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CHRON Cables (08/19/1983)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:
Records

Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [8/19/83]
Box 91407-53

Date: 12/3/99
Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #190321Z Aug 83, 3 p	8/19/83	P1/F1
2. Letter	Reagan to P.M. Menachem Begin, 2 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
3. Letter	Reagan to President Amin Gemayel, 2 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
4. Talking Pts	Points for Mubarek Meeting, (notes on verso), 2 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #190824Z Aug 83, 4 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #190829Z Aug 83, 1 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #191031Z Aug 83, 1 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #191153Z Aug 83, 1 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
9. Draft Cable	No Cable #, re: Meeting with Uri Lubrani..., 2 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #191457Z Aug 83, 3 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #191502Z Aug 83, 3 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #191723Z Aug 83, 3 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #191734Z Aug 83, 7 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #191742Z Aug 83, 6 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #191923Z Aug 83, 4 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
16. Cable	Cable #192233Z Aug 83, 5 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1
17. Cable	No Cable #, re: Legal Considerations and DOD..., 8	8/19/83	P1/F1
18. Cable	Cable #191805Z Aug 83, 6 p.	8/19/83	P1/F1

D 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #198

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

RBW 11/6/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/19/83]

FOIA

name of process: M2008-098/12

Box Number 91407

5

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
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56649	CABLE	190321Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	3	8/19/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			

56650	LETTER	RR TO P.M. MENACHEM BEGIN [0 - 0]	2	8/19/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			

56651	LETTER	RR TO PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL [0 - 0]	2	8/19/1983	B1
	D	11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			

56652	DRAFT CABLE	NO CABLE #, RE. MTG. WITH URI LUBRANI [ANNOTATED] [0 - 0]	2	8/19/1983	B1
	R	11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10	56653 CABLE	191457Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	3	8/19/1983	B1
11	56654 CABLE	191502Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] D 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	3	8/19/1983	B1
12	56655 CABLE	191734Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	3	8/19/1983	B1
14	56656 CABLE	191742Z AUG 83 [0 - 0] D 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12	6	8/19/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

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[8/19/83]

FOIA

M2008-098/12

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
56657	CABLE	191923Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	4	8/19/1983	B1
		R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			
56658	CABLE	192233Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	5	8/19/1983	B1
		R 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			
56659	TELEGRAM	NO CABLE #, RE. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DOD [0 - 0]	8	8/19/1983	B1
		R 4/19/2006 F98-008/1			
		DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O.			
56660	CABLE	191805Z AUG 83 [0 - 0]	6	8/19/1983	B1
		D 11/24/2008 M2008-098/12			

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER / LISTED ON THE
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**EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
Tel Aviv**

August 19, 1983

His Excellency
Menachem Begin
Prime Minister of the
State of Israel
Jerusalem

Dear Mr. Prime Minister:

I have been asked to convey the enclosed
message to you from President Reagan.

With warmest personal regards,

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'S. Lewis', written over the typed name.

Samuel W. Lewis
Ambassador

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.



EMBASSY OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

August 19, 1983

His Excellency
Sheikh Amin Gemayel
President of the
Republic of Lebanon
Beirut

Dear Mr. President:

I have the honor to transmit to you the
attached letter dated August 19, 1983, from
President Reagan.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Robert S. Dillon".

Robert S. Dillon
Ambassador

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8/19/83

POINTS FOR MUBARAK MEETING

Egyptian initiative with Syria to discourage Syrian intervention (direct or indirect) in LAF redeployment.

- LAF redeployment imminent
- 600 Syrian/PSP artillery tubes
- Syrian special forces facing Lebanese positions in areas vacated by Israelis

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DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
 NLS F98-008/1 #184
 3: CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/06

12-511 (8/13/83)

U.S. CONVINCED ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL

(TEXT) WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON

SANTA BARBARA, CALIFORNIA -- THE WHITE HOUSE SAYS THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION IS CONVINCED THAT THE PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON WILL LEAD TO A TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM THAT COUNTRY.

IN A STATEMENT REITERATING U.S., ISRAELI AND LEBANESE UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE AGREEMENT REACHED ON MAY 17 BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, WHITE HOUSE SPOKESMAN LARRY SPEAKES TOLD REPORTERS AUGUST 19 THAT THE PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IS "THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT."

"WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES," SPEAKES SAID.

HE SAID THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS "BEST EFFORTS TO HELP CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THESE WITHDRAWALS TO

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PAGE 2 NE5110819

(BEGIN TEXT)

FOUR WEEKS AGO, PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON -- THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL.

THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 17 IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD ACHIEVEMENT OF THOSE GOALS. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS.

FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL WITHDRAWAL AND FULL AUTHORITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

PAGE 3 NE5110819

EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FACES IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS, THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT.

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IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES
UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL, SAYING THAT IT PRESUPPOSES
A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE
ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ITS
FORCES IN LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE
OFFICIAL ISRAELI STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

PAGE 4 NE5110819

"IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE
REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE ANWALI LINE IS ONLY PART
OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. (AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND
MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS.
THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF
BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE
COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL TAKE
PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL
OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES.

THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO HELP CREATE
CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THESE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE
AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON
WILL COORDINATE THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF
RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH-SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY,
EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE

PAGE 5 NE5110819

CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION
CAN TAKE HOLD.

WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING PROCESS
OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED,
SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

(END TEXT)

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8/19/83

U. S. DRAFT STATEMENT

Four weeks ago President Reagan reaffirmed his commitment to three fundamental goals in Lebanon -- the earliest possible withdrawal of all foreign forces; the extension of Lebanese sovereignty throughout its territory; and that ~~Southern~~ Lebanon shall not again become a source of hostile actions against Israel. The Agreement concluded between Israel and Lebanon on May 17 ^{is an important} ~~was a~~ first step toward achievement of these goals. The President directed that U.S. efforts be renewed in a mission to the Middle East headed by Ambassadors Robert McFarlane and Richard Fairbanks.

Since that time Ambassadors McFarlane and Fairbanks have traveled extensively throughout the region undertaking intensive talks with Arab and Israeli leaders. Several conclusions have emerged from these talks. First and foremost is the ^{foundation of} solid support ⁱⁿ throughout the Arab world and in Israel for the principles of full withdrawal and full authority for the Lebanese Government. Equally clear is the enormity of the task the Lebanese Government faces in seeking to strengthen the consensus among the diverse confessional groups in Lebanon which is so essential to the reconstruction and revitalization of the Lebanese economy and the establishment of political stability. It is clear that President Gemayel is committed to these goals.

In its efforts the Government of Lebanon will soon face an opportunity to restore stability and extend the process of ~~reconciliation~~ ^{and consensus building} and reconstruction to the districts of Alayh and Shuf as the Government of Israel withdraws its forces from these areas. This move by Israel is the first in a process of withdrawal envisaged in the May 17 Agreement. In recent weeks some have questioned the motives underlying this withdrawal by Israel saying that it presages a permanent partition of Lebanon. We are convinced that the Israeli Government is committed to the full withdrawal of its forces in Lebanon. In this regard it is instructive to note ^{official Israeli} the statements of ~~Israeli Government officials~~ such as the following:

"It is the policy and the intention of the Government of Israel to withdraw from the whole of Lebanon and that the redeployment of our forces along the Awwali line is only part of that total withdrawal."

(And Further)

"It is our firm desire to see a strong central government restoring its authority over the whole of Lebanon and maintaining security throughout its 10,452 square kilometers; thus, all allegations regarding Israeli intentions of bringing about a partition or division of Lebanon are completely baseless and totally without foundation."

concurrent

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO ^{help} ~~CREATE~~ CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW ~~THE~~ WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

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WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL ~~INITIATE TALKS DEVOTED TO ASSURING~~ THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH/SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE ^{domestic} CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING ~~COMMITMENT TO A~~ PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

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DE RUEHDM #6373/01 2310828

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O 190824Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3316

INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0466

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0782

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8572

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5703

RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6536

RUFHFRM/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE IMMEDIATE 0030

RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2401

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8341

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2569

BT

~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 06373

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS-KHADDAM

- PLENARY MEETING AUGUST 17

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: KHADDAM

SOUGHT TO USE THE INITIAL (PLENARY) MEETING WITH THE FAIRBANKS TEAM NOT FOR THE ANTICIPATED CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT RATHER FOR AN EXPOSITION OF THE "ILLEGALITY" OF THE AGREEMENT PER SE. HE CONTENDED THE AGREEMENT IS "INVALID" BECAUSE IT WAS NEGOTIATED UNDER DURESS (VIENNA CONVENTION), IMPOSED ON THE GOL BY THE USG (CITING LEBANESE FON MIN AS HIS AUTHORITY), SURRENDERED SOUTH LEBANON TO ISRAEL, IMPOSES UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND ARAB SECURITY, AND IS REJECTED BY MOST LEBANESE. FAIRBANKS ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST APPLICABILITY OF VIENNA CONVENTION, POINTED OUT AGREEMENTS ON TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY ARE RARELY NEGOTIATED IN THE ABSENCE OF OCCUPYING FORCES, INSISTED ON THE LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL WHICH NEGOTIATED IT, AND LISTED THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL BENEFITS IT PROVIDES FOR LEBANON.

END SUMMARY.

3. MORNING AUGUST 17 AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS AND FONMIN KHADDAM HAD INITIAL MEETING, AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED, TO UNDERTAKE CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE ISRAELI-LEBAN SE AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, ROBINSON, ROSS, KRECZKO, WILLIS, AND A/DCM ACCOMPANIED. KHADDAM HAD HIS IO DIRECTOR HAYTHAM AL-KAYLANI, MFA INFORMATION DIRECTOR ABDAL-KARIM SABBAGH, AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GLAIEL, ARAB AFFAIRS DIRECTOR HINAYN HATIM, INTERPRETER AND NOTE TAKERS.

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CHRG: PROG

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4. ALTHOUGH U.S. SIDE HAD EXPECTED TO BEGIN DETAILED REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, THIS INITIAL MEETING, WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR, WAS DEVOTED TO A DEBATE ON THE LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENT PER SE. (IT WAS DECIDED THAT ROBINSON AND KAYLANI AND THEIR STAFFS WOULD MEET AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON AND, AS NECESSARY, AUGUST 18 TO 20, TO COMPLETE THE ACTUAL DETAILED REVIEW - SEPTTEL.)

5. FAIRBANKS BEGAN BY REITERATING U.S. DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR THE EVACUATION OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON ASAP. HE RECALLED THE ISRAELI STATEMENT (ARENS) OF AUGUST 16 REITERATING GOI PLEDGE TO WITHDRAW WITHIN EIGHT OR 12 WEEKS AFTER ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE AGREEMENT, ON THE CONDITION THAT OTHER FOREIGN FORCES ALSO DEPART. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT SYRIA IS READY TO WITHDRAW ON THE CONDITION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS RESCINDED.

6. KHADDAM SUGGESTED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE TO "REMOVE" FROM THE AGREEMENT AND ALL ITS ANNEXES ANYTHING NOT CONSONANT WITH THE SOVEREIGNTY OF LEBANON OR THE SECURITY OF SYRIA AND THE ARAB WORLD. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE USG IS NOT A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT AND CANNOT CHANGE IT, HE HOPED FOR AGREEMENT WITH KHADDAM ON WHAT THE AGREEMENT MEANS.

7. KHADDAM DECLARED THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT A LEGAL ONE. IF IT WERE, THE AGREEMENT IS CLEARLY INVALID UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION WHICH STIPULATES ANY AGREEMENT CONCLUDED UNDER FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS INVALID. THIS PROPOSITION, HE EMPHASIZED, IS NOT DEBATABLE; SIMILAR CLAUSES APPEAR IN UN CHARTER AND RESOLUTIONS.

8. A DETAILED EXCHANGE THEN ENSUED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LEGALITY AND VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT. FAIRBANKS ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE USG CONSIDERS THE AGREEMENT TO BE A VALID LEGAL CONTRACT UNDERTAKEN BY TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. SYRIA IS A PARTY TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION, BUT THE US AND LEBANON ARE NOT. NEVERTHELESS, THE USG ACCEPTS THE CONVENTION AS A VALID STATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE BELIEVE IT IS ABSURD TO MAINTAIN THAT AN END TO HOSTILITY CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WHEN ONE PARTY REMAINS ON THE SOIL OF THE OTHER.

9. FAIRBANKS ALSO STRESSED THAT THE AGREEMENT IS NOT A

10. KHADDAM DISAGREED SHARPLY, ASKING IF THE USG WAS NOT IN FACT TAKING THE POSITION THAT ISRAEL IS AN OCCUPYING POWER. FAIRBANKS CLARIFIED THAT THE USG MAKES NO FINDING ON THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF ISRAELI INVASION. THE QUESTION AT ISSUE IS NOT THE LEGALITY OF ISRAELI ACTION BUT THE STATUS OF ISRAEL ON THE GROUND IN GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIES.

11. KHADDAM THEN LISTED SARG GROUNDS FOR ARGUING THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID:

--AGREEMENT WAS IMPOSED BY DURESS; GEMAYEL REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING FON MIN, HAD TOLD SARG USG IMPOSED THE AGREEMENT ON THE GOL.

