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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

	Collection Name	EXECUT	TIVE SECRETARIA	T, NSC: SUBJECT FILE	With	hdrawer
					CAS	12/5/2008
	File Folder	MIDDLE	MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES			A
		[8/05/83-	8/07/83]		M08	-099/2
	Box Number	53			STO	CKER
,	ID Doc Type	Doc	ument Description	No of Pages	32 Doc Date	Restrictions
	57747 CABLE	05004	42Z AUG 83	2	8/5/1983	B1
		D	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #79; R 5/3/2 M08-099/2 #57747	010	
	57748 CABLE	05005	50Z AUG 83	5	8/5/1983	B1
		D	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #80; R 5/3/2 M08-099/2 #57748	010	
3.	57749 CABLE	05011	17Z AUG 83	5	8/5/1983	B1
		D	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #81; R 5/3/2 M08-099/2 #57749	010	
-1	57750 CABLE	05014	41Z AUG 83	4	8/5/1983	B1
		D	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #82; R 5/3/2 M08-099/2 #57750	010	
5.	57751 CABLE	05030	04Z AUG 83	1	8/5/1983	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1 #83		
$(\varphi$	57752 CABLE	04092	28Z AUG 83	2	8/4/1983	B1
		R	11/15/2002	NLSF98-008/1 #84		
7.	57755 CABLE		CFARLANE/FAIRBA ATIVE TRAVEL PL		8/3/1983	B2 B6
		PAR	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #85; R 5/3/20 M08-099/2 #57755	010	

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA] B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

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- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA] B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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1	File Folder	MIDDLE	E EAST TRIP (MC	FARLANE) CHRON	N CAB	LES	FOI	A
		[8/05/83-	-8/07/83]				M08	8-099/2
1	Box Number	53						CKER
	ID Doc Type	Doc	cument Descriptio	n		o of ges	Doc Date	Restrictions
	57756 CABLE	0504	04Z AUG 83			2	8/5/1983	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1	#86			
	57757 CABLE		ICFARLANE/FAIRI DAR TRIP	BANKS MISSION:		1	8/5/1983	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1	#87			
	57759 CABLE	0507	40Z AUG 83			2	8/5/1983	B1
		R	11/15/2002	NLSF98-008/1	#88			
	57760 CABLE	0516	18Z AUG 83			3	8/5/1983	B1
		D	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #89 M08-099/2 #57		3/2	010	
	57762 CABLE	0518	17Z AUG 83			1	8/5/1983	B6
		PAR	11/15/2002	F98-008/1 #90 5/3/2010 M08-0				
	57763 TALKING POINTS	RE M	IEETING WITH PRI	ESIDENT ASSAD		5	ND	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1	#91			
	57764 TALKING POINTS	US POSITION				3	ND	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1	#92			
	57766 TALKING POINTS	RE A	GREEMENT			4	ND	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1	#93			

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	File Folder	MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES [8/05/83-8/07/83]		FOIA M08-099/2			
	Box Number	53					CKER
	ID Doc Type	Do	cument Descriptio	n	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
.	57767 CABLE	0604	453Z AUG 83		1	8/6/1983	B1
		R	11/15/2002	NLSF98-008/1 #9	14		
7.	57768 CABLE	0613	323Z AUG 83		2	8/6/1983	B1
1		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1 #9	95		
8.	57769 CABLE	0615	508Z AUG 83		7	8/6/1983	B1
		PA	R 4/19/2006	F98-008/1 #96; R M08-099/2 #5776		010	
9.	57770 CABLE	0620)57Z AUG 83		1	8/6/1983	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1 #9	7		
0.	57772 CABLE	0621	04Z AUG 83		2	12/5/2008	B1
		R	4/19/2006	NLSF98-008/1 #9	8		

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CONTROL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. NONETHELESS, ISRAEL CANNOT SET DATES FOR ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD IMPLEMENT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED BY ASKING, GIVEN THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, WHERE THE IDF WOULD BE AT THE END OF EIGHT TO TWELVE WEEKS. KIMCHE ANSWERED THEY WOULD STILL BE AT THE AWWALI LINE, UNLESS SYRIA AND THE PLO HAD MOVED.

AT THIS POINT, KIMCHE SUGGESTED, IN HIS OPINION AND ON A PRIVATE BASIS (PROTECT FULLY) THAT HE COULD CONTEMPLATE A QUOTE FIG LEAF UNQUOTE FOR THE LEBANESE. QUOTE TO THE EXTENT THE GOL CAN PROVIDE SECURITY, THE GOI MIGHT BE WILLING TO SAY THAT COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WAS 'FEASIBLE OF IMPKEMENTATION' IN NO MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS, PROVIDED THE SYRIANS (AND PLO) WITHDRAW UNQUOTE. HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING GOL AGREEMENT TO A NEW LOCATION FOR THE MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED THE LEBANESE CONDITIONS; I.E., NO UNIFORMED SECURITY PRESENCE AND NO OVERLAND IDF MOVEMENT TO AND - FROM THE OFFICE. KINCHE SAID THESE CONDITIONS POSED NO PROBLEM. 264

5. COMMENT: WE ARE UNDERTAKING TO DRAFT LANGUAGE TO 24 PRESENT TO THE ISRAELIS FOR DISCUSSION FIRST AT FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS HERE AND THEN AT TOMORROW NIGHT'S TRIPARTITE MEETING IN BEIRUT. THE DRAFT LANGUAGE WILL BE REVIEWED WITH KIMCHE WEDNESDAY MORNING DURING OR FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH SHAMIR. END COMMENT. CLUVERIUS - BT

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MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND TEICHER MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER - 3. PRESERVATIC SHAMIR, DAVID KIMCHE, HANON BAR-ON, URI LUBR NI AND SEVERAL OTHER MFA OFFICIALS FOR FIFTY MINUTES, MORNING AUGUST 3. SHAMIR EXPRESSED HIS READINESS TO COOPERATE AND TURNED THE FLOOR OVER TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE. AMB MCFARLANE OPENED HIS PRESENTATION BY REAFFIRMING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE AMERICAN

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GOALS IN LEBANON. THE US IS MOST CONCERNED WITH BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. VISIT TO PEIRUT SOUGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS A CHANCE FOR AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLANS AND LEBANESE CONCERNS. THE LEBANESE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD MANAGE THE SHOUF IN THE WAKE FOF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. POLITICALLY THE GOVERNMENT IS INTENSIFYING ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE DRUZE AND THE LEBANESE FOR ACCOMMODATION IN THE SHOUF. REGARDING THE MILITARY, THE LEBANESE ARMY IS READY TO GO INTO THE SHOUF BUT ALL KNOW THAT STABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS. BUT THE LEBANESE EXPRESSED A HIGH DEGREE OF CONCERN REGARDING HOW REDEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE. FOR THEM IT SHOULD BE PART OF A PROCESS THAT DOES TWO THINGS: (1) STRENGTHENS THE APPEARANCE AND REALITY OF THEIR CONTROL IN THE ALEY/SHOUF AND (2) THAT THE WITGDRAWAL TAKE PLACE IN A PROCESS WHICH TAKES SYRIA -INTO ACCOUNT AND PROVIDES INCENTIVES FOR SYRIAN WITH-DRAWAL. FURTHER, THE WITHDRAWAL MUST NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A PRETEXT FOR PARTITION.

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-4. MCFARLANE PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE US SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THESE CONCERNS. FIRST WORK SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN A TRIPARTITE CONTEXT TO DEVELOP A PROCESS OF CONTINUOUS WITHDRAWAL. THIS SHOULD INVOLVE GREATER EMPHASIS N THE WESTERN CORRIDOR. THE TRIPARTITE TALKS COULD FOCUS ON ESTABLISHING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL. WITHIN LEBANON, ISRAELI THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. ISRAELI CONTACT WITH THE FACTIONS UNDERMINES THE AUTHORITY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ACTIVE CONTACT BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IS NECESSARY TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. MCFARLANE CLOSED HIS OPENING REMARKS BY STRESSING HIS BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS READY TO EXTEND ITS FCONTROL ALONG THE WESTERN FRONT AS SOON AS THE ISRAELIS ARE READY TO LEAVE.

5. SHAMIR SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT MCFARLANE IS GIVING THE ISRAELIS HIS PICTURE OF THE LEBANESE WAY OF THINKING BUT HE WAS CONFUSED BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT AN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED ABOUT NEXT

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STEPS IN WASHINGTON. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE REDEPLNYMENT WAS PART OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE FIRST ISRAELI STEP TOWARDS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. A SIGN OF GOODWILL FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE. TIT IS NOW TIME TO SEE WHAT THE SYRIANS ARE READY TO DO AND PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON THE SYRIANS TO START TO LEAVE LEBANON. INSTEAD PRESSURE IS BEING PUT ON ISRAEL FOR SYRIA TO WAIT QUIETLY, ISRAEL TO LEAVE AND TERRORISTS RAIDS TO RESUME IN THE NORTH. WHAT MCFARLANE SUGGESTED WOULD ERODE THE PRINCIPAL OF SIMU. TANEOUS WITHDRAWAL BUT ISRAEL WANTS TO COORDINATE AND IS READY TO COOPERATE. SHAMIR ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DRUZE. HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE WANTED ISRAEL TO HELP THE DRUZE COME TO TERMS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL IN THE WEST AND THE EAST-BUT ISRAEL WILL MOVE TO THE AWWALI AND WAIT FOR SYRIAN RESPONSE.

6. SHAMIR THEN ASKED ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT. HE SAID THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS, AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND GENERALLY BE HELPFUL. HE CONTINUED QUOTE DISENGAGEMENT WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WIT WITHDRAWAL BUT CAN BE A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. IT IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN US AND THE SYRIANS THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE LEBANESE UNQUOTE. ARRANGEMENTS ALSO WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT PLO INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM. THIS WOULD NEED TO BE ARRANGED WITH THE SYRIANS. DISENGAGEMENT MAY BE LESS IMMEDIATELY IMPORTANT, AS REDEPLOYMENT WILL TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS AND LEBANON MUST TAKE CONTROL OF THE AREA. BUT ISRAEL WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH US AND LEBANON TO SEE WHAT CAN HAPPEN.

7. MCFARLANE MADE CLEAR THE LEBANESE CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND EXPLAINED HOW WE MIGHT WORK WITH THIRD OUNTRIES INCLUDING THE ARABS AND EUROPEANS TO DEVISE INCENTIVES FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE IDF PRESENCE, EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL INTENDS TO LEAVE, PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE. REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, WE HAVE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO COUNTER SYRIAN OBDURACY AND ISRAELI INTENTION TO LEAVE. THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT IS A HEALTHY AND CORRECT WAY TO DEVELOP A PROCESS. WITHIN LEBANON HOWEVER THE UNDENIABLY POPULAR PERCEPTION IS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL LEAD TO PARTITION. THIS IS WHY WE NEED A PROCESS, CONDITIONED FUNDAMENTALLY ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO OVERCOME THE PARTITION PERCEPTION. MCFARLANE REPORTED THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI RATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS AN INCENTIVE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE DO NOT SHARE THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION. RATHER IT WOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR SYRIANS TO REMAIN WHILE THE LEBANESE GOAL IS TO GET SYRIA OUT AND EXPAND LEBANESE CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. SHAMIR

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REITERATED THAT IF SY IA MOVES, ISRAEL WILL MOVE BUT 5. THERE CAN BE NO UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AFTER 6 THE ISRAELI DEPLOYMENT, THERE MUST BE SOME SYRIAN -MOVEMENT. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT, IT WILL BE AN INCENTIVE 8. FOR THE SYRIANS TO REMAIN IN LEBANON FOREVER. SH SHAMIR 18 Ť - IMPORTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WHICH HE CHARACTERIZES AS QUOTE NOT A GOVERNMENT AT ALL UNQUOTE. 12-ISRAELI REDEPLNYMENT WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THEIR 14.1 AUTHORITY. TO BECOME A REAL GOVERNMENT, THE LEBANESE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL. IF IT DOESN'T, SYRIA j. WILL END UP CONTROLLING ALL OF LEBANON AND GEMAYEL WILL 16-NOT BE PRESIDENT FOR LONG. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE SHOULD 1 GO TALK TO THE SYRIANS BEFORE DISCUSSING QUOTE NEW 18-SCHEMES UNQUOTE WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL WILL GO AHEAD AND 20

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REDEPLOY ITS FORCES AND TRY TO COORDINATE WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. BUT BECAUSE OF THE LEBANESE POSITION THIS COORDINATION WILL NOT SUCCEED. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR A LETTER ASKING THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE, THERE AREN'T INCENTIVES FOR THE SYRIANS TO ACT. SHAMIR OPINED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE ITS POSITION FROM THAT WHICH IT ARTICULATED IN WASHINGTON. ISRAEL HAS NO TALK OF CHANGE BUT ISRAEL WILL NOT LEAVE UNTIL IT IS HĽ. SURE ABOUT ITS SECURITY AND IT CANNOT HAVE CONFIDENCE ABOUT ITS SECURITY UNTIL THE PLO AND SYRIANS LEAVE. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS BY THE PARTIES. EVEN IF THE PLO AND SYRIANS LEAVE, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL ONLY BE BARELY SUFFICIENT. IF THEY DON'T LEAVE, THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE OF NO USE. AND NOW THERE SEEMS TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID OF THE PLO WHICH SHAMIR HOPED MCFARLANE COULD NO ONE SHOULD FORGET THAT THE REASON FOR THE EXPL RE. OPERATION IN LEBANON WAS TO GET RID OF THE PLO AND NOT BUT NOW THE TERRORISTS ARE UNDER THE THE SYRIANS. PROTECTION OF THE SY IANS. NONE OF THIS DEPENDS ON WHAT THE LEBANESE SAY. THE LEBANESE ARE A LESS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS EQUATION. QUOTE LEBANON IS THE OBJECT, NOT THE SUBJECT UNQUOTE. ISRAEL IS READY . TO HELP THEM BECOME A STRONG GOVERNMENT BUT THE LEBANESE ARE PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE WAY.

