactics."

The Tupamaro charge that Mitrione advocated and fought the use of police torture is without foundation. Increasing Tupamaro terror and police arrests were accompanied by increasing charges of police brutality in the left-wing press. It is difficult to get solid evidence on police abuse in any society, but competent foreign observers believe that there was relatively little police brutality in spite of a Uruguayan Senate committee that reported torture was frequent. A leading committee member said in private that the report's conclusions were exaggerated. Further, the police were painfully aware that they might share the fate of police inspector Moran Charqueo, who was accused of abusing Tupamaro prisoners and was found on April 13, 1970, with 29 machine gun holes in his body.

Role of the adviser

Whatever police abuse there may have been in Uruguay, neither Mitrione nor any other U.S. adviser

had anything to do with it, except to advise tactfully but strongly against all inhumane or other illegal methods. Like advisers in other countries and instructors at the International Police Academy, Mitrione pointed out that the mistreatment of suspects was unprofessional and unethical, and that on the practical level a fingerprint or a chip of paint provided more reliable evidence than a worthless confession beat out of a man.

"No inheritors of the Iberian-Roman tradition," said Covey T. Oliver, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 1967-68, "seem to need (instruction in torture) from representatives of other cultures," adding that AID advice has doubtless had the effect of reducing these "cruel methods" in some countries.

The Tupamaros also alleged that Mitrione directed a secret Uruguayan police operation to repress "revolutionaries" by illegal and violent means. This, too, is without foundation. Public safety personnel are strictly advisory. All country AID agreements provide for technical assistance on any aspect of civilian police work requested by the host government, except political intelligence. Since the beginning of the program in 1954, no adviser in any of the 49 assisted countries has ever been accused by the government of interfering improperly in internal affairs and none has been declared *persona non grata*. No assisted government has ever requested the termination of a public safety effort. Few, if any, other U.S. programs abroad can match this record.

The program reached its peak in 1968 with an AID expenditure of \$55.1 million and with 458 advisers in 34 countries, including some 200 advisers in South Vietnam, which took almost half the total resources. The January 27, 1973, ceasefire agreement ended the advisory effort in Vietnam. Usually a country has from two to four advisers. Thailand with 36 advisers has by far the largest current program.

To date public safety aid has provided training in a wide range of skills for more than 7,000 police officers and technicians from 73 countries, most of them at the International Police Academy, the only professional institution in the world devoted exclusively to training civil police from the developing world.

Supplementing training and advice, AID also provides police equipment. In 1972, for example, \$7.2 million worth of commodities was provided worldwide, including Vietnam, as follows:

<i>Item</i>	<i>Percent</i>
Radio Equipment	37.5
Cars, motor cycles, etc.	29.4
Police weapons	22.4
General supplies	10.7

As of early 1973, the program had provided 43,000 low-cost radios, developed by AID-public safety technicians, to 30 countries. Supplies have also included police textbooks in English, Spanish, and French and the airlifting of several pedigreed German shepherd dogs, received gratis from the U.S. Army, to Guyana to upgrade the K-9 element in the police force there.

For political and humane reasons, certain commodities are not provided by AID. These include automatic rifles, electric shock police batons designed for crowd control, "sickening gas" which causes nausea and

diarrhea, electronic recording equipment, and lie detectors.

The basic aim of police aid, declared Byron Engle, who was public safety director from the beginning to last April, is to help provide the assisted country with "an adequate measure of internal stability needed to facilitate economic, social, and political progress." To this end, said David E. Bell, AID administrator in 1964, the program seeks to "strengthen the capability of the civil police...to enforce the law and maintain public order with the minimum use of physical force, and to counter Communist-inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency" and to encourage and develop "responsible and humane police administration." The emphasis of the Kennedy Administration on assisting in counterinsurgency efforts has in the past five years largely given way to "institution building," the creation of self-sufficient police services that have some chance of carrying on effectively after U.S. aid is terminated.

Weighing the political condition

The charge that police assistance has been used to uphold reactionary and repressive regimes has also been leveled against military and economic assistance, often by the same critics. This criticism, which is sometimes heard on Capitol Hill, is more difficult to deal with because one man's "repressive regime" is another man's viable government. Since 1947, Washington has provided aid to a broad spectrum of governments, from left-wing socialist to right-wing military, when it was deemed in its interest whether or not it approved of the regimes in question.

At the same time, public safety and military aid have been terminated, suspended, or turned down on a number of occasions when the State Department concluded that the behavior of the regime would nullify the objectives of the assistance. In Korea, Laos, and Indonesia, police aid was ended when the regime prevented its police service from operating as a reasonably nonpartisan and professional law enforcement instrument. In Venezuela, Bolivia, and Laos, requests for such aid were turned down when these countries were in the grip of what Washington regarded as a repressive regime.