--AGREEMENT IS A PEACE TREATY IMPOSING NORMALIZATION AS WELL AS MILITARY, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANON. SIMILAR AGREEMENTS STRETCHING BACK TO THE 19TH CENTURY HAVE HAD THE SAME RESULTS, I.E., WHERE THE AGGRESSOR GAINS, NEW WARS ARE INEVITABLE. FURTHER, WORLD WAR II TREATIES LED TO THE DIVISION OF GERMANY; NOW WE HAVE THE FRAGMENTATION OF LEBANON.

--THE LEBANESE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE AGREEMENT, DESPITE USG CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY. REPRESENTATIVE MOSLEMS LIKE THE MUFTI AND CHRISTIANS LIKE RAYMOND EDDE, FRANGIEH, AND MUNIR ABU FADHIL DO NOT ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT.

--LEBANON HAS NOT REGAINED ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOUTH.

12. DURING AND AFTER THIS EXPOSITION BY KHADDAM, FAIRBANKS STRESSED THAT WE DISAGREE FUNDAMENTALLY WITH KHADDAM'S "EVIDENCE" FOR THE "INVALIDITY" OF THE AGREEMENT, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS "INVALID LEGAL CONCLUSIONS." WE NEED TO COME TO A CONSENSUS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OR AGREE TO DISAGREE ON SPECIFIC POINTS. SO FAR, BOTH SIDES AGREE ON SEEKING THE EARLIEST WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES (FAIRBANKS SPECIFIED HE WAS MAKING NO EQUATION BETWEEN THE LEGITIMACY OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON), ON RESTORING GOL SOVEREIGNTY, ON NECESSITY THAT THE GOL BE REPRESENTATIVE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOL ACHIEVING FULL CONTROL OF ALL LEBANON.

13. TURNING TO KHADDAM'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS FAIRBANKS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

--INTERNATIONAL STABILITY DEPENDS UPON THE RULE OF LAW. TERRORIST ATTACKS DID OCCUR ACROSS LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER. THESE ATTACKS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

TERRORIST ATTACKS DID OCCUR ACROSS LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER

-- AGREEMENT IS A FAIR ONE IN VIEW OF USG, GOL AND LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM (LEGISLATURE).

-- AGREEMENT PROVIDES GAINS FOR LEBANON INCLUDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, RECOGNITION OF BORDER, NO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE THIRD PARTY CLAUSE, RESTORATION OF

CONTROL IN THE SOUTH, AND TIME LIMITED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- SINCE NEGOTIATIONS ON TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY RARELY OCCUR WITH ARMIES ON THE BORDER RATHER THAN IN OCCUPATION, AGREEMENT IS RESULT OF USUAL, NOT EXTRAORDINARY, CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE GOL CONCLUDING OTHER AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH SYRIA.

14. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

(10) ACTION ROSS5 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

VZCZCBLO652
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHDM #6374 2310833

LOC: DISK 03 150
19 AUG 83 0917
CN: 07989
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 190829Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0784
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3318
BT
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 06374

EXDIS

BEIRUT PASS TO OTHER POST IF MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS NOT IN BEIRUT

FOR MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS FROM PAGANELLI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, LE, IS, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PRESS BACKGROUNDER
- ON FAIRBANKS/KHADDAM MEETING OF AUGUST 17

REF: BEIRUT 0089

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PRESS BACKGROUNDER HAVE THEIR RISKS AND BENEFITS, BUT IN ANY CASE SHOULD PLAY IT STRAIGHT. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT CHARACTERIZING MEETING OF LEGAL EXPERTS HERE AS "A SMALL STEP FORWARD" (REFTEL) WAS WARRANTED EITHER BY THE AUGUST 17 DISCUSSIONS OR ANY SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN ROBINSON AND THE SYRIANS.

3. BBC RADIO THIS MORNING, AUGUST 19, IS REPORTING, OBVIOUSLY BASED ON BACKGROUNDER, THAT SYRIANS MAY BE "MODIFYING THEIR VIEWS" ON THE AGREEMENT. AS YOU KNOW, THIS IS DEAD WRONG, BUT BACKGROUNDER OPENS UP POSSIBILITIES OF SUCH MISINTERPRETATION.

4. WE CAN EXPECT THAT THE SYRIAN MEDIA WILL PICK UP ALL OF THIS AND SHOOT IT BACK AT US IN THEIR USUAL NEGATIVE FASHION, AND THIS CAN BE NOTHING BUT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO YOUR MISSION. THE SYRIANS DON'T NEED ANY PROMPTING TO ATTACK OUR POLICIES AND YOUR ACTIVITIES, BUT I BELIEVE THE LESS WE GIVE THEM TO CHEW ON, THE BETTER. IN ADDITION, THIS WON'T HELP OUR ONGOING EFFORT TO GET THE SYRIANS TO CUT OUT THEIR PRESS ATTACKS ON YOUR MISSION.

5. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT WE REVERT TO PREVIOUS POLICY OF NOT REPEAT NOT COMMENTING TO OR BACKGROUNDING THE PRESS ON YOUR DISCUSSIONS WITH CONCERNED GOVERNMENTS.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 98-008/1 #786
BY LOJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

Mark-up
Revised
per
Wadia Haddad
from Jidda

REVISED PER JERUSALEM 2958 AND 2963

U.S. DRAFT STATEMENT

~~Two~~ ^{Four} WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON -- THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THESE GOALS ARE EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 17. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND LEBANON ENJOY WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK HE FACES IN SEEKING TO ~~FORGE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION~~ ^{to restore the consensus} AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. AFTER EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH CHARGES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THE STATEMENTS GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS OF ~~THE ISRAELI~~ MINISTER OF ~~DEFENSE OF AUGUST 16~~ AS FOLLOWS: SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

"I WISH TO STATE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL INITIATE TALKS DEVOTED TO ASSURING THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH/SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TOWARD POLITICAL RECONCILIATION WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

AS THIS PROCESS PROGRESSES IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO LEND ITS MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ASSIST. WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

U.S. DRAFT STATEMENT

Chron
(3 copies made.)

TWO WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON -- THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THESE GOALS ARE EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 17. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND LEBANON ENJOY WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK HE FACES IN SEEKING TO FORGE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. AFTER EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH CHARGES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF AUGUST 16 AS FOLLOWS:

"I WISH TO STATE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

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AS THIS PROCESS PROGRESSES IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO LEND ITS MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ASSIST. WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

OPERATION CENTER CALLED. AMB. FAIRBANKS IS REQUESTING THE FOLLOWING
CHANGES BE MADE IN AMB. MCFARLANE'S DRAFT. OPERATION CENTER WISHES
TO KNOW IF THIS IS ACCEPTABLE TO AMB. MCFARLANE.

SUGGESTED NEW TEXT:

"WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND
AND ISRAEL WILL COORDINATE THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN
OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH-SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY,
EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE
DOMESTIC CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND
RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD."

TEXT BEFORE CHANGES:

"WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON
AND ISRAEL WILL INITIATE TALKS DEVOTED TO ASSURING THE
SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE
ALAYH-SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY, EFFORTS BY THE GOVERN-
MENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE
SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD."

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 9135

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEHDM RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHTV RUEHJM RUEHEG
DE RUEHBL #9135 231 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 191029Z AUG 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0958
INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2425
RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0889
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0855
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0663

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/19/83
APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
TD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4; AMB

BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09135

EXDIS

DAMASCUS ALSO FOR DAVIS ROBINSON
CAIRO PLEASE PASS AMB. MCFARLANE
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, SY, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: NEXT STEPS IN
- DAMASCUS

REF: DAMASCUS 6354

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BARRING THE UNFORESEEN I AM AVAILABLE FOR A SUNDAY,
AUGUST 21, MEETING WITH KHADDAM AND OUR LEGAL TEAMS.
I WOULD PLAN TO ARRIVE AND DEPART ON SAME DAY.

3. TO PERMIT A FULL DEBRIEFING ON YOUR DISCUSSIONS FOR
US, AND POSSIBLY FOR THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS, I WOULD
APPRECIATE IT IF KRECZKO COULD STAY FOR A FEW DAYS AFTER
YOUR DEPARTURE. TRAVEL ARRANGEMENTS OUTLINED IN REFTEL
FOR ROBINSON ARE FINE. DILLON

BT
#9135

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 9135

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines; July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 12/3/97

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 9136

VZCZCBLI *
OO RUEKJCS RUEHC RUEADWW
DE RUEHBL #9136 231 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191031Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEKJCS / SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEEC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2426
RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09136

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/19/83
APPRV: RMC FARLANE
DRFTD: PDUR
CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4
AMB.

EXDIS

SECDEF PERSONAL FOR SECRETARY WEINBERGER AND GEN. VESSEY
DEPARTMENT FOR THE DEPUTY SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12456: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: APPOINTMENT OF
- U.S. REPRESENTATIVE TO IDF-LAF COORDINATION
- COMMITTEE

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AS I MENTIONED TO GEN. KELLEY WHILE HE WAS HERE, I
THINK IT IS IMPORTANT THAT BG STEINER (J5PM) COME TO
BEIRUT TO REPRESENT US ON THE HIGH LEVEL IDF-LAF
COORDINATION COMMITTEE. DILLON
BT

#9136

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 9136

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-00811#187

BY CS NARA. DATE 4/19/06

ACTION CG INFO DPO VIP-5 7

VZCZCJM0547
OO RUEHJM
DE RUEHDM #6390 2311154
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 191153Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3320
RUEA WW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0470
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0786
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8576
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5706
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6539
RUFHFRM/AMCONSUL MARSEILLE IMMEDIATE 0032
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2404
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8345
RUEH T/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 2571
BT
S E C R E T DAMASCUS 06390

with - check

19-AUG-83
TOR: 11:57
CN: 27570
CHRG: PROG
DIST: EXDV

EXDIS

FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION FROM LEGAL ADVISOR ROBINSON

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MA
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS-KHADDAM
- PLENARY MEETING AUGUST 17 - CORRECTIONS

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 6373, (B) BEIRUT 9105 (NOTAL)

1. SUGGEST FOLLOWING TWO CHANGES IN THE RECORD OF THE AUGUST 17 KHADDAM/FAIRBANKS PLENARY MEETING:

-- PARA 2, SENTENCE 3: DELETE "AGAINST APPLICABILITY OF VIENNA CONVENTION" AND REPLACE WITH "THAT THE AGREEMENT WAS NEGOTIATED FREELY BETWEEN TWO SOVEREIGN STATES AND."

-- PARA 1, TIC 3: ADD "DISPUTE RESOLUTION" BETWEEN "PARTY" AND "CLAUSE". PAGANELLI#

2. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

BT
#6390

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 198-008/1#188

BY LOS NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

12
11
10
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8
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5

(6) ACTION USIS INFO AMB DCM POL ROSS PM

RXXVZCZCBL0681
 OO RUEHBL
 DE RUEH TV #1283 2311217
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 O 191216Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 TO RUEHFO/USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5633
 RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3641
 RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 3331
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1222
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6715
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7940
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9633
 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3287
 BT
 UNCLAS TEL AVIV 11283

LOC: DISK 03 239
 19 AUG 83 1224
 CN: 08018
 CHRG: USIS
 DIST: MEDI

USIA
 DEPARTMENT FOR PA AND PA/PRESS
 NSC FOR WILLIAM CLARK
 WHITEHOUSE FOR LARRY SPEAKES
 USINFO FOR P/PPN, VOA NEWS/CA, NEA, P/RC, R/P, P/FW
 CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
 BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356:N/A
 SUBJECT: PRESS REMARKS BY AMEASSADOR ROBERT MCFARLANE

1. FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS BY AMBASSADOR
 MCFARLANE TO THE PRESS AFTER MEETING WITH PRIME
 MINISTER MENAHEM BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER ITZHAK SHAMIR
 AND DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE ARENS, JERUSALEM, AUGUST 19,
 1983:
 BEGIN REMARKS:

I JUST COME FROM A VERY WORTHWHILE SESSION WITH THE
 PRIME MINISTER, THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DEFENSE
 MINISTER. AS ALWAYS, IT WAS AN EXTREMELY USEFUL
 EXCHANGE OF VIEWS DEVOTED TO HOW TOGETHER WE CAN
 MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR COMMON GOALS OF ACHIEVING
 THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES--
 ALL FOREIGN FORCES--FROM LEBANON, ASSURING THE EARLY
 RESTORATION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT THE
 COUNTRY, AND ASSURING THAT LEBANON DOES NOT AGAIN
 BECOME A SOURCE OF ATTACKS AGAINST ISRAEL.

THIS WAS A VERY USEFUL EXCHANGE, WE DISCUSSED AS WELL
 THE WAYS AND MEANS THAT TOGETHER WE CAN TAKE TO
 ASSURE THAT THE FORTHCOMING REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE
 ALEY-SHOUF AREA TAKES PLACE IN A STABLE, ORDERLY
 FASHION, AND HOW WORKING TOGETHER--THE TWO GOVERNMENTS--
 CAN PROPERLY COORDINATE THAT WITHDRAWAL. WE ALSO
 DISCUSSED AS WELL THE IMPORTANCE OF DISPELLING THE

ERRONEOUS NOTION THAT THIS REDEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO PARTITION. THIS IS CLEARLY NOT THE POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, AND WE DISCUSSED WAYS IN WHICH WE CAN MAKE THAT EMPHATICALLY CLEAR.