MCFARLANE REAFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE 8. LEBANESE PLEDGES OF SUPPORT TO THE AGREEMENT BUT THAT WHAT ISRAEL WANTS NOW WOULD HAVE A QUOTE CATASTROPHIC UNQUOTE AFFECT ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO SURVIVE. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL LEAVES AT ALL OR NOT, THE PERCEPTION OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL - IS PARTITION. THIS PERCEPTION IS CORROSIVE AND COULD BRING ABOUT THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE LEBANESE ARE TRYING HARD TO WORK OUT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHIC WILL LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL REDEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY. IF ALL WORK TOGETHER, A PROCESS CAN BE DEVELOPED TO BRING ABOUT THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THAT WE ALL SEEK. MCFARLANE SAID QUOTE I EXPECT TO BE HERE A LONG TIME. UNQUOTE.

9. SHAMIR ASKED MCFARLANE TO MEET WITH THE INTER-50 . MINISTERIAL GROUP TO DISCUSS DETAILS BUT REAFFIRMED UU UTHAT THE PRINCIPLES, AS STATED IN WASHINGTON, WERE CLEAR AND STAND. HE THEN ASKED MCFARLANE WHEN HE WOULD GO TC DAMASCUS. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT WE MAY FIRST 54.1 GO TO JIDDA AND THEN ON TO DAMASCUS THIS WEEKEND. SHAMIR CLOSED BY ASKING MCFARLANE IF HE WOULD SEE 56 PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, PERHAPS TOMORROW. MCFARLANE . AGREED TO IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL. CLUVERIUS 58. . ST 1

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28-	WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY		
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32.	E.O. 12356; DECL; OADR		
1.4.1	TAGS; PREL, MDPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, F	R, IT, UK	
34	SUBJECT; MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MEETING WITH MNF	ANBASSADORS	
1 73.	SUBJECT, METARENIETTALKONING HEETA		
36	A CREATE - ENTIDE TEVT		
1 1 12 6	1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT		
38	2. SUMMARY: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM MET FOR	ONE AND	
41 1	ONE-HALF HOURS WITH MNF AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT F	DN 02 AUG	
40	ONE-HALF MOURS WITH MAP AND ADJECTIVES IN I	BANON	
12 1	AFTER REVIEW OF U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN LE	ITNE	
42	AND OUTLINE OF CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR OBTAIN		
	WITGDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, MCFARLANE ASH		
44	IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN AME		
,	HENRY AND OTTIERI AND BRITISH CHARGE PALMER.	AMBS	
46	PROVIDED INSIGHTS AND SUBJECTIVE ANALYSES OF FA		
1. 1.	REARING ON LEBANON PROBLEMS GENERATING CONSIDER	ADLE	
48	DISCUSSION ABOUT IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF MNI		
	MCFARLANE OUTLINED TENTATIVE THOUGHTS ABOUT POS	SSIBLE ROLES	
	FOR MNF IN LIGHT OF PLANNED IDF REDEPLOYMENT AN	ND INDICATED	
	NEED FOR CAREFUL COORDINATION AMONG CO-CONTRIBU	JTORS AND	
	HIS INTENTION TO CONSULT FURTHER IN BOTH BEIRUT	F AND	
52-	CAPITALS. MCFARLANE CLOSED MEETING WITH REQUES	ST FOR	
	AMBASSADORS' IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN	SYRIA AND	
54.	ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF THE MNF FOR DI		
1 N N	AT HIS NEXT MEETING WITH THEM. END SUMMARY.	LATION COPY	
56.		PRESERVATION COPY	
81 1	3. MCFARLANE SUMMARIZED LATEST U.S. THINKING A	BOUT	
58	ISRAELI REDEPLNYMENT PLANNING AND LEBANESE READ	TIONS,	
	STRESS NG NECESSITY FOR SEEING THIS AS A CONTIN	UOUS	
60.	PROCESS CULMINATING IN COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF	ALL FOREIGN	
1	FORCES. MCFARLANE OUTLINED U.S. APPROACH TO ST	RIA AND	
	FORUES. MURAKLANE UUILINED 0.5. AFTROACH TO ST		
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THE NEED FOR BOTH INCENTIVES AND PRESSURES. IN THIS REGARD, HE NOTED THAT OUR CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT WOULD LEAVE IDF IN PLACE IN EASTERN LEBANON ADJACENT TO SYRIAN LINES AND SUGGESTED THIS WAS IMPORTANT FORM OF PRESSURE TO INDUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED FOR IMPRESSIONS FROM THE EXPERTS ON THE SCENE AND ESPECIALLY THEIR VIEWS OF WHAT ROLE THE MNF MIGHT PLAY FOLLOWING IDF REDEPLOYMENT NOTING APPARENT CONFUSION WITHIN GOL ABOUT PRECISELY WHAT IS REQUIRED OR DESIRED BY THE LEBANESE.

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ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SUMMARIZED HIS GOVERNMENT'S 4. IMPRESSIONS ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IN BRIEF, AMBASSADOR OTTIERI EXPLAINED--AS THE ITALIANS HAVE EXPLAINED TO GOL -- THAT, FOR TIME BEING, SYRIA APPEARS CONVINCED THAT ASSAD HAS EVERYTHING TO LOSE AND NOTHING TO GAIN BY WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON: HE "OWNS" THE PLO, DOMINATES LEBANESE OPPOSITION FACTIONS, AND USES LEBANON ISSUE TO GALVANIZE SYRIAN AND ARAB PUBLIC -OPINION. ITALIAN THINKING IS THAT BY WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON HE LOSES THESE ADVANTAGES AND JEOPARDIZES HIS DOMESTIC POSITION. OTTIERI THEN PROVIDED HIS IMPRES-SIONS OF LEBANESE DESIRES FOR MNF AND CURRENT ITALIAN THINKING. ALTHOUGH EARLIER GOL THINKING SEEMED TO INCLUDE AN MNF PRESENCE IN THE SHOUF, MORE RECENTLY GENERAL TANNOUS HAD INDICATED HE DID NOT WANT AN MNF PRESENCE THERE WHEN ISRAELIS LEAVE. OTTIERI'S THINKING WAS THAT IF THE LAF ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS, THEY DID NOT WANT MNF WITNESSES AS THEY WENT ABOUT SETTLING THEM, PERHAPS FORCIBLY. OTTIERI THEN NOTED DIMINISHING FIMPORTANCE OF ALL MNF CONTINGENTS, NOTING THAT WHILE MNF HAD ORIGINALLY "MESMERIZED" LEBANESE BY PRESENCE, "EFFECT HAD ERODED OWING TO LARGELY PASSIVE AND <u>a</u>(ISOLATED FORM OF PRESENCE.

THE BRITISH CHARGE PALMER SPOKE NEXT NOTING THAT . 5. 40 . . "HMG WAS CONCERNED WITH SYRIAN ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THE AREAS WHICH THE ISRAELIS PLAN TO VACATE. LONDON IS WONDER NG WHETHER WE SAW ANY MILEAGE IN WARNING SYRIANS AGAINST THIS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR HENRY OPENED BY EX-PLAINING THAT HE VIEWS PROBLEM OF RESTORING LEBANESE 18 SOVEREIGNTY AS A PROCESS OF RESOLVING A SERIES OF "LOCAL" PROBLEMS. THE FRONCH VIEW DISCOUNTS PROSPECTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE PLANS. INSTEAD HE POSITED NEED FOR

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GOL TO RESOLVE LOCAL ISSUES AND SUGGESTED THE ISRAELIS HAD TO PROCEED VERY CAREFULLY LEST THESE ISSUES ERUPT INTO VIOLENCE WHICH CONFLAGRATES. HENRY NOTED THAT FIRST GOL "TEST" WILL BE THE SHOUF. HE SAID THAT WHILE GOL PLANNING WAS SKETCHY, THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE TOO LITTLE FEEL FOR WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE GROUND. HIS PRINCIPAL OBSERVATION WAS THAT THE GOL APPEARS CONFUSED AND IS GUARDED ABOUT HOW IT PLANS TO SETTLE ISSUES IN THE SHOUF AND ELSEWHERE, (GEN FARIS ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE FRENCH THAT "ALL THE SCENARIOS" ARE WRONG.) AND THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION FROM OWN SOURCES BECAUSE THEY DON'T GET AROUND THE COUNTRY TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES. THESE TRENDS ARE PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE THE SY IANS ARE UNPREDIBTABLE AND THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE TOO LITTLE INFORMATION ON WHICH TO PLAN.

22 6. AMB OTTIERI THEN RAISED TWO ISSUES WHICH HE THINKS WILL REQUIRE URGENT ATTENTION. ONE IS ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTION THAT THE LF WILL NOT DROP ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION OR DISARM OWING TO ITS DISTRUST OF THE LAF, PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE ARMY'S INTEGRITY 12 AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND CHRISTIANS. AMB FAIRBANKS 28 CASKED OTTIERI ABOUT ITALIAN IMPRESSIONS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAF AND OTTIERI AGREED WITH FAIRBANKS THAT, WHILE THE LAF WAS VASTLY IMPROVED AND MIGHT BE MILITARILY CAPABLE OF HANDLING LOCAL MILITIAS, IT COULD NOT CONFRONT THE SYRIANS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR HENRY CONCURRED NOTING THE ENORMOUS IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE SYRIAN ARMY AS THE LAF WAS REBUILDING.

