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File: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane)
CHRON Cables (08/08/1983-08/09/1983)
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/8/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/8/83-8/9/83]

FOIA

M10-370/1

Box Number 91407

BROWER

33

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57840	CABLE	NO CABLE # RE BRINGING PRESSURE ON SYRIA <i>D</i> 11/5/2002 <i>F98-008/1 #99; R 5/24/2010</i> <i>M08-099/3 #57840</i>	2	8/8/1983	B1
57841	CABLE	081233Z AUG 83 <i>R</i> 11/5/2002 <i>NLSF98-008/1 #100</i>	2	8/8/1983	B1
57842	CABLE	081302Z AUG 83 <i>D</i> 11/5/2002 <i>F98-008/1 #101; R 5/24/2010</i> <i>M08-099/3 #57842</i>	7	8/8/1983	B1
57843	CABLE	081315Z AUG 83 <i>D</i> 11/5/2002 <i>F98-008/1 #102; R 5/24/2010</i> <i>M08-099/3 #57843</i>	5	8/8/1983	B1
57844	CABLE	081532Z AUG 83 <i>D</i> 11/5/2002 <i>F98-008/1 #103; R 5/24/2010</i> <i>M08-099/3 #57844</i>	13	8/8/1983	B1
57845	CABLE	081739Z AUG 83 <i>D</i> 11/5/2002 <i>F98-008/1 #104; PAR 5/24/2010</i> <i>M08-099/3; PAR UPHELD</i> <i>4/5/2013 M370/1</i>	7	8/8/1983	B1
57846	CABLE	081748Z AUG 83 <i>R</i> 4/19/2006 <i>NLSF98-008/1 #105</i>	1	8/8/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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57848	CABLE	091338Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #107	3	8/9/1983	B1
57849	CABLE	091720Z AUG 83 D 11/5/2002 F98-008/1 #108; UPHELD 5/24/2010 M08-099/3 #57849; D UPHELD 4/5/2013 M370/1	2	8/9/1983	B1
57850	NOTE	RE POSSIBLE STEPS R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #109	1	ND	B1
57851	PAPER	RE WHERE WE GO FROM HERE R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #110	4	ND	B1

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROG 8/8/83

RCMCFARLANE

CROSS

RFAIRBANKS

MCFARLANE (4) AMB DCM POL

AMEMBASSY JIDDA

AMEMBASSY AMMAN, NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, IMMEDIATE

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM, IMMEDIATE

USELO RIYADH, IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FOR CHARGE AND RSO

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP, JO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: JORDAN VISIT

REF: AMMAN 6899 NOTAL

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

RCM
CR
RF

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

2. WE PLAN TO DEPART TA'IF AT ⁰⁸³⁰0830 LT (0630 ZULU) TUESDAY
AUGUST 9. ETA AMMAN 1030 LT (⁰⁸³⁰0730 ZULU).

3. AMB. MCFARLANE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AMB. FAIRBANKS,
TEICHER, DUR AND ROSS TO THE MEETING WITH THE KING. AT
AN APPROPRIATE POINT, HOWEVER, PART OF THE MEETING MAY BE
PRIVATE. EMBASSY A/DCM SHOULD PLAN TO TAKE NOTES AND
PREPARE A DRAFT REPORT FOR TRANSMISSION TO US AT OUR NEXT
STOP.

4. MRS. MCFARLANE ACCEPTS WITH PLEASURE MRS. VIETS'
INVITATION TO LUNCH.

5. THE OFFICIAL PARTY REMAINS AS LISTED IN PARA (7)
REFTEL.

6. THE PRESS ARRANGEMENTS PROPOSED ARE FINE. MCFARLANE
DOES NOT PLAN TO MAKE A STATEMENT UPON ARRIVAL.

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

3

7. THE PARTY PLANS TO DEPART FOR BEIRUT IMMEDIATELY
FOLLOWING THE WORKING LUNCH AND A SHORT DEBRIEF WITH THE
CHARGE. ETD FOR PLANNING PURPOSES IS 1600 LT (~~1300~~ ZULU);
ETA BEIRUT ~~1650~~ LT (~~1450~~ ZULU). ¹⁴⁰⁰
~~1730~~ ~~1530~~ ~~1530~~ 1530

FOR BEIRUT: WILL CONFIRM EXACT ETA UPON ARRIVAL IN
AMMAN. MURPHY##

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

57840

~~SECRET~~

PROG: 8/8/83
RMC FARLANE
HTEICHER
RMC FARLANE
MCFARLANE-1

RCM Rcn

AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE

RCM

ROGER CHANNEL SPECIAL ENCRYPTION

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY, EYES ONLY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINS, SY, XF
SUBJECT: BRINGING PRESSURE ON SYRIA

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN SEPTEL REPORT
TRIPARTITE MEETING WHICH REVIEWS LAST***
WHICH REVIEWS LAST WEEK'S TRIPARTITE MEETING
FOCUSSING PRIMARILY ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT AND THE ASSOCIATED ISSUES.
WE ALSO DISCUSSED THE NEED TO DEVELOP A STRATEGY OF
QUOTE CARROTS AND STICKS UNQUOTE. ALL PRESENT
AT THE MEETING AGREED ON THE NEED FOR A FAMILY OF
QUOTE STICKS UNQUOTE WHICH COULD BRING MEANINGFUL
PRESSURE TO BEAR ON SYRIA. PARTICIPANTS ARE
COMMITTED TO DISCUSS POSSIBLE QUOTE STICKS UNQUOTE
AT THIS COMING THURSDAY'S MEETING.

3. I UNDERSTAND THAT SOME CONSIDERATION HAS BEEN
GIVEN TO THIS QUESTION OVER THE LAST FEW WEEKS
RESULTING IN A PAPER AUTHORED BY BILL CASEY. I AM
INFORMED THAT THE PAPER WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REJECTED
AND I HAVE NOT YET BEEN APPRISED OF ANY AGREED
SUGGESTIONS FOR PRESSURE. I WOULD GREATLY APPRECIATE
YOUR MEETING WITH BILL CASEY TO DEVELOP COORDINATED
VIEWS WHICH I COULD PRESENT AT THIS THURSDAY'S
TRIPARTITE MEETING. IT IS VERY IMPORTANT THAT WE HAVE

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NLRR MO8-099/3 #57840

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

~~SECRET~~

IDEAS OR OUR CREDIBILITY WILL BE SUBSTANTIALLY DAMAGED.

4. ONE POSSIBILITY WOULD INVOLVE SENDING DICK WALTERS TO TURKEY AND PERHAPS TO IRAQ TO DETERMINE THE LIKELIHOOD OF COOPERATIVE MEASURES WITH AS WELL AS SUGGESTIONS FROM THESE GOVERNMENTS. I GREATLY APPRECIATE YOUR HELP.
MURPHY##

UUUU

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHDM RUEHJM RUEHJI RUEHTV
 DE RUEHBL #8634 220 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 O 081233Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2105
 INFO RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0588
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0787
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0712
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0564
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0735
 BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08634

CLASS: SECRET
 CHARGE: PROG 8/8/83
 APPRV: AMB:RSDILLON
 DRFTD: AMB:RSDILLON:DLP
 CLEAR: 1.POL:RCCROCKER
 DISTR: AMB DCM POL
 P-M ROSS CHRON

EXDIS

APPROPRIATE POSTS PLTASE PASS TO MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, LE, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE MEETING WITH WALID JUMBLATT

UUUU

1. (S - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. BEIRUT PRESS THIS MORNING QUOTES MARWAN HAMMADA IN AMMAN AS SAYING, APPARENTLY IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, THAT A MEETING BETWEEN WALID JUMBLATT AND ROBERT MCFARLANE "IS A POSSIBILITY." HAMMADA ALSO IS REPORTED AS HAVING SAID THAT THE AMERICAN ADMINISTRATION HAD RENEWED ITS INVITATION TO JUMBLATT TO VISIT WASHINGTON BUT A DATE HAD NOT BEEN FIXED (SEE SEPTTEL FOR FULL REPORT OF HAMMADA STATEMENT PLUS COMMENTARY ON QUESTION OF "INVITATION").

UUUU

3. WADI' HADDAD TELEPHONED ME THIS MORNING TO EXPRESS GREAT UNHAPPINESS REGARDING NEWS REPORT AND PARTICULARLY POSSIBILITY THAT MCFARLANE WOULD MEET WITH JUMBLATT. I ASSURED HIM THERE WAS NO PLAN FOR A JUMBLATT/MCFARLANE MEETING. HADDAD PERSISTED THAT IF THAT WERE THE CASE THERE SHOULD BE AN AMERICAN DENIAL OF REPORT. I TOLD HIM I WOULD REPORT HIS CONCERNS AND LET HIM KNOW WHAT ACTION WE PLAN TO TAKE.

UUUU

4. I BELIEVE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN AS WELL AS SPOKESMEN IN OUR VARIOUS EMBASSIES SHOULD REPLY IF ASKED WHETHER A MCFARLANE/JUMBLATT MEETING IS ANTICIPATED THAT NO SUCH MEETING IS PLANNED OR ANTICIPATED. IF THE QUESTION ARISES OF WHETHER JUMBLATT IS "INVITED" TO THE UNITED STATES, OUR ANSWER SHOULD PRESUMABLY BE THAT JUMBLATT IS SENDING HIS BABY TO THE U.S. FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT. WE KNOW OF NO PLANS FOR HIM TO VISIT THE UNITED STATES. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THERE HAS BEEN A "PREVIOUS" OR "STANDING" INVITATION TO JUMBLATT TO VISIT THE U.S. IS A TRICKIER ONE TO HANDLE, AS WADI' HADDAD FULLY UNDERSTANDS (SEE SEPTTEL). PROBABLY SPOKESMEN SHOULD REPLY TO THIS THAT JUMBLATT HAS VISITED THE U.S. SEVERAL TIMES BUT THERE HAVE BEEN NO "OFFICIAL" INVITATIONS.

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 NLS F98-008/1 #100
 BY KAJ NARA, DATE 11/5/02

PRESERVATION COPY

UUUU

~~SECRET//EXDIS~~

BEIRUT 8634

5. WHEN GUIDANCE ON THIS QUESTION IS WORKED OUT, I
WOULD LIKE TO HAVE IT IMMEDIATELY TO PASS TO WADI
HADDAD. DILLON

BT

NNNN #8634

NNNN

~~SECRET//EXDIS~~

BEIRUT 8634

NNNN

NNNN

NNNN

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

57842

(05) ACTION ROSS INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON POL

CIXVZCZCBLO956

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6410/01 2201310

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 081302Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2119

INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUSNNOA/USCINCEUR VAHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6206

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0187

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6446

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3174

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1959

RUEHRE/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 5002

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3516

BT

S E C R E T JIDDA 06410

LOC: DISK 10 607

08 AUG 83 1316

CN: 06344

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDRESSEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
JCS FOR J-5

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
- LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER, AUGUST 5

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. DURING AN AUGUST 5 VISIT TO LEBANESE ARMY
COMMANDER GEN. TANNUS, AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS
POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS RELATED TO THE ISRAELI
REDEPLOYMENT. THE SIGNIFICANT POINTS IN TANNUS' ANSWERS
WERE (A) THE MNF SHOULD SUPPORT THE LEBANESE ARMY BY
SHOWING THE FLAG ON THE "POINTS OF CONTACT" WITH THE
SYRIANS, THE PLO, AND THE ISRAELIS. THE FRENCH SHOULD
DO SO AT SAWFAR (I.E., ON THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY),
THE U.S. ON THE HEIGHTS CONTROLLING THE BEIRUT-SIDON
HIGHWAY, THE ITALIANS ON THE BEIRUT-TRIPOLI ROAD, AND
THE BRITISH IN 'ALAYH AND THE SHUF; (B) THE LEBANESE
ARMY WAS PREPARED TO ENTER THE SHUF FROM A MILITARY
POINT OF VIEW, BUT THIS REQUIRED A POLITICAL DECISION.
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMY IN THIS OPERATION WOULD
DEPEND ON THE NATURE OF THE THREAT, WHICH IN TURN WOULD
DEPEND ON THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. GOOD PREPARATION
WOULD MAKE THE ARMY'S JOB EASIER. BAD PREPARATION WOULD
MAKE IT HARDER, BUT IT WOULD STILL BE DONE; (C) THE
LEBANESE INTENDED TO RELIEVE THE ISRAELIS IN PLACE WITH
A 12-HOUR OVERLAP, BUT, IN VIEW OF THE RECENT 'ALAYH

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NLRR M08-D99/3 #57842

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

INCIDENT AGAINST THE LEBANESE ARMY, MORE GUARANTEES WERE REQUIRED TO MAKE A RELIEF IN PLACE WORK. A TRIPARTITE "WITHDRAWAL COMMITTEE" EMPOWERED TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS ON THE SPOT WAS THE ANSWER IN TANNUS' MIND; (D) THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD PREVENT INFILTRATION INTO THE SHUF IF RPT IF SOMETHING WAS DONE ABOUT THE SYRIAN PRESENCE IN THE MATN; (D) ARAFAT'S FIGHTERS WANTED TO LEAVE THE BIQA', AND THE SYRIANS WERE ENCOURAGING THEM. HOWEVER, THEY WOULD NOT LET THEM TAKE THEIR ARMS; (E) LEBANON WAS THINKING ABOUT BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE IN THE SOUTH. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, ACCOMPANIED BY TEICHER AND ROSS, MET WITH LEBANESE ARMY COMMANDER GENERAL IBRAHIM TANNUS AND HIS SENIOR STAFF FOR ONE HOUR AUGUST 5. OMC CHIEF COL. FINTEL AND NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD WERE ALSO PRESENT, THE LATTER IN YET A FURTHER DEMONSTRATION OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S DETERMINATION TO SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE UNDER HADDAD'S GUIDANCE DURING THE CURRENT PHASE OF NEGOTIATIONS.

4. AFTER EXPRESSING HIS AWARENESS OF THE ENORMITY OF THE TASK FACING GENERAL TANNUS AND HIS PLEASURE AT THE ENCOURAGING SPIRIT AND PROGRESS THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD SHOWN UNDER ITS PRESENT STRONG LEADERSHIP, MCFARLANE POSED A SERIES OF QUESTIONS TO WHICH HE SOLICITED TANNUS' ANSWERS.

5. LEBANESE ARMY ABILITY TO CONTROL EVACUATED AREAS.

NOTING THAT THE RATE AT WHICH THE ISRAELI ARMY WAS PLANNING TO WITHDRAW IN THE COASTAL REGION OF LEBANON DEPENDED IN PART ON THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO ESTABLISH CONTROL, MCFARLANE ASKED TANNUS HIS SENSE OF WHAT THIS MIGHT BE.

