

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Executive Secretariat, NSC: Subject
File: Records, 1981-1985
Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane)
CHRON Cables (08/05/1983-08/07/1983)
Box: 53

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/5/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/05/83-8/07/83]

FOIA

M08-099/2

Box Number 53

STOCKER

32

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1.	57747 CABLE	050042Z AUG 83 D 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #79; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57747	2	8/5/1983	B1
2.	57748 CABLE	050050Z AUG 83 D 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #80; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57748	5	8/5/1983	B1
3.	57749 CABLE	050117Z AUG 83 D 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #81; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57749	5	8/5/1983	B1
4.	57750 CABLE	050141Z AUG 83 D 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #82; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57750	4	8/5/1983	B1
5.	57751 CABLE	050304Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #83	1	8/5/1983	B1
6.	57752 CABLE	040928Z AUG 83 R 11/15/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #84	2	8/4/1983	B1
7.	57755 CABLE	RE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: TENTATIVE TRAVEL PLANS PAR 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #85; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57755	2	8/3/1983	B2 B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/5/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/05/83-8/07/83]

FOIA

M08-099/2

Box Number 53

STOCKER

32

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
8	57756 CABLE	050404Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #86	2	8/5/1983	B1
9	57757 CABLE	RE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BANDAR TRIP R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #87	1	8/5/1983	B1
10	57759 CABLE	050740Z AUG 83 R 11/15/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #88	2	8/5/1983	B1
11	57760 CABLE	051618Z AUG 83 D 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #89; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57760	3	8/5/1983	B1
12	57762 CABLE	051817Z AUG 83 PAR 11/15/2002 F98-008/1 #90; UPHELD 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57762	1	8/5/1983	B6
13	57763 TALKING POINTS	RE MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #91	5	ND	B1
14	57764 TALKING POINTS	US POSITION R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #92	3	ND	B1
15	57766 TALKING POINTS	RE AGREEMENT R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #93	4	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/5/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[8/05/83-8/07/83]

FOIA

M08-099/2

Box Number 53

STOCKER

32

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
16.	57767 CABLE	060453Z AUG 83 R 11/15/2002 NLSF98-008/1 #94	1	8/6/1983	B1
17.	57768 CABLE	061323Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #95	2	8/6/1983	B1
18.	57769 CABLE	061508Z AUG 83 PAR 4/19/2006 F98-008/1 #96; R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57769	7	8/6/1983	B1
19.	57770 CABLE	062057Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #97	1	8/6/1983	B1
20.	57772 CABLE	062104Z AUG 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1 #98	2	12/5/2008	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

57747

VZCZCJMI *
 00 RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHDM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV RUEHDT
 DE RUEHJM #2793 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050042Z AUG 83 ZFF6
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6134
 INFO RUEA WW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3700
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0145
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9535
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6234
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3760
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1825
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1168
 RUEHT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7099
 BT
 S E C R E T JERUSALEM 02793

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/4/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: HTEICHER
 CLEAR: AMB MCFARLANE
 DISTR: CONGEN;MCFARLANE-

DECLASSIFIED
 NLRR M08-099/2 #57747
 BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-10

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: FOLLOW-UP MEETING
 WITH DAVID KIMCHE, AUGUST 3 1983

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET FOR NINETY
 MINUTE WITH MFA DIRECTOR GENERAL DAVID KIMCHE AND HIS
 DEPUTY, HANAN BAR-ON, LATE AFTERNOON AUGUST 3 TO SEEK
 FURTHER ISRAELI FLEXIBILITY REGARDING A CONDITIONAL TARGET
 DATE FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. BASED ON WORKING PAPER
 DEVELOPED WITH WADIA HADDAD AND ELIE SALEM, MCFARLANE
 EXPLAINED LEBANESE POSITION ON PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL AND
 CONCESSIONS LEBANESE COULD MAKE IN RETURN FOR MORE
 CONCRETE ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO PHASED WITHDRAWAL BEYOND
 AWWALI RIVER.

