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File: Records, 1981-1985  
**Folder Title:** Middle East Trip (McFarlane)  
CHRON Cables (08/16/1983-08/17/1983)  
**Box: 53**

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

**Withdrawer**

CAS 12/8/2008

**File Folder** MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES  
[8/16/83-8/17/83]

**FOIA**

M08-099/3

**Box Number** 91407

STOCKER

35

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1.	57876 DRAFT CABLE	DRAFT US STATEMENT (PARTIAL) <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #153</b>	2	ND	B1
2.	57877 CABLE	NO CABLE NUMBER RE DEALING WITH THE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION <b>R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #154</b>	6	8/16/1983	B1
3.	57878 CABLE	160000Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #155</b>	1	8/16/1983	B1
4.	57879 CABLE	160659Z AUG 83 <b>D 11/5/2002 F98-008/1 #156; R 5/24/2010 M08-099/3 #57879</b>	9	8/16/1983	B1
5.	57880 CABLE	NO CABLE NUMBER RE FAIRBANSK VISIT TO DAMASCUS <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #157</b>	1	8/16/1983	B1
6.	57881 CABLE	160730Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #158</b>	2	8/16/1983	B1
7.	57882 CABLE	160825Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #159</b>	3	8/16/1983	B1
8.	57883 CABLE	161148Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #160</b>	1	8/16/1983	B1
9.	57884 CABLE	NO CABLE NUMBER RE HADDAD TO JIDDA <b>R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #161</b>	1	8/16/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
10.	57885 CABLE	161635Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #162</b>	3	8/16/1983	B1
11.	57886 CABLE	162150Z AUG 83 <b>PAR 4/19/2006</b> <b>F98-008/1 #163; R 5/24/2010</b> <b>M08-099/3 #57886</b>	7	8/16/1983	B1
12.	57887 CABLE	170927Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #164</b>	4	8/17/1983	B1
13.	57888 CABLE	171005Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #165</b>	2	8/17/1983	B1
14.	57889 CABLE	171347Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #166</b>	1	8/17/1983	B1
15.	57890 CABLE	171557Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #167</b>	3	8/17/1983	B1
16.	57891 CABLE	171603Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #168</b>	1	8/17/1983	B1
17.	57892 CABLE	NO CABLE NUMBER RE PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #169</b>	3	8/17/1983	B1

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
18.	57893 CABLE	171748Z AUG 83 <b>D 11/5/2002</b> <b>F98-008/1 #170; R 5/24/2010</b> <b>M08-099/3 #57893</b>	7	8/17/1983	B1
19.	57894 CABLE	172043Z AUG 83 <b>R 11/5/2002</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #171</b>	2	8/17/1983	B1
20.	57895 CABLE	172208Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #172</b>	3	8/17/1983	B1
21.	57896 CABLE	172221Z AUG 83 <b>R 4/19/2006</b> <b>NLSF98-008/1 #173</b>	3	8/17/1983	B1

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C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



7. BEGIN TEXT: DRAFT U.S. STATEMENT

TWO WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON--THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON LEBANON'S BORDERS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. HE DIRECTED THAT US EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND LEBANON ENJOY WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK HE FACES IN SEEKING TO FORGE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHOUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON MAY 17. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. AFTER EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH CHARGES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF AUGUST 16 AS FOLLOWS:

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#153

~~SECRET~~

BY L2J NARA DATE 11/5/02



"I WISH TO STATE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AHWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

*We are confident*

IT IS CLEAR THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL INITIATE TALKS DEVOTED TO ASSURING THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH/SHOUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TOWARD POLITICAL RECONCILIATION WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

AS THIS PROCESS PROGRESSES IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO LEND ITS MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ASSIST. WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

END TEXT.



Beirut, August 16th, 1983

Statement by the Israeli Minister of Defence Mr. M. Arens

I wish to state clearly and unequivocally that it is the policy and the intention of the Government of Israel to withdraw from the whole of Lebanon and that the redeployment of our forces along the "Awali" river is only part of that total withdrawal. Further phases will take place in this process, and withdrawal to the international frontier within 8-12 weeks. We have guaranteed to leave Lebanon within 8-12 weeks after entry into force of the May 17th agreement, and we stand by that commitment provided of course the other parts of the agreement are implemented.

We have no intention whatsoever of staying in Lebanon one day more than is absolutely necessary.

It is our firm desire to see a strong central Government restoring its authority over the whole of Lebanon and maintaining security throughout its 10.452 Km<sup>2</sup>; thus, all allegations regarding Israeli intentions of bringing about a partition or division of Lebanon are completely baseless and totally without foundation.

It is Syria which is doing everything to prevent the total evacuation of all foreign forces from this country.

We have to pool all our efforts in order to bring about the withdrawal of all Syrian and PLO forces and so to enable Lebanon to channel its energies and resources towards national reconstruction after all those difficult years of plight and suffering.



Déclaration du Ministre Israélien de la Defense Mr. M. Arens

Beyrouth, 16.8.83

Je tiens à déclarer d'une façon claire et sans équivoque que la politique du gouvernement israélien est de se retirer de tout le Liban et que le rédéploiement de nos forces militaires sur le long du fleuve de l'Awali n'est qu'une étape vers notre retrait total du Liban.

Nous avons affirmé notre intention de quitter le Liban de 8 à 12 semaines après l'entrée en vigueur de l'accord du 17 Mai 1983, et nous nous considérons liés par cet engagement à la condition que les autres termes de l'accord seront réalisés.

Nous n'avons aucune intention, quelle qu'elle soit, de rester au Liban un jour de plus qu'il n'est nécessaire.

Nous désirons voir au Liban un gouvernement central fort capable de restaurer son autorité sur l'ensemble du territoire libanais, et assurant la sécurité sur ses 10.452 Kms<sup>2</sup>.

Il est donc évident que toutes les allégations concernant une soi-disante intention de la part d'Israël de vouloir diviser le Liban sont dénués de tout fondement.

C'est la Syrie qui fait tout son possible pour empêcher le retrait de toutes les forces étrangères de ce pays.

Nous devons joindre nos efforts afin d'arriver à un retrait des forces de la Syrie et de l'OLP, de façon à permettre au Liban de consacrer ses énergies et ses ressources à la reconstruction nationale après tant d'années de peines et de souffrances.



بيروت (١١ آب ١٩٨٣)

## بيان وزير الدفاع الإسرائيلي السيد م آرنسي

أود ان أعلن بوضوح وبشكل لا يقبل التأويل ان سياسة حكومة اسرائيل تقضي بالانسحاب من جميع لبنان وان إعادة انتشار قواتنا على طول نهر "الاولى" ما هي الا جزء من الجلاء الشامل .

لقد تعهدنا بمغادرة لبنان خلال ٨ - ١٢ اسبوعا بعد دخول اتفاقية ١٢ مايو ( ايار )

حيز التنفيذ ، ولا نزال ملتزمين بذلك شريطة ان يتم تنفيذ بقية اجزاء تلك الاتفاقية .

ليست لدينا اية نية مهما كانت بالبقاء في لبنان يوما واحدا اكثر مما هو ضروري . اننا

نرغب رغبة اكيدة في رؤية حكومة مركزية قوية تستعيد سلطتها على جميع لبنان وتحافظ على الامن

في كل شبر من مساحة الارض اللبنانية البالغه ١٠٤٥٢ كيلومترا مربعا . وهكذا فان جميع

المزام المتعلقة بنية اسرائيل في تجزئة لبنان او تقسيمه ، انما هي مزام لا تستند الى اساس

ابدا .

ان سوريا هي التي تفعل كل شيء لعرقلة انسحاب جميع القوات الاجنبية من هذه البلاد .

ووجب ان تتضافر جميع جهودنا لتحقيق انسحاب جميع القوات السورية وقوات منظمة التحرير ،

لكي نتيج للبنان المجال لتوجيه طاقاته وموارده نحو إعادة البناء الوطني بعد كل تلك السنين

من المحن والمعاناة .



ATTN JORDAN AAMM

LEBANON: ISRAEL'S ARENS HOLDS PRESS CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT

NC160948

BEIRUT VOICE OF LEBANON IN ARABIC 0915 GMT 16 AUG 83

((LIVE DISPATCH BY REPORTER CLAUDE ABU NADIR))

((TEXT)) A FEW MINUTES AGO ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE ARENS HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN BEIRUT DURING WHICH HE MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT:

I WOULD LIKE TO DECLARE FRANKLY AND IRREFUTABLY THAT THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT'S POLICY PROVIDES FOR WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL LEBANON, AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AL-AWWALI RIVER IS PART OF THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. WE PLEDGED TO LEAVE LEBANON 8 TO 12 WEEKS AFTER THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE 7 MAY AGREEMENT. WE ARE STILL COMMITTED TO THIS PROVIDED THAT THE OTHER PROVISIONS OF THIS AGREEMENT ARE IMPLEMENTED. WE HAVE NO INTENTION AT ALL OF STAYING 1 DAY MORE THAN NECESSARY IN LEBANON. WE EARNESTLY DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT WHICH WOULD RESTORE ITS AUTHORITY IN ALL LEBANON AND MAINTAIN SECURITY ON EVERY INCH OF THE 10,452 SQUARE KM OF LEBANESE TERRITORY. THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS ABOUT ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO PARTITION OR DIVIDE LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS. IT IS SYRIA WHICH DOES EVERYTHING TO OBSTRUCT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN FORCES FROM THIS COUNTRY. ALL OUR EFFORTS MUST BE UNITED TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE SYRIAN AND PLO FORCES TO GIVE LEBANON AN OPPORTUNITY TO DIRECT ITS CAPACITIES AND RESOURCES TOWARD THE NATIONAL REBUILDING AFTER ALL THESE YEARS OF ORDEALS AND SUFFERINGS.

THIS IS THE END OF THE STATEMENT. WE HAVE LEARNED THAT ARENS WILL MEET WITH SOME LEBANESE PERSONALITIES BEFORE RETURNING TO ISRAEL. THE ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER AFFIRMED THAT HE HAS MET WITH FORMER MINISTER MARWAN HAMADAH BUT HE DECLINED TO REVEAL ANYTHING ABOUT WHAT WAS DISCUSSED. PROFESSOR MOSHE ARENS IS NOW MEETING WITH THE COMMANDER OF THE LEBANESE FORCES, FADI AFRAM.

THIS IS ALL WE HAVE UP TILL NOW. WE WILL PROVIDE YOU WITH MORE DETAILS WHEN WE RECEIVE THEM.

((ENDALL)) 160915 AS/CONNERY/CP 16/0954T AUG

BT

#0276



02958

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~SECRET~~

PROG: 8/16/83

RMCFARLANE

RMCFARLANE

NONE

RMCFARLANE (2), AMB, DCM, CONGEN

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO: WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, NIACT IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, NIACT IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DEALING WITH  
THE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FROM EARLIER REPORTING YOU ARE AWARE OF OUR EFFORTS TO BRING FORTH A STATEMENT FROM THE GOI MAKING CLEAR ITS COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL WITH AS MUCH PRECISION AS POSSIBLE. AFTER EFFORTS REACHED AN IMPASSE LAST FRIDAY, YOUR ASSISTANCE WAS REQUESTED IN THE FORM OF A LETTER FROM WASHINGTON UNDERSCORING THE IMPORTANCE WE PLACE ON THIS MATTER. YOUR HELP IN THE PREPARATION AND CLEARANCE OF SUCH A LETTER WAS MOST TIMELY AND VERY MUCH APPRECIATED.

-

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1, #154

BY CU NARA, DATE 4/19/06

INITIALS  
ARCM *RCM*

INITIALS  
ARCM *RCM*

1

2

3

4

5

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

2

3. YESTERDAY (MONDAY) SAM LEWIS RECEIVED WORD THAT THE GOI HAD RECONSIDERED ITS EARLIER POSITION AND WAS WILLING TO DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF SUCH A STATEMENT. THIS MORNING, DICK FAIRBANKS AND I TRAVELLED TO JERUSALEM WHERE, TOGETHER WITH SAM LEWIS, WE HAVE NOW CONCLUDED ROUGHLY FIVE HOURS OF TALKS SPREAD OVER TWO MEETINGS. IN A NUTSHELL, ALTHOUGH THE ISRAELIS WERE WILLING TO

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

DISCUSS THE CONTENT OF A STATEMENT, THEY SOUGHT TO CAST THE REDEPLOYMENT AS BEING CARRIED OUT IN IMPLEMENTATION OF THE GOL-GOI AGREEMENT. CLEARLY THIS UNDERMINES THE ENTIRE PURPOSE OF THE STATEMENT WHICH IS TO STRENGTHEN THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON'S HAND.

4. THERE IS NO QUESTION BUT THAT THE GOI IS UNDER INTENSE DOMESTIC-POLITICAL PRESSURE TO SHOW POSITIVE RESULTS FROM THE LEBANON INVASION. THEIR IMMEDIATE GOALS IN THIS CONTEXT ARE TO SECURE THE FORMAL EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR VISIBLE AND EFFECTIVE GOL-GOI COORDINATION OF THE REDEPLOYMENT. EITHER OF THESE ARE SIMPLY MORE THAN THE TRAFFICE WILL BEAR IN LEBANON AT THIS TIME. ALTHOUGH COORDINATION COULD TAKE PLACE IF THE GOL IS GIVEN SOMETHING, I.E. A GOI TIMETABLE OF COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS WITH WHICH TO DISPEL THE POPULAR PERCEPTION THAT THEY WOULD BE COOPERATING WITH PARTITION. UNFORTUNATELY, OUR TALKS LAST WEEK AND TODAY MAKE CLEAR THAT ISRAELI OPPOSITION IS VERY FIRM. THE REASONS ARE WELL-KNOWN. I WOULD STRESS, HOWEVER, THAT THEIR NORMAL SENSITIVITY TO LOSS OF GROUND ON FOREIGN ISSUES IS PARTICULARLY HEIGHTENED AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE UNDER THE MOST EXTREME PRESSURE AND VULNERABILITY DOMESTICALLY.

5. I SEE TWO OPTIONS AT THIS POINT. ONE IS TO INSIST ON A STATEMENT ALONG THE LINES WE HAVE PROPOSED. THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE INVOCATION OF A PRESIDENTIAL LETTER RECAST TO REFLECT THE ABOVE AND WITH GREATER INSISTENCE ON THEIR COMMITMENT TO A CONCRETE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL, A REFERENCE TO TIME RELATED TO THE PHASES OR TO THE LENGTH OF THE OVERALL PROCESS.

6. THE ALTERNATIVE IS TO SET ASIDE THE IDEA OF AN ISRAELI STATEMENT BEARING IN MIND THAT THE NEURALGIA DISPLAYED DURING THE PAST FOUR DAYS GIVES US A HIGH PROBABILITY THAT EVEN WHEN ISSUED, IT WOULD BE QUASI OFFICIALLY DISCOUNTED. NEEDLESS TO SAY, THIS WOULD BE WORSE THAN NO STATEMENT AT ALL. IN PLACE OF THEIR STATEMENT, WE WOULD RELY UPON A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE UNITED STATES (WHITE HOUSE PRESSMAN SPOKESMAN). SUCH A STATEMENT COULD GO BEYOND THE PURPOSE OF VINDICATING ISRAELI BONA FIDES TO PROVIDE AS WELL A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF WHERE OUR MISSION STANDS. BUT IN IT WE WOULD STATE FIRMLY OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE ALAYH-SHUF OPERATION WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY FURTHER MOVEMENTS SOUTH OF THE AWWALI AND THAT

6  
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4  
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PARTITION WAS OUT OF THE QUESTION. A DRAFT TEXT OF SUCH A STATEMENT IS TRANSMITTED BELOW FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

7. BEGIN TEXT: DRAFT U.S. STATEMENT

TWO WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON--THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A STABLE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT ON LEBANON'S BORDERS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. HE DIRECTED THAT US EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS.

SINCE THAT TIME AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS HAVE TRAVELED EXTENSIVELY THROUGHOUT THE REGION UNDERTAKING INTENSIVE TALKS WITH ARAB AND ISRAELI LEADERS. SEVERAL CONCLUSIONS HAVE EMERGED FROM THESE TALKS. FIRST AND FOREMOST IS THE SOLID FOUNDATION OF SUPPORT WHICH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND LEBANON ENJOY WITHIN THE ARAB WORLD AND IN ISRAEL. EQUALLY CLEAR IS THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK HE FACES IN SEEKING TO FORGE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION AMONG THE DIVERSE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IN LEBANON WHICH IS SO ESSENTIAL TO THE RECONSTRUCTION AND REVITALIZATION OF THE LEBANESE ECONOMY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF POLITICAL STABILITY. IT IS CLEAR THAT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IS COMMITTED TO THESE GOALS.

IN ITS EFFORTS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL SOON FACE AN OPPORTUNITY TO RESTORE STABILITY AND EXTEND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION AND RECONSTRUCTION TO THE DISTRICTS OF ALAYH AND SHOUF AS THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS ITS FORCES FROM THESE AREAS. THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL ON MAY 17. IN RECENT WEEKS SOME HAVE QUESTIONED THE MOTIVES UNDERLYING THIS WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAEL SAYING THAT IT PRESAGES A PERMANENT PARTITION OF LEBANON. AFTER EXTENSIVE TALKS WITH ISRAELI OFFICIALS, IT IS CLEAR THAT SUCH CHARGES ARE COMPLETELY WITHOUT FOUNDATION. IN THIS REGARD IT IS INSTRUCTIVE TO NOTE THE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF AUGUST 16 AS FOLLOWS:

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"I WISH TO STATE CLEARLY AND UNEQUIVOCALLY THAT IT IS THE POLICY AND THE INTENTION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF OUR FORCES ALONG THE AWWALI LINE IS ONLY PART OF THAT TOTAL WITHDRAWAL."

(AND FURTHER)

"IT IS OUR FIRM DESIRE TO SEE A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT RESTORING ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE WHOLE OF LEBANON AND MAINTAINING SECURITY THROUGHOUT ITS 10,452 SQUARE KILOMETERS; THUS, ALL ALLEGATIONS REGARDING ISRAELI INTENTIONS OF BRINGING ABOUT A PARTITION OR DIVISION OF LEBANON ARE COMPLETELY BASELESS AND TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION."

IT IS CLEAR THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE IN THE WEEKS AHEAD TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES.

WITHIN THIS CONTEXT, THE GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND ISRAEL WILL INITIATE TALKS DEVOTED TO ASSURING THE SMOOTH AND ORDERLY RETURN OF RESPONSIBILITY IN THE ALAYH/SHOUF AREAS. CONCURRENTLY EFFORTS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON TOWARD POLITICAL RECONCILIATION WILL CONTINUE SO THAT STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION CAN TAKE HOLD.