OTTIERI ASKED WHAT OUR SENSE WAS OF WHEN THE IDF 7. WOULD BEGIN MOVING AND FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT IT COULD BE "WITHIN A COUPLE OF WEEKS." THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO SYRIAN OBJECTIVES IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. HENRY THINKS THE SYRIANS WILL REMAIN LONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS LOYAL TO OR SUPPORTIVE OF SARG. HE POSITED THAT RECENT SYRIAN ARMY DEPARTURE FROM TRIPOLI MIGGT BE A PRECEDENT IN THAT MILITIAS LOYAL TO SYRIA HAD REPLACED SYRIAN SOLDIERS. HE NOTED THAT WHILE SARG MAY EVACUATE ITS TROOPS IN FAVOR OF LOCAL SURROGATES, THE PR CESS WILL TAKE TIME. OTTIERI THEN TURNED TO URGENCY OF DEVELOPING A COORDINATED MNF PLAN FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

50. . -R. MCFARLANE OUTLINED TENTATIVE US THINKING ABOUT MNF PRESENCE OUTSIDE BEIRUT WHICH IS BASED ON VERY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF LAF CAPABILITIES AND GOL DETERMINATION TO SETTLE LOCAL ISSUES WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP. MCFARLANE NOTED SOUTH OF BEIRUT BY SHOWING THE FLAG. HE IS INCLINED AGAINST ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT PRESENCE AND MOVE TOWARD PERIODIC MOBILE OPERATIONS ON A REGULAR BASIS. MCFARLANE PRESERVATION COPY ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS BY SMALL MNF CADRES MIGHT BE USEFUL. MCFARLANE INQUIRED ABOUT WILLINGNESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE SIMILAR MEASURES. OTTIERI RESPONDED FIRST BY NOTING THAT ITALIAN MILITARY FAVORS MUCH LARGER MILITARY PRESENCE (INCLUDING

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S E C R E T SECTION D2 OF * JERUSALEM 02795 H TANKS) AND ACTIVE PRESENCE WITH THE LAF IN THE AREAS VACATED BY IDF. OTTIERI NOTED THAT POLITICAL LEADERS WERE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF THIS APPROACH. WHILE NOTING THAT THE 2000-MAN ITALIAN CONTINGENT IS A FINANCIAL BURDEN ON ITALY. ITALY IS INCLINED TO MAINTAIN THE FORCE AT STRENGTH IF WE CAN DEFINE AN MNF MISSION WHICH WARRANTS THE EXPENSE. FRONCH AMBASSADOR HENRY ADDED THAT IF THE MNF WAS NEEDED OUTSIDE BEIRUT TO VERIFY IDF REDEPLNYMENT AND THE REASSERTION OF GOL AUTHORITY, THAT MISSION COULD BE PERFORMED BY MNF "OBSERVERS." HE ASKED GROUP TO CONSIDER WHETHER MNF PRESENCE SHOULD BE MILITARILY EFFECTIVE OR SIMPLY SYMBOLIC. IF THE FORMER IS THE PREFERENCE, HE IMPLIED THE MNF SHOULD NOT REMAIN GARRISSONED IN BEIRUT. IF THE LATTER WAS THE CHOICE, THE MNF COULD BE GREATLY REDUCED TO A FORCE OF "OBSERVERS" 11 1 · B S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF * JERUSALEM 02795

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S E CR E T SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02795 - C NODIS . . FOR THE SHOUF AND BEYOND. -8 19. 0N MCFARLANE FOLLOWED UP THESE LAST POINTS BY RAISING TWO PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION AT HIS NEXT 10 * MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS. HE ASKED HOW THEY REGARDED THE SOVIET ROLE IN SYRIA AND ITS EFFECT ON SYRIAN 12 -SENSITIVITIES AND HOW THEY THINK THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS PERCEIVE THE MNF IN ITS CURRENT DISPOSITION. 14 MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS PLAN TO MEET WITH AMBASSADORS :10. 16 DURING NEXT VISIT TO BEIRUT. BY THAT TIME WE HOPE TO CLARIFY GOL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MNF AND SUBMIT FURTHER 18 RECOMMENDATIONS. CLUVERIUS BT #2795 -22 NNNN 24 24 33 34 34 34 **C** S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02795 1 42 44 ļ 48 . PRESERVATION COPY ſ,

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VZCZCJMI OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHDT DE RUEHJM #2796/01 217 ** CLASS: SECRET ZNY SSSSS ZZH CHRGE: PROG 8/3/83 0 0501412 AUG 83 ZFF6 16. APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM DRFTD: PDUR TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6141 12-CLEAR: RMCFARLANE INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE DISTR: CONGEN; MCFARLANE RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3704 14 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0152 Ņ RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9539 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6238 .1 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3764 DECLASSIFIED , 18 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1829 NLRR M08-099/2#57750 7103 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 20. BT S E C R E T SECTION D1 OF * JERUSALEM 02796 BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-10 22 . NODIS 24-DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY 24 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY USUN FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY 1 FROM AMB MCFARLANE 30 -E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US 32 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: AUGUST 3 MEETING WITH ARENS 36 REF: JERUSALEM 2794 38. 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 40 2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND LEWIS, DATT AND COR DUR MET 3 AUGUST WITH DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE 42 ARENS, CHIEF OF STAFF GEN LEVY, AMB LUBRANI, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE M/G BARAK FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS 44. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH AT MOD IN TEL AVIV. DESCRIPTION OF GOL POSITIONS AND THINKING BEHIND THEM. THE THEN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO BOLSTERING 46 PROSPECTS FOR GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION OF ITS AUTHORITY BEYOND BEIRUT. MCFARLANE STRESSED GOL'S NEED 48. FOR TIMELINES OR APPROXIMATE BOUNDS FOR ISRAELI WITH-DRAWAL TO GIVE APPEARANCE THAT FIRST PHASE WAS THE 50 % 围 BEGINN NG OF A CONTINUOUS PROCESS. ARENS RESPONDED WITH - ARGUMENTS ABOUT IMPORTANCE GOI ATTACHES TO EXCHANGE OF 52 Ĩ. RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS AND DIRECT, FREQUENT EXCHANGES WITH THE GOL AS CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS. 54. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED LEBANESE POSITIONS ON EACH OF THESE 56.(POINTS AND STRESSED THE GROWING LEBANESE MISTRUST OF PRESERVATION COPY ARENS AND GEN LEVY REFUTED LEBANESE GCI INTENTIONS. ALLEGATIONS OF ULTERIOR ISRAELI MOTIVES AND AGAIN STRESSED 58 URGENT NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS OR NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE 50 MISTRUST. END SUMMARY. 62

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3 13. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH PRESENTATION SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN MORNING MEETING (SEE REFTEL), RECOUNTING GOL CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT AS A CONTINUCUS PROCESS WITHIN DEFINED TIME LIMITS AND FIRM GOL RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR EXCHANGE OF -INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND FORMAL DEMANDS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE SUMMARIZED BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT IN STRATEGY BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE GOI ALTHOUGH BOTH SHARED THE SAME OBJECTIVES OF OBTAINING ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND STRENGTHEN-ING THE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OF THE GOL.

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4. ARENS BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY NOTING THAT ISRAEL SEES ...(PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE OVERCOME BEFORE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON GOL REQUESTS. FOREMOST IS THE NEED FOR A PROMPT EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. ARENS EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER LEBANESE MOTIVES IN QUOTE ABORTING UNQUOTE RATIFICATION PROCESS AND PERSISTENT REFUSAL TO COORDINATE ON IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM SHOUF. ARENS WONDERED RHETORICALLY IF THIS MEANT THAT GOL THOUGHT IT COULD PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT TO REDEPLOY; IF THIS OBSTINACY WAS A FORM OF PRESSURE. ARENS STRESSED NEED FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SO THAT GOI CAN UNDERSTAND AND ATTEMPT TO SATISFY LEBANESE CONCERNS. HE NOTED POINTEDLY THAT GOL SPOKESMEN ARE PROMOTING A SELF FULFILLING PROPHECY ABOUT THE IMMINENCE OF PARTITION FOLLOWING IDF REDEPLOYMENT, BECAUSE ISRAEL QUOTE HAS NO PONE TO TALK TO UNQUOTE ABOUT NEXT STEPS.

5. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT LEBANESE RELUCTANCE TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION STEMMED FROM THE FRAGILITY OF THE GOL AND A PERCEPTION THAT THE GEMAYEL 36-GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO GAIN STRENGTH AND PUT PRESSURE ON SYRIA WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ARAB WORLD. LEBANESE INSIST THAT EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS CANNOT THEREFORE TAKE PLACE UNTIL COMMITMENT EXISTS FOR COMPLETE WITH-CORAWAL ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE INCLUDED IN THE 4 AGREEMENT AND REQUIREMENT EXPRESSED IN SIDE LETTER. - GOL OPPOSES PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOI BECAUSE THE CONTEXT OF IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHOUF IS TOO NARROW. MORECVER, ISRAELI DECI ION IS SEEN AS UNILATERAL. ARENS REJOINED THAT ISRAEL HAS 46

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CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO NEGCTIATE AND COORDINATE THIS REDEPL YMENT.

MCFARLANE THEN DESCRIBED THE SOURCES OF LEBANESE 6. ANXIETY INCLUDING: (1) THE PROBLEMS IN THE SHUF, E.G., LEBANESE ALLEGATIONS THAT IDF IS ACQUIESCING IN ARMS TRANSFERS FROM SYRIA TO DRUZE MILITIA AS REPORTED BY BOTH LEBANESE AND MNF SOURCES; (2) COMPLAINTS THAT ISRAEL IS DEALING WITH CONFESSIONAL FACTIONS; AND, (3) MNF AND LEBANESE ACCOUNTS OF ISRAELI STOCKS AND SUPPLIES MOVING FROM ISRAEL. TAKEN TOGETHER, HE SAID, THESE NORT IMPRESSIONS, HOWEVER ERRONEOUS OR UNFOUNDED, CREATE GRAVE CONCERNS. HE STRESSED NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BASED ON PROCESS AND CLEAR PROGRESS TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. ARENS PROPOSED THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON RATIFY AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BASED ON SYRIAN OBSTINACY AND QUOTE URGENT CONSULTATION UNQUOTE CLAUSE CONTAINED IN ISRAELI-U.S. SIDE LETTER. MCFARLANE REITERATED LEBANESE INSISTENCE ON MORE CONCRETE ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITH-DRAWAL AS CONDITION FOR THIS DIALOGUE STRESSING HIS BELIEF THAT, GIVEN FRAGILITY OF LEBANESE CONSENSUS, THE CONDITION WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. ARENS NOTED THAT LEBANESE SEEMED PREOCCUPIED WITH DATES (QUOTE WINDOW DRESSING UNQUOTE) WHEN THEY HAVE MORE IMPORTANT EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS, QUOTE THE WILL OF THE ISRAELI BODY POLITIC UNQUOTE WHICH IS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL. FAIRBANKS REFERRED TO GOL CONCERNS ABOUT QUOTE FROZEN LINES UNQUOTE ON THE GROUND AND THE APPEARANCES OF PARTITION. HE SAID THE GOL BADLY NEEDS QUOTE WINDOW DRESSING UNQUOTE TO HOLD THE CONSENSUS TOGETHER.

7. ARENS RETURNED TO THE NEED FOR A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH LEBANESE AND AN EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS. FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT GOI SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO SEE PROBLEM FROM LEBANON'S PERSPECTIVE. LEBANON SEES ITSELF AS HAVING MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN THE AGREEMENT AND THAT ABSENT CERTAIN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD NOT GET WHAT IT BARGAINED FOR. HE NOTED THAT THE SIDE LETTER TO WHICH ARENS REFERRED WAS NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THE AGREEMENT ENVISIONED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN TWELVE WEEKS.

8. ARENS CLOSED MEETING STRESSING URGENCY OF CONSULTATION REFERRING TO ISRAELI DRUZE ACCOUNTS THAT LEBANESE DRUZE ARE QUOTE ARMING THEMSELVES TO THE TEETH UNQUOTE AND THAT THEY ARE PRESENTLY DISPOSED TO FIGHT THE CHRISTIANS. GEN. LEVY DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT ISRAEL IS EITHER ACQUIESCING IN THE ARMING OF THE DRUZE (ABSURD) OR MOVING PREPOSITIONED STOCKS TO THE SHUF (THEY ARE MOVING SOUTH).

