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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE:
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File Folder: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [8/11/83-
8/13/83] Box 91407 53

Date: 12/2/99
Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #110926Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>R 4/19/06 NLSP98-008/1 #126</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1 →
2. Cable	Cable #111311Z Aug 83, 5 p. <i>Part " " #127</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
3. Cable	Cable #111701Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSP98-008/1 #128</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1 →
4. Cable	Cable #111748Z Aug 83, 5 p. <i>PART 4/19/06 " #129</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
5. Cable	Cable #112318Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>D 11/5/02 NLSP98-008/1 #130</i>	8/11/83	P1/F1
6. Cable	No Cable #, re: Sticks and Syria, 2 p. <i>D " " #131</i>	8/12/83	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #121621Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>D " " #132</i>	8/12/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #121713Z Aug 83, 2 p. <i>D " " #133</i>	8/12/83	P1/F1
9. Cable	Cable #121947Z Aug 83, 9 p. <i>PART 4/19/06 " #134</i>	8/12/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	No Cable #, re: Working Lunch with Chief of Staff Bin Shaker and ForMin Kassim, Et al., Amman., 15 p. <i>PART " " #135</i>	8/13/83	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #130717Z Aug 83, 8 p. <i>R " " #136</i>	8/13/83	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #130754Z Aug 83, 7 p. <i>PART " " #137</i>	8/13/83	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
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- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

F.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LF, IS
 SUBJFCT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: CONTINGENCY
 PPSSE GUIDANCE FOR OCCASIONAL TRAVEL OF GOI OFFICIALS ON
 MCFARLANE TEAM AIRCRAFT

REF: A. TEL AVIV 10456, B. STATE 220483, C. ROSS-JONES
 TELCON, D. STATF 223104

1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. BASED ON REF TELCON, WE HAVE REVISED CONTINGENCY
 PRESS GUIDANCE AS FOLLOWS:
3. Q. WHY IS (NAME OF ISRAELI OFFICIAL) TRAVELLING WITH
 THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION IN THE SPAR AIRCRAFT?
 - A. CONSISTENT WITH PAST PRACTICE, WE WILL NOT
 PUBLICLY COMMENT ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE
 MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION.

3. BFIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SFULTZ
 BT
 #6164

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 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 12/2/95

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 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0579
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0831
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0755
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0603
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0538
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0781
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0144

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/11/83
 APPRV: RFAIRBANKS
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: PDUR
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4- AMB
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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: CLASHES TRIGGER
 - - - - DECISIONS ON TRIPARTITE COORDINATION, RECONCILIATION

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. THE LAF-DRUZE CLASHES IN THE ABAYH REGION AUGUST 10, IN WHICH THE MCFARLANE TEAM WAS WHOLLY INVOLVED DUE TO THE NEED FOR RAPID COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE ISRAELIS, TRIGGERED USEFUL DISCUSSIONS THROUGHOUT THE DAY AND EVENING ON THE ISSUE OF BETTER COORDINATION FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE SHUF, THE PROSPECTS FOR A POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON THE SHUF, AND OUR OVERALL STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING OUR GOALS IN LEBANON.
3. NEED FOR BETTER COORDINATION: AT A SERIES OF MEETING WITH MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS THROUGHOUT THE DAY, THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP (GEMAYEL, HADDAD AND SALEM) PRESENTED A PROPOSAL THAT TRILATERAL MEETINGS OF THE MILITARY AND CIVIL NEGOTIATORS WHO HAD WORKED TOGETHER TO PRODUCE THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT BEGIN MEETING AGAIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. GEMAYEL STATED THAT HE HAD CONVINCED WAZZAN TO "REVIVE THE COMMITTEE AS IF WE WERE IMPLEMENTING THE AGREEMENT." HE NOTED THAT A "TREMENDOUS POLITICAL PRICE" WOULD HAVE TO BE PAID FOR THIS STEP, BUT IT WAS A FURTHER REASSERTION TO SYRIA THAT DESPITE ITS THREATS ON THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP, LEBANON WAS STILL IN CONTACT WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL, GEMAYEL SAID, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT HAPPENED ON THE GROUND, AND THAT THE SITUATION IN ABAYH WAS UNACCEPTABLE. THE ISRAELIS HAD TO WORK TO IMPROVE

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THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS PROBED TO LEARN THE LEBANESE AGENDA FOR THE MEETINGS PROPOSED. TO AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION THAT THESE MEETINGS WOULD BE DEVOTED SIMPLY TO REDEPLOYMENT NARROWLY DEFINED ON THE ONE HAND OR RENEGOTIATION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT ON THE OTHER, IT WAS AGREED THAT THE U.S. WOULD TRY TO OBTAIN ISRAELI AGREEMENT FOR A COMMON CHARACTERIZATION OF THESE MEETINGS AS INTENDED TO DEAL WITH THE "PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH WITHDRAWALS." THE LEBANESE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY THAT AMB. FATTAL, GEN. HAMDAN, AND COL. RUHAYYIM WOULD BE ASKED TO REPRESENT LEBANON AT THESE MEETINGS. THEY PROPOSED THAT AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS REPRESENT THE U.S. AMB. MCFARLANE, WHO HAS GONE TO ISRAEL TO EXPLORE THIS AND OTHER ISSUES, WILL BE SEEKING WAYS TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS LEBANESE PROPOSAL IN ORDER TO OBTAIN A MORE RESPONSIVE ISRAELI POSITION ON PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REDEPLOYMENT OPERATION.

4. POLITICAL AGREEMENT ON THE SHUF: REFLECTING THE FEAR THAT THE CLASH IN ABAYH WOULD DRAG THE U.S. INTO UNPRODUCTIVE CONCERN FOR "THE MICRO PICTURE," THE LEBANESE INITIALLY EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN THE SETTLEMENT OF LEBANON'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS. THE SOLUTION TO THESE, THEY SAID, WAS LEBANESE, AND -- TO USE SALEM'S WORDS -- "YOU WILL KNOW IN GOOD TIME." MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MADE IT CLEAR IN SUCCESSIVE MEETINGS THAT SUCH AN ATTITUDE WAS UNWARRANTED. PRESIDENT REAGAN PERSONALLY HAD VOICED OUR FULL COMMITMENT TO SUPPORTING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND WE COULD NOT BUY A PIG IN A POKE. IN KEEPING WITH OUR PRACTICE OF FULL DIALOGUE, IT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR US TO KNOW WHAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS DOING TO REACH AN AGREEMENT ON THE SHUF. WE WANTED TO BE SURE TO BE ON THE SAME WAVE LENGTH WITHOUT TRYING TO SECOND GUESS THE LEBANESE. IN THE NEAR TERM, THE LEBANESE SHOULD NOT BE SURPRISED TO FIND US DEVOTING SIGNIFICANT ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE SHUF IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. A LEBANESE SUCCESS IN THIS OPERATION, WHILE IMPORTANT IN AND OF ITSELF, WOULD ALSO BE IMPORTANT FOR THE LARGER PICTURE, SINCE IT WOULD DEMONSTRATE TO SYRIA AND TO KEY ARAB STATES THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ENJOYS A STRONG DOMESTIC POSITION. MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT, IN URGING ISRAELI COOPERATION ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE SHUF, HIS POSITION WOULD BE GREATLY STRENGTHENED

IF HE WERE IN A POSITION TO CONFIRM THE SERIOUS NATURE OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS WITH THE DRUZE.

IN THE PROCESS OF CLEARING THE AIR ON THE PROPER DEGREE OF U.S. INTEREST IN LEBANON'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS, THE LEBANESE DID DESCRIBE SOME OF THEIR RECENT INITIATIVES: -- THREE CABINET MINISTERS (HAMIYA, MROUE, AND PIERRE KHURI) WERE BEING DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO THE SHUF, UNDER DANGEROUS CONDITIONS, TO PURSUE DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SHAYKH AL-AQL, THE DRUZE SPIRITUAL LEADER. (SEE SEPTELS FOR THE FATE THAT HAS BEFALLEN THESE MINISTERS ON THEIR MISSION.)

-- THE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO OPEN DISCUSSIONS DIRECTLY WITH WALID JUMBLATT. SALEM AFFIRMED THAT "WE HAVE NO APRIORI POSITIONS ON ANYONE." GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT HE WAS READY TO DEAL WITH HIM. IN FACT, GEMAYEL ARGUED, WALID JUMBLATT WOULD DO BETTER TO DEAL WITH HIM THAN WITH OTHER OPPOSITION LEADERS, PARTICULARLY THE SHI'ITES. ALTHOUGH JUMBLATT WAS CALLING FOR MORE "RIGHTS" FOR THE DRUZE, THEY ALREADY HAD A SHARE OF POWER DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE SEVEN OR EIGHT PERCENT OF THE POPULATION THEY REPRESENT. IN THE LAST MEETING OF THE DAY, SALEM DEFINED THE PROBLEM OF WALID JUMBLATT AS ONE OF HANDLING. A WAY HAD TO BE FOUND TO ENGAGE HIM WITHOUT GIVING HIM A PLATFORM TO EXPLOIT. FAIRBANKS SUMMARIZED THE FOUR POSSIBLE CHANNELS FOR DOING SO. THE FIRST WAS A SAUDI CHANNEL: KING FAHD HAD INDICATED THAT, IN A FORTHCOMING MEETING WITH JUMBLATT, HE WOULD INSIST THAT JUMBLATT ACT AS A LEBANESE, NOT AS A SYRIAN TOOL. HE WOULD URGE HIM TO RALLY TO GEMAYEL AND WORK FOR A DIRECT GEMAYEL-JUMBLATT MEETING.

THE SECOND CHANNEL WAS JORDANIAN: KING HUSSEIN HAD GIVEN JUMBLATT THE SAME PITCH IN STRONG TERMS ABOUT TEN DAYS AGO AND WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONTINUE IN THIS VEIN.

THE THIRD CHANNEL WAS ISRAELI: (HADDAD HAD CONFIDED EARLIER IN THE DAY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD OFFERED TO BROKE A MEETING WITH JUMBLATT.) MCFARLANE INTENDS TO PURSUE THIS IDEA WHILE IN ISRAEL. BOTH SALEM AND HADDAD EXPRESS ED PARTICULAR INTEREST IN THE ISRAELI CHANNEL, OBSERVING THAT THE ISRAELI DRUZE COMMUNITY PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT POINT OF PRESSURE.

THE FOURTH CHANNEL WAS AMERICAN: OUR EMBASSY IN AMMAN WAS PREPARED TO TALK TO HIM, ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT SEEKING HIM OUT.

AN INFORMAL GROUP COMPOSED OF GEMAYEL, WAZZAN, HADDAD, SALEM AND TUENI MET LAST EVENING TO REVIEW WHAT WAS HAPPENING ON THE INTERNAL SCENE. SALEM HAD THE SPECIFIC BRIEF OF ANALYZING THE GRIEVANCES OF THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY. HE HAD ALREADY COME UP WITH SEVERAL IDEAS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THEM. THE NEGOTIATING TEAM DEALING WITH MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS COULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE MUSLIMS (THIS IDEA HAS ALREADY BEEN IMPLEMENTED. AT LEAST FOR MEDIA PURPOSES, GEN. HAMDAN AND AMB. ZAFIR AL-HASAN WILL PARTI-

CIPATE WITH FAIRBANKS AT TODAY'S SESSION.) A COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS OR POLITICIANS COULD BE ESTABLISHED TO WORK ON NATIONAL RECONCILIATION. THE POLITICAL LEADERS OF THE NATION COULD BE INVITED TO THE PALACE FOR DISCUSSIONS.

PPPP MCFARLANE ASKED ABOUT STEPS TO DEAL WITH LEBANESE FORCES VIOLENCE. HADDAD, SPEAKING IN GEMAYEL'S PRESENCE, REPORTED THAT GEMAYEL HAD MET WITH THE PHALANGE AND THE LEBANESE FORCES AND TOLD THEM THAT THEY MUST GET THEIR NON-NATIVE COMBATTANTS AND HEAVY WEAPONS OUT OF THE SHUF. GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT, AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, "I WANT TO CLEAN UP THE AREA."

5. STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH SYRIA: AS HAS BEEN OUR WON ON MANY OCCASIONS, THE LEBANESE COMPLAINED INITIALLY THAT THE U.S. WAS KEEPING THEM IN THE DARK ABOUT WHERE IT WAS GOING. GEMAYEL ASKED, "DOES A STRATEGY EXIST OR NOT?" HE STRESSED HE WAS WITH US ALL THE WAY AND COULD WAIT, BUT HE NEEDED TO KNOW "THE PLAN." SALEM, IN GEMAYEL'S ABSENCE, ECHOED THE SAME THEME. HE POINTED OUT THAT IN WASHINGTON HE HAD REPEATEDLY REQUESTED US TO SHARE OUR GEOPOLITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AND ASSURE THE LEBANESE OF OUR COMMITMENT IN TERMS OTHER THAN THOSE OF "POLITICAL THEOLOGY." THIS, HE SAID, WAS NECESSARY TO PERMIT THE LEBANESE LEADERSHIP TO SPEAK TO OTHERS WITH CONFIDENCE. SALEM POINTED OUT THAT ONE REASON GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT THE POSSIBILITY OF IN-DEPTH U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANON'S INTERNAL PROBLEMS WAS THAT IT WOULD DISTRACT US FROM THE "MACRO PICTURE." IN THE LAST MEETING OF THE DAY, AFTER EMOTIONS ON THE ABAYH CONFLICT HAD SUBSIDED, FAIRBANKS REVIEWED OUR GLOBAL STRATEGY IN TERMS THAT APPEARED TO SATISFY SALEM AND HADDAD.

FAIRBANKS SET FORTH A NUMBER OF REALITIES:

-- IT WAS CLEAR FROM THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TOUR OF THE RELEVANT CAPITALS THAT NEGOTIATIONS WITH SYRIA WERE UNLIKELY TO PRODUCE RESULTS IN THE NEAR TERM.

-- WHILE WE WORK TO BUILD PRESSURE ON SYRIA, WE HAD TO BUILD THE STRENGTH OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT IN A VISIBLE WAY. THIS WOULD BE HELPFUL IN NEGOTIATING WITH SYRIA, BECAUSE THE PERCEPTION OF A STRONG LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT BY SYRIA.

-- EXPANSION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY INTO THE SHUF PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE ITS STRENGTH IN CONCRETE TERMS.