AS THIS PROCESS PROGRESSES IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS AHEAD, THE UNITED STATES WILL CONTINUE TO LEND ITS MAXIMUM EFFORTS TO ASSIST. WE CALL UPON SYRIA AND THE PLO FOR A CORRESPONDING COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL SO THAT LEBANON CAN BE RESTORED AS A UNIFIED, SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENT COUNTRY.

END TEXT.

8. ACTION REQUESTED: YOUR CONSIDERATION OF THESE ALTERNATIVES IS REQUESTED AS WELL AS A DECISION ON HOW YOU WISH US TO PROCEED. ON BALANCE, I TILT SLIGHTLY IN FAVOR OF THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT. IF THE DECISION IS TO PERSIST IN SEEKING AN ISRAELI STATEMENT, IT IS REQUESTED THAT THE TEXT OF THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER BE REVISED TO ACHIEVE THE GREATER DEGREE OF FIRMNESS AND CONCRETENESS OF PROCESS WE ARE TRYING TO ACHIEVE.

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9. I AM SCHEDULED TO SEE MINISTER ARENS TOMORROW 8:00 A.M. LOCAL TIME. WHILE HE IS MORE SYMPATHETIC TO OUR INTERESTS AND TO OUR PURPOSES, THIS ISSUE IS BASICALLY WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. THUS I WOULD NOT HOLD OUT GREAT HOPE THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION WILL CHANGE. FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH ARENS, I HAVE TENTATIVELY AGREED TO MEET WITH FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS. IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE A DECISION AND AN APPROVED DOCUMENT (STATEMENT OR LETTER) BY THAT TIME. IF ON THE OTHER HAND, STAFFING REQUIREMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF PRINCIPALS REQUIRES MORE TIME, PLEASE ADVISE AND I WILL RECESS TALKS HERE AND RETURN TO BEIRUT TO WORK ON MNF AND RECONCILIATION ISSUES.

10. FOR JIDDA: IN THE HOPE THAT WADIA HADDAD IS STILL IN THE KINGDOM, YOU ARE REQUESTED TO CONTACT HIM AND TO SUMMARIZE THE STATE OF PLAY IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS WITH ISRAEL. PLEASE SOLICIT HIS REACTION AND PREFERENCE AS BETWEEN THE TWO POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION, STRESSING THAT IN MY JUDGMENT AN ISRAELI STATEMENT WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY BE LESS CONCRETE THAN WE BOTH DESIRE. YOU SHOULD ALSO SAY THAT ON BALANCE I FAVOR THE WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT BUT THAT WE INVITE HIS VIEWS BEFORE A DECISION IS REACHED. CLUVERIUS##

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F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MASS, PREL, MOPS, OPRC, LE, US

SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON MORTAR LOCATING RADAR

REF: DOD MESSAGE DTG 42245Z AUGUST, 1983

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL DOD PRESS GUIDANCE ON NEW MORTAR LOCATING RADAR FOR U.S. MNF CONTINGENT WAS NOT CLEARED IN NEA. POST IS WELL AWARE OF OBVIOUS PROBLEMS RELEASE OF SUCH DETAILED INFORMATION IN BEIRUT MEDIA COULD CAUSE US. WE ARE PARTICULARLY CONCERNED THAT LOCAL LEBANESE PRESS MIGHT DRAW THE CONCLUSION, AT A MINIMUM, THAT WE ARE EXPANDING, OR OTHERWISE CHANGING, THE PRESENT MISSION OF OUR MNF CONTINGENT. SINCE THE INFORMATION OBTAINED BY THE RADARS WILL BE PASSED TO THE LAF, ANY LEAK ABOUT OUR INTELLIGENCE SHARING IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NEW EQUIPMENT MIGHT WELL LEAD TO HEADLINES THAT THE U.S. IS HELPING THE LAF TO "TARGET VILLAGES IN THE MATH AND THE SHUF." RELEASE OF INFORMATION ON THE NEW RADAR EQUIPMENT MIGHT ALSO HAVE AN OBVIOUSLY HARMFUL EFFECT ON AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S NEGOTIATIONS IN DAMASCUS. WE THEREFORE BELIEVE THAT THE LESS SAID, THE BETTER.

3. ALTHOUGH WE ARE NOW EXAMINING THE POSSIBILITY OF HAVING PRESENT PRESS GUIDANCE RESCINDED AND NEW GUIDANCE ISSUED, WE THINK IT IS NECESSARY THAT POST IMMEDIATELY COORDINATE WITH OMC IN BEIRUT TO ENSURE THAT PRESENT GUIDANCE IS NOT USED. IN RESPONSE TO POSSIBLE INQUIRIES ABOUT THE ARRIVAL OF ARMY PERSONNEL AND RADAR EQUIPMENT IN BEIRUT, WE SUGGEST THE FOLLOWING GUIDANCE:

-- YES, NEW RADAR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO THE U.S. MNF CONTINGENT IN LEBANON IN ORDER TO INCREASE ITS DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES. THIS DOES NOT IMPLY, HOWEVER, ANY CHANGE IN THE U.S. MNF CONTINGENT'S MISSION OR AREA OF OPERATION.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

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CLASS: SECRET  
CHRG: PROG 8/16/83  
APPRV: RMC FARLANE  
DRFTD: PDUR  
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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, LE, IS, US, XF  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH  
GENERAL TANNOUS AND GENERAL LEVY, SUNDAY, AUGUST 14, 1983

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1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS  
ATTENDED MEETING BETWEEN GENERAL LEVY, CHIEF OF STAFF, IDF  
AND GENERAL TANNOUS, CHIEF OF STAFF, LAF, AT GENERAL  
TANNOUS' RESIDENCE. SUBJECTS INCLUDED COORDINATION OF  
IDF REDEPLOYMENT, RECENT INCIDENTS AROUND ABEH AND THE  
NEED FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND ISRAELI COMMITMENT  
TO FULL WITHDRAWAL TO FACILITATE LAF DEPLOYMENT TO  
ALAYH AND THE SHUF. THE MEETING WAS VERY SIGNIFICANT  
IN THAT THE ISRAELIS REQUESTED VERY SPECIFIC RESPONSES  
TO QUESTIONS INCIDENT TO THEIR REDEPLOYMENT. GENERAL  
LEVY ALSO AGREED TO SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR ASSISTANCE IN  
THE RETURN OF MEN AND EQUIPMENT CAPTURED BY THE PSP  
DURING THE AUGUST 10 INCIDENT AT ABEH. GENERAL LEVY  
ALSO AGREED TO THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COORDINATION  
COMMITTEE TO FACILITATE THE IDF-LAF TURNOVER IN THE SHUF.  
THE MEETING ENDED WITH BOTH GENERALS AGREEING TO MEET  
AGAIN IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE. END SUMMARY.

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3. AT GENERAL TANNOUS' INVITATION, AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE  
AND FAIRBANKS, ACCOMPANIED BY DUR (NOTETAKER), MET FOR  
FOUR HOURS WITH GENERAL TANNOUS AND GENERAL LEVY IN  
GENERAL TANNOUS' QUARTERS SUNDAY NIGHT. THE ISRAELI  
DELEGATION INCLUDED MAJOR GENERAL DRORY, NORTHERN FRONT  
COMMANDER, AND GENERAL LEVY'S PERSONAL AIDE. THE  
LEBANESE SIDE INCLUDED COLONEL QASSIS AND A NOTETAKER.  
THE MEETING OPENED WITH GENERAL LEVY ASKING ABOUT THE  
CONTINUING CLOSURE OF THE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT  
(BIA). HE SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE LOGIC FOR ITS  
CLOSING. THE GOL HE SAID WAS CONCEDED TO DRUZE  
PRESSURE AND PLAYING INTO THE HANDS OF WALID JUMBLATT.  
LEVY WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE GOL'S CONCERN ABOUT ROCKET

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ATTACKS FROM SHUWAYFAT WAS NOT ENTIRELY WELL-FOUNDED. HE NOTED THAT HOSTILE ARTILLERY IN THE UPPER METN AND THE SHUF COULD CLOSE THE AIRPORT VERY EASILY. THE POINT HE SAID WAS TO DEMONSTRATE THE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO OPERATE THE AIRPORT IN SPITE OF THESE THREATS. GENERAL TANNOUS RESPONDED THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT CIVILIAN CASUALTIES AND THE RISKS TO CIVIL AVIATION.

4. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE ASKED BOTH GENERALS ABOUT THE LOCATION OF PSP ARTILLERY WHICH THREATENS BIA. HE ASKED WHETHER THE ARTILLERY WAS NEAR SYRIAN FORTIFICATIONS OR VILLAGES IN THE UPPER METN. LEVY AND TANNOUS BOTH AGREED THAT THEY WERE COLLOCATED WITH POPULATION CENTERS AND SYRIAN POSITIONS. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE THEN ASKED A HYPOTHETICAL QUESTION: IF AFTER THE IDF-LAF TURNOVER, THE PSP BEGINS SHELLING FROM THE METN AND THE LEBANESE RESPOND WITH THEIR OWN ARTILLERY, WHO WILL GET KILLED? GENERAL LEVY RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO PREDICT GIVEN THE NUMBERS OF WEAPONS WHICH THE SYRIANS AND PSP CAN BRING TO BEAR. GENERAL TANNOUS ESTIMATED THAT THE SYRIANS ALONE HAVE FORTY-THREE ARTILLERY IMPLACEMENTS IN THE METN BUT THAT THERE WERE MANY MORE TUBES WHICH CAN REACH THE SHUF UNDER THE CONTROL OF SYRIAN SURROGATES. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE ASKED THE GENERALS WHERE THE GREATEST SYRIAN VULNERABILITY WAS IN LEBANON AND WHERE THE LEBANESE COULD RETALIATE EFFECTIVELY IF ATTACKED. GENERAL LEVY THOUGHT THEY WERE MOST VULNERABLE IN THE BEKAA.

5. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE THEN ASKED GENERAL LEVY ABOUT ISRAELI STRENGTH IN THE SHUF. LEVY AND DRORY RESPONDED THAT THE IDF HAD THREE INCOMPLETE BRIGADES INCLUDING ABOUT FOUR THOUSAND MEN AND FIFTY-SEVEN TANKS. HE POINTED OUT THAT THE IDF ROTATION CYCLE MAKES FOR GREAT VARIANCE IN ISRAEL STRENGTH. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED ABOUT ISRAELI-LEBANESE PLANNING FOR THE TURNOVER; HOW LONG IT WOULD TAKE, FOR EXAMPLE. LEVY RESPONDED THAT IT WAS A MATTER OF DAYS AND COULD BEGIN WHENEVER GENERAL TANNOUS SAYS HE IS READY. LEVY NOTED THE URGENCY WHICH HE ATTACHES TO PLANNING FOR THE REDEPLOY-

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MENT AND THE NEED FOR DETAILED PLANNING FOR RELIEF OF THE LINES. GENERAL TANNOUS MENTIONED THE NEED FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT BEFORE THE MILITARY RELIEF COULD BEGIN. LEVY REJOINED WITH THE NEED FOR A DEADLINE. HE LIKENED THE PROBLEM TO "JUMPING INTO A POOL", SUGGESTING THAT LEBANESE HESITATION WOULD HAVE TO BE OVERCOME. GENERAL TANNOUS SAID THAT FROM A PURELY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THE RELIEF PROCESS HE ENVISAGES WILL TAKE TWO TO THREE WEEKS. IT WILL BEGIN WITH A COMMON IDF-LAF APPRECIATION FOR THE TACTICAL SITUATION. HIS PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT TO BE DONE IN TWO PHASES. HE PROPOSED TO FIRST SEND A BRIGADE TO RELIEVE THE IDF IN THE ALAYH/SOFAR DISTRICT HOLDING THE BRIGADE DESTINED FOR THE SHUF IN RESERVE UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED THE RELIEF PROCESS IN ALAYH/SOFAR. HE WOULD THEN MOVE THE SECOND BRIGADE INTO THE SHUF. LEVY DISAGREED WITH THIS SCHEDULE. HE WANTS IT DONE MORE QUICKLY AND SEES A CLEAR RISK THAT THE DRUZE WILL FORTIFY THEIR POSITIONS IN THE SHUF AND COMPLICATE THE SECOND PHASE. GENERAL DRORY AGREED AND SUMMARIZED THE IDF THINKING AS REDEPLOYMENT IN ONE PHASE AND WITHIN A WEEK. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE INTERJECTED THE PRIOR NEED FOR A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE GOL, THE DRUZE, AND THE LEBANESE FORCES WHICH WOULD TRIGGER THE MILITARY TIMETABLE. HE NOTED THAT THIS WAS SOMEWHAT DIFFERENT FROM WHAT HE HAD HEARD FOUR-FIVE DAYS EARLIER IN ISRAEL WHERE THE GOI SEEMED TO HAVE ASSUMED THAT THE LAF WOULD MOVE INTO THE SHUF FIRST AND THAT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT WOULD COME LATER. GENERAL LEVY SAID HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THIS; THAT HE HAD ALSO INSISTED FOR THE NEED FOR AN AGREEMENT BEFORE THE LAF CAME IN. HE WAS AWARE OF GENERAL TANNOUS' NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE DRUZE BUT HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE DRUZE LEADERS WANT TO TALK TO LEBANESE POLITICAL LEADERS AND NOT JUST THE ARMY. MCFARLANE AFFIRMED THAT THE GOL UNDERSTANDS THAT BEFORE ANY MILITARY MOVEMENT CAN SUCCEED, THERE MUST BE A POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. THERE SIMPLY HAS TO BE ONE HE SAID. TANNOUS REMARKED THAT HIS MILITARY TIMETABLE CAN BE COMPLETED IF THERE IS POLITICAL RECONCILIATION. LEVY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE POLITICAL AGREEMENT MUST BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL AND THAT PRECISELY BECAUSE THE DRUZE KNEW THE ISRAELIS WERE LEAVING, THEY COULD NOT BE OF MUCH HELP.

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6. GENERAL LEVY NOTED THAT THE REAL PROBLEM IS DRUZE DISQUIET ABOUT THE FUTURE BALANCE OF POWER IN THE SHUF. THEY ARE WORRIED THAT THE LAF WILL WORK AGAINST THEIR INTERESTS AND IT IS THAT FEAR WHICH CAUSES "ALL THE DRUZE TO RALLY TO WALID JUMBLATT." A YEAR AGO HE NOTED THE ATMOSPHERE WAS QUIET AND THE DRUZE SEEMED PREPARED TO TRUST THE GOL. NOW THEY ARE MUCH MORE CONCERNED. MCFARLANE ASKED IF THE GENERALS AGREED THAT THERE WERE REALLY TWO PROBLEMS TO BE DEALT WITH. ONE IS THE POLITICAL AGREEMENT WITH THE DRUZE; HE THOUGHT THAT THE GOL WAS WORKING HARD TO TRY AND MEET JUMBLATT AND QUIET SOME OF THIS CONCERN. TO THIS

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END, THE GOL WANTED THE GOI TO HELP ARRANGE A MEETING WITH JUMBLATT. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THIS FIRST MEETING MUST TAKE PLACE AND MUST LEAD TO A SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENT. AS THE POLITICAL PROCESS GOES ON, THERE HAS TO BE MILITARY TO MILITARY COOPERATION AT A HIGH LEVEL AND PERHAPS DOWN TO THE BATTALION COMMANDER LEVEL TO WORK OUT A SMOOTH TRANSITION AND AN ORDERLY RELIEF OF LINES. FROM HIS POINT OF VIEW, HE SAW A SIMULTANEOUS MOVEMENT INTO THE ALAYH/SOFAR AND THE SHUF SEEMED TO MAKE SENSE. HE WAS ALSO SUPPORTIVE OF AN OVERLAP OF PERHAPS A WEEK. HE STRESSED THE NEED TO BEGIN PLANS NOW ALTHOUGH THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PLANS WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON THE NECESSARY POLITICAL AGREEMENT. MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN BE VERY HELPFUL WITH THE POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND THAT LEVY'S INSISTENCE THAT IT WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM WAS NOT ENTIRELY FAIR. THERE ENSUED A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL.

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7. THIS DISCUSSION FURTHER THE FAMILIAR ISRAELI ARGUMENTS REBUTTING LEBANESE FEARS ABOUT PARTITION. THE THRUST OF GENERAL LEVY'S ARGUMENT WAS THAT AN IDF MOVEMENT OUT OF THE SHUF WAS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOL AND NOT A LIABILITY. HE REPEATED AGAIN THE ARGUMENTS THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT IMPROVE ITS SECURITY BY REMAINING IN THE SHUF AND CHALLENGED THE LEBANESE TO ASSERT THEIR AUTHORITY AND TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR DETERMINATION. HE POINTED OUT THAT ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS WITH THE DRUZE IS THAT THEY PERCEIVE WEAKNESS AND INDECISION AND THEY WILL GET TOUGHER IF THESE TRENDS CONTINUE. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS REITERATED THAT THE FEAR OF PARTITION HAS GRIPPED THE POPULATION OF LEBANON AND THAT THESE FEARS COULD BE ALLAYED AT LITTLE COST TO THE GOI. WHAT WAS NEEDED WAS A PUBLIC AFFIRMATION FROM ISRAEL THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT PROCESS WOULD CONTINUE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER.

8. GENERAL LEVY SAID THAT FROM HIS PERSONAL POINT OF VIEW, HE THOUGHT THAT ISRAEL WOULD CONTINUE WITHDRAWING EVENTUALLY TO THE BORDER PROVIDED THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ENVISAGED IN THE AGREEMENT WERE IMPLEMENTED. LEVY THEN ARGUED THAT A PUBLIC STATEMENT FROM THE GOI WAS A MATTER FOR THE POLITICIANS. HE SAID THAT FROM A MILITARY PERSPECTIVE, THERE WERE OTHER MEASURES WHICH COULD MAKE LEBANESE MOVEMENT INTO THE SHUF MORE SUCCESSFUL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THE PARTICIPATION OF THE MNF COULD "CHANGE THE SITUATION FUNDAMENTALLY." FOR EXAMPLE, IF MNF UNITS WERE PRESENT WITH THE LAF ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY, THIS FACT WOULD AFFECT THE DRUZE RESPONSE AS WELL AS THAT OF THE SYRIANS. THE ABILITY OF THE MNF TO QUIET VOLATILE SITUATIONS HAS BEEN DEMONSTRATED IN WEST BEIRUT AND EAST BEIRUT HE SAID. NOT EVERYONE WAS HAPPY WITH THE MOVEMENT OF THE MNF INTO THESE AREAS BUT NO ONE HAS REACTED VIOLENTLY TO THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF WITH THE LAF. A MNF ROLE IN THE IDF-LAF TURNOVER WOULD HAVE MORE BEARING ON A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME THAN ANY POLITICAL STATEMENT OR NEGOTIATIONS.