The Eisenhower administration refused police aid to Perez Jimenez, the anti-Communist dictator of Venezuela, but such aid was given to Romulo Betancourt, his more democratic and liberal successor. Washington also provided such aid to the leftist regime of Goulart in Brazil and for several years to its military successor. Police assistance to Brazil was terminated in 1972.

Estimate of the program

Has this low-cost, low-profile program served U.S. interests at an acceptable cost? According to the testimony of those in the best position to know, the answer is a decisive yes. In interviews with some 200 persons, largely U.S. and local officials, in 15 program countries last year, the author received these responses to four questions. The answers apply to the country where the interview was held:

1. Has the program improved the efficiency of the police force? Significant improvement—70%, Some improvement—29%, No improvement—1%.

2. Has the program enhanced the professional attitudes and behavior of the civil police force? Significant

improvement—40%, Some improvement—56%, No improvement—4%.

3. Has the program been criticized to the point where it has hurt the reputation of the United States? No negative effect on U.S. image—88%, Slight negative effect—6%, Potential negative effect—6%.

4. Should the public safety program be continued? If so, at what level of effort? Continue at present level—72%, Continue at increased level—19%, Continue at decreased level—6%, Terminate—3%.

By enhancing the capability of the police to maintain order and security more effectively, according to many interviewees, the program has contributed to constructive economic and political activity. This point was also made by six former assistant secretaries of state for inter-American affairs. One of them, Dr. Lincoln Gordon, said that the "modest and low-cost public safety assistance program made a positive contribution to economic and social development," especially in "view of the headlong pace of urbanization."

In several countries, increased order resulting from the program has improved the climate for economic development. The neutralization of guerrillas (as in Guatemala) and the curbing of urban terrorists (as in Caracas and Montevideo) have created conditions favorable to agricultural reform, normal economic activity, and attracting foreign investment.

A half dozen U.S. ambassadors credited the program with making the police more effective in humane methods of crowd control with the result that student demonstrations and election rallies were held without violence. They noted that effective law enforcement insures that political debate, organization, and elections can take place, thus encouraging peaceful adjustment and change.

A high AID official in Laos said he would be willing to sacrifice some development projects, such as agricultural research, in favor of police assistance, because the latter deals with the survival of the country without which there could be no peaceful development.

The public safety program has yielded two unexpected byproducts. By preparing police specialists in narcotics control and in counter-terror measures, local police in several countries have been able to work more effectively with U.S. embassy personnel in supporting President Nixon's campaign against illicit narcotics and in the protection of American overseas personnel against terrorist attacks. In the early 1960s, AID-trained police in Ecuador aborted a terrorist plot to hijack a passenger plane in Quito. In 1973, an AID-trained specialist in Guatemala successfully identified and defused a letter bomb sent to the Israeli Embassy there.

From its beginning, the public safety effort has suffered from misunderstanding on Capitol Hill and among foreign policy-makers, especially those who have not seen the effects of the program in the field. This may reflect in part an undefined suspicion that many Americans have toward policemen and police work. Further, some AID officials find it difficult to see how police assistance fits into an agency devoted primarily to economic development. For these and other reasons, the public safety share of the AID budget has since 1968 declined more sharply

Continued on page 17



Continued from page 16

than the budget as a whole and the future of the program is not assured.

Returning to Dan Mitrione who symbolizes the worldwide public safety program, the hard evidence establishes his innocence of the three charges made against him by the Tupamaro "people's court." He has also been vindicated by the Uruguayan people. The tragic murder of this man dedicated to justice and humane law enforcement seemed to turn the tide against the terrorists and in the eyes of many Uruguayans he became a national hero. On the second anniversary of his death, the government issued a purple and gold postage stamp honoring Mitrione as a "Servant of Freedom."

September-October/1973/No. 21

Daughters Continued from Page 1C



"princess" or "porcelain doll" or "Daddy's little girl," these daughters slot themselves into the role of Ms. woman.

They are ambitious — within middle-class definitions. They nurse a "rage," but a rage voiced in the accents of prestigious colleges — their body-language anger outlined by name designers, as it were.

In all fairness, the Ms. woman is no-

Americans Resist Evidence U.S. Taught Torture Methods Abroad

• The writer is the author of "Hidden Terrors," a book about the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America.

By A.J. LANGGUTH
The New York Times

LOS ANGELES — A few months ago, I received some clippings of interviews with a former federal intelligence agency official. That operative, Jesse Leaf, had been involved with the agency's activities in Iran, and well into the stories Leaf made some damning accusations.