-- IT WAS ESSENTIAL TO PORTRAY THE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT AS A FIRST STEP IN A PROCESS OF FULL WITHDRAWAL. THIS WOULD NOT ONLY STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, BUT WOULD ALSO CONTRIBUTE DIRECTLY TO EFFORTS TO OBTAIN SYRIAN AND PLO WITHDRAWAL. OUR TALKS IN SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN HAD DEMONSTRATED THAT A PERCEPTION THAT FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL HAD BEGUN WOULD STRENGTHEN THEIR HAND WITH SYRIA.

FAIRBANKS OUTLINED A NUMBER OF IDEAS THAT COULD BE USED AT THE PROPER TIME. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE, HE SAID, TO PRESENT A NEAT PACKAGE TO THE LEBANESE. AS OUR EFFORTS PROCEEDED, WE COULD IMPLEMENT THESE IDEAS AS CONDITIONS WARRANTED. AMONG OUR IDEAS WERE THE FOLLOWING:

-- MORE STRUCTURED ARAB SUPPORT FOR LEBANON. FAHD HAD PROMISED THAT THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR WOULD ARRIVE SHORTLY IN BEIRUT. SAUD, WHO WOULD BE ATTENDING A GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL MEETING SHORTLY, WOULD URGE THOSE GULF STATES WITHOUT AMBASSADORS TO SEND THEM. WE HAD

URGED SAUDI ARABIA TO TAKE THE LEAD IN ORGANIZING THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT TO SUPPORT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. ARAB DIPLOMATS IN SEVERAL CAPITALS WOULD BE PROMOTING A SYRIAN-LEBANESE DIALOGUE. KING HASSAN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN ON WAYS THAT HE COULD HELP. THE ALGERIANS HAD IMPROVED THEIR RELATIONS WITH SAUDI ARABIA AT THE EXPENSE OF SYRIA, AND THIS WAS A GOOD DEVELOPMENT.

-- A FORMAL DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE SAUDIS AND JORDANIANS HAD GIVEN US CONFLICTING ADVICE ON REQUIRING FULL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ON THE ONE HAND AND A PARTIAL PULLBACK FROM THE METN ON THE OTHER. WHICHEVER ALTERNATIVE

SECRET

WAS CHOSEN, ANY LETTER SUBMITTED SHOULD BE AIMED TO ENSURE MAXIMUM ARAB SUPPORT. SALEM NOTED THAT HE MIGHT BE GOING TO CONSULT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF THE GULF STATES AT THE END OF THEIR UPCOMING MEETING. SIMILARLY, THE LEBANESE COULD SEND EMISSARIES TO THE GULF REGION AT THE PROPER TIME. HADDAD PROPOSED THAT A LETTER BE SENT TO SYRIA IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING WHAT HE HOPED WOULD BE THE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION OF OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI STATEMENT CHARACTERIZING REDEPLOYMENT AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD FULL WITHDRAWAL. THIS LETTER COULD REQUEST A SCHEDULE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS FROM LEBANON "IN LIGHT OF" THE ISRAELI ANNOUNCEMENT. (ECHOING FEZ)

-- MULTIPLE PRESSURES ON THE SYRIANS. INASMUCH AS SYRIA APPEARED TO FIND THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCE COMFORTABLE AND APPEARED UNLIKELY TO FACILITATE A DIPLOMATIC BREAK-THROUGH, A COMBINATION OF POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, MILITARY AND OTHER PRESSURES HAD TO BE APPLIED. ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, SYRIA'S BAGHDAD PAYMENTS, U.S. SALES OF GRAIN, AND THE U.S. AID PROGRAM COULD BE EXPLOITED. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BIQA' WAS IMPORTANT. IN ADDITION, LEBANESE ARMY CAPABILITIES WERE IMPROVING TO THE POINT WHERE SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND ATTRITION TACTICS WOULD BE POSSIBLE IN THE NOT TOO DISTANT FUTURE. BEYOND THIS, SYRIA'S NEIGHBORS MIGHT BE CALLED UPON TO ASSIST.

-- PLO DEPARTURE. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN A DEPARTURE OF PLO FIGHTERS FROM LEBANON. THIS WOULD BE A REAL PLUS IN ISRAEL AND WOULD HELP REMOVE SYRIA FROM THE CENTER OF ARAB ACTION.

-- SOVIET CONCERNS. WHILE WE WERE ENGAGED IN AN ONGOING DIALOGUE WITH THE SOVIETS ON THE MIDDLE EAST, WE WERE LIMITING OUR EXCHANGES TO A PRESENTATION OF OUR POSITION. ONE CARD VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS WAS THE PRESENCE OF THE MNF IN LEBANON. HADDAD CONFIRMED THAT THE SOVIETS BIGGEST WORRY WAS U.S. BASES. IN HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET DIPLOMATS, HADDAD WAS KEEPING THE PRESSURE ON BY EMPHASIZING THAT THE CURRENT SOVIET POLICY OF SUPPORT FOR SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE AND OPPOSITION TO THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT WAS PUSHING GEMAYEL CLOSER TO THE U.S. AND ISRAEL. HE WAS FOLLOWING UP BY PROMISING TO USE ALL HIS INFLUENCE TO "PREVENT U.S. BASES IN LEBANON" IF THE SOVIETS ADOPTED A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE POLICY.

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RUEBEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9565
RUEEDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6258
RUEEJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3787
RUEETV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1238
RUEEDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7118
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC
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~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 02897

~~EXDIS~~ NODK PER JERUSALEM 2903

NSC FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY
FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, SY, US XF
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS WITH
- ARENS AND KIMCHE, AUGUST 10

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: ON ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL AUGUST 10, MCFARLANE MET WITH KIMCHE, FOLLOWED BY MEETING WITH ARENS AND SENIOR IDF STAFF. MCFARLANE BRIEFED EXTENSIVELY ON HIS MEETINGS IN SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN, CONCLUDING WITH STRONG APPEAL FOR ISRAELI PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, NECESSARY TO BOLSTER GEMAYEL'S GOVERNMENT AND TO PROVIDE COVER FOR LEBANESE TO AGREE TO POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION WITH ISRAEL ON REDEPLOYMENT ISSUES.

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THERE WAS CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ALSO ON THE FIGHTING IN THE SHUF AUGUST 10 AND ON THE PROSPECTS FOR LEBANESE GOVERNMENT-DRUZE DIALOGUE. END SUMMARY.

3. IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL EARLY

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 198-008/1 7/27
BY , NARA, Date 7/19/06

EVENING OF AUGUST 10, AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS AND TEICHER MET DAVID KIMCHE TO BRIEF HIM ON MCFARLANE'S MEETINGS IN THE REGION. MCFARLANE REVIEWED EXTENSIVELY HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSAD AND FAHD, NOTING THAT ASSAD'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF WITHDRAWAL HAD BEEN THE CENTERPIECE OF THE DAMASCUS MEETINGS. MCFARLANE TOLD KIMCHE THAT THE MOST IMMEDIATE ISSUE CONFRONTING US -- PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE FIGHTING IN THE SHUF -- WAS TO ADDRESS GEMAYEL'S URGENT NEED FOR ISRAELI PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A MORE CONCRETE DESCRIPTION OF A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, WITH FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONED, HOWEVER, ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE CAN PUBLICLY ACCEPT LINKAGE BETWEEN ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWALS, BUT CANNOT PUBLICLY ACCEPT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL BEING CONDITIONED ON LEBANESE CAPABILITIES OF ENSURING SECURITY BECAUSE OF THE PERCEPTION OF AN ISRAELI VETO (EVEN THOUGH THE LEBANESE ACCEPT THIS IMPLICITLY IN PRIVATE.). MCFARLANE ASKED KIMCHE TO CONSIDER A FORMULA WHICH LAYS OUT A PROCESS AND NOTIONAL TIMETABLE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, WITH FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONED ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE SAID THAT, WITH THIS FORMULA AS POLITICAL COVER, THE LEBANESE COULD PROBABLY BE INDUCED TO AGREE TO A PUBLIC RECONSTITUTION OF A COMMITTEE IN WHICH LEBANON AND ISRAEL COULD DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF WITHDRAWAL.

4. KIMCHE DID NOT RESPOND SUBSTANTIVELY TO MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION, BUT UNDERTOOK TO CONSIDER THE FORMULA OUTLINED BY MCFARLANE. KIMCHE PROBED MCFARLANE ON THE QUESTION OF SYRIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD A DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES; MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT ASSAD HAD CATEGORICALLY REJECTED ANY FORM OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND HAD NOT PICKED UP ON THE SUGGESTION FOR A PARTIAL DISENGAGEMENT OF FORCES IN THE META OR ELSEWHERE.

5. IN A SUBSEQUENT LATE EVENING MEETING WITH MINISTER OF DEFENSE ARENS, CHIEF OF STAFF LEVY, DMI BARAK, LUBRANI, GENERAL EINAN AND AIDES, MCFARLANE SIMILARLY REVIEWED HIS MEETINGS IN THE REGION AND URGED ARENS TO CONSIDER THE FORMULA FOR A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. AFTER NOTING THAT HE WOULD NEED TIME TO CONSIDER MCFARLANE'S APPROACH, ARENS COMMENTED THAT

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[REDACTED] MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT, IF GEMAYEL CAN MAKE A CREDIBLE PUBLIC PRESENTATION TO THOSE LEBANESE WHO BELIEVE THAT REDEPLOYMENT MEANS THE PARTITION OF LEBANON, HIS HANDS WILL BE FREED TO COORDINATE THE DETAILS OF WITHDRAWAL WITH ISRAEL MORE PUBLICLY AND CLOSELY.

6. [REDACTED]

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7. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT GEMAYEL WAS SHAKEN BY THE EVENTS OF THE DAY, PARTICULARLY THE EMBARRASMENT OF LAF LOSSES. MANY LEBANESE BELIEVE THAT, EVEN IF ISRAEL WAS NOT DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FIGHTING, IT COULD HAVE PREVENTED IT. HE ADDED THAT THE LEBANESE BELIEVE ONLY TWO OPTIONS EXIST: EITHER TO ALLOW THE LAF SUFFICIENT FORCE AND FREEDOM OF ACTION TO RESPOND TO THE DRUZE ATTACK, OR TO RELY ON ISRAEL TO RETURN THE SITUATION TO THE STATUS QUO ANTE AND TURN OVER EVACUATED AREAS TO THE LAF AFTER DISARMING THE DRUZE.

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9. POW/MIA ISSUE. IN BOTH MEETINGS, MCFARLANE TOLD THE ISRAELIS THAT ASSAD HAD AGREED TO ALLOW THE EXAMINATION OF THE FOUR BODIES BURIED IN DAMASCUS. MCFARLANE URGED

ARENS TO FOLLOW-UP WITH THE ICRC. BOTH KIMCHE AND ARENS EXPRESSED GENUINE PLEASURE OVER THIS DEVELOPMENT, NOTING THE IMPORTANCE WHICH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN ATTACHES TO THE ISSUE.

10. COMMENT: DESPITE THE STATED MISGIVINGS OF ARENS AND LEVY, THE ISRAELIS ARE CLEARLY GIVING SERIOUS CONSIDERATION TO THE MCFARLANE PROPOSAL ON A WITHDRAWAL PROCESS AND TIMETABLE, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED PUBLIC DISCUSSIONS WITH THE LEBANESE ON POLITICAL AND MILITARY ISSUES INVOLVED IN WITHDRAWAL. BOTH ARENS AND KIMCHE WERE TAKEN ABACK BY MCFARLANE'S BLUNT DESCRIPTION OF ASSAD'S CATEGORICAL REJECTION OF WITHDRAWAL. IN ADDITION, MCFARLANE'S POINTED QUESTIONS REGARDING ISRAELI MILITARY ACTIVITY (E.G., REPORTS THAT ISRAELI 175MM ARTILLERY WERE OPERATING FROM SOUTH OF THE AWWALI) HAVE PUT THE ISRAELIS ON NOTICE OF OUR ACCURATE

3/3

~~S E C R E T~~/EXDIS

JERUSALEM 002897/03

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS WITH
AND REAL-TIME INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES IN LEBANON.
MCFARLANE HAS TOLD ARENS AND KIMCHE THAT HE NEEDS MOVEMENT
FROM THE ISRAELIS IN ORDER TO BOLSTER GEMAYEL FOLLOWING
THE AUGUST 10 FIGHTING; MCFARLANE WILL CONTINUE TO PRESS
THIS THEME IN AUGUST 11 MEETINGS WITH KIMCHE, SHAMIR AND
BEGIN. END COMMENT.

CLUVERIUS

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~~S E C R E T~~/EXDIS

JERUSALEM 002897/03

U.S. draft given to Knaiche

8/11/83

PROPOSED GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL STATEMENT

- The Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and does not covet a single square inch of Lebanese soil. This concept was one of the key elements of the Agreement of May 17.

- The Government of Israel respects Lebanon's independence and hopes the Government of Lebanon will be able to assert its sovereign authority throughout all territories as soon as possible through the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

As stated in the agreement, withdrawal can be completed in 8-12 weeks.

- The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awwali river line as the first stage in a process of withdrawal, Over time,

to the international boundary.

further phased withdrawals to the international boundary, each phase to be completed

with dispatch

(will) take place. The complete withdrawal of all foreign forces could be accomplished within three months. For this process to be completed, Syria must demonstrate its commitment to complete withdrawal as well.


a limited period dispatch

- The withdrawal of Israeli forces is fully consistent with all elements of the Israel-Lebanon Agreement of May 17 and will be carried out in the context of this Agreement.

consistent in pace with the pace of Israel's initial redeployment

expeditiously the PLO

their

within


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U.S. draft given to Kacche

8/11/83

PROPOSED GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL STATEMENT

- The Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and does not covet a single square inch of Lebanese soil. This concept was one of the key elements of the Agreement of May 17.

- The Government of Israel respects Lebanon's independence and hopes the Government of Lebanon will be able to assert its sovereign authority throughout all territories as soon as possible through the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

- The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming re-deployment of its military forces to the Awwali river line ^{to the international boundary.} as the first stage in a process of withdrawal. Over time, further phased withdrawals to the international boundary, each phase to be ^{executed with dispatch} completed in approximately one month's time, ^{are contemplated.} will take place. The complete withdrawal of all foreign forces ^{can, if possible, etc.} [could] be accomplished within three months. For this process to be completed, Syria must demonstrate its commitment to complete withdrawal as well.