9. WHEN PRESSED AGAIN BY MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS ON THE PRIOR NEED FOR POLITICAL AGREEMENT AND ISRAELI HELP IN THIS REGARD, LEVY EXPLAINED THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND LEBANON'S NEED FOR AN "UMBRELLA" TO COOPERATE ON A MILITARY LEVEL. MCFARLANE ASKED POINTEDLY IF LEVY COULD PLAN WITH THE LAF FOR WITHDRAWAL ALL THE WAY TO THE BORDER. LEVY RESPONDED AFFIRMATIVELY BUT EMPHASIZED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT TO PLAN FIRST FOR THE SHUF. TAKING A SOMEWHAT PATRONIZING STANCE, HE QUESTIONED LEBANESE RELUCTANCE TO EXTEND ITS CONTROL TO THIS PART OF LEBANON AND ENCOURAGED TANNOUS NOT TO BE AFRAID. HE ASKED AGAIN WHY THE LEADERSHIP OF THE GOL NEEDED ASSURANCED ABOUT "THE WHOLE IN ORDER TO EXECUTE PLANS FOR A PART." MCFARLANE ASKED WHY LEVY'S WILLINGNESS TO PLAN FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL COULD NOT BE STATED PUBLICLY. LEVY RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A POLITICAL PROBLEM AND

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IF IT TURNS OUT THAT SUCH A STATEMENT IS NOT FEASIBLE, THAT THE GOL SHOULD NEVERTHELESS COORDINATE WITH ISRAEL TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY. DRORY INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT IF THE LEBANESE COULD NOT COORDINATE MILITARY PLANS WITHOUT A TIMETABLE FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD BE VERY EASY FOR ISRAEL TO LEAVE UNILATERALLY. MCFARLANE STRESSED AGAIN THAT THE GOVERNMENT COULD FALL IF IT WAS SEEN TO BE COORDINATING A PARTITION. THERE FOLLOWED A LONG DISCUSSION ABOUT THE RISKS OF COORDINATION AND COOPERATION ABSENT A PUBLIC STATEMENT. THE ISRAELIS ALSO ARGUED ALONG FAMILIAR LINES FOR RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS THE WAY TO REASSURE THE PUBLIC OF EVENTUAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

10. LEVY THEN TURNED TO TANNOUS AND SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ON COORDINATION. LEVY ASKED WHICH OF THE IDF FORTIFICATIONS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF TANNOUS WANTED HIM TO PRESERVE, INDICATING THAT THOSE WHICH WERE

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NOT DESIRED BY THE LAF WOULD BE DESTROYED. TANNOUS ASKED THAT THE ISRAELIS LEAVE THE FORTIFICATIONS ALONG SIDE THE SYRIANS INTACT. LEVY WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT THE FORTIFICATIONS BETWEEN THE VILLAGES IN THE SHUF WHICH ARE PRESENTLY IN THE "NO MAN'S LAND", AND BETWEEN PSP AND THE LF MILITIAS. DRORY INDICATED THAT HE NEEDED TO KNOW WHICH OF THESE THE LEBANESE WANTED TO KEEP AS A MATTER OF URGENCY, POINTING OUT THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE ALREADY BEGUN DESTROYING SOME OF THEIR FORTIFICATIONS. TANNOUS RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD LIKE TO SEE WHICH FORTIFICATIONS THE ISRAELIS WERE TALKING ABOUT. LEVY AND TANNOUS THEN AGREED THAT THEIR OPERATIONS STAFFS WOULD EXAMINE THE APPROPRIATE MAPS

11. LEVY ALSO POINTED TO THE NEED FOR ON-SITE INSPECTIONS AND COORDINATION ON THE GROUND. TANNOUS REJOINED THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TRIED TO COORDINATE, AND ALLUDING TO THE INCIDENT AT ABEH, HE SAID THEY HAD NOT SUCCEEDED. PERHAPS THERE HAD BEEN SOME MISUNDERSTANDING. LEVY OFFERED TO TRANSPORT THE LEBANESE IN ISRAELI VEHICLES OR HELOS AND THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO COORDINATE AT WHATEVER LEVEL TANNOUS WANTED. TANNOUS TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO SUGGEST A COMMITTEE WITH U.S. PARTICIPATION. LEVY AGREED AND SAID THAT WOULD BE NO PROBLEM. MCFARLANE ASKED WHETHER HE COULD BE CONFIDENT THAT COORDINATION WOULD WORK BETTER THAN IT HAD BEFORE THE AUGUST 10 INCIDENTS. LEVY RESPONDED THAT COORDINATION HAD NOT BEEN THE PROBLEM. THE DRUZE HAD ATTACKED THE LAF AND NOT BECAUSE THERE HAD BEEN NO COORDINATION. LEVY SAID THAT UNTIL THE DRUZE FEARS WERE QUIETED, THE LEBANESE COULD ANTICIPATE FURTHER INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE. TO FOOTNOTE LEVY'S POINT, DRORY NOTED THAT THE ATTACK ON THE BATTALION AT ABEH COINCIDED WITH A SERIES OF DRUZE ACTIONS AGAINST THE LEBANESE ARMY AT BIA AND KHALDE. TANNOUS RESPONDED QUICKLY THAT HE SAW WHAT APPEARED TO BE IDF COLLUSION IN THE ATTACK ON THE BATTALION AT ABEH. TANNOUS SPOKE OF "YOUR DRUZE" WHO WERE SEEN TO BE COLLABORATING WITH THE PSP MILITIA. DRORY RESPONDED THAT THE IDF HAD BEEN UNABLE TO PREVENT THE ATTACK BECAUSE IT HAD ONLY TWELVE SOLDIERS IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. TANNOUS AFFIRMED HIS BELIEF THAT THE IDF COULD HAVE STOPPED IT IF ONLY BECAUSE THE ARMED MILITIAMEN MUST HAVE PASSED THROUGH THE IDF CHECKPOINT. LEVY AND DRORY EMPHASIZED THAT THEY WERE ATTEMPTING TO ARRANGE A RETURN TO THE STATUS QUO AND WERE NOW PREPARED TO COOPERATE FULLY. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO THE DETAILS OF LEBANESE REQUESTS TO RESUPPLY AND REINFORCE THE BATTALION AT ABEH AND ISRAELI INSISTENCE ON DETAILED COORDINATION OF SUCH MOVES. IN RESPONSE TO TANNOUS' COMPLAINTS ON THE DELAYING THIS CREATED AND THE IDF'S BLUNT REFUSAL TO PERMIT DIRECT SUPPORT OF THE LAF BATTALION, LEVY AND DRORY MADE CLEAR THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD HAVE TO TAKE "COMPLETE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WHOLE AREA." IF TANNOUS WAS PREPARED TO ACCEPT THIS RESPONSIBILITY, THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW. DRORY EMPHASIZED THAT THE IDF

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WAS UNWILLING TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY FOR LEBANESE LOSSES AND CASUALTIES AS LONG AS THEY WERE IN CONTROL OF THE AREA. TANNOUS ASKED THAT THE IDF REGARD THE LAF AS ITS PARTNER AND NOT THE DRUZE, POINTING OUT THAT THE MORALE OF HIS FORCES HAD BEEN DESTROYED BY THIS ACT. DRORY INSISTED THAT THE DRUZE HAD ATTACKED WITHOUT ISRAELI KNOWLEDGE FOR REASONS WHICH TANNOUS UNDERSTOOD. HE OFFERED AGAIN TO ALLOW THE LEBANESE TO FIGHT ON THEIR OWN TERMS IF THEY ACCEPTED RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE AREA IN QUESTION. TANNOUS RESPONDED THAT HE WOULD LET THE ISRAELIS KNOW WHEN THE TIME WAS RIGHT. THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO DETAILS CONCERNING THE RETURN OF TWENTY-FOUR PRISONERS (WHOM THE ISRAELIS SAY "WILL NOT RETURN TO BEIRUT") AND FIVE CAPTURED APC'S. THE DISCUSSION ALSO RESULTED IN ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO RETURN THE CAPTURED LAF PERSONNEL, "BY FORCE IF NECESSARY."

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12. AT THE DINNER WHICH FOLLOWED IT WAS AGREED THAT

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BEIRUT 8943

THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELIS WOULD MEET ON 15 AUGUST TO ESTABLISH "COORDINATION AT THE STAFF OPERATIONS LEVEL" AND PREPARE MORE DETAILED PLANS FOR THE IDF-LAF RELIEF. IT WAS ALSO AGREED THAT A REPRESENTATIVE FROM GENERAL TANNOUS' STAFF WOULD PROCEED TO KFARMATTA (NEAR ABEH) TO COORDINATE THE RESUPPLY OF THE LAF BATTALION AND THE RETURN OF MISSING PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT. AT AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION, GENERAL LEVY OFFERED TO ESTABLISH A DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS LINK TO GENERAL TANNOUS TO FACILITATE COORDINATION IN THE EVENT OF FUTURE INCIDENTS. GENERAL TANNOUS WAS NON-COMMITTAL BUT AGREED TO CONSIDER THE REQUEST. (COMMENT: THIS MEETING MAY BE THE HARBINGER OF THE TYPE AND DEGREE OF MILITARY COORDINATION WHICH WE HAVE BEEN TRYING TO PROMOTE. I EXPECT ANOTHER MEETING AT THIS LEVEL VERY SOON FOLLOWED BY ADDITIONAL STAFF-TO-STAFF, COMMANDER-TO-COMMANDER MEETINGS PREPARATORY TO THE IDF REDEPLOYMENT. THE LEBANESE HAVE ASKED THAT THE U.S. PARTICIPATE (AS A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE MNF IN A COORDINATION COMMITTEE AT THE CORPS COMMANDER LEVEL. I THINK THIS IS A SUGGESTION WHICH WARRANTS FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION AND WOULD WELCOME DOD'S RECOMMENDATION ON A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE. END COMMENT.)

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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PRG 8/16/83

~~DATE~~  
FROM JEPowell

~~TO~~  
TO MCFARLANE:JEP:DWP

~~REFERENCES~~  
NONE

~~DISTRIBUTION~~  
AMB DCM MCFARLANE, ROSS POL/MIL CHRON

~~ORIGINATOR~~

~~ACTION ADDRESSEE, PRECEDENCE~~  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE

FOR FAIRBANKS FROM PAGANELLI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, LE, IS, XF, US, OTRA

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS' VISIT  
TO DAMASCUS -- CARE AND FEEDING

CPU PLEASE REPEAT DAMASCUS 6227, DATED AUGUST 16, 1983  
TO TEL AVIV AND JERUSALEM.

DILLON##

INITIALS:  
AUTH dp

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NLS F98-008/#157

BY LS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02



ACTION CG INFO DPB 2

VZCZCJMD963  
OO RUEHJM  
DE RUEHC #1398 2280737  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 160730Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 9120  
BT

16-AUG-83  
TJR: 07:38  
CN: 26998  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: NODI

~~SECRET~~ STATE 231398

NODIS  
FOLLOWING STATE 231398 DTD AUG 16 SENT ACTION BEIRUT  
BEING REPEATED TO YOU  
QUOTE

~~SECRET~~ STATE 231398

NODIS  
FOR MCFARLANE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY  
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, LE, US  
SUBJECT: STRATEGIC THINKING ON LEBANON

REF: BEIRUT 8930

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE VERY MUCH APPRECIATE YOUR ANALYSIS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION AND YOUR PROPOSALS FOR BREAKING THE IMPASSE. I HAVE ASKED THAT NICK CHAIR AN INTERAGENCY MEETING IN THE DEPARTMENT TOMORROW MORNING TO DEVELOP A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO YOUR PROPOSALS. WE CAN ANTICIPATE SOME OF THE QUESTIONS THAT WILL BE RAISED IN THIS PROCESS.

3. A MAJOR QUESTION, OF COURSE, WILL BE THE PROPOSED ROLES FOR THE MNF IN THE "PACIFICATION OF THE SHUF" AND IN "DETECTING SYRIAN INTERVENTION":

-- COULD NOT UNTSO ITSELF PROVIDE "OBSERVERS" TO ACCOMPANY THE LAF INTO THE SHUF? UNTSO OBSERVERS WERE ACTIVE IN BEIRUT LAST SUMMER, AND PERHAPS THEY CAN BE USED IN CONNECTION WITH AN IDF HANDOVER OF POSITIONS TO THE LAF.

-- WHAT EXACTLY WOULD THE ROLE OF THE MNF "TRAINERS" BE IN THE FORTIFIED LAF POSITIONS TURNED OVER BY THE IDF? COULD PERSONNEL UNDER AN OMC UMBRELLA WORK IN THIS ROLE? WOULD THEY HAVE TO BE PERMANENTLY ASSIGNED TO LAF UNITS?

4. ON OTHER ISSUES:

--WOULD A STRONGLY WORDED GOL DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIANS ACCOMPLISH VERY MUCH AT THIS POINT? WOULD A DEMARCHE BY THE SAUDIS BE MORE EFFECTIVE AND/OR LESS LIKELY TO RUN THE RISK OF SYRIAN REJECTION?

-- IN SUCH A DEMARCHE, WHAT WOULD BE THE INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE MATN?

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NLS  
BY 127 NARA, DATE 11/5/02



-- WOULD A LEBANESE REQUEST FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IF IT CAME AFTER A SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF?

-- WE HAVE ALREADY OBTAINED ODD AUTHORIZATION TO USE U.S. AIRCRAFT TO FLY WALID JUMBLATT TO ANY MEETING WITH AMIN. WOULD A MEETING ON A SIXTH FLEET SHIP PUT AMIN IN AN EMBARRASSING SITUATION? SHOULD WE PUSH FOR JUMBLATT TO COME ALL THE WAY TO BEIRUT, IF NECESSARY UNDER OUR PROTECTION?

-- SINCE HUSSEIN HAS HIMSELF RAISED DOUBTS THAT AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT WOULD PROVIDE MUCH IN THE WAY OF ARAB SUPPORT FOR LEBANON, IS THERE ANYTHING NEW THAT YOU BELIEVE WOULD MAKE SUCH A SUMMIT WORTHWHILE?

-- IN THE SAME REGARD, ANY LEBANESE INITIATIVE IN THE UN WOULD OBVIOUSLY HAVE TO BE BROADER THAN UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. MIGHT NOT SUCH A UN INITIATIVE BACKFIRE?

5. ANY THOUGHTS YOU MAY HAVE ON THESE OR OTHER QUESTIONS YOU CAN ANTICIPATE GIVEN THE PLAYERS INVOLVED (WHOM YOU KNOW WELL) WOULD BE A GREAT HELP IN THE INTERAGENCY PROCESS.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZED. DAM UNQUOTE DAM

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PROG 8/16/83

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CWSROSS

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CWSROSS

FINANCES

NONE

DISTRIBUTION

MCFARLANE-4 AMB DCM, POL P/M DAO

ORIGINATOR

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, NIACT IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

DAMASCUS FOR AMB. PAGANELLI  
TEL AVIV/JERUSALEM FOR AMB. FAIRBANKS

FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, OVIP, LE, SY, IS, PLO, US  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS VISIT  
- TO DAMASCUS

REF: GLASPIE-POWELL TELECON; ROSS-FLATEN TELECON

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO REACH AMB. FAIRBANKS, BUT  
EMBASSY TEL AVIV (FLATEN) CONFIRMS THAT, AS OF 1415Z  
AUGUST 16, THE FAIRBANKS PARTY ETA IN DAMASCUS REMAINED  
0940 DAMASCUS TIME (0640Z) AUGUST 17, WITH RETURN TO  
BEIRUT THE SAME DAY.

3. WE REPEATED AMB. PAGANELLI'S LUNCHEON INVITATION TO  
AMB. FAIRBANKS IN ISRAEL THIS MORNING FOR HIS RESPONSE.  
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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/95



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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

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CHARGE DATE  
PROG 8/16/83

APPROVED BY  
CWSROSS  
DRAFTED BY  
CWSROSS  
CLEARANCES  
NONE

DISTRIBUTION  
MCFARLANE-4 AMB DCM POL P/M

ORIGINATOR

ADDRESSES, PRECEDENCE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY JIDDA, NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE  
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE  
USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

JIDDA/RIYADH FOR AMB. MURPHY  
TEL AVIV/JERUSALEM FOR AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS

FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION (ROSS)

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, LE, SY, PLO, IS, US, SA  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: HADDAD TO JIDDA

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)\*\*\*
2. WADI' HADDAD CALLED ROSS AFTERNOON OF\*\*\*

REF: RIYADH 0289

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. WADI' HADDAD CALLED ROSS AFTERNOON OF AUGUST 16 TO CONFIRM THAT HE WOULD TRAVEL TO JIDDA TONIGHT, AUGUST 16, TO MEET WITH PRINCE BANDAR. HE IS TRAVELLING VIA ME 374, ETA JIDDA 2030 LT.

3. ALTHOUGH, ACCORDING TO HADDAD, BANDAR SHOULD BE AWARE OF THE ABOVE, HADDAD DID ASK THAT AMBASSADOR MURPHY CONFIRM HIS ETA WITH BANDAR "FOR OBVIOUS REASONS."  
DILLON##

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NLS F98-008/1#161

BY LOJ NARA DATE 11/5/02

INITIALS:  
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(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

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OO RUEHBL  
DE RUEHDM #6244/01 2280827  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 160825Z AUG 83  
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3244  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0731  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0446  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 8555  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 5677  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 6515  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADE 2381  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 8314  
BT

LOC: DISK 01 251  
16 AUG 83 1129  
CN: 07503  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: EXDI

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 06244

EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, EAID, EAGR, ETRD, SY, LE, US  
SUBJECT: PROPOSED "PRESSURES" ON SYRIA

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8891, (B) DAMASCUS 5774 (NODIS)  
- (C) DAMASCUS 5981, (D) DAMASCUS 5756 (E) DAMASCUS 5675

1. IN HIS AUGUST 11 MEETING WITH THE LEBANESE (REFTEL), AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS ENUMERATED A NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WAYS OF PRESSURING SYRIA TO MODIFY ITS POSITION ON WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON. FOR THE RECORD, WE OFFER BELOW DESCRIPTIONS OF THE STATUS OF EACH OF THESE PRESSURE POINTS.

2. USAID PROGRAM: A TOTAL OF \$438 MILLION WAS OBLIGATED FOR THE AID PROGRAM BETWEEN 1975 AND 1979. NO NEW FUNDS HAVE BEEN MADE AVAILABLE FOR SYRIA SINCE 1979. THE REMAINING UNEXPENDED PROJECT FUNDS, PRIMARILY LOANS, AMOUNT TO APPROXIMATELY \$129 MILLION, PLUS AN ESTIMATED \$96 MILLION THAT ARE ALREADY FROZEN AS A RESULT OF HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE ACTION DURING 1981.