He said that the CIA sent an operative to teach interrogation methods to SAVAK, the shah's secret police, that the training included instruction in torture, and the techniques were copied from the Nazis.

Reading through the clippings, I could think of several reasons why the accusations had not been featured prominently. Leaf could not, or did not, supply the name of the instructor, his victims would be hard to locate, and the testimony from opponents of the shah would be suspect.

But there is still another reason that I take to be the truest one: We — and I mean we as Americans — don't believe it. We can read the accusations, even examine the evidence and find it irrefutable. But, in our hearts, we cannot believe that Americans have gone abroad to spread the use of torture.

We can believe that public officials

with reputations for brilliance can be arrogant, blind or stupid. Anything but evil. And when the cumulative proof becomes overwhelming that our representative in the CIA or the Agency for International Development police program did in fact teach torture, we excuse ourselves by vilifying the individual men.

This has been on my mind since I returned from Cuba recently. In Havana, I had tried to hunt down a former double agent, a Cuban named Manuel, who was said to have information about United States involvement with torture in Latin America. Manuel had revealed his true sympathies by leaving his job with the CIA in Montevideo and returning to his homeland.

But from his editor I learned that Manuel, whose full name turned out to be Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, would be out of the country the entire time I was in Cuba. I could, however, get a copy of the book he had published six months earlier, "Pasaporte 11333, Eight Years With the CIA."

Hevia had served the CIA in Uruguay's police program. In 1970, his duties brought him in contact with Dan Mitrione, the United States police adviser who was kidnapped by the Tupamaro revolutionaries later that year and shot to death when the Uruguayan government refused to save him by yielding up political prisoners.

Mitrione has become notorious throughout Latin America. But few men ever had the chance to sit with him and discuss his rationale for torture. Hevia had that chance.

Now, reading Hevia's version, which I believe to be accurate, I see that I too had resisted acknowledging how drastically a man's career can deform him. I was aware that Mitrione knew of the tortures and condoned them. That was bad enough. I could not believe even worse of a family man. A Midwesterner. An American.

Thanks to Hevia, I was finally hearing Mitrione's true voice:

"When you receive a subject, the first thing to do is determine his physical state, his degree of resistance, through a medical examination. A premature death means a failure by the technician.

"Another important thing to know is exactly how far you can go given the political situation and the personality of the prisoner. It is very important to know beforehand whether we have the luxury of letting the subject die....

"Before all else, you must be efficient. You must cause only the damage that is strictly necessary, not a bit more. We must control our tempers in any case. You have to act with the efficiency and cleanliness of a surgeon and with the perfection of an artist...." A few months later, Mitrione paid with his life for those excesses.

LOS ANGELES — A few months ago, I received some clippings of interviews with a former Federal intelligence agency official. That operative, Jesse Leaf, had been involved with the agency's activities in Iran, and well into the stories Mr. Leaf made some damning accusations.

He said that the C.I.A. sent an operative to teach interrogation methods to SAVAK, the Shah's secret police, that the training included instruction in torture, and the techniques were copied from the Nazis.

Reading through the clippings, I could think of several reasons why the accusations had not been featured prominently. Mr. Leaf could not, or did not, supply the name of the instructor, his victims would be hard to locate; and the testimony from opponents of the Shah would be suspect.

But there is still another reason that I take to be the truest one: We — and I


mean we as Americans — don't believe it. We can read the accusations, even examine the evidence and find it irrefutable. But, in our hearts, we cannot believe that Americans have gone abroad to spread the use of torture.

We can believe that public officials with reputations for brilliance can be arrogant, blind or stupid. Anything but evil. And when the cumulative proof becomes overwhelming that our representative in the C.I.A. or the Agency for International Development police program did in fact teach torture, we excuse ourselves by vilifying the individual men.

Torture's Teachers

By A.J. Langguth

This has been on my mind since I returned from Cuba recently. In Havana, I had tried to hunt down a former double agent, a Cuban named Manuel, who was said to have information about United States involvement with torture in Latin America. Manuel had revealed his true sympathies by leaving his job with the C.I.A. in Montevideo and returning to his homeland. But from his editor I learned that Manuel, whose full name turned out to be Manuel Hevia Cosculluela, would be out of the country the entire time I was in Cuba. I could, however, get a copy of the book he had published six



Marshall Artsman

months earlier, "Pasaporte 11333, Eight Years With the C.I.A."