AVOIDING A DIRECT ANSWER, TANNUS FIRST DISGRESSED TO PAY SPECIAL TRIBUTE TO THE U.S. TRAINING PROGRAM UNDER COL. FINTEL, WHICH HE SAID WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PROGRESS THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD MADE TO DATE. HE ALSO HIGHLIGHTED THE NEW SPIRIT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY AND PEOPLE, AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE HIGH RATE OF RECRUITMENT. ADDRESSING THE ENTRY OF THE ARMY INTO THE SHUF, TANNUS STATED THAT IT WAS PREPARED TO DO SO FROM A STRICTLY

MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. THIS DEPENDED ON A POLITICAL DECISION. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ARMY IN CONTROLLING EVACUATED AREAS DEPENDED DIRECTLY ON THE THREAT, WHICH IN TURN DEPENDED ON THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE. THE GOVERNMENT WAS WORKING ON THIS BUT, HE URGED, THE U.S. SHOULD DO SO AS WELL, SINCE ISRAEL AND SYRIA WERE BOTH INVOLVED IN THE AREA TO BE EVACUATED. THIS GAVE THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION ROLES TO PLAY, THE U.S. ROLE BEING THE GREATER. IN SHORT, IF THE PREPARATION WAS GOOD, THE ARMY WOULD HAVE AN EASIER TASK. IF THE PREPARATION WAS BAD, THE JOB WOULD BE HARDER AND MORE COSTLY, BUT IT WOULD BE DONE.

6. BEST METHOD TO RELIEVE ISRAELIS IN SHUF.

MCFARLANE ASKED WHAT TANNUS THOUGHT TO BE THE BEST WAY TO RELIEVE THE ISRAELIS IN THE SHUF, ASSUMING A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. THERE WAS, AFTER ALL, THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE. HOW COULD ISRAELI LINES BE MOST EFFECTIVELY RELIEVED?

TANNUS REPLIED THAT TWO TYPES OF RELIEF HAD BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ISRAELIS, RELIEF IN PLACE WITH A 12-HOUR OVERLAP OF LEBANESE AND ISRAELI SOLDIERS MAN FOR MAN, WITH FULL BRIEFING OF THE LEBANESE BY THE ISRAELIS, AND UNILATERAL RELIEF WITH A 12-HOUR UNDERLAP FOLLOWING ISRAELI DEPARTURE. TANNUS HAD CHOSEN THE FIRST METHOD AS MOST EFFICIENT, BUT THE RECENT INCIDENT AGAINST THE LEBANESE ARMY IN 'ALAYH HAD SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE INTENTIONS OF THE ISRAELIS. GEN. LEVY HAD INDEED APOLOGIZED, AND A CERTAIN LEVEL OF CREDIBILITY HAD BEEN REESTABLISHED, BUT THE LEBANESE NOW REQUIRED MORE "GUARANTEES." TANNUS HAD DISCUSSED THIS WITH GEN. VESSEY DURING THE LATTER'S RECENT VISIT AND PROPOSED THE CREATION OF A WITHDRAWAL COMMITTEE WITH LEBANESE, ISRAELI, AND U.S. REPRESENTATIVES (THE LAST ATTENDING ON BEHALF OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE, WHICH "MIGHT EVENTUALLY GO TO THE MOUNTAIN," AND SERVING AS CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE). SUCH A COMMITTEE COULD CONVOKE FACTIONAL REPRESENTATIVES AS NEEDED AND RESOLVE PROBLEMS AND TENSIONS ON THE SPOT. GEN. VESSEY HAD UNDERTAKEN TO RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY WITH MCFARLANE (WHICH IN FACT HE DID). TANNUS SAID SUCH A COMMITTEE WOULD HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE IN PROVIDING MORE GUARANTEES FOR A RELIEF IN PLACE.

7. PACE OF WITHDRAWAL.

FAIRBANKS ASKED TANNUS WHETHER, IN THE LIGHT OF INDICATIONS THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE PREPARED TO BE FLEXIBLE ON THE PACE OF WITHDRAWAL IF THE LEBANESE ARMY PROVED CAPABLE OF ASSUMING CONTROL OF EVACUATED AREAS, THE LEBANESE PREFERRED A RAPID DEPARTURE OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ANY GIVEN AREA.

TANNUS MISUNDERSTOOD THE QUESTION AND REPLIED THAT THE ARMY WAS DEVELOPING A PUBLIC AFFAIRS STRATEGY FOR ITS ENTRY INTO THE SHUF, SO THAT THE POPULATION OF THE AREA

TANNUS REPLIED BY EMPHASIZING THAT HE SAW THE MNF AS A SUPPORT FORCE, NOT A FIGHTING FORCE. IT SHOULD BE A "GUARANTEE" FOR THE LEBANESE ARMY VIS A VIS ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE PLO. THE BEST WAY TO USE THE MNF, HE SAID, WAS TO SHOW THE FLAG ON THE "POINTS OF CONTACT." IF AN AGREEMENT COULD BE REACHED WITH SYRIA AND WITH THE FACTIONS IN THE SHUF, HE WANTED "TO SEE THE FRENCH FLAG IN SAWFAR." THIS WAS NOT A CONDITION, BUT IT WOULD BE HELPFUL. SIMILARLY, HE WANTED TO SEE THE U.S. FLAG NEAR BUT NOT ON THE ROAD TO SIDON (I.E., ON THE HEIGHTS CONTROLLING THE ROAD, NOT ON CHECKPOINTS), THE ITALIAN FLAG ON THE ROAD TO TRIPOLI, AND THE BRITISH FLAG PERHAPS ON PATROL IN THE 'ALAYH AND SHUF DISTRICTS THEMSELVES. ALL THIS WOULD GIVE THE ARMY MORE CREDIBILITY VIS A VIS THE POPULATION IN THE LONG TERM. IN SHORT, THE MNF ROLE IN THE SHUF COULD BE MUCH LIKE ITS ROLE IN EAST BEIRUT -- FIRST THE LEBANESE ARMY ENTERED AND SECURED THE AREA, AND THEN THE MNF SHOWED A "PRESENCE."

9. PLO INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH.

MCFARLANE OBSERVED THAT ONE OF THE KEY ISRAELI CONCERNS WAS THAT OF PLO INFILTRATION INTO THE SOUTH. HE ASKED TANNUS FOR HIS EVALUATION OF THE RISKS.

TANNUS, WITHOUT ANSWERING THE QUESTION DIRECTLY, POINTED OUT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY HAD BEEN ABLE TO PUT BEIRUT UNDER ITS CONTROL AND TO CONFRONT ANY DIRECT THREAT. (HE OBSERVED THAT, IN ANY CASE, THE PLO TRADITIONALLY HAD A VERY LOW LEVEL OF RESISTANCE -- IT HAD BEEN HIS DIRECT EXPERIENCE DURING THE CIVIL WAR THAT, WHEN PLO CASUALTIES REACHED 10 IN ANY GIVEN CLASH, THE FIGHTERS PULLED BACK.) UNDERGROUND ACTIVITIES OF THE PLO WERE PROPERLY THE DOMAIN OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE, WHICH COULD TAKE CARE OF IT IN AN ADEQUATE IF NOT PERFECT MANNER (G-2 CHIEF COL. QASSIS WINCED SLIGHTLY AS TANNUS MADE THIS ASSERTION).

TANNUS DID ASSERT THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD CONTROL THE MOUNTAIN IF RPT IF THE SYRIANS COULD BE GOTEN OUT OF THE MATN. AS LONG AS THEY WERE THERE, ARMS AND AMMUNITION REACHED DRUZE AREAS UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL FROM THOSE AREAS UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL. THE ISRAELIS SEEMED TO BE PERMITTING THIS, PERHAPS FOR PURPOSES OF BALANCE. SIMILARLY, THEY WERE ALLOWING THE LEBANESE FORCES TO BRING IN AMMUNITION.

10. PLO DEPARTURE FROM LEBANON.

MCFARLANE ASKED WHETHER, IF THE PLO WANTED TO GET OUT OF LEBANON, IT COULD DO SO. WOULD SYRIA ALLOW ITS FIGHTERS TO GO?

TANNUS OPINED THAT THERE WERE "MANY WAYS" THEY COULD LEAVE. THE SYRIANS WERE IN FACT ENCOURAGING ARAFAT'S FIGHTERS TO LEAVE THE BIQA' FOR TRIPOLI. THE PROBLEM WAS THAT THE FIGHTERS WANTED TO TAKE THEIR ARMS, AND

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JIDDA 006410/03

THE SYRIANS WOULD NOT LET THEM. IN THE TRIPOLI AREA,
THE SYRIANS WERE ALLOWING THE PLO A COMFORTABLE EXISTENCE.

FAIRBANKS ASKED HOW MANY PRO-ARAFAT FIGHTERS TANNUS
ESTIMATED TO BE IN LEBANON. QASSIS RESPONDED THAT THERE
WERE ABOUT 12,000 PRO-ARAFAT FIGHTERS VERSUS ABOUT 1,000
PRO-ABU MUSA FIGHTERS. TANNUS CALLED THE LATTER "MERELY
A FACADE FOR SYRIA.

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11. THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE.

TANNUS, ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE, TOLD MCFARLANE THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE TERRITORIAL BRIGADE MEANT TO BE CREATED IN THE SOUTH. THEY HAD ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO SEND ITS FUTURE OFFICERS TO THE SOUTH TO BEGIN ORGANIZING IT. THE LEBANESE WERE NOW THINKING ABOUT THIS. IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO USE A BARRACKS LOCATED IN TYRE AS THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS AND BEGIN INTEGRATING SA'D HADDAD'S MEN. IT WOULD TAKE TIME TO BUILD THE BRIGADE, AND THIS WOULD TAKE A POLITICAL DECISION. IT COULD BE DONE, HOWEVER.

12. MCFARLANE VISIT TO UNITS.

IN THE COURSE OF THE MEETING, MCFARLANE ASKED TANNUS IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR HIM TO VISIT SELECTED LEBANESE ARMY UNITS. TANNUS REPLIED HE WOULD BE HAPPY TO ARRANGE A VISIT TO UNITS AND TO LIVE-FIRE EXERCISES. MURPHY

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2123

INFO RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6210

RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0191

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6450

RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3178

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1963

RUEHRE/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 5006

RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 1764

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SECRET JIDDA 06411

LOC: DISK 10 638

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CN: 06348

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING AUGUST 5
- WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. SUMMARY. AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN AUGUST 5. WAZZAN EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO CONTINUE ACCORDING LEBANON HIGH PRIORITY AND NOTED THAT A U.S. FAILURE IN LEBANON WOULD DEAL A FATAL BLOW TO ITS POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SITUATION IN LEBANON WAS "RIPE" FOR A SOLUTION, AND THE U.S. HAD TO WORK WITH THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO HELP FIND IT. IF THE ISRAELIS DID NOT WITHDRAW, WAZZAN STATED, LEBANON WAS FREE TO SUSPEND OR ABROGATE THE AGREEMENT. ISRAEL HAD SET IT ASIDE WITH ITS PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL, AND SYRIA REFUSED TO DISCUSS ITS WITHDRAWAL UNLESS IT WAS ABROGATED. IN SHORT, THE AGREEMENT HAD BECOME AN OBSTACLE. WAZZAN RECOMMENDED THAT MCFARLANE ATTEMPT TO FIND AN ARRANGEMENT WITH SYRIA THAT RECOGNIZED THIS FACT.

MCFARLANE MENTIONED ISRAELI FEARS OF RENEWED PLO INFILTRATION IN THE COURSE OF DESCRIBING ONE IDEA ON WHICH WE HAD BEEN WORKING, I.E., ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COASTAL REGION ALL THE WAY TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. WAZZAN REPLIED THAT EACH STAGE IN A CALENDAR OF PHASED WITHDRAWALS COULD BE A TEST OF THE LEBANESE ARMY ON THE GROUND. SINCE THE POPULATION FEARED PARTITION, HOWEVER, ISRAEL HAD TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH

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BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

BY ANNOUNCING SUCH A CALENDAR. ASKED HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE POSSIBLE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTH, WAZZAN REPLIED THAT, AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, HE HAD BEEN TRYING TO ACCOMPLISH THIS IN ALL OCCUPIED AREAS. IN THE SOUTH, ISRAEL HAD TO HELP BY DESISTING FROM ITS PETTY HARRASSMENT. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD NOW PRONOUNCED THEMSELVES WILLING TO COOPERATE IF A DIALOGUE WAS BEGUN ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. WAZZAN RULED OUT "PUBLIC COLLABORATION," BUT WITHOUT FORECLOSING COORDINATION BEHIND THE SCENES. COMMENT: WAZZAN WAS CORDIAL AND COMPOSED, BUT CLEARLY FELT STRONGLY ABOUT U.S. RESPONSIBILITY TO HELP LEBANON OUT OF ITS DIFFICULT POSITION. WITH THE POSSIBLE EXCEPTION OF HIS STATEMENT ON ABANDONMENT OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IN THE EVENT OF ISRAELI FAILURE TO WITHDRAW, HIS MAJOR POINTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF GEMAYEL AND HADDAD. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS, ROSS, TEICHER, AND DUR, MET WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, WITH MFA DIRECTOR MAKKAWI TAKING NOTES, FOR OVER ONE HOUR AUGUST 5. ALTHOUGH THE MEETING HAD BEEN SET UP WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER HADDAD LARGELY TO FULFILL PROTOCOLARY REQUIREMENTS AND DEMONSTRATE SUPPORT FOR WAZZAN, IT DID PROVIDE AN OCCASION FOR A SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGE WITH THE LEADING MUSLIM FIGURE IN GOVERNMENT.

4. AT WAZZAN'S REQUEST, MCFARLANE BEGAN WITH A REPORT ON THE STATE OF PLAY. NOTING THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ACCORDED A VERY HIGH PRIORITY TO FURTHER PROGRESS ON LEBANON, HE REVIEWED U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE CURRENT DIPLOMATIC EFFORT. WITH SPECIFIC REGARD TO THE ISSUE OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHUF, MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THE U.S. DESIRE TO HAVE IT CHARACTERIZED PUBLICLY IN A WAY SUPPORTIVE OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT, I.E., AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS OF FULL WITHDRAWAL, NOT AS A STEP TOWARD PARTITION. ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF SYRIAN FORCES, MCFARLANE NOTED HE WAS GOING TO DAMASCUS AUGUST 6. ALTHOUGH HE INTENDED TO MAKE A MAJOR PUSH, HE WAS UNDER NO ILLUSIONS ON THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS TASK.