3. US GRAIN SALES TO SYRIA: SINCE 1979 WHEN THERE WAS A PL 480 AGREEMENT WITH SYRIA, ALL US GRAIN (WHEAT, WHEAT FLOUR, CORN AND BARLEY) SOLD TO SYRIA HAVE BEEN ON COMMERCIAL TERMS. SYRIA NEVER RESPONDED TO THE JANUARY 1983 OFFER OF A \$133 MILLION USDA BLENDED CREDIT PACKAGE FOR THE PURCHASE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS. SINCE THE LAST PL 480 SHIPMENT OF GRAIN TO SYRIA THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT HAS NOT SOLD, FINANCED OR BEEN DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE SALE OF US GRAIN TO SYRIA. THERE WERE NO US WHEAT EXPORTS TO SYRIA IN 1981. IN 1982, 51,000 TONS OF WHEAT VALUED AT \$8 MILLION WAS EXPORTED. SO FAR IN 1983 (JANUARY-MAY) 21 TONS OF WHEAT FLOUR VALUED AT \$14,000 HAVE BEEN SHIPPED TO SYRIA. US CORN EXPORTS IN 1981 AND 1982 WERE 180,000 MT AND 215,000 MT RESPECTIVELY VALUED AT

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BY LST NARA, DATE 11/5/02



\$23.0 MILLION FOR BOTH YEARS. US CORN EXPORTS TO SYRIA DURING THE FIRST FIVE MONTHS OF 1983 WERE 26,000 TONS VALUED AT \$3 MILLION.

4. SYRIA'S COMMERCIAL RELATIONS: THE DIVERSITY OF SYRIA'S TRADING PARTNERS LEADS US TO CONCLUDE THAT EFFORTS TO DISRUPT THESE RELATIONSHIPS ARE LIKELY TO BE INEFFECTIVE.

SYRIA'S TRADE 1981	SOURCE OF IMPORTS PERCENT	DESTINATION OF EXPORTS PERCENT
-----	-----	-----
EEC	33	66
- FRG	7	1
- ITALY	10	42
- GREECE	2	8
- FRANCE	5	14
EASTERN BLOC	16	19
- ROMANIA	4	10
- DRG	3	2
- USSR	1	5
U.S.	4	4
JAPAN	-	4

PRESUMABLY EACH PARTY TO THE COMMERCIAL EXCHANGE SEES AN ADVANTAGE IN ESTABLISHING AND MAINTAINING IT. EEC EXPORT SALES TO SYRIA ARE WON DESPITE STIFF COMPETITION FROM OTHER SOURCES. SYRIAN EXPORTS SALES, PRIMARILY CRUDE AND REFINED OIL, RESULT TO A LARGE EXTENT FROM LOW TRANSPORT COSTS TO MEDITERRANEAN BASIN DESTINATIONS AND SYRIAN CRUDE'S SUITABILITY FOR REFINING AND BLENDING IN GREEK AND ITALIAN REFINERIES.

5. DEPENDENCE ON IRANIAN OIL: SYRIA REMAINS A NET EXPORTER OF CRUDE AND REFINED PRODUCTS. NONETHELESS, SYRIA REFINERIES WOULD REQUIRE MAJOR MODIFICATIONS TO MAKE THEM CAPABLE OF RUNNING ON ONE HUNDRED PERCENT SYRIAN HIGH SULFUR HEAVY CRUDE. IN VIEW OF THE EXISTING POLITICAL ALIGNMENT IN THE REGION AND THE GULF, NOTHING SHORT OF



MILITARY INTERDICTION IS LIKELY TO INTERRUPT THE FLOW OF IRANIAN CRUDE. IF THE FLOW WERE TO STOP, SYRIA WOULD BE REQUIRED TO OBTAIN LIGHT LOW-SULFUR CRUDE FROM OTHER SOURCES. IF THE SARG COULD COME UP WITH CASH OR CREDIT FACILITIES, MARKET CONDITIONS INDICATE SUPPLIERS COULD BE FOUND WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

6. FROM INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US, IT DOES NOT APPEAR THAT BAGHDAD SUBVENTION DONORS ARE ANXIOUS TO TERMINATE THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE AGREEMENT. CERTAINLY THE LARGEST CONTRIBUTOR, SAUDI ARABIA, HAS NOT DONE SO AND IS CURRENTLY PAID UP THROUGH SEPTEMBER (FIGURES ON STATUS OF BAGHDAD PAYMENTS ARE CONTAINED IN REF B).

7. FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FOR YOUR INFORMATION, WE ARE REPEATING TO YOU REFTELS B THRU E, IN WHICH EMBASSY PROVIDED DETAILED OVERVIEW OF SYRIAN ECONOMY AND ITS VULNERABILITY TO OUTSIDE PRESSURES.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI



~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 006257

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

N PVZCZCBL0168

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DE RUEHDM #6257 2281148

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3252

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0734

INFO RUFHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 0668

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 5679

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 8316

BT

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 006257

LOC: DISK 01 280

16 AUG 83 1149

CN: 07514

CHRG: PROG

DIST: EXDI

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BEIRUT ALSO FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: MOPS, PREL, IS, LE, SY, US, ICRC

SUBJECT: SYRIAN PRESIDENT'S AGREEMENT TO EXHUMATION OF  
- ISRAELI WAR DEAD

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 10830

(B) DAMASCUS 6088

1. ICRC DAMASCUS DELEGATE GAUTIER (PROTECT) TOLD EMBASSY OFFICER AUGUST 15 TOOK THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT HAD PASSED ON TO HIM VIA GENEVA THE FACT THAT SYRIAN PRESIDENT AL-ASSAD HAD AGREED IN HIS AUGUST 7 MEETING WITH MCFARLANE TO ALLOW EXHUMATION OF THE FOUR ISRAELI BODIES BURIED IN THE JEWISH CEMETERY IN DAMASCUS ON JULY 4, 1982 (REF A). EMBASSY OFFICER TOLD GAUTIER THAT THE US GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PART HOPED HE COULD USE THE AL-ASSAD/MCFARLANE EXCHANGE IN HIS EFFORTS TO EFFECT THE EXHUMATION (REF B).

2. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

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DAMASCUS 006257

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NLS F98-008/1 #160

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02



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OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHBL  
DE RUEHJM #2956/01 228 \*\*  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 161635Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6257  
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0168

BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 02956

CLASS: SECRET  
CHRG: PROG: 8/L6/83  
APPRV: RMC FARLANE  
DRFTD: PDUR/RMC FARLANE  
CLEAR: NONE  
DISTR: RMC FARLANE (4)  
AMB

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY  
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, LE, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGY FOR  
LEBANON

REFTEL: STATE 231398

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING COMMENTS ARE KEYED TO THE SPECIFIC QUESTIONS  
POSED IN REFTEL.

A. AN ELABORATION OF THE UNTSO MISSION TO PERMIT  
PATROLS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF WOULD BE AN ATTRACTIVE  
OPTION, PARTICULARLY IF IT COULD BE ARRANGED BEFORE  
THE IDF BEGINS WITHDRAWING. WHAT WE SEEK IS A VISIBLE  
PRESENCE IN AND AMONG THE DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN POPULATION  
CENTERS TO WITNESS, GIVE MORAL SUPPORT TO, AND BY THEIR  
IMPARTIALITY GIVE CREDIBILITY TO LAF EFFORTS TO  
MAINTAIN THE SEPARATION OF DRUZE AND LF FORCES IN THE  
CONTESTED AREA. THIS ROLE WILL BE ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT  
FOR THE DRUZE LEADERSHIP AND COULD BE CRITICAL TO AVOIDING  
SITUATIONS SUCH AS WE HAD AT ABEH WHERE THE LAF WAS  
PERCEIVED TO BE AN ALLY OF THE LF. WOULD WELCOME YOUR  
ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBILITY OF GETTING TIMELY UN APPROVAL  
FOR SUCH A CHANGE.

B. THE ROLE OF MNF "TRAINERS" IN FORTIFIED LAF  
POSITIONS IS TO PROVIDE MORAL SUPPORT AND TACTICAL ADVICE  
TO LOW-MID LEVEL LAF COMMANDERS IN THE FIELD. THE  
INCIDENT AT ABEH AND THE PRIMITIVE STATE OF LAF  
EXPERIENCE IN RESPONDING TO COMPLEX AND FAST-MOVING  
DEVELOPMENTS ON THE GROUND ARGUE FOR PRACTICAL,  
EXPERIENCED ASSISTANCE. ANOTHER PURPOSE APPLICABLE TO  
THE FORTIFICATIONS ADJACENT TO SYRIAN POSITIONS IS  
DETERRENCE OF SYRIAN PROBES AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING FOR  
THE LAF UNITS FACING SYRIANS. IF ADEQUATE NUMBERS OF  
TRAINERS CAN BE MADE AVAILABLE UNDER THE AEGIS OF OMC

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NLS #162  
F98-008/1  
NARA, DATE 4/19/06

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THIS MIGHT BE PREFERABLE TO MNF. FOWEVER, TO THE EXTENT THAT WE WANT TO SHARE THIS COMMAND ADVISORY FUNCTION WITH THE OTHER MNF CO-CONTRIBUTORS, WE MIGHT WANT TO CONSIDER PUTTING THESE TRAINERS UNDER THE MNF UMBRELLA. NOR DO WE FORECLOSE OTHER MNF CONTRIBUTORS TAKING THIS ON. EITHER OMC OR MNF OPTIONS HAVE CONGRESSIONAL IMPLICATIONS. WE COULD CONSIDER DECREASES IN PRESENT MNF DEPLNYMENTS SO THAT WE MIGHT PRESENT CHANGES IN MISSION WITH LITTLE OR NO MANPOWER INCREASE.

3. AS TO THE OTHER ISSUES:

A. A STRONGLY WORDED GOL DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIANS -- SUPP RTED BY STATEMENTS FROM THE US AND OTHER MNF CO-CONTRIBUTORS -- IS DESIGNED TO DETER SYRIAN ACTION TO DISRUPT THE LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SHUF. PUT BLUNTLY, IF WE ARE GOING TO PUT THE LAF AND OTHERS AT RISK IN AREAS VACATED BY THE ISRAELIS, IT IS SENSIBLE TO FIRST PLACE THE ONUS FOR ANY DISRUPTION ON SYRIA.

B. AS TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN, THE INCENTIVE COULD BE TO DISPEL LATENT ARAB CRITICISM OF SYRIA AS THE INTRANSIGENT FIGURE. THIS IS PROBABLY NOT HI H ON THE LIST OF SYRIAN WORRIES BUT NOT WITHOUT SIGNIFICANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF OUR BROADER ISOLATION STRATEGY.

C. IN MY ESTIMATION, THE TIMING OF THE GOL REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD BE KEYED TO THE READINESS OF THE APPROPRIATE ARAB GOVERNMENTS TO SUPPORT THE GOL DEMAND. THIS IS ALSO AN IMPORTANT CARD WITH THE ISRAELIS. IN SHORT, I AGREE WITH YOUR SENSE OF TIMING BUT I WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST MAKING THE CALL CONDITIONAL UPON A SUCCESSFUL DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF.

D. WHILE NOT COMMITTED TO A MEETING ON A SIXTH FLEET SHIP, I BELIEVE IT SHOULD BE KEPT IN MIND AS AN OPTION. SENSITIVE EXCHANGES WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL LAST NIGHT HAVE RAISED POSSIBILITIES FOR BEIRUT VENUE. MORE ON THIS AFTER I RETURN TO BEIRUT TOMORROW.



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~~S E C R E T~~/NODIS

JERUSALEM 02956

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY  
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, LE, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGY FOR  
E. AS TO AN ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT, THIS IS CLEARLY  
DOWNSTREAM. A SUCCESSFUL LAF DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SHUF  
FOLLOWED BY A GOL CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWALL WOULD LEAD  
LOGICALLY TO A CALL FOR AN ARAB SUMMIT. EVEN IF IT DID  
NOT MATERIALIZE (ALTHOUGH ONE IS SCHEDULED IN THE FALL),  
THE GOL SEE IT AS A PRECONDITION TO TAKING THE ISSUE TO  
THE UNSC.

F. THE INITIATIVE IN THE UN IS SOMETHING THE LEBANESE  
ARE VERY KEEN ON IF THE SYRIANS CONTINUE IN THEIR  
INTRANSIGENCE, ALTHOUGH I SHARE YOUR MISGIVINGS. IN ANY  
EVENT, IT WOULD NOT LIKELY TAKE PLACE UNTIL AT LEAST  
NOVEMBER.

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JERUSALEM 02956

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ACTION CG INFO DPO VIP-5 7

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OO RUEHJM  
DE RUEHC #2004/01 2282359  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 162150Z AUG 83 ZFF5  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9123  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9547  
BT

17-AUG-83  
TOR: 02:12  
CN: 27112  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: NODV

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 STATE 232014

NODIS

FOLLOW NG BEIRUT 8930 REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO ACTION SECSTATE  
INFO WHITE HOUSE DTD AUG 15:

QTE: SECRET BEIRUT 8930

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY AND PASS SECDEF  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, LE, IS, XF, US  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: STRATEGY FOR THE  
IMMEDIATE FUTURE

REF: (A) STATE

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WHERE WE ARE. WE ARE AT A CRITICAL JUNCTURE IN OUR  
EFFORT TO MAKE PROGRESS ON THE OBJECTIVES THE PRESIDENT  
HAS SET FOR LEBANON. WITHIN LEBANON, THE GOVERNMENT  
WILL BE EITHER GREATLY STRENGTHENED OR SEVERELY  
UNDERCUT DEPENDING ON THE OUTCOME OF THE FORTHCOMING  
SHUF REDEPLNMENT BY THE IDF.

-- THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP HAS GROWN INCREASINGLY  
EMBITTERED TOWARD AMIN GEMAYEL DUE TO ITS PERCEPTIONS  
OF LEBANESE WEAKNESS AND BACKSLIDING WITH REGARD TO  
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE ELIMINATION  
OF A PUBLIC BILATERAL DIALOGUE. GIVEN THIS MISTRUST  
OF GOL MOTIVES, THE APPARENT MISUNDERSTANDING OF THE  
REALITIES OF LEBANESE POLITICS, AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS  
THAT SUCH A STATEMENT MIGHT CREATE WITH THE LABOR  
OPPOSITION INSIDE ISRAEL, THE GOI CONTINUES TO RESIST  
OUR REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC STATEMENT COMMITTING ISRAEL  
TO A PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL LINKED WITH A NOTIONAL  
TIMETABLE. ADDITIONALLY, THE IDF CONTINUES TO PERMIT  
THE STRENGTHENING AND MOVEMENT OF DRUZE AND PHALANGE  
MILITIAS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE LAF. THIS SEEMS TO  
RESULT FROM INTERNAL POLITICAL CALCULATIONS AS WELL  
AS A POLICY TO EXERT PRESSURE ON THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT  
IN RESPONSE TO ITS REFUSAL TO COOPERATE PUBLICLY.

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NLRR M08-D99/3 #57886

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

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-- THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP IS UNDER GROWING DOMESTIC PRESSURE ON TWO RELATED FRONTS: PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS THAT ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WILL LEAD TO PARTITION AND THAT RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND NON-MARONITE CONFESSIONAL GROUPS IS INCREASINGLY UNLIKELY DUE TO THE PHALANGE DOMINANCE OF THE GOVERNMENT. THESE PROBLEMS ARE EXACERBATED BY SYRIAN POLICIES DESIGNED TO UNDERMINE GEMAYEL'S LEGITIMACY AND WIDEN THE CLEAVAGES AMONG CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. IN THIS CONTEXT, THE CLOSURE OF THE AIRPORT BY THE DRUZE AND THE LAF'S HUMILIATION IN THE SHUF COMBINE TO FURTHER UNDERMINE SUPPORT FOR AND CONFIDENCE IN THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES.

-- PRESIDENT ASSAD REMAINS ADAMANTLY OPPOSED TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AND IS UNWILLING TO TAKE ACTIONS, SUCH AS A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN THE UPPER METN, THAT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE ASSERTION OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY IN A MANNER THAT WOULD FACILITATE THE LAF'S MOVE INTO THE SHUF. ON THE CONTRARY, THE SYRIANS ARE OBSTRUCTING OUR EFFORTS TO PROMOTE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, INSIST THEY WON'T CONSIDER WITHDRAWAL UNTIL ALL ISRAELIS LEAVE, AND -- SIGNIFICANTLY -- APPEAR UNCONCERNED BY THE PRESENCE OF THE IDF 22 KM FROM DAMASCUS. ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSAD IS TRYING TO WHET OUR APPETITE WITH HIS "GESTURE" OF ALLOWING RED CROSS IDENTIFICATION OF ISRAELI BODIES AND KHADDAM'S READINESS TO DISCUSS WITH US THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. MORE LIKELY, HE IS STRINGING US ALONG TO MAKE A RECORD OF "GOOD FAITH" WHILE BUYING TIME TO UNDERMINE GEMAYEL.

-- THE SAUDIS CONTINUE TO SUPPORT OUR DIPLOMACY, BOTH WITH RESPECT TO STRENGTHENING THE GOL WHILE ENCOURAGING LEBANESE RECONCILIATION (I.E. PRESSURE ON WALID JUMBLATT) AND BY SUPPORTING OUR POSITIONS VIS-A-VIS THE SYRIANS. HOWEVER, WHILE SAUD AND BANDAR ASSERT SYRIAN WILLINGNESS TO UNDERTAKE SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON, OUR OWN DIALOGUE WITH KHADDAM AND ASSAD LEADS TO DIAMETRICALLY DIFFERENT CONCLUSIONS. (WE THEREFORE DON'T HAVE GREAT EXPECTATIONS OF SAUDI DIPLOMACY, ALTHOUGH THEY CAN OCCASIONALLY BE HELPFUL ON LOW-RISK OR SYMBOLIC OPERATIONS.

3. OUR OBJECTIVES. OUR BROAD GOALS ARE WELL-KNOWN AND DO NOT NEED ELABORATION; FOR NOW WE NEED TO FOCUS DIRECTLY ON THE SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES WHICH MUST BE ATTAINED QUICKLY TO PRESERVE AND STRENGTHEN THIS GOVERNMENT FOR THE DIFFICULT PERIOD WHICH LIES AHEAD. ON THE BASIS OF THE FIRST TWO WEEKS OF MY MISSION, AND IN KEEPING WITH REFTEL, THESE OBJECTIVES CAN BE SUMMARIZE



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AS FOLLOWS: TO MAKE CLEAR PROGRESS IN PROMOTING RECONCILIATION BETWEEN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND THE LEADERS OF THE SEVERAL FACTIONS, MOST IMPORTANTLY THE DRUZE; TO PACIFY ALAYH AND THE SHUF, FACILITATE THE ENTRY OF THE LAF AND AT LEAST INTERIM ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND LOCAL LEADERS; TO DETER FURTHER SYRIAN INTERVENTION, DIRECT OR INDIRECT, TO DESTABILIZE AND OTHERWISE UNDERMINE THE PROCESS WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN; TO ENSURE THAT ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT IS SEEN AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS; AND TO ESTABLISH MOMENTUM FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS.