Mr. Hevia had served the C.I.A. in Uruguay's police program. In 1970, his duties brought him in contact with Dan Mitrione, the United States police adviser who was kidnapped by the Tupamaro revolutionaries later that year and shot to death when the Uruguayan Government refused to save him by yielding up political prisoners.

Mr. Mitrione has become notorious throughout Latin America. But few men ever had the chance to sit with him and discuss his rationale for torture. Mr. Hevia had once.

Now, reading Mr. Hevia's version, which I believe to be accurate, I see that I too had resisted acknowledging how drastically a man's career can deform him. I was aware that Mr. Mitrione knew of the tortures and condoned them. That was bad enough. I could not believe even worse of a family man. A Midwesterner. An American.

Thanks to Mr. Hevia, I was finally hearing Mr. Mitrione's true voice:

"When you receive a subject, the first thing to do is determine his physical state, his degree of resistance, through a medical examination. A premature death means a failure by the technician.

"Another important thing to know is exactly how far you can go given the political situation and the personality of the prisoner. It is very important to know beforehand whether we have the luxury of letting the subject die . . .

"Before all else, you must be efficient. You must cause only the damage that is strictly necessary, not a bit more. We must control our tempers in any case. You have to act with the efficiency and cleanliness of a surgeon, and with the perfection of an artist . . .

A few months later, Mr. Mitrione paid with his life for those excesses. Five years later, thanks to the effort of such men as former Senator James Abourezk, the police advisory program was finally abolished.

But few of the accomplices in torture have ever been called to account. Years ago in open hearings, Senator Frank Church tried to force some admissions but his witnesses sidestepped his staff's sketchy allegations. Given the willingness of Congress to accept the C.I.A.'s alibis about national security, I don't think any other public hearings would fare better.

But neither Jimmy Carter nor Adm. Stansfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelligence, is implicated in those past cruelties, and the President should call on Admiral Turner for a complete internal investigation and a full report. If he wants Vice President Mondale to oversee the effort, all the better. They can start with Operation Bandierantes in São Paulo, Brazil, continue with Manuel Hevia's expose of practices in Uruguay, and then move on to Chile, Iran and Southeast Asia.

If, at the end, the President can assure us that no American who taught or condoned torture is still working for the C.I.A. or any other agency of the Government, I know that at least we will want to believe him.

A.J. Langguth is the author of "Hidden Terrors," a book about the Central Intelligence Agency in Latin America.

22
MAURICE H. STANS

February 11, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.


Dear Mr. President:

There is one program of the government that had an outstanding value to our relations with Third World countries and to their internal stability, at a small cost to us. By this letter I want to call it to your attention because it probably would be very valuable if it were in effect at this time. Unfortunately, Senator Church managed to kill it off in 1974.

It is the program to assist internal security forces of the less developed countries. The program was carried on by the Office of Public Safety within the State Department and by its International Police Academy.

I enclose a one-page memorandum on this program and a short biography of the highly respected man who ran it, Byron Engle. Mr. Engle would be happy to consult with anyone in your office or the State Department about the details of the program.

Sincerely,


Maurice H. Stans

MHS:ac

Enclosures

23

FOREIGN POLICE ASSISTANCE

In 1954 President Eisenhower adopted a policy to assist Civil Security Forces of the less developed countries of the Free World.

The policy was based on the premise that if we are to live in a community of free nations, Internal Defense is vital to their survival.

To paraphrase the President, Civil Security Forces (conventional police, gendarmerie, rural police, police paramilitary elements and domestic intelligence services) are the First Line of Defense against criminality and subversion. Their role is the enforcement of law, the protection of life and property, detection of crime including subversion, and the control of violence ranging from minor disorders to terrorism and guerrilla warfare. Success of their activities is necessary to provide the safety and stability essential for economic, political and social development.

To implement this policy an element was established in the foreign assistance program, subsequently known as the Office of Public Safety/AID, which functioned from 1955 until abolished in 1974. During this period it assisted police forces in improving organization and management, training and equipment by providing professional advisors skilled in the various functional areas.

The Public Safety Program was one of the most cost effective activities of the US Government. It involved assistance to foreign internal security forces with over one million personnel in some fifty countries utilizing only a few hundred US advisors. Its cost to the US Government was a few million dollars since almost all of the costs were borne by the host government.

The Public Safety Program was directed by Byron Engle. Additional information regarding the program and his biodata are attached.

Biographic Data

BYRON ENGLE

Byron Engle began his police career on the Kansas City (Missouri) Police Department and advanced through the commissioned ranks to become the Director of Personnel and Training in that Department, a position he held for several years.

In 1946, Engle was assigned as a Police Administrator in Tokyo under General MacArthur. He was responsible for establishing the training program of the Japanese Police and its direction from Allied Headquarters for four and one-half years.