5. AT MCFARLANE'S REQUEST, WAZZAN THEN SHARED HIS OWN THOUGHTS. HE OPENED WITH AN EXPRESSION OF APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION TO CONTINUE ACCORDING

LEBANON A HIGH PRIORITY, CALLING IT A TRUE REFLECTION OF THE INTERESTS OF THE U.S. A FAILURE IN LEBANON, HE SAID, WOULD DEAL A FATAL BLOW TO THE U.S. POSTURE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. HE DESCRIBED THE SITUATION IN LEBANON AS "RIPE" FOR A SOLUTION. ISRAEL, SYRIA, AND THE LEBANESE FACTIONS NOW HAD TO BE MADE CONSCIOUS OF THE CRITICAL STAGE THAT THE COUNTRY HAD REACHED. ISRAEL MUST UNDERSTAND THAT IT HAD ACHIEVED ITS STATED GOAL OF SECURITY. IF IT WAS SINCERE, IT COULD FIND A SOLUTION WITH, IF NECESSARY, U.S. HELP. LEBANON HAD RELIED ON THE U.S. TO HELP IT EACH TIME IT WAS IN DIFFICULTY. THE DEPARTURE OF THE FIGHTERS FROM WEST BEIRUT WAS A GOOD EXAMPLE, FOR WHICH LEBANON WAS APPRECIATIVE. THERE WAS ALSO THE PROBLEM OF SYRIA, WHICH WAS DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF ISRAEL, BECAUSE IT FORCES HAD BEEN INVITED IN. HOWEVER, THE SYRIANS HAVE SAID THEIR FORCES WILL LEAVE AS SOON AS THEY ARE ASKED TO LEAVE. AS FOR THE PALESTINIANS, THEIR FIGHTERS HAD TO LEAVE LEBANON. ALL FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD LEAVE, AS LEBANON HAD TOLD THE U.N., THE ARAB LEAGUE, AND THE NAM.

IN THE AGREEMENT, THERE WERE NO CONDITIONS RELATING TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THESE EXISTED ONLY IN THE ISRAELI SIDE LETTER. IF ISRAEL DID NOT LEAVE, WAZZAN SAID, LEBANON WAS FREE TO SUSPEND OR ABROGATE THE AGREEMENT. LEBANON HAD ONLY ONE OBJECTIVE -- ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. "WITHOUT WITHDRAWAL, WHY HAVE THIS AGREEMENT?" WAZZAN REITERATED THAT HE PERSONALLY WAS NOT PREPARED TO AGREE TO PUT THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE UNLESS THE ISRAELIS WITHDREW. ISRAEL ITSELF HAD SET THE AGREEMENT ASIDE BY ITS PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. SYRIA HAD SAID IT WOULD NOT DISCUSS ITS OWN WITHDRAWAL UNLESS THE AGREEMENT WAS ABROGATED. IN SHORT, THE AGREEMENT HAD BECOME AN OBSTACLE. THE CURRENT POLITICAL MOOD WAS "VOLCANIC," WAZZAN SAID, AND AN ERUPTION HAD TO BE AVOIDED. LOOKING AHEAD TO MCFARLANE'S VISIT TO SYRIA, WAZZAN URGED THAT HE ATTEMPT TO FIND AN ARRANGEMENT WITH SYRIA "AS IF THE AGREEMENT HAD BEEN SET ASIDE." MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT WE THOUGHT OF VARIOUS ALTERNATIVES, INCLUDING THAT OF PUTTING THE AGREEMENT INTO ABEYANCE FOR THE MOMENT.

6. MCFARLANE ASKED FOR WAZZAN'S EVALUATION OF THE VALUE OF THE ISRAELI PRESENCE ON THE SYRIAN BORDER NEAR DAMASCUS. WAS IT GOOD OR BAD? WAZZAN, AVOIDING A DIRECT ANSWER, SAID THERE WAS NOTHING CONSTRUCTIVE IN ANY ARMED PRESENCE. "HOWEVER," HE SAID, "I DO NOT WANT TO GET INTO A DISCUSSION OF TACTICS."

7. MCFARLANE OUTLINED ONE IDEA ON WHICH WE WERE WORKING -- AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN THE COASTAL REGION. HE POINTED OUT THAT THAT ISRAELIS, HOWEVER, FEARED THAT, AS LONG AS THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO REMAINED IN LEBANON, PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS WOULD INFILTRATE INTO THE SOUTH. WAZZAN RESPONDED THAT, WITH A CALENDAR OF PHASED WITHDRAWALS, EACH STAGE COULD BE A TEST OF THE LEBANESE ARMY ON THE GROUND. IT WAS NORMAL FOR THE ISRAELIS TO HAVE SUCH FEARS, BUT THE LEBANESE ARMY WOULD SHOULDER ITS RESPONSIBILITIES, AS IT HAD PROVEN IT COULD

DO IN WEST BEIRUT, MUCH TO THE SURPRISE OF EVEN THE U.S. ISRAEL HAD TO SHOW ITS GOOD FAITH BY ESTABLISHING A CALENDAR OF WITHDRAWALS. THE POPULATION OF THE SOUTH, INCLUDING CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES SPEAKER KAMIL AL-AS'AD AND OTHER DEPUTIES, FEARED PARTITION, AND TROUBLE WAS BEGINNING TO EMERGE IN PARLIAMENT. THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN LEBANON HAD ONLY BEEN ESTABLISHED IN 1943 ON THE BASIS OF A CAREFUL EQUILIBRIUM, AND THE ISOLATION OF ANY COMPONENT PART COULD BRING THE COLLAPSE OF LEBANON AS WE KNOW IT TODAY. EGYPT HAD REMAINED EGYPT WITHOUT SINAI, AND SYRIA HAD REMAINED SYRIA WITHOUT THE GOLAN, BUT LEBANON COULD NOT SURVIVE THE LONG-TERM OCCUPATION OF THE SOUTH, THE BIQA', AND THE NORTH.

8. MCFARLANE ASKED WAZZAN HOW HE FELT ABOUT THE ISSUE OF REESTABLISHING LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE SOUTH. WAZZAN RESPONDED THAT HE, AS MINISTER OF INTERIOR, WAS TRYING TO DO THIS NOT ONLY IN THE SOUTH, BUT IN THE OTHER OCCUPIED AREAS AS WELL. IN THE SOUTH, THIS REQUIRED ISRAELI HELP. THE OCCUPATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICES (AS IN THE CASE OF THE SERAIL IN SIDON), THE HUMILIATION OF LOCAL SECURITY FORCES, AND THE INTERFERENCE WITH THE FREE MOVEMENT OF GOVERNMENT MINISTERS AND OFFICIALS THROUGH ROADBLOCKS DID NOT FACILITATE THE PROCESS. MCFARLANE REPLIED THAT WE HAD DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH THE ISRAELIS, AND THEY WERE NOW WILLING TO COOPERATE PROVIDED A DIALOGUE WAS BEGUN ON PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS. THIS WAS VERY IMPORTANT. WAZZAN REJOINED THAT RESULTS WERE MORE IMPORTANT THAN PUBLICITY (WHICH HE ASSUMED THE ISRAELIS WOULD GIVE ANY LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETINGS FOR THIS PURPOSE). OPEN COOPERATION WOULD LEAD TO AN IMAGE OF COLLABORATION WITH AN OCCUPIER. THE ISRAELIS HAD SIMPLY TO STAND ASIDE AND REMAIN ALOOF FROM THE OPERATIONS OF THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION EXCEPT FOR "CERTAIN THINGS" (PRESUMABLY THINGS DIRECTLY AFFECTING THEIR OWN SECURITY). THERE COULD BE NO OPEN COLLABORATION BETWEEN LEBANESE ADMINISTRATORS AND THE ISRAELI ARMY. THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION HAD TO BE PURELY LEBANESE.

9. TO CLOSE THE MEETING, WAZZAN REPEATED HIS APPRECIATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S CONTINUING COMMITMENT TO OUR INITIATIVE IN LEBANON AND STRESSED THAT "WE ARE HOPING FOR A GREAT DEAL FROM THE U.S."

10. COMMENT: WAZZAN, WHILE CORDIAL AND COMPOSED, OBVIOUSLY FELT STRONGLY ABOUT THE DIFFICULT POSITION LEBANON FOUND ITSELF IN AND THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE U.S. TO HELP. HIS MAJOR POINTS WERE CONSISTENT WITH THOSE OF GEMAYEL AND HADDAD (HADDAD HAD TOLD US THAT, WITH THE ADVENT OF THE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION, HE HAD WORKED OUT PROCEDURES TO ENSURE THAT THE VARIOUS LEBANESE INTERLOCUTORS WOULD EXPRESS A CONSISTENT LINE). FOR INSTANCE, HE WAS PREPARED TO ACQUIESCE IN THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROTRACTED ISRAELI PRESENCE IN THE BIQA' AS PART OF A SCENARIO TO OBTAIN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COASTAL REGION, CALLING THIS A "TACTICAL ISSUE." LIKEWISE, HE TOOK A POSITIVE ATTITUDE ON THE REESTABLISHMENT OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN OCCUPIED REGIONS AS LONG AS NO PUBLICITY WAS GIVEN TO ANY COORDINATION. ON THE OTHER HAND, HE DID AGAIN HINT THAT THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT COULD BE ABANDONED IF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL DID NOT OCCUR. IT WAS NOT CLEAR ON THIS POINT WHETHER HE WAS EXPRESSING AN OFFICIAL POSITION OR NOT. MURPHY

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ACTION:MCFAR5 INFO:AMB DCM P/E CHRON

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SECRET SECTION 01 OF 07 DAMASCUS 06036

LOC: DISK 04 348
08 AUG 83 1724
CN: 33378
CHRG: PROG
DIST: SPB

EXDIS

FOLLOWING MSG ORIG SENT TO AMMAN IS READDRESSSED TO JIDDA FOR ACTION FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PINR, SY, IS, LE, XF
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: AUG 6 MEETING
- WITH SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. FOLLOWING IS DRAFT MEMCON FOR CLEARANCE. BEGIN TEXT:
 1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT).
 2. SUMMARY: IN TWO AND HALF-HOUR MEETING WITH KHADDAM EVENING AUGUST 6, AMB MCFARLANE PRESENTED OVERVIEW OF USG GLOBAL PRIORITIES AND OF THE PRINCIPLES ON WHICH WE BASE OUR APPROACH TO LEBANON. ALTHOUGH KHADDAM TOOK PAINS TO STRESS SYRIA WELCOMES RESUMPTION OF OUR BILATERAL DIALOGUE, HE PROVIDED STANDARD SYRIAN HARD LINE -- GEMAYEL'S PRO-PHALANGIST POLICIES ARE "DIMINISHING" GOL LEGITIMACY; SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL DEPENDS ON UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL AND "RESCINDING" OF THE AGREEMENT; USG'S PRO-ISRAELI BIAS FATALLY VITIATES ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A CONSTRUCTIVE PLAYER IN THE MIDDLE EAST. KHADDAM SAID MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION OF A SYRIAN PULLBACK FROM THE METN WOULD EXPOSE ITS INHABITANTS TO MASSACRE, BUT DID FORMALLY AGREE TO A USG/SARG CLAUSE-BY-CLAUSE REVIEW OF THE AGREEMENT. ATMOSPHERE THROUGHOUT WAS CORDIAL AND KHADDAM ENDED WITH UPBEAT REFERENCE TO "A USEFUL START".
END SUMMARY.
 3. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH SYRIAN FONMIN KHADDAM FROM 1800-2100 LOCAL AUGUST 6. AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI, ROSS, TEICHER, DUR AND GLASPIE ACCOMPANIED. ON THE SYRIAN SIDE WERE MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS FARUQ AL-SHAR', DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER RASHID KAYLANI, MFA AMERICAN AFFAIRS DIRECTOR SAMI GLAIEL, INTERPRFTER SAMIH ABU FARIS, AND TWO NOTETAKERS.
 4. KHADDAM OPENED THE MEETING BY EXPRESSING HIS HOPE THAT THE VISIT WOULD LEAD TO BETTER AND MORE COMPREHENSIVE UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION. SARG/USG BILATFRAL CONTACTS HAD PROVEN USEFUL IN THE PAST, AS THE FACT OF THE CURRENT MCFARLANE VISIT BORE WITNESS.

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BY RW NARA DATE 5-21-10

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5. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT ALTHOUGH A NEWCOMER TO THE AREA, HE WAS "VERY CONSCIOUS OF THE IMPERATIVE OF CONSULTING CLOSELY" WITH SARG, ACKNOWLEDGED THE HISTORIC ROLE SYRIA MUST CONTINUE TO PLAY IN THE AREA, AND NOTED COMPLEX PROBLEMS REQUIRE TIME AND DISCUSSION FOR SOLUTION. HAVING WORKED FOR DR. KISSINGER FOR FIVE YEARS, MCFARLANE HOPED TO EMULATE HIS PATIENCE AND HIS ABILITY TO LISTEN AND TO LEARN.

6. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD ASKED HIM TO PROVIDE SARG WITH AN OVERVIEW OF USG GLOBAL PRIORITIES AND OF THE APPROACH THE USG REGARDS FRUITFUL IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND SPECIFICALLY IN LEBANON.

7. MCFARLANE RECALLED THAT WHEN PRESIDENT REAGAN CAME TO OFFICE HE HAD DEFINED MORE THAN A DOZEN ISSUES TO WHICH THE U.S. MIGHT CONTRIBUTE SO AS TO INCREASE STABILITY AND IMPROVE HUMAN WELFARE. DURING THE PAST YEAR HE HAD CONCLUDED THAT IN THE TERM OF OFFICE WHICH REMAINS TO HIM HE COULD HOPE TO EFFECT STRATEGIC IMPROVEMENTS IN ONLY TWO OF THESE AREAS, TO WHICH HE WILL ACCORDINGLY DEVOTE A MAXIMUM OF HIS TIME AND RESOURCES. THE AREAS HE HAS CHOSEN ARE EAST-WEST RELATIONS AND THE MIDDLE EAST. THIS CHOICE DOES NOT INDICATE A DENIGRATION OF THE IMPORTANCE OF OTHER AREAS SUCH AS CENTRAL AMERICA, SOUTHERN AFRICA, AND ARMS CONTROL, BUT RATHER IS A RECOGNITION THAT THE VOLATILITY OF THE MIDDLE EAST NECESSITATES THAT THE U.S. DO WHAT IT CAN TO LESSEN INSTABILITY AND IMPROVE THE QUALITY OF LIFE.

8. USG INTERESTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED, ARE NOT PURELY ALTRUISTIC BUT INCLUDE SUCH GOALS AS PEACEFUL ACCESS TO AREA RESOURCES BY ALL. FURTHER, THESE INTERESTS AND COMMITMENTS ARE NOT SHORT TERM -- THEY ARE ENDURING.

9. MCFARLANE EMPHASIZED THAT THE USG IS ABSOLUTELY COMMITTED TO ISRAELI SECURITY. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT IN THE PAST YEAR U.S.-ISRAELI RELATIONS HAVE PASSED THROUGH A STORMY PERIOD BECAUSE THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE ON WHICH THE RELATIONSHIP IS BASED HAS BEEN STRETCHED TO ITS LIMITS -- I.E., WHEN ONE OF TWO "ALLIES" TAKES A STRATEGIC STEP IT HAS AN OBLIGATION TO CONSIDER THE

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VIEWS OF THE OTHER. PRESIDENT REAGAN NOW BELIEVES THIS BILATERAL PROBLEM HAS BEEN OVERCOME AND A PERIOD OF RESTORATION AND IMPROVEMENT OF RELATIONS HAS BEGUN.

10. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT IN THE COMING DAYS AND WEEKS OF THE U.S.-SYRIAN DIALOGUE IT MIGHT BE ACADEMICALLY INTERESTING TO DISCUSS ISRAELI SECURITY STRATEGY. AT PRESENT HE WOULD SIMPLY OFFER ONE CONCLUSION, I.E., ISRAEL WILL CONTINUE TO REGARD ITS OWN SECURITY AS ITS FOREMOST NATIONAL GOAL, AN ISSUE ON WHICH THE PRIME MINISTER CAN RALLY THE POPULATION AS ON NOTHING ELSE. HENCE, ALTHOUGH ISRAEL CAN PROTECT ITS SECURITY IN MANY WAYS, PRIME MINISTER BEGIN HAS OVERWHELMING POPULAR SUPPORT FOR MAINTENANCE OF ISRAELI FORCES WHEREVER NECESSARY TO PROTECT AGAINST FOREIGN THREATS. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT HE DID NOT ESPOUSE OR PROMOTE THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS; IT IS A FACT WE MUST TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION.

11. TURNING TO LEBANON, MCFARLANE OFFERED HIS VIEWS ON HOW SARG AND THE USG MIGHT JOIN IN THE PROCESS OF CREATING GREATR STABILITY. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S GOALS, ESTABLISHED IN COORDINATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, ARE TO SECURE THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, TO FACILITATE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOL'S SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT LEBANON, AND TO INSURE A STABLE SECURITY SITUATION ON LEBANON'S BORDERS, INCLUDING WITH ISRAEL AND SYRIA.

12. THE FIRST GOAL, EVACUATION OF FOREIGN FORCES, SEEMS TO THE USG A REASONABLE PRIORITY GIVEN THE INSTABILITY OF FORCES IN DIRECT CONFRONTATION AND THE FACT OF DAILY VIOLENCE. ESCALATION OF VIOLENCE, E.G., BETWEEN PLO UNITS OR BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE PLO, CAN ULTIMATELY INVOLVE SYRIAN UNITS AND BECOME WIDE IN SCALE. FORCE CONCENTRATION AND CAPACITY ON BOTH SIDES HAS RISEN IN THE PAST YEAR. SYRIAN STRENGTH IS EXTREMELY IMPRESSIVE, AS ISRAEL IS AWARE. HOWEVER, FROM HIS OWN TALKS WITH ISRAELIS AND FROM INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS, MCFARLANE HAS CONCLUDED THERE IS NO DOUBT ISRAEL WILL ACCEPT MAJOR LOSSES IF ITS SECURITY IS IN JEOPARDY.

13. THE SECOND GOAL, ESTABLISHING GOL CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, REQUIRES THE COOPERATION OF ALL OF LEBANON'S NEIGHBORS. NOTING THAT SYRIA IS BETTER INFORMED ON LEPANESE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES THAN IS THE USG, MCFARLANE NFVERTHELESS POINTED TO THE FACT THAT CONFESSIONAL DISAGREEMENTS ARE COMPLICATED BY SUCH OTHER PROBLEMS AS INCIPIENT CONOMIC DISASTER. CLEARLY, MCFARLANE STRESSED, GOL POLICIES MUST BENEFIT THE ENTIRE COUNTRY OR THEY WON'T WORK.

14. MCFARLANE STRESSED HIS BELIEF THAT GEMAYEL RECOGNIZES THIS FACT. HE IS IN INTENSE DIALOGUE WITH ALL FACTIONS, INCLUDING SOMETIMES BITTER EXCHANGES WITH THE PHALANGE. AS A MILITARY EXPERT, MCFARLANE SAID, HE WAS STRUCK BY THE JUDGMENT AND WISDOM WITH WHICH COMMAND BILLETS ARE CURRENTLY BEING ASSIGNED.

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15. TURNING TO IDEAS ON HOW BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS MIGHT APPROACH IMPLEMENTATION OF OUR SHARED GOALS, MCFARLANE CITED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VIEW THAT WE SHOULD PROCEED FROM TWO PRINCIPLES. FIRST, EVERY SOVEREIGN STATE OUGHT TO HAVE THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE AUTONOMOUSLY ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS AND HOW THEY SHOULD BE DEFENDED. SECOND, EVERY COUNTRY OUGHT TO HAVE THE SOVEREIGN ABILITY TO DECIDE HOW TO DIRECT ITS OWN AFFAIRS.

16. THE PRESENCE OF FOREIGN FORCES IS CREATING MAJOR DIFFICULTIES FOR THE GOL IN IMPLEMENTING THE FIRST PRINCIPLE. FURTHER, THE GOL IS CONCERNED THAT IF THOSE FOREIGN POWERS LEAVE, THE GOL MUST BE IN A POSITION TO TAKE CARE OF THE SECURITY ISSUES WHICH HAVE CONCERNED THE OCCUPYING POWERS. THE GOL, WHICH MUST BE ABLE TO RESOLVE INTERNAL POLITICAL FACTIONAL DISPUTES IN ORDER TO PROVIDE FOR INTERNAL SECURITY, IS WORKING POLITICALLY (THROUGH OUT-REACH TO THE CONFESSIONS) AND MILITARILY (BY DEVELOPING A MILITARY ARM CAPABLE OF MAINTAINING INTERNAL ORDER AND SECURE BORDERS). THE GOL ALSO FACES THE PROBLEM OF THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE CAUSED BY CONFRONTATION BETWEEN FOREIGN FORCES AND THE INTERPLAY OF THOSE FORCES WITH DOMESTIC PARTIES. CONSEQUENTLY, THE USG BELIEVES THE GOL'S PROGRESS TOWARD ITS BASIC

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GOALS WILL BE ENHANCED IF WE CAN FIND A BASIS FOR THE DEPARTURE OF THE FOREIGN FORCES.

17. TURNING TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, MCFARLANE SAID IT WAS HIS SENSE THAT THE GOI WILL WITHDRAW, BUT IT IS VERY CLEAR IT WILL NOT WITHDRAW ENTIRELY AS LONG AS THE SYRIAN PRESENCE (IN LEBANON) CONTINUES TO POSE A RISK. MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI MILITARY PRESENCE IS NEITHER ANALOGOUS NOR HISTORICALLY CONGRUENT, BUT STRESSED THAT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER INVOLVING THE STABILITY OF LEBANON, THE DEPARTURE OF BOTH IS INTER-RELATED. MCFARLANE ASSERTED THAT IN THE NEXT TWO MONTHS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL COMMENCE. FIRST STEPS TAKEN IN ALAY/SHUF WILL ENABLE THE REESTABLISHMENT OF GOL AUTHORITY IN A GREAT PART OF THE COUNTRY, AND THAT IS GOOD.

18. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED KHADDAM A QUESTION. SINCE THE SARG BELIEVES IT USEFUL TO CONTRIBUTE TO THE EXPANSION OF GOL AUTHORITY, WOULD KHADDAM CONSIDER THE VALUE OF MOVEMENT OF SYRIAN FORCES, FOR EXAMPLE OUT OF THE MATN, TO PROVIDE A FURTHER OPPORTUNITY FOR THE GOL TO REASSUME CONTROL. THE USG BELIEVES SUCH A SYRIAN MOVEMENT WOULD NOT ONLY BE CONSTRUCTIVE BUT WOULD ALSO PROVIDE "GREATER STABILITY ON THE BATTLEFIELD."

19. SMILING, KHADDAM RESPONDED THAT MCFARLANE'S PRESENTATION HAD TAKEN LESS TIME THAN HE HAD BEEN EXPECTING (PRESUMABLY A REFERENCE TO THE STEADY STREAM OF MEDIA REPORTS FROM ISRAEL AND LEBANON ABOUT "NEW IDEAS"). HE THANKED MCFARLANE FOR HIS EXPOSE OF USG VIEWS, SAYING THAT BEFORE HE CLARIFIED THE SYRIAN POSITION HE WOULD POSE SOME QUESTIONS.

20. KHADDAM ASKED FIRST WHETHER THE PRESENT U.S. "MOVE" IS WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT, I.E., IS THE USG CONVINCED OF THE FUTILITY OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE NECESSITY THAT IT BE "RESCINDED"?

21. MCFARLANE RECALLED THAT THE GOL HAD ENTERED AN AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL TO WHICH THE U.S. WAS A PARTY. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, THE AGREEMENT IS NOT PRESENTLY BEING IMPLEMENTED. THE PROPOSED ISRAELI MOVEMENT OF FORCES IS A MATTER IN AND OF ITSELF. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT THE IDEAS HE HAD PROPOSED HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE AGREEMENT.

22. KHADDAM THEN ASKED, "WHAT IS THE FATE OF THE AGREEMENT IN SUCH A CASE?", TO WHICH MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT THE GOL HAS CHOSEN FOR THE MOMENT NOT TO IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT. THE USG BELIEVES THE AGREEMENT TO BE REASONABLE BUT THE GOL AND SARG (SIC) -- (MCFARLANE MEANT GOI AND KHADDAM UNDERSTOOD THIS) -- WILL DECIDE WHETHER TO MOVE FORWARD AS IS THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT. MCFARLANE ADDED THAT HE WOULD ANTICIPATE BOTH GOVERNMENTS MUST CONSIDER HOW THEIR ACTIONS WOULD RELATE TO THE SARG.

23. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT WOULD BE THE POSITION OF THE

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USG AND GOI "IF" THE GOL ANNOUNCES IT IS RESCINDING THE AGREEMENT. NOTING HE CANNOT SPEAK FOR THE GOI, MCFARLANE SAID HE WOULD EXPECT HIGH TENSION AND A CONTINUING ISRAELI PRESENCE IN LEBANON.

24. KHADDAM CITED MCFARLANE (INCORRECTLY) AS HAVING DECLARED USG'S TOP PRIORITY IS ISRAELI SECURITY. HE ASKED WHAT THE USG "CONCEPT" IS BOTH OF ISRAELI SECURITY AND OF THE SECURITY OF OTHERS IN THE REGION. MCFARLANE SAID ISRAEL'S SECURITY IS BEST ACHIEVED BY FINDING A BASIS FOR POLITICAL GUARANTEES WITH ALL ITS NEIGHBORS. WE ENCOURAGE THAT PROCESS, AND UNTIL IT IS COMPLETED THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO ASSIST IN ASSURING THE GOI CAN DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST FOREIGN ATTACK.

25. KHADDAM ASKED WHO WILL GUARANTEE OTHER STATES AGAINST ATTACKS BY ISRAEL. MCFARLANE SAID JUST, LASTING AGREEMENTS RECOGNIZING THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF ISRAEL'S NEIGHBORS IS THE BEST WAY FORWARD. THERE COULD BE GUARANTEES INVOLVING THE PRINCIPLE OF MILITARY BALANCE AND MEASURES TO INSURE THIS BALANCE IS MAINTAINED. KHADDAM ASKED AGAIN HOW ARAB SECURITY WOULD BE GUARANTEED IN THE INTERIM WHILE THE U.S. GUARANTEES ISRAELI SECURITY. MCFARLANE STATED THAT THE U.S. "DOES NOT ENDORSE OR CONDONE ANY AGGRESSION BY ISRAEL OR BY ANY OTHER STATE".

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26. ISRAEL, KHADDAM RETORTED, DESTROYED AND OCCUPIED THE CAPITAL OF LEBANON. WHAT DID THE U.S. DO ABOUT THAT AGGRESSION AND WILL IT DO THE SAME THING AGAIN. RESPONDING TO HIS OWN RHETORICAL QUESTION, KHADDAM ANSWERED THAT THE U.S. CONGRESS' RESPONSE WAS 500 MILLION DOLLARS OF INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

27. THE USG DID NOT ENDORSE ISRAELI ACTION, MCFARLANE RESPONDED, BUT IT IS IMPORTANT NOT TO IGNORE THAT OVER A COURSE OF YEARS VIOLENCE WAS PERPETRATED OVER ISRAELI BORDERS. WITH REGARD TO THE CURRENT ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, PRESIDENT REAGAN DID NOT CHANGE PROGRAM LEVELS FROM LAST YEAR. FURTHER, THE USG RECOGNIZES THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY NEEDS OF ARABS AS IS EVIDENCED BY THE SAUDI AND EGYPTIAN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS WHICH ARE SIMILAR TO ISRAELI AID IN SCALE AND DIMENSION AND WHICH ARE LIKWISE EXPECTED TO EXPAND IN THE FUTURE.

28. KHADDAM TOOK STRONG ISSUE, INSISTING THAT ISRAEL RECEIVES MORE AND THIS ASSISTANCE IS WHAT ENCOURAGES THE GOI IN ITS AGGRESSION. MCFARLANE ALLUDED AGAIN TO THE FIRST PRINCIPLE HE HAD SKETCHED OUT, ANY COUNTRY -- GREECE, SYRIA, LEBANON -- IS ENTITLED TO DECIDE WHAT IS A THREAT TO IT AND HOW TO DEAL WITH THAT THREAT. PRACTICALLY, THIS MEANS SYRIA, FOR EXAMPLE, CAN UNDERTAKE MEASURES TO PROTECT ITS SECURITY INTERESTS.

29. KHADDAM ASKED WHAT FREEDOM OF DECISION THE GOL HAS WHEN ISRAELI TANKS ARE ONLY A FEW METERS FROM THE PRESIDENT'S RESIDENCE. MCFARLANE SAID HE TOOK KHADDAM'S POINT THAT NEGOTIATIONS UNDER FOREIGN OCCUPATION CAN COLOR THE OUTCOME. BUT AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, SUCH NEGOTIATIONS HAVE OCCURRED IN THE PAST IN THE MIDDLE EAST BETWEEN ISRAEL AND AN ARAB COUNTRY, PROVIDING A RESULT WHICH THE LATTER FOUND VERY ACCEPTABLE.

30. KHADDAM ASKED IF THOSE ARRANGEMENTS HAD PROVIDED REGIONAL SECURITY TO WHICH MCFARLANE SAID YES, POINTING TO THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN SEPARATION OF FORCES AS AN INSURANCE OF STABILITY. WHILE HE COULD NOT SPEAK FOR SYRIA'S VIEW OF THE ARRANGEMENTS SYRIA HAD CONCLUDED WITH ISRAEL TO EFFECT SIMILAR SEPARATION, MCFARLANE NOTED THAT HISTORICALLY THERE HAVE BEEN FEW UNILATERAL WITHDRAWALS. HOWEVER, THE ISRAELI-EGYPTIAN AND ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENTS DO PROVIDE FOR THE RETURN OF ALL OCCUPIED TERRITORY, A SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENT.

31. KHADDAM THEN PRESENTED THE SARG POSITION ON USG AREA POLICY. ISRAELI EXPANSIONISM, HE SAID, ALIENATES ANY POSSIBILITY OF COMPREHENSIVE PEACE. UNLIMITED U.S. SUPPORT IS WHAT PERMITS ISRAEL TO EXPAND, ANNEX ARAB LAND, AND CREATF NEW AREA TENSION. IF ISRAEL, THE AGGRESSOR STATE, FINDS ITS SECURITY A BASIC NATIONAL INTEREST, AXIOMATICALLY THE ARABS WHO ARE SUBJECT TO ISRAELI AGGRESSION REGARD THEIR SECURITY AS EVEN MORE BASIC.