4. POSSIBLE STRATEGIES. AS RECOUNTED IN EARLIER CABLES, WE HAVE TWO OPTIONS TO BREAK THE CURRENT IMPASSE. ONE IS AN INCREMENTAL STRATEGY WHICH WOULD RELY ON FREQUENT AND REPEATED NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE MAJOR ACTORS. WHILE IT MIGHT LEAD TO MEASURED PROGRESS IN SYRIA AND ISRAEL, FOR EXAMPLE, THE DESPERATION AND ANXIETY OF THE GOL LEADERSHIP AND THE IMMINENCE OF THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FORCES ME TO RECOMMEND A BOLDER AND MORE DECISIVE APPROACH TOWARD THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR NEAR-TERM OBJECTIVES. AS DISCUSSED BELOW, WHAT WE PROPOSE IS A SERIES OF INITIATIVES TO BOLSTER THE CONFIDENCE OF THE GOL, FORCE THE GOI TO SOME PROMPT AND CONSTRUCTIVE DECISIONS, AND PUT DOWN MARKERS TO THE SARG THAT WE WILL NOT TOLERATE COERCIVE OR FORCEFUL INTERVENTION IN LEBANESE AFFAIRS.

5. CAPITALIZING ON THE FIRST PHASE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. THE PROACTIVE STRATEGY OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 IS PREDICATED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE SCHEDULED IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF OFFERS AN OPP RTUNITY FOR THE GOL TO BUILD ITS STRENGTH AND CONFIDENCE AND SET A PATTERN FOR SUBSEQUENT EXTENSIONS OF ITS AUTHORITY AND FOR FOSTERING A CLIMATE OF RECONCILIATION. LIKEWISE IT WILL BEGIN THE PROCESS OF CLOSE, DIRECT, AND FREQUENT COOPERATION BETWEEN THE GOL AND GOI ENVISAGED IN THE AGREEMENT AND HELP DISCOURAGE SYRIAN INTERVENTION.

6. ELEMENTS OF THE STRATEGY.

A. NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. OUR FIRST PRIORITY IS TO PROMOTE ACTIONS WHICH REDUCE LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION WHILE ENCOURAGING NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. IT IS THEREFORE CRUCIAL THAT THE GOI PUBLICLY AFFIRM ITS COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, IN ADDITION TO FACILITATING THE EXTENSION OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SERVICES INTO THE SOUTH. SIMULTANEOUSLY WE MUST MAKE CLEAR TO GEMAYEL AND JUMBLATT THE NEED FOR MUTUAL ACCOMMODATION. THE SUCCESS (OR FAILURE) OF GOL-DRUZE RECONCILIATION WILL SET AN IMPORTANT PRECEDENT FOR OTHER CONFESSIONAL GROUPS AS FOREIGN FORCES WITHDRAW FROM OTHER PARTS OF LEBANON. WE SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER HOW TO HELP DEFUSE THE PERCEPTION OF DE FACTO PHALANGE DOMINATION. THIS WILL REQUIRE U.S. PRESSURE ON PIERRE



GEMAYEL, AS IT IS INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT HIS "GODFATHER" STATURE, AND AMIN'S OWN RELATIVE POLITICAL WEAKNESS, ALLOW THE ELDER GEMAYEL TO DOMINATE AND BLOCK RECONCILIATION EFFORTS. WE MUST THEREFORE DEVISE A MECHANISM FOR NEUTRALIZING SHAYKH PIERRE WHILE BUILDING NATIONAL CONFIDENCE IN AMIN.

B. PACIFICATION OF THE SHUF. BEYOND THE MEETINGS WITH WALID JUMBLATT, THE GOL, BY ITS OWN ADMISSION, MUST ALSO NEGOTIATE WITH A VARIETY OF DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN LEADERS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF TO FACILITATE THE ENTRY OF THE LAF AND OTHERWISE EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY AND THE PROVISION OF NECESSARY SERVICES TO THIS AREA. THESE NEGOTIATIONS MUST BE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE GOL; NEVERTHELESS WE WILL WANT TO IMPOSE A CERTAIN DISCIPLINE IN THE PROCESS BY KEEPING CLOSELY ABREAST OF ITS PROGRESS. ANOTHER POSSIBLE WAY WE CAN HELP IS TO OFFER "OBSERVERS" TO ACCOMPANY THE LAF AS IT RELIEVES THE IDF POSITIONS AND CHECKPOINTS THROUGHOUT ALAYH AND THE SHUF. WHAT WE HAVE IN MIND ARE SMALL DETACHMENTS SIMILAR TO UNTSO TO SERVE AS "WITNESSES" AND REASSURE LOCAL FORCES, ESPECIALLY THE DRUZE, THAT THE LAF WILL NOT SHOW PARTIALITY TOWARD ONE COMMUNITY OR THE OTHER. IN SHORT, THIS LATTER STEP MIGHT HELP TO PRECLUDE INCIDENTS SUCH AS OCCURRED IN ABAYH.

C. DETERRING SYRIAN INTERVENTION. THIS IS PERHAPS THE MOST DIFFICULT AND CERTAINLY THE RISKIEST OBJECTIVE. BARRING A CREDIBLE COMMITMENT FROM THE SARG TO NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE IDF REDEPLNYMENT FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF, I AM NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT THE SYRIANS WILL REFRAIN FROM USING THEIR DRUZE FACTIONS OR EVEN THEIR OWN FORCES TO OPPOSE THE LEBANESE FORCIBLY OR HARASS THEM, ESPECIALLY IN THE "FREE ZONE." GENERAL TANNOUS HAS DISCUSSED TWO "RED LINES" (SYRIAN AIR ATTACKS AND MASSED ACTIONS) AND TWO LESSER CONDITIONS (PSP ARTILLERY FIRE FROM THE SHUF AND SYRIAN/PSP ARTILLERY FROM THE METN) WHICH WILL EITHER PRECLUDE OR GREATLY COMPLICATE LAF



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DEPLOYMENT INTO ALAYH AND THE SHUF. GIVEN THE ENORMOUS RISKS WHICH ATTEND A FAILURE TO ESTABLISH LAF CONTROL IN THESE AREAS, I RECOMMEND THAT WE URGE THE GOL TO SEND A STRONGLY WORDED DEMARCHE TO THE SARG, WHICH WE WOULD REINFORCE, WARNING AGAINST THIS KIND OF INTERFERENCE. THE DEMARCHE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THE GOL IS IN THE FIRST INSTANCE PROPOSING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN AND A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO MAINTAIN THE TRUCE. TO UNDERLINE OUR DETERMINATION, I RECOMMEND WE GIVE FAVORABLE CONSIDERATION TO THE GOL REQUEST FOR REGULAR MNF PATROLS ON THE STRATEGIC ARTERIES IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. MOREOVER, TO DETER SYRIAN ATTACKS ACROSS DEFENSIVE LINES MANNED BY THE LAF, I RECOMMEND THAT, AS AN ADDITIONAL MEASURE FOR EARLY CONSIDERATION, WE CONSIDER THE DEPLOYMENT OF MNF TRAINERS WITH LAF UNITS AT THE FORTIFIED POSITIONS TURNED OVER BY THE IDF. THE FACTS ARE THAT THE LAF IS POORLY LED. ITS LINE UNITS HOLD PROMISE OF BEING ABLE TO HACK IT, BUT NOT WITHOUT FAR BETTER LEADERSHIP THAN NOW EXISTS. RECOGNIZING THAT THESE MEASURES WILL BE DIFFICULT POLITICALLY, WE MUST BALANCE THE RISK OF MNF CASUALTIES AGAINST THE RISK THAT SARG OPPOSITION TO THE LAF (MASKED AS PSP OPPOSITION) MIGHT LEAD TO WHAT WOULD BE PERCEIVED A CATASTROPHIC FAILURE OF THE LAF AND THE ATTENDANT CHAOS IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. A FINAL JUSTIFICATION IS THAT WE NEED TO MAKE CLEAR TO THE SARG THAT WE ARE COMMITTED TO LEBANON'S SECURITY.

D. MAINTAINING MOMENTUM OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. GIVEN THE POLITICAL-ECONOMIC SITUATION IN ISRAEL, IT MAY BE POSSIBLE TO INSTIGATE A CONTINUING WITHDRAWAL OF THE IDF AS A RESULT OF THE REDEPLOYMENT OUT OF THE SHUF. THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCH A DEVELOPMENT WOULD BE AFFECTED BY LAF CAPABILITIES AND THE PLO PRESENCE IN LEBANON. MOREOVER, IT IS CLEAR THAT MOD ARENS, UNLIKE PM BEGIN AND FM SHAMIR, IS MUCH MORE WILLING TO CONSIDER WAYS TO CUT ISRAELI LOSSES AND EXPEDITE THE DEPARTURE OF THE IDF FROM LEBANON. THIS RESULTS FROM ARENS' LACK OF DIRECT ASSOCIATION WITH THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT'S INABILITY TO ACHIEVE THE ORIGINAL GOALS BEGIN, SHAMIR, AND SHARON PROCLAIMED AT THE OUTSET OF THE OPERATION AND FROM THE MOD'S BUDGET CRISIS. ARENS IS UNDER PRESSURE TO SLASH THE DEFENSE BUDGET BY AS MUCH AS 20 BILLION SHEKELS (APPROXIMATELY 400 MILLION DOLLARS). OBVIOUSLY, ARENS' ABILITY TO BRING ABOUT IDF WITHDRAWAL WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCE HIS OWN POPULARITY AT A TIME WHEN THE REST OF THE GOVERNMENT FACES A DRUMBEAT OF CRITICISM.

7. ACTION AGENDA/DECISION POINTS. THE FOLLOWING AGENDA IS KEYED TO THE OPERATIONAL STRATEGY OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6. WE WILL NEED YOUR THINKING ON THESE ITEMS AND APPROVAL TO SET THEM IN MOTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

A. PUBLIC STATEMENT BY THE GOI. THE STATUS OF THIS INITIATIVE HAS BEEN REPORTED. I BELIEVE WE NEED A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY AS SOON AS POSSIBLE



TO THIS EFFECT, AS WELL AS SUBSEQUENT PUBLIC STATEMENTS REAFFIRMING OUR STRONG BELIEF THAT THIS IS A REASONABLE AND NECESSARY MEASURE.

B. INTER-CONFESSIONAL MEETINGS. WE NEED TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOL AND LEADERS OF THE MAJOR CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. THE FIRST PRIORITY IS THE MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT, AND WE ARE TRYING TO ARRANGE THIS NOW. TO DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST, I BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD OFFER TO HOST THIS FIRST MEETING UTILIZING A SIXT FLEET UNIT AS A PLATFORM.

C. FORMAL LEBANESE REQUEST FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE ISRAELI STATEMENT AND THE FIRST GOL MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT, WE SHOULD PRESS GEMAYEL TO SEND THE FORMAK REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL TO THE SARG.

D. MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY. ONCE THE GOL LETTER HAS BEEN TRANSMITTED, I PROPOSE TO SEND DICK FAIRBANKS TO THE MAJOR ARAB CAPITALS TO REINFORCE GOL DIPLOMACY DESIGNED TO RALLY PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE GOL AND UNDERLINE ARAB DETERMINATION TO ISOLATE ASSAD IF HE FAILS TO COMPLY. I MAY BE ABLE TO MAKE A SEPARATE TRIP TO EUROPEAN CAPITALS LATE THIS WEEK (E.G. MNF PARTNERS, FRG, GREECE, VATICAN). MORE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THE TENSION OF GOI-GOL DIPLOMACY AND RECONCILIATION TROUBLES WILL KEEP ME HERE. AGAINST THAT PROBABILITY, I WOULD APPRECIATE THE DEPARTMENT'S DEVELOPMENT OF A MAJOR DEMARCHE TAILORED FOR EACH EC/NATO CAPITAL AND DESIGNED TO SUMMARIZE WHERE WE ARE (BASED ON THIS AND OTHER CABLES) AND SEEKING EC/NATO SUPPORT OF YOUR EFFORTS, PARTICULARLY VIS-A-VIS SYRIA. IN ADDITION, I RECOMMEND WE PLAN TO SUPPORT A LEBANESE INITIATIVE IN THE UN STRONGLY AND THAT WE ENCOURAGE THE SAUDIS TO USE THE FORTHCOMING ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT TO SUPPORT LEBANON'S CASE.



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E. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE MNF. IF THE SPECIFIC MEASURES OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 6 ARE APPROVED, I WOULD WORK WITH THE LEBANESE (PREFERABLY WITH THE HELP OF JCS LIAISON) TO DEVELOP A CONCEPT PLAN FOR MNF COOPERATION IN ALAYH AND THE SHUF. THIS PLAN WOULD THEN BE BRIEFED TO THE MNF CONTRIBUTORS HERE AND IN CAPITALS.

F. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON RECONCILIATION. ALTHOUGH OUR THINKING ALONG THESE LINES IS IN THE FORMATIVE STAGES, I BELIEVE THAT A CONFERENCE OF ALL MAJOR CONFESSIONAL LEADERS, INCLUDING THE PATRIARCHS (E.G. CHAMOUN, FRANJIYYA, KARAMI, GEMAYEL), SHOULD BE CONVENED AND CHAIRED BY AMIN GEMAYEL. WHATEVER SUBSTANCE IS DISCUSSED, THE APPEARANCE OF ALL THE MAJOR FACTIONS MEETING AT THE PRESIDENT'S REQUEST -- WITH HIGH U.S. SUPPORT AND INTEREST -- COULD LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR A NEW CONSENSUS AND PERHAPS A STRENGTHENED AND MORE BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT.  
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From Damascus

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01/02

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DAMASCUS 006328/01

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NLS F98-008/11-#164

FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS

27 CU NARA, DATE 4/19/06

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, US, SY, LE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FAIRBANKS-KHADDAM

- PLENARY MEETING AUGUST 17

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING DRAFT MEMCON FOR YOUR CONCURRENCE. BEGIN TEXT:

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: KHADDAM

SOUGHT TO USE THE INITIAL (PLENARY) MEETING WITH THE FAIRBANKS TEAM NOT FOR THE ANTICIPATED CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, BUT RATHER FOR AN EXPOSITION OF THE "ILLEGALITY" OF THE AGREEMENT PER SE. HE CONTENDED THE AGREEMENT IS "INVALID" BECAUSE IT WAS NEGOTIATED UNDER DURESS (VIENNA CONVENTION), IMPOSED ON THE GOL BY THE USG (CITING LEBANESE FON MIN AS HIS AUTHORITY), SURRENDERED SOUTH LEBANON TO ISRAEL, IMPOSES UNACCEPTABLE CONDITIONS ON LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND ARAB SECURITY, AND IS REJECTED BY MOST LEBANESE. FAIRBANKS ARGUED STRONGLY AGAINST APPLICABILITY OF VIENNA CONVENTION, POINTED OUT AGREEMENTS ON TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY ARE RARELY NEGOTIATED IN THE ABSENCE OF OCCUPYING FORCES, INSISTED ON THE LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL WHICH NEGOTIATED IT, AND LISTED THE SECURITY AND POLITICAL BENEFITS IT PROVIDES FOR LEBANON. END SUMMARY.

3. MORNING AUGUST 17 AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS AND FONMIN KHADDAM HAD INITIAL MEETING, AS PREVIOUSLY ARRANGED, TO UNDERTAKE CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT. AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, ROBINSON, ROSS, KRECKO, WILLIS, AND A/DCM ACCOMPANIED. KHADDAM HAD HIS IO DIRECTOR HAYTHAM AL-KAYLANI, MFA INFORMATION DIRECTOR ABDAL-KARIM SABBAGH, AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR GLAIEL, ARAB AFFAIRS DIRECTOR HINAYN HATIM, INTERPRETER AND NOTETAKER

4. ALTHOUGH U.S. SIDE HAD EXPECTED TO BEGIN DETAILED REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, THIS INITIAL MEETING, WHICH LASTED ONE HOUR, WAS DEVOTED TO A DEBATE ON THE LEGALITY OF THE AGREEMENT PER SE. (IT WAS DECIDED THAT ROBINSON AND KAYLANI AND THEIR STAFFS WOULD MEET AGAIN IN THE AFTERNOON

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~~SECRET~~

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AND, AS NECESSARY, AUGUST 18 TO 20, TO COMPLETE THE ACTUAL DETAILED REVIEW - SEPTEL.)

5. FAIRBANKS BEGAN BY REITERATING U.S. DETERMINATION TO WORK FOR THE EVACUATION OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON ASAP. HE RECALLED THE ISRAELI STATEMENT (ARENS) OF AUGUST 16 REITERATING GOI PLEDGE TO WITHDRAW WITHIN EIGHT OR TEN WEEKS AFTER SIGNATURE OF THE AGREEMENT, ON THE CONDITION THAT OTHER FOREIGN FORCES ALSO DEPART. KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT SYRIA IS READY TO WITHDRAW ON THE CONDITION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS RESCINDED.
6. KHADDAM SUGGESTED THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF THE PRESENT DISCUSSION SHOULD BE TO "REMOVE" FROM THE AGREEMENT AND ALL ITS ANNEXES ANYTHING NOT CONSONANT WITH THE INTEGRITY OF LEBANON OR THE SECURITY OF SYRIA AND THE ARAB WORLD. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH THE USG IS NOT A PARTY TO THE AGREEMENT AND CANNOT CHANGE IT, HE HOPED FOR AGREEMENT WITH KHADDAM ON WHAT THE AGREEMENT MEANS.
7. KHADDAM DECLARED THAT THE ISSUE IS NOT A LEGAL ONE. IF IT WERE, THE AGREEMENT IS CLEARLY INVALID UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION WHICH STIPULATES ANY AGREEMENT CONCLUDED UNDER FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS INVALID. THIS PROPOSITION, HE EMPHASIZED, IS NOT DEBATABLE; SIMILAR CLAUSES APPEAR IN UN CHARTER AND RESOLUTIONS.
8. A DETAILED EXCHANGE THEN ENSUED ON THE SUBJECT OF THE LEGALITY AND VALIDITY OF THE AGREEMENT. FAIRBANKS ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE USG CONSIDERS THE AGREEMENT TO BE A VALID LEGAL CONTRACT UNDERTAKEN BY TWO SOVEREIGN STATES. SYRIA IS A PARTY TO THE VIENNA CONVENTION, BUT THE US AND LEBANON ARE NOT. NEVERTHELESS, THE USG ACCEPTS THE CONVENTION AS A VALID STATEMENT OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW. WE BELIEVE IT IS ABSURD TO MAINTAIN THAT AN END TO HOSTILITY CANNOT BE NEGOTIATED WHEN ONE PARTY REMAINS ON THE SOIL OF THE OTHER.
9. FAIRBANKS ALSO STRESSED THAT THE AGREEMENT IS NOT A PEACE TREATY.
10. KHADDAM DISAGREED SHARPLY, ASKING IF THE USG WAS NOT IN FACT TAKING THE POSITION THAT ISRAEL IS AN OCCUPYING POWER. FAIRBANKS CLARIFIED THAT THE USG MAKES NO FINDING ON THE LEGALITY OR ILLEGALITY OF ISRAELI



INVASION. THE QUESTION AT ISSUE IS NOT THE LEGALITY OF ISRAELI ACTION BUT THE STATUS OF ISRAEL ON THE GROUND IN LEBANON. USG AGREES ISRAEL IS IN OCCUPATION OF LEBANON; GENEVA CONVENTION APPLIES.