3. KIMCHE RESPONDED BY STATING THAT LEBANESE AND ISRAELI
 OBJECTIVES ARE IDENTICAL: TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN
 FORCES, RESTORATION OF INDEPENDENT AND SOVEREIGN LEBANON,
 AND SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER. WHERE LEBANON
 AND ISRAEL DISAGREE IS ON TACTICS TO ACHIEVE THOSE GOALS.
 U.S. AND ISRAEL ALSO DIFFER ON CAPABILITY OF LEBANESE ARMY
 AND SECURITY SERVICES TO PREVENT VIOLENCE IN SOUTH OR TO
 SECURE THE SHUF. THEREFORE, ISRAEL CANNOT COMMIT TO
 FURTHER WITHDRAWALS BEYOND THE AWWALI DUE TO THE LIKELI-
 HOOD OF PLO AND SYRIAN THREATS. BUT ISRAEL WILL TRY TO
 MEET INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL LEBANESE POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS.
 THE GOI IS READY TO HELP STRENGTHEN THE GOL BY, INTER ALIA,
 WELCOMING COOPERATION BY LOCAL OFFICIALS IN THE SOUTH WITH
 THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO ALLOW THE GOL TO EXTEND ITS

PRESERVATION COPY

CONTROL TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER. NONETHELESS, ISRAEL CANNOT SET DATES FOR ADDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL. AS AN ALTERNATIVE, ISRAEL AND LEBANON COULD IMPLEMENT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED BY ASKING, GIVEN THE UNLIKELIHOOD OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL, WHERE THE IDF WOULD BE AT THE END OF EIGHT TO TWELVE WEEKS. KIMCHE ANSWERED THEY WOULD STILL BE AT THE AWWALI LINE, UNLESS SYRIA AND THE PLO HAD MOVED.

4. AT THIS POINT, KIMCHE SUGGESTED, IN HIS OPINION AND ON A PRIVATE BASIS (PROTECT FULLY) THAT HE COULD CONTEMPLATE A QUOTE FIG LEAF UNQUOTE FOR THE LEBANESE. QUOTE TO THE EXTENT THE GOL CAN PROVIDE SECURITY, THE GOI MIGHT BE WILLING TO SAY THAT COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WAS 'FEASIBLE OF IMPKEMENTATION' IN NO MORE THAN FIVE MONTHS, PROVIDED THE SYRIANS (AND PLO) WITHDRAW UNQUOTE. HE ALSO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF GAINING GOL AGREEMENT TO A NEW LOCATION FOR THE MFA LIAISON OFFICE IN THE BEIRUT AREA. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED THE LEBANESE CONDITIONS; I.E., NO UNIFORMED SECURITY PRESENCE AND NO OVERLAND IDF MOVEMENT TO AND FROM THE OFFICE. KIMCHE SAID THESE CONDITIONS POSED NO PROBLEM.

5. COMMENT: WE ARE UNDERTAKING TO DRAFT LANGUAGE TO PRESENT TO THE ISRAELIS FOR DISCUSSION FIRST AT FURTHER MINISTERIAL MEETINGS HERE AND THEN AT TOMORROW NIGHT'S TRIPARTITE MEETING IN BEIRUT. THE DRAFT LANGUAGE WILL BE REVIEWED WITH KIMCHE WEDNESDAY MORNING DURING OR FOLLOWING THE MEETING WITH SHAMIR. END COMMENT. CLUVERIUS

BT
#2793

MNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

57748

VZCZCJMI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHDM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHDT
 DE RUEHJM #2794/01 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050050Z AUG 83 ZFF6
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6135
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3701
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0146
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9536
 RUEH M / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6235
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3761
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1826
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7100

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/2/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: HTEICHER
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

*Shamir Am m74
 9:40 - 10:30 AM
 24 Panded m74
 10:50 - 12:00*

BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * JERUSALEM 02794

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-099/2 #57748

BY kw NARA DATE 5-3-10

FROM AMB MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: AUGUST 3 MEETING
 WITH SHAMIR

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: IN THE COURSE OF A FRANK MEETING WITH SHAMIR ET AL, MCFARLANE REVIEWED TALKS IN BEIRUT WITH EMPHASIS ON NEED FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PROCESS OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND TIMING OF CONTINUOUS ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. HE FURTHER EXPLAINED THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF FAILURE TO MOVE BEYOND PROPOSED ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. SHAMIR EXPRESSED CONSTERNATION AS HE THOUGHT THAT UNDERSTANDING ABOUT NEXT STEPS HAD BEEN REACHED IN WASHINGTON AND THAT WE WERE NOW PUTTING PRESSURE ON ISRAEL WHICH WOULD ONLY REDOUND TO SYRIAN BENEFIT. SHAMIR REITERATED HIS INTEREST IN A DISENGAGEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND SYRIAN FORCES IN THE BIQA, A STEP WHICH SHAMIR DESCRIBED WOULD BE A QUOTE POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE SITUATION UNQUOTE. AT THE SAME TIME, SHAMIR MADE CLEAR THAT AFTER ITS REDEPLYMENT TO THE AWWALI, ISRAEL WOULD WAIT FOR SYRIAN MOVES. END SUMMARY.