32. WE HOPE, KHADDAM SAID, WE WILL SEE THE DAY WHEN

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THE USG WILL BE BALANCED; THEN U.S. POLICY WILL BE MORE EFFECTIVE IN THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AND THE U.S. WILL FIND FRIENDS. PEOPLE IN THE AREA WILL SEE USG PRACTICES ACCORD WITH THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF A SUPERPOWER PERMANENT MEMBER OF THE UNSC. THE USG'S ATTEMPT TO LOOK AT THE MIDDLE EAST THROUGH AN ISRAELI LENS CONTRADICTS ARAB ASPIRATIONS "IRRESPECTIVE OF WORDS OF FLATTERY YOU MAY HEAR" (I.E., FROM OUR ARAB FRIENDS).

33. I WANT TO STRESS, SAID KHADDAM, SYRIA WANTS A JUST AND COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE CONTEXT OF UN RESOLUTIONS CALLING FOR (A) THE INALIENABLE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE AND (B) ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. (COMMENT: FROM THE CONTEXT IT IS NOT CLEAR IF KHADDAM WAS REFERRING TO 242 AND 338 IN ADDITION TO 508 AND 509.) A MIDDLE EAST PEACE WILL HAVE POSITIVE EFFECTS ON INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY. U.S. BALANCE IS NOW NON-EXISTENT AND CANNOT BE IMPLIED BY POINTING TO AIRPLANE DELIVERY TO EGYPT AND TANKS TO JORDAN WHILE ISRAEL BOMBS AND DESTROYS LEBANON AND THREATENS SYRIA AND ALL THE ARAB NATION.

34. NEVERTHELESS, KHADDAM DECLARED, "I THINK CONTINUATION OF DIALOGUE WITH THE U.S. ADMINISTRATION IS A POSITIVE

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THING."

35. TURNING TO LEBANON, KHADDAM AGREED WITH THE PRINCIPLES OUTLINED BY MCFARLANE, STRESSING THAT IN ALL PAST USG CONTACTS WITH SARG, INCLUDING MESSAGES FROM VARIOUS U.S. PRESIDENTS TO ASSAD, THE U.S. HAS STATED LEBANESE SURVIVAL DEPENDS ON ITS INDEPENDENT, UNITED AND SOVEREIGN STATUS. HOWEVER, U.S. APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES LEAD TO MAJOR DIFFERENCES WITH SARG. THE AGREEMENT IMPOSED ON LEBANON IS AN EXAMPLE OF NON-OBJECTIVE APPLICATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES.

36. IF THE U.S. IS TRULY COMMITTED TO THESE PRINCIPLES, KHADDAM SAID, SYRIA IS READY TO DISCUSS WAYS TO IMPLEMENT THEM. LET'S READ THE AGREEMENT CLAUSE BY CLAUSE AND OMIT ANYTHING CONTRADICTING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY. RESTRICTIONS AND OBLIGATIONS IMPOSED ON LEBANON ARE GREATER THAN THOSE IMPOSED ON NAZI GERMANY. ISRAEL HAS ASKED LEBANON TO PAY THE COST OF HER VICTORY, A WAR IN WHICH LEBANON DID NOT EVEN FIGHT. LEBANON IS TRANSFORMED INTO AN ISRAELI PROTECTORATE; THE SECURITY AND INTERESTS OF SYRIA AND ALL ARABS ARE CONTRAVENED.

37. KHADDAM RECALLED THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF SYRIA'S ENTRY INTO LEBANON. ON ONE SIDE, THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT (KAMAL JUMBLATT AND THE PALESTINIANS), WHOSE POLITICAL OBJECTIVES WERE LARGELY IN ACCORD WITH SYRIA'S, WAS FIGHTING THE PHALANGE-BASED LEBANESE FRONT WITH WHICH SYRIA HAD NO COMMON POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. IN 1976 AS THE WAR ESCALATED, SYRIA ACTED TO PROTECT THE NATIONAL BALANCE BY ENTERING ON THE SIDE WITH WHICH IT HAD NO COMMON POLITICAL OBJECTIVES. SYRIA ENTERED AT THE REQUEST OF THE CHRISTIAN PRESIDENT AND MOST LEBANESE TO PREVENT THE DOMINATION OF ANY ONE SIDN AND THE DISMEMBERMENT OF LEBANON.

38. TWO THINGS NOW THREATEN LEBANON, KHADDAM ASSERTED: POPULAR OPPOSITION TO THE AGREEMENT AND OPPRESSION OF MUSLIMS AND OTHER LEBANESE PATRIOTS. PREVIOUS DAY, KHADDAM SAID, A MARONITE FRIEND CLOSE TO GEMAYEL (PRESUMABLY JEAN OBEID) HAD TOLD KHADDAM THAT GEMAYEL IS NOW TRYING TO ESTABLISH TWO STATES, A STATE OF HIS OWN (GOL) AND A STATE OF HIS FATHER (LEBANESE FORCES AND PHALANGE). KHADDAM HAD SAID A THIRD "HOLY STATE" (ISRAEL) HAD BEEN OMITTED FROM THE LIST.

39. KHADDAM THEN ARGUED STRONGLY THAT THE PHALANGE IS ESTABLISHING "HEGEMONY" OVER ALL OF THE STATE INSTITUTIONS. EVEN THE MODERATE MUFTI HAD SAID SO PUBLICLY. PHALANGE MILITIA ARE OPPRESSING AND KILLING IN WEST BEIRUT. THE RESULT IS A STATE OF NATIONAL IMBALANCE. GEMAYEL, "BY CONTINUING THIS POLICY, IS INVALIDATING GOL'S LEGITIMACY."

40. KHADDAM STATED THAT ACHIEVEMENT OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY WOULD DEPEND ON (A) UNCONDITIONAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT BENEFIT FOR ISRAEL PER UNSC RES. 508 AND 509; THIS MEANS RESCINDING OF THE AGREEMENT, AND (B) COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL RECONCILIATION.

41. RESPONDING TO MCFARLANE'S COMMENT ON CONFSSIONAL

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BALANCE OF NEW MILITARY BILLETS, KHADDAM SAID THE REAL QUESTION IS WHO MAKES THE DECISIONS. THE WHOLE SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT, HE INSISTED, IS IN PHALANGIST HANDS -- THE ARMY COMMANDER, THE HEAD OF ARMY INTELLIGENCE, THE HEAD OF PUBLIC SECURITY, AND THE HEAD OF THE GENDARMERIE. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS ARE NOW ALSO PHALANGE DOMINATED.

42. TURNING TO MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION FOR A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM THE METN, KHADDAM RECALLED SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM BEIRUT RESULTED IN PHALANGIST MASSACRES. SARG CANNOT EXPOSE LEBANESE CITIZENS TO NEW MASSACRES.

43. SUMMARIZING THE SYRIAN POSITION, KHADDAM SAID THAT SARG'S COMMITMENTS TO A UNIFIED, INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON AND TO THE MAINTENANCE OF SYRIAN SECURITY ARE INTEGRAL AND COMPLEMENTARY.

44. TURNING TO SARG CONTACTS WITH THE GOL, KHADDAM SAID SYRIA MAINTAINS ITS STANDARD POSITION. SARG IS PREPARED TO DISCUSS ANYTHING BENEFICIAL TO LEBANON WITH THE GOL AND IS PREPARED TO COMPLY WITH LEBANESE REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL "IN A VERY SHORT TIME" IF REPEAT IF ISRAEL WITHDRAWS WITHOUT GAINS SUCH AS THOSE GUARANTEED IN THE AGREEMENT. FURTHER, SYRIA DOES NOT WANT A MILITARY CLASH, BUT "IF IT IS IMPOSED BY ISRAEL," SYRIA

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WILL INFLICT GREAT CASUALTIES, REALIZING THAT SYRIA WILL TAKE GREAT CASUALTIES ITSELF.

45. A LEBANESE SOLUTION CANNOT PROCEED FROM A FAIT ACCOMPLI; THE AGREEMENT IS ILLEGAL AND ILLEGITIMATE, CONTRAVENING THE GENEVA CONVENTION BY WHICH "ANY AGREEMENT IMPOSED BY FORCE OR THREAT OF FORCE IS INVALID."

46. CONCLUDING HIS PRESENTATION, KHADDAM SAID MCFARLANE'S "OPTIMISTIC STATEMENTS" HAD LED HIM TO ANTICIPATE NEW U.S. IDEAS, WHICH HE HAD NOT YET HEARD. DID THE U.S. INTEND SIMPLY TO CREATE AN OPTIMISTIC ATMOSPHERE OR PRODUCE SOMETHING TANGIBLE -- "WHAT IS NEW FROM YOU?"

47. MCFARLANE OFFERED COMMENTS ON FOUR OF KHADDAM'S POINTS. HE NOTED KHADDAM HAD CALLED INTO QUESTION USG'S FUNDAMENTAL PURPOSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, ALLEGING EXCLUSIVE ORIENTATION TO ISRAEL RATHER THAN COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AS OUR GOAL. THIS POINT IS "TERRIBLY IMPORTANT" SINCE THERE IS NO HOPE FOR AGREEMENT IN OTHER AREAS IF CONFIDENCE CANNOT BE ESTABLISHED ON THIS ISSUE. MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT HIS JOB INVOLVES DAILY MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN FROM WHICH HE HAS GARNERED A SENSE OF THE PRESIDENT'S MOTIVES AND HIS VIEW OF WHAT IS RIGHT AND WRONG. THE PRESIDENT'S VERY STRONG FEELING IS THAT WE MUST BREAK OUT OF THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE WHICH SERVES NEITHER OUR INTERESTS NOR THE INTERESTS OF JEWS OR ARABS.

48. MCFARLANE AGREED KHADDAM MAY BE CORRECT THAT THE USG IS PERCEIVED AS EXCLUSIVELY FOCUSED ON ISRAELI SECURITY. BUT KHADDAM IS WRONG ABOUT THE U.S. POLICY GOAL, WHICH IS PEACE WITH JUSTICE FOR ALL, AS ENUNCIATED ON SEPTEMBER 1, 1982. TIME AND AGAIN MCFARLANE HAS HEARD THE PRESIDENT EXPLAIN TO ISRAELI LEADERS THAT THEIR INTERESTS WOULD BE SERVED BY ACHIEVING A JUST PEACE BASED ON 242 AND 338. MCFARLANE EXPRESSED HIS PLEASURE THAT AT FEZ SYRIA AND OTHER ARABS HAD FOUND POSITIVE ELEMENTS IN THE SEPTEMBER 1 INITIATIVE.

49. REBUTTING KHADDAM'S ALLEGATION THAT THE AGREEMENT IS UNBALANCED, MCFARLANE SUGGESTED AN EXHAUSTIVE STUDY AT STAFF LEVEL. HE NOTED TWO OBVIOUS BENEFITS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON: PROVISION FOR TOTAL WITHDRAWAL (AND THEREFORE A CONDITION OF CONTROL BY THE GOL WHICH HAS NOT EXISTED FOR TEN YEARS) AND ISRAELI RECOGNITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER, A BENEFIT WHICH SUCH AGREEMENTS DO NOT ALWAYS PROVIDE.

50. ON GOL LEGITIMACY, A POINT WHICH RELATES TO THE EQUITY OF THE AGREEMENT, MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT THE GOL, SEEKING TO PROVIDE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS, HAD EXERCISED ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHT AND DETERMINED TO EMBARK ON THE AGREEMENT. IF SARG DISAGREES ABOUT THE GOL'S LEGITIMACY, "THERE IS LITTLE BASIS FOR DIALOGUE." INDEED GOL LEGITIMACY IS SOMEWHAT OF A MODEL FOR THIS AREA.

51. FINALLY, MCFARLANE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN LEBANON IS NOT PERFECT BUT GEMAYEL'S CONCERN

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FOR ALL THE LEBANESE IS MANIFEST, NOT ONLY IN DAILY CONTACTS WITH ALL THE SECTS BUT IN THE CONFSSIONAL COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY FOR WHICH VOLUNTEERS FROM EACH SECT ARE NOW GREATER THAN CAN BE ABSORBED.

52. MCFARLANE CLOSED BY CHARACTERIZING THE EXCHANGE AS "WORTHWHILE" AND EXPRESSING THE HOPE WE CAN CARRY ON CLARIFYING AND DEFINING DISAGREEMENTS WHERE THEY EXIST AND MAKE PROGRESS TOGETHER.

53. KHADDAM, RETURNING TO THE AGREEMENT, ASSERTED THAT SOUTH LEBANON IS NOW UNDER LEBANESE-ISRAELI ADMINISTRATION AND THE LEBANESE ARE DOMINATED BY THE ISRAELIS. ISRAEL IS NOT CONCERNED ABOUT BORDERS; IT HAS IN PRACTICE ANNEXED THE SOUTH.

54. HE AGREED TO MCFARLANE'S SUGGESTION THAT THEIR REPRESENTATIVES MEET AND DISCUSS THE "SCORES OF SYRIAN OBJECTIONS TO THE AGREEMENT."

55. AS FOR THE LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL, KHADDAM RECALLED ASSAD'S PROPOSAL TO THE SECRETARY OF A REFERENDUM, TO TAKE PLACE AFTER THE DISARMING OF ALL SIDES, AFTER SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, AND UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. NEITHER GEMAYEL NOR THE AGREEMENT

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WOULD GET FIVE PERCENT OF THE LEBANESE VOTE.