9. COMMENT: IT BECAME CLEAR DURING SESSION WITH ARENS THAT GOI TIMING FOR REDEPLOYMENT (SIX-EIGHT WEEKS) IS PREDICATED SIMPLY ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. (IN A SIDE CONVERSATION, GEN LEVY NOTED THAT IDF COULD REDEPL Y TO AWWALL FROM POSITIONS IN SHOUF QUOTE WITHIN

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02796

B S E C R E T SECTION OZ OF DZ JERUSALEM 02796 TEN HO RS UNQUOTE. ASSUMING 15 OCTOBER DEADLINE, THIS GIVES US A BETTER FEEL FOR HOW LONG WE MAY HAVE BEFORE THE IDF WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN MOVING BACK. CLUVERIUS BT #2796 NNNN 08 4 S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02796 H 1. (ŧ ŧ 1 PRESERVATION COPY ſ

SECRET/NODIS BETRUT 8531 OUT VZCZCBLI * OO RUEHDM RUEHC RUEHJI RUEHTV RUEADWW DE RUEHBL #8531 217 ** CLASS: SECRET ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK 0 050304Z AUG 83 ZFF4 CHRGE: PROG 8/4/83 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0758 TD: RFAIRBANKS INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2048 CLEAR: NONE RUEEJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0543 DISTR: MCFARLANE -5 AMB RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE Ø712 RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE BT SECRET BEIRUT Ø8531 NODIS DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY FROM MCFARLANE E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE REF: (A) DAMASCUS 5907; (B) JERUSALEM 2791 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL B, OUR PRIMARY PURPOSE IN VISITING DAMASCUS IS TO HAVE SERIOUS, DETAILED AND HOPEFULLY PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. THUS. WHILE WE HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT SCHEDULED AUGUST 7. PER REFTEL (A), WOULD STRONGLY PREFER RELATIVELY SHORT AND TIME-LIMITED ENCOUNTER WITH FONMIN KHADDAM. THEREFORE, REQUEST YOU ALTER SCHEDULE (USING EXCUSE OF MEETINGS SCHEDULED HERE AS NECESSARY) TO LIMIT DIRECT ENCOUNTER WITH KHADDAM TO ONE MEETING. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, WORKING LUNCHEON IS THE BEST FORUM, WILL PLAN TO ARRIVE IN TIME FOR THAT. WOULD PREFER A MEETING LATE AFTERNOON AUGUST 6 INSTEAD. 3. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE FINAL PLANS MOST FEASIBLE FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE. DILLON BT #8531 NNNN SECRET/NODIS BEIRUT 8531 OUT

NLS F98-008/, #83 SCIS_NARA, DATE HIGHOL

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(05) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

K 1VZCZCBL0420 OO RUEHBL DE RUEHDM #5907 2160930 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 040928Z AUG 83 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0654 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5627 INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3086 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6452 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6452 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8510 RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8258 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0379 BT

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 05907

NODIS

BEIRUT/JERUSALEM FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT TO DAMASCUS

REF: JERUSALEM 2791

1. SEGRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. PER REFTEL, AMBASSADOR AND A/DCM MET WITH DR. SAMI GLAIEL, SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AT 0900 HOURS LOCAL, AUGUST 4 TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION VISIT TO DAMASCUS. WE REQUESTED AUGUST 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AS EARLY AS CONVENIENT AND SUGGESTED MEETING AND/OR WORKING LUNCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM. WE NOTED MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS REQUIREMENT TO DEPART FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 7. GLAIEL SAID HE WOULD CONSULT IMMEDIATELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND GET BACK TO US WITH SYRIAN RESPONSE.

3. GLAIEL CONTACTED US AT 1100 HOURS AUGUST 4 AND SAID KHADDAM WELCOMES MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS AUGUST 6-7 VISIT TO DAMASCUS. PRESIDENT ASSAD NOT REPEAT NOT AVAILABLE FOR MEETING UNTIL SUNDAY, AUGUST 7. KHADDAM PLEASED TO MEET WITH MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS ON MORNING AUGUST 6 AND ACCEPTED INVITATION FOR WORKING LUNCH THAT DAY AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.

4. WE ASSUME AUGUST 7 MEETING WITH ASSAD WILL BE SCHEDULED FOR MID/LATE MORNING, BUT AS IS THEIR USUAL PRACTICE, SYRIANS WILL NOT CONFIRM SPECIFIC TIME UNTIL VERY LAST MINUTE.

5. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU ACCEPT SCHEDULE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. SARG IS AWAITING CONFIRMATION, SO PLEASE ADVISE

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6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI BT #5907

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DAMASCUS 005907

SECRET PROG 8/3/83 AMB MGFARLANE RFAIRBANKS RMCFARLANE CONGEN; MCFARLANE-4

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, NIACT IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY JIDDA, NIACT IMMEDIATE INFO, AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.:12356 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: TENTATIVE TRAVEL PLANS

REF: DAMASCUS 5888

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. PRESENTLY PLANNED FOLLOWING ONWARD TRAVEL FROM ISRAEL: DEPART ISRAEL FOR BEIRUT APPROXIMATELY 1330 LOCAL 4 AUG.; DEPART BEIRUT FOR DAMASCUS EARLY A.M. SATURDAY, 6 AUG. (TIME CONTINGENT UPON MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS); DEPART DAMASCUS FOR SAUDI ARABIA SUNDAY, 7 AUG. (TIME AND DESTINA-TION IN COUNTRY CONTINGENT UPON MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS AND LOCATION OF KING FAHD).

3. FOR DAMASCUS: PLEASE SEEK MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AS EARLY AS CONVENIENT ON SATURDAY, 6 AUG. BRIEF SEPARATE MEETING OR MEAL WITH FONMIN KHADDAM PER YOUR ADVICE. PLEASE ARRANGE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR THE FOLLOWING TRAVELING PARTY:

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	NLRF	m08-099/2#57755
BY		NARA DATE 5-3-10

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BY LOT	NARA, DATE 11/5

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-ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, X156488, WASHDC, 8/27/81, D/POB: WASHDC USA, JUL 12, 1937 -JONDA R. MCFARLANE, X190662, WASHDC, 7/27/83, D/POB: MARYLAND USA, DEC 8, 1938 -RICHARD M. FAIRBANKS, X170061, WASHDC, 5/15/82, D/POB: INDIANA USA, FEB 10, 1941 -PATSY B. MEYER, X165534, WASHDC, 2/11/82, D/POB: GEORGIA USA, OCT 26, 1939 -CHRISTOPHER ROSS, X178968, WASHDC, 9/9/82, D/POB: ECUADOR, MAR 3, 1943 -JAMES M. CROWE (SY), X190641, WASHDC, 7/26/83, D/POB: TENNESSEE USA, AUG 27, 1949 -DAVID HAAS (SY), X190642, WASHDC, 7/26/83, D/POB: NEW YORK USA, DEC 16, 1951 -WILMA G. HALL, X190667, WASHDC, 7/27/83, D/POB: NORTH CAROLINA USA, JUL 3, 1940 -PHILIP DUR, X190663, WASHDC, 7/27/83, D/POB: MARYLAND USA, 22 JUN 1944 -HOWARD TEICHER, X190660, WASHDC, 7/27/83 D/POB: MASSACHUSETTS USA, 9 MAY 1954

4. RE REFTEL PARA (4), ALL MEMBERS OF PARTY HAVE SYRIAN VISAS EXCEPT REPEAT EXCEPT ROSS. ENTIRE PARTY WILL ARRIVE AND DEPART VIA USG AIRCRAFT.

5. REFTEL PARA (8) FOR SECURITY AGENTS CROWE AND HAAS, WEAPONS INFORMATION FOLLOWS: CROWE-WEAPON: BARETTA 92SB, 9MM, SN B75794Z; HAAS-WEAPON: COLT 45 GOVT. MODEL, SN 70G97460.

6. FOR JIDDA: PLEASE SEEK MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR ON SUNDAY P.M., 7 AUGUST, AND SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE KING. PLAN TO OVERNIGHT IN APPROPRIATE SAUDI CITY AND RETURN TO BEIRUT MONDAY A.M., 8 AUGUST. PLEASE ARRANGE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR EVENING. PARTY WILL BE SAME AS DAMASCUS AND ALL HAVE SAUDI VISAS WITH EXCEPTION OF ROSS.

7. FOR DAMASCUS AND JIDDA: WILL NEED THREE CARS AND ONE BAGGAGE VAN ON ARRIVAL AND ASSISTANCE IN BAGGAGE HANDLING. ALSO PASS TO RSO: COORDINATE WITH LOCAL SERVICE. CLUVERIUS##

Animelie at OUT -BETRUT 8532 SECRET/NODIS A take a disease 5-124 的机学生 VZCZCBLI * OO RUEHAM RUEHJI RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHDM RUEHTV RUEHJM DE RUEHBL #8532 217 ** CLASS: SECRET ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK 17 050310Z AUG 83 ZFF4 CHRGE: PROG 8/4/83 0 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT APPRV: AMBMCFARLANE TO RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE Ø569 DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE Ø544 CLEAR: RMCFARLANE INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2049 DISTR: MCFARLANE (5) RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE AMB RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0759 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0713 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0691 BT SECRET BEIRUT Ø8532 NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY AND CHARGE DJEREJIAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY 16 FROM MCFARLANE E.O.: 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT SCHEDULE REF: JIDDA 6283 1. SECRET>- ENTIRE TEXT. 2. CONCUR WITH YOUR SUGGESTION OF MEETING WITH KING FAHD MONDAY. SUNDAY WILL BE FULL INDEED. WOULD PREFER MEETING WITH BANDAR WELL PRIOR TO MEETING WITH KING. WOULD BE PREPARED TO OVERNIGHT MONDAY EVENING IF NECESSARY. 3. FOR AMMAN: AM CONSIDERING STOP IN AMMAN AFTER JIDDA BOTH TO BRIEF KING HUSSEIN ON THE STATUS OF MY MISSION CONCERNING LEBANON AND TO COUNSEL WITH HIM ON THE QUESTIONS OF THE FUTURE OF THE PLO AND THE PROSPECTS FOR THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS GENERALLY. AS YOU CAN SEE FROM FOREGOING, TENTATIVE ARRIVAL IN AMMAN WOULD BE LATE MONDAY EVENING OR TUESDAY MORNING. WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS ON PRACTICALITY OF STOP SOONEST. DILLON BT #8532 DECLASSIFIED Department of State Guidelines, July,21, 1997 NNNN By alb NARA, Date 12/1/99 OUT SECRET/NODIS BEIRUT 8532

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(09) ACTION ROSS INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

HTGVZCZCBL0433 OO RUEHBL DE RUEHJI #6283 2161057 ZNY SSSSS ZZH O 041056Z AUG 83 FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0174 INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3159 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1945 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6432 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6432 RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3502 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6191 RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE BT

SECRET JIDDA 06283

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FOR MCFARLANE

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION:VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

REF:A) JERUSALEM 2791 B) DAMASCUS 5907

1. (SENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN LIGHT DAMASCUS REFTEL, I PROPOSE WE SEEK MEETING WITH FAHD FOR MONDAY MORNING INSTEAD OF SUNDAY. SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT YOU WILL LEAVE DAMASCUS PRIOR TO LATE SUNDAY AFTERNOON. FLIGHT TO TAIF WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. YOU WILL HAVE HAD LONG SESSION WITH ASSAD AND BE READY FOR REST HERE ON ARRIVAL, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY MEETING WITH BANDAR. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF LETTING BANDAR BRIEF FAHD BEFORE YOUR MEETING FOLLOWING DAY.

3. SINCE FAHD ROUTINELY MEETS WITH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON MONDAY EVENINGS WE COULD EXPECT SESSION WITH HIM ABOUT NOON ON MONDAY GETTING YOU BACK TO BEIRUT AROUND 1800 HOURS.

4. FOREGOING FOR YOUR REACTION BEFORE I APPROACH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WHO KNOWS ONLY THAT YOU PLAN ARRIVE TAIF LATE SUNDAY. FAHD MAY PREFER LATE NIGHT MEETING

SUNDAY. MURPHY BT #6283


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DECLASSIFIED Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 By NARA, Data 12/1/91 LOC: DISK Ø8 851 Ø4 AUG 83 1121 CN: Ø5845 CHRG: PROG DIST: ROSS

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IN ADDITION SAVE ARE NOW IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS TO DELIVER MIG RIFLES AND AMMUNITION AND PROTECTIVE VESTS ON A HIGHLY ACCELERATED SCHEDULE. WE WILL ALSO DISPATCH TOMORROW THE AIR FORCE SURVEY TEAM YOU REQUESTED.

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BOTE THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON CAN BE VERY PROUD OF THE EXTREMELT POSITIVE RESULTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO EQUIP AND TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. VERY SOON, THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WILL EXTEND THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY EXTERNAL FORCES. MANY MORE OF LEBANON'S PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT FROM YOUR STRONG AND WIST LEADERSHIP, AND THEY WILL PRIDE THEMSELVES IN THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH UNITES ALL OF LEBANON'S COMMUNITIES IN THE GREATER CAUSE OF LEBANON.

YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF MY SUPPORT AND BEST WISHES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, AS WE STRIVE TOGETHER TO GIVE ALL OF LEBANON BACK TO ITS PEOPLE.