3. MCFARLANE, LEWIS AND TEICHER MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR, DAVID KIMCHE, HANON BAR-ON, URI LUBR NI AND SEVERAL OTHER MFA OFFICIALS FOR FIFTY MINUTES, MORNING AUGUST 3. SHAMIR EXPRESSED HIS READINESS TO COOPERATE AND TURNED THE FLOOR OVER TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE. AMB MCFARLANE OPENED HIS PRESENTATION BY REAFFIRMING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION TO ACHIEVE AMERICAN

PRESERVATION COPY

GOALS IN LEBANON. THE US IS MOST CONCERNED WITH BRINGING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON. VISIT TO PEIRUT SOUGHT TO DETERMINE WHETHER THERE WAS A CHANCE FOR AN ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PLANS AND LEBANESE CONCERNS. THE LEBANESE EXPRESSED CONFIDENCE THAT THEY COULD MANAGE THE SHOUF IN THE WAKE OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. POLITICALLY THE GOVERNMENT IS INTENSIFYING ITS DIALOGUE WITH THE DRUZE AND THE LEBANESE FOR ACCOMMODATION IN THE SHOUF. REGARDING THE MILITARY, THE LEBANESE ARMY IS READY TO GO INTO THE SHOUF BUT ALL KNOW THAT STABILITY IS A FUNCTION OF POLITICAL AGREEMENTS. BUT THE LEBANESE EXPRESSED A HIGH DEGREE OF CONCERN REGARDING HOW REDEPLOYMENT TAKES PLACE. FOR THEM IT SHOULD BE PART OF A PROCESS THAT DOES TWO THINGS: (1) STRENGTHENS THE APPEARANCE AND REALITY OF THEIR CONTROL IN THE ALEY/SOUFF AND (2) THAT THE WITHDRAWAL TAKE PLACE IN A PROCESS WHICH TAKES SYRIA INTO ACCOUNT AND PROVIDES INCENTIVES FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. FURTHER, THE WITHDRAWAL MUST NOT BE PERCEIVED AS A PRETEXT FOR PARTITION.

4. MCFARLANE PROCEEDED TO DESCRIBE US SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH THESE CONCERNS. FIRST WORK SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN IN A TRIPARTITE CONTEXT TO DEVELOP A PROCESS OF CONTINUOUS WITHDRAWAL. THIS SHOULD INVOLVE GREATER EMPHASIS ON THE WESTERN CORRIDOR. THE TRIPARTITE TALKS COULD FOCUS ON ESTABLISHING THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR AND TIMING OF WITHDRAWAL. WITHIN LEBANON, ISRAELI INTENTIONS REMAIN A CAUSE OF CONCERN. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL DEAL EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE CENTRAL AUTHORITIES. ISRAELI CONTACT WITH THE FACTIONS UNDERMINES THE AUTHORITY AND CONFIDENCE OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT. ACTIVE CONTACT BY THE TWO GOVERNMENTS IS NECESSARY TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE. MCFARLANE CLOSED HIS OPENING REMARKS BY STRESSING HIS BELIEF THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS READY TO EXTEND ITS CONTROL ALONG THE WESTERN FRONT AS SOON AS THE ISRAELIS ARE READY TO LEAVE.

5. SHAMIR SAID THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THAT MCFARLANE IS GIVING THE ISRAELIS HIS PICTURE OF THE LEBANESE WAY OF THINKING BUT HE WAS CONFUSED BECAUSE HE THOUGHT THAT AN UNDERSTANDING HAD BEEN REACHED ABOUT NEXT