- The withdrawal of Israeli forces is fully consistent with all elements of the Israel-Lebanon Agreement of May 17 and will be carried out in the context of this Agreement.

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U.S. draft given to Knafo 8/11/83

PROPOSED GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL STATEMENT

- The Government of Israel has no territorial ambitions in Lebanon and does not covet a single square inch of Lebanese soil. This ^{attitude} [concept] was one of the key ^{elements} [elements] of the Agreement of May 17. *was concluded*

- The Government of Israel respects Lebanon's independence and hopes the Government of Lebanon will be able to assert its sovereign authority throughout all territories as soon as possible through the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

- The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming re-deployment of its military forces to the Awwali river line as the first stage in a process of withdrawal. ~~Over time,~~ further phased withdrawals to the international boundary, each phase to be completed ^{with dispatch} [in approximately one month's time] will take place.

The complete withdrawal of all foreign forces could be accomplished within three months. For this process to be completed, Syria must demonstrate its commitment to complete withdrawal as well. *and the agreement must be implemented.*

- The withdrawal of Israeli forces is fully consistent with all elements of the Israel-Lebanon Agreement of May 17 and will be carried out in the context of this Agreement.

As envisaged in the agreement

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Statement by the Government of Israel

^{As has been}
~~It is well known, and recently~~ redemonstrated by the May 17, 1983 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, ~~that~~ Israel respects Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. It is our hope that ^{the Lebanese} ~~Lebanon's~~ Government will be able to assert its sovereign authority as soon as possible throughout all its territory, through the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. In this context, Israel wishes to withdraw all its forces from Lebanon as soon as possible in accordance with the ^{May 17} ~~Agreement's~~ package.

The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awali River Line as the first stage in the withdrawal envisaged in the Agreement, which ^{it} expects to enter soon into force. This redeployment is fully consistent with all the elements of the agreement, allowing the Government of Lebanon to restore its authority over a significant part of its territory.

The Government of Israel regrets any allegations regarding any intention on its part to bring about a division of Lebanon, ~~it is well known to all, including the Government of Lebanon, that these~~ ^{which} allegations are completely unfounded. Israel sees in its best interests a free and independent Lebanon, with a strong central Government capable of maintaining security throughout its territory. This is one of the key elements of the Agreement.

^{intends to execute}
Israel ~~will be ready to~~ further phases of this withdrawal towards the international boundary, ^{with} in the context of the implementation of the Agreement. ~~phased parallel withdrawals of the PLU and Syria, and the creation of suitable security conditions in the south of Lebanon in the framework of the above.~~ (as conditions permit). This process will be completed when all foreign forces leave Lebanon.

~~(Israel will continue to do its utmost to ensure the security of its northern boundary).~~

DRAFT

Statement by the Government of Israel

^{As has been}
~~It is well known, and recently demonstrated~~ by the May 17, 1983 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, ~~that~~ ^{the Lebanese} Israel respects Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. It is our hope that ~~Lebanon's~~ ^{Lebanon's} Government will be able to assert its sovereign authority as soon as possible throughout all its territory, through the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. In this context, Israel wishes to withdraw all its forces from Lebanon as soon as possible in accordance with the ^{May 17} Agreement ~~and package~~.

The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awwali River Line as the first stage in the withdrawal envisaged in the Agreement, which ^{it} expects to enter soon into force. This redeployment is fully consistent with all the elements of the agreement, allowing the Government of Lebanon to restore its authority over a significant part of its territory.

The Government of Israel regrets any allegations regarding any intention on its part to bring about a division of Lebanon. ~~It is well known to all, including the Government of Lebanon, that these allegations~~ ^{which} are completely unfounded. Israel sees in its best interests a free and independent Lebanon, with a strong central Government capable of maintaining security throughout its territory. This is one of the key elements of the Agreement.

^{intends to create}
Israel ~~will be ready to~~ ^{within} further phases of this withdrawal towards the international boundary, ~~in~~ the context of the implementation of the Agreement, ~~phased parallel withdrawals of the PLO and Syria, and the creation of suitable security conditions in the south of Lebanon in the framework of the above.~~ ^(and as conditions permit)
This process will be completed when all foreign forces leave Lebanon.

~~(Israel will continue to do its utmost to ensure the security of its northern boundary).~~

Statement by the Government of Israel

As has been
It is well known, and recently ~~re~~demonstrated by the May 17, 1983 Agreement between Israel and Lebanon, ~~that~~ ^{the Lebanese} Israel respects Lebanon's independence and sovereignty. It is our hope that ~~Lebanon's~~ Government will be able to assert its sovereign authority as soon as possible throughout all its territory, through the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. In this context, Israel wishes to withdraw all its forces from Lebanon as soon as possible. [In accordance] with the Agreement's package.

The Government of Israel regards the forthcoming redeployment of its military forces to the Awali River Line as the first stage in the withdrawal envisaged in the Agreement, which ^{it} expects to enter soon into force. This redeployment is fully consistent with all the elements of the agreement, allowing the Government of Lebanon to restore its authority over a significant part of its territory.

The Government of Israel regrets any allegations regarding any intention on its part to bring about a division of Lebanon. [It is well known to all, including the Government of Lebanon, that these allegations are completely unfounded.] Israel sees in its best interests a free and independent Lebanon, with a strong central Government [capable of] maintaining security throughout its territory. [This is one of the key elements of the Agreement]

intends to execute
Israel will be ready to further phases of this withdrawal towards the international boundary, ^{within} in the context of the implementation of the Agreement, phased parallel withdrawals of the PLU and Syria, and the creation of suitable security conditions in the south of Lebanon in the framework of the above. This process will be completed when all foreign forces leave Lebanon.

(Israel will continue to do its utmost to ensure the security of its northern boundary).

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

CLASSIFICATION
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 CHARGE-DATE
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 AMB. RSDILLON
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 NONE
 DISTRIBUTION
 ROSS AMB POL, P/M FAIRBANKS CHRON
 ORIGINATOR
 ACTION ADDRESSES, PRECEDENCE
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
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 AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE
 AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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EXDIS

JERUSALEM/TEL AVIV FOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, US, LE, SY
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETINGS IN
 DAMASCUS

REF: DAMASCUS 6137

1. (~~C~~-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. FAIRBANKS, ROSS AND A TEAM FROM L WILL BE TRAVELLING TO DAMASCUS FOR THE MEETINGS PROPOSED REFTEL. ARRIVAL DETAILS TO FOLLOW SEPTTEL. DILLON ##

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DECLASSIFIED
 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 12/2/99

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROG-DATE 8/11/83

FROM MCFARLANE

CROSS BY

FAIRBANKS

DISTRIBUTION MCFARLANE-4, AMB DCM POL P-M

ORIGINATOR

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

ACTION ADDRESSES, PRECEDENCE
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, 3788 3000
DEPARTMENT ALSO FOR AMB. BENNETT
USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY***

FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

E.O.: 12356, DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP, (LONG, CLARENCE) IS, LE
SUBJECT: CODEL LONG REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH AMB.
MCFARLANE

REF: STATE 226429

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS WOULD BE PLEASED TO MEET WITH CODEL LONG IN EITHER BEIRUT OR DAMASCUS AS THEIR SCHEDULES OF TRAVEL PERMIT. WE NOTE THAT CODEL LONG DEPARTS WASHINGTON AUGUST 13. SINCE WE ARE UNABLE TO FORESEE AT THIS TIME EXACTLY WHERE WE WILL BE IN THE AUGUST 20-24 TIMEFRAME, AND MAY NOT EVEN BE IN THE THREE POSTS CODEL LONG IS VISITING, WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIPT OF CODEL LONG'S ITINERARY, SO THAT WE MAY BE IN TOUCH CLOSER TO THEIR ARRIVAL IN THE IMMEDIATE AREA. DILLON##

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/2/97

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DE RUEHBL #8819 223 **
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2221
RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0639
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0595
RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0845
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0770
RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0616
RUEHLD / AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 0121
RUFHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 0174
RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY RCME IMMEDIATE 0147
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0796

CLASS: LIMITED OFFICIAL USE
CHRG: PROG: 8/11/83
APPRV: CWSROSS
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: NONE
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4 AMB DCM
POL P-M CHRON

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DEPARTMENT FOR S/S-O, NEA, L
WHITE HOUSE FOR SITUATION ROOM, PLEASE PASS TO SIGNAL
BOARD

E.O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP, LE
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS BEIRUT TELEPHONE NUMBERS

1. WHENEVER AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS ARE IN BEIRUT,
THEY CAN BE REACHED ON THE FOLLOWING TELEPHONE NUMBERS:
421-176, 421-277, AND (ONLY AS A LAST RESORT) 386-956.

2. CERTAIN POSTS MAY FIND IT MORE RAPID TO CALL THROUGH
THE DEPARTMENT (S/S-O).

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

BEIRUT 8820

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RUDKKR RUFHFR RUEHRO RUFHOL RUEHLD RUEHC
RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHJM RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV
RUEHDM RUEHDT

DE RUEHBL #8820 223 **

ZNY CCCCC ZZH

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUFHRS / AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 0036

RUEHAD / USINT BAGHDAD 0024

RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO 0596

RUQMKW / AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0029

RUQMMT / AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0004

RUEHRA / AMEMBASSY RABAT 0018

RUDKKR / AMEMBASSY TUNIS 0116

RUFHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS 0175

RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME 0148

RUFHOL / AMEMBASSY BONN 0029

RUEHLD / AMEMBASSY LONDON 0122

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC 2222

RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC

RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN 0640

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0771

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0617

RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH 0551

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 0797

RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0846

RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0149

BT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ BEIRUT 08820

ROME ALSO FOR VATICAN OFFICE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O.:12356, DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, EF, XA, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISITS TO AREA
CAPITALS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN THE COURSE OF OUR INTENSIVE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO OBTAIN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON, STRENGTHEN THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, AND CREATE CONDITIONS OF SECURITY ON LEBANON'S BORDERS, AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS WILL BE TRAVELING WITH MEMBERS OF THEIR STAFF TO A NUMBER OF AREA POSTS OVER THE COMING WEEKS. IN VIEW OF THE NEED FOR BRIEFINGS AND CONSULTATIONS IN A LARGE NUMBER OF CAPITALS, AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MAY TRAVEL TOGETHER OR SEPARATELY. IN EITHER CASE, THEY WILL BE FULLY ARTICULATING U.S. POLICY IN ACHIEVING THE ABOVE OBJECTIVES.

3. ALTHOUGH POSTS SHOULD NOT RAISE THE POSSIBILITY OF

CLASS: ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CHRG: PROG 8/11/83
APPRV: RCMCRARLANE
DRFTD: CROSS
CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
DISTR: MCFARLANE-4; AMB.

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-0081#128
BY hst NARA, DATE 11/5/02

OUT

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BEIRUT 8820

OUT

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BEIRUT 8820

VISITS WITH HOST GOVERNMENTS, AMBS. MCFARLANE AND
FAIRBANKS WOULD APPRECIATE LEARNING OF HOST GOVERNMENT
INTEREST IN SUCH VISITS IF IT IS EXPRESSED. MESSAGES
ON THIS SUBJECT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO THE DEPARTMENT
WITH A REQUEST TO PASS THEM TO MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS PARTY
AT THE APPROPRIATE POST. DILLON

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(4) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS CHRON

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 DE RUEHTV #0923/01 2232100
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZA
 O 111748Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
 TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5486
 RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 3296
 INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3242
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6660
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 9604
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1137
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 7913
 RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 4286
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 3057
 RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

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~~SECRET~~ TEL AVIV 10923

NODIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

PAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, SY, US, XF

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION: HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS WITH
 - PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR,
 - AND KIMCHE, AUGUST 11, 1983

REF: JERUSALEM 2897

1. ~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. MCFARLANE HELD SEPARATE MEETINGS AUGUST 11 WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR AND KIMCHE AND AIDES. MCFARLANE REVIEWED THE RESULTS OF HIS REGIONAL DISCUSSIONS ALONG THE SAME LINES SHARED WITH ARENS AND KIMCHE LAST EVENING (REFTEL). BEGIN PROBED FOR THE LEBANESE REACTION TO ISRAELI CONCERNS ABOUT THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND THE NEED FOR LEBANON TO CALL PUBLICLY ON SYRIA TO WITHDRAW. SHAMIR COMPLAINED THAT, WHILE ISRAEL TRIES TO UNDERSTAND GEMAYEL'S PROBLEMS, THE LEBANESE DO NOT UNDERSTAND ISRAEL'S CONCERNS. IN EACH MEETING, MCFARLANE DEVOTED CONSIDERABLE ATTENTION TO THE NEED TO SHORE UP THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT, AND GEMAYEL'S PERCEPTION THAT ISRAEL'S PUBLIC COMMITMENT TO A CONTINUOUS PROCESS OF WITEDRAWAL WOULD RESPOND TO LEBANESE CRITICISM OF REDEPLOYMENT AND PERMIT THE LEBANESE TO COORDINATE PUBLICLY WITHDRAWAL PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL.

By CAI, NARA, Date 4/19/02
 NLS 198-008/1/129
 DECLASSIFIED IN PART #129

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HOWEVER, SHAMIR

INVITED MCFARLANE TO PROPOSE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE, FOLLOWING WHICH THE GOI WILL DECIDE ON ITS RESPONSE. MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND TEICHER SUBSEQUENTLY MET WITH KIMCHE AND AIDES TO REVIEW A PROPOSED GOI STATEMENT TABLED BY MCFARLANE. (KIMCHE WAS QUITE PESSIMISTIC AFTER SEEING THE DRAFT.) BEGIN HAD EARLIER INDICATED THAT HE MAY HAVE TO BRING OUR PROPOSAL TO THE CABINET, BUT THEN AGREED WITH LEWIS' SUGGESTION TO DEFER DECIDING WHETHER CABINET ACTION IS NEEDED UNTIL BEGIN, SHAMIR AND ARENS REVIEW THE PROPOSED LANGUAGE. ARENS LATER CALLED MCFARLANE TO SAY THAT BEGIN HAS CALLED HIM AND SHAMIR TO A MEETING, FRIDAY MORNING AUGUST 12. MCFARLANE IS NOW SCHEDULED TO GET THE ISRAELI RESPONSE FROM SHAMIR AND ARENS FRIDAY AFTERNOON. END SUMMARY.

3. MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND TEICHER MET SEPARATELY AUGUST 11 WITH KIMCHE AND AIDES, SHAMIR AND AIDES, AND BEGIN AND AIDES. IN EACH MEETING MCFARLANE DESCRIBED HIS TALKS IN SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA AND JORDAN (IN SAME TERMS AS IN REFTTEL), AND HIGHLIGHTED THE IMMEDIATE NEED FOR ACTION TO SHORE UP THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT. MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE AGREEMENT, ACKNOWLEDGES ISRAEL'S COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW FULLY, AND UNDERSTANDS THAT SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE IS THE MAIN OBSTACLE. HOWEVER, GEMAYEL IS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE FROM LEBANESE ELEMENTS WHICH BELIEVE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT MEANS PARTITION, AND THUS HE CANNOT PUBLICLY COORDINATE WITHDRAWAL PROBLEMS WITH ISRAEL SINCE THIS WILL LEAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT HE HAS ACQUIESCED TO PARTITION. ACCORDINGLY, GEMAYEL NEEDS A PUBLIC ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO A CONTINUOUS WITHDRAWAL PROCESS, WITH FINAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL CONDITIONED ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. GEMAYEL ALSO UNDERSTANDS THE LINK BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND LEBANON'S EFFECTIVE PERFORMANCE OF SECURITY FUNCTIONS IN EVACUATED AREAS; HOWEVER, GEMAYEL CANNOT MAKE THIS LINKAGE PUBLIC. WITH A GOOD PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENT IN HAND, MCFARLANE SAID, GEMAYEL CAN PROBABLY BE INDUCED TO AGREE TO PUBLIC LEBANESE-ISRAELI MILITARY AND POLITICAL COORDINATION ON WITHDRAWAL PROBLEMS.

4. THE ISRAELIS AGREED TO CONSIDER SUCH A FORMULA IF

PRESENTED BY THE U.S., BUT ALSO RAISED A NUMBER OF CONCERNS:

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BEGIN SAID HE SEES NO DIFFERENCE BETWEEN WHAT ISRAEL HAS ALREADY SAID PUBLICLY, AND WHAT IS NOW BEING ASKED BY THE LEBANESE. BEGIN EMPHASIZED THAT ISRAEL DOES NOT WANT TO PARTITION LEBANON; DOES NOT WANT TO REMAIN IN LEBANON FOR A LONG TIME; WANTS LEBANON TO BE FREE IN TERMS OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY; AND REMAINS PREOCCUPIED WITH ENSURING SECURITY IN NORTHERN ISRAEL.

5. MCFARLANE RESPONDED BY NOTING THE VALIDITY OF MANY OF ISRAEL'S CONCERNS, BUT HIGHLIGHTING DIFFERENT PERCEPTIONS HELD BY THE LEBANESE. LEWIS TOLD BEGIN THAT LEBANON'S REQUEST INVOLVES NO SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE IN POSITIONS, BUT RATHER RESPONDS TO LEBANON'S PERCEIVED NEED FOR A PUBLIC ISRAELI STATEMENT TO BOLSTER ITS AUTHORITY AND DENY LEGITIMACY TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE GOL'S OPPONENTS.

6. [REDACTED]

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7. MIA'S: ASKING THAT THE INFORMATION BE ESPECIALLY CLOSELY HELD, MCFARLANE INFORMED BEGIN AND SHAMIR THAT ASSAD HAD AGREED THAT A THIRD PARTY COULD EXAMINE THE BODIES BURIED IN THE DAMASCUS CEMETERY TO IDENTIFY THEM PROPERLY. BEGIN EXPRESSED SINCERE APPRECIATION FOR MCFARLANE'S EFFORTS ON THIS HUMANITARIAN ISSUE, WHILE LAMENTING THE LACK OF ANY MOVEMENT ON PRISONER EXCHANGE.

8. IN A FOLLOW-UP MEETING WITH THE MFA NEGOTIATING TEAM HEADED BY DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE, KIMCHE ASKED FOR MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION FOR THE NEXT "PRACTICAL STEPS." AMB MCFARLANE SAID WE HAVE TWO ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES: 1) TO CONTINUE TO DISCUSS AND ARGUE, VISIT AND TRY TO PERSUADE THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW, OR 2) BASED ON A PREMISE THAT THE SYRIANS ARE UNLIKELY TO BE PERSUADED, TRY TO DEVELOP POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE PRESSURES ON THE SYRIANS, WHILE CONCENTRATING OUR ATTENTION ON HELPING TO SUSTAIN THE GEMAYEL GOVERN-

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MENT. [REDACTED]

9. MCFARLANE SAID THE NEED FOR CLOSE COOPERATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON NOW APPEARS BOTH MORE URGENT AND MORE FEASIBLE. HE DESCRIBED THE LEBANESE PROBLEM IN WHICH MANY LEBANESE, INCLUDING THE PRIME MINISTER, SEE COOPERATION IN REDEPLOYMENT AS COOPERATION IN PARTITION. TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM MCFARLANE TABLED A DRAFT STATEMENT SUGGESTING AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE. [REDACTED]

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10. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] ASKED IF THERE WOULD BE A COUNTERPART STATEMENT BY THE GOL. MCFARLANE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT THE GOL TO RESPOND IN A POSITIVE WAY, BUT WAS NOT SURE IT WOULD BE A PARALLEL STATEMENT.

11. THE MEETING CONCLUDED WITH A BRIEF DESCRIPTION [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] AND AGREEMENT TO MEET AGAIN ON FRIDAY.

12. MCFARLANE WAS NOT ABLE TO REVIEW THIS MESSAGE BEFORE HIS DEPARTURE, AND HE MIGHT WANT TO SUPPLEMENT.

13. MINIMIZE BEIRUT CONSIDERED. LEWIS

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~~SECRET~~

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PGOV, IS, LE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MISSION - KIMCHE LUNCHEON

MOD DIRECTOR GENERAL MENDY MERON AND MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE INVITE AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND WHOEVER ACCOMPANYING HIM ON AUGUST 12 TO LUNCHE AT 1300 HOURS IN TEL AVIV. WE HAVE GIVEN TENTATIVE OK, ASSUMING YOU CAN ARRIVE HERE BY 1230 HOURS LOCAL, BUT WILL CONFIRM AFTER HEARING FROM YOU IN THE MORNING. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. LEWIS

~~SECRET~~

TEL AVIV 010924

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DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/2/99

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT
~~SECRET~~ JERUSALEM 02925

EXDIS

WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

USUN FOR AMBASSADOR KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MILI, IS, LE, SY, US, XF
SUBJ: MCFARLANE MISSION: MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
SEAMIR AND DEFENSE MINISTER ARENS, AUGUST 12, 1983

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 10923, (B) JERUSALEM 2897

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE~~ TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: MCFARLANE AND LEWIS MET WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS FRIDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 12, IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING A CONSULTATION AMONG BEGIN, SHAMIR AND ARENS ABOUT THE PROPOSED STATEMENT WHICH MCFARLANE HAD LEFT WITH THE ISRAELIS ON THURSDAY FOR THEIR CONSIDERATION (REF A, PARA 8). MCFARLANE FIRST SUMMARIZED HIS IMPRESSIONS FROM HIS LATEST MEETINGS IN BEIRUT, STRESSING (A) THE SOBERING EFFECT OF THE LAST 48 HOURS ON THE GOL AND THE GREATER SERIOUSNESS AND READINESS ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE TO COORDINATE WITHDRAWAL MATTERS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND TO STRIVE MORE ENERGETICALLY FOR A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING WITH JUMBLATT AS WELL AS THE OTHER DRUZE, AND (B) A GROWING SENSE OF SMOLDERING BITTERNESS TOWARD ISRAEL AMONG THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT LEADERS. MCFARLANE RELAYED CERTAIN SPECIFIC GOL REQUESTS OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES AND STRESSED AGAIN THE IMPORTANCE OF OBTAINING A PUBLIC STATEMENT OF MORE PRECISE INTENT ABOUT WITEDRAWAL FROM THE GOI. WITH SHAMIR DOMINATING THE DISCUSSION THAT FOLLOWED, THE TWO ISRAELI MINISTERS

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NIS 198-008/1 4/19/02
BY [Signature] NARA, Date

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IN THE COURSE OF THE DISCUSSION, MCFARLANE ALSO RELAYED GOL THINKING THAT IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO MOVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO COMPLETE THE IDF REDEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN STRING IT OUT UNNECESSARILY. ARENS SAID THAT THIS THOUGHT PARALLELED THE MOST RECENT THINKING IN THE IDF AS WELL. HE SAID THAT THE AWWALI LINE COULD BE READY TO BE OCCUPIED FROM A LOGISTICAL POINT OF VIEW BY SEPTEMBER FIRST. IT WAS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE NEXT FEW WEEKS SHOULD BE USED FOR THE MOST CLOSE COORDINATION POSSIBLE BETWEEN THE IDF AND THE LAF, AND FOR A CONTINUING MAJOR EFFORT TO ACHIEVE A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN THE DRUZE AND THE GOL TO PERMIT A SMOOTH TRANSITION. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND LEWIS MET WITH MINISTERS SHAMIR AND ARENS, PLUS A NOTETAKER, FOR APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR ON FRIDAY AFTERNOON, AUGUST 12. JUST PRIOR TO THIS MEETING, SHAMIR AND ARENS HAD MET WITH PRIME MINISTER BEGIN TO DISCUSS THE PROPOSED STATEMENT BY THE GOI WHICH MCFARLANE HAD SUGGESTED TO THE ISRAELIS IN TEL AVIV ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 11. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT BEGIN, SHAMIR AND ARENS HAD AGREED THAT THE STATEMENT WAS UNACCEPTABLE AND THEY HAD NO INTENTION OF PUTTING IT BEFORE THE ISRAELI CABINET.

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7. ARENS THEN SAID THAT HE WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD LIKE TO SEE AN EARLY REDEPLOYMENT RATHER THAN A SLOWER ONE, SINCE THIS WAS ALSO THE LATEST ISRAELI THINKING. HE HAD NOW LEARNED THAT THE LOGISTICAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT TO THE AWWALI WOULD BE COMPLETED BY SEPTEMBER FIRST. (SHAMIR INTERJECTED TO SUGGEST THAT NO DATE HE MENTIONED, RATHER "SEVERAL WEEKS."

8. WHILE RECONFIRMING THAT THE LEBANESE WANT TO STEP-UP AND INCREASE REAL COORDINATION FOR THE REDEPLOYMENT, MCFARLANE THEN STRESSED THAT THEY ARE STILL ANXIOUS TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI PUBLIC STATEMENT WHICH PUTS THAT REDEPLOYMENT INTO THE CONTEXT OF A CONTINUING PROCESS. THIS THEN KICKED OFF A LENGTHY DISCUSSION ABOUT THE U.S. PROPOSAL.

9. [Redacted]

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[Redacted] MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT BOTH PRESIDENT AMIN GEMAYEL AND WADDI HADDAD SAID THAT "WE HAVE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH THE DRUZE," THOUGH THIS IS OBVIOUSLY A DIFFERENT FORMULATION THAN SAYING THEY WERE READY TO MAKE CONCESSIONS. SHAMIR THEN ASKED AGAIN WHETHER THE GOL WANTS ISRAELI ASSISTANCE IN THIS EFFORT. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT INDEED THE GOL DID WISH ISRAELI ASSISTANCE AND IN FACT PREFERRED TO HAVE ISRAEL TAKE THE LEAD IN CONTACTING WALID JUMBLATT IN SETTING UP A MEETING WITH HIM, A MEETING WHICH THEY NOW WANT TO UNDERTAKE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

10. SINCE SHAMIR AND ARENS SEEM TO BE FOCUSING ON THE FACT THAT THE LEBANESE, NOW SOBERED, WERE SEEKING MORE ACTIVELY ISRAELI COOPERATION AND COORDINATION, MCFARLANE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO MISLEAD THE ISRAELIS. THOUGH THE LEBANESE AGREE THAT THEY MUST COORDINATE WITH THE IDF, MCFARLANE WAS SURE THAT WE WILL FACE CONTINUED DELAYS AND DIFFICULTIES UNTIL THEY OBTAIN A "FIGLEAF" IN THE FORM OF A SATISFACTORY PUBLIC DECLARATION FROM ISRAEL.

11. THE AGREEMENT ALREADY CONTAINS A PRECISE TIMETABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL; BUT IT IS NOT ENOUGH FOR RIGHT NOW. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT HE WAS NOT ATTEMPTING TO PLEAD THE LEBANESE CASE. HOWEVER, THEY BELIEVE STRONGLY THAT THE AGREEMENT PRODUCES NO BENEFITS FOR LEBANON AND ON THE OTHER HAND PRODUCES SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER RISKS, SO LONG AS SYRIAN RECALCITRANCE MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO CARRY OUT. MCFARLANE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE "MELODRAMATIC," BUT WE ARE AT A POINT WHICH ONE MIGHT CALL A STRATEGIC LITMUS TEST IN BEIRUT. AND THE BITTERNESS AND MISTRUST OF ISRAEL

IS RISING. THE AGREEMENT HAS BECOME THE EMBODIMENT OF A PROBLEM, A PROBLEM WHICH WOULD BE WORSENERD BY AN EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS. THE LEBANESE, MCFARLANE SAID, ARE COMING TO THE POINT RAPIDLY OF THINKING THAT IF ISRAEL CANNOT DO THIS SIMPLE THING TO ASSIST THEM AT THIS MOMENT OF GREAT DIFFICULTY, THEN THE AGREEMENT ITSELF WILL INEVITABLY BECOME A DEAD LETTER."

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16. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT HE WOULD NOT CHARACTERIZE IT THAT WAY. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WILL SIMPLY LOSE CONFIDENCE IN THE VALUE OF THE AGREEMENT. ONE CANNOT ESCAPE, HE SAID, THE DEPTH OF THEIR CONVICTION THAT THIS IS THE "TENT STRAW"; A KIND OF TEST OF ISRAEL'S INTENTION. HE SAID THAT THE LEBANESE WOULD NOT EVEN ADMIT THAT THE DIFFICULTIES IN RECENT DAYS MIGHT HAVE BEEN AVOIDED HAD THE LEBANESE EARLIER COORDINATED MORE CLOSELY WITH THE

IDF. NONETHELESS, THEY ARE CLOSE TO A POINT OF SERIOUS REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT AT THIS MOMENT.

17.