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SINCERELY. RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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JIDDA FOR AMB. MURPHY DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK		<u>4</u> 5
FROM MCFARLANE		
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BANDAR TRIP		
1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)		
2. NEITHER WADI' HADDAD NOR I HAS RECEIVED ANY WORD I BANDAR ON THE TIMING AND FORMAT OF BANDAR'S PROJECTED VISIT TO BEIRUT. HADDAD HAS BEEN MAKING FREQUENT ATTEMPTS TO TELEPHONE BANDAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THIS HA ME PERSONALLY VERY CONCERNED, AND I REQUEST THAT YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH BANDAR IMMEDIATELY TO DISCOVER HIS INTENTIONS.		
3. IN DOING SO, YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT I WILL BE OUT OF BEIRUT BY EARLY SATURDAY AFTERNOON, AND HE COULD THEREFORE COME UP HERE WITHOUT RISKING ANOTHER "TRIPARTITE CONSULATION" STORY EITHER LATE SATURDAY OR SUNDAY.		
4. I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE A RESPONSE FROM BANDAR BY THIS EVENING. DILLON##		
DECLASSIFIED NLS $\overline{198-008/1}$ = $4/19/06$ $\overline{198}$ 3^{10}	72) 32 ⁵²⁾	

VZCZCBLI OO RUEHFO RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM RUEBJI RUEHRH RUEKJCS RUFRQJQ DE RUEHBL #8572 217 ** ZNR UUUUU ZZH 30 051416Z AUG 83 PM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT TO RUEHFO / USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2069 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0572 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0530 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0765 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0694 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0547 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0490 RUEKJCS / SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE RUFRGJQ / COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE BT

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SECSTATE FOR NEA/ARD; COMSILTEFLT FOR PAO

MCFARLANE STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRESS STATEMENT BY U.S., ENVOY ROBERT MCFARLANE AFTER HIS ONE AND A QUARTER HOUR MEETING WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, FRIDAY MORNING, AUGUST 5:

(BEGIN TEXT) IT'S WITH CONSIDERABLE HUMILITY BUT ECUALLY DETERMINATION THAT I'VE ARRIVED IN BEIRUT TO UNDERTAKE & MISSION THAT I'M TO CARRY ON THE EFFORTS OF MI COUNTRY TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF PEACE IN LEBANON AND THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. I'M HERE (INAUDIBLE) AN EXPRESSION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION TO LEND FRE FULL WEIGHT OF UNITED STATES RESOURCES. DIPLOMACY AND ALL OTHER EFFORTS WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF STABILITY AND PEACE IN LEBANON. I'VE BEEN HERE A SHORT TIME. IN THAT SHORT TIME, TWO OR THREE THINGS ARE VERY APPARENT. FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS THE EXTRA-ORDINARY RESILIENCY AND DETERMINATION OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE TO RESTORE THEIR COUNTRY, TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF MAKING A BETTER WAY OF LIFE FOR THEIR PEOPLE. IN ADDITION TO THE STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE. IT IS VERY APPARENT THAT THE LEADERSHIP PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS A LEADERSHIP CONCERNED FOR ALL OF LEBANON; A LEADERSHIP DETERMINED TO PROVIDE A BETTER WAY OF LIFE FOR THEIR PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY -- FOR ALL OF THE PEOPLE. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT FOR THIS PROCESS TO GET STARTED AND SUCCEED. WE MUST ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN FORCES THIS IS A PRO FORMA PRIORITY AND IT IS NOW IN LEBANON. A TASE TO WHICH I WILL BE DEVOTING MY EFFORTS WITH THE DELEGATION, IN COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMATEL, THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS HERE IN LEBANON. T MUST SAY THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCEEDING ARE INFLUENCED BY THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS GOVERNMENT, I'M VERY ENCOURAGED. TO

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED CHRGE: PROG 8/5/83 APPRV: USIS:JMREID DRFTD: USIS:JMREID:DLP CLEAR: NONE DISTR: USIS AMB DCM POL ROSS-4 P-M CHRON

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THE EXTENT THAT THERE WILL BE A PRODUCT OF THE DETERMINATION OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO SUCCEED, AND YES, TO TAKE RISKS, I'M VERY ENCOURAGED. I DON'T MINIMIZE THE JOB. THERE HAS TO BE A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF OTHERS, OTHER COUNTRIES -- ISRAEL, SYRIA, THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY ALSO TO TAKE RISKS (INAUDIBLE) AND IN THE UNITED STATES. BEARING THIS IN MIND, I ANTICIPATE GOING TO STRIA TOMORROW, TO MAKE VISITS TO OTHER CAPITALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: TO SEEK THE ADVICE AND COUNCIL OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND TO PRESS ON WITH DETERMINATION WITH THE ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUCCEED. REID. BT

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STREET, MARKET BEIRUT 8575 SEGRET/NODIS ACBLI * RUEHDM RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHJI RUEHTV 3 RUEHBL #8575 217 ** CLASS: SECOND ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK CHRGE: PROG< 8/5/83 0 \$51553Z AUG 83 ZFF4 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT APPRV: RMCFARLANE TO RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0768 TD: RFAIRBANKS INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2073 CLEAR: RMCFARLANE RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE DISTR: AMB RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0551 MCFARLANE-5 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0719 BT SECRET BEIRUT 08575 NODIS FOR AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK. EYES ONLY FROM MCFARLANE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE REF: DAMASCUS 5946 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. SCHEDULE REFTEL SOUNDS FINE. WILL PLAN TO ARRIVE DAMASCUS AIRPORT APPROXIMATELY 1700 HOURS LOCAL. WILL CONFIRM PRECISE PLANS THROUGH DAO CHANNEL. 3. RE MEETING WITH ASSAD. I WOULD PREFER THE OPPORT-UNITY FOR BOTH A SMALL GROUP MEETING WITH MY TEAM PLUS HIS ADVISORS AND A ONE-ON-ONE WITH ASSAD PLUS INTERPRETER. I WOULD LIKE TWO HOURS FOR PRIVATE MEETING; IF IT IS EITHER/OR THE PRIVATE MEETING IS MOST CRUCIAL. DILLON

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FOR MCFARLANE FROM PAGANELLI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE

REF: BEIRUT 8531

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 1.

2. REFTEL RECEIVED AT OPENING OF BUSINESS AUGUST 5.

3. IN LINE WITH YOUR WISHES, WE CONTACTED KHADDAM'S OFFICE DIRECTOR AT 0900 AUGUST 5 TO REQUEST A LATE AFTERNOON MEETING FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 6 AND TO REITERATE OUR REQUEST THAT YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 7 BE SCHEDULED DURING THE MORNING.

4. KHADDAM'S OFFICE DIRECTOR WAS ABLE TO REACH THE MINISTER IMMEDIATELY, AND WE HAVE A CONFIRMED APPOINTMENT FOR YOU FOR 1800 LOCAL SATURDAY, AUGUST 6 AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (WE HAVE CANCELLED THE WORKING LUNCH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 6.)

5. IF YOU WISH TO SPEAK WITH ASSAD ONE-ON-ONE (PLUS ASSAD'S INTERPRETER), I WILL MAKE THE REQUEST. IF, HOWEVER, YOU INTEND TO INCLUDE OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR TEAM IN THE ASSAD MEETING, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INCLUDE KHADDAM. IN FACT, DURING MY ALMOST TWO YEARS HERE. ASSAD INCLUDED KHADDAM IN EVERY MEETING WITH YOUR PREDECESSOR.

6. AS YOU KNOW, ASSAD MAKES ALL FINAL DECISIONS, BUT KHADDAM IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT AND COUNSELOR. THE TWO MEN DIFFER IN THEIR PRESENTATIONAL STYLE, BUT INVARIABLY COME OUT IN THE SAME PLACE WHEN DISCUSSING SYRIAN POLICY. I BELIEVE YOU ARE WISE TO ACCEPT KHADDAM'S SUGGESTION THAT YOU MEET FIRST WITH HIM. SINCE ANY SUSPICION HE MIGHT DEVELOP THAT YOU WISH TO END-RUN HIM OR OTHERWISE DIMINISH HIS ROLE COULD, IN MY VIEW, UNDERCUT YOUR

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SECRET/NODIS BETRUT 8576 Statistica in VZCZCBLI * OO RUEHAM RUEHC RUEHJI RUEHDM RUEHTV RUEHJM DE RUEHBL #8576 217 ** CLASS: SECRET ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK 0 Ø51555Z AUG 83 ZFF4 CHRGE: PROG: 8/5/83 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE TO RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0575 DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2074 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS; RMCFA RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE Ø552 NE RUEEDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0769 DISTR: AMB RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE Ø720 MCFARLANE-5 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0697 BT SECRET BEIRUT Ø8576 NODIS FOR CHARGE DJEREJIAN DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK. EYES ONLY FROM MCFARLANE E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, JO, IS, SY, SA, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: JORDAN VISIT REF: AMMAN 6872 1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. 2. WILL CONFIRM ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE TIMES AMMAN AS SOON AS OUR SCHEDULE IN SAUDI ARABIA BECOMES CLEAR. SCHEDULE REFTEL FOR MEETINGS WITH HIS MAJESTY SOUNDS FINE. DILLON BT #8576 NNNN SECRE, T/NODIS BEIRUT 8576 Bollow on cables re schedule Amman 6899 (1 any 23) Amman 6899 (1 aur 83) Amman 6899 (8 aur 83 Amman 6936 AMMAN DECLASSIFIED Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 --- NARA, Date 12/1/99 By_ b

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DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY USUN FOR AME. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM AMB. MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, JS SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH DEFMIN ARENS, 4 AUGUST 1983

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND LEWIS, 2. DATT AND CDR DUR MET WITH DEFMIN ARENS. GEN LEVY, AMB. LUBRANI AND GEN BARAK AT MOD FOR ONE HOUR JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE ISRAEL. MEETING WAS TO SUMMARIZE DISCUSSIONS TO DATE AND OUTLINE TENTATIVE NEXT STEPS. ARENS LISTENED TO DRAFT FORMULA FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. WHILE AGREEING TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR SUCH A FORMULA, ARENS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THIS WOULD RESOLVE IMPASSE WHICH HE SEES AS A RESULT OF LEBANESE REFUSAL TO NEGOTIAT WITH ISRAEL. MCFARLANE AGAIN STRESSED GEMAYEL'S NEED TO REFUTE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION, PROTECT THE FRAGILE CONSENSUS IN LEBANON, AND GARNER SUPPORT FROM THE MODERATE ARABS. END SUMMARY.

3. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH A DESCRIPTION OF LATEST DISCUSSIONS WITH FORMIN SHAMIR AND PM BEGIN. CHARACTERIZ ING THE VISITS AS USEFUL, MCFARLANE POINTED TO COMMON AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN LEBANON, FOR A STRATEGY TO INDUCE SYRIA TO WITHDRAW AND FOR THE NEED TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE TO STRENGTHEN THE GOL AND ENHANCE ITS PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL. SECONDLY, MCFARLANE NOTED URGENT NEED TO BRING ALL THE PRESSURE TO BEAR THAT WE CAN TO GET SYRIA OUT. THE PROBLEM AS WE SEE IT, HE SAID, WAS TO CONSIDER HOW THOSE

CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: PROG:8/5/83 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE DRFTD: PDUR CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS;HTEICHER; CROSS DISTR: AMB;MCFARLANE-4

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DECLASSIFIED NLRR M08-D49/2 #5776D BY LW NARA DATE 5-3-1) TWO IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES ARE EFFECTED BY ISRAEL'S DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT.

4. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE UNFORTUNATE REALITY IN LEBANO IS THAT REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE SYRIAN AND OTHERS OPPOSED TO THE GEMAYEL REGIME AS ISRAELI INTENTION TO PARTITION THE COUNTRY. GEMAYEL'S WORST FEAR IS THAT THESE PERCEPTIONS WILL ERODE THE CONFIDENCE OF THOSE WHO CURRENTLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL NEEDS A FORMULA TO PORTRAY REDEPLOYMENT AS A STEP WHICH LEADS TO A PROCESS OF CONTINUOUS WITHDRAWAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT PHASED WITHDRWAL PROCESS DID NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE A PRECISE TIMETABLE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A FORMULA TO REMOVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AWWALI LINE HAS PERMANENCY. OUR JOINT TASK THEN IS TO FORMULATE A STATEMENT WHICH WILL DRAW ON ISRAEL'S STATED DESIRE TO LEAVE LEBANON CONDITIONED ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN MAINTAINING SECURITY. SUCH A FORMULA SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY.

5. MCFARLANE THEN INDICATED THAT WE ARE WORKING ON SUCE A FORMULA AS A FIRST CUT AND IT WILL NEED MODIFICATION. IT IS AN ABSTRACT PROPOSITION THAT, IN EFFECT, POSITS BOTH THE POSSIBILITY AND THE FEASIBILITY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A CERTAIN TIMEFRAME.