Engle's duties involved the preparation of curricula, acquisition of facilities, training of more than 2,200 instructors, retraining of the entire Japanese Police Force of 93,000 at that time, and the training of 55,000 recruits.

In the final year of the training program, 64 police training schools with 150 to 2,000 capacity each were operating including a National Police College for senior officers and six regional schools for other commissioned officers.

That year 100,200 Japanese Police completed retraining courses of two months duration and 53,000 completed specialized training. This training was described by United Press International as "the world's largest training program." All 125,000 of the new Police were trained in Riot Control.

Engle also was responsible for assisting in the reorganization of the entire Japanese Police and the present structure of the Japanese Police system includes many of his recommendations.

In 1951-52 Engle organized and directed the Police Advisory Group in Ankara, Turkey.

Engle served as Chief Police Administrator, United Nations Command, Tokyo, from 1953 to 1955 and was responsible for the liaison between the Japanese law enforcement and security services and the United Nations Command.

In 1955 Engle was transferred to Washington where he directed the formation of a U. S. Government program to assist foreign police under the International Cooperation Administration and administered it for several years.

In an action to strengthen and expand this program in 1962, a Presidential Directive established the Office of Public Safety, Agency for International Development, Department of State, and Engle was appointed its Director.

Under Office of Public Safety (OPS), the police assistance program was greatly expanded to meet increased requests for assistance and became world-wide in scope. Approximately 450 advisors provided advisory assistance in management, training and material to police forces with a personnel strength of over one million in 49 countries. The training assistance involved the training of approximately 85,000 police annually.

Engle successfully introduced "Non-Lethal Riot Control" in many countries that had OPS Programs and this resulted in major reductions in casualties and more effective police operations.

An International Police Academy (IPA) exclusively for the training of foreign police commissioned officers was established in Washington under OPS. Police Lt. Generals to Police Colonels were trained in the Senior Course and others in the General Course. Both courses emphasized police administration, management and comparative police systems. During IPA's operation over 7,000 foreign police officers from over 80 countries were graduated from IPA.

The Technical Services Division of OPS assisted countries in meeting their technical equipment requirements for transport including airplanes, communications, firearms, records and identification equipment and systems, riot control equipment, etc.

Studies and surveys were conducted in over 40 countries to determine their needs in organization, management and technical fields. Advisors were provided to implement mutually agreed upon recommendations.

Engle was responsible for coordination with other U. S. departments and foreign governments. He served on numerous committees and was a member of the U. S. INTERPOL delegation for 16 years. He travelled extensively throughout the world and has directed and participated in on-the-scene studies and surveys of foreign police systems.

During his 28 years of federal service, Engle received many awards including the highest given by the Agency for International Development, Department of State--the Distinguished Honor Award.

During his last ten years in the federal government, Engle held the highest grade in the U. S. Civil Service--GS-18.

Upon Engle's retirement in 1973, the President wrote:

"... You have been among the pioneers in advocating humane enforcement of law to facilitate economic and social progress in developing nations beginning with your initial assignment under General MacArthur in Japan.

You have brought to each of your assignments a high degree of professional competence and personal dedication. These qualities are now reflected in the effectiveness of our Public Safety Programs abroad and of the International Police Academy here in Washington.

You have my deep appreciation for a difficult job exceedingly well done..."

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

March 28, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*
SUBJECT: Situation Reports re. Hijacking in Managua
and the New Hijacking in Malaysia.

Attached are Situation Reports dealing with the hijacking to Managua and the new hijacking in Malaysia.

I have also included an outgoing State Department cable which indicates instructions to our embassies in Tegucigalpa and Managua.

CC: Ed Meese
Jim Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~ATTACHMENT~~

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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FOR THE PRESIDENT
28
Roa

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

SAHSA HIJACKING WORKING GROUP

Situation Report No. 2

Situation in Managua as of 0500 EST, March 28, 1981

The situation in Managua was stable overnight. As of 0500 EST, the aircraft remains on the ground in Managua.

A communique' from the Movimiento de Liberacion Popular which set out the hijackers' demands was picked up at a drop point in Tegucigalpa. The hijackers are demanding that the Government of Honduras (GOH):

- (1) "Cease persecution" of leaders and clergy of Santa Rosa de Copan diocese;
- (2) Free 16 detainees, including 13 Salvadorans, two presumed Hondurans, and one Costa Rican;
- (3) Adopt a "policy of neutrality and non-intervention in the affairs of other countries;
- (4) Accede to demands of striking students; and
- (5) Dismantle Somocista training camps in Honduras;

In addition, the hijackers hold the GOH responsible for "whatever happens to" a long list of persons "who are about to be assassinated."