[REDACTED] MEANWHILE, IT WAS AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE ANOTHER TRILATERAL MEETING SATURDAY NIGHT IN BEIRUT AND THAT MCFARLANE WOULD SEEK TO TRIGGER ANOTHER MEETING BETWEEN GENERALS TANNOUS AND LEVY, THOUGH HE COULD NOT GUARANTEE IT. THE ISRAELIS COMMITTED THEMSELVES TO WORK ON TRYING TO SET UP A MEETING WITH JUMBLATT FOR THE LEBANESE.

18. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, MCFARLANE, IN VERY SOMBER TONES, SHOWED HIS CONCERN ABOUT THE ISRAELI POSITION BY SAYING THAT HE WAS VERY, VERY WORRIED ABOUT THE IMMEDIATE PROSPECTS AHEAD, AND THAT HE HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED IN ISRAELI INTENTIONS TO WITHDRAWAL FULLY UP TO THIS POINT. SHAMIR ASKED WHETHER HE NOW DOUBTED THOSE INTENTIONS. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT HE HAD TO ADMIT HE WAS AT A LOSS TO UNDERSTAND THE ISRAELI POSITION OR WHAT DAMAGE ISRAEL WOULD INCUR BY ISSUING THIS STATEMENT, PARTICULARLY COMPARED WITH THE VERY GREAT DANGER TO THE FUTURE ISRAELI-LEBANESE RELATIONSHIP WHICH THREATENED AS A RESULT OF NONE ISSUANCE. "THERE MUST BE SOME GREATER ISRAELI STRATEGIC PURPOSE HERE THAT I JUST DON'T UNDERSTAND".

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20.

[REDACTED]

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USG-GOF POSITIONS ON CONTROLLING ARMAMENTS IN THE SHUF

THE FOLLOWING POINTS CONSTITUTE THE BASIS FOR AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON AND THE PSP.

- THE USG AND GOF UNDERTAKE TO ORGANIZE A UN OBSERVER BODY TO PRESIDE OVER THE COLLECTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS (CREW-SERVED AUTOMATIC WEAPONS, ROCKETS, ARMORED FIGHTING VEHICLES, TANKS, AND ARTILLERY) IN THE POSSESSION OF MILITIA UNITS IN THE ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS. THE UN OBSERVER BODY WILL ALSO SUPERVISE THE REMOVAL OF SUCH WEAPONS TO REMOTE SITES WHERE THEY WILL REMAIN UNDER THE SURVEILLANCE OF UN OBSERVERS.
- THE USG AND THE GOF WILL UNDERTAKE JOINTLY TO DRAFT AND DELIVER A DEMARCHE TO THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC GOVERNMENT TO EXPLAIN THE FOREGOING PROPOSAL AND SEEK THE SUPPORT OF THAT GOVERNMENT FOR ITS PEACEFUL IMPLEMENTATION.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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CPROG-08793/83

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DISTRIBUTION
MCFARLANE-4; AMB.

ORIGINATOR

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

- SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
- WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
- INFOR AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE
- AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE
- AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE
- AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE
- AMEMBASSY JIDDA, IMMEDIATE
- USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE
- AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356, DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, IS, PLO, LE, JO, SA

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: WORKING LUNCH
WITH CHIEF OF STAFF BIN SHAKER AND FORMIN KASSIM,
ET AL, AMMAN, ON 9 AUGUST 1983

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS, DCM DJEREJIAN, DUR AND TEICHER ATTENDED A WORKING LUNCHEON 9 AUGUST HOSTED BY JAF CHIEF OF STAFF ZEID BIN SHAKER. OTHER GOJ PARTICIPANTS WERE FOREIGN MINISTER MARWAN KASIM, MINISTER OF INFORMATION ABU ODEH, AND UN AMBASSADOR ABDUL SALAH. MEETING PROVIDED OPPORTUNITY TO DEBRIEF MISSION TO DATE AND TO DETERMINE GOJ IMPRESSIONS OF LEBANON SITUATION AND POSSIBLE NEXT STEPS. JORDANIANS WERE KEENLY INTERESTED IN POSSIBLE COMMITMENT TOWARD PHASED ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] END SUMMARY.

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3. LUNCHEON PRECEDED BY BRIEF OF MCFARLANE MISSION TO
LEBANON, ISRAEL AND SAUDI ARABIA. JORDANIANS WERE VERY
INTERESTED IN CURRENT ISRAELI AND SAUDI ATTITUDES AND
SYRIAN ARGUMENTATION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NOTING THEIR "JUSTIFIABLE" OBJECTIONS TO THE
AGREEMENT, HE SAID THAT SARG WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN
SABATOGING PROGRESS ON ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE
REJOINED THAT ASSAD IS USING THE AGREEMENT AS A VEHICLE
TO DIG IN HIS HEELS ON EVERY ISSUE ALTHOUGH THIS AGREEMENT
COULD BE SEEN AS BETTER THAN THAT WHICH HE NEGOTIATED IN
1974 IN THAT IT PROVIDES FOR THE COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF
ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON.

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4. MCFARLANE CHARACTERIZED HIS DISCUSSIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA AS GOOD ONES STRESSING THE "OPTIMISTIC" MOOD OF KING FAHD AND NOTING KHADDAM REAFFIRMATION OF SARG'S READINESS TO UNDERTAKE "SIMULTANEOUS" WITHDRAWALS. BIN SHAKER NOTED THAT IF SAUDI OPTIMISM ABOUT SYRIAN FLEXIBILITY IS WARRANTED, IT WILL ENTAIL A "VERY HIGH PRICE." MCFARLANE COMMENTED THAT HE HAD TRIED TO DRAW ASSAD OUT ON PRECISELY WHAT THE "PRICE" WAS, TO NO AVAIL.

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5. MCFARLANE STRESSED THE STEPS GEMAYEL IS TAKING TO BUILD CONSENSUS AND TO START PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION CITING THE STRIDES MADE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LAF AS A CASE IN POINT. HE THEN NOTED THAT THE FORTHCOMING IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE ALEY/SHUF WOULD POSE A CRITICAL POLITICAL TEST FOR THE GOL AND ITS PROGRAM FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION, SPECIFICALLY, THE RELATIONSHIP OF WALID JUMBLATT TO AMIN GEMAYEL. BIN SHAKER RESPONDED THAT WHEN KING HUSSEIN HAD MET RECENTLY WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL IN FRANCE, GEMAYEL HAD OFFERED TO MEET WITH JUMBLATT, IN THE PRESENCE OF KING HUSSEIN IF THAT WOULD FACILITATE THINGS. BIN SHAKER COMMENTED THAT WALID JUMBLATT WAS VERY "HARD" IN HIS OPPOSITION TO THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND "TOTALLY DISTRUSTFUL" OF ITS MOTIVES. FAIRBANKS ASKED THE JORDANIANS FOR THEIR IMPRESSION OF JUMBLATT'S CHARACTER;

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6. MCFARLANE TURNED NEXT TO HIS DISCUSSIONS IN SYRIA WHERE HE TRIED TO ELICIT SOME SMALL SIGN OF SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE AND THE PROCESS OF RECONCILIATION. HE EXPLAINED THE INITIATIVE TABLED IN DAMASCUS REGARDING A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE UPPER METN AS A MEANS OF PERMITTING A FURTHER EXTENSION OF GOL CONTROL AND AUTHORITY AND A SIGN OF SYRIAN GOOD FAITH IN THAT REGARD. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT ANOTHER REASON WHICH WAS NOT STATED WAS THE NEED TO CONTROL OR NEUTRALIZE PSP ARTILLERY IN RANGE OF THE ABEY AND SHUF. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT THE SYRIANS DID NOT BITE AND THAT THEY STRESSED THAT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION WAS A LEBANESE PROBLEM.

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7. MCFARLANE EXPRESSED HIS THANKS FOR THE CANDID ADVICE
AND NOTED THAT WE WERE AT A CROSSROADS
IN OUR DEALINGS WITH SYRIA. WE COULD ADOPT THE
TRADITIONAL INCREMENTAL APPROACH HOPING TO EVENTUALLY
FIND FLEXIBILITY OR WE COULD USE A MORE FRONTAL
APPROACH PREMISED ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT IF WE COULD
NOT CHANGE ASSAD'S MIND WE MIGHT CHANGE HIS ENVIRONMENT.

MCFARLANE EXPLAINED THAT A TACTIC
UNDER CONSIDERATION WAS FOR GEMAYEL TO ASK FORMALLY
FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL -- PERHAPS A "GOOD FAITH"
REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE METN FIRST -- AND THEN TO RALLY
MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE LEBANESE DEMAND IN VERY
VISIBLE WAYS. MCFARLANE TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO
EXPRESS U.S. THANKS AND ADMIRATION FOR THE JUST-
COMPLETED "GIFT" OF JORDANIAN M48 TANKS AND APCs.

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8. BIN SHAKER NOTED SOBERLY THAT SYRIA'S REJECTION OF THE AGREEMENT HAD, TO SOME EXTENT, REBUILT THE SARG'S IMAGE AS THE DEFENDER OF ARAB WILL NOTING THAT UNTIL THE AGREEMENT WAS CONCLUDED, ASSAD HAD BEEN LARGELY ISOLATED IN THE ARAB WORLD.

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9. FORMIN KASSIM THEN RAISED THE NEED FOR MORE ATTENTION TO SECURING A "PROGRAM" FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WHICH WOULD PROVIDE "THE HOOK" FOR RALLYING ARAB SUPPORT OF LEBANON. TO UNDERLINE THE URGENCY, KASIM STRESSED THAT THE GOJ SENSED A MOOD OF GROWING PESSIMISM IN LEBANON AND SAW GEMAYEL AS SINKING DEEPER AND DEEPER IN HIS DESPAIR AND NOTING THAT THE REALITY OUTSTRIPS THE PROSPECTS. MCFARLANE REITERATED USG DETERMINATION TO OBTAIN AN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO A PROCESS LEADING TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWALS HOLDING THE LAST STAGE -- DISENGAGEMENT FROM POSITIONS ADJACENT TO THOSE OCCUPIED BY SYRIA -- UNTIL SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS COMPLETED. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT THE ONLY OPERATIVE CONDITIONS FOR SUBSEQUENT PHASES OF WITHDRAWAL WAS THE LAF'S ABILITY TO SECURE AREAS VACATED BY THE IDF. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT CONDITIONS MIGHT BE SATISFIED BY A USG-GOI SIDE LETTER WHICH WOULD PROVIDE FOR A JOINT DETERMINATION IN THIS REGARD.

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10. KASIM THEN CITED THE LIMITED MEANS WE HAVE TO
INFLUENCE SYRIA. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CORE PROBLEM HE
NOTED IS THE PERCEPTION IN THE ARAB WORLD THAT THE U.S.
HAS ATTEMPTED TO TRANSFORM THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI
PROBLEM INTO AN INTER-ARAB PROBLEM. FURTHER, HE SAID,
THE AGREEMENT HAD IN EFFECT PERMITTED ALL SORTS OF
PEOPLE IN LEBANON TO DEAL WITH SYRIA, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] KASIM ASKED WHETHER THE ISRAELI
PRESENCE IN LEBANON COULD BE SUSTAINED INDEFINITELY;
WOULD ISRAEL ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN A SPHERE OF INFLUENCE
IN LEBANON.

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11. MCFARLANE STRESSED THE TWO MOST PRESSING OBJECTIVES WERE TO STRENGTHEN THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND TO GET A COMMITMENT FROM SYRIA TO BEGIN WITHDRAWING. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, HE NOTED THAT A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BEKAA CREATES PRESSURE ON SYRIA. BIN SHAKER NOTED THE ROLE OF THE SOVIETS IN GETTING A SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL. KASIM QUESTIONED WHETHER OUR ASSUMPTIONS FOR DEALING WITH SYRIA WERE FLAWED.



BIN
SHAKER ADDED THAT IN THIS CASE, THE SOVIETS WILL PRESS ASSAD TO RESIST ANY SETTLEMENT OF THE ISSUE UNLESS THE USSR HAS A "PIECE OF THE ACTION."

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12. MINISTER OF INFORMATION ABU ODEH THEN ENTERED THE DISCUSSION NOTING THAT MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT SUFFICE TO GET SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. HE NOTED THAT IN THE LEBANON CRISIS AS WELL AS IN THE LARGE MIDDLE EAST CONTEXT, THERE ARE THREE PARTIES WHO SUFFER FROM THE "NEITHER PEACE NOR WAR" SITUATION. THOSE WHO LOSE ARE LEBANON, JORDAN, AND THE PALESTINIANS, WHILE THOSE WHO PROFIT ARE ISRAEL, SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION. UNFORTUNATELY, THOSE WHO STAND TO GAIN OUTWEIGH THE LOSERS

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MCFARLANE REITERATED THAT A PUTATIVE ISRAELI THREAT TO "DOWNTOWN DAMASCUS" AND PROSPECTS FOR A TWO-FRONT WAR WITH ISRAEL WERE IMPORTANT FORMS OF PRESSURE WHICH SYRIA HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT. THIS WAS THE LOGIC FOR LIMITING THE INITIAL PHASES OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE WESTERN COASTAL PLAIN.

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13. MCFARLANE THEN SUMMARIZED HIS NEAR TERM OBJECTIVES AS GETTING THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT TO DEAL MEANINGFULLY WITH THE DRUZE LEADERS, KEEPING THE ISRAELI PRESSURE IN PLACE IN EASTERN LEBANON, AND GARNERING MODERATE ARAB SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL. THE LAST OBJECTIVE WAS AN AREA IN WHICH THE GOJ COULD BE ESPECIALLY HELPFUL. BIN SHAKER ASKED ABOUT THE SHUF AND FOR MCFARLANE'S ASSESSMENT OF ISRAEL'S OBJECTIVES THERE; WERE THEY FORMENTING TROUBLE? MCFARLANE RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT THE ISRAELIS SEEM TO HAVE MODIFIED THEIR STRATEGY AND WERE NOW "HEDGING THEIR BETS" ON THE ABILITY OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO PACIFY THE SHUF. HE WAS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THAT THE GOI WAS READY TO ASSIST. ABU ODEH OBSERVED THAT MCFARLANE WAS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT ON THE CRITICALITY OF THE SHUF. GEMAYEL, HE SAID, HAS TO GET THE PHALANGE UNDER CONTROL TO PERSUADE LEBANESE MUSLIMS OF HIS COMMITMENT TO RESTORING THE CONSENSUS. IN THIS REGARD, HE HAS TO "START IN HIS OWN FAMILY" BY APPEARING TO BE "MORE LEBANESE THAN THE PHALANGE."