I WILL LEAVE ISRAEL TODAY AND GO ON TO CAIRO. I ANTICIPATE RETURNING TO BEIRUT. I LOOK FORWARD TO REMAINING IN THE AREA SO THAT THE PROCESS OF PRESERVING THE CONSENSUS IN LEBANON--THE REDEPLOYMENT-- AND OUR BROADER EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES CAN BE SUSTAINED WITH RENEWED MOMENTUM.

ONCE MORE WE APPRECIATE THE HOSPITALITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL HERE, WE LOOK FORWARD TO FURTHER EXCHANGES IN THE DAYS AHEAD. (END TEXT)
BEIRUT MINIMIZED CONSIDERED.
LEE

(10) ACTION ROSS5 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

VZCZCBLO697

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJM #3007/01 2311417

ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK

O 191415Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6289

RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0176

INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9604

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1312

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JERUSALEM 03007

LOC: DISK 03 291

19 AUG 83 1424

CN: 08033

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS AND AMBASSADOR DILLON

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED STATEMENT
DEALING WITH PERCEPTIONS OF PARTITION1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE.

3. I HAVE CONCLUDED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND
LEBANESE REGARDING REVISIONS TO SUBJECT STATEMENT.
HERE FOLLOWS MY RECOMMENDATION FOR FINAL STATEMENT TO BE
DELIVERED AT TODAY'S WHITE HOUSE PRESS BRIEFING IN
SANTA BARBARA. STATEMENT HAS BEEN CAREFULLY COORDINATED
AND I RECOMMEND IT BE ISSUED AS FOLLOWS:

4. BEGIN TEXT: U.S. STATEMENT

FOUR WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS
COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON --
THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES;
THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT
ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME
A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THE
AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON
MAY 17 IS AN IMPORTANT STEP TOWARD RELIEFMENT OF THESE
GOALS. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT U.S. EFFORTS BE
RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY
AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS
HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDER-
TAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS.
SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS.

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By 016 NARA, Date 12/3/89

PRESERVATION COPY

FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL FOR THE PRINCIPLES OF FULL WITHDRAWAL AND FULL AUTHORITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT FACES IN SEEKING TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONSTRUCTION AND CONSENSUS-BUILDING TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT IS COMMITTED TO THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ITS FORCES IN LEBANON. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE OFFICIAL ISRAELI STATEMENTS SUCH AS THE FOLLOWING:

"IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."
WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE CONCURRENT WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO HELP CREATE

CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THESE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WILL COORDINATE THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH/SHUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TO STRENGTHEN THE CONSENSUS WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY. END TEXT.
CLUVERIUS

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NLRR M9008-098/12 # 54652

BY Amf NARA DATE 11/24/08

SECRET/EXDIS

FROM: AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO: AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE
SECSTATE

INFO: WHITE HOUSE

DEPARTMENT FOR ACTING SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
~~SAID ... MCFARLANE~~
FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION; MEETING WITH URI LUBRANI
~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ TERMS FOR MEETING WITH JUMBLATT

L. SECRET ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING SESSION WITH JOINT FOREIGN MINISTRY AND DEFENSE OFFICIALS (REPORTED SEPTEL) AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS (PLUS TEICHER, DUR AND KURTZER) HELD USEFUL ONE HOUR SESSION WITH URI LUBRANI (PLUS BAR-ON, MERHAV AND DAGHAN) ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN ISRAELI EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN WALID JUMBLATT AND A LEBANESE OFFICIAL (PRESUMPTIVELY WADIA HADDAD), ~~as well as~~

3. AT THE OUTSET LUBRANI STATED THAT ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ ^{which suggest} AS A SUMMARY COMMENT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK BY A GREATER READINESS TO MEET ~~IN WITH GOL OFFICIALS.~~ JUMBLATT'S COMMENTS IN RECENT DAYS. IN SHORT, IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF WHETHER BUT WHERE, WHEN AND WHAT WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. REGARDING DRUZE DEMANDS, LUBRANI STATED THAT IN GENERAL THE DRUZE WANT REPROCAL TREATMENT TO THAT ACCORDED TO THE CHRISTIANS AND OTHER SECTS (LATER LUBRANI QUOTED JUMBLATT AS STRESSING THE NEED FOR A NEW POLITICAL REALIGNMENT WITHIN LEBANON WHICH BETTER REFLECTS THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN SECTS DUE TO EVENTS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR). SPECIFICALLY THIS TRANSLATES TO THEIR HOPE OF HAVING ~~TWO~~ ^{two} CABINET POSITIONS FILLED BY DRUZE NOW. JUMBLATT EXPRESSED NO PREFERENCE AS TO WHICH PORTFOLIOS THEY RECEIVED, ALTHOUGH THE MORE PRESTIGIOUS THE BETTER OF COURSE. THE CANDIDATES ARE KHALID JUMBLATT (A COUSIN) AND MARWAN HAMMADEH. SECONDLY THEY HOPE TO SEE A ~~XXXXXX~~ LARGER PIECE OF THE PUBLIC RESOURCE PIE BENEFITTING THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF (ROADS, SCHOOLS ETC). THIRDLY THEY HOPE TO SEE DRUZE RECEIVE A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE ARMY.

5. REGARDING THE FORMAT FOR THE MEETING, JUMBLATT PREFERS THAT PIERRE GEMAYEL NOT REPEAT NOT BE THERE (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY THAT WAS A PRECONDITION). THEY PREFER THAT THOSE PRESENT INCLUDE ONLY JUMBLATT AND WADIA HADDAD (ALTHOUGH THEY HOPE ~~THE~~)

In other words a new national pact reflecting the actual distribution of power.

In other words, a new national pact reflects actual distribution of power.
In addition to the well-known security demands, they specifically seek to

~~Jumblatt~~ Walid has no personal interest in a post.

proposed

THE ISRAELIS "WILL BE IN THE WINGS NEARBY." CONCERNING VENUE, THEY PREFER A NEUTRAL SITE AND OFFERED PARIS OR WASHINGTON AS POSSIBILITIES. THEY WERE NOT INSPIRED BY THE IDEA OF HAVING IT ON A US SHIP IN THE MED.

"matters of interest"

6. AS GROUND RULES (AS OPPOSED TO PRECONDITIONS) FOR THE MEETING JUMBLATT HAS SEVERAL CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY HE STATED THAT THE GOL MUST APPLY THE SAME RULES TO THE LEBANESE FORCES IN THE ALAYH/SHOUF AREA AS THEY PLAN TO APPLY TO THE DRUZE. SECOND HE WANTS TO KNOW HOW FAR THE US IS WILLING TO GO IN UNDERWRITING WHATEVER COMMITMENTS THE GOL MAKES. THIS WAS NOT PRECISELY ARTICULATED. IT STRUCK ME THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN AN EXPRESSION ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXXXXX~~ THAT WE WOULD ASSURE GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE BY THE ~~XXXXXXXX~~ GOL.

our commitment to

7. BY WAY OF OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF PLAY, JUMBLATT ~~XXXXXX~~ HAS STATED THAT NO ONE SHOULD EXPECT THE GOL TALKS WITH DALLOUL AND HAMMADEH TO RESULT IN ANYTHING (~~XXXXXXXX~~ ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING "I'M THE GUY."). FINALLY THE ISRAELIS ASKED THAT THE GOL DISCONTINUE ALL OTHER EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A JUMBLATT MEETING (~~WITH THE JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS~~). I SAID I COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT ON THIS; IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE LEBANESE COULD TELL THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS TO STAND DOWN WHILE THEY WORK THE PROBLEM WITH THE ISRAELIS. YOU MIGHT PASS THIS ALONG FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH; URI SAYS IT IS MAKING HIS TASK FAR MORE DIFFICULT.

VIA

8. FOR BEIRUT. AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT WADIA TO PROVIDE A DEBRIEF OF THIS SESSION AND TO ASK HIS HELP IN GETTING ANSWERS TO TWO BASIC POINTS WHICH SHOULD BE PASSED BACK TO THE ISRAELIS TOMORROW (SATURDAY). FIRST, ALTHOUGH NO PRECONDITIONS ARE PROPOSED, IS IT FAIR TO EXPECT THAT THE GOL WILL ENTER THE TALKS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO ~~XXXXXX~~ TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON A RELATIONSHIP OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF WHICH ACCORDS THEM RECIPROCAL TREATMENT TO THAT ACCORDED NOW TO THE CHRISTIANS? SECOND, WHERE WOULD THE GOL LIKE TO HAVE THE MEETING AND WHEN? FINALLY (FOR THE U.S.) WHAT ROLE WILL WE PLAY DOWNSTREAM? MY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF URGING THAT THE GOL RESPONSIBLY AND FAIRLY WITH THE DRUZE, BOTH AS A MATTER OF EQUITY AND IN THE INTEREST OF FOSTERING THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

between generally

deal

9. URI LUBRANI IS HOPING THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GET THESE ANSWERS TO HIM TOMORROW OS THAT HE CAN GET BACK TO JUMBLATT. HE ASKED WHETHER YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER WITH HIM WHEN YOU COME DOWN (EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER ANN ARRIVES). HE LIVES NEAR TEL AVIV. PLEASE LIAISE WITH SAM LEWIS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS.
WARM REGARDS.

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(10) ACTION ROSS5 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

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 ZZ RUEHBL
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 Z 191457Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT FLASH 0178
 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 6291
 INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1314
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9606
 BT
~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 03011

LOC: DISK 03 303
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 CN: 08035
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ACTING SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
 BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
 CAIRO FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION; MEETING WITH URI
 LUBRANI: TERMS FOR MEETING WITH JUMBLATT

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. FOLLOWING SESSION WITH JOINT FOREIGN MINISTRY AND
 DEFENSE OFFICIALS (REPORTED SEPTEL) AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE
 AND LEWIS (PLUS TEICHER, DUR AND KURTZER) HELD USEFUL
 ONE-HOUR SESSION WITH URI LUBRANI (PLUS BAR-ON, MERHAV
 AND DAGAN) ON THE STATE OF PLAY IN ISRAELI EFFORTS TO
 ARRANGE A MEETING BETWEEN WALID JUMBLATT AND A LEBANESE
 OFFICIAL (PRESUMPTIVELY WADIA HADDAD).

3. AT THE OUTSET LUBRANI STATED THAT HE HAD BEEN STRUCK
 BY JUMBLATT'S COMMENTS IN RECENT DAYS WHICH SUGGEST
 GREATER READINESS TO MEET WITH GOL OFFICIALS. IN SHORT,
 IT IS NOT A QUESTION OF WHETHER BUT WHERE, WHEN AND WHAT
 WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED.

4. REGARDING DRUZE DEMANDS, LUBRANI STATED THAT IN
 GENERAL THE DRUZE WANT RECIPROCAL TREATMENT TO THAT
 ACCORDED TO THE CHRISTIANS AND OTHER SECTS. (LATER LUBRANI
 QUOTED JUMBLATT AS STRESSING THE EVENTUAL NEED FOR A NEW
 POLITICAL REALIGNMENT WITHIN LEBANON WHICH BETTER
 REFLECTS THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF CERTAIN SECTS DUE TO
 EVENTS SINCE THE CIVIL WAR. IN OTHER WORDS, A NEW
 NATIONAL PACT REFLECTING THE ACTUAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER.)
 IN ADDITION TO THE WELL-KNOWN SECURITY DEMANDS, THEY
 SPECIFICALLY SEEK TO HAVE TWO CABINET POSITIONS FILLED
 BY DRUZE NOW. JUMBLATT EXPRESSED NO PREFERENCE AS TO

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BY Amj NARA DATE 11/24/88

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WHICH PORTFOLIOS THEY RECEIVED, ALTHOUGH THE MORE PRESTIGIOUS THE BETTER OF COURSE. THE CANDIDATES ARE KHALID JUMBLATT (A COUSIN) AND MARWAN HAMMADEH. WALID HAS NO PERSONAL INTEREST IN A POST. SECONDLY, THEY HOPE TO SEE A LARGER PIECE OF THE PUBLIC RESOURCE PIE BENEFITTING THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF (ROADS, SCHOOLS, ETC). THIRDLY, THEY HOPE TO SEE DRUZE RECEIVE A LARGER PERCENTAGE OF THE OFFICER POSITIONS IN THE ARMY.

5. REGARDING THE FORMAT FOR THE MEETING, JUMBLATT PREFERS THAT PIERRE GEMAYEL NOT REPEAT NOT BE THERE (ALTHOUGH HE DID NOT SAY THAT WAS A PRECONDITION). THEY PREFER THAT THOSE PRESENT INCLUDE ONLY JUMBLATT AND WADIA HADDAD (ALTHOUGH THEY HOPE THE ISRAELIS "WILL BE IN THE WINGS NEARBY.") CONCERNING VENUE, THEY PREFER A NEUTRAL SITE AND PROPOSED PARIS OR WASHINGTON AS POSSIBILITIES. THEY WERE NOT INSPIRED BY THE IDEA OF HAVING IT ON A U.S. SHIP IN THE MED.