6. ARENS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND SUCH A FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ISRAELI OBJECTIVES, BUT HE SAID HE WAS NOT CONVINCED HIMSELF THAT THE PROBLEM IS AS MCFARLANE DESCRIBED IT. HE SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUCH A WIDELY-HELD FEAR OF PARTITION. FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT THE AWWALI LINE HAS TAKEN ON A CHARACTER OF ITS OWN AS THE DE FACTO LINE OF PARTITION. ARENS RESPONDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ALAY THESE FEARS WOULD BE TO COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT AND MAKE A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE DRUZE. HE ALSO REITERATED GOI READINESS TO HAVE THE GOL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY SOUTH OF THE AWWALL. GEN LEVY UNDERLINED THE POINTS MADE AT AN EARLIER MEETING BY RECOUNTING HIS EARLIER FRUITLESS EFFORTS AT ESTABLISHING A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH HIS LEBANESE COUNTERPART. HE ALLEGED AGAIN THAT THE LEBANESE HAD CREATED THE

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ENVIRONMENT DEPICTING THE REDEPLOYMENT AS PARTITION. IN GENERAL, HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE CONTINUING REFUSAL OF THE GOL TO COORDINATE ON PROBLEMS AND THEN TO CRITICIZE ISRAEL FOR UNILATERAL ACTION. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT THE PROBLEMS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY POLITICAL AND NOT MILITARY. THE LEBANESE FEEL THEY CANNOT COORDINATE BECAUSE THAT LEADS TO A POLITICAL CHARACTERIZATION WHICH HAS THEM NEGOTIATING PARTITION WITH ISRAEL. MCFARLANE SAID THAT WE MUST FIND A WAY TO DEPICT COORDINATION AS THE BEGINNIN OF A PROCESS AND NOT AS AN ENDING. ARENS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOESN'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT LEBANON MEANS. HE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL HAS TRIED TO MEET LEBANESE CONCERNS BUT THEY WILL NOT COMMUNICATE WHEN NECESSARY.

7. MCFARLANE CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION ON LEBANON BY NOTING AGAIN THAT SOME OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING HAS TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A VERY FRAGILE GOVERNMENT WHOSE INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE IMPERFECT, WHICH IS NOT IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE, AND IS VULNERABLE TO SYRIAN AND OTHER PROPAGANDA. MCFARLANE INDICATED HIS INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A FORTHCOMING TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH LEBANESE AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO CONSIDER THE FORMULA OUTLINED EARLIER. HE THEN SAID THE MISSION WOULD PROCEED TO SYRIA TO ENSURE THAT THE SARG UNDERSTANDS EXACTLY WHERE WE STAND AND TO REINFORCE SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A SOVEREIG LEBANON, FREE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WHICH IT PERCEIVES TO BE IN ITS BEST INTERESTS. DILLON BT

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34	WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK	•	
	FROM AMBASSADOR MURPHY		
	E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA SUBJ: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BANDAR TRIP		
	REF: BEIRUT 8573		
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	2. HAVE LOCATED BANDAR ON BAHRAIN FROM WHERE HE EXPECT RETURN JIDDA LATE TONIGHT. HIS TELEPHONE ON BAHRAIN IS HE WILL BE AT JIDDA RESIDENCE (TELEPHONE ON HIS RETURN HERE.	S	(
	3. HE ADVISED HE HAS NOT YET GOTTEN FAHD'S CLEARANCE ON IDEA OF HIS TRAVELING TO BEIRUT TO MEET WITH HADDAD. I ASKED HIM TO TRY TO SECURE DECISION FROM KING TONIGHT AND ADVISE ME ASAP. I EMPHASIZED YOU WOULD BE OUT OF BEIRUT AS OF EARLY SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND THERE NO PROSPECT OF STIMULATING RUMOR OF TRIPARTITE CONSULTA- TIONS. WILL RELAY ASAP HIS ANSWER BUT THIS MAY NOT BE UNTIL SATURDAY MRONING. MURPHY BT		
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TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

US Commitment to Lebanon

-- Over the last several months we have observed various efforts by outside powers to undermine the legitimacy of the Government of Lebanon and prevent it from extending its authority throughout Lebanese territory.

-- President Reagan is determined to take all possible measures to strengthen the Government of Lebanon and insure its ability to assert control throughout Lebanese territory.

-- For example, you may have heard an announcement regarding the provision of additional tanks to the Lebanese Army.

-- We are examining other ways to strengthen the military capabilities of the army and are dispatching special forces training teams to accelerate the development of Lebanese strike forces capabilities.

-- Such forces will prove extremely useful in the event that Lebanese factions prove unwilling to cooperate with the exchange of central government control. Leaders of these communities should have no doubt of the will of the Lebanese Government to persevere in bringing its control to the entire state, or of the will of the US to support this effort.

In this regard, we are improving US capabilities in a manner, which will facilitate the Lebanese Government's awareness of the source of certain military actions.

-- As a military man, I am sure you are aware of special radars that provide the capability to pinpoint the source of incoming fire. Because of the attacks on the Beirut area, we are bringing such radars to the US component of the MNF to enable us to determine from where the fire is coming. Obviously such knowledge will help combat anti-government forces.

-- Our commitment to strengthen the government goes well beyond military means. There is no question that increased economic resources must be made available to improve the lot of the people in rural areas.

-- As you know from our own experience in Syria, the US can provide many types of economic development and assistance. Our Congress has recently agreed to provide a special fund of \$ million for economic development in Lebanon.

-- Tragically the destruction of our Embassy left several key members of our economic staff dead or wounded. But we have already replaced these people and strengthened our mission and are now looking at other ways for America to help galvanize the Lebanese economy and thereby strengthen the confidence of the people in the government.

Turn to Shouf/Aley

-- I have met with various Lebanese officials in the last week and we have spoken extensively about their impending move into the Aley/Shouf regions.

-- This move has to clear components: political and military aspects.

-- On the political level, you know better than I the attitude of the Druze leadership and their requests for concessions from the Government of Lebanon. Surely you would agree that

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reconciliation between the communities in the Shouf and the central authorities is imperative to a peaceful assertion of central control in these areas,

-- Surely stability in these areas serves Syrian interests as well as Lebanese interests and I would hope you could use your extensive influence with the Druze leadership to encourage a political reconciliation,

-- I have met with General Tannous, the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army, and have discussed his plans for asserting control in the Shouf and Aley,

-- While the Lebanese Army has the capability to forcibly assert control, this is not how the political leaders wish to proceed.

Discussion on Syrian "Redeployment"

-- Play to Syrian rhetoric about "strong, free, independent Lebanon."

-- Point to Israeli redeployment as an imminent reality which will allow GOL to extend its control and sovereignty beyond Beirut (whatever Israel's motivation).

-- Couldn't we have a reciprocal gesture from Syria? Such a commitment, however tentative, might facilitate further Israeli moves thereby expediting entire process.

-- Believe it best that such a possibility be discussed by SARG with the GOL directly. Would an opening request from the Lebanese side be desirable?

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Stability in the METN and Shouf

-- Israeli redeployment from Alezy and Shouf offers Lebanese first opportunity to reestablish authority and to develop working relationship with local authorities to reinstitute delivery of government services.

-- GOL is working hard to defuse confessional strife in Shouf and Aley; I believe the government is prepared to guarantee the safety of the local population, especially the Druze, from attack by the militias which have provoked them in the past.

-- The years of strife and the crimes on both sides will make the pacification of the Shouf a demanding task.

-- The GOL must pass this first test of its ability to govern beyond Beirut. We see this as a critical milestone in the restoration of Lebamon;s territorial integrity.

-- We have been in close consultation with some of the other countires with a <u>manifest</u> commitment to the territorial integrity of Lebanon (i.e. our MNF co-contributors) and we are resolved to assist and facilitate restorative process as necessary.

-- The USG certainly would take serious exception to violence in Shouf originating from areas not under Lebanese control.

-- As you will appreciate, it will be difficult for the GOL to reconcile differences with Druze authorities and make neaningful gestures of concern for Druze people unless entire Lebanese Druze community could be brought into accord from beginning.

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-- Would SARG be prepared to facilitate this process:

Allowing GOL to extend services and permit
 Lebanese authorities to operate in METN as they extend
 reach into Aley and Shouf.

• Better yet, withdrawing Syrian Army from METN to facilitate entry of Lebanese security forces.

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TALKING POINTS

-- BECAUSE MY COUNTRY IS A LARGE, DIVERSE ONE WITH A ROBUST DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, MANY PEOPLE MISTAKE OUR INTENTIONS AND RESOLVE. THERE IS A CONSTANCE OF U.S. POLICY POALS THAT GOES BEYOND INDIVIDUALS AND EVEN CHANGES IN POLITICAL PARTIES OR ADMINISTRATIONS. THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND OUR PERSISTENCE ARE IN ERROR.

-- YOUR PRESS HERE IN SYRIA AND OTHERS IN THE ARAB WORLD HAVE SPECULATED THAT MINE IS A NEW FACE, BUT NOT BRINGING A NEW POLICY. ALTHOUGH THAT WAS MEANT IN A NEGATIVE SENSE, IN A FUNDAMENTAL WAY IT IS CORRECT: U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS ARTICULATED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS NOT CHANGED. WE ARE DEEPLY AND FUNDAMENTALLY COMMITED TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, ONE THAT CAN BE LASTING BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON EQUITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION. THIS DEEP ASPIRATION ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT IS BASED BOTH ON A MORAL IMPERATIVE AND OUR SELF INTEREST, BECAUSE WE ARE A FUNDAMENTALLY CONSERVATIVE POWER IN THIS AREA: FEACE AND STABILITY SERVE OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

-- THIS REGION HAS CARDINAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FOR MY COUNTRY AND THE OTHER INDUSTRALIZED NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD. THOSE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES INCLUDE THE VAST OIL AND

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OTHER NATURAL WEALTH OF THE AREA, AS WELL AS THE TRADITIONALLY GEOGRAPHIC NEXIS THAT HAS MADE THE EASTERN LEVANT A KEY CROSSROAD THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF MAN.

-- IN ASSIGNING ME THIS MISSION, PRESIDENT REAGAN STRESSED TO ME THE HIGH POLITICAL PRIORITY THAT HE PLACES IN OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLES OF THIS REGION ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY. OUR COMMITMENT IS LARGE IN THIS AREA -- ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND MILITARILY --BECAUSE OUR INTERESTS ARE LARGE. THEY WILL NOT GO AWAY AND NEITHER WILL WE. WE WILL BACK OUR COMMITMENT IN ALL WAYS NECESSARY; NOT BECAUSE WE WANT BASES OR DESIRE HEGEMONY, BUT TO CONTINUE THE COMMITMENT TO OUR UNSHAKEABLE POLICY GOALS I HAVE MENTIONED.

-- IN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE PRESIDENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS HE OUTLINED ON SEPTEMBER 1 LAST YEAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL OF HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PEACE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS AS CONTEMPLATED BY UNSC 242.

-- WE HARBOR NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD SYRIA. INDEED I HAVE SPOKEN TO A NUMBER OF AMERICAN LEADERS SUCH

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AS FORMER PRESIDENTS NIXON AND CARTER AND SECRETARY KISSINGER WHO HAVE ALL DEALT WITH YOU AND BEEN IMPRESSED WITH YOUR ABILITY AND INTELLECTUAL INTEGRITY. THEY HAVE ALL COUNSELED THAT YOU RETURN HONESTY FOR HONESTY. I WILL NOT MISLEAD YOU ABOUT OUR GOALS NOR OUR SPECIFIC POLICY POSITIONS TO IMPLEMENT THOSE GOALS. I COUNSEL YOU NOT TO UNDERESTIMATE OUR RESOLVE.

-- YOU HAVE CRITICIZED AMERICAN POLICY IN THIS REGION FOR GEING PRO-ZIONIST AND FOR SEEKING THE SOLE ADVANTAGE OF ISRAEL. I CHALLENGE YOU TO TEST OUR EVEN-HANDEDNESS. ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT, I CAN GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL ENSURE THE TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ARAB LAND OF LEBANON IF WE CAN ALSO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR FORCES AND THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS.

-- WITH REGARD TO LEBANON...

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TALKING POINTS RE AGREEMENT

-- I HAVE NOTED THE ARGUMENT YOU HAVE BEEN MAKING ABOUT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IN VARIOUS SPEECHES THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN. IT MAY BE THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN QUOTED AS RAISING WITH THAT DOCUMENT ARE THE PRODUCTS OF EITHER FACTUAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF WHAT IT PROVIDES OR A MISAPPREHEN-SION ABOUT THE HISTORIC PARALLELS AND EVOLVED PRACTICES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANALAGOUS SITUATIONS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, YOU HAVE SAID THAT "THE AGREEMENT DEEPLY INFRINGED ON LEBANON INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

-- TO THE CONTRARY, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES A MEANS FOR LEBANON TO SECURE FIRMLY ITS INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IT PROVIDES FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF LEBANON "CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF LEBANON THAT ALL EXTERNAL FORCES WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON."