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14. AMB. ABDUL SALAH TURNED TO THE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION ISSUE NOTING THAT GEMAYEL CANNOT RECONSTITUTE THE LEBANESE NATION WITHOUT ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF HOW TO AVOID FUTURE CIVIL WARS. IN HIS OPINION THE OLD ORDER BROKE DOWN IN 1975 AND LEBANON NEEDS TO CONVENE A NEW NATIONAL CONVENTION IN WHICH THE PHALANGE DOES NOT REEMERGE AS THE VICTOR; WHERE THERE ARE NEITHER VICTORS NOR VANQUISHED. A CONVENTION MIGHT BE A WAY TO "GET GEMAYEL OUT OF HIS PREDICAMENT."

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15. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT THE IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHUF WILL POSE GEMAYEL WITH AN ACID TEST IN CURBING THE KĀTĀEB. BUT HIS SUCCESS WITHIN THE AREAS VACATED BY THE ISRAELIS MAY BE HOSTAGE TO SYRIAN OR PSP INTERFERENCE FROM ADJACENT AREAS. IN THIS REGARD, MCFARLANE ASKED WHETHER HIS HOSTS THOUGHT A VISIBLE AND FORMAL CALL FOR SYRIA TO PULL OUT OF THE METN WAS A GOOD IDEA.

IF IT WERE TO MATERIALIZE, AS A VERY IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT TO DEMONSTRATE ITS FAIRNESS. KASIM INTERJECTED THAT THE GOL, IN ANY CASE, NEEDS TO REACH AN UNDERSTANDING WITH THE DRUZE AND WALID JUMBLATT WILL EXACT A HIGH PRICE FOR HIS COOPERATION. NONETHELESS, HE AGREED THAT THE SHUF CAN BE A PATTERN FOR RECONCILIATION BETWEEN OTHER FACTIONS. DILLON##

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
JCS FOR J-5

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, IS, PLO, LE
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BRIEFING BY
GEN. TANNOUS ON LAF PLANNING FOR THE SHUF, 12 AUG 83

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS DILLON AND FAIRBANKS, AND U.S. DELEGATION MET WITH GENERAL TANNOUS, GEN HAMDAN, AND STAFF TO RECEIVE BRIEFING ON EVENTS OF 10 AUGUST AROUND ABEYH AND TO HEAR LAF VIEWS OF PROBLEMS BEARING ON ITS MOVEMENT INTO THE ALEY/SOUF REGION FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. THE MOST IMMEDIATE PROBLEM RAISED BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER DR. WADIA HADDAD HAD TO DO WITH NEED TO SECURE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AGAINST ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACK BEFORE IT IS REOPENED.
END SUMMARY.
3. AMBASSADORS DILLON AND FAIRBANKS, ACCOMPANIED BY DUR, ROSS, NELSON, EUCOM LIAISON OFFICER COL. WILLIAMS, OMC MAJ. D'ENTREMONT, OMC OFFICER MAJ. ENGLEHARDT, AND ARMA ATTENDED SUBJECT BRIEFING IN GEN. TANNOUS' OFFICE AT THE MOD. THE LEBANESE SIDE ALSO INCLUDED FORMIN SALEM AND WADIA HADDAD, NCSA. THE BRIEFING BEGAN WITH A MAP PRESENTATION AND DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENTS IN AND AROUND ABEYH SINCE 1 AUGUST. GEN. TANNOUS' DISCUSSION OF THE EVENTS WAS IN CONTRAST TO THE SKETCHY INFORMATION WE HAVE RECEIVED FROM A VARIETY OF OTHER SOURCES. HE

EXPLAINED THAT TWO PLATOON POSITIONS HAD BEEN ENCIRCLED AND ONE PLATOON HAD BEEN OVERRUN FORCIBLY. ANOTHER PLATOON IS STILL BESIEGED BY THE PSP AND OUT OF COMMUNICATION WITH LAF COMMAND AUTHORITIES. GEN. TANNOUS COMPLAINED BITTERLY THAT UNTIL TODAY THE IDF HAD REFUSED PERMISSION TO RESUPPLY THE 42ND BATTALION AND IT CONTINUES TO REFUSE PERMISSION FOR THE LAF TO RELIEVE THE PLATOON IN POSITION NEAR KFAR MATTA. GEN. TANNOUS REPLIED THAT DURING THE ACTION 74 LAF SOLDIERS HAD BEEN CAPTURED (ALL HAVE NOW BEEN RELEASED THROUGH THE IDF), TWO KILLED IN ACTION AND SIX WOUNDED IN ACTION. SIX, INCLUDING ONE OFFICER -- APPARENTLY DRUZE -- HAVE DECIDED NOT TO RETURN TO THEIR UNITS. AS THE MEETING WAS DRAWING TO A CLOSE, GEN. TANNOUS SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE THAT PSP MILITIA WAS ADVANCING ON THE BESIEGED PLATOON AND ESCORTED BY THE IDF. WE HAVE NO WAY OF DETERMINING THE VERACITY OF THIS REPORT BUT IT IS NOTABLE THAT THE LAF SUSPECTS THIS DEGREE OF ISRAELI PSP COLLUSION. (BEFORE THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED, GEN. TANNOUS HAD INDICATED THAT THE LAF HAD INTELLIGENCE THAT THE PSP WOULD ATTEMPT TO OVERRUN THIS PLATOON TONIGHT AND THAT LAF ARTILLERY MIGHT BE USED TO BREAK THE PSP SIEGE.)

4. GEN. TANNOUS EXPLAINED THAT THE INCIDENT AT ABEYH HAS HAD BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE ASPECTS. WHILE RECOGNIZING THAT THERE HAD BEEN A FAILURE IN INTELLIGENCE AND WARNING AND THAT THERE HAD BEEN SOME LAXITY EVIDENT IN AT LEAST ONE OF THE PLATOON POSITIONS, HE THOUGHT THE BATTALION HAD FOUGHT WELL IN THIS FIRST TEST. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THERE HAD BEEN A HIGH DEGREE OF COHESION IN THIS UNIT SINCE THERE WERE ONLY SIX APPARENT DEFECTIONS BY DRUZE SOLDIERS OUT OF 82 ASSIGNED TO THE BATTALION. HE ALSO POINTED OUT THAT THE ABEYH ACTION WAS THE FIRST TEST FOR THE LAF ARTILLERY WHICH HAD BEEN USED TO DEFEND TROOPS, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PROVIDING A RALLYING POINT FOR THE DRUZE IN THIS AREA AGAINST THE ARMY. GEN. TANNOUS IS CLEARLY DETERMINED TO OFFSET THE NEGATIVE IMPRESSIONS RESULTING FROM THE DEFEAT OF ONE COMPANY AND THE SIEGE OF A PLATOON BY FORCIBLY OPPOSING ANY FURTHER ATTACKS BY THE PSP AGAINST THIS BATTALION.

5. THE BRIEFING THEN SHIFTED TO THE MORE GENERAL

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JCS FOR J-5

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, IS, PLO, LE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BRIEFING BY

PROBLEM "OF THE MOUNTAIN." TANNOUS BEGAN BY NOTING THAT THERE WERE MANY ACTORS ON THE MOUNTAIN: SYRIA, THE ISRAELIS, THE PSP MILITIA, THE LF AND FINALLY THE LEBANESE ARMY. HE PROCEEDED THEN TO DESCRIBE EACH ACTOR'S OBJECTIVES. THE SYRIANS, HE SAID, APPEAR DETERMINED TO UNDEPMEINE THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND INTERFERE WITH THE EFFORTS OF THE LAF WHICH IS THE INSTRUMENT OF REUNIFICATION. TO THIS END, HE EXPECTS THE SYRIANS WILL TRY TO USE THE PSP IN THE MOUNTAINS (AND THE AMAL MILITIAS) TO ACTIVELY OPPOSE THE RESTORATION OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY. WITH REGARD TO THE PSP MILITIAS, GEN. TANNOUS NOTED THAT WALID JUMBLATT IS NOT THE MAIN ACTOR AND THAT PSP ACTIVITIES ARE, IN HIS ESTIMATION, GOVERNED BY THE COMMUNIST ACTION ORGANIZATION OR OTHER LEFTIST ELEMENTS WHO FORCE DECISIONS ON WALID JUMBLATT AFTER THE FACT. SINCE HE IS NOT PRESENT IN THE MOUNTAINS, JUMBLATT PERFORCE HAS TO SUPP RT THE SOVIET AND SYRIAN AGENDA.

6. AMONG THE MNST SIGNIFICANT ASPECTS OF TANNOUS' BRIEFING WAS HIS PRESENTATION OF BOTTOM-LINE REQUIREMENTS FOR LAF MOVEMENT INTO THE SHUF AS THE IDF WITHDPAWS. FIRST. HE MUST HAVE ASSURANCE THAT THE SYRIANS WILL NOT CONDUCT AIR ATTACKS ON THE LEBANESE ARMY WHICH IS NOT PRESENTLY EQUIPPED TO DEFEND ITSELF IN THAT REGARD. SECONDLY, HE NEEDS A GUARANTEE THAT MASED SYRIAN FORCES WILL NOT ATTACK ACROSS THE "FREE ZONE." THE ABOVE CONDITIONS, HE SAID, WERE INDISPENSABLE PRIOR TO THE LAF DEPLOYMENT. HE THEN NOTED TWO OTHER CONDITIONS WHICH, WHILE IMPORTANT, WOULD NOT BLOCK LAF DEPLOYMENT. THE FIRST LESSER CONDITION IS THAT RYRIAN CONTROLLED (PSP) ARTILLERY IN THE SHUF PROPER IS NEUTRALIZED. SECOND IS THAT RYRIAN AND PSP ARTILLERY IN THE UPPER METN IS NOT USED TO OPPOSE LAF DEPLNYMENT.

7. TURNING TO THE ISRAELIS, TANNOUS SUSPECTS THAT THE ISRAELIS ARE INTENT ON THE "CANTONIZATION" OF LEBANON INTO CHRISTIAN, DRUZE, AND SHI'ITE DISTRICTS. FROM HIS EXPERIENCE, IT APPEARS THAT THE ISPAELIS HAVE WORKED TO INCREASE THE ENMITY BETWEEN MILITIAS. HE CITED THE MOVEMENT OF EXTERNAL LEBANESE FORCES INTO THE MOUNTAIN AREAS AND THE ISRAELI ASSISTANCE TO BOTH THE LF AND THE PSP. THE IDF, HE SAID, APPEARS TO ENCOURAGE FIGHTING BETWEEN DRUZE AND CHRISTIAN MILITIAS THEREBY CREATING MORE AND MORE ENMITY BETWEEN THEM. FURTHER, HE COMPLAINED, THE

ISRAELIS HAVE BROUGHT THE DRUZE TO A STATE OF NEAR-HYSTERIA WHERE THEY SUSPECT ALL CHRISTIANS AND NOT JUST THE LEBANESE FORCES. THEY HAVE DONE THE SAME THING WITH THE CHRISTIAN POPULATION IN THE DRUZE. WITH THE IMPENDING DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF TO THE MOUNTAINS, THE ISRAELIS ARE NOW TRYING TO DISCREDIT THE ARMY AND TO PRESENT IT AS A THREAT TO THE DRUZE POPULATION. HE POINTED TO THE DRUZE SHELLING OF ARMY POSITIONS ON 10 AND 11 AUGUST AND NOTED THAT WHILE HE HAD RESISTED RESPONDING TO EARLIER PSP ATTACKS ON THE ARMY -- TO SAVE THE UNITY OF THE ARMY AND ITS IMAGE AS A DEFENDER OF ALL LEBANON -- HE COULD NO LONGER TOLERATE SUCH ATTACKS. TO UNDERLINE HIS POINT, HE QUESTIONED WHY THE LAF BATTALION AT ABEYH HAD NOW BEEN ATTACKED BY THE PSP WITHOUT REASON AFTER HAVING BEEN IN THAT POSITION SINCE OCTOBER 1982. HE CONCLUDED BY NOTING POINTEDLY THAT THE ISRAELIS HAVE REALIZED THEIR OBJECTIVES: THE ARMY WAS

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
JCS FOR J-5

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, SY, IS, PLO, LE
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BRIEFING BY

ATTACKED, THE ARMY WAS SEEN TO FAIL, AND LAF ARTILLERY HAD BEEN USED AGAINST THE PSP FOR THE FIRST TIME. ANY MORE INCIDENTS OF THIS TYPE AND THE DRUZE THROUGHOUT THE SHUF WILL SEE THE LAF AS A THREAT AND AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SUBJUGATION.

8. TURNING TO THE MILITIAS, TANNOUS BEGAN BY DESCRIBING THE "GOOD RELATIONS" THAT THE LAF HAS HAD TO DATE WITH THE PSP LEADERSHIP. HE EXPLAINED THAT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE ARMY HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH WALID JUMBLATT AND THAT SEVERAL OF THE CONDITIONS SET BY JUMBLATT TO COOPERATE WITH THE LAF DEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN MET. FOR EXAMPLE, HE HAD BEEN ABLE TO ASSURE JUMB ATT THAT GEN. ABU DARGHAM (THE APPOINTED DRUZE COMMANDER FOR THE SHUF AREA) WOULD HAVE FULL AUTHORITY AND THAT HE WOULD CONTROL THE LEBANESE FORCES. TANNOUS NOTED THAT SOME OF THE CONDITIONS OF A POLITICAL NATURE HAD ALSO BEEN MET WITH ONE SIGNIFICANT EXCEPTION. MARWAN HAMMADA'S REQUEST CONCERNING DECENTRALIZATION HAD BEEN REFUSED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL FOR THE TIMEBEING. OTHER CONDITIONS GOVERNING THE FREE MOVEMENT OF DRUZE CITIZENS BETWEEN THE MOUNTAIN AND BEIRUT, FOR EXAMPLE, WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF. SINCE THOSE DISCUSSIONS, HOWEVER, THE SITUATION APPEARS TO HAVE CHANGED AND WALID JUMBLATT'S RECENT ACTIONS SUGGEST THAT HE MAY NOT COOPERATE. TANNOUS SAID POINTEDLY THAT THIS IS THE MOST DIFFICULT PROBLEM HE FACES BECAUSE THE LAF "CANNOT GO TO THE MOUNTAIN IF THE POPULATION IS AGAINST US." IF THE GOL CANNOT GET AN AGREEMENT WITH WALID JUMBLATT BEFORE IT DEPLOYS, IT WILL NEED TO MAKE AGREEMENTS WITH AT LEAST FIFTY PERCENT OF THE LOCAL DRUZE PEOPLE. TANNOUS TOOK THIS OPPORTUNITY TO NOTE THAT PSP ATTACKS ON THE AIRPORT MUST STOP IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE THE COUNTRY CANNOT TAKE THE PRESSURE ON ITS ECONOMY. HE WARNED THAT THE LAF WOULD HAVE TO REACT FORCIBLY TO STOP ANY FUTURE SHELLING. WITH REGARD TO LEBANESE FORCES, TANNOUS SAID THAT THIS WAS A "BAD SITUATION UNTIL JUST A FEW DAYS AGO," BUT HE NOW HAD ASSURANCE THAT OUTSIDE LF FORCES WOULD LEAVE THE MOUNTAIN ALTHOUGH INDIGENOUS MILITIA UNITS WOULD STAY IN THEIR POSITIONS.