6. AS "MATTERS OF INTEREST" (AS OPPOSED TO PRECONDITIONS) FOR THE MEETING JUMBLATT HAS TWO CONCERNS. SPECIFICALLY HE STATED THAT THE GOL MUST APPLY THE SAME RULES TO THE LEBANESE FORCES IN THE ALAYH/SHOUF AREA AS THEY PLAN TO APPLY TO THE DRUZE. SECOND HE WANTS TO KNOW HOW FAR THE U.S. IS WILLING TO GO IN UNDERWRITING WHATEVER COMMITMENTS THE GOL MAKES. THIS WAS NOT PRECISELY ARTICULATED. IT STRUCK ME THAT HE WAS INTERESTED IN OUR COMMITMENT TO ASSURE GOOD FAITH PERFORMANCE BY THE GOL.

7. BY WAY OF OTHER GENERAL COMMENTS ON THE STATE OF PLAY, JUMBLATT HAS STATED THAT NO ONE SHOULD EXPECT THE GOL TALKS WITH DALLOUL AND HAMMADEH TO RESULT IN ANYTHING (ANOTHER WAY OF SAYING "I'M THE GUY."). FINALLY, THE ISRAELIS ASKED THAT THE GOL DISCONTINUE ALL OTHER EFFORTS TO ARRANGE A JUMBLATT MEETING (VIA THE JORDANIANS AND SAUDIS). I SAID I COULD MAKE NO COMMITMENT ON THIS; IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE LEBANESE COULD TELL THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS TO STAND DOWN WHILE THEY WORK THE PROBLEM WITH THE ISRAELIS. YOU MIGHT PASS THIS ALONG FOR WHAT IT IS WORTH; URI SAYS IT IS MAKING HIS TASK FAR MORE DIFFICULT.

8. FOR BEIRUT: AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS IS REQUESTED TO CONTACT WADIA TO PROVIDE A DEBRIEF OF THIS SESSION AND TO ASK HIS HELP IN GETTING ANSWERS TO TWO BASIC POINTS WHICH SHOULD BE PASSED BACK TO THE ISRAELIS TOMORROW (SATURDAY). FIRST, ALTHOUGH NO PRECONDITIONS ARE PROPOSED, IS IT FAIR TO EXPECT THAT THE GOL WILL ENTER THE TALKS PREPARED IN PRINCIPLE TO REACH AGREEMENTS ON A RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE DRUZE IN THE SHUF WHICH ACCORDS THEM GENERALLY RECIPROCAL TREATMENT TO

~~SECRET~~

JERUSALEM 003011/02

THAT ACCORDED NOW TO THE CHRISTIANS? SECOND, WHERE WOULD THE GOL LIKE TO HAVE THE MEETING AND WHEN? FINALLY (FOR THE U.S.), WHAT ROLE WILL WE PLAY DOWNSTREAM? MY PROPOSAL IS THAT WE WILL CONTINUE TO STRESS THE IMPORTANCE OF URGING THAT THE GOL DEAL RESPONSIBLY AND FAIRLY WITH THE DRUZE, BOTH AS A MATTER OF EQUITY AND IN THE INTEREST OF FOSTERING THE STRENGTHENING OF THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS IN THE MONTHS AND YEARS AHEAD.

9. URI LUBRANI IS HOPING THAT YOU WILL BE ABLE TO GET THESE ANSWERS TO HIM TOMORROW OR THAT HE CAN GET BACK TO JUMBLATT. HE ASKED WHETHER YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO GET TOGETHER WITH HIM WHEN YOU COME DOWN (EITHER BEFORE OR AFTER ANN ARRIVES). HE LIVES NEAR TEL AVIV. PLEASE LIAISE WITH SAM LEWIS TO MAKE ARRANGEMENTS. WARM REGARDS.
CLUVERIUS

~~SECRET~~

JERUSALEM 003011/02

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 4-11-1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

~~SECRET~~
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 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2442
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0668
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09165

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG 8/19/83
 APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
 DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4; AMB.

~~SECRET~~
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DEPARTMENT FOR ACTING SECRETARY
 CAIRO FOR AMB. MCFARLANE
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED
NLS 98008/1 #192

BY CU NARA, DATE 4/19/02

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PRIVATE MEETING
 WITH WADIA HADDAD

REF: DAM-MCFARLANE TELECON, 8/18/83

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. FOLLOWING TODAY'S MEETING WITH THE BROADER LEBANESE
 POLITICAL GROUP (SEPTEL), I MET WITH NATIONAL SECURITY
 ADVISER WADIA HADDAD FOR AN HOUR IN HIS OFFICE. WE
 DISCUSSED THE ONGOING EFFORTS OF THE GOL TO ACHIEVE
 BROADER DOMESTIC POLITICAL RECONCILIATION GENERALLY,
 AND SPECIFICALLY AS THAT PROCESS APPLIES TO THE PROPOSED
 LAF MOVEMENT INTO THE SHUF.

3. HADDAD STRESSED THAT THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION IS
 EXTREMELY SENSITIVE; THAT IT IS KNOWN TO ONLY A FEW IN
 HIS GOVERNMENT; AND THAT ANY LEAK WOULD BE SEVERELY
 COUNTERPRODUCTIVE AND MIGHT BLOW THE FRAGILE PROCESS OUT
 OF THE WATER.

4. OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS BOTH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND
 HADDAD HAVE BEEN IN TOUCH WITH A WIDE RANGE OF PLAYERS
 IN THE ARAB WORLD, BOTH WITHIN AND WITHOUT LEBANON. THE
 FOCUS OF THE DEALINGS WITH THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS HAS
 BEEN TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE TO WALID JUMBLATT (AS WELL AS
 TO THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT (NSF)
 THAT THE GOL IS READY FOR A DIRECT POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH
 THEIR MOST VISIBLE DOMESTIC OPPOSITION, THAT INTERNAL
 POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE
 PROPOSED REASONABLY, BUT THERE MUST BE NO PRECONDITIONS
 BY JUMBLATT -- READ RENUNCIATION OR RENEGOTIATION OF THE
 MAY 17 AGREEMENT.

5. BUILDING ON PHONE CONVERSATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT
 GEMAYEL AND THE OTHER TWO NSF LEADERS, HADDAD TRAVELED

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SECRETLY TO NORTHER LEBANON YESTERDAY AND MET WITH KARAMI AND SULAYMAN FRANJIIYA'S SON. KARAMI INDICATED THAT, DESPITE THE ANTI-GOL AND ANTI-GEMAYEL RHETORIC HE HAD USED SINCE JOINING THE NSF, HE WAS NOW CONVINCED THAT GEMAYEL WAS MAKING A GENUINE EFFORT AT OUTREACH.

KARAMI SAID THAT HE WANTED TO DEAL WITH HIS FRUSTRATIONS AND UNHAPPINESS WITHIN THE LEBANESE CONTEXT. HADDAD OFFERED TO ARRANGE A MEETING FOR HIM WITH GEMAYEL AT THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE. KARAMI SAID THAT HE WAS NOT READY YET BUT THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT TAKE PLACE SHORTLY (HADDAD HAD THE IMPRESSION THAT THIS MEANT THAT A JUMBLATT MEETING SHOULD PRECEDE HIS). HADDAD NEXT MET WITH FRANJIIYA'S SOLE REMAINING SON (COMMENT: IN AN EARLIER CONVERSATION, GEMAYEL TOLD MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS THE HE, AMIN GEMAYEL, WAS THE ONLY MEMBER OF THE KATA'IB PARTY THAT THE FRANJIIYA CLAN EXONERATED FROM INVOLVEMENT IN THE ASSASSINATION OF TONY FRANJIIYA BY BASHIR GEMAYEL. END COMMENT.) FRANJIIYA SAID THAT HE AND HIS FATHER WERE ALSO NOT CHALLENGING THE PRESIDENCY OF AMIN GEMAYEL, BUT RATHER WERE LOOKING FOR A WIDER POLITICAL BASE IN THE GOVERNMENT AND SECURITY GUARANTEES FROM THE LAF IN THE NORTH. THE YOUNGER FRANJIIYA (WHO IS AN OLD PERSONAL FRIEND OF HADDAD) ALSO SAID THAT HIS CLAN WANTED TO KEEP THE DIALOGUE OPEN WITH GEMAYEL AND WORK OUT THEIR PROBLEMS INTRA-LEBANESE.

6. THE THIRD AND MOST VISIBLE MEMBER OF THE NSF, THE MUCH-TRAVELED WALID JUMBLATT, WILL HOLD AN EXTREMELY SECRET MEETING TOMORROW IN NORTHERN LEBANON WITH THE THREE CABINET MINISTERS WHO HAD EARLIER BEEN KIDNAPPED IN THE SHUF. HADDAD BELIEVES THE FACT OF THE MEETING TO BE HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT, THE PROSPECTS GOOD FOR A FRANK GIVE AND TAKE WITH JUMBLATT ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY COMPROMISE, AND THE LEVEL OF THE MEETING "JUST RIGHT" -- THAT IS CLEARLY OFFICIAL ON BEHALF OF THE GOVERNMENT, BUT NOT INVOLVING THE PRESIDENT IN THE INITIAL STAGE.

7. BASED ON THE FOREGOING MEETINGS, AS WELL AS WHAT HE SEES AS CONTINUED POSITIVE SUPPORT FROM SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, HADDAD IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN THE SHUF MAY BE POSSIBLE SHORTLY. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE FORCES HAVE SEPARATELY AGREED TO

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SURRENDER OF THEIR HEAVY WEAPONS SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE DRUZE, AND REMOVAL OF NON-LOCAL LF FORCES.

8. AS MENTIONED IN THE TELECON (REF), AMB. MCFARLANE AND I BELIEVE THAT, HOWEVER BELATEDLY, THE GOL IS FULLY SEIZED OF THE NEED TO DEAL DIRECTLY WITH THEIR MAJOR DOMESTIC POLITICAL OPPOSITION, BOTH TO AID THE INTERNAL CONSENSUS AND TO ASSIST GEMAYEL'S CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD GENERALLY. I WILL BE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AT BIKPAYYA THIS EVENING TO GIVE HIM PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER AND TO GO OVER THESE MATTERS WITH GREATER PRECISION.

9. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT ALL THREE NSF LEADERS HAVE RECENTLY BEEN IN CONTACT WITH DAMASCUS AND THAT THE FOREGOING MEETINGS AND DISCUSSIONS MUST BE TAKING PLACE AT A MINIMUM WITH THE KNOWLEDGE OF SYRIA, IF NOT WITH THEIR ACTUAL ACQUIESCENCE. FOR OUR MILITARY PLANNING, I WOULD ALSO UNDERLINE THAT HADDAD TALKED TODAY OF SETTING A TARGET "D DAY" FOR LAF MOVEMENT INTO THE SHUF OF SEPTEMBER 10, BUT NOTED THAT IF A POLITICAL DEAL WITH JUMBLATT IS CUT, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO MOVE EVEN MORE QUICKLY. THIS MEANS THAT THE LAF-IDF COORDINATION NOW HOPEFULLY BEGINNING IN A MEANINGFUL WAY IS EVEN MORE TIME SENSITIVE, AS ARE USG DECISIONS ON THE ROLE OF THE MNF AND THE NEED TO COORDINATE THOSE DECISIONS WITH OUR MNF PARTNERS. DILLON

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CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/19/83
APPR: RFAIRBANKS
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4
AMB DCM POL P/M

O 191734Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2446
INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0724
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0672
RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0969
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0864
RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0704
RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0627
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0808
RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0160

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BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09167

MLRR M2008-098/12

BY *[Signature]* NARA DATE 11/24/08

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV/CAIRO ALSO FOR AMB. MCFARLANE

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
LEBANESE WORKING GROUP, AUGUST 19

1. (SECRET -- ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY.