Several American citizens and one permanent resident alien were among the passengers released from the aircraft. They were housed overnight in the Embassy Managua guest house. They described the hijackers as "calm" and "professional". The five hijackers were described as in their late twenties and armed with automatic pistols. They told the passengers to be prepared for a "long wait" until the GOH gave in to their demands. The released passengers confirmed that at least five Americans remain on board. We believe that there are at least three additional Americans on the plane, making a total of at least eight.

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(GDS, 3/28/87, Eastham, Alan W.)

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
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
A Nicaraguan junta member told our Ambassador in Managua that the hijackers are "completely intransigent." Reported Nicaraguan efforts to have Cuba or Panama accept the aircraft have gone unanswered.

At a press conference last night, Nicaraguan Interior Ministry official Luis Carrion, who leads the GRN task force for handling the hijacking, said that the GRN considers the matter to be the responsibility of the Honduran government and that the Hondurans would be "responsible" for any violence that might occur.

There is now another hijacking in progress in Malaysia. An Indonesian Garuda Airlines DC-9, on a scheduled flight from Jakarta to Medan, was hijacked March 28. The six hijackers, who are reportedly armed with rifles, diverted the aircraft to Penang, Malaysia. Late reports indicate that the aircraft has been fueled and provisioned. The hijackers have asked for flight information to Colombo, Sri Lanka. No information is available as to the identities of the hijackers or the purpose of the hijacking. ~~There appear to be no Americans on board.~~

**Late item: The Garuda aircraft is reported to have left Penang en route to Bangkok, Thailand.


Alan Eastham, Jr.
Sahsa Hijacking Group


Dennis Sandberg
Senior Watch Officer

NEW REPORT FROM JAKARTA REVEALS 2 MALE US
CITIZENS ABOARD, ONE AN OIL DRILLING MUD SALESMAN
AND THE OTHER A BECHTEL EMPLOYEE.

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~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 078909

E.O. 12065: GDS 3/27/87 (PEREZ, FH)

TAGS: PINS, EAIR, HO, NU, XK, CASC

SUBJECT: SAHSA HIJACKING

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT,

2. THE U.S. POSITION ON HIJACKING AND OTHER FORMS OF TERRORISM IS WELL-KNOWN. WE CONDEMN THESE CRIMINAL TERRORIST ACTS, WHICH ENDANGER THE LIVES OF INNOCENT PEOPLE AND THREATEN THE SAFETY OF CIVIL AVIATION. WE WOULD EXPECT THAT THE GOVERNMENTS INVOLVED WILL TAKE MEASURES TO MEET THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO: 1) ENSURE THE SAFE RELEASE OF ALL THE PASSENGERS AND CREW AND 2) BRING THE PERPETRATORS OF THESE CRIMINAL ACT TO JUSTICE.

3. FOR TEGUCIGALPA: YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO GOH THAT US POLICY IN CRIMINAL HIJACKINGS IS NOT TO PAY RANSOM, RE-

SIT: RA NAN COL VP
EOB: ARA, EURW
WHSR COMMENTS:

PAGE 01

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*****~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~***** COPY

LEASE PRISONERS, OR OTHERWISE GIVE IN TO TERRORIST DEMANDS. ALSO EXPRESS OUR HOPE THAT GOH WILL PRESS GRN TO RESOLVE INCIDENT IN MANNER WHICH, WHILE SAFEGUARDING THE LIVES OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW, WILL NOT PERMIT THE TERRORISTS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND WILL ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL HIJACKERS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE.

4. FOR MANAGUA: YOU SHOULD CONVEY TO GRN THAT US POLICY IN CRIMINAL HIJACKINGS IS NOT TO PAY RANSOM, RELEASE PRISONERS, OR OTHERWISE GIVE IN TO TERRORISTS' DEMANDS. ALSO EXPRESS OUR HOPE THAT THE GRN WILL RESOLVE INCIDENT IN MANNER WHICH, WHILE SAFEGUARDING THE LIVES OF THE PASSENGERS AND CREW, WILL NOT PERMIT THE TERRORISTS TO ACHIEVE THEIR OBJECTIVES AND WILL ENSURE THAT THE CRIMINAL HIJACKERS ARE BROUGHT TO JUSTICE. YOU SHOULD REMIND GRN THAT IT HAS ACCEDDED TO THE HAGUE CONVENTION WHICH REQUIRES PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION OF THE HIJACKERS SHOULD THE INCIDENT BE RESOLVED IN MANAGUA.