56. IN CLOSING, KHADDAM AGAIN THANKED MCFARLANN FOR
THEIR USEFUL EXCHANGE, SAYING THAT IRRESPECTIVE OF
DIVERGENCE OR NON-DIVERGENCE OF VIEWPOINTS, THEY HAD
TOGETHER MADE "A USEFUL START."
END DRAFT MEMCON. PAGANELLI

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 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3520
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1966
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DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
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 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, US

FROM MCFARLANE

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: SECOND TRIPARTITE
 POLITICAL MEETING

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: THE SECOND HIGH-LEVEL ISRAELI-LEBANESE-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SINCE THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD LATE AUGUST 4 WITH AMB MCFARLANE IN ATTENDANCE. THE SUBJECTS RAISED AND THE POSITIONS TAKEN WERE PREDICTABLE. THE LEBANESE FOCUSED ON THE NEED TO LINK ISRAEL'S PLANNED REDEPLOYMENT TO A WIDER PROGRAM OF WITHDRAWALS. ISRAEL RAISED THE NEED FOR FULL POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION OF ITS REDEPLOYMENT, THE NEED TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS BY BRINGING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT INTO FORCE AND FORMALLY DEMANDING THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN TROOPS, AND ITS DESIRE TO MOVE ITS OFFICE FROM YARZAH. MCFARLANE PROMOTED CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THESE POINTS IN ORDER TO BUILD GREATER LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONFIDENCE. HE AGREED WITH THE LEBANESE THAT A FORMAL DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS PREMATURE. THE ONLY SIGNIFICANT NEW DEVELOPMENT WAS LEBANESE CONCESSION OF MILITARY COORDINATION ON ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT NO MATTER WHAT THE OUTCOME OF THE POLITICAL DISCUSSIONS. THE LEBANESE ASKED FOR ISRAELI HELP IN COUNTERING THE "WALID JUMELATT PHENOMENON" BOTH POLITICALLY AND MILITARILY (BY COLLECTING HIS HEAVY WEAPONS, SUCH AS THE 130 MM CANNON REPORTEDLY IN THE BARUQ AREA, BEFORE REDEPLOYMENT). MCFARLANE CALLED FOR URGENT ACTION TO MOBILIZE ALL LEVERAGE AGAINST THE SYRIANS, SINCE, IF PROGRESS WERE NOT MADE RAPIDLY, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD DISINTEGRATE WITHIN ONE MONTH. IT WAS AGREED THAT THE NEXT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR 118-0015 #5786

BY RW NARA DATE 5-24-10

WOULD BE HELD AUGUST 11 OR 12, DEPENDING ON MCFARLANE'S SCHEDULE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE SECOND HIGH LEVEL ISRAELI-LEBANESE-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SINCE THE TRIPARTITE NEGOTIATIONS WAS HELD LATE AUGUST 4 WITH KIMCHE, MERHAV, AND LEOR IN ATTENDANCE FOR ISRAEL, QASSIS AND AN LAF NOTETAKER FOR LEBANON, AND AME MCFARLANE AND ROSS FOR THE U.S. T

RG

ANTIVE PVOTION

OF THE MEETING, WHICH WAS FOLLOWED BY DINNER, LASTED ABOUT TWO HOURS AND COVERED A WIDE RANGE OF PREDICTABLE SUBJECTS. THE LEBANESE RAISED ABOVE ALL THE NEED TO LINK ISRAEL'S PLANNED REDEPLOYMENT TO A WIDER PROGRAM OF WITHDRAWALS. ISRAEL RAISED THE NEED FOR FULL POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION OF ITS REDEPLOYMENT, THE NEED TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS BY BRINGING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT INTO FORCE AND FORMALLY DEMANDING THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN TROOPS, AND ITS DESIRE TO MOVE ITS OFFICE FROM YARZAH. THE U.S. PROMOTED CONSTRUCTIVE DISCUSSION OF THESE POINTS IN ORDER TO BUILD GREATER LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONFIDENCE.

4. LINKAGE OF REDEPLOYMENT TO FULL WITHDRAWAL: QASSIS, SEIZING ON AN EARLY REFERENCE BY KIMCHE TO FULL AND COMPLETE COORDINATION OF REDEPLOYMENT, IMMEDIATELY CONCEDED THAT MILITARY COORDINATION WOULD OCCUR, SINCE IT WAS IN THE DIRECT INTEREST OF BOTH LEBANON AND ISRAEL TO PREVENT INSTABILITY IN THE SHUF AND INFILTRATION FROM SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS. HOWEVER, HE EMPHASIZED, THERE COULD BE NO POLITICAL COORDINATION IF THE FOCUS WAS A UNILATERAL PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL. IT WOULD THEN BE UP TO ISRAEL TO SAY WHAT IT WANTED FOR PUBLIC CONSUMPTION.

KIMCHE COUNTERARGUED FOR THREE FORMS OF COORDINATION - MILITARY/INTELLIGENCE, PRACTICAL (I.E., HOW TO HANDLE THE SHUF), AND POLITICAL (I.E., HOW TO PACKAGE THE REDEPLOYMENT IN ATTRACTIVE POLITICAL TERMS). QASSIS REITERATED THAT POLITICAL COORDINATION COULD ONLY OCCUR IN THE CONTEXT OF A SATISFACTORY WITHDRAWAL PACKAGE. IF ISRAEL INDEED WANTED A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IN LEBANON, IT SHOULD AGREE TO A FORMAT OF WORDS THAT WAS NOT POLITICALLY DAMAGING, I.E., THAT WAS NOT PERCEIVED AS PARTIICN.

QASSIS NOTED THAT, AT THE LAST TRIPARTITE MEETING, HE HAD SUGGESTED A TIMETABLE OF WITHDRAWALS DOWN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER WITH COORDINATION OF EACH STEP AND ASSURANCES THAT THE LEBANESE ARMY COULD MAINTAIN SECURITY. KIMCHE REPLIED THAT ISRAEL WAS INDEED ANXIOUS TO SUPPORT

THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND WAS PREPARED TO MAKE SOME SORT OF STATEMENT. QASSIS' IDEA WAS INTERESTING IF IT COULD BE LINKED TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. ISRAEL, HE SAID, COULD MAKE A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT ITS REDEPLOYMENT WAS THE FIRST STEP IN THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON AND THAT THIS PROCESS COULD BE COMPLETED IN A FINITE NUMBER OF MONTHS -- I.E., THREE OR FOUR. HOWEVER, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO SAY THAT THIS WAS LINKED TO (A) THE STATE OF SECURITY ON THE GROUND AND (B) THE WITHDRAWAL OF OTHER FOREIGN FORCES. WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT AS STRONG A STATEMENT AS POSSIBLE. IT WAS OBVIOUS, HOWEVER, THAT A TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL WITHOUT THIS LINKAGE WOULD DECREASE PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS.

QASSIS COUNTERARGUED THAT, IF ISRAEL GAVE A TIMETABLE FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL, IT COULD BE DEMONSTRATED THAT SYRIA WAS NOW THE OBSTACLE, NOT ISRAEL. QASSIS DID AGREE THAT IN PRACTICE SUCH A TIMETABLE WOULD HAVE TO BE LINKED TO SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO ANNOUNCE A TIMETABLE AND THEN, IF NECESSARY, STOP AT THE AWWALI.

5. COORDINATION OF REDEPLOYMENT:

WITHOUT FURTHER RESOLUTION OF THE PRECEDING AGENDA ITEM, QASSIS RETURNED TO THE ISSUE OF FULL COOPERATION AND COORDINATION ON REDEPLOYMENT. HE REPEATED THAT MILITARY COORDINATION WAS BEING CARRIED OUT AND WOULD CONTINUE. THERE WAS NO FURTHER NEED TO DISCUSS IT. ON THE POLITICAL SIDE, HOWEVER, FURTHER EXAMINATION WAS NEEDED. LEBANON NEEDED ISRAEL'S HELP TO DEAL WITH THE "WALID JUMBLATT PHENOMENON." GLANCING SUCCESSIVELY AT BOTH MCFARLANE AND KIMCHE, QASSIS COMPLAINED THAT JUMBLATT SHOULD NOT APPEAR AS IF HE HAD U.S. BACKING AND ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE IN ARMS RESUPPLY. FOR MONTHS, JUMBLATT HAD BEEN BRINGING WEAPONS INTO THE REGION ALONG THE BEIRUT-DAMASCUS HIGHWAY WITH ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE, IF NOT KNOWLEDGE. MCFARLANE ASKED IF QASSIS HAD POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT HIS ASSERTION. QASSIS SAID THAT JUST YESTERDAY HE HAD HAD A REPORT OF 130 MM CANNONS DEPLOYED IN A BATTERY UNDER ISRAELI SURVEILLANCE JUST OFF THE ROAD GOING UP TO BARUQ. KIMCHE, WARNING THAT IT WAS VERY EASY TO BE SUSPICIOUS AND THAT RUMORS FLEW ALL TOO EASILY, SAID IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE THAT SUCH WEAPONS COULD BE BROUGHT IN WITHOUT ISRAELI KNOWLEDGE, JUST AS IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE THAT ISRAEL COULD HAVE AGREED. QASSIS AND KIMCHE AGREED TO PURSUE THIS MATTER

E. O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3 (b) (6)

RETURNING TO THE POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE SHUF, QASSIS URGED KIMCHE TO HELP LEBANON ISOLATE JUMBLATT POLITICALLY AND WEAKEN HIM MILITARILY, SPECIFICALLY BY BRINGING DRUZE ARTILLERY AND OTHER HEAVY WEAPONS UNDER CONTROL BEFORE REDEPLOYMENT. KIMCHE, CALLING QASSIS' REQUEST "VALID," SAID ISRAEL WOULD HAVE TO LOOK INTO ITS IMPLICATIONS AND SEE WHAT COULD BE DONE. OBVIOUSLY, THE LEBANESE FORCES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO COME UNDER SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS.

QASSIS REPLIED EAGERLY THAT LEBANON WOULD INDEED WELCOME AN ISRAELI MOVE TO TAKE CONTROL OF LEBANESE FORCES HEAVY WEAPONS AS WELL.

QASSIS STRESSED REPEATEDLY THAT ISRAEL SHOULD NOT LEAVE

ANY "TIMEBOMBS" BEHIND IN THE SHUF. IF THE REASSERTION OF LEBANESE GOVERNMENTAL AUTHORITY IN THE SHUF DID NOT SUCCEED IT WOULD BE VERY DANGEROUS FOR ALL CONCERNED, SINCE THE SHUF WAS "THE HEART OF LEBANON." KIMCHE, WHILE HE AGREED THAT ISRAEL WOULD TRY TO BE HELPFUL, OBSERVED THAT A LONG-TERM SETTLEMENT FOR THE SHUF COULD ONLY BE REACHED BY THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES. THEREFORE, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HAVE TO MAKE ATTRACTIVE POLITICAL PROPOSALS.

QASSIS CONFIRMED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS PREPARED TO MEET THE MAJOR DRUZE DEMANDS, BUT REPEATED THAT LEBANON WOULD NEED ISRAEL'S HELP TO SUCCEED IN THE SHUF. KIMCHE REPLIED IN TURN THAT THIS WOULD REQUIRE ONGOING AND INTENSIVE COORDINATION, NOTING THAT SINCE THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT SIGNATURE OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT, THERE HAD BEEN NO REAL SUBSTANTIVE CONTACTS.

6. PUBLIC LEBANESE-ISRAELI MEETINGS:

KIMCHE THEN WENT ON TO PRESENT FAMILIAR ISRAELI ARGUMENTS FOR MAKING THE OCCURRENCE OF LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. MEETINGS PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, NOTING THAT THEIR SUBSTANCE COULD BE DESCRIBED AS "DISCUSSION OF WITHDRAWALS." QASSIS COUNTERED THAT WHAT COUNTED WAS RESULTS, NOT PUBLICITY. PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE MEETINGS WOULD NOT HELP THE PROCESS OF OBTAINING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL OR MOBILIZING THE ARAB WORLD. IT WOULD IN FACT GIVE THE SYRIANS YET ANOTHER CARD. KIMCHE COUNTERARGUED THAT, IF THERE WAS NO PUBLIC ACKNOWLEDGEMENT, SYRIA COULD SAY IT HAD BLOCKED BOTH THE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUING TALKS. IT WAS ESSENTIAL NOT TO APPEASE THE SYRIANS.

7. FORMAL DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL:

CONTINUING IN THIS VEIN, KIMCHE ARGUED THAT, ONCE THERE WAS AGREEMENT ON PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF ISRAEL'S REDEPLOYMENT AS A STEP TOWARD WITHDRAWAL, A FORMAL DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL SHOULD FOLLOW IMMEDIATELY.

MCFARLANE OBSERVED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS UNDER INTENSE PRESSURE. IT COULD NOT AFFORD TO TAKE ACTIONS THAT PRODUCED NO VISIBLE CHANGE. IF GEMAYEL SENT A FORMAL REQUEST FOR WITHDRAWAL TO ASSAD, WHAT WOULD RESULT?

KIMCHE ARGUED IN RESPONSE THAT IT WOULD FORM PART OF A "GLOBAL OFFENSIVE" TO PUT PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS. MERHAV ADDED THAT SUCH A REQUEST COULD ALSO BE VERY IMPORTANT IN THE ARAB WORLD, WHICH VALUED "LEGITIMACY" AS A PRINCIPLE OF ISLAMIC LAW.

MCFARLANE AGAIN DEMURRED, ASKING WHETHER A LEBANESE DEMAND FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WAS WORTH THE PRIME MINISTER'S LIFE. DID IT REALLY IMPROVE THE SITUATION TO HAVE SYRIA REFUSE TO WITHDRAW? SUCH A SITUATION CREATED GREAT RISKS, GIVEN THE FRAGILITY OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. IT COULD DESTROY IT, AND THIS WAS IN NO ONE'S INTEREST. IT WOULD BE BETTER FOR THE U.S. TO GO TO DAMASCUS, POSIT THE SOVEREIGN RIGHT OF EVERY COUNTRY TO DETERMINE ITS OWN SECURITY INTERESTS AND RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS, ARGUE THAT THIS COULD BE DONE WITH SYRIA IF REPEAT IF THERE WAS WITHDRAWAL CONCURRENTLY WITH SYRIAN-LEBANESE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, AND THEN -- IF SYRIA REJECTED THIS REASONING -- TURN TO THE OTHER ARAB STATES TO INTENSIFY THE DIPLOMATIC EFFORT, POINTING OUT THAT THE LEBANESE HAD MADE A REASONABLE OFFER TO SYRIA.

KIMCHE AGAIN DISAGREED, ARGUING THAT GEMAYEL WOULD INCREASE HIS POPULARITY BY DEMANDING THE DEPARTURE OF SYRIAN FORCES. HE SHOULD NOT SUBMIT. MCFARLANE POINTED OUT THAT GEMAYEL HAD HAD TWO THREATS ON HIS LIFE IN RECENT TIMES. IT WOULD BE BETTER TO CALL FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL WHEN THE CHANCES FOR ARAB SUPPORT WERE THE GREATEST. MERHAV COUNTERED THAT 12 OR 13 ARAB STATES COULD SUPPORT AN INTELLIGENT ARAB MOVE ON LEBANON. SYRIA WOULD FIND A LEBANESE DEMAND DIFFICULT TO IGNORE. QASSIS BROKE IN TO POINT OUT THAT GEMAYEL HAD ALREADY TAKEN TWO STEPS IN THIS DIRECTION -- HE HAD CANCELLED THE ARAB DETERRENT FORCE

COMMAND IN MARCH AND PUBLICLY BLAMED SYRIA FOR ANY PRESENCE OF FOREIGN TROOPS OR PARTITION OF LEBANON. A THIRD STEP WOULD NOT HELP IN ANY WAY.

8. ISRAELI OFFICE IN YARZAH:

AT THE END OF THE MEETING, KIMCHE RAISED THE ISSUE OF MOVING THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN YARZAH, STRESSING THAT AFTER REDEPLOYMENT NO MILITARY PRESENCE OR VEHICLES WOULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THAT OFFICE IN ITS NEW LOCATION. QASSIS REPLIED THAT THE LEBANESE WERE NOT WORRIED ABOUT THAT. THEIR CONCERN WAS OVER SECURITY. HE THEREFORE PROPOSED THAT THE ISRAELI OFFICE MOVE INTO THE EXISTING LAD-IDF LIAISON OFFICE BUILDING IN YARZAH, WHERE SECURITY WOULD NOT BE A PROBLEM. KIMCHE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL PREFERRED ITS OWN BUILDING.