AMB. FAIRBANKS AND ROSS MET WITH THE LEBANESE WORKING GROUP (SALEM, HADDAD, AL-HASAN, AND HAMDAN) AUGUST 19 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY. SALEM OUTLINED LEBANESE INITIATIVES TO KEEP THE PRESSURE ON SYRIA OVER THE NEXT MONTH, AND FAIRBANKS SKETCHED THE RECENT AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES OF THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM. PROGRESS ON THE MILITARY COORDINATION AND POLITICAL ACCOMODATION REQUIRED FOR A SUCCESSFUL ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION WAS REVIEWED, AND HADDAD PROPOSED THAT A NOTIONAL "D-DAY" BE SET FOR THIS OPERATION TO BEGIN. THE VARIOUS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STEPS REQUIRED IN PREPARATION COULD THEN BE SCHEDULED. AFTER DISCUSSION, IT WAS AGREED THAT "D-DAY" COULD BE SET FOR THE SEPTEMBER 10-15 PERIOD, PARTLY TO ENSURE COMPLETION OF THE OPERATION BY THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE GEMAYEL PRESIDENCY (SEPTEMBER 23). SALEM AND HADDAD COMPLAINED THAT THE FORTIFICATIONS THE ISRAELIS WERE BUILDING ALONG THE AWWALI LINE REINFORCED THE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION. SALEM URGED THE U.S. AND ISRAEL TO GET TOUGH WITH SYRIA TO PREVENT ITS INTERFERENCE WITH THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION. HAMDAN ASKED ABOUT THE POSSIBLE ROLE OF THE MNF, AND FAIRBANKS REPLIED THAT THIS WAS UNDER INTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON. HAMDAN AND SALEM URGED THAT

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THE NEXT STEP IN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BE IN THE FORM OF A PULLOUT FROM ONE OR MORE MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS SUCH AS SIDON AND TYRE. THIS, HAMDAN SAID, WOULD BE VERY USEFUL WITH IMPORTANT FRACTIONS OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION, I.E., THE SHI'ITES. HADDAD EXPRESSED CONTINUING SKEPTICISM ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS ON NEXT STEPS AND U.S. ABILITY TO BRING THESE ABOUT. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT ISRAELI SELF-INTEREST AND THE STRONG U.S. COMMITMENT WOULD WORK TO MOVE THINGS IN THE PROPER DIRECTION. SALEM ASKED WHETHER IT WAS TIME FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO ASK ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE PLO PUBLICLY FOR WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULES. FAIRBANKS SAID HE WOULD THINK ABOUT THIS. END SUMMARY.

3. AMB. FAIRBANKS AND ROSS MET WITH THE LEBANESE WORKING GROUP (SALEM, HADDAD, AL-HASAN, AND GEN. HAMDAN) FOR ONE HOUR AND ONE-HALF AUGUST 19 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY. MEETINGS OF THE SMALLER CORE GROUP PRECEDED AND FOLLOWED THIS EXPANDED MEETING, AND THEIR RESULTS ARE REPORTED SEPTEL.

4. SALEM OPENED THE EXPANDED MEETING WITH A BRIEF REVIEW OF THE INITIATIVES LEBANON INTENDED TO TAKE IN THE ARAB CONTEXT TO BUILD PRESSURE ON SYRIA OVER THE COMING MONTH. SALEM HIMSELF WOULD VISIT CERTAIN KEY ARAB COUNTRIES. THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT WOULD BE MOBILIZED (SALEM HANDED FAIRBANKS A LIST OF ARAB EMBASSIES IN BEIRUT ANNOTATED TO SHOW THE RANK OF EACH PRINCIPAL REPRESENTATIVE; WE WILL BE ENLISTING SAUDI HELP TO OBTAIN THE RETURN OR ASSIGNMENT OF AMBASSADORS FROM EACH ARAB COUNTRY). SALEM WOULD INVITE THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF JORDAN, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, AND PERHAPS ALGERIA TO VISIT LEBANON. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WOULD SEND A LETTER TO ARAB HEADS OF STATE THROUGH FORMER PRIME MINISTERS OR MINISTERS SALEM WOULD KEEP MEETING ONE-ON-ONE WITH KEY ARAB AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT. SALEM WOULD HOLD A DINNER FOR ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS ATTENDING THE UNGA IN LATE SEPTEMBER. A LEBANESE CHIEFS OF MISSION MEETING WOULD BE HELD IN BAHRAIN. MAJOR ATTENTION WOULD BE PAID TO MEDIA IN KEY ARAB COUNTRIES, AND THE EDITORS OF MAJOR NEWSPAPERS WITH WIDE CIRCULATION IN THE ARAB WORLD WOULD BE BRIEFED. AMB. AL-HASAN WOULD PUT TOGETHER A DEFENSE OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT POINT BY POINT, AND THIS WOULD BE PRINTED AND DISTRIBUTED WIDELY (WE ARE TO

MEET WITH AL-HASAN AUGUST 20 TO PROVIDE HIM WITH USEFUL MATERIALS).

5. FAIRBANKS LIKEWISE OUTLINED THE RECENT AND PROJECTED ACTIVITIES OF THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM -- MCFARLANE'S TRIP TO CAIRO, FAIRBANKS' RETURN TO DAMASCUS, THE RETURN OF AT LEAST ONE OF OUR LEGAL EXPERTS TO BEIRUT, FAIRBANKS' COMING TRIP TO THE MAGHRIB, MCFARLANE'S TRIP TO EUROPE, A TRIP TO OMAN AND SOME OF THE GULF STATES, A RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA, AND VICE-PRESIDENT BUSH'S VISIT TO NORTH AFRICA. FAIRBANKS, REFERRING TO ERRONEOUS PRESS SPECULATION, INDICATED THERE WERE NO NEAR-TERM PLANS TO RETURN TO WASHINGTON; NEITHER MCFARLANE NOR FAIRBANKS WAS LIKELY TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON BEFORE CONGRESS RECONVENED.

6. SALEM THEN TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, NOTING THE RECEIPT OF CONFLICTING REPORTS ON ITS IMMINENCE AND ASKING FAIRBANKS FOR HIS OPINION. FAIRBANKS REPLIED THAT WE TOO HAD BEEN RECEIVING CONFLICTING REPORTS, AND THIS MIGHT BE PART OF AN EFFORT TO PUT PSYCHOLOGICAL PRESSURE ON THE LEBANESE. HADDAD CONFIRMED THAT A LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY MEETING HAD OCCURRED AUGUST 19 IN THE PRESENCE OF EUCOM'S LIAISON OFFICER, COL. WILLIAMS, WHO REPRESENTED THE MNF. HADDAD NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD SEEMED GENUINELY SURPRISED AND SHOCKED AT WILLIAMS' PRESENCE AND HAD CONDUCTED AT LEAST PART OF THE MEETING IN HEBREW WITH ARABIC TRANSLATION TO MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO FOLLOW THE PROCEEDINGS.

7. ADDRESSING THE IMMINENCE OF REDEPLOYMENT, FAIRBANKS EXPRESSED THE JUDGEMENT THAT, IN THE END, THINGS WOULD MOVE AT THE PROPER PACE, PROVIDED THERE WERE AT LEAST TEN "GOOD DAYS" OF COORDINATION. HADDAD POINTED OUT THAT TWO WEEKS OF COORDINATION HAD BEEN AGREED. FAIRBANKS, SEEKING TO HIGHLIGHT THE OTHER REQUIREMENTS FOR REDEPLOYMENT, ADDED THAT THE POLITICAL AUTHORITIES HAD TO GIVE A GO-AHEAD ONCE THE NECESSARY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS HAD BEEN MADE. THIS WAS, AFTER ALL, A POLITICAL OPERATION. IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT SOME ADVANCE WARNING BE GIVEN, NOT ONLY TO PERMIT THE LEBANESE ARMY TO MOBILIZE (HAMDAN ESTIMATED THIS WOULD TAKE 48 HOURS), BUT ALSO TO PERMIT US TO OBTAIN A DECISION ON ANY MNF ROLE IF SUCH A DECISION HAD NOT YET BEEN TAKEN.

8. HADDAD PROPOSED THAT WE SHOULD DEFINE A NOTIONAL "D-DAY," AND THEN LOOK AT WHO HAD TO DO WHAT WHEN. THIS D-DAY SHOULD BE EARLY ENOUGH TO ENSURE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF BEFORE THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF GEMAYEL'S PRESIDENCY ON SEPTEMBER 23. AFTER SOME DISCUSSION BACK AND FORTH, FAIRBANKS, SALEM, AND HADDAD AGREED TO WORK FOR THE FORMAL BEGINNING OF THE REDEPLOYMENT/RELIEF PROCESS IN THE SEPTEMBER 10-15 WINDOW. THIS D-DAY COULD BE MOVED UP IF A POLITICAL BREAKTHROUGH OCCURRED AND RAPID ACTION WAS NECESSARY.

LAST FEW DAYS TO DESIGN A STATEMENT ON REDEPLOYMENT

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9. SALEM THEN "SUMMARIZED" AS FOLLOWS:

-- THE U.S. HAS FAILED TO OBTAIN A "FULL SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS" FROM ISRAEL, BUT MIGHT BE ABLE TO OBTAIN ONE IF THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IN ISRAEL CHANGED. FAIRBANKS POINTED OUT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION WAS EVEN MORE CRITICAL THAN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT. WITHOUT DIRECTLY ADDRESSING THE POSSIBILITY OF GETTING A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS AT A LATER DATE, HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE DEGREE OF SUCCESS OF THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION WOULD HAVE A MAJOR IMPACT ON THE PACE OF FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

-- ISRAEL WILL WITHDRAW TO THE AWWALI LINE AT PRESENT. THERE WAS GREAT CONCERN IN LEBANON ABOUT THE "MASSIVE FORTIFICATIONS" ISRAEL HAD ERECTED ALONG THIS LINE, SINCE THEY APPEARED TO PRESAGE A LONG-TERM ISRAELI PRESENCE. HADDAD ADDED THAT "SOMETHING HAD TO BE DONE ON THE GROUND" ABOUT THIS. ROSS REMINDED SALEM AND HADDAD THAT FOR SOME TIME THE ISRAELIS HAD BEEN SEEKING TO ENGAGE THE LEBANESE IN A PRACTICAL DISCUSSION ON THE NATURE OF THE ARRANGEMENTS TO BE SET UP ON THE AWWALI LINE. FAIRBANKS AGREED THAT, WHILE THE U.S. COULD RAISE THIS ISSUE WITH ISRAEL, IT SHOULD ALSO BE DISCUSSED ON A BILATERAL BASIS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL.

-- WOULD IT NOT BE POSSIBLE TO REVISE THE PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT WITH SOME KIND OF "ULTIMATUM" ON THE NEED FOR URGENT PROGRESS WITHIN TWO OR THREE MONTHS? THE LEBANESE INTERNAL FRONT WAS ERODING, AND SOMETHING NEEDED TO BE DONE TO BOLSTER IT. FAIRBANKS INDICATED THE PRESENT TEXT WAS THE RESULT OF INTENSIVE DELIBERATIONS AND COULD NOT BE CHANGED.

-- THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION WAS A MAKE-OR-BREAK PROPOSITION FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THIS BEING SO, IT MIGHT BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO INCREASE THE CHANCES OF ITS SUCCESS BY HAVING PRESIDENT REAGAN SEND A LETTER TO ASSAD SETTING FORTH SOME "RED LINES." LIKEWISE, ISRAEL COULD BE TOUGHER ON SYRIA, LETTING IT KNOW THAT SYRIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE SHUF COULD BRING THE WAR TO DAMASCUS. IN SHORT, SYRIAN ACQUIESCENCE HAD TO BE DELIVERED. LEBANON ASSUMED THAT THE U.S. COULD DELIVER ISRAELI COOPERATION.

10. HAMDAN ASKED WHETHER THE MNF WOULD COME INTO THE SHUF WITH THE LEBANESE ARMY OR AT SOME LATER POINT. FAIRBANKS REPLIED THAT THE MNF ISSUE WAS UNDER INTENSIVE DISCUSSION IN WASHINGTON, AND NO DECISION HAD BEEN TAKEN. WITHOUT A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT ON THE SHUF, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO SEE ANY MNF ROLE. HADDAD MUMBLED THAT IN SUCH A CASE THERE WOULD NO LEBANESE ARMY ROLE EITHER.

11. SALEM ASKED FAIRBANKS WHAT "OUR INTELLIGENCE" HAD DISCOVERED ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS VIS A VIS THE SHUF. FAIRBANKS REPLIED THAT, WHILE THE SYRIANS HAD THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO ENGAGE IN DISRUPTIVE ACTS -- PARTICULARLY SHELLING, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THEY WOULD ACT DIRECTLY. BEYOND THE MILITARY ASPECT, THERE WAS AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL DIMENSION TO THE ISSUE, AND THERE WERE TOO MANY UNCERTAINTIES TO THIS DIMENSION TO PROVIDE A DEFINITIVE ANSWER. UNDER THE RIGHT CIRCUMSTANCES, THE MNF COULD GIVE SYRIA A "CHILLING SIGNAL" AND BLOCK ITS MORE BLATANT BEHAVIOR.

12. ANTICIPATING A MAJOR SYRIAN MEDIA BARRAGE AS A MINIMUM REACTION TO THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION ("ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IS A CONFIRMATION OF PARTITION, ETC."), SALEM ASKED RHETORICALLY WHAT ELSE LEBANON COULD DO TO MINIMIZE ITS IMPACT. HE WONDERED WHETHER IT WOULD BE

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USEFUL FOR HIM TO APPEAR ON TELEVISION AND DEC-
 LARE THAT FURTHER ISRAELI STEPS COULD OCCUR "WITHIN
 ONE MONTH." HAMDAN ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELIS COULD BE
 PERSUADED TO GIVE UP CONTROL OF MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS
 SUCH AS SIDON OR TYRE AS A NEXT STEP. THIS, HE SAID,
 WOULD BE VERY HELPFUL IN CALMING THE FEARS OF IMPORTANT
 FRACTIONS OF THE LEBANESE POPULATION, ESPECIALLY THE
 SHI'ITES. SALEM AGREED THAT THE EXTENTION OF CONTROL
 TO EVEN TWO VILLAGES WITHIN THE FUTURE SECURITY REGION
 WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IN SHOWING MOMENTUM.