-- ISRAEL SPECIFICALLY AGREES TO RESPECT THE "SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF LEBANON AND TO "CONSIDER THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON INVIOLABLE."

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-- ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO SOME DEGREE LIMIT FREEDOM OF ACTION BY THE SIGNATORIES, BUT ARE EXERCISES OF SOVEREIGNTY. THIS AGREEMENT IS THUS NOT OUT OF THE ORDINARY. IT HAS THE SAME CHARACTER OF THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND OTHER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OTHER COUNTIRES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING YOURS.

-- THE BALANCE STRUCK BY LEBANON IN ITS AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WILL DIFFER FROM YOURS, BUT THEY GOT MORE IN RETURN: TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL OF THEIR TERRITORY.

-- YOU HAVE ARGUED THAT ONE-TWIRD OF LEBANON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED A SECURITY REGION UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL.

-- IT IS UTTERLY UNTRUE THAT ISRAEL WILL CONTROL THE SECURITY REGION. IN FACT, ALL ISRAELI FORCES WILL DEPART THE COUNTRY AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A DECADE. -- FOR EXAMPLE, THE AGREEMENT EXPLICITLY PROVIDES THAT WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE, "THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY, POLICE AND OTHER CONTROL OPERATIONS RESTS WITH THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORIZED LEBANESE ORGANIZATIONS, AND NOT WITH THE JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS ."

-- THE RETURN OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL IS FURTHER UNDERSCORED BY THE STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEES CREATED BY THE AGREEMENT. ALL JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE DECISIONS MUST BE AGREED TO BY LEBANON, SO THERE IS A TOTAL VETO OF ANY ACTION TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED. (THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE SIMILAR IN CHARACTER TO THOSE PROVIDED IN THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS -- INCLUDING THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN ARMS AGREEMENT. A MIXED ARMS COMMISION CONSISTING OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH STATE AND THE UNTSO WAS ESTABLISHED TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION. EACH COMMISSION OPERATED FROM A HEADQUARTERS AND DISPATCHED TEAMS OF OBSERVERS TO VERIFY MILITARY UNDERSTANDINGS.

-- YOU HAVE ALSO ALLEGED THAT "LEBANON IS FORBIDDEN TO OVERFLY THE SOUTH EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION FROM ISRAELI AUTHORITIES." -- THIS IS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE LEBANESE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF OVERFLIGHTS IN THE SECURITY REGION TO AVOID MISIDENTIFICATION BUT THAT "APPROVAL OF THESE FLIGHTS IS NOT REQUIRED."

-- YOU HAVE ALSO SAID THAT "LEBANON IS FORCED TO OPEN THE BORDERS (WITH ISRAEL) TO ALLOW THE PEOPLE TO CROSS, WHICH IS A THREAT TO THE ECONOMY AND SECURITY OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB HOMELAND."

-- IN FACT, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY OR AUTOMATICALLY OPEN THE BORDER TO THE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS. INDEED, IT PROVIDES ONLY THAT WITHIN SIX MONTHS <u>AFTER</u> THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS. THUS, THE AGREEMENT IS A LARGE STEP FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ALONG THE BORDER AND PROVIDES FOR A FULL NEGOTIATION BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

-- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER POINTS THAT YOU HAVE RAISED REGARDING THE AGREEMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE MISAPPREHEND ICS CHARACTER, PROVISIONS AND PRECEDENCE. PERHAPS YOU WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THEM IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MY TEAM OR BILACERALLY WITH MINISTER SALEM AND THE LEBANESE WHO NEGOTIATED THEM.

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OUTGOING TELEGRAM

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EXDIS FOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF SUBJECT: JUMBLATT VISIT

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM AMMAN CABLES THAT WALID JUMBLATT INTENDS TO TRAVEL TO U.S. AUGUST 7 OR 8 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING MEDICAL ATTENTION FOR HIS INFANT SON. WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR CHILD TO BE TREATED AT CHILDREN'S NATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER IN WASHINGTON AND EXPECT TO BE FACILITIATING FAMILY'S ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH HOSPITAL THROUGH LEBANON DESK OFFICER BILL STANTON. WE HAVE INFORMED LEBANESE EMPASSY OF HIS VISIT.

3. WHEN JUMBLATT HAD PLANNED TO VISIT EARLY LAST MONTH, WE HAD LET HIM KNOW THAT NICK VELIOTES WOULD SEE HIM, THOUGH APPOINTMENTS AT A HIGHER LEVEL WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF GEMAYEL'S GREAT SENSITIVITY ABOUT OUR CONTACTS WITH JUMBLATT AT THIS TIME AND YOUR OWN RECENT REQUEST THAT A VISITING U.S. OFFICIAL AVOID MEETING WITH CONFESSIONAL GROUP LEADERS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE HIS

POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS IN THE DEPARTMENT.

4. ON A SEPARATE SUBJECT, YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON THE DELIVERY OF COUNTER-BATTERY RADARS TO THE MNF, IN LIGHT OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON GOL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONFESSIONAL LEADERS AND OUR PERCEIVED ROLE THERIN.

5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ BT #1730

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
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
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CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83 APPRV: RMCFARLANE DRFTD: CWSROSS CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

DAMASCUS 5990

DECLASSIFIED NLRR MD8-D99/2#57769 BY AND NARA DATE 5-3-10

EXDIS

1.

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US SUBJECT: <u>MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH</u> - LEBANESE, AUGUST 4

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT:)

2. SUMMARY. AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH HADDAD AND SALEM AUGUST 4 TO BRIEF THEM ON THEIR TALKS IN ISRAEL AND BEGIN EXPLORING NEXT STEPS, PARTICULARLY ON THE PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. MCFARLANE TABLED U.S. DRAFTS OF STATEMENTS THAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS MIGHT MAKE. WHILE SALEM HAD TWO SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT LEBANESE STATEMENT, HADDAD OBJECTED TO HAVING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ISSUE A STATEMENT AT ALL, PREFERRING THAT THE U.S. DO SO. SALEM PUT FORTH A LEBANESE PROPOSAL FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COASTAL REGION IN STAGES. WITH AD HOC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS. INCLUDING SUPERVISORY TEAMS, FORESEEN IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HADDAD, SEIZING ON ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FRUM TH COASTAL SECTOR WITHOUT FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IF THE SYRIAN AND PLO THREAT WAS REMOVED, URGED THAT THIS "CARD" BE EXPLOITED WITH THE SYRIANS. MCFARLANE AGREED THAT HE WOULD DO SO, AND INDICATED THAT HADDAD SHOULD DO THE SAME WITH BANDAR. ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MERIT IN PURSUING THE IDEA OF GETTING THE PLO OUT OF THE BIQA AND NORTH LEBANON IN THE SHORT TERM AS A WAY OF MEETING ISRAELI CONCERNS. HADDAD SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE NON-ARAFAT FIGHTERS TO LEAVE. ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF THE SHUF, HADDAD EMPHASIZED THE ISRAELIS HAD TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AS THEY LEFT. MEETINGS FOR COORDINATION WERE NOT ENOUGH. ACTION ON

DAMASCUS 5990

THE GROUND WAS NEEDED, SPECIFICALLY THE COLLECTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE DRUZE AND LEBANESE FORCES BEFORE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. JUMBLATT'S POSSESSION OF 130 MM MORTARS WHICH COULD REACH BEIRUT GREATLY STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION. MCFARLANE AGREED THIS WAS SOMETHING TO DISCUSS WITH THE ISRAELIS, BEGINNING WITH THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER AUGUST 4. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS AND ROSS, MET WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WADI HADDAD AND FOREIGN MINISTER ELIE SALEM FOR 90 MINUTES AUGUST 4 TO BRIEF THEM ON HIS TALKS IN ISRAEL AND EXPLORE NEXT STEPS.

4. TALKS IN ISRAEL

MCFARLANE HIGHLIGHTED THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL:

-- WE HAD STRESSED TO THE ISRAELIS LEBANON'S POLITICAL PROBLEM ON REDEPLOYMENT -- I.E., HOW TO COUNTER THE PERCEPTION THAT A WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWWALI RIVER CONSTITUTED A STEP TOWARD PARTITION -- AND HAD UNDERLINED THE NEED TO AGREE ON A PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS STEP THAT CREATED A SENSE OF PROCESS, OF MOVEMENT BEYOND THE SHUF. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAD EXPLORED THE IDEA OF STAGED WITHDRAWALS DOWN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN THE COASTAL SECTOR, WITH THE ISRAELIS REMAINING IN THE BIQA' VALLEY TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS.

-- THE ISRAELIS HAD RECOGNIZED LEBANON'S POLITICAL PROBLEM AND INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL, BUT THEY REJECTED ANY TIMETABLE WITH DATES CERTAIN THAT WAS NOT LINKED TO THE IDEA OF A STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREAS EVACUATED. THIS PRESENTED THEM WITH SEVERAL PROBLEMS, SOME POLITICAL, SOME PRACTICAL. POLITICALLY, THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS MAKING THIS KIND OF CONCESSION WITHOUT HAVING ACHIEVED ONE OF THEIR DECLARED GOALS -- THE REMOVAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF LABOR PARTY DEMANDS ALONG THESE LINES. PRACTICALLY, THEY HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO PERFORM ITS SECURITY MISSION IN THE AREAS EVACUATED WHILE THE PLO WAS STILL IN LEBANON. IT BT

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CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83 APPRV: RMCFARLANE DRFTD: CWSROSS CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO EXPOSE NORTHERN ISRAEL TO THE RISK OF RENEWED ATTACKS. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, FINALLY AGREED TO EXPLORE WAYS OF MEETING LEBANON'S POLITICAL NEEDS AS LONG AS THEIR OWN CONCERNS, INCLUDING THE NEED TO MAKE A FINAL STEP IN WITHDRAWAL CONTINGENT ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, WERE MET.

-- IN A RELATED CONCERN, THE ISRAELIS HAD EXPRESSED REAL DOUBTS ON THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF FOLLOWING THEIR WITHDRAWAL. THE DRUZE WERE STILL NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THEIR INTERESTS, AND THEY FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF A LEBANESE FORCES OFFENSIVE. WE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WAS ALREADY DEEPLY ENGAGED IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE FACTIONS INVOLVED IN THE SHUF UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. HADDAD.

-- ALL OF OUR ISRAELI INTERLOCUTORS HAD STRESSED REPEATEDLY THE NEED FOR INTENSIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS. THIS WAS PARTICULARLY URGENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE REDEPLOYMENT OPERATION. WE HAD RESPONDED THAT ANY EXCHANGES THAT WERE PUBLICLY PERCEIVED TO BE LIMITED TO REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

-- WE HAD RAISED THE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN OVER THE REPORTED INFILTRATION OF WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES TO THE DRUZE FROM SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS, APPARENTLY WITH ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE. WHILE THE ISRAELIS HAD DENIED THIS WAS OCCURRING, THEY DID PROMISE TO LOOK INTO THE REPORTS. THEY HAD CLEARLY GOTTEN OUR MESSAGE. SECRET

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-- FINALLY, KIMCHE, SPEAKING PERSONALLY IN A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL, HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN YARZAH, WHICH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WISHED TO MOVE TO MORE SECURE QUARTERS FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT. KIMCHE POINTED OUT THAT THIS ISSUE HAD ACQUIRED SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP, AND A HELPFUL STEP ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HELP CONDITION THE ISRAELI FRAME OF MIND. WE HAD RESPONDED THIS WAS OF COURSE A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE, BUT HAD NOTED THAT, TO THE EXTENT THE ISRAELI OFFICE LOOKED LIKE A CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE, IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN OUR POINT AND AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT OF MILITARY TRAFFIC TO OR FROM THE OFFICE AND NO GUARDS IN UNIFORM.

5. NEXT STEPS: PROPOSED TEXTS

MCFARLANE TOLD SALEM AND HADDAD THAT, SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO LOOK AT WAYS TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF REDEPLOYMENT WAS NOT ONE OF PARTITION, WE HAD BEGUN LOOKING AT WAYS TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. SPECIFICALLY, WE HAD DEVELOPED DRAFT TEXTS OF STATEMENTS THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS MIGHT WISH TO MAKE IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDEPLOYMENT TO MEET THE NEEDS OF BOTH PARTIES. MCFARLANE SHARED OUR DRAFTS WITH SALEM AND HADDAD AND ASKED THEM TO THINK ABOUT THEM.