NODIS

STEPS IN WASHINGTON. IT HAD BEEN MADE CLEAR THAT THE REDEPLOYMENT WAS PART OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND THE FIRST ISRAELI STEP TOWARDS TOTAL WITHDRAWAL. A SIGN OF GOODWILL FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE. IT IS NOW TIME TO SEE WHAT THE SYRIANS ARE READY TO DO AND PRESSURE SHOULD BE PUT ON THE SYRIANS TO START TO LEAVE LEBANON. INSTEAD PRESSURE IS BEING PUT ON ISRAEL FOR SYRIA TO WAIT QUIETLY, ISRAEL TO LEAVE AND TERRORISTS RAIDS TO RESUME IN THE NORTH. WHAT MCFARLANE SUGGESTED WOULD ERODE THE PRINCIPAL OF SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL, BUT ISRAEL WANTS TO COORDINATE AND IS READY TO COOPERATE. SHAMIR ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT THE DRUZE. HE THOUGHT THE LEBANESE WANTED ISRAEL TO HELP THE DRUZE COME TO TERMS WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN WITHDRAWAL IN THE WEST AND THE EAST-BUT ISRAEL WILL MOVE TO THE AWWALI AND WAIT FOR SYRIAN RESPONSE.

6. SHAMIR THEN ASKED ABOUT DISENGAGEMENT. HE SAID THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN DISENGAGEMENT WOULD REDUCE TENSIONS, AVOID A MILITARY CONFRONTATION AND GENERALLY BE HELPFUL. HE CONTINUED QUOTE DISENGAGEMENT WOULD HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH WITHDRAWAL BUT CAN BE A POSITIVE FACTOR IN THE SITUATION. IT IS A PROBLEM BETWEEN US AND THE SYRIANS THAT HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH THE LEBANESE UNQUOTE. ARRANGEMENTS ALSO WOULD BE NECESSARY TO PREVENT PLO INFILTRATION AND TERRORISM. THIS WOULD NEED TO BE ARRANGED WITH THE SYRIANS. DISENGAGEMENT MAY BE LESS IMMEDIATELY IMPORTANT, AS REDEPLOYMENT WILL TAKE SEVERAL WEEKS AND LEBANON MUST TAKE CONTROL OF THE AREA. BUT ISRAEL WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH US AND LEBANON TO SEE WHAT CAN HAPPEN.

7. MCFARLANE MADE CLEAR THE LEBANESE CONCERN ABOUT SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND EXPLAINED HOW WE MIGHT WORK WITH THIRD COUNTRIES INCLUDING THE ARABS AND EUROPEANS TO DEVISE INCENTIVES FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE IDF PRESENCE, EVEN THOUGH ISRAEL INTENDS TO LEAVE, PROVIDES AN IMPORTANT INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE. REGARDING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT, WE HAVE AGREED THAT IT SHOULD BE IMPLEMENTED AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT. THE QUESTION IS HOW TO COUNTER SYRIAN OBSTACLES AND ISRAELI INTENTION TO LEAVE. THE TRIPARTITE CONTEXT IS A HEALTHY AND CORRECT WAY TO DEVELOP A PROCESS. WITHIN LEBANON HOWEVER THE UNDENIABLY POPULAR PERCEPTION IS THAT ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL LEAD TO PARTITION. THIS IS WHY WE NEED A PROCESS, CONDITIONED FUNDAMENTALLY ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL TO OVERCOME THE PARTITION PERCEPTION. MCFARLANE REPORTED THAT HE HAD EXPLAINED THE ISRAELI RATIONALE FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS AN INCENTIVE FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. THE LEBANESE DO NOT SHARE THE ISRAELI PERCEPTION. RATHER IT WOULD PROVIDE INCENTIVES FOR SYRIANS TO REMAIN WHILE THE LEBANESE GOAL IS TO GET SYRIA OUT AND EXPAND LEBANESE CONTROL THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY. SHAMIR

PRESERVATION COPY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

R

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF * JERUSALEM 02794

REITERATED THAT IF SY IA MOVES, ISRAEL WILL MOVE BUT THERE CAN BE NO UNILATERAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. AFTER THE ISRAELI DEPLOYMENT, THERE MUST BE SOME SYRIAN MOVEMENT. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT, IT WILL BE AN INCENTIVE FOR THE SYRIANS TO REMAIN IN LEBANON FOREVER. SHAMIR FURTHER ARGUED THAT THE US WAS ATTACHING TOO MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WHICH HE CHARACTERIZES AS QUOTE NOT A GOVERNMENT AT ALL UNQUOTE. ISRAELI REDEPLNYMENT WILL HELP STRENGTHEN THEIR AUTHORITY. TO BECOME A REAL GOVERNMENT, THE LEBANESE SHOULD