13. HADDAD EXPRESSED THE FEAR THAT THE U.S. WOULD BE
 UNABLE TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO ENGAGE IN FURTHER MOVES,
 SINCE IT HAD BEEN UNABLE EVEN TO GET THE ISRAELIS TO

ISSUE A STATEMENT. FAIRBANKS SAID, THAT WHILE IT WAS TRUE THAT THE ISRAELIS REFUSED TO COMMIT THEMSELVES TO A STATEMENT INCORPORATING ANY NOTION OF A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWALS (LARGELY BECAUSE THEY WERE STILL NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD MAINTAIN SECURITY OR THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD REACH SATISFACTORY POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS), THEY WERE COMMITTED TO FURTHER MOVES ON THE GROUND. POLITICAL AND BUDGETARY PRESSURES, AS WELL AS THE DESIRE TO AVOID FURTHER WEAKENING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, ITS PARTNER IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT, WERE COMBINING TO PRODUCE FURTHER MOVES IF RPT IF THE ALAYH/SHUF OPERATION WAS A SUCCESS. IN SHORT, ISRAELI SELF-INTEREST WAS PUSHING THEM IN THE DIRECTION WE WANTED. BEYOND THIS, THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY WERE DEEPLY COMMITTED TO FURTHER STEPS TOWARD FULL WITHDRAWAL. THE ONLY WAY TO HAVE GOTTEN A TIMETABLE OUT OF THE ISRAELIS WOULD HAVE BEEN TO PUT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. WE HAD REFUSED TO ARGUE FOR THIS, JUDGING THAT IT WOULD FURTHER WEAKEN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

14. TURNING TO FAIRBANKS' RECENT VISIT TO DAMASCUS, HADDAD NOTED WITH INTEREST THAT THE SYRIANS SEEMED TO BE MAKING "A BIG DEAL" OUT OF THE DISCUSSIONS THAT HAD RESULTED. RASHID KARAMI HAD CALLED TO SAY HE HAD HEARD FROM THE SYRIANS THAT THE TALKS WERE VERY SIGNIFICANT. WHY, HADDAD WONDERED, WOULD THE SYRIANS BE MAKING MORE OUT OF THE TALKS THAN THEY ACTUALLY WARRANTED? THIS WAS VERY ENCOURAGING.

15. SALEM CLOSED THE MEETING BY ASKING WHETHER IT WOULD HELP U.S. EFFORTS IF LEBANON ASKED PUBLICLY FOR SCHEDULES OF WITHDRAWALS FROM ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE PLO. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD WANT TO THINK ABOUT THIS. DILLON

BT

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 14-5 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

56657

(10) ACTION ROSS5 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CERON

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FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 7985
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0173
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 2814
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0947
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6377

LOC: DISK 03 617
19 AUG 83 1940
CN: 08103
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

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~~SECRET~~ CAIRO 24521

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M2008-098/12 # 56657

BY smj NARA DATE 11/24/08

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
DAMASCUS FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: AUGUST 19 MEETING
WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: DURING THE COURSE OF A ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE REVIEWED U.S. EFFORTS TO ENCOURAGE ISRAELI-LEBANESE MILITARY COOPERATION AND LEBANESE POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S INTENTION TO ISSUE A STATEMENT, SPECIFYING THAT THE STATEMENT WILL INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS AFTER THIS REDEPLOYMENT. BEGIN RESPONDED THAT WITHDRAWALS WOULD OCCUR AS LONG AS SECURITY OF THE NORTH WAS ASSURED. BEGIN ALSO STATED THAT THE GOI HAD NO INTENTION OF UNDERMINING THE GOL THROUGH ARENS' VISIT TO BEIRUT, AND REGRETTED THE MISUNDERSTANDING WITH US. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS AND TEICHER MET FOR ONE-HOUR WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS FRIDAY, AUGUST 19. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY SUMMARIZING RECENT EVENTS IN BEIRUT AND THEIR EFFECT ON THE ACHIEVEMENT OF OUR MUTUAL GOALS. IN THE NEAR TERM THIS MEANS WORKING TOGETHER TO ACTIVELY COORDINATE A STABLE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE IDF AND THE STRENGTHENING OF THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. RECENT DAYS HAVE SHOWN A MARKED CHANGE IN THE THINKING OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS REGARDING THE URGENCY OF CONFESSSIONAL RECONCILIATION. MCFARLANE OPINED THAT A SERIOUS EFFORT IS UNDERWAY TO COME TO

TERMS WITH THE DRUZE AND SO PERMIT A PEACEFUL ASSERTION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY INTO THE SHUF. ADDITIONALLY, GOL NOW RECOGNIZES THE NEED FOR CLOSE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY COORDINATION WHICH IS NOW UNDERWAY.

4. MCFARLANE THEN EXPLAINED SOME OF HIS PERSONAL IDEAS FOR OUTSIDE INVOLVEMENT, IF NECESSARY, TO HELP OVERCOME POTENTIAL LAF SHORTCOMINGS. THIS COULD INCLUDE OBSERVERS TO WITNESS THE LAF ENTRY INTO THE SHUF. THE SECOND PROBLEM DEALS WITH DETERRING THE THREAT OF SYRIAN DISRUPTION IN THE SHUF. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, THE U.S. IS TRYING TO MOBILIZE ARAB SUPPORT TO PRESS SYRIA TO COOPERATE. A MILITARY DETERRENT, WHICH COULD INCLUDE MNF PERSONNEL MIGHT ALSO BE DESIRABLE.

5. MCFARLANE REVIEWED FOR BEGIN THE CONTINUING PERCEPTION IN LEBANON THAT REDEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO PARTITION. THE LEBANESE CONTINUE TO "SEE A NEED TO REMOVE THE IMPRESSION THAT REDEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO PARTITION. A CREDIBLE STATEMENT BY ISRAEL WILL QUALITATIVELY IMPROVE THE PACE OF PUBLIC COORDINATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON." FOLLOWING AN EXPLANATION OF OUR CURRENT THINKING ON A U.S. STATEMENT, MCFARLANE INFORMED BEGIN OF THE PRESIDENT'S INTENTION TO SEND A LETTER TO AMIN GEMAYEL URGING RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE AND IMPROVED COORDINATION WITH THE GOI.

6. TURNING TO OUR STRATEGY TOWARD SYRIA, MCFARLANE EXPLAINED HOW WE WILL WORK WITH OTHER ARABS TO ISOLATE ASSAD WHILE SUPPORTING GEMAYEL. CRUCIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE STRATEGY WILL BE A PEACEFUL ASSERTION OF GOL AUTHORITY INTO THE SHUF AND RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE.

7. WITH REGARD TO THE WEAKNESS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, MCFARLANE EXPLAINED WHY THE U.S. ATTACHES SO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO STRENGTHENING GEMAYEL. THIS WAS THE GOVERNMENT THAT CONCLUDED AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL AND ITS IN NEITHER U.S. NOR ISRAELI INTEREST FOR THIS GOVERNMENT TO FALL. BUT CONTRARY TO THE

GOI ANALYSIS THE GOL IS VERY FRAGILE, AS DEMONSTRATED BY THE EVENTS OF ARENS' VISIT ON PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AND OTHER LEADERS OF THE MOSLEM COMMUNITY. MCFARLANE CLOSED HIS OPENING REMARKS BY STRESSING U.S. DESIRE FOR FIRM COOPERATION WITH THE GOI TO HELP OVERCOME THESE PROBLEMS.

8. PRIME MINISTER BEGIN RESPONDED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WISH "ANY PARTITION OF LEBANON WHATSOEVER. REDEPLOYMENT IS RELATED TO SECURITY AND WHILE ARENS AND SHAMIR WERE IN WASHINGTON, SECRETARY SHULTZ MADE CLEAR HIS UNDERSTANDING THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT INTEND TO PARTITION LEBANON." ARENS NOTED THAT IN THE LAST 48 HOURS, DUE TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S EFFORTS, SERIOUS COORDINATION AT THE MILITARY LEVEL HAD BEGUN. BEGIN COMMENTED THAT THE PROBLEM REMAINS JUMBLATT AND THE SYRIANS. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT GEMAYEL HAD NOW BEGUN SPEAKING WITH OTHER LEADERS, SUCH AS FRANJIEH AND KARAMI TO DISCUSS ACCOMMODATION BUT THE U.S. IS PRESSING FOR ACTION NOT RHETORIC. SUCH BILATERAL CONTACTS MAY EVENTUALLY LEAD TO A GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL UNITY. BEGIN ARGUED FOR FOCUSING ON RECONCILIATION IN THE SHUF AND LEAVING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION FOR A LATER PHASE.

9. ARENS TURNED THE DISCUSSION TO WHAT HE DESCRIBED AS LEBANESE BACKTRACKING AS STANDING IN THE WAY OF PROGRESS. HE DESCRIBED RELATIONS AS TOTALLY FROZEN AND COMPLAINED OF THE INGRATITUDE OF THE GOL TOWARD THE IDF FOR RISKING ISRAELI LIVES TO SAVE THE KIDNAPPED LEBANESE MINISTERS. MCFARLANE ANSWERED THIS CHARGE BY REMINDING ARENS THAT WHILE "WE UNDERSTAND THE INTEREST IN EXPRESSIONS OF LEBANESE GRATITUDE, SUCH PUBLIC STATEMENTS WOULD BECOME A POLITICAL VULNERABILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD." BEGIN THEN ASKED WHAT JUMBLATT WAS UP TO. AMBASSADOR LEWIS SAID HE IS SAYING DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. - HE IS DEPENDENT ON THE SYRIANS ALTHOUGH HE WANTS US TO BUILD HIM UP."

10. BEGIN SUMMED UP BY STRESSING THAT ISRAEL WANTS TO DO EVERYTHING IT CAN TO COORDINATE THE IDF WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF AND THE ENTRY OF THE LAF. WAS THERE ANYTHING ELSE THAT THE U.S. SEEKS OF ISRAEL? MCFARLANE EXPLAINED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WILL MAKE A STATEMENT EXPRESSING HIS SENSE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS NOT TO PARTITION LEBANON. MOREOVER THE PRESIDENT WILL SAY "THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS CONDITIONS PERMIT." BEGIN NOTED "OF COURSE AS LONG AS THE SECURITY OF THE NORTH IS ASSURED." MCFARLANE SAID "THE CONDITIONS ARE CLEAR." THE PRESIDENT WILL ALSO RESTATE U.S. GOALS TOWARD LEBANON, COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT AND THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE PLO AND THE SYRIANS.

11. TURNING TO ARENS VISIT TO BEIRUT, BEGIN SAID

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CAIRO 024521/02

THE MINISTER OF DEFENSE DID NOT INTEND TO UNDERMINE
GOVERNMENT OF AMIN GEMAYEL. THERE HAS BEEN A
MISUNDERSTANDING. I HOPE WE CAN LEAVE THIS EPISODE
BEHIND US." MCFARLANE AGREED. PRECHT
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2453
INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0679
BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09175

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/20/83
APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-5; AMB

~~SECRET~~
NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
CAIRO FOR AMB. MCFARLANE, EYES ONLY

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS-GEMAYEL
MEETING AUGUST 19

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, ACCOMPANIED BY ROSS, MET WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM, AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD FOR TWO HOURS AUGUST 19 AT GEMAYEL'S SUMMER RESIDENCE IN BIKFAYYA. FAIRBANKS DELIVERED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S LETTER TO GEMAYEL. IN ADDITION TO A GENERAL REVIEW OF THE SITUATION, THE MEETING BROKE NEW GROUND ON AT LEAST TWO FRONTS.

3. REBUILDING THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS.

PROMPTED BY FAIRBANKS' OBSERVATION THAT THE SHUF OPERATION WAS AWAITING A SIGNAL FROM GEMAYEL THAT THE POLITICAL DIMENSION WAS READY, GEMAYEL OUTLINED HIS EFFORTS TO REBUILD A NATIONAL CONSENSUS. EMPHASIZING THAT "WE'RE TRYING TO DO THE BEST WE CAN," GEMAYEL OUTLINED HIS RECENT TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS WITH SULAYMAN FRANJIYYA AND RASHID KARAMI AND HIS MEETINGS WITH EMISSARIES FROM WALID JUMBLATT. HE THEN IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING STEPS THAT WOULD BE TAKEN IN THE NEAR FUTURE:

-- A MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF ADIL HAMIYYA, PIERRE KHURI, AND ADNAN MURUWWA WOULD MEET WITH JUMBLATT, FRANJIYYA, AND KARAMI AUG 20 IN ZGHARTA. KING HUSSEIN AND KING FAHD HAD "DONE A GOOD JOB" IN PREPARING THE WAY FOR THIS MEETING.