9. CONCLUSION:

KIMCHE SUMMED UP AS FOLLOWS:

- POLITICAL COORDINATION HAD TO BE CONTINUED TO FIND A PUBLIC FORMULA ON REDEPLOYMENT, POSSIBLY WITH U.S. HELP.
- MILITARY COORDINATION, TRIPARTITE IF NECESSARY, HAD TO CONTINUE INTENSIVELY TO WORK OUT PRACTICAL DETAILS.
- LEBANON SHOULD THINK MORE ABOUT THE REMAINING POINTS OF DISAGREEMENT, SUCH AS PUBLICIZING THE POLITICAL MEETINGS, FORMALLY REQUESTING SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, AND BRINGING THE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE.
- PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS HAD TO CONTINUE TO BUILD. ON THIS LAST POINT, QASSIS OBSERVED THAT A MILITARY OPERATION WAS THE QUICKEST WAY TO "KICK THE SYRIANS OUT." MCFARLANE THAT WHATEVER LEVERAGE ANYONE HAD HAD TO BE MOBILIZED QUICKLY. AN INTEGRATED AGENDA OF POLITICAL, MILITARY, ECONOMIC, AND OTHER ACTIONS HAD TO BE CREATED. IF PROGRESS WERE NOT MADE RAPIDLY, THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT COULD DISINTEGRATE WITHIN ONE MONTH.

IT WAS AGREED IN CLOSING THAT THE NEXT TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING WOULD BE HELD WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY, AUGUST 11 OR 12, DEPENDING ON MCFARLANE'S SCHEDULE.

10. COMMENT: WHILE THE MEETING HELPED CLEAR THE AIR AND BUILD CONFIDENCE, IT ACHIEVED FEW CONCRETE RESULTS. THE ONLY NOTABLE DEVELOPMENT WAS QASSIS' CONCESSION OF MILITARY COORDINATION ON ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT NO MATTER WHAT HAPPENS ON THE POLITICAL FRONT. IN ADDITION TO CONTINUING TO PROMOTE A POLITICAL UNDERSTANDING IN THE SEUF TO PREPARE FOR A LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TAKEOVER, WE WILL, NOW THAT MILITARY COORDINATION IS ASSURED, CONTINUE TO WORK THROUGH THIS AND OTHER CHANNELS FOR A SATISFACTORY PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THE REDEPLOYMENT OPERATION.

MURPHY

BT

#6430

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EXDIS

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JIDDA 6431

VZCZCJII *
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 DE RUEHJI #6431 220 **
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 O 081748Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2136
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0198
 BT
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JIDDA 06431

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRGE: PROG: 8/8/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: RMC FARLANE
 CLEAR: RMC FARLANE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-3
 AMB

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PGOV, PREL, US, LE
 SUBJECT: USG CONTACTS WITH WALID JUMBLATT
 REF: STATE 222228

1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. CONCUR WITH COURSE OF ACTION PROPOSED IN REFTEL.
MURPHY

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#6431

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JIDDA 6431

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1-#105

CU NARA, DATE 4/19/06

RESERVATION COPY

NODIS ACTION: MCFARLANE INFO: AMB DCM D/CHRON

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OO RUFHJI
DE RUEHC #2228 2192340
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUFHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5303
RUFHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9222
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7600
RUFHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 4550
RUFHPH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2986
INFO RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 9018
RUFHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 9347
BT

LOC: DISK 03 512
08 AUG 83 2338
CN: 33204
CHRG: PROG
DIST: NOD

~~SECRET~~ STATE 222228

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1-#106

NODIS
JIDDA PASS MCFARLANE

at CU NARA, DATE 4/19/06

F O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, US, LE
SUBJECT: USG CONTACTS WITH WALID JUMBLATT
REF: (A) BEIRUT 8612, (B) DAMASCUS 5993,
(C) TEL AVIV 10644, (D) STATE 221730, (E) AMMAN 6873,
(F) STATE 219756, (G) AMMAN 6869, (H) STATE 212990,
(I) STATE 211536, (J) STATE 211363, (K) BEIRUT 8297,
(L) BEIRUT 8222, (M) STATE 207555 AND PREVIOUS

*Dick
Pb
send
"Concys
with
proposal
of action
in letter"
I thank
Bud*

1. ~~SECRET~~ (ENTIRE TEXT).
2. REFTELS DESCRIBE THE RECENT HISTORY OF OUR CONTACTS WITH WALID JUMBLATT AND HIS INTERMEDIARY MARWAN HAMMADA AS WELL AS HOW THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT OF WALID'S SON EVOLVED. WE STRONGLY CONCUR ON THE NEED FOR THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION IN USG MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE FACTIONAL LEADERS.
3. ALTHOUGH WE STILL DO NOT HAVE AN ARRIVAL TIME FOR JUMBLATT, WE EXPECT HE WILL ARRIVE IN THE U.S. IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS. MEDICAL TREATMENT FOR JUMBLATT'S SON WAS ARRANGED THROUGH EMBASSY AMMAN, THROUGH THE CHANNEL PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AGREED TO AT THE TIME OF HIS VISIT TO WASHINGTON. WADIA HADDAD SUBSEQUENTLY CONFIRMED ON JULY 28 THE VALUE OF CONTINUED U.S. CONTACT WITH JUMBLATT, NOTING THAT IT IS IMPORTANT WALID HEAR FROM THE U.S. THAT HE CANNOT OPPOSE THE GOL AND ENJOY U.S. SUPPORT AT THE SAME TIME. NEVERTHELESS, WE HAVE FACILITATED JUMBLATT'S TRAVEL NOW ONLY AS A HUMANITARIAN CONCERN. WE HAVE NEITHER SOUGHT NOR RECEIVED ANY REQUESTS FOR OFFICIAL APPOINTMENTS.
4. IT HAS BEEN A STANDING U.S. GOVERNMENT POLICY TO MAINTAIN CONTACTS WITH VARIOUS LEBANESE CONFESSONAL LEADERS. THIS IS CONSISTENT WITH OUR OBJECTIVE OF A FREE, INDEPENDENT AND DEMOCRATIC LEBANON IN WHICH ALL CONFESSIONS PARTICIPATE IN A BROAD NATIONAL CONSENSUS AND RESOLVE THEIR DIFFERENCES THROUGH POLITICAL INTERACTION RATHER THAN VIOLENCE. ALTHOUGH THIS GOAL STILL LIES IN THE FUTURE, OUR INFLUENCE SHOULD BE USED IN THE DIRECTION OF HELPING ACHIEVE IT. WE DO NOT SUPPORT A PHALANGE - DOMINATED

PRESERVATION COPY

111 DICTATORSHIP IN LEBANON AND ONE OF THE WAYS WE DEMONSTRATE THIS IS THROUGH CONTINUING DIALOGUE WITH OTHER CONFESSIONAL GROUPS. THERE ARE ALSO DANGERS IN NOT KEEPING IN TOUCH WITH OPPOSITION LEADERS. THESE CONTACTS PROVIDE VITAL INFORMATION AND ALLOW US TO EXERCISE INFLUENCE IN DIRECTIONS WHICH PROMOTE U.S. OBJECTIVES. MOREOVER, WE DO NOT WANT TO GIVE THE GOL THE IMPRESSION THAT IT CAN DICTATE WHOM WE CAN OR CANNOT SEE.

5. NEVERTHELESS, WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT IN THE COMING WEEKS THERE WILL BE INTENSIVE AND DELICATE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE GOL, THE DRUZE AND THE LEBANESE FORCES. OUR GOAL IS TO SEE THAT THE PARTIES REACH A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION. WE SHOULD THEREFORE AVOID A SITUATION IN WHICH THE DRUZE OR THE LF MIGHT USE MEETINGS WITH USG OFFICIALS TO STRENGTHEN THEIR HANDS AGAINST THE GOL OR TO REINFORCE THEIR OWN INTRANSIGENCE. WE ALSO MUST AVOID ALLOWING JUMBLATT TO MANIPULATE OUR MEETINGS WITH HIM INTO A DEMONSTRATION OF SUPPORT FOR HIS POSITION. MEETINGS WITH JUMBLATT IN WASHINGTON COULD HAVE THE EFFECT OF MUDDYING THE WATERS IN BEIRUT AS WELL AS SHAKING GOL CONFIDENCE IN U.S. SUPPORT.

6. ON BALANCE, THEREFORE, WE ARE INCLINED TO FOREGO SUBSTANTIVE WASHINGTON CONTACTS WITH JUMBLATT DURING THIS PERIOD. WE WOULD OF COURSE SEE THAT JUMBLATT'S ARRIVAL GOES SMOOTHLY AND THAT HIS SON RECEIVES THE SPECIALIZED MEDICAL ATTENTION HE NEEDS. WE WOULD, HOWEVER, ADVISE JUMBLATT - IF HE ASKS FOR A MEETING - THAT THIS IS A DELICATE STAGE IN HIS NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GOL AND WE BELIEVE WHAT OFFICIAL CONTACTS HE HAS WITH THE USG SHOULD BE WITH THE OFFICIALS MOST FAMILIAR WITH THE SITUATION ON

THE GROUND - THE MCFARLANE TEAM AND EMBASSIES BEIRUT AND AMMAN. THIS WILL ALSO ALLOW THE CLOSEST POSSIBLE COORDINATION WITH THE GOL.

7. WE CAN EXPECT CONSIDERABLE AGITATION FROM THE DRUZE - AMERICAN COMMUNITY AND ITS FRIENDS ON THE HILL IF JUMBLATT PRESSES FOR A MEETING IN WASHINGTON. NEVERTHELESS, WE DO NOT NEED TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION NOW. THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUE AT THIS POINT IS TO ENSURE THAT ALL ELEMENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ARE FOLLOWING A CONSISTENT AND COORDINATED APPROACH TO JUMBLATT AND OTHER LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL LEADERS.

8. WOULD APPRECIATE COMMENTS OF AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND DILLON ON FOREGOING. WOULD ALSO APPRECIATE REPORTING ON GOL'S STRATEGY FOR REACHING A POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION IN THE SHUF AND AS DETAILED A STATUS REPORT AS YOU HAVE OF CURRENT GOL NEGOTIATIONS WITH DRUZE AND LEBANESE FORCES.

9. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT
#2228

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PRESERVATION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS

AMMAN 006961

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS ECON RSO CHRON

WWDTVZCZCBLO105
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHAM #6961 2211203
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 091202Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0218
RUEHBI/USDAO BEIRUT LE IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5174
RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2101
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0268
RUEHDM/USDAO DAMASCUS SY IMMEDIATE
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6382
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 9496
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3255
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7279
BT

LOC: DISK 11 182
09 AUG 83 1205
CN: 06484
CHRG: PROG
DIST: POL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 06961

EXDIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR AND RSO

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS : PREL, OVIP, LE
SUBJECT : MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BEIRUT SCHEDULE

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. OUR MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN HAS BEEN DELAYED UNTIL 1530 AMMAN TIME. WE THEREFORE EXPECT TO DEPART FOR BEIRUT SOME TIME BETWEEN 1730 AND 1830 AMMAN TIME (1530 AND 1630 Z) AUGUST 9. ETA BEIRUT IS THUS BETWEEN 1850 AND 1950 BEIRUT TIME (1650 AND 1750 Z). IF WE LEARN WITH ENOUGH LEAD TIME THAT THE ETA WILL SLIP FURTHER, WE WILL ADVISE YOU. OTHERWISE, THIS WILL BE OUR LAST ADVISORY.

3. WHILE WE REALIZE THAT HADDAD AND SALEM WILL BE ANXIOUS TO HEAR FROM US ON OUR DISCUSSIONS IN SYRIA AND SAUDI ARABIA, WE WILL BE ARRIVING IN BEIRUT RATHER TIRED FROM TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS AND TRAVEL. WE WOULD THEREFORE MUCH APPRECIATE IT IF HADDAD AND SALEM COULD SCHEDULE OUR FIRST MEETING WITH THEM FOR NO EARLIER THAN 1000 LT ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10. AS USUAL, WE WILL SCHEDULE ANY FURTHER MEETINGS IN LEBANON IN CONSULTATION WITH THEM.

4. ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT LODGING ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE THE SAME AS IN THE PAST, WE WOULD APPRECIATE

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/97

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~/EXDIS

AMMAN 006961

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L / E X D I S~~

AMMAN 006961

DINNER FOR THOSE OF THE PARTY STAYING AT THE RESIDENCE.

5. WE ARE TENTATIVELY PLANNING TO PROCEED TO ISRAEL
SOME TIME ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 11. DETAILS WILL FOLLOW
BY SEPTEL IN RESPONSE TO TEL AVIV 10716.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

DJEREJIAN

BT

#6961

NNNN

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L / E X D I S~~

AMMAN 006961

Rem File

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

YXLVVZCZCBL0108
 OO RUEHBL
 DE RUEHAM #6964 2211235
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 091235Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
 TO RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7282
 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5176
 RUEADWW/WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0219
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0271
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6385
 BT
~~SECRET~~ AMMAN 06964

LOC: DISK 11 190
 09 AUG 83 1237
 CN: 06487
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: ROSS

EXDIS

TEL AVIV FOR LEWIS
 DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS : PREL, MOPS, MARR, OVIP, LE, IS, US
 SUBJECT : MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: THIRD
 -- TRIPARTITE MEETING AND PROGRAM IN ISRAEL

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOUR GUESS ON OUR ARRIVAL IN ISRAEL IS ABOUT RIGHT. WE ANTICIPATE HOLDING DEBRIEFING AND STRATEGY SESSIONS WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AND HIS ADVISERS DURING THE COURSE OF THE DAY ON WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 10. WE WOULD PLAN TO PROCEED TO ISRAEL SOME TIME ON THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. FOR PLANNING PURPOSES, 0945 ISRAEL TIME (0745 Z) MAY BE USED AS A PRELIMINARY ETA. ON OUR SCHEDULE IN ISRAEL, WE WOULD PROPOSE TO START WITH A MEETING WITH YOU, MOVE TO A RESTRICTED SESSION WITH KIMCHE, AND THEN HOLD SMALL MEETINGS WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS. WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR RECOMMENDATIONS.

3. THIS SCHEDULE WILL OF COURSE FORECLOSE A WEDNESDAY OR THURSDAY, AUGUST 10 OR 11, TRIPARTITE MEETING (WE REGRET THE CONFUSION OF DAYS AND DATES IN JIDDA 6430). SUBJECT TO KIMCHE'S SCHEDULE AND THE REQUIREMENTS OF SHABBAT, WE COULD HOLD A MEETING WITH A BEIRUT VENUE FRIDAY OR SATURDAY, AUGUST 12 OR 13.