9. TANNOUS THEN TURNED TO THE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS OF REDEPL YMENT AND COORDINATION WITH THE ISRAELIS.

HE BEGAN WITH A STATEMENT OF CONCERN ABOUT IDF WILLINGNESS TO COORDINATE. HIS SUSPICIONS HAVE BEEN REINFORCED BY THE ON-AGAIN, OFF-AGAIN NATURE OF COOPERATION REGARDING THE ABEYH INCIDENT. TANNOUS SAID THE LEBANESE RECOGNIZE THAT THEY NEED TO COORDINATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE LAF WITH THE IDF AND THAT HE WANTS "CORRECT MILITARY RELATIONS" WITH THE ISRAELIS. HE ASSERTED THAT U.S. REPRESENTATION WAS ESSENTIAL IN THIS REGARD BECAUSE THE ISRAELIS "COOPERATE ONLY IF THE U.S. IS PRESENT." PRACTICALLY SPEAKING, TANNOUS WANTS TO ESTABLISH A COORDINATION COMMITTEE AT THE SECTOR COMMANDER LEVEL WITH A U.S. ELEMENT. HE SAID THAT HE ENVISAGED A SITUATION WHERE THE THREE PERMANENT MEMBERS WOULD MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE AD HOC PARTICIPATION OF PSP AND LF REPRESENTATIVES AS WARRANTED. THE NEXT SPECIFIC REQUIREMENT TANNOUS PRESENTED WAS THE PRESSING NEED FOR BETTER CONDITIONS AND CONTROL FOR THE LAF. HE PREPARED THIS REQUEST WITH A DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE "EMBRYONIC" CONDITION OF THE LAF WHICH CAN FIGHT "ANY MILITIA WHICH IS ISOLATED FROM POPULAR

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
JCS FOR J-5

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
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SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BRIEFING BY

SUPP RT BUT NOT THE IDF OR SYRIAN FORCES."
RETURNING TO SPECIFICS, HE MADE A STRONG APPEAL FOR
SECURE COMMUNICATIONS WHICH HAD BEEN A VULNERABILITY
IN THE RECENT ABEYH INCIDENT AS THE PSP HAD EXPLOITED
COMMUNICATIONS TO FIND LAF WEAKNESSES. MAJ. D'ENTREMONT
THEN ELABORATED ON THE STATUS OF THE SIX HUNDRED
COMMERCIAL SCRAMBLERS THAT ARE ON ORDER FOR THE LAF,
POINTING OUT THAT ABOUT ONE HUNDRED TO ONE HUNDRED FIFTY
OF THESE DEVICES MIGHT SOON BE AVAILABLE. TANNOUS THEN
REVIEWED THE STATUS OF LAF ARTILLERY AND ITS NEED FOR
ACCELERATED TRAINING AND AMMUNITION. HE DID NOT MAKE A
SPECIFIC REQUEST HERE, BUT POINTED OUT THAT LEBANON HAD
FOUR THOUSAND ROUNDS OF 105 MM AMMUNITION ON ORDER FROM
PORTUGAL. TANNOUS ALSO INDICATED THAT THE LAF NEEDS
THE FIVE APCS WHICH WERE CAPTURED BY THE PSP AT ABEYH
AND THAT HE HAD ASKED THE ISRAELIS TO HELP RETURN THESE
APCS.

10. FORMIN SALEM THEN FOCUSED SPECIFICALLY ON THREE
ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WHICH REQUIRED URGENT ISRAELI
COOPERATION. THE FIRST IS REOPENING THE AIRPORT,
SECOND IS PRECLUDING ANY MORE INCIDENTS INVOLVING THE
LEBANESE FORCES AT ABEYH, AND THIRD BEING BETTER MEANS
TO COORDINATE DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SHUF. FAIRBANKS
REITERATED THE ISRAELI CONCERN FOR PUBLIC ISRAELI-
LEBANESE COORDINATION, AND WADIA HADDAD AFFIRMED
THAT THIS WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM ONCE THERE WAS
AGREEMENT ON A TIMETABLE. THE CONVERSATION THEN
FOCUSED DIRECTLY ON THE REOPENING OF THE AIRPORT
AND BOTH SALEM AND HADDAD PRESSED HARD FOR MEANS
TO PRECLUDE FUTURE ROCKET AND MORTAR ATTACKS ON THE
AIRPORT. THIS WAS A CONDITION, THEY SAID, FOR
ITS REOPENING. AT THIS POINT THE CONVERSATION
BECAME SOMEWHAT CONFUSED WITH SALEM AND HADDAD
DISAGREEING ON WHETHER THE ISRAELIS SHOULD PROVIDE
GUARANTEES AGAINST FUTURE ATTACKS FROM AREAS UNDER
THEIR CONTROL (SALEM) OR WHETHER THE LAF SHOULD BE
ALLOWED TO DEPLOY IN FORCE IN AND AROUND SHUWAYFAT
TO "SECURE" THESE AREAS SO THAT THEY ARE NOT USED TO
ATTACK THE AIRPORT. ON A MAP, HADDAD DREW A WIDE
CIRCLE TO DEFINE THE AREA WHICH NEEDED TO BE SECURED
AND DESCRIBED IT AS THE ARC OF FIRE FOR 122 MM
ROCKETS AND MORTARS. FAIRBANKS NOTED THE NEED FOR
A POLITICAL AGREEMENT IN EITHER CASE. OTHERWISE,
HE SAID, THE PSP WOULD KEEP THE LAF FROM DEPLOYING
OR THE ISRAELIS MIGHT NOT COOPERATE. IN GENERAL,
AMB. DILLON AND OTHER MEMBERS OF THE U.S. TEAM

POINTED TO THE ENORMOUS DIFFICULTIES IN MAKING THE ARRANGEMENTS NECESSARY TO SECURE THE AIRPORT FROM ATTACK. THE LEBANESE, AND GEN. TANNOUS IN PARTICULAR, EXPRESSED THEIR CONFIDENCE THAT THE ISRAELIS CAN CONTROL ATTACKS ON THE AIRPORT IF THEY GET TOUGH WITH THE PSP.

11. COMMENT: AT THIS MEETING, WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE GOVERNOR'S OFFICE N ALEY WHICH HAD BEEN OCCUPIED BY THE PSP WAS NOW BACK IN THE CONTROL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THIS BRIEFING MUST BE SEEN AS ONE OF THE MOST SIGNIFICANT EXPRESSIONS OF LEBANESE THINKING ABOUT THE RISKS WHICH ATTEND THE IMPENDING IDF REDEPLOYMENT. THE "RED LINES" AND LESSER CONDITIONS FOR MOVEMENT INTO THE SHUF ARE ESPECIALLY SIGNIFICANT. WE WILL ANALYZE THE LEBANESE POSITIONS FURTHER AND PROVIDE OUR RECOMMENDATIONS BY SEPTEL. DILLON

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 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0611
 RUEEDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0868
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0783
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0632
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 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0809
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CLASS: SECRET
 CERGE: PROG 8/12/83
 APPRV: FAIRBANKS
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
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 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4 AME DCM
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DEPT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARA, EYES ONLY

FROM FAIRBANKS

F.O.: 12356, DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLC, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETINGS IN
 - - - - - BEIRUT, AUGUST 11 AND 12

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

1A. SUMMARY. AMB. FAIRBANKS MET WITH A CONFessionALLY EXPANDED LEBANESE WORKING GROUP AUGUST 11 TO BRIEF ITS MEMBERS ON DEVELOPMENTS ON THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION TO DATE. AFTER STRESSING THE U.S. COMMITMENT OVER THE LONG HAUL, FAIRBANKS DESCRIBED THE RESULTS OF THE MISSION'S STOPS IN ISRAEL, SYRIA, SAUDI ARABIA, AND JORDAN, SHARED SOME THOUGHTS ON THE PLO AND ON THE EGYPTIAN POSITION, AND REVIEWED THE ELEMENTS FROM WHICH WE INTEND TO SHAPE OUR POLICY ON SYRIA. SALEM RESPONDED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF LEBANON'S FEAR THAT THE ADMINISTRATION WILL BE DISTRACTED AWAY FROM LEBANON WHEN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN BEGINS. HE ALSO NOTED THAT LEBANON HAD PUT ALL ITS CHIPS ON THE U.S. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT IS UNSHAKABLE AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT, JUST AS LEBANON HAS CAST ITS LOT WITH THE U.S., SO HAS THE U.S. CAST ITS LOT WITH LEBANON. THE ADMINISTRATION, THE CONGRESS, AND THE PUBLIC HAD TO RETAIN CONFIDENCE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE BROADLY BASED, NOT A CHRIS-TIAN, MARONITE, OR PHALANGE CLIQUE. IN CLOSING, SALEM ASKED FOR U.S. HELP ON THE SHUF PROBLEM AND CALLED FOR A SHORT-TERM SCHEDULE OF ACTIONS AND A DIVISION OF LABOR. IT WAS AGREED TO HOLD AN "OPERATIONAL MEETING" FOR THIS PURPOSE AUGUST 13. IN SEPARATE DISCUSSIONS AUGUST 11-12, SALEM AND HADDAD RAISED THE PROBLEMS THE LEBANESE ARMY WAS FACING IN THE MFAH MATTA/ABAYH POCKET. THE ABSENCE OF ISRAELI ASSISTANCE ON THESE PROBLEMS WAS CONTRIBUTING TO

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GROWING SUSPICIONS ABOUT ISRAELI INTENTIONS. HADDAD WENT SO FAR AS TO SAY THAT HIS EFFORTS WITH GEMAYEL AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL DECISION TO EFFECT AN OPENING TO ISRAEL AS PART OF A STRATEGY TO DEMONSTRATE THE BANKRUPTCY OF SYRIAN POLICY WERE BEING SEVERELY UNDERCUT. END SUMMARY.

2. AMB. FAIRBANKS, AMB. DILLON, ROSS, AND DUR MET WITH THE LEBANESE WORKING GROUP -- EXPANDED FOR CONFIDENTIAL BALANCE TO INCLUDE GEN. HAMDAN (SHI'ITE) AND AMB. TO SAUDI ARABIA AL-HASAN (SUNNI), IN ADDITION TO SALEM AND HADDAD -- FOR THE FIRST TIME ON AUGUST 11 TO BRIEF ITS MEMBERS ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION TO DATE. AMB. MCFARLANE AND TEICHER HELD SEPARATE MEETINGS IN ISRAEL (SEPTEL).

3. AT THE MEETING WITH THE EXPANDED LEBANESE WORKING GROUP, FAIRBANKS OPENED BY STRESSING THAT THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION WAS COMMITTED TO INTENSIVE EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE THE COMMON U.S. -LEBANESE OBJECTIVES SET FORTH BY PRESIDENT REAGAN. THE U.S. WAS CONSCIOUS THAT THE OBSTACLES COULD NOT BE DISSIPATED OVERNIGHT, AND THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM WAS HERE " FOR THE LONG HAUL."

4. FAIRBANKS' BRIEFING COVERED THE FOLLOWING POINTS:

-- THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT THE TWO TOP FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES FOR THE FUTURE WOULD BE (A) ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WITH THE RESOLUTION OF THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AS A NECESSARY FIRST STEP, AND (B) IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN ALL OF OUR STOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WE HAVE CONFIRMED THIS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITMENT.

-- ON LEBANON, OUR GOALS REMAIN AS STATED BY THE PRESIDENT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, THE RESTORATION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY, AND THE CREATION OF ADEQUATE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ON LEBANON'S TWO BORDERS. WHILE IT IS EASY TO STATE THESE GOALS, THEIR ACHIEVEMENT WILL BE DIFFICULT AND WILL REQUIRE INTENSIVE EFFORTS AND CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG LEBANON, THE U.S., AND THEIR FRIENDS IN THE REGION.

-- IN ISRAEL, WE ARE ENGAGING IN ONGOING CONVERSATIONS ON THE PRIORITY ISSUE OF THE MOMENT -- HOW TO ENSURE THAT, IN PERCEPTION AND REALITY, ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SOUTH IS A FIRST AND CREDIBLE STEP TOWARD FULL WITHDRAWAL. THE ISRAELI MOVE, PROPERLY EXPLOITED, CREATES IMPORTANT OPPORTUNITIES. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WILL BE ABLE TO DEMONSTRATE ITS COMMITMENT TO A FAIR DEAL FOR ALL COMMUNITIES. THE LEBANESE ARMY WILL BE GIVEN THE CHANCE TO FLEX ITS MUSCLES AND INCREASE ITS CREDIBILITY. ALL OF THIS HAS IMPORTANT RAMIFICATIONS VIS-A-VIS SYRIA AND OTHER NATIONS. PROPER MANAGEMENT OF THE ISRAELI MOVE IS THUS AN IMPORTANT STEP IN THE OVERALL EFFORT TO REMOVE FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON AND RESTORE THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

-- IN SYRIA, WE HAD BEEN MET WITH TOTAL RHETORICAL AND PRACTICAL INTRANSIGENCE GOING EVEN BEYOND THE POSITIONS SYRIA HAD TAKEN IN ITS DISCUSSION WITH SAUDI ARABIA. SPECIFICALLY, SYRIA HAD REFUSED TO CONSIDER PULLING ITS FORCES OUT OF THE UPPER MOUNTAINS OR COMMITTING ITSELF TO A TIMETABLE OF FULL WITHDRAWAL. IT HAD STATED THAT THERE COULD BE NO WITHDRAWAL UNTIL THE LAST ISRAELI SOLDIER HAD LEFT LEBANON AND THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT HAD BEEN RENOUNCED. IN ADDITION, SYRIA HAD STRONGLY ATTACKED THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AS BEING RESPONSIVE ONLY TO THE PHALANX. IN ITS ATTACK, IT HAD STOPPED JUST SHORT OF DENYING THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOVERNMENT.