-- IF THE RESULTS OF THE MEETING WERE SUCCESSFUL, GEMAYEL WOULD ADDRESS A MESSAGE TO THE NATION AUGUST 22 INVITING JUMBLATT, FRANJIYYA, KARAMI AND OTHER POLITICAL LEADERS TO THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE IN B'ABDA FOR DISCUSSIONS ON A SOLUTION TO THE DOMESTIC CRISIS, A STRENGTHENING OF THE

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MLRR M2008-098/12 # 56658

BY Amf NARA DATE 11/24/08

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NATIONAL CONSENSUS, AND JOINT ACTION TO PROMOTE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. THE THEMES OF THIS ADDRESS TO THE NATION WOULD BE DISCUSSED IN ADVANCE WITH JUMBLATT, FRANJIYYA AND KARAMI.

-- IN THE COURSE OF THE WEEK BEGINNING AUGUST 22, GEMAYEL COULD SEE JUMBLATT. GEMAYEL PREFERRED TO SEE HIM IN PERSON, ALTHOUGH JUMBLATT WAS TALKING ABOUT SENDING HIS EMISSARIES.

-- IF GEMAYEL WAS ABLE TO SEE JUMBLATT, CONSENSUS COULD BE REACHED ON THE SHUF BEFORE THE END OF THE WEEK IN PREPARATION FOR DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE DRUZE. (HADDAD INTERJECTED THAT THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE WOULD BE MEETING TONIGHT, AUGUST 19, WITH LEADERS OF THE LEBANESE FORCES. GEMAYEL CONFIDED THAT HADDAD, TANNUS, AND OTHERS HAD HELD A "TECHNICAL MEETING" WITH LEBANESE FORCES LEADERS LAST WEEK.)

-- TALKS COULD BEGIN ON AUGUST 29 AND WOULD TAKE A FEW DAYS. AS SOON AS AGREEMENT WAS REACHED, THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD MOVE IMMEDIATELY INTO ALAYH AND THE SHUF. THIS WAS AN APPROXIMATE AGENDA. A MORE SPECIFIC ONE WOULD BE POSSIBLE AFTER THE AUGUST 28 TALKS IN ZGHARTA.

GEMAYEL NOTED THAT, WHILE "YOU AND OTHERS HAVE THOUGHT WE ARE NOT MAKING STRONG EFFORTS, I AM FULLY COMMITTED TO REBUILDING THE CONSENSUS." DIFFICULTIES AND PROBLEMS DID EXIST, HOWEVER. JUMBLATT, FRANJIYYA, AND KARAMI WERE NOT FREE AGENTS. EVEN SO, GEMAYEL HAD MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACT WITH BOTH FRANJIYYA AND KARAMI. KARAMI, WHILE HE HAD ADVISED THAT IT WAS NOT YET TIME FOR GEMAYEL TO TALK TO THE SYRIANS, HAD INDICATED A READINESS TO SERVE AS A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EMISSARY TO DAMASCUS. HE HAD REITERATED THIS TO HADDAD AUGUST 18, AND THIS WAS A POSITIVE POINT. EVENTS WERE NOW MOVING IN A GOOD DIRECTION. GEMAYEL EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE MEETING WITH THE MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE AUGUST 20 WOULD BE A GOOD ONE, "SO THAT WE CAN CALL FOR RECONCILIATION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE." UNFORTUNATELY, THE ARENS VISIT HAD BEEN A STEP BACKWARDS, AND THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN OBLIGED TO REDO EVERYTHING IT HAD DONE. ARENS' VISIT HAD BEEN

DESTRUCTIVE" IN THAT IT HAD UNDERMINED ALL OF GEMAYEL'S EFFORTS TO DATE. KARAMI HAD LET IT BE KNOWN THAT IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR HIM TO COME TO B'ABDA TO MEET WITH THE LIKES OF THE GEMAYELS AND THE CHAMOONS IN THE WAKE OF THE ARENS VISIT. IF HE WERE ABLE TO COME, HE COULD MEET ONLY WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS CABINET. THIS WAS A PROBLEM, BECAUSE THERE HAD TO BE TALKS AMONG ALL MAJOR POLITICAL FIGURES IF RECONCILIATION WAS TO OCCUR. HOWEVER, EVEN A RESTRICTED MEETING WOULD BE A USEFUL FIRST STEP.

"OFF THE RECORD," GEMAYEL MENTIONED THAT A LOGICAL STEP FOLLOWING A B'ABDA MEETING WOULD BE TO CALL FOR A NEW CABINET AND INCLUDE SEVERAL KEY POLITICAL FIGURES. IN RESPONSE TO FAIRBANKS' QUESTION, HE INDICATED THAT THIS COULD COME AFTER THE ENTRY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE SHUF. AFTER THAT, THE ATMOSPHERE WOULD BE BETTER, RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THE DRUZE COULD BE ARRANGED, AND THE VARIOUS LEADERS COULD COOPERATE MORE EASILY.

AS AN ADDITIONAL ELEMENT IN THE SHUF STRATEGY, GEMAYEL SAID, SAUDI ARABIA MIGHT BE PREVAILED UPON TO PROVIDE FUNDING FOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS AND FAMILY COMPENSATION IN THE SHUF. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD A DEVELOPMENT PLAN, AND THE SITUATION WOULD BE EASIER IF SAUDI ARABIA LENT A HELPING HAND. THIS WAS SOMETHING GEMAYEL SAID HE INTENDED TO APPROACH THE SAUDIS ON AT THE APPROPRIATE TIME.

FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT THE TIMETABLE THAT GEMAYEL HAD SKETCHED DOVETAILED NEATLY WITH DEVELOPMENTS AND NEEDS ON OTHER FRONTS, PARTICULARLY THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY TALKS AND CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AND AMONG CONTRIBUTORS ON THE MNF. IT APPEARED THAT THE NEXT TWO WEEKS WOULD BE PARTICULARLY BUSY.

DESCRIBING GEMAYEL'S PLANS TO ADDRESS THE NATION AS "VERY ENCOURAGING NEWS," FAIRBANKS HIGHLIGHTED THE IMPORTANCE OF DEMONSTRATING THE COMMITMENT OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO REBUILDING THE NATIONAL CONSENSUS. THIS WOULD YIELD IMPORTANT BENEFITS THROUGHOUT THE ARAB WORLD. EVEN IN SYRIA, NO ONE WAS TALKING ANY LONGER OF REMOVING GEMAYEL. GEMAYEL REPLIED THAT HE WAS "TRYING TO SERVE THE INTERESTS OF MY COUNTRY. I AM NOT ACTING AS A MEMBER OF THE PHALANGE. BUT, HE OBSERVED, IT WAS NOT ENOUGH TO BE CREDIBLE. STRONG AND RAPID U.S. BACKING WAS NEEDED.

4. NEXT STEPS AFTER REDEPLOYMENT.

SALEM URGED GEMAYEL TO CONSIDER MAKING A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE WEEK AFTER THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT, I.E., AROUND SEPTEMBER 23, TO ASSURE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE THAT ITS GOVERNMENT RETAINED CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. AND EXPRESS THE EXPECTATION THAT A MAJOR CITY LIKE SIDON OR A GROUP OF 15 TO 20 VILLAGES BELOW THE AWWALI WOULD BE TURNED OVER IN THE NEAR FUTURE. THIS WOULD BE ESSENTIAL TO SHOW MOMENTUM AND COUNTER THE SYRIAN

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CLAIM THAT REDEPLOYMENT MEANT PARTITION. ALTHOUGH GEMAYEL DID NOT RESPOND IMMEDIATELY TO THIS PROPOSAL, HE CAME BACK TO IT LATER IN THE DISCUSSION. SALEM REPEATED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO "BREAK THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PARTITION" IN THE CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES AND ELSEWHERE. A STATEMENT ABOUT ONE WEEK FOLLOWING SUCCESSFUL REDEPLOYMENT TO SUGGEST THAT IN THREE TO FOUR WEEKS LEBANON WOULD GET ADDITIONAL AREAS BACK WOULD BE VERY USEFUL. LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, SALEM RETURNED TO THIS ISSUE TO STRESS THAT LEBANESE RECOVERY OF "SOMETHING" BELOW THE AWALI SHOULD BE MADE A SECRET PART OF THE "AGREEMENT" ON ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FOR USE AT THE PROPER TIME. THIS WOULD BE A "CONCRETE" U.S. CONTRIBUTION TO LEBANESE GOVERNMENT EFFORTS. HADDAD EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT RECOVERY OF SIDON WOULD BE THE BEST NEXT STEP.

FAIRBANKS REPLIED THAT BOTH THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER AND THE U.S. STATEMENT ON REDEPLOYMENT WERE MEANT TO GIVE THE

LEBANESE GOVERNMENT A HOOK FOR PORTRAYING NEXT STEPS IN OPTIMISTIC TERMS. THIS THEY DID BY BREAKING THE LINK BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS FROM AREAS SOUTH OF THE AWWALI ON THE ONE HAND AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE OTHER.

5. FORMAL REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

FAIRBANKS ASKED GEMAYEL HIS LATEST VIEWS ON THE TIMING OF A FORMAL REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL RESPONDED THAT HE WAS WAITING FOR U.S. ADVICE. FAIRBANKS COUNSELED THAT THE NECESSARY LETTER BE SENT ONCE LEBANON WAS ON A "RISING CURVE OF STRENGTH," I.E., AFTER THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD ENTERED THE SHUF. GEMAYEL AGREED, ADDING THAT SUCH A LETTER SHOULD WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY THAT SOME AREAS BELOW THE AWWALI WOULD SOON BE RECOVERED.

6. COMMENT: THE MEETING ALSO INCLUDED DISCUSSIONS OF FAIRBANKS' TRIP TO DAMASCUS, THE DEPTH OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO LEBANON, LEBANESE-SYRIAN CONTACTS, POSSIBLE PRESSURE BY SYRIA'S NEIGHBORS, ESPECIALLY TURKEY, AND THE POSSIBLE EARLY DEPARTURE OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, ALL ALONG FAMILIAR LINES. GEMAYEL WAS IN AN EXTREMELY DISCOURAGED AND DISTRACTED FRAME OF MIND AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MEETING, BUT PERKED UP CONSIDERABLY IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION.

7. DEPARTMENT REPEAT FURTHER AS DESIRED. NOTE: IT IS ESSENTIAL THAT THE ISRAELIS NOT BE PROVIDED ANY DETAILS ON THE JUMBLATT-LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CONTACTS DESCRIBED ABOVE, SINCE THEY WERE GIVEN TO US ON THE STRICT UNDERSTANDING THAT WE NOT SHARE THEM. FAIRBANKS WILL EXPLORE THIS SUBJECT WITH LUBRANI FACE-TO-FACE AUGUST 20. DILLON

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PREPARED BY
R: FAIRBANKS
MCFARLANE-4; AMB
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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
ACTION ADDRESSEES + PRECEDENCE
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12456: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: LEGAL
- CONSIDERATIONS AND DOD QUESTIONS ON POSSIBLE
- MNF/UNTSO ROLES

REF: (A) STATE 232434, (B) STATE 233642,
- (C) JERUSALEM 2956, (D) BEIRUT 8930

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2. FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND RESPONSES ARE KEYED TO REFS (A) AND (B) AND ARE PURSUANT TO REFS (B) AND (C). SOME COMMENTS ARE NECESSARILY GENERAL IN TONE PENDING MORE DETAILED INFORMATION FROM THE LAF AND FROM IDF-LAF REDEPLOYMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE WHICH WILL BEGIN MEETING SOON (TOMORROW, AUGUST 19).

3. WITH REGARD TO A POSSIBLE UNTSO ROLE IN THE SHUF, WE AGREE COMPLETELY WITH THE POLITICAL COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES IN REF (A). U.N. OBSERVERS WOULD BE PREFERRABLE TO MNF GIVEN THEIR NON-U.S. STATUS, OTHER BASE OF EXPERIENCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL FLAG WHICH THEY WOULD BRING INTO THE SHUF. WE APPRECIATE THE PROBLEM WE FACE IN GETTING SYG TO SUPPORT THIS MOVE IN TIME TO MEET IDF REDEPLOYMENT PLANNING, ESPECIALLY IF IT WERE CONTINGENT ON SYRIAN AND SOVIET ATTITUDES. ONE ARGUMENT WHICH MIGHT BE OF SOME USE, ESPECIALLY WITH THE SOVIETS, IS THE PROPOSITION THAT USE OF U.N. OBSERVERS WOULD OBTAIN THE NEED FOR AN MNF ALTERNATIVE FOR THIS MISSION. WITH REGARD TO YOUR SPECIFIC QUESTION, WE HAVE NOT REPEAT NOT FORMALLY RAISED THIS ISSUE WITH THE GOL PENDING RECEIPT OF WASHINGTON THINKING OF ITS FEASIBILITY. WE RAISED IT INFORMALLY WITH WADIA HADDAD LAST EVENING AND HE WAS BOTH INTERESTED IN AND SUPPORTIVE OF THE CONCEPT. WOULD APPRECIATE DEPARTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF A GAME PLAN FOR HANDLING U.N./SOVIET/SYRIAN DIMENSIONS. WE THINK IT MIGHT BE USEFUL FOR US FIRST TO RAISE THIS INFORMALLY WITH URHQART AND, IF HE SEEMS INTERESTED, PROPOSE THAT HE TRAVEL TO BEIRUT TO DISCUSS THIS CONCEPT WITH US AND THE LEBANESE. THEREAFTER, THE GOL WOULD MAKE AN APPROPRIATE REQUEST. AS TO THE TENURE OF THESE OBSERVERS, WE ARE INCLINED TO RECOMMEND THAT THIS MISSION BE BOUND IN TIME. THE TURNOVER PHASE IS THE MOST CRITICAL. BUT, AT THIS POINT, WE SEE NO COMPELLING REASON FOR AN EXPANDED UNTSO MANDATE TO LAST MORE THAN SIX MONTHS. IF THE TRUCE HOLDS FOR THIS PERIOD OF TIME, THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL RECONCILIATION WILL BE IN TRAIN AND THE UNTSO MISSION FULFILLED.