AFTER A QUICK REVIEW OF OUR TEXTS, SALEM SAID THE TEXT WE WERE PROPOSING FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE" IN TWO RESPECTS: (A) IT MADE SUCCESSIVE WITHDRAWALS IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE AWWALI CONTINGENT ON SECURITY CONDITIONS OF WHICH ISRAEL, NOT LEBANON, WAS TO BE THE JUDGE. THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEFEND IN PARLIAMENT, SINCE CONCEIVABLY ISRAEL WOULD STAY FOR YEARS AND YEARS. THE REGIME, NOT TO MENTION THE CABINET, WOULD FALL. SALEM STRESSED HE NEEDED SOME NOTION OF A DATE CERTAIN TO USE WITH PARLIAMENT TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM; (B) ANY STATEMENT MADE BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD TO HIGHLIGHT THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF ANY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS TO COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT.

HADDAD, UPON FURTHER REFLECTION, SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE BT #5990

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CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83 APPRV: RMCFARLANE DRFTD: CWSROSS CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

DAMASCUS 5990

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH

THERE SHOULD BE A LEBANESE STATEMENT AT ALL, SINCE ALL THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT WAS FULL WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS UP TO THE ISRAELIS TO PUT LESSER STEPS INTO A SUITABLE CONTEXT. IF THE U.S. WANTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON.

6. NEXT STEPS: LEBANESE PROPOSAL

MCFARLANE THEN ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE WOULD PROPOSE BE DONE. SALEM PROPOSED THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW TO THE SECURITY REGION, WAIT TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPED IN THE EVACUATED AREA, AND THEN ANNOUNCE A WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE WESTERN SECTOR OVER A ONE OR TWO MONTH PERIOD. AS THIS WAS CARRIED OUT, LEBANON WOULD IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AND THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS COULD BE PUT INTO PLACE. AS A FINAL STEP, THE ISRAELIS COULD STATE THEY WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE BIQA' IN ANOTHER TWO MONTHS PROVIDED THE SYRIANS WITHDREW. THIS WOULD GIVE THE LEBANESE A DATE THEY COULD EXPLOIT TO BUILD PRESSURE ON SYRIA IN THE ARAB WORLD.

FAIRBANKS COUNTERED THAT, WITH THE PLO STILL IN LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WOULD VIEW THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONTEMPLATED IN THE AGREEMENT AS INSUFFICIENT. ONE WAY TO BREAK THE LOGJAM WOULD BE SIMPLY TO PUT THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. THIS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF BRINGING THE 8 TO 12 WEEK TIMETABLE OF THE AGREEMENT INTO PLAY. HADDAD EXPRESSED GREAT SKEPTICISM OVER THE WISDOM

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OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION. SALEM ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WOULD ABSOLUTELY REFUSE TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT PUT INTO FORCE WITHOUT SOME BREAKTHROUGH ON SYRIA, SUCH AS THE OPENING OF LEBANESE-SYRIAN TALKS AND THE SUSPENSION OF SYRIAN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE LEBANESE LEADERS.

LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, HADDAD CAME BACK TO MCFARLANE'S EARLIER BRIEFING ON THE TALKS IN ISRAEL AND ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE COASTAL REGION WITHOUT FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IF RPT IF THE SYRIAN AND PLO THREAT WERE NEUTRALIZED AS FAR AS THE AREAS EVACUATED WERE CONCERNED. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE. HADDAD POINTED OUT THIS WAS A CARD THAT MIGHT HAV SOME VALUE WITH THE SYRIANS. IF THIS IDEA WERE TO BE DEVELOPED, LEBANON WOULD OF COURSE GIVE "TACIT ASSURANCES" THAT IT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT FULLY AFTER THE WITHDRAWALS WERE COMPLETED. 1118 MCFARLANE SAID HE WOULD GIVE THIS IDEA "THE HARD SELL" WITH THE SYRIANS AND ASKED HADDAD TO PURSUE IT WITH BANDAR .

7. NEXT STEPS: THE PLO

MCFARLANE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MERIT TO TRYING TO GET A PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IN THE SHORT TERM AS A WAY OF MEETING ISRAELI CONCERNS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT MUCH EASIER FOR THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE COASTAL REGION. FAIRBANKS ADDED THAT THIS WOULD PLAY VERY WELL IN ISRAEL, SINCE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD SAY THE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN GOTTEN OUT OF LEBANON.

HADDAD SAW LITTLE VALUE IN PURSUING THIS SCENARIO, SINCE IT WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS (RESUMABLY BY REMOVING A BODY OF SUNNI PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS FROM AREAS IN WHICH ALAWITES AND SHI'ITES WERE NUMEROUS). IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THE NON-ARAFAT FIGHTERS COULD NOT BE GOTTEN OUT OF THE BIQA', AND EVEN IN SMALL NUMBERS THEY COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE ISRAELIS.

8. NEXT STEPS: THE SHUP

HADDAD RETURNED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE SHUFF, INDICATING BT #5990

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CLASS: SECRET CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83 APPRV: RMCFARLANE DRFTD: CWSROSS CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

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EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH

THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO HELP IN THE REASSERTION ØF LEBANESE

AUTHORITY AS THEY WITHDREW. FAIRBANKS REMINDED HIM THE ISRAELIS WERE ANXIOUS FOR MEETINGS IN ORDER TO COORDINATE. THIS, HADDAD REJOINED, WAS NOT ENOUGH. THERE HAD TO BE CONCRETE ACTION ON THE GROUND. ONE THING THE ISRAELIS COULD DO AS THEY LEFT WOULD BE TO TAK THE HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE POSSESSION OF BOTH THE DRUZE AND THE LEBANESE FORCES AWAY. THIS WOULD MAKE BOTH FACTIONS MORE AMENABLE TO DISCUSSIONS. ONE PARTICULARLY BAD PROBLEM WAS THE EXISTENCE OF 130 MM "ARTILLERY" (MORTARS) IN THE HANDS OF THE DRUZE. WALLD JUMBLATT HAD THREATENED TO USE THESE ON BEIRUT IF ANY DECISION WAS MADE TO MOVE THE LEBANESE ARMY INTO THE SHUF WITHOUT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT. MCFARLANE AGREED THIS COULD BE RAISED WITH THE ISRAELIS, BEGINNING WITH THE TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED LATER IN THE EVENING.

9. COMMENT: THIS WAS AN INITIAL, AND IN SOME SENSES INCONCLUSIVE, DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE. IT WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY SEVERAL FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HADDAD AND SERVED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO PREPARE THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER AUGUST 4, WHICH MCFARLANE ATTENDED (SEPTEL). PAGANELLI

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VZCZCDYI * OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHBL DE RUEHDM #5992 218 ** ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK CLASS: SECRET Ø62057Z AUG 83 ZFF4 CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS APPRV: RMCFARLANE TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3124 DRFTD: RMCFARLANE INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT Ø674 DISTR: AMB MCFARLANE-4

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STATE FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

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E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR 2 1 1 TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF SUBJECT: SYRIAN POSITION ON DIALOGUE WITH GOL AND OTHER MATTERS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. IN GEMAYEL-MCFARLANE PHONE CALL REPORTED SEPTEL, PRESIDENT GEMAAEL ALSO DEBRIEFED ON POINTS RECEIVED VIA SENSITIVE GOL-SARG HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT (PLEASE PROTECT). THE FIRST CONCERNED SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT NO MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS KHADDAM AND SALEM COULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS LEBANON AGREED IN ADVANCE TO CANCELLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.

AS A SEPARATE MATTER, THE SARG PORTRAYED THE 3. DECISION TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS A MATTER OF US INSISTENCE IN GOL AUTONOMOUS JUDGMENT. GEMAYEL WAS QUITE CONCERNED AT THIS SYRIAN EFFORT TO UNDERMINE HIS CREDIBILITY AND ASKED THAT I CORRECT THE RECORD DURING MY MEETING WITH KHADDAM AND ASSAD.

AS A SUMMMAY JUDGMENT GEMAYEL STATED HIS 4. INTERLOCUTORS ASSESSMENT THAT SYRIA INTENDED TO PRESENT AN ABSOLUTE STONEWALL TO USG AND GOL PROPOSALS FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. PAGANELLI BT #5992

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STATE FOR THE SECRETARY WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH JUMBLATT DURING TREATMENT OF HIS SON

THE FE STATE 221730

SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL INVITES MY VIEWS ON OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH WALID JUMBLATT DURING TREATMENT DF HIS SON IN WASHINGTON. AS A FOOTNOTE I AM PUZZLED AS TO HOW/WHY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TREATMENT WERE MADE WITHOUT MY KNOWING ABOUT IT. IT IS NOT A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE --INDEED IT IS AN ENTIRELY SENSIBLE THING TO DO. RATHER, I AM PROMPTED TO WONDER WHAT OTHER CONTACTS WITH LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL LEADERS MAY BE GOING ON WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE. I AM SURE YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE IPORTANCE OF CLOSE COORDINATION OF THESE MATTERS GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL 82. . PERSONALLY (SEE BELOW) AND THEIR EFFECT ON MY MISSION.

3. COINCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF THE INCOMING REFTEL, IN I RECEIVED A CALL FROM WADIA HADDAD WHO HAD MENTIONED TRAVEL OF JUMBLATT'S SON TO ME LAST NIGHT. IN SEEKING HIS VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLE VALUE OF A MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH A DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, I STRESSED THAT ANY SUCH MEETING WOULD OF COURSE BE DESIGNED TO REINFORCE GOL BONA FIDES AND TO INSIST THAT JUMBLATT ENTER GOODFAITH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM AND FURTHER TO CEASE HIS ACTIVITIES WITH THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT. AS A TACTICAL MATTER I ASKED WHETHER GOL MIGHT LIKE TO MAKE THE CONTACT WITH JUMBLATT SO AS TO REMOVE THE LEADERS ABILITY TO EXPLOIT SUBSEQUENTLY THE MEETING FOR SELF-SERVING PURPOSES.

4. JUST BEFORE LFAVING BEIRUT FOR DAMASCUS I WAS CALLED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WHO HAD DISCUSSED JUMBLATT MATTER WITH HADDAD. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, GEMAYEL ASKED

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THAT THERE BE NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH JUMBLATT. HE STATED WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY THAT JUMBLATT WOULD NOT BE MOVED BY US ARGUMENTS AND MORE IMPORTANTLY WOULD EXPLOIT THE MEETING TO ELEVATE HIS STANDING IN THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT AND AMONG HIS OWN PEOPLE. AFTER MAKING CLEAR THAT OUR MOTIVES WERE SIMPLY TO OFFER THE GOL THE OPPORTUNITY TO INDICATE ITS CONTROL OVER EVENTS TO JUMBLATT, I INDICATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COORDINATE CLOSELY ON THESE MATTERS. AFTER SOME TO AND FRO. GEMAYEL STATED THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR SOME THIRD PERSON (NON-USG) TO MAKE PRIOR CONTACT WITH JUMBLATT AND TO SECURE HIS AGREEMENT THAT AS A CONCESSION FOR HAVING THE MEETING, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BUT ONLY ON THESE TERMS. COMMENT: THIS CONCESSION BY GEMAYEL CAME UP ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE DEBATE DURING WHICH HIS NEURALGIA WAS CLEARLY HIGHER THAN ON ANY OTHER ISSUE WE HAD DISCUSSED. IT IS MY STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT NO SUCH MEETING TAKE PLACE. PAGANELLI

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EXIDS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR TAGS: MASS, PREL, MOPS, OPRC, LE, US SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON MORTAR LOCATING RADAR

REF: (A) STATE 221730; (B) SECDEF 042245Z AUG 83

1. SEGRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE SHARE CONCERN STATED REFTEL A ABOUT PRESS GUIDANCE PROPOSED REFTEL B. TO ENHANCE DETERRENT EFFECT IN DEPLOYMENT OF SUBJECT EQUIPMENT, PARA 3 REFTEL A MIGHT BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE YES NEW RADAR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO THE US MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT TO ENHANCE THE POSTURE OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THE DEPLOYMENT OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS A MEASURE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE TACTICAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN LEBANON. UNQUOTE. PAGANELLI##

DECLASSIFIED Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997 NARA, Date 12/1/99 By.

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