-- IN SAUDI ARABIA, WE HAD FOUND KING FAHD TO BE PERSONALLY AND STRONGLY COMMITTED TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL. HE HAD PROFESSED HIMSELF UNABLE TO UNDERSTAND THE ATTACKS TO WHICH GEMAYEL WAS NOW BEING SUBJECTED, POINTING OUT THAT HE HAD BEEN ELECTED WITH BROAD LEBANESE AND ARAB (INCLUDING SYRIAN) SUPPORT.

IT WAS FAHD'S BELIEF THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAD A GREATER INFLUENCE ON SYRIA THAN WE HAD PREVIOUSLY SUSPECTED. FOR OUR PART, WHILE WE ARE NOT DELUDING OURSELVES THAT SAUDI SUPPORT WILL SOLVE ALL OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS, THE SAUDI POSITION IS AN IMPORTANT CARD, AND FAHD HAS AGREED TO PROMOTE ACTION ON A NUMBER OF SPECIFICS: (A) THE NEW SAUDI AMBASSADOR WILL PROCEED TO BEIRUT IN THE VERY NEAR FUTURE; (B) SAUDI ARABIA WILL ENCOURAGE OTHER ARAB STATES TO REPLACE THEIR CHARGES D'AFFAIRES WITH AMBASSADORS, BEGINNING WITH THE GULF, WHERE FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD WILL SHORTLY BE MAKING A SWING; (C) SAUDI ARABIA WILL TAKE THE LEAD IN ENCOURAGING THE ARAB AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT TO INCREASE VISIBLE SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL AMONG LEBANON'S VARIOUS COMMUNITIES AND TO FORGE BILATERAL LEBANESE-SYRIAN LINKS; AND (D) FAHD HAS INVITED WALID JUMBLATT TO VISIT HIM "IN THE NEAR FUTURE"

THIS CONTEXT, FAHD WILL BE WORKING TO GET GEMAYEL AND JUMBLATT TOGETHER FACE-TO-FACE. IN DISCUSSING THESE SPECIFIC STEPS TO RALLY LEBANESE AND ARAB SUPPORT FOR GEMAYEL, FAHD HAD EMPHASIZED THAT OUR EFFORTS TO MAKE ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT A FIRST STEP TOWARD

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FULL WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE VERY USEFUL

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-- IN JORDAN, KING HUSSEIN HAD EXPRESSED FULL SUPPORT AND UNDERSTANDING FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND HAD TAKEN THE COURAGEOUS DECISION TO SEND MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO LEBANON. THIS WAS IMPORTANT IN BOTH MILITARY AND SYMBOLIC TERMS. HUSSEIN HAD RECENTLY MET WIFE JUMBLATT TO CONVEY THE SAME GENERAL MESSAGE AS FAED.

-- ON THE PLO, IT IS IMPORTANT TO PURSUE THE POSSIBILITY

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OF GETTING ITS FIGHTERS OUT OF LEBANON. THIS COULD BE A USEFUL DEMONSTRATION THAT FOREIGN FORCES WERE INDEED BEGINNING TO DEPART. IT WOULD ALSO BE A GREAT HELP WITH THE ISRAELIS, WHO MIGHT BE MORE FLEXIBLE ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL ONCE THE PLO FIGHTERS HAD BEEN DEALT WITH.

-- ON EGYPT, WE ARE UNHAPPY WITH BUTROS GHALI'S RECENT STATEMENTS DOWNPLAYING THE PRIORITY OF LEBANON IN FAVOR OF A WIDER MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT AND SHOWING UNDERSTANDING OF SYRIA'S REJECTION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. WE WILL BE TAKING UP THESE STATEMENTS AND THE LEBANESE ISSUE IN GENERAL WITH THE EGYPTIANS BOTH IN CAIRO AND HERE. (SALEM HAS TOLD US THAT BUTROS GHALI AND USAMA AL-BAZ ARE PLANNING TO VISIT BEIRUT ON AUGUST 15.)

5. FAIRBANKS THEN TURNED TO OUR STRATEGY FOR THE FUTURE. IN THE PRESENT CONTEXT OF SYRIAN INTRANSIGENCE, TRADITIONAL DIPLOMACY THROUGH BILATERAL MEETINGS OR SHUTTLES WILL NOT WORK. ASSAD FEELS HIMSELF TO BE IN A VERY COMFORTABLE POSITION. OUR EFFORTS TO CHANGE HIS PERCEPTION WILL THEREFORE REQUIRE BRINGING A NUMBER OF DIFFERENT ACTIONS AND FORCES TO BEAR. THIS WILL HAVE TO BE DONE ON A FLEXIBLE BASIS. IT IS NOT POSSIBLE, AS THE LEBANESE (PARTICULARLY GEMAYEL AND SALEM) HAVE FREQUENTLY URGED, TO CREATED A MASTER TIMETABLE OF SPECIFIC STEPS. INSTEAD, WE MUST KEEP THE LIST OF AVAILABLE ACTIONS AND PRESSURES BEFORE US TO EXPLOIT ON A DYNAMIC BASIS. THESE INCLUDE DIPLOMATIC, ECONOMIC, MILITARY, AND OTHER COMPONENTS.

-- ON THE DIPLOMATIC FRONT, WE AND OUR ALLIES AND REGIONAL FRIENDS CAN DO A NUMBER OF THINGS. THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT CAN DEMONSTRATE ITS POLITICAL AND MILITARY STRENGTH AND CAN ALSO SIGNAL AN INTENTION TO MOVE CLOSER TO THE U.S. AND TO ISRAEL, WHICH WOULD BE DISADVANTAGEOUS FOR SYRIA. THE U.S., WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE LIMITED STEPS IT CAN TAKE VIS A VIS SYRIA, CAN EXPLOIT THE POSSIBILITY OF BILATERAL DIALOGUE TO OBTAIN SYRIAN CONCESSIONS. IT CAN ALSO MOBILIZE A BROADER DIPLOMATIC EFFORT BY OUR ALLIES AND REGIONAL FRIENDS AND CONTINUE TO WORK ON THE SOVIETS.

-- ON THE ECONOMIC FRONT, THE DOLS 250 MILLION OF FROZEN U.S. AID, U.S. CCC GRAIN SALES CREDITS, THE COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, SYRIAN DEPENDENCE ON IRANIAN OIL, AND THE ARAB SUBSIDIES DECIDED BY THE BAGHDAD SUMMIT CAN BE EXPLOITED.

-- ON THE MILITARY FRONT, THE PRESENCE OF THE IDF IN THE BIQA' VALLEY NEAR DAMASCUS AND THE INCREASING CAPABILITIES OF THE LEBANESE ARMY CAN SIMILARLY BE EXPLOITED.

-- SPECIFICALLY ON THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, THE U.S. AND SYRIA HAVE AGREED TO COMPARE THEIR INTERPRETATION OF ITS PROVISIONS IN THE NEAR FUTURE AT THE KHADDAM-FAIRBANKS LEVEL. THE SYRIANS HAVE A TOTALLY ERRONEOUS VIEW OF THE AGREEMENT, AND WE WILL POINT THIS OUT, ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT THIS DISCUSSION WILL NOT IN AND OF ITSELF CAUSE SYRIA TO CHANGE ITS POSITION. ONE ARGUMENT THAT WE AND THE

LEBANESE WILL USE WITH THE ARABS IS THAT -- WHILE THE 1974 DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENT THAT SYRIA ITSELF CONCLUDED DID NOT PRODUCE THE FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ITS TERRITORY -- THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT DOES JUST THAT.

6. SALEM, THANKING FAIRBANKS FOR HIS "USEFUL, MEATY PRESENTATION," RAISED ONE "FEAR" THAT HAUNTS MANY LEBANESE -- THAT THE ADVENT OF THE 1984 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN IN THE U.S. WILL DISTRACT THE ADMINISTRATION FROM LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. GIVEN THIS FEAR, HE ARGUED FOR A SOLUTION BY SEPTEMBER OR OCTOBER OF THIS YEAR. (SALEM WAS RAISING THIS POINT LARGELY TO GIVE THE MUSLIMS PRESENT

AT THE MEETING THE BENEFIT OF FAIRBANKS' ANSWER.) FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S COMMITMENT IS UNSHAKABLE AND THAT, IN ANY CASE, PARRING A MAJOR CONFLICT THE MIDDLE EAST WILL NOT BE AN ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN, AT LEAST NOT IN A DECISIVE WAY.

7. SALEM, IN AN INSISTENT TONE, SAID THAT LEBANON HAD PUT "ALL ITS CHIPS" ON PRESIDENT REAGAN. IT WOULD BE IN REAL TROUBLE IF ITS PROBLEMS WERE NOT SOLVED DURING HIS PRESIDENCY. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT, WHILE A SOLUTION CERTAINLY HAD TO BE FOUND IN THE NEXT 18 MONTHS, PRESIDENT REAGAN WOULD IN ANY CASE BE ELECTED FOR A SECOND TERM. HE WENT ON TO POINT OUT THAT, JUST AS LEBANON FELT THAT IT HAD PUT ITSELF IN U.S. HANDS, THE ADMINISTRATION HAD IN A VERY REAL SENSE PUT ITSELF IN THE HANDS OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. THE ADMINISTRATION, THE CONGRESS, AND THE U.S. PUBLIC ALL HAD TO RETAIN CONFIDENCE THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT THAT THEY WERE SUPPORTING WAS A BROADLY BASED GOVERNMENT -- NOT A CHRISTIAN, MARONITE, OR PHALANGE CLIQUE. (AT THIS POINT, HAMDAN AND AL-HASAN SAT TALLI)

8. SALEM CLOSED THE MEETING WITH AN APPEAL FOR U.S. HELP IN SOLVING THE SHUF PROBLEM. THE LEBANESE WERE SUSPICIOUS OF ISRAELI AND SYRIAN INTENTIONS, AND THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD NOT SURVIVE A DEFEAT.

ADDRESSING THE WIDER LEBANESE PROBLEM, SALEM CALLED FOR THE DEFINITION OF A SHORT-TERM SCHEDULE OF ACTIONS AND A DIVISION OF LABOR FOR THE NEXT MONTHS. TO CREATE SUCH A SCHEDULE, HE PROPOSED AN "OPERATIONAL" MEETING. THIS WAS TENTATIVELY SET FOR SATURDAY MORNING, AUGUST 13.

9. MEANWHILE, FOLLOWING THE RETURN OF AMB. MCFARLANE AND TEICHER TO BEIRUT AUGUST 11, ADDITIONAL MEETINGS WERE HELD WITH HADDAD AND SALEM LATE AUGUST 11 AND EARLY AUGUST 12 TO REVIEW THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE PROPER MANAGEMENT OF THE REDEPLOYMENT ISSUE. BECAUSE OF THE LEBANESE ARMY'S CONTINUING PROBLEMS IN THE ABAYH/AFAR MATT POCKET, A PORTION OF THESE DISCUSSIONS FOCUSED ON THE NEED FOR ISRAELI ASSISTANCE IN RESTORING THE STATUS QUO ANTE ON THE GROUND. HADDAD WENT SO FAR AS TO STATE THAT ISRAEL UNWILLINGNESS TO DO WHAT WAS NECESSARY WAS SEVERELY UNDERCUTTING HIS EFFORTS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND OTHERS TO BRING ABOUT A POLITICAL DECISION TO EFFECT AN OPENING TO THE ISRAELIS AS PART OF A STRATEGY TO DEMONSTRATE TO SYRIA THAT ITS PRESENT POLICY IN LEBANON WOULD LEAD NOWHERE.

10. MCFARLANE AND TEICHER RETURNED TO ISRAEL AUGUST 12 (WITH RETURN TO BEIRUT PLANNED FOR AUGUST 13). FAIRBANKS AND ROSS MET WITH CODEL KASTEN DURING ITS BEIRUT VISIT AND ACCOMPANIED ITS MEMBERS TO A MEETING WITH SALEM AND PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN. A LEBANESE-U.S. POLITICO/MILITARY MEETING TOOK PLACE LATER IN THE DAY TO DISCUSS MILITARY OPTIONS FOR LEBANESE ARMY DEPLOYMENT INTO THE SHUF (SEPTEL). FAIRBANKS, ROSS, AND DUR WERE PRESENT, AS WELL AS AMB. DILLON AND EMBASSY STAFF. DILLON

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Chron file

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUFRQJQ RUFRMDA RUFRMHA RUFRMKA RUQMAD RUEHTV
 RUEHJM RUEHC RHDLCNE
 DE RUEHBL #8894 225 **
 UUUU ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZZK
 O 130939Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUFRQJQ / COMSIXTHFLT NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUFRMDA / CTF SIX ZERO NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUFRMHA / CTF SIX ONE NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUFRMKA / CTF SIX TWO NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUQMAD / USDAO TEL AVIV IS NIACT IMMEDIATE
 INFO RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0813
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0787
 RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2266
 RHDLCNE / CINCUSNAVEUR LONDON UK IMMEDIATE

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRG: PROG 8/13/83
 APPRV: CWSROSS
 DRFTD: PDUR/CWSROSS
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: ROSS-4 AMB DCM
 DAO EUCOM JEP

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E.O. 12356: DECL: 8/13/84
 TAGS: OVIP, LE, IS
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: HELO SUPPORT

REF: STATE 228560 NOTAL

1. (~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. CONTINUED CLOSURE OF BIA NECESSITATES URGENT REQUEST FOR HELO LIFT IN SUPPORT OF MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION 13 AUGUST. REQUEST CTF 61/62 PROVIDE TWO PAX (ONE CODE THREE) LIFT FROM BEN GURION/TEL AVIV TO BIA/BEIRUT AT 1700 LT (1500Z) 13 AUGUST.
3. FYI, PAX -- DAVIS ROBINSON AND ALAN KRECZKO -- ARRIVING BEN GURION 1545LT (1345Z) 13 AUGUST VIA TW 806.
4. THIS CONFIRMS TELECONS FROM CDR. DUR TO USDAO TEL AVIV, USDAO BEIRUT, AND CTF 62 OPS. DILLON

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DECLASSIFIED
 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 12/2/99