11. KHADDAM THEN LISTED SARG GROUNDS FOR ARGUING THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID:

--AGREEMENT WAS IMPOSED BY DURESS; GEMAYEL REPRESENTATIVES, INCLUDING FON MIN, HAD TOLD SARG USG IMPOSED THE AGREEMENT ON THE GOL.

--AGREEMENT IS A PEACE TREATY IMPOSING NORMALIZATION AS WELL AS MILITARY, SECURITY, AND ECONOMIC RESTRICTIONS ON LEBANON. SIMILAR AGREEMENTS STRETCHING BACK TO THE 19TH CENTURY HAVE HAD THE SAME RESULTS, I.E., WHERE THE AGGRESSOR GAINS, NEW WARS ARE INEVITABLE. FURTHER, WORLD WAR II TREATIES LED TO THE DIVISION OF GERMANY; NOW WE HAVE THE FRAGMENTATION OF LEBANON.

--THE LEBANESE ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE AGREEMENT, DESPITE USG CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY. REPRESENTATIVE MOSEMS LIKE THE MUFTI AND CHRISTIANS LIKE RAYMOND EDDE, FRANGIER, AND MUNIR ABU FADHIL DO NOT ACCEPT THE AGREEMENT.

--LEBANON HAS NOT REGAINED ITS SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOUTH.

12. DURING AND AFTER THIS EXPOSITION BY KHADDAM, FAIRBANKS STRESSED THAT WE DISAGREE FUNDAMENTALLY WITH KHADDAM'S "EVIDENCE" FOR THE "INVALIDITY" OF THE AGREEMENT. WE NEED TO COME TO A CONSENSUS ON GENERAL PRINCIPLES OR AGREE TO DISAGREE ON SPECIFIC POINTS. SO FAR, BOTH SIDES AGREE ON SEEKING THE EARLIEST WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES (FAIRBANKS SPECIFIED HE WAS MAKING NO EQUATION BETWEEN THE LEGITIMACY OF SYRIAN AND ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON), ON RESTORING GOL SOVEREIGNTY, ON NECESSITY THAT THE GOL BE REPRESENTATIVE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF THE GOL ACHIEVING FULL CONTROL OF ALL LEBANON.

13. TURNING TO KHADDAM'S SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS FAIRBANKS MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- INTERNATIONAL STABILITY DEPENDS UPON THE RULE OF LAW. TERRORIST ATTACKS DID OCCUR ACROSS LEBANESE/ISRAELI BORDER.

-- AGREEMENT IS A FAIR ONE IN VIEW OF USG, GOL AND LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM (LEGISLATURE).

-- AGREEMENT PROVIDES GAINS FOR LEBANON INCLUDING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, RECOGNITION OF BORDER, NO INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE THIRD PARTY CLAUSE, RESTORATION OF CONTROL IN THE SOUTH, AND TIME LIMITED SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS.

-- SINCE NEGOTIATIONS ON TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY RARELY OCCUR WITH ARMIES ON THE BORDER RATHER THAN IN OCCUPATION, AGREEMENT IS RESULT OF USUAL, NOT EXTRAORDINARY,



02/02

~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 006328/02

CIRCUMSTANCES.

-- AGREEMENT DOES NOT PRECLUDE GOL CONCLUDING OTHER AGREEMENTS, SUCH AS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WITH SYRIA.

14. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

02/02

~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 006328/02



(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

XEEQVZCZCBLO315  
OO RUEHBL  
DE RUEHJM #2963 2291007  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 171005Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

LOC: DISK 01 763  
17 AUG 83 1009  
CN: 07661  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: EXDI

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 6263  
INFO RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1286  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0173  
BT

~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 02963

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED  
MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. STATEMENT DEALING WITH PERCEPTION  
OF PARTITION.

REF: JERUSALEM 2958

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS AND TEICHER MET WITH  
MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER  
YEHUDA BEN-MEIR AND MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI INTER-  
MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON LEBANON FOR TWO AND A HALF  
HOURS THIS MORNING TO REVIEW TEXT OF PROPOSED U.S.  
STATEMENT TRANSMITTED IN REFTEL. AS A RESULT OF  
THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE DEVELOPED A STATEMENT WHICH HOLDS  
PROMISE OF BEING SUSTAINED IN ISRAEL. WHILE WE MUST  
NOW REVIEW THIS STATEMENT WITH LEBANESE AUTHORITIES,  
IT IS MY EXPECTATION, SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON APPROVAL,  
THAT I WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL FRIDAY FOR A MEETING WITH  
THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THIS  
ISSUE. LATER THAT DAY, THE STATEMENT COULD BE  
DELIVERED BY THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN.

A. NEW PARA ONE: QUOTE: TWO WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT  
REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL  
GOALS IN LEBANON--THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL  
OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE  
SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT  
SOUTHERN LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF  
HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THESE GOALS ARE  
EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL  
AND LEBANON ON MAY 17. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED  
THAT US EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-008/1 #165  
BY CH NARA, DATE 4/19/06



~~SECRET~~

JERUSALEM 002963

GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST  
HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD  
FAIRBANKS. UNQUOTE.

B. IN PARA THREE, SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED  
TO READ: QUOTE: THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN  
THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17  
AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE.

C. NEW PARA SIX: QUOTE: WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT  
FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS  
CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN  
FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS  
TO CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWALS  
TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.  
UNQUOTE.

END OF REVISIONS.

..... CLUVERIUS

~~SECRET~~

JERUSALEM 002963



(6) ACTION ROSS INFO ~~AND DGM POL FM~~ CHRON

JOGVZCZCBL0343  
OO RUEHEL  
DE RUEHJI #6734 2291348  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 171347Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0224  
BT

LOC: DISK 01 881  
17 AUG 83 1348  
CN: 07685  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: EXDI

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06734

FOLLOWING FOR MCFARLANE:  
O 171247Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2250  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 3547  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 1991  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6240  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3206  
BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06724

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ACTING SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY  
BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, EYES ONLY  
FROM AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DEALING WITH THE  
PERCEPTION OF PARTITION

REF: JERUSALEM 2958 RPTD SECSTATE 232683

1. (~~X~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WHEN I WAS FINALLY ABLE REACH WADIA HADDAD HE WAS WITH BANDAR AT KING'S HOME IN JIDDA ABOUT TO GO INTO MEETING. WE WILL GET TOGETHER AS SOON AS POSSIBLE THEREAFTER. HE PLANS RETURN BEIRUT TONIGHT.
3. PLEASE ADVISE IF ANY GOI REACTION IS AS YET AVAILABLE WHICH COULD BE SHARED WITH HADDAD THIS AFTERNOON. MURPHY

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#166

BY LOS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02



VZCZCBLI \*  
 OO RUEHC RUEHTV RUEADWW  
 DE RUEHBL #9049/01 229 \*\*  
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
 O 171557Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2356  
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NICAT IMMEDIATE 0871  
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 BT  
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09049

CLASS: SECRET  
 CHRGE: PROG< 8/17/83  
 APPRV: RMCFARLANE  
 DRFTD: RMCFARLANE  
 CLEAR: NONE  
 DISTR: RMCFARLANE (5)  
 AMB

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY  
 TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS  
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 98-008/1 #167

as NARA, DATE 4/19/06

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF  
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FALLOUT OF ARENS  
 AUGUST 16 VISIT TO BEIRUT.

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. UPON RETURNING TO BEIRUT FROM TEL AVIV AT 1400 I WAS CONFRONTED AT THE RESIDENCE BY FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM WHO DESCRIBED WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION "THE GOVERNMENTAL CRISIS BROUGHT ON BY THE VISIT OF ISRAELI MOD ARENS TO BEIRUT AUGUST 16." IN A NUTSHELL PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WAS OUTRAGED BY THE EFFRONTERY OF AN ISRAELI CABINET OFFICER CONDUCTING A PUBLIC VISIT IN WHICH HE DEALT EXCLUSIVELY WITH OPPOSITION FIGURES, HELD A PRESS CONFERENCE AND GENERALLY DEMONSTRATED THE IMPOTENCE OF THE GOL. WAZZAN EXPRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT LAST EVENING HIS INTENTION TO RESIGN. AFTER LENGTHY SESSIONS DURING THE NIGHT WITH FM SALEM, BY 0830 THIS MORNING WAZZAN HAD AGREED TO WITHHOLD HIS RESIGNATION ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE REMAINS IN DOUBT. SALEM IS WITH HIM NOW AND WILL REPORT BACK LATER THIS AFTERNOON. SAEB SALAAM AND OTHER MOSLEM FIGURES ARE ALSO WORKING ON WAZZAN.

3. FROM OTHER REPORTING DEPARTMENT IS AWARE OF THE FRAGILE STATE OF THE GOL DUE TO ITS DELAY IN TACKLING THE DIFFICULT ISSUE OF RECONCILIATION AND ITS TEMPORIZING ON THE IMPENDING ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. AS OF LAST MONDAY NIGHT I BELIEVED THE EMBARRASSMENT OF LAST WEEK'S DEBACLE AT ABAYH AND KAFR MATA HAD SHAKEN PRESIDENT GEMAYEL INTO SOBER RECOGNITION OF THE NEED TO MOVE ON BOTH FRONTS. I STILL FEEL THAT WAY. INDEED HOWEVER UNNECESSARY THIS LATEST CRISIS IS, AS A CLEAR PRECEDENT FOR WHAT CAN HAPPEN AGAIN IT MAY EVEN INSPIRE A GREATER MEASURE OF ZEAL IN GEMAYEL'S EFFORTS.

4. NEVERTHELESS OUR TASK IN THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE WILL BE TO KEEP PRESIDENT GEMAYEL ON THE STRAIGHT



AND NARROW OF RECONCILIATION AS WELL AS TO TRY TO  
ENGENDER THOROUGH AND EFFECTIVE COORDINATION  
WITH ISRAEL ON THEIR REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHOUF.  
FOR US TO SUCCEED IN THESE EFFORTS WILL REQUIRE FAR  
GREATER RESTRAINT ON THE PART OF ISRAEL THAN WE HAVE  
SEEN TO DATE.

5. SAM LEWIS IN MY MEETINGS WITH GOI OFFICIALS  
IN THE PAST TWO DAYS DEMONSTRATED THAT THEIR OWN  
DOMESTIC CRISIS HAS MADE THEM MUCH MORE SENSITIVE  
TO VULNERABILITY ON THE FOREIGN FRONT. BEYOND  
THIS NORMAL POLITICAL REACTION HOWEVER THERE IS  
GROSS SELF-DELUSION IN ISRAEL ABOUT THE REALITY  
ABOUT WHAT THE TRAFFIC WILL BEAR HERE IN BEIRUT  
AND SPECIFICALLY ABOUT HOW ISRAELI INTERESTS WILL  
BE DAMAGED IF ISRAEL CONTINUES ON ITS PRESENT  
COURSE OF BULLYING LEBANON INTO SUBMISSION. IN MY  
JUDGMENT IT WOULD BE USEFUL FOR SAM TO VISIT WITH  
ISRAELI OFFICIALS TODAY TO GO OVER IN PRIVATE THE  
WAZZAN AFFAIR; MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS WAS THE VERY  
RISK WE DISCUSSED AS LIKELY IF THEY PERSISTED IN  
THEIR OBSTINACY; AND TO CALL FOR A MORE SOBER ISRAELI  
UNDERSTANDING OF THE CATASTROPHE THAT COULD OCCUR.  
SURELY IF ISRAEL DISTAINS THE WEAKNESS OF THE  
PRESENT LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, THEY CANNOT EXPECT  
THAT A CABINET CRISIS WILL MAKE IT ANY STRONGER.  
THEY ARE CLEARLY PLAYING WITH FIRE.

6. AS TO HOW TO PROCEED FROM HERE IT SEEMS TO ME THAT  
WE CAN BEST CONTRIBUTE TO CALMING INTRA-CABINET  
FEARS BY URGING DISCREETLY BUT FIRMLY THAT PRESIDENT  
GEMAYEL MOVE OUT MUCH MORE SMARTLY WITH VISIBLE  
EFFORTS TOWARD RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE AND  
PHALANGE COMMUNITIES. A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT TO  
PRESIDENT GEMAYEL PROPOSING THIS COURSE WOULD BE  
VERY USEFUL. THE LETTER SHOULD ALSO STRESS THAT HIS  
GOVERNMENT CAN ONLY ESTABLISH ITS BONA FIDES AND  
CREDIBILITY BY A SUCCESSFUL OPERATION IN THE SHOUF.  
THIS WILL REQUIRE THAT HE ESTABLISH EFFECTIVE  
CHANNELS OF COORDINATION WITH THE GOI. A DRAFT TEXT  
WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL.

BT

#9049

NNNN



7. PARALLEL TO THE GEMAYEL LETTER, I BELIEVE THAT IT MIGHT BE USEFUL TO INTERJECT THIS SAME SENSE OF REALISM IN THE GOI AT THE TOP WHILE STRESSING OUR OWN COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT AND THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL. IT SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT PRESERVING THESE GOALS RELIES FUNDAMENTALLY ON THE CONTINUITY OF A STABLE GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON. SURELY WE CAN PLEDGE OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS IN THIS REGARD BUT THESE EFFORTS MUST REPEAT MUST BE BUTTRESSED BY MORE SOBER RESPONSIBLE BEHAVIOR ON THE PART OF ISRAEL. A DRAFT TEXT WILL FOLLOW BY SEPTEL.

8. MY TENTATIVE THINKING IS THAT THE U.S. STATEMENT DESIGNED TO OVERCOME THE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION IS STILL WORTHWHILE (ALTHOUGH WE SHOULD SEEK ISRAELI QUOTATIONS OTHER THAN FROM ARENS AUGUST 16 STATEMENT) AND THAT TO UNDERSCORE THAT IT NOT BE UNDERCUT, THE PRESIDENTIAL LETTER BE DELIVERED IN A TENTATIVE MEETING WITH BEGIN NOW SCHEDULED FOR FRIDAY MORNING. PRESUMPTIVELY THE RELEASE OF THE STATEMENT WOULD FOLLOW THAT MEETING FROM THE CALIFORNIA WHITE HOUSE.

9. PLEASE CONSIDER THESE THOUGHTS. I EXPECT TO BE IN FURTHER TOUCH. WE ARE PRIVILEGED TO SERVE IN THESE EXCITING TIMES. DILLON



VZCZCBLI \*

OO RUEHJI RUEHTV RUEHJM

DE RUEHBL #9050 229 \*\*

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 171603Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0679

INFO RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0873

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0838

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09050

CLASS: SECRET  
CHRG: PROG: 8/17/83  
APPRV: RMC FARLANE  
DRFTD: HTEICHER  
CLEAR: NONE  
DISTR: RMC FARLANE (5)  
AMB

NODIS

JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY

TEL AVIV FOR AMBASSADOR LEWIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: IS, LE, XF, US, PREL

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED

MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. STATEMENT DEALING WITH

PERCEPTION OF PARTITION; MEETING WITH WADIA HADDAD

REF: JIDDA 6724

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN LIGHT OF SUBSEQUENT TALKS IN ISRAEL THIS MORNING

SOME MODIFICATIONS TO THE DRAFT HAVE BEEN MADE.

MCFARLANE NEEDS TO SEE WADIA HADDAD AS SOON AS HE RETURNS

BUT THE BASIC TEXT IS AS MURPHY RECEIVED IT.

DILLON

~~SECRET~~

BEIRUT 9050

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#168

BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/5/02



OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TELETYPE

~~SECRET~~  
PROG: 8/17/83  
RMCFARLANE  
HTEICHER  
RMCFARLANE  
RMCFARLANE (2), AMB,

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE  
INFO: WHITE HOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED  
MODIFICATIONS TO U.S. STATEMENT DEALING WITH PERCEPTION  
OF PARTITION.

REFTEL: JERUSALEM 2958

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS AND TEICHER MET WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS, DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER YEHUDA BEN-MEIR AND MEMBERS OF THE ISRAELI INTER-MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON LEBANON FOR TWO AND A HALF HOURS THIS MORNING TO REVIEW TEXT OF PROPOSED U.S. STATEMENT TRANSMITTED IN REFTEL. AS A RESULT OF THESE DISCUSSIONS, WE DEVELOPED A STATEMENT WHICH HOLDS PROMISE OF BEING SUSTAINED IN ISRAEL. WHILE WE MUST NOW REVIEW THIS STATEMENT WITH LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, IT IS MY EXPECTATION, SUBJECT TO WASHINGTON APPROVAL, THAT I WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL FRIDAY FOR A MEETING WITH THE PRIME MINISTER TO CONCLUDE DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE. LATER THAT DAY, THE STATEMENT COULD BE DELIVERED BY THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SPOKESMAN.

RCM  
HT *HT*  
RCM  
AMB SL

DECLASSIFIED  
NLS F98-008/1 #169  
BY AL NARA, DATE 4/19/06



~~SECRET~~

2

A. NEW PARA ONE: QUOTE: TWO WEEKS AGO PRESIDENT REAGAN REAFFIRMED HIS COMMITMENT TO THREE FUNDAMENTAL GOALS IN LEBANON--THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES; THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT ITS TERRITORY; AND THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON SHALL NOT AGAIN BECOME A SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL. THESE GOALS ARE EMBODIED IN THE AGREEMENT CONCLUDED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON ON MAY 17. THE PRESIDENT DIRECTED THAT US EFFORTS DEVOTED TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THESE GOALS BE RENEWED IN A MISSION TO THE MIDDLE EAST HEADED BY AMBASSADORS ROBERT MCFARLANE AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS. UNQUOTE.