4. FYI, KIMCHE'S STATEMENT THAT WE HAD DECIDED TO HOLD THE NEXT MEETING THURSDAY, AUGUST 11, IS NOT ACCURATE. WE HAD AGREED, SUBJECT TO MY SCHEDULE, TO HOLD IT EITHER AUGUST 10 OR 11. ON THE ISSUE OF A POSSIBLE ISRAELI VENUE IN THE FUTURE, QASSIS TOOK THE IDEA ON BOARD, INDICATED NO PERSONAL OBJECTION,

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 By dlb NARA, Date 6/12/1997

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BUT IMPLIED STRONGLY HE WOULD HAVE TO CHECK IT OUT.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

DJEREJIAN

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#6964

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(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

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OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHDM #6076/01 2211347
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 091338Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0698
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3152
BT
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 06076

LOC: DISK 11 246
09 AUG 83 1357
CN: 06498
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

NODIS

BEIRUT FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, SY, XF, LE, IS
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FIRST ROUND WITH
- THE SYRIANS -- DAMASCUS ASSESSMENT

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. HERewith IS MY ASSESSMENT OF YOUR FIRST ROUND HERE AND THOUGHTS ON NEXT STEPS WITH THN SYRIANS.

3. ASSESSMENT: AS KHADDAM SAID, WE HAVE MADE "A USEFUL START." THE SYRIANS HAVE HAD A CHANCE TO LOOK YOU OVER AND I BELIEVE THEY WERE GENUINELY REASSURED TO HAVE HEARD YOUR ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS OF KEY SYRIAN CONCERNS, PARTICULARLY RECOGNITION OF SYRIA'S NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE AREA AND SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP WITH LEBANON. YOUR CLEAR STATEMENT THAT PATIENCE WILL BE A WATCHWORD OF THE AMERICAN SIDE FITS IN WELL WITH ASSAD'S OWN NEGOTIATING STYLE. IN SHORT, YOUR CREDENTIALS AS A CREDIBLE PLENIPOTENTIARY INTERLOCUTOR ARE ESTABLISHED, THE INTERPERSONAL CHEMISTRY WAS VERY GOOD, AND THE SYRIAN BOYCOTT OF THE PRESIDENT'S MIDDLE EAST ENVOY IS DEFINITELY ENDED. IN THIS CONTEXT, ESTABLISHMENT OF TETE-A-TETE ACCESS TO ASSAD AT THE OUTSET OF YOUR MISSION IS OF MAJOR SIGNIFICANCE, ESPECIALLY GIVEN THE PERSONAL RAPPORT THAT APPEARS TO HAVE DEVELOPED.

4. I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD BE PLEASED, IN FACT EVEN MILDLY ENCOURAGED, TO HAVE ACHIEVED THIS MUCH IN ROUND ONE. GIVEN ASSAD'S METHODOICAL AND RHETORICAL NEGOTIATING STYLE, MORE CONCRETE PROGRESS WOULD HAVE BEEN PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE IN AN INITIAL ENCOUNTER, AND THE SYRIANS REPEATED THEIR DESIRE TO CONTINUE HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE.

5. MEANWHILE, SARG'S PRIVATE AND PUBLIC POSITIONS REMAIN IDENTICAL (E.G., A SARG-INSPIRED COMMENTARY IN THE DAMASCUS PRESS SUMMARIZES OUR CURRENT IMPASSE: "U.S. ENVOY MCFARLANE HAS COME WITH AN EMPTY BAG CONTAINING ONLY FUTILE PRESSURES.") SINCE YOUR DEPARTURE, THE PRESS CONTINUES TO INVEIGH AGAINST THE AGREEMENT AND GEMAYEL'S PURPORTED PHALANGIST BIAS. THIS CONTINUED

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COUPLING OF THE TWO ISSUES IS PROBABLY SIGNIFICANT. IN MY VIEW, FINAL ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF ALL PARTIES WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE IF THE SYRIANS REMAIN CONVINCED THAT GEMAYEL IS IRREVERSIBLY EMBARKED ON ESTABLISHING A DEGREE OF PHALANGIST DOMINATION PERMANENTLY DESTRUCTIVE OF CONFSSIONAL BALANCE.

6. A BRIGHT SPOT IN THE OTHERWISE PRO FORMA STATEMENTS MADE TO YOU BY ASSAD AND KHADDAM WAS CERTAINLY KHADDAM'S WILLINGNESS TO REVIEW THE AGREEMENT. THIS PROCESS WILL AT A MINIMUM OPEN THE WAY FOR A FULL EXCHANGE ON I'VE WRITTEN KHADDAM ASKING HIM TO PROPOSE DATES FOR A FAIRBANKS-KHADDAM MEETING IN DAMASCUS TO FOLLOW UP. ASSAD'S GOOD-WILL GESTURE ON THE ICRC EXHUMATIONS IS TYPICAL OF HIM, AND PROBABLY LESS SIGNIFICANT IN POLITICAL TERMS. I ASSUME YOU WILL REPORT THIS TO THE ISRAELIS, WHO CAN THEN TAKE IT UP WITH THE ICRC. A WORD OF CAUTION -- ASSAD HAS BEFORE BEEN FORTHCOMING ON POW/MIA ISSUES, BUT SYRIAN RESPONSE THEN BREAKS DOWN IN THE MOD BUREAUCRACY THAT HAS ACTION ON THE PROBLEM.

7. NEXT STEPS: WHAT DOES ASSAD WANT OR EXPECT FROM THE DIALOGUE WHICH HE APPEARS TO WELCOME? PERHAPS HE IS SIMPLY STRINGING US ALONG, PLEASED TO HAVE A SUPER-POWER TO ADD TO THE LIST OF DEMANDEURS CURRENTLY MAKING THE HAJJ TO DAMAECUS. IF SO, HE WILL LIT THE DIALOGUE TAKE ITS COURSE WITHOUT ANY INTENTION OF MODERATING HIS POLICY, JUDGING THAT HE WINS EITHER WAY -- WE MAY PROVIDE SOME CONCESSIONS; IF WE DO NOT, HE RETAINS HIS IMAGE AS THE ARAB LEADER STANDING UP TO THE IMPERIALISTS. THIS STRATEGY WOULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGE FOR ASSAD OF PERMITTING HIM TO CHOOSE HIS OWN TIME FOR POLITICAL ACCOMMODATION, SHOULD HE ULTIMATELY DECIDE TO ENGAGE IN SERIOUS NEGOTIATION. IN THE MEANTIME, HE WILL BE ABLE TO EXPLOIT THE PLO RIFT AND IS WELL POSITIONED TO REAP ARAB POLITICAL BENEFIT FROM ISRAEL REDEPLOYMENT. (AS BACKGROUND, ALL OUR INTELLIGENCE INDICATIONS SUGGEST THAT AS A RESULT OF SOVIET MILITARY RESUPPLY, HE IS CURIOUSLY UNAFRAID OF THE IDF.)

8. ON THE OTHER HAND, ASSAD IS NOT SMUG. WHILE HE WILL BE IN NO HURRY TO SURRENDER CURRENT POLITICAL ADVANTAGES, I BELIEVE, ON BALANCE, THAT HIS ULTIMATE PREFERENCE IS TO SECURE SYRIA'S VITAL INTERESTS IN LEBANON BY MEANS

OTHER THAN MILITARY OCCUPATION. THE OCCUPATION IS EXPENSIVE TO FINANCE AND ULTIMATELY DETRIMENTAL TO HIM IN THE ARAB POLITICAL CONTEXT. WE ARE ALSO HEARING VAGUE RUMORS, SO FAR UNVERIFIABLE, THAT ASSAD'S MILITARY PLANNERS' APPRECIATION OF BIQA' DEFENSE TENDS TO WITHDRAWAL OF THE MAJORITY OF GROUND FORCES TO HIGH GROUND ALONG THE EASTERN SIDE OF THE BIQA' (ON THE SYRIAN BORDER), AND COVERAGE OF THE VALLEY WITH AIR DEFENSE MISSILES AND CONVENTIONAL ARTILLERY UNITS.

9. GIVEN THE IMMINENCE OF REDEPLOYMENT, I ASSUME ANY NEXT STEPS ARE LIKELY TO CONCENTRATE ON DISENGAGEMENT. I NOTE FROM TEL AVIV 10685 THAT THERE MAY BE SERIOUS DISCUSSION IN ISRAEL OF FULL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN ADVANCE OF SYRIAN PULLOUT IF ASSAD WERE TO SET A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL TIMETABLE. IF TRUE, THIS SCHEME IS SOMETHING WHICH I BELIEVE YOU SHOULD BEGIN TO DISCUSS VERY SOON WITH THE SYRIANS. NEEDLESS TO SAY, WE WILL NEED ATTRACTIVE PACKAGING. GOVERNMENT-INSPIRED SPECULATION IN THE ISRAELI AND LEBANESE PRESS WILL DIMINISH ANY POSSIBILITY OF ASSAD NIBBLING AT THE BAIT.

10. AS A SECOND FRONT IN YOUR CONVERSATIONS WITH ASSAD, I BELIEVE IT IS USEFUL TO PUSH HARD FOR DIRECT SYRIAN-LEBANESE CONVERSATIONS AND TO SUPPORT THESE EFFORTS WITH ANY HARD INFORMATION YOU CAN PROVIDE TO ASSAD TO DEBUNK HIS CONVICTION (AND IT IS A CONVICTION) THAT GEMAYEL HAS EMBARKED ON--OR IS POWERLESS TO PREVENT -- A PHALANGE TAKEOVER OF GOL INSTITUTIONS. THE LEBANESE WILL PRESUMABLY PUSH THEMSELVES FOR WHATEVER FORA THEY CAN INDUCE THE SYRIANS TO ACCEPT AND WILL HAVE THEIR OWN IDEAS OF INTERLOCUTORS. IT IS CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT ELIE SALEM WOULD NOT SUCCEED IN THIS ROLE. HE IS UNWELCOME AND DISCREDITED IN DAMASCUS.

11. FINALLY, A WORD ON HOW OUR STYLE IN LEBANON PLAYS HER. THE SYRIANS ARE JEALOUS OF OUR INFLUENCE IN BEIRUT, WHICH THEY REGARD AS USURPING THEIR DIVINE RIGHT AS POWER BROKERS. NO MATTER WHAT YOU DO OR SAY, YOU WILL HAVE A VICEREGAL POSTURE IN SYRIAN EYES. I DO NOT THINK THIS SHOULD BOTHER US IN THE SLIGHTEST. IN FACT, GIVEN THIS INEVITABLE PROCONSULAR REPUTATION, THERE IS NO SYRIAN RPT SYRIAN REASON FOR US TO BE DETERRED FROM OFFERING THE LEBANESE PARTIES WHATEVER ADVICE SEEMS APPROPRIATE TO YOU AND AMBASSADOR DILLON.

12. IN A SEPTTEL I HAVE ADDRESSED THE QUESTION OF THE OPTIMAL USG APPROACH TO MOVING THE SYRIANS AWAY FROM THEIR CURRENT INTRANSIGENCE -- WHETHER WE SHOULD WORK WITH THEM, AGAINST THEM, OR BOTH.

13. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI
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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 06973

LOC: DISK 11 277

09 AUG 83 1419

CN: 06505

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

E.O. 12356: DECL:8/31/83

TAGS : OVIP, LE

SUBJECT : MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WILL WANT TO USE THE SECURE TELEPHONE IN THE MARINE HEADQUARTERS UPON HIS ARRIVAL IN BEIRUT.

3. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

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WHERE WE GO FROM HERE

- ① Agreement
- ② Arab Commission
- ③ Arab on NE
- ④ Arabat statement.
- ⑤ Disposition for reconciliation - Gemayel

-- Is it time to turn up the heat?

- To rally the community in support of the Government of Lebanon;
- To move the PLO out;
- To convene an Arab Summit;
- To have Gemayel send the letter formally requesting Syrian withdrawal.

-- Is there any Syrian flexibility?

- Can we make any progress with the concept of staggered withdrawal, where the agreement is not implemented until later?
- Can Syrian be persuaded to give the Government of Lebanon a chance internally?
- Can we facilitate the movement of the PLO first to Tripoli and then to Jordan?

-- Are there partial or more near-term measures that would start the process while strengthening the Government of Lebanon?

- Would Arabs support a GOL request that as a first step towards withdrawal and reconciliation that Syria leave the Metin?
- Are there other collateral measures to rally support the Lebanon?
- Other forms of support for Lebanon -- political and economic, i.e. high-level visits to Beirut?

SUMMARY OF MCFARLANE MISSION TO DATE

After visits to Lebanon, Israel and Syria, can report two important problems we confront:

-- Israel intends to redeploy to the Awwali line probably not later than October 15.

- The Lebanese are prepared to live with that provided it is portrayed as part of a process leading to total withdrawal.

- Israel, in turn, seems prepared to show more flexibility in this regard. They may be willing to cast it as a step leading to full withdrawal with "a national willingness" to complete the process in 4-5 months but this is subject to two conditions: (1) a Syrian agreement to withdraw and (2) that the actual pace of Israeli withdrawal would be conditioned by the capabilities of the Lebanese to assure security.

o The Lebanese object to the latter condition because it gives Israel a unilateral veto on future withdrawals. This might be circumvented by a US side letter to Israel where we would state our understanding that each phase would be preceded by adequate security arrangements

-- A second deals with the internal situation in Lebanon and the pressing need for reconciliation of the factions.

- The Government of Lebanon believes that they have an ongoing dialogue with the factions and that they are capable of reaching agreement. The first test of which will be in the Aley and Shouf.

- Militarily the Lebanese believe they are prepared to move into the area vacated by the Israelis. In this regard there are, however, two problems from our point of view: (1) Do they have the ability to make the political deals necessary? (2) If they achieve political accommodation, can they cope with outside pressure and Syrian ability to disrupt their military moves?

-- A Syrian Dimension. There are two problems:

- Willingness of the SARG to permit and facilitate a political reconciliation to take place. Here I got nowhere.

- Their readiness to get the Syrian Army out of Lebanon. I stressed that Israel will not leave finally until Syria leaves. I noted that this was a way for Assad to get credit for getting the Israelis out of Lebanon.

Problem of the Agreement

-- It seems to me that we have two basic ways to go from here:

- One is an incremental approach like the one Kissinger used in the mid-70's. In brief, steady process of consultations but not create confrontation between Syria and the other Arabs.

- Second approach is more frontal and is based on the assumption that Syria will never willingly

compromise. Therefore, we need to get Arab states to rally behind Lebanon and bring pressure to bear on Assad. For example, moving the PLO out of Lebanon. The difficulty is to get the Arabs to take on another Arab state and the need for a pretext.

o The pretext for this frontal approach is two-fold:

oo Every state has the right to determine its own security interests.

oo Every state has the right to determine what its relations with its neighbors should be.

TRANSFER SHEET

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 OTHER (SPECIFY: *Different folder - see below*)

DESCRIPTION:

*Material was within bul clip put in Chron Cables File.
 Has identifying note - "Excess from Bud's briefcase."
 Some handwritten notes, drafts of further diplomatic
 steps, originals of Talking Points w/ Pres. Assad (copies
 elsewhere in Chron Cables), Info on meeting w/ King
 Hussein (8/9/83).*

SERIES <i>SUBJECT FILE</i>	BOX NO. <i>91407</i>
FILE FOLDER TITLE: <i>From "Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [8/9/83] to!</i>	
TRANSFERRED BY: <i>dlb</i>	DATE OF TRANSFER: <i>12/1/99</i>

"Middle East Trip (McFarlane) - Handwritten Notes" ←