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4. WITH REGARD TO THE OTHER OMC/MNF ROLES WE HAVE PROPOSED, WE ARE INDEED PREDICATING OUR RECOMMENDATION ON THE EXISTENCE OF A PRIOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND CLOSE LAF-IDF COORDINATION (STATUS REPORT BY SEPTTEL). WE ALSO ENVISAGE A ROLE FOR ALL THE THREE CONTINGENTS IN THE MNF MISSIONS WE HAVE PROPOSED. WITH REGARD TO OUR CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY, MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS CAN RETURN TO WASHINGTON TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE CONSULTATION PROCESS. AS THIS QUESTION IS REVIEWED, IT SHOULD BE KEPT CLEARLY IN MIND THAT THE MNF MISSION WOULD BE DETERRENCE, NOT INTERPOSITION. WE RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT IN OUR INTERNAL DELIBERATIONS, WE STRESS THE SYRIAN DIMENSION IN ALL OF THIS, AS DISCUSSED IN REF (C), THE MORE DIFFICULT MNF MISSIONS ARE GEARED TO DETER SYRIAN INTERVENTION AND NOT TO INTERPOSE THE MNF BETWEEN LEBANESE FACTIONS.

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5. WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT ENVISAGE AN AGGREGATE NEED FOR MORE TROOPS TO FULFILL THE PROPOSED UNTSO/MNF MISSIONS. (A) WE BELIEVE THE UNTSO MISSION CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITH ROUGHLY THE SAME NUMBERS OF OBSERVERS AS ARE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED TO THE OGB IN BEIRUT (50).

(B) THE TRAINING ROLE WOULD REQUIRE A VERY LIMITED NUMBER (PRIMARILY SENIOR NCOs AND FIELD GRADE OFFICERS) TO PROVIDE EXPERIENCED TACTICAL ADVICE TO THE APPROPRIATE LAF COMMANDS AND UNITS. WE DON'T HAVE A HARD FIGURE (MUCH WILL DEPEND ON OUR DETAILED DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LAF) BUT WOULD NOT ANTICIPATE A NEED FOR MORE THAN 100 TRAINERS DRAWN PROPORTIONATELY FROM THE THREE MNF UNITS.

(C) THE PATROLS IN THE SHUF COULD BE DRAWN ENTIRELY FROM THE EXISTING MNF UNITS WHICH WE UNDERSTAND TO BE UNDEREMPLOYED.

(D) THE TENURE FOR CONTINGENTS INVOLVED IN THE TRAINING MISSION WOULD BE LIMITED TO SIX MONTHS. AS WITH THE UNTSO MISSION, THIS PERIOD OF TIME SHOULD AFFORD US SUFFICIENT OPPORTUNITY TO ACCELERATE THE OJT TRAINING FOR LAF COUNTERPARTS DEPLOYED IN THE SHUF. THE TENURE OF THE DETERRENT PATROLS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHOULD BE KEYED TO THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE UPPER METN. THESE PATROLS PROVIDE US WITH A DEGREE OF LEVERAGE AND WOULD NOT BE WARRANTED EXCEPT FOR THE MENACING PRESENCE OF SYRIAN ARTILLERY ON THE ADJACENT HIGH GROUND AND SUPERIOR SYRIAN FORCES IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE LAF IN THE "FREE ZONE." IN OTHER WORDS, THE MNF WILL SEND A STRONG SIGNAL TO THE SYRIANS OF OUR DETERMINATION TO GET SYRIAN FORCES OUT OF LEBANON.

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6. (A) WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE OBSERVERS BE IN POSITION THROUGHOUT THE SHUF (WITH ATTENDANT VISIBILITY AND PUBLICITY BEFORE THE FACT) AT THE TIME OF THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE LAF-IDF RELIEF. WE WOULD NOT ENVISAGE THEIR PRESENCE IN STATIC POSITIONS AT CHECKPOINTS OR FORTIFIED POSITIONS AT ANY TIME.

(B) AS A FALL-BACK TO ACTUAL UNTSO OBSERVERS, COULD WE MUSTER THE REQUISITE NUMBER OF TRAINED OBSERVERS FROM MNF COUNTRIES WHO HAVE CONTRIBUTED PERSONNEL TO UNTSO IN THE PAST? WHILE THIS MIGHT REQUIRE AN MNF UMBRELLA, IT WOULD BE A TRAINED AND EXPERIENCED CADRE.

(C) WE ANTICIPATE THAT U.S. PERSONNEL (AND OTHER MNF PERSONNEL) ASSIGNED AS TRAINERS WOULD BE ASSIGNED TO LAF UNITS WITH RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGHOUT ALEY AND THE SHUF, ALTHOUGH THE MOST IMPORTANT LOCATIONS ARE THE POSITIONS WHERE THE LAF WILL ASSIGN THEIR BATTALION FLAGS AND ESPECIALLY THOSE BATTALION POSITIONS ADJACENT TO SYRIAN LINES.

(D) WE RECOMMEND THAT PERIODIC DETERRENT PATROLS BY MNF UNITS BE LIMITED TO THE FOUR MAJOR ARTERIES IN THE ALEY/SHUF TO WHICH THE LAF MUST HAVE ACCESS (AND WHICH THE SYRIANS OR THEIR SURROGATES MIGHT BE TEMPTED TO INTERDICT) TO MAINTAIN COMMUNICATIONS WITH AND LOGISTICS SUPPORT OF ITS UNITS. BASED ON PRELIMINARY CONVERSATIONS WITH LAF, THESE ROUTES ARE:

-- THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY BETWEEN JAMHUR AND BHAMDUN AL-MAHATTA;

-- THE NE/SW ROAD BETWEEN BHAMDUN AL-MAHATTA AND RASHMAYYA;

-- THE NE/SW ROAD BETWEEN ALAYH AND QABR SHAM'UN;

-- THE W/E ROAD BETWEEN AL-KHIYAM (JUST SOUTH OF DAMUR) AND BATLUN.

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7. THE MISSION FOR MNF TRAINERS AT FORTIFIED LAF POSITIONS WOULD BE AS DESCRIBED ABOVE. SINCE WE EXPECT THAT BATTALION FLAGS WILL BE ESTABLISHED IN OR NEAR EXISTING IDF FORTIFICATIONS, THE TRAINERS WILL BE PROVIDING REAL-TIME TACTICAL ADVICE AS NECESSARY, BUT ANOTHER PRIMARY ROLE WILL BE PROVIDING MORAL SUPPORT AND GENERAL TRAINING IN THE COORDINATION OF BATTALION OPERATIONS.

8. AS TO MNF PATROLS, WE WOULD RECOMMEND PERIODIC MOBILE PATROLS ALONG THE MOST IMPORTANT ARTERIES (PARA. 6) WHICH ARE VULNERABLE TO INTERDICTION. THE TERM "STRATEGIC" WAS MEANT TO DESCRIBE THOSE ARTERIES INDISPENSIBLE TO EFFECTIVE SUPPORT OF LAF UNITS DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE SHUF.

(A) WE ARE NOT REPEAT NOT PROPOSING THAT MNF PATROLS ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES AGAINST LEBANESE MILITARY OR THE LOCAL POPULATION. WE ARE CERTAINLY NOT PROPOSING COUNTERATTACKS OR SEARCH AND DESTROY. THE PROPOSAL COULD BE DESCRIBED AS DETERRENCE THROUGH MOBILE PRESENCE.

(B) THE POLICY GOVERNING THE ASSIGNMENT OF THE TRAINERS IS SOMETHING WHICH CAN BE DECIDED LATER. CONCEPTUALLY, THE OPTIONS RANGE FROM DISPATCHING TRAINERS FROM A CENTRAL MULTINATIONAL POOL ON A ROTATIONAL BASIS TO THE ASSIGNMENT OF INDIVIDUAL ADVISERS TO DISCRETE BATTALIONS. WE DEFER TO THE U.S. AND FOREIGN EXPERTS ON THIS SCORE. THE R.O.E. FOR TRAINERS WOULD BE SIMILAR TO PRECEDENTS. TRAINERS WOULD USE FORCE ONLY IN SELF-DEFENSE BUT THEY WOULD HAVE TO BE CAPABLE OF PROVIDING REAL-TIME TACTICAL ADVICE TO LAF UNITS WHICH MAY BECOME ENGAGED IN ACTUAL COMBAT, ALTHOUGH THE TRAINERS WOULD NEVER ACCOMPANY THE UNITS INTO COMBAT. IN SHORT, IT IS SIMILAR TO THE MISSIONS IN EL SAL. THE MNF PATROLS WOULD BE ASSIGNED THE MISSION OF "ACTIVE" DETERRENCE OR MOBILE PRESENCE NOT UNLIKE THE PATROL MISSIONS THE MNF CONTINGENTS CURRENTLY UNDERTAKE IN GREATER BEIRUT. (FYI: FRENCH AND ITALIAN UNITS PATROL AS FAR AS THE MOD IN BAABDA FROM THEIR BASES IN BEIRUT. END FYI.)

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(C) AS TO BASING, WE RECOMMEND THAT THESE PATROLS ORIGINATE AND RETURN TO BEIRUT, THE DISTANCES INVOLVED WOULD NOT WARRANT THE REPOSITIONING OF COMBAT OR LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ELEMENTS. AN EXCEPTION MIGHT BE THE AN/TPQ-37 (OR AN/TPQ-36) WHICH WE COULD CO-LOCATE WITH LAF ARTILLERY TO PROVIDE BETTER INTELLIGENCE ON ARTILLERY FIRE ORIGINATING FROM SYRIAN-OCCUPIED LEBANON AND TO FACILITATE ACCURATE LAF COUNTERBATTERY. THIS CAPABILITY WILL ALSO CONTRIBUTE TO DETERRENCE OF THE SYRIANS. WE WOULD APPRECIATE DOD'S COMMENT ON WHAT WE MIGHT DO TO ASSIST THE LAF IN DIRECTING COUNTERBATTERY FIRE IF ATTACKED.

9. WE SHARE YOUR CONCERNS THAT RELIANCE ON THE MNF MIGHT ENCOURAGE THE LAF TO DO LESS FOR THEMSELVES. WE MUST CAREFULLY CONSIDER THE IMPORTANCE OF MNF CONTRIBUTIONS IN ENSURING THAT (A) THE FACTIONS IN ALAYH/SHUF WILL BE TREATED FAIRLY FROM THE ONSET; (B) THE LAF COMMAND STRUCTURE PERFORMS EFFECTIVELY; AND, (C) THE SYRIANS DO NOT INTERVENE FORCIBLY TO OPPOSE THE LAF'S DEPLOYMENT OR TO DISRUPT ITS OPERATIONS. WE WANT TO EMPHASIZE OUR OWN APPRECIATION AND CONCERN FOR THE RISKS IMPLICIT IN WHAT WE ARE PROPOSING. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MUST NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THE SUCCESSFUL EXTENSION OF THE GOL AUTHORITY TO THIS AREA IS ABSOLUTELY CRITICAL TO THE FUTURE VIABILITY OF THIS GOVERNMENT AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF ITS ARMY BEYOND THE SHUF, AS WELL AS OUR STRATEGY TO REMOVE THE SYRIANS FROM LEBANON. OUR PURPOSE IS TO WALK THE NARROW LINE BETWEEN THE LAF'S OVERDEPENDENCE ON OUTSIDE ASSISTANCE AND GAINING PASSING MARKS ON THIS CRITICAL FIRST TEST. TO THIS END, WE RECOMMEND STRONGLY THAT THE "OBSERVER" AND "TRAINER" MISSIONS BE EXPLICITLY BOUND IN TIME BEFORE WE UNDERTAKE THEM, AND THAT TERMINATION OF THE DETERRENT MISSION (ACTIVE PATROLS) BE CONTINGENT ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES FROM THE UPPER METN.

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10. AS TO THE MINIMUM MISSION, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SET PRIORITIES BETWEEN THE THREE WE HAVE PROPOSED, BUT WE BELIEVE THAT GIVEN A POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND IN VIEW OF OUR BROADER GOALS (PRESSURING THE SYRIANS), THE MISSION TO DETER SYRIAN INTERVENTION SEEMS MOST CRITICAL (BUT IN TRUTH, THE LEAST DANGEROUS), ESPECIALLY SINCE THIS IS CLEARLY BEYOND THE LAF'S CAPABILITIES. DILLON#

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