-

~~SECRET~~



B. IN PARA THREE, SECOND SENTENCE SHOULD BE REVISED TO READ: QUOTE: THIS MOVE BY ISRAEL IS THE FIRST IN THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL ENVISAGED IN THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. UNQUOTE.

C. NEW PARA SIX: QUOTE: WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS WILL TAKE PLACE AS EFFORTS CONTINUE TO SECURE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES. THE UNITED STATES PLEDGES ITS BEST EFFORTS TO CREATING CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWALS TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. UNQUOTE.  
END OF REVISIONS.  
CLUVERIUS##



57893

(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHERON

MYQYVZCZCBL0402  
OO RUEHBL  
DE RUEHTV #1182/01 2291755  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
O 171748Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5594  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3319  
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3274  
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6694  
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9623  
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7928  
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADE IMMEDIATE 4298  
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3069  
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

LOC: DISK 02 165  
17 AUG 83 1804  
CN: 07743  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: ROSS

BT  
SECRET TEL AVIV 11182

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR ACTING SECRETARY; WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY; BEIRUT FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION; USUN FOR AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US, XF  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS IN ISRAEL AUGUST 16-17, 1983

REFS: A. JERUSALEM 2963 (NOTAL); B. JERUSALEM 2958 (NOTAL)

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS AND TEICHER HELD THREE EXTENDED SESSIONS WITH ISRAELI TEAM HEADED BY KIMCHE AND AN HOUR MEETING WITH MINDEF ARENS AUGUST 16-17, CONTINUING EFFORTS TO PERSUADE ISRAEL TO AGREE TO MAKE A PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH WOULD HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT BY DISPELLING POPULAR LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION AS A RESULT OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. AFTER NEARLY FIVE HOURS OF UNSUCCESSFUL WRANGLING WITH THE ISRAELI TEAM OVER THE TEXT OF A PROPOSED STATEMENT TO BE ISSUED BY THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT, MCFARLANE AGREED TO TRY DRAFTING INSTEAD A STATEMENT FOR ISSUANCE BY THE U.S. INCORPORATING THE ELEMENTS NECESSARY TO BOLSTER GEMAYEL (REF B). THE ISRAELIS OBJECTED TO PORTIONS OF THE U.S. DRAFT STATEMENT, IN PARTICULAR, THE LACK OF REFERENCE TO THE NEED FOR THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT TO BE IMPLEMENTED AND THE FAILURE OF THE U.S. DRAFT TO LINK FURTHER ISRAELI WITDRAWALS TO THE CREATION OF SUITABLE CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND, I.E., AN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO LEBANESE CAPABILITY OF SECURING THE AREA FROM WHICH ISRAEL EVACUATES. MCFARLANE THEN UNDERTOOK

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-099/3 #57893

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10



TO REDRAFT THREE PORTIONS OF THE U.S. STATEMENT (REF A) AND ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO PREPARE A DRAFT RESPONSE WHICH THE GOI WOULD MAKE FOLLOWING THE U.S. STATEMENT. MCFARLANE WILL RETURN TO ISRAEL FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, FOR MEETINGS WITH BEGIN, SHAMIR AND ARENS, AFTER CONSULTING WITH THE LEBANESE AND WITH WASHINGTON ABOUT THE DRAFT. HE HOPES TO SECURE ISRAELI AGREEMENT THEN ON THE PACKAGE OF STATEMENTS TO BE ISSUED. END SUMMARY.

3. DURING AUGUST 16-17 VISIT TO ISRAEL, MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND TEICHER HELD EXTENDED DISCUSSIONS WITH KIMCHE AND AIDES AND A ONE-HOUR MEETING WITH MINDEF ARENS IN AN ATTEMPT TO NAIL DOWN ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO AN ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENT ON A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. IN THE FIRST AUGUST 16 MEETING, KIMCHE SURPRISED MCFARLANE WITH THE NEWS THAT ARENS WAS IN BEIRUT AND HAD JUST ISSUED A STATEMENT THERE STRESSING ISRAEL'S INTENTION TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON (FBIS NC 160948). KIMCHE EXPLAINED THAT ARENS' STATEMENT WAS NOT DESIGNED TO REPLACE THE STATEMENT PROPOSED BY MCFARLANE AND THAT ISRAEL REMAINED PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED U.S. DRAFT. THE ENSUING DISCUSSION, WHICH LASTED FOR NEARLY FIVE HOURS IN TWO SEPARATE SESSIONS, COVERED FAMILIAR GROUND. KIMCHE AND HIS ASSOCIATES ARGUED THE NEED FOR INCLUSION OF A SPECIFIC TIMETABLE FOR A PHASED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. KIMCHE AND OTHERS SAID THAT SUCH A TIMETABLE COULD HARDEN SYRIA'S POSITION, IN THAT THE SYRIANS WOULD SEE THE STATEMENT AS CONFIRMING THEIR POLICY OF STANDING FAST. ISRAELIS ALSO NOTED THAT THEY ARE UNSURE, IN FACT QUITE SKEPTICAL, OF THE LEBANESE ARMY'S CAPABILITIES OF ENSURING SECURITY IN THE AREAS FROM WHICH ISRAEL EVACUATES; AND THAT FUTURE ISRAELI DECISIONS TO WITHDRAW FURTHER SOUTH FROM THE AWALI WOULD DEPEND PRIMARILY ON LEBANON'S DEMONSTRATED CAPABILITIES OF ENSURING SECURITY. RUBINSTEIN AND OTHERS ALSO EVINced CONSIDERABLE DISTRUST WITH REGARD TO LEBANESE INTENTIONS, ARGUING THAT IF ISRAEL WERE TO AGREE TO A GENERAL STATEMENT WITH IMPLICIT UNDERSTANDINGS NOT SPELLED OUT, OVER TIME THE LEBANESE WOULD DEMAND FURTHER CHANGES IN ISRAEL'S POSITION



REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE UNSTATED CONDITIONS HAD BEEN MET OR NOT.

4. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT, WHILE THE U.S. AND GEMAYEL DO NOT DOUBT ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PERCEIVES A POPULAR FEELING WHICH EQUATES ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT WITH THE FINAL PARTITION OF LEBANON. THIS EXERCISE OF DRAFTING A STATEMENT OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS AND A PHASED WITHDRAWAL PROCESS IS DESIGNED TO DISPEL THIS PERCEPTION IN LEBANON AND TO BOLSTER GEMAYEL'S HAND. MCFARLANE SAID THAT, AS A RESULT OF AN ISRAELI STATEMENT, GEMAYEL WOULD FEEL SECURE ENOUGH TO AGREE PUBLICLY TO MILITARY AND POLITICAL COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON REDEPLOYMENT PROBLEMS, SOMETHING WHICH BOTH SIDES RECOGNIZE AS VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF REDEPLOYMENT AND TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO EXTEND ITS AUTHORITY IN THE SHOUF. MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT MANY OF ISRAEL'S CONCERNS ABOUT THE AGREEMENT AND ABOUT SECURITY REQUIREMENTS ARE VALID; HOWEVER, HE ARGUED THAT THIS PARTICULAR EXERCISE IS NOT THE PROPER PLACE FOR MEETING ISRAEL'S CONCERNS.

5. THE ISRAELIS COUNTER-ARGUED THAT THE CONTINUED NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, COUPLED WITH THE DEMAND THAT ISRAEL AGREE TO A STATEMENT WHICH MAKES NO REFERENCE TO THE AGREEMENT'S IMPLEMENTATION, HAS ALREADY WEAKENED THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE AND BAR-ON SAID THAT THE COROLLARY TO LEBANESE FEARS OF PARTITION IS THE ISRAELI SUSPICION THAT LEBANON IS TRYING TO SHELVE THE AGREEMENT IRRESPECTIVE OF ISRAELI ACTIONS, OR IMPLEMENT ONLY THOSE PARTS OF THE AGREEMENT WHICH ARE GOOD FOR LEBANON. THE ISRAELIS SAID THAT THEY CANNOT PUBLICLY ENDORSE LEBANON'S IMPLICIT NON-IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. KIMCHE FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE IDF HAS NOT YET DECIDED WHETHER, FROM A STRICTLY MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS ARE NECESSARY AND DESIRABLE. THUS, HE SAID, IT IS NOT AXIOMATIC THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN AGREE TO WITHDRAW FROM THE WESTERN SECTOR WHILE LEAVING THEIR FORCES IN PLACE IN THE BEKA'A.

6. MCFARLANE REEMPHASIZED THE U.S. AND LEBANESE COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT, NOTING THAT THE MORE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM FACING US IS THE WEAKNESS OF THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. WE ARE PERSUADED THAT THIS PROBLEM NEEDS TO BE DEALT WITH BEFORE FURTHER DISCUSSIONS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT. MCFARLANE ALSO CITED ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENTS, SUCH AS THOSE MADE BY MINDEF ARENS IN WASHINGTON, TO THE EFFECT THAT ISRAEL IS ALREADY THINKING ABOUT WITHDRAWING TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER AT LEAST IN THE WESTERN SECTOR. HE SAID WE



RECOGNIZE THAT THE MILITARY VIABILITY OF LONGER-TERM MILITARY PRESENCE IN THE BEKA'A AND ITS EFFECT IN PRESSURING SYRIA TO WITHDRAW ARE QUESTIONS WHICH REMAIN TO BE DISCUSSED.

7. FOLLOWING PROTRACTED AND UNPRODUCTIVE DISCUSSION ON THESE POINTS, MCFARLANE FINALLY AGREED WITH KIMCHE'S SUGGESTION THAT, IN PLACE OF AN ISRAELI STATEMENT, THE U.S. MIGHT ISSUE ITS OWN STATEMENT WHICH WOULD EXPRESS OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON. IN THE AUGUST 17 MEETINGS WITH ARENS AND KIMCHE, MCFARLANE REVIEWED WITH THEM A DRAFT U.S. STATEMENT INTENDED TO BE ISSUED BY THE WHITE HOUSE (REF B). ARENS, BEN-MEIR AND OTHERS IMMEDIATELY HIGHLIGHTED SEVERAL PROBLEMS OF CONCERN TO THE GOI: FIRST, THEY ARGUED THAT THE LANGUAGE IN THE FIRST PARAGRAPH ON U.S. OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON WAS DIFFERENT FROM AND WEAKER THAN THAT OF PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS; SECOND, THAT THE U.S. DRAFT OMITTED REFERENCES TO THE NEED FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE NEED FOR SIMULTANEOUS ISRAELI, SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL; AND THAT



THE LANGUAGE ON FURTHER ISRAELI WITHDRAWALS OMITTED EVEN IMPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE CONDITIONS ON THE GROUND WHICH WOULD BE NECESSARY FOR ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FURTHER, THAT IS, LEBANESE CAPABILITIES TO SECURE AREAS FROM WHICH ISRAEL WITHDRAWS. MCFARLANE ACCEPTED THE FIRST ISRAELI POINT AND SAID THAT THE U.S. DRAFT WOULD BE BROUGHT INTO CONFORMITY WITH PREVIOUS PUBLIC STATEMENTS OF THE U.S. POSITIONS. HE ALSO UNDERTOOK TO INCLUDE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT; AND HE SUGGESTED A NEW CLAUSE IN THE WITHDRAWAL PARAGRAPH IN WHICH THE U.S. WOULD PLEDGE "ITS BEST EFFORTS TO CREATE CONDITIONS WHICH WILL ALLOW THE WITHDRAWAL TO TAKE PLACE AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT" (REF A). MCFARLANE ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO DRAFT WHAT THE GOI WOULD SAY IN ANY RESPONSE THEY MADE STRESSING THAT THEY SHOULD BE CAREFUL TO ACCEPT WHAT WE HAVE SAID WITHOUT UNDERMINING THE PURPOSE TO WHICH IT IS DIRECTED. HE SAID HE WOULD RETURN TO ISRAEL ON FRIDAY, AUGUST 19, AT WHICH TIME, HE WOULD MEET BEGIN, SHAMIR AND ARENS TO TRY TO REACH A FINAL UNDERSTANDING ON THE U.S. AND ISRAELI STATEMENTS, AS WELL AS TO INFORM THE ISRAELIS OF THE LEBANESE RESPONSE WHICH WILL INCLUDE PUBLIC COORDINATION ON MILITARY AND POLITICAL ISSUES INVOLVED IN REDEPLOYMENT. HE CAUTIONED KIMCHE THAT HE HAD TO CONSULT WITH THE LEBANESE AND WITH WASHINGTON ABOUT OUR DRAFT STATEMENT AND THAT IT COULD UNDERGO FURTHER CHANGES IN LIGHT OF THOSE DISCUSSIONS.

8. DURING THE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, SEVERAL OTHER RELATED ISSUES WERE DISCUSSED:

A. MCFARLANE REPORTED THAT THE LEBANESE NOW RECOGNIZE AND ARE COMMITTED TO THE NEED FOR RECONCILIATION WITH THE DRUZE BEFORE THE LAF MOVES INTO THE SHOUF. KIMCHE AND LUBRANI WELCOMED THIS, BUT SAID THAT IT IS IMPERATIVE THAT THE U.S. AND ISRAEL PREPARE THE LEBANESE AND DRUZE FOR THEIR UPCOMING DIALOGUE. MCFARLANE SAID THAT GEMAYEL RECOGNIZES THE NEED TO COME TO GRIPS WITH DRUZE DEMANDS FOR SECURITY, REPRESENTATION IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND SOME DEGREE OF AUTONOMY IN THE SHOUF. GEMAYEL REALISTICALLY EXPECTS JUMBLATT TO MAKE MORE EXTREME DEMANDS, BUT HE IS PREPARED TO TALK. LUBRANI REEMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR PRELIMINARY MOVES TO STRUCTURE THE GEMAYEL/JUMBLATT DIALOGUE. JUMBLATT, HE SAID, WILL "PLAY AROUND" IF THERE ARE "TOO MANY COOKS" (I.E. INVOLVEMENT BY THE SAUDIS AND OTHERS). MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT GEMAYEL HAD INVITED JUMBLATT TO BEIRUT BUT THAT JUMBLATT HAD



DEMANDED AS A PRE-CONDITION THAT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT BE RENEGOTIATED. GEMAYEL HAD TURNED DOWN THIS DEMAND AND IS NOW WAITING FOR JUMBLATT'S REPLY.

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B. MCFARLANE REPORTED THAT SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM HAD INVITED FAIRBANKS TO COME TO DAMASCUS TO REVIEW THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THIS WOULD PRESENT US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO REEMPHASIZE OUR COMMITMENT TO THE AGREEMENT AND TO TRY TO REMOVE ARTIFICIAL SYRIAN PUBLIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE AGREEMENT.

C. MCFARLANE ALSO SAID THAT THE LEBANESE NOW RECOGNIZE MORE CLEARLY THE IMPERATIVE OF CLOSE COOPERATION WITH ISRAEL ON REDEPLOYMENT. IN THIS CONTEXT MCFARLANE ARGUED AGAIN THAT GEMAYEL NEEDS A POLITICAL FIG LEAF TO PERMIT HIM TO AGREE PUBLICLY TO FURTHER POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION WITH ISRAEL.

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9. FOLLOWING MCFARLANE'S DEPARTURE FROM ISRAEL AUGUST 17, RUBINSTEIN CALLED EMBASSY TO URGE THE INCLUSION IN THE U.S. DRAFT OF



STRONG LANGUAGE ON THE NEED TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT AND ON SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL. RUBINSTEIN ALSO ADDED, AS A PERSONAL COMMENT, THAT THE MORE CLOSELY HE READS THE U.S. DRAFT STATEMENT, THE MORE PROBLEMS HE DISCOVERS IN IT. HE SAID THAT, WHILE HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR SHAMIR AND THE POLITICAL LEVEL, HE BELIEVES THAT WE FACE ROUGH SAILING BEFORE THE GOI CAN CONCUR EVEN WITH THE MODIFIED LANGUAGE IN THE U.S. STATEMENT.

10. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE DEPARTED BEFORE SEEING THIS MESSAGE AND MAY WISH TO COMMENT.

11. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

BT

#1182

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(08) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

NZCYVZCZCBLO417  
OO RUEHBL  
DE RUEHDM #6325 2292050  
ZNY SSSSS ZZH  
O 172043Z AUG 83  
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

LOC: DISK 02 240  
17 AUG 83 2056  
CN: 07758  
CHRG: PROG  
DIST: ROSS

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3279  
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE  
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0755  
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8324  
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5687  
BT  
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 06325

FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS

DEPARTMENT FOR D, NEA AND L FROM ROBINSON

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: IS, LE, SY, PEPR  
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: LEGAL REVIEW OF  
THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WITH THE SYRIANS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: LEGAL ADVISER ROBINSON HAD SEVEN HOURS OF  
TALKS AUGUST 17 WITH SYRIAN TEAM REVIEWING SYRIAN  
OBJECTIONS TO THE ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT. SYRIANS  
RAISED EVERY PAST OBJECTION TO THE AGREEMENT AND SEVERAL  
NEW ONES. ROBINSON HAS BEGUN EXPLAINING THE U.S.  
POSITION WITH RESPECT TO EACH SYRIAN OBJECTION, A PROCESS  
WHICH WILL UNDOUBTEDLY REQUIRE SEVERAL MORE LENGTHY  
SESSIONS. END SUMMARY.

3. AS INDICATED SEPTTEL, AMB. FAIRBANKS AND SYRIAN FONMIN  
KHADDAM MET AUGUST 17 TO INITIATE A REVIEW OF THE MAY 17  
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. AFTER AN HOUR  
EXCHANGE ON SOME OF SYRIA'S MORE GENERAL OBJECTIONS TO  
THE AGREEMENT (E.G., AGREEMENT WAS COERCED AND VIOLATES  
LEBANON'S SOVEREIGNTY), KHADDAM AND FAIRBANKS AGREED TO  
ESTABLISH A WORKING GROUP TO REVIEW IN DETAIL THE SYRIAN  
OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT.

4. WORKING GROUP MET IN TWO SESSIONS FOR A TOTAL OF SEVEN  
HOURS FOLLOWING THE FAIRBANKS/KHADDAM MEETING. U.S. TEAM  
CONSISTED OF LEGAL ADVISOR ROBINSON, KRECZKO (L/NEA) AND  
EMBOFF WILLIS. SYRIAN TEAM IS LED BY MFA DIRECTOR OF  
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS DEPARTMENT HAYTHAM KAYLANI  
AND INCLUDES THE DIRECTORS OF THE DEPARTMENTS FOR ARAB  
HOMELAND (HATIM), INFORMATION (SABAGH), AND AMERICA  
(GLAIEL), AND AN INTERPRETER (ABU-FARIS). IT APPEARS  
THAT NONE OF THE SYRIAN MEMBERS HAS A LAW DEGREE.