5. THE FOLLOWING US INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC OBLIGATIONS IN THE HIJACKING AREA ARE PROVIDED FOR AMBASSADOR PEZZULLO'S BACKGROUND AND MAY BE USED AS HE SEES FIT.

A. BONN DECLARATION, WHICH WAS ISSUED BY ECONOMIC SUMMIT COUNTRIES (US, UK, FRG, ITALY, FRANCE, CANADA AND JAPAN) IN 1978, OBLIGATES THE BONN COUNTRIES TO SUSPEND AIR SERVICE TO AND FROM A COUNTRY WHICH RECEIVES HIJACKERS AND FAILS TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE THEM.

B. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF PROVISIONS OF U.S. LAW WHICH MIGHT COME INTO PLAY SHOULD NICARAGUA GRANT SANCTUARY TO HIJACKERS. THESE ARE:

WHICH REQUIRES A TERMINATION OF ASSISTANCE FOR AT LEAST A YEAR TO ANY GOVERNMENT WHICH "AIDS OR ABETS, BY GRANTING SANCTUARY FROM PROSECUTION TO ANY INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP WHICH HAS COMMITTED AN ACT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM."

IZES THE PRESIDENT TO SUSPEND AIR SERVICES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND ANY COUNTRY WHICH AIDS ORGANIZATIONS WHICH USE HIJACKING.

THAT THE U.S. OPPOSE LOANS IN THE MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS TO COUNTRIES WHICH PROVIDE REFUGE TO HI-

32

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JACKERS, UNLESS THE LOANS ARE FOR PROGRAMS DIRECTED
TOWARD BASIC HUMAN NEEDS.
THE U.S. "WORK IN OPPOSITION" TO IMF FINANCIAL OR
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES WHICH "PERMITS ENTRY...
SUPPORTS, ENCOURAGES, OR HARBORS" HIJACKERS. HAIG
BT

PAGE 03 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 8909
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DTG: 272229Z MAR 81 PSN: 000188
TOR: 086/2257Z

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MEMORANDUM

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33

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

March 30, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
ED MEESE
JIM BAKER

FROM: DICK ALLEN

SUBJECT: Central American and East Asian Hijackings

Attached for your information is a memo from Secretary Haig on the status of the latest hijackings.

Attachment

~~CONFIDENTIAL ATTACHMENT~~

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OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES

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35

NOTE TO SECRETARIAT:


it is possible you don't have the item logged with the package as you received it from Shoemaker's office

(am not sure who received the orig Haig memo) - I've got that now 4/1/81

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

CONFIDENTIAL

March 29, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 
SUBJECT: Central American and East Asian Hijackings

Less than two weeks after the end of the PIA hijacking to Damascus, we have again been faced with hijackings involving American citizens. The Honduran airliner which was hijacked to Nicaragua and Panama had thirteen Americans aboard; the Indonesian plane in Bangkok has three. The Honduran hijacking ended last night with the safe release of all the hostages.

These hijackings point up the continuing vulnerability of international civil aviation. Only in North America and Western Europe is there extensive and effective airport security. We can expect additional hijackings with a high probability that Americans will be involved. The FAA is alerting U.S. carriers and airports of this increased threat. The likelihood of further hijackings will be enhanced if these incidents end with the release of substantial numbers of prisoners. The terrorists demanded the release of 16 prisoners in Honduras and 80 in Indonesia. We do not know whether the Hondurans undertook to release prisoners as the price for the termination of the incident last night. The Indonesians are still negotiating with the hijackers.

In our contacts with the governments concerned, we have reiterated our firm policy of not paying ransom or releasing prisoners. We urged them to resolve the incidents in a manner which, while safeguarding the hostages' lives, would not permit the terrorists to achieve their objective. We are stressing the importance of ensuring that terrorists are brought to justice.

We have had a 24-hour Task Force monitoring the hijackings and are providing situation reports to you via the NSC.

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS - 3/29/87

DECLASSIFIED

Authority DS Waiver

BY CN NARA DATE 9/16/17

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

March 30, 1981

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD V. ALLEN

THROUGH: ROBERT SCHWEITZER *S/ 1130*

FROM: CHRIS SHOEMAKER *Q*

SUBJECT: Airplane Hijackings

Secretary Haig has sent a memorandum to the President (Tab A) which gives him a status report on the two hijackings which occurred over the weekend. Because of the dynamics of the situation, this memorandum is in some ways dated. Moreover, there are issues which are obliquely presented or implied in his memorandum which should be made explicit.

The attached memorandum (Tab I) from you to the President provides two additional items of information and highlights the more general issues.

RECOMMENDATION

That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review 3/30/87

DECLASSIFIED
 Sec. 34(c), E.O. 12958, as amended
 White House Guidelines, Sept. 11, 2008
 BY NARA CAS, DATE 9/16/17

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN
SUBJECT: Airplane Hijackings

Al Haig has sent you an update on the two hijackings which occurred over the weekend (Tab A). To his update, two additional items of information should be added:

1. As you probably know, an American was wounded when he escaped from the hijacked Indonesian airplane in Thailand. He is in a Thai hospital and is expected to recover.

2. The Thai government has given permission for a commando raid on the airplane at 2:00 p.m. (EST). Some 30-50 Indonesian commandos are on the scene.

In addition to the update, Al Haig's memo raises several points which transcend the immediate situation:

1. The hijackers in two of the cases seem to be achieving their objectives. Although the fate of the Pakistani hijackers and the released prisoners is not yet clear, it is evident that some degree of success was achieved. Similarly the Honduran government released the 15 prisoners demanded by the terrorists. The situation in the Indonesian hijacking is unclear.

2. The airport security in most of the third world is appallingly deficient. There is evidence that, in at least one of the most recent cases, there was no airport screening for passengers, and the terrorists walked on the airplane completely unchallenged.

3. Taken together, these two factors mean that we should expect more hijackings and more American hostages in the future.

We will continue to use the mechanism of the State-chaired interagency group on terrorism (IG/T) to attack these issues.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Review 3/30/87

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED
Authority LS Waller
BY LN NARA DATE 9/6/17

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES
FROM HAIG, A

RECEIVED 30 MAR 81 08

DOC DATE 29 MAR 81

TO PRES

URGENT

KEYWORDS: TERRORISM HIJACKING
HONDURAS INDONESIA
CM

SUBJECT: STATUS RPT ON CENTRAL AMERICAN & EAST ASIA AIRCRAFT HIJACKINGS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR PRES DUE: ^{30 Mar 81} ~~01 APR 81~~ STATUS S FILES

FOR ACTION	FOR COMMENT	FOR INFO
SCHWEITZER	FONTAINE LILLEY	COLSON
	GREGG	LENZ

COMMENTS 3 Hour Turnaround
No Original Recd in NSC/S (enclosed in folder 4/2/81)

REF# 8109873 LOG NSCIFID (B /)

ACTION OFFICER (S)	ASSIGNED	ACTION REQUIRED	DUE	COPIES TO
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Allen	x 3/30	Pres for info	3/31	
	c 4/2	EVA ref add-on memo to VPT/Heese/Baker		82, 70, 52 16, 14

DISPATCH _____ W/ATTCH FILE 9A (C) H.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

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FOR THE PRESIDENT

GARUDA HIJACKING WORKING GROUP

Situation Report No. 4

Situation in Bangkok as of 0500 EST, March 30, 1981


The only significant development in the negotiations with the hijackers in the twelve hours since the last sitrep is the interjection of a new demand by the hijackers for \$ 1.5 million ransom, to be deposited in a Bangkok bank. The Indonesian negotiators, led by General Murdani, Deputy Chief of Indonesian Military Intelligence, were in contact with the hijackers at approximately 3:00 p.m. Bangkok time (0300 EST). The hijackers renewed their demand for the \$ 1.5 million and set a new deadline of 9:00 p.m. local time; we do not know what, if any, specific threats were made in connection with this new deadline. It is the latest in a series of deadlines which have passed without incident.

At this time, we are not in direct contact with the Thai or Indonesian negotiators, but depend on an Embassy officer at the airport command center for our information. Press reports and atmospherics at the airport as reported by the Embassy indicate that the Indonesians are pressing for a commando operation against the plane to free the hostages, while the Thais are reluctant to use force unless the hijackers begin to harm the hostages. The Thais do not consider the shooting of American Karl Schneider as calculated brutality against the hostages because he was shot while apparently trying to escape. However, the Embassy reports that a consensus seems to be emerging among the Thais and Indonesians that, if there is no change in the remaining daylight hours, an assault could be mounted during the night of March 30/31 (daylight hours March 30 in Washington).

Karl Schneider is in satisfactory condition in a Bangkok hospital and doctors are optimistic. He is awake, alert and anxious to see his wife who is due to arrive in Bangkok momentarily.



Joseph C. Snyder
Garuda Hijacking Working Group



W. Scott Butcher
Senior Watch Officer

CONFIDENTIAL
(GDS, 3/30/81, Snyder, J.C.)

DECLASSIFIED
Authority DOS Walker
BY C. J. KARA DATE 9/6/17

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