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101 NARA, DATE 4/5/02  
BY



5. AFTER BEING STUCK IN ELEVATOR WITH SYRIAN HOSTS FOR TEN MINUTES, ROBINSON BEGAN THE SESSION BY SUPPLEMENTING FAIRBANKS' REBUTTAL TO THE SYRIAN POSITION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW BECAUSE IT WAS COERCED BY AN ILLEGAL USE OF FORCE. KAYLANI RESPONDED WITH A THREE HOUR NONSTOP AND RELATIVELY UNSTRUCTURED PRESENTATION OF SYRIA'S "PRINCIPLED" AND "SPECIFIC" OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT. IT WAS A "KITCHEN-SINK" PERFORMANCE, WITH KAYLANI RAISING EVERY ARGUMENT WHICH WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY HEARD FROM THE SYRIANS AND A FEW NEW ONES.

6. IT WAS THEN AGREED THAT THE GROUP WOULD REVIEW ONE BY ONE EACH OF THE POINTS WHICH KAYLANI MADE. KAYLANI SAID HIS TEAM WAS PREPARED TO SPEND AS MUCH TIME AS REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS REVIEW. ALTHOUGH EACH SIDE RECOGNIZED IT WAS UNLIKELY THE REVIEW WOULD PRODUCE ANY SIGNIFICANT SHIFTS IN POSITION, IT WAS AGREED THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT THAT EACH UNDERSTAND IN DETAIL THE RATIONALE FOR THE POSITIONS OF THE OTHER AND CLEAR UP CERTAIN MISIMPRESSIONS.

7. EVENING SESSION CONCLUDED AT 9:00 P.M. AFTER ROBINSON BEGAN AN EXCHANGE ON THE SYRIAN VIEWS. HIS SUPPORT FOR THE U.S. VIEW WAS DEVOTED PRIMARILY TO GENERAL SYRIAN ARGUMENTS THAT THE AGREEMENT IS INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS COERCED, BECAUSE IT WAS CONCLUDED WITH AN UNREPRESENTATIVE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND BECAUSE IT VIOLATED SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 508 AND 509. WE ALSO REBUTTED THE SYRIAN ARGUMENT THAT THE AGREEMENT CONSTITUTES A PEACE TREATY. AS EXPECTED, SYRIANS HELD THEIR GROUND ON EACH POINT, AS DID WE.

8. MEETINGS WILL RESUME AT 9:00 A.M. AUGUST 18 AND CONTINUE ON AUGUST 20, IF NECESSARY (AS NOW APPEARS LIKELY). WE WILL PROVIDE A SUBSTANTIVE REPORT ON THE EXCHANGES FOLLOWING AUGUST 18 SESSION.

9. COMMENT: SYRIAN INTERLOCUTORS WERE COURTEOUS THROUGHOUT. THEY APPEARED ESPECIALLY UNCOMFORTABLE AT THE CONCEPTUAL COMPARISONS WE DREW TO THE 1974 SYRIA-ISRAEL DISENGAGEMENT. END COMMENT.

10. DEPARTMENT REPEAT AS DESIRED. PAGANELLI  
BT  
#6325

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 OO RUEHC RUEADWW  
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 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK  
 O 172208Z AUG 83 ZFF4  
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2368  
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
 BT  
~~S E C R E T~~ BEIRUT 09054

CLASS: SECRET  
 CHRG: PROG: 8/17/83  
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE  
 DRFTD: RMC FARLANE/RFAIRBA  
 S  
 CLEAR: NONE  
 DISTR: MCFARLANE (5)  
 AMB.

NODIS/SIERRA

DEPARTMENT FOR THE ACTING SECRETARY, EYES ONLY  
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US, XF  
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: PROPOSED DRAFT  
 - PRESIDENTIAL LETTERS TO BEGIN AND GEMAYEL

REF: BEIRUT 9049

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AS DISCUSSED REFTEL, FOLLOWING ARE DRAFT LETTERS FROM  
 THE PRESIDENT TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND PRIME MINISTER  
 BEGIN. TIME IS URGENT ON BOTH COUNTS. WOULD APPRECIATE  
 FINAL TEXTS IN MY HANDS SOONEST.

3. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER BEGIN: BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRIME MINISTER:

THREE WEEKS AGO I DISPATCHED AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE  
 AND FAIRBANKS TO THE MIDDLE EAST TO COOPERATE WITH YOU,  
 PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, AND THE LEADERS OF OTHER  
 INTERESTED GOVERNMENTS IN A DETERMINED EFFORT TO  
 ACHIEVE OUR COMMON GOALS IN LEBANON. THESE GOALS  
 REMAIN THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES,  
 THE RESTORATION OF THE SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE  
 OF LEBANON, AND THE GUARANTEE THAT SOUTHERN LEBANON  
 WILL NOT AGAIN BECOME THE SOURCE OF HOSTILE ACTIONS  
 AGAINST ISRAEL. THESE OBJECTIVES ARE EMBODIED IN THE  
 MAY 17 AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON, TO WHICH  
 THE U.S. REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED. IN THIS CONTEXT,  
 IT IS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT OF THE  
 ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES OUT OF THE ALAYH AND SHUF  
 DISTRICTS WILL REPRESENT THE FIRST PHASE IN A PROCESS  
 OF CONTINUING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON AND THE  
 BEGINNING OF THE EXTENSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT  
 AUTHORITY OUTSIDE OF THE BEIRUT AREA.

AS I AM SURE YOU AGREE, IT IS IMPERATIVE TO ACCOMPLISH  
 OUR MUTUAL GOALS IN LEBANON THAT ALL STEPS BE TAKEN  
 TO HELP STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL

DECLASSIFIED  
 NLS 98-008/1 #172  
 NARA, DATE 4/19/02



GOVERNMENT SO THAT IT MAY EXTEND IN A PEACEFUL MANNER ITS CONTROL IN AREAS EVACUATED BY FOREIGN FORCES. IT WAS THIS GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH YOU CONCLUDED THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 17, AND OUR HOPES TO IMPLEMENT THAT AGREEMENT ARE THEREFORE ALSO TIED TO ITS CONTINUING IN POWER. IT IS THUS WITH DISMAY THAT I LEARNED OF THE ACTIVITIES OF MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS ON AUGUST 16, WHEN HE AFFRONTED THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON BY TRAVELLING TO BEIRUT AND MEETING WITH FACTIONAL AND MILITIA LEADERS -- SOME OF WHOM ACT IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO THE INTERESTS OF OUR MUTUAL GOALS -- AND SO REINFORCED THE FEARS OF PARTITION WHICH ARE SPREADING AND UNDERMINING THE VERY GOVERNMENT WHICH WE BOTH SEEK TO STRENGTHEN. I HOPE THAT YOU WILL FIND THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE A POSITIVE EXPRESSION OF YOUR SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AS IT FACES ITS PRESENT POLITICAL CRISIS, SPECIFICALLY BY REAFFIRMING ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO CONTINUE THE PROCESS OF WITHDRAWAL THAT WILL BEGIN WITH YOUR MOVE TO THE AWWALI RIVER, WHILE WE WORK TOGETHER TO ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF PLO AND SYRIAN FORCES NECESSARY FOR THE AGREEMENT TO COME FULLY INTO FORCE.

THE SUCCESS OF OUR POLICY IN LEBANON CLEARLY REQUIRES COOPERATION BY ALL THE PARTIES. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO ENSURE THAT THE DEGREE OF LEBANESE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION NEEDED TO ACHIEVE OUR GOALS WILL TAKE PLACE. THEIR EFFORTS WILL CONTINUE, BUT I BELIEVE THEY MUST BE MATCHED BY COORDINATION AND PARALLEL COOPERATION, AND NOT UNILATERAL ACTION, BY YOUR GOVERNMENT AS WELL AS BY THE LEBANESE.

SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN.  
END TEXT.

4. PROPOSED LETTER TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. BEGIN TEXT:

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: AS YOU KNOW, THE UNITED STATES IS FIRMLY COMMITTED TO THE RESTORATION OF YOUR GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY AND SOVEREIGNTY THROUGHOUT LEBANON, AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF YOUR SHATTERED ECONOMY. TO ENABLE



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THIS PROCESS TO GO FORWARD WE ARE WORKING TO ACHIEVE THE TIMELY WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON.

I AM CONCERNED THAT THE PROMISE OF YOUR ELECTION AS PRESIDENT OF LEBANON AND THE BROADLY BASED SUPPORT SO EVIDENT ON THAT OCCASION APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DILUTED BY TIME. SURELY SOME OF THE CRITICISM AND OPPOSITION THAT YOU FACE ARE THE INEVITABLE RESULT OF THE COURAGEOUS STEPS YOU HAVE TAKEN WITH US TOWARD THE ATTAINMENT OF OUR COMMON OBJECTIVES. MOREOVER, I RECOGNIZE THAT THERE ARE OTHER PARTIES WHO WOULD HAVE US FAIL AND ARE THEREFORE ACTIVELY UNDERMINING YOUR GOVERNMENT.

I UNDERSTAND FULL WELL THE VERY REAL FEARS OF PARTITION AMONG YOUR PEOPLE ENGENDERED BY THE IMMINENT REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALAYH AND THE SHUF. BUT AFTER EXTENSIVE DIALOGUE WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL, I AM CONFIDENT THAT THIS IS BUT THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS WHICH WILL CULMINATE IN THE TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES. IN THAT CONTEXT I BELIEVE THAT IT OFFERS AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THE IMPARTIALITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF YOUR LEADERSHIP. AS YOU ARE AWARE, WE ARE AT THE POINT OF AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL ON A PUBLIC PRESENTATION WHICH WILL PORTRAY THIS PROCESS IN A MANNER WHICH IS BOTH CREDIBLE AND HELPFUL AND IN THE CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT SO EVIDENT IN THE AGREEMENT OF MAY 17. LIKE YOU, I AM AFFRONTED BY THE APPARENT INSENSITIVITY OF THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL AS DEMONSTRATED DURING A RECENT VISIT BY A RANKING ISRAELI OFFICIAL.

I MUST ALSO EMPHASIZE THAT I AM CONCERNED ABOUT YOUR GOVERNMENT'S PREPARATIONS FOR THIS FORTHCOMING REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES. I AM PERSUADED THAT THERE IS A GREAT DEAL YOUR GOVERNMENT CAN DO ITSELF TO CORRECT THE FALSE IMPRESSIONS THAT THIS STEP WILL LEAD TO A PARTITION. IN THE REGARD, I WOULD ENCOURAGE YOU TO DEMONSTRATE YOUR COMMITMENT TO NATIONAL RECONCILIATION BY REACHING A PROMPT ACCOMMODATION WITH THE PARTIES IN CONFLICT IN THE ALAYH AND THE SHUF.

I CANNOT STRESS ENOUGH THE IMPORTANCE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT PLACES IN THE FIRMNESS OF YOUR LEADERSHIP. TO THIS END, I HAVE ASKED AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS TO REDOUBLE THEIR EFFORTS, WORKING WITH YOU AND MEMBERS OF YOUR ADMINISTRATION TO ASSIST IN THIS PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION IN WHATEVER WAY YOU FIND HELPFUL. I HAVE ALSO ASKED THEM TO ASSIST YOU IN FACILITATING THE IMPORTANT AND URGENT PROCESS OF COORDINATING WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL THE REDEPLOYMENT AND THE MOVEMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES INTO THE AREAS VACATED.

I LOOK FORWARD TO CONTINUING TO WORK CLOSELY WITH YOU IN THESE CRITICAL ENDEAVORS SO IMPORTANT TO THE FUTURE OF LEBANON. SINCERELY, RONALD REAGAN. END TEXT.  
DILLON  
BT



VZCZCBLI \*

OO RUEHC RUEHJM RUEHTV RUEADWW RUEHJI

DE RUEHBL #9055/01 229 \*\*

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 172221Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2370

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM NIACT IMMEDIATE 0839

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE 0874

INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0680

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 09055

CLASS: SECRET  
CHRG: PROG 8/17/83  
APPRV: RMCFARLANE  
DRFTD: CWSROSS  
CLEAR: NONE  
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4  
AMB  
DCM

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY  
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

*4th mtg*

E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS:PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: TRIPARTITE  
- MEETING, AUGUST 17

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. TO REINFORCE OUR SIGNAL OF PROFOUND DISPLEASURE AT THE CONTINUING LACK OF PROGRESS ON AN ISRAELI STATEMENT ON WITHDRAWALS, ON LEBANESE WILLINGNESS TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS MILITARY COORDINATION ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF, AND ON LEBANESE PROCRASTINATION REGARDING A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION -- AND TO REGISTER OUR DEEP UNHAPPINESS AT THE MANNER IN WHICH DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS VISITED LEBANON AUGUST 16 -- AMB. MCFARLANE BEGAN AND ENDED THE AUGUST 17 LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING (ATTENDED BY QASSIS AND A NOTETAKER FOR LEBANON, RIMCHE, MERHAV, AND LEOR FOR ISRAEL, AND MCFARLANE AND ROSS FOR THE U.S.) WITH A STRONG STATEMENT DEMANDING "A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE" ON THE PART OF BOTH THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS.

3. MCFARLANE, TAKING THE FLOOR IMMEDIATELY AS THE MEETING BEGAN, STATED HE WAS "NOT IN A DIPLOMATIC MOOD." HE HAD RETURNED TO LEBANON AUGUST 17 AND FOUND FOREIGN MINISTER SALEM WAITING TO TALK TO HIM ABOUT HIS PROBLEM OF THE LAST 24 HOURS -- THE RESIGNATION TENDERED BY PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN. WAZZAN HAD TAKEN THE VISIT OF ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS TO LEBANON AUGUST 16 AS AN EMBARRASSMENT TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THAT AN ISRAELI CABINET OFFICER COULD VISIT LEBANON, BE RECEIVED WITH A FULL MILITARY REVIEW BY A MILITIA IN OPPOSITION, AND HAVE THE "EFFRONTERY" TO HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN A MANNER DESIGNED TO SHOW THE IMPOTENCE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS OUTRAGEOUS, AT LEAST IN WAZZAN'S EYES. THIS HAD LED HIM TO TENDER HIS RESIGNATION LAST NIGHT, AUGUST 16, AND -- ALTHOUGH THE ISSUE APPEARED TO BE ON

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THE WAY TO RESOLUTION -- THE ISSUE STILL REMAINED IN DOUBT.

4. MCFARLANE STATED HE THOUGHT WAZZAN WAS RIGHT. WHILE IT WAS WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE HOW TO BEHAVE, SUCH ACTIONS WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE NATURE OF THE RELATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE U.S., AND WE WOULD HAVE MORE TO SAY ON THIS IN OTHER FORA. IF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WANTED TO DO BUSINESS IN THIS WAY, SO BE IT, BUT WHERE WAS THE ISRAELI-U.S. COORDINATION THAT WAS NECESSARY? MCFARLANE DECLARED HIMSELF TIRED OF BEING CONFRONTED BY FAITS ACCOMPLIS. "IF THE GOVERNMENTS OF ISRAEL AND LEBANON WANT TO RETIAN THE GOOD OFFICES OF THE U.S. IN THIS SITUATION, IT HAD BETTER GOD DAMNED WELL NOT HAPPEN AGAIN."

5. ADOPTING A QUIETER TONE, MCFARLANE TURNED TO COL. QASSIS TO DISCUSS GOL PERFORMANCE IN PREPARING FOR THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. THERE WAS GOING TO BE REDEPLOYMENT, HE SAID, AND THIS PRESENTED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO SHOW THAT IT COULD REACH COMPROMISES REPRESENTING MORE THAN THE INTERESTS OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT HE SAW NO REAL EFFORT IN THIS DIRECTION WITH THE DRUZE LEADERSHIP. IT WAS ALSO ABOUT TIME FOR LEBANON TO DO SOME SERIOUS COORDINATING WITH ISRAEL. MCFARLANE HAD TRIED TO BE SENSITIVE TO LEBANESE CONCERNS, BUT TIME WAS FLEETING. BEGINNING TOMORROW (AUGUST 18), THERE MUST BE MILITARY COORDINATION FROM THE TOP COMMAND LEVEL ON DOWN. IN ADDITION, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT MUST GET SERIOUS ABOUT POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION AND SHOW THE DRUZE THAT THEY NEED NOT FEAR ATTACKS FROM THE "LEBANESE FORCES." THIS MEANT COMING TO TERMS WITH PIERRE GEMAYEL AND HIS FORCES, AND WE DID NOT SEE THAT HAPPENING. MCFARLANE WOULD BE TALKING ABOUT THIS TO OTHERS LATER.

6. MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT INVOLVED IN THE LEBANESE CRISIS OUT OF SOME ALTRUISTIC SENTIMENTALITY. IT HAD ABIDING INTERESTS IN THE AREA. ITS COMMITMENT TO ISRAEL WAS ETERNAL. ITS COMMITMENT TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WAS FIRM. BUT ACTION WAS NEEDED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND ON MILITARY COORDINATION. LIKewise, ISRAEL NEEDED



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TO RECOGNIZE CLEARLY THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS VERY FRAGILE. NO ONE AT THE MINISTERIAL LEVEL IN ISRAEL SEEMED TO RECOGNIZE THIS. THE U.S. GOVERNMENT WAS REVIEWING THE SITUATION, AND PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD BE SENDING MESSAGES TO BEGIN AND GEMAYEL. EVERYTHING THAT WE HAD SEEN IN THE LAST FEW DAYS WAS IN THE REALM OF POLITICAL DEMAGOGUERY, AND WE EXPECTED RESULTS BY TOMORROW. IN SHORT, "THERE HAD BETTER BE A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE."

7. MCFARLANE THEN GOT UP AND WALKED OUT, CUTTING SHORT AN ATTEMPT BY KIMCHE TO RESPOND. DILLON

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AMERICANS IN THE SHELLING OF FORCE POSITIONS NEAR BEIRUT AIRPORT. HE SAID GENAYEL HAD MADE NO REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INCREMENTS TO THE FORCE.

THE LEADERS ALSO DISCUSSED ISRAELI PLANS TO REDEPLOY THEIR FORCES FROM THE CHOUF AREA NEAR BEIRUT TO SAFER POSITIONS TO THE SOUTH. THE OFFICIAL SAID THE UNITED STATES WOULD BE HELPFUL TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN REACHING ACCOMMODATION WITH FACTIONS IN THE CHOUF OVER THE AUTHORITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. BUT HE NOTED THE MATTER IS ESSENTIALLY AN INTERNAL LEBANESE CONCERN, TO BE HANDLED IN THE FIRST INSTANCE BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE SAID THERE HAD BEEN NO DISCUSSION OF MOVING MNF TROOPS INTO THE CHOUF, THE ASSUMPTION BEING THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR LAW AND ORDER IN THE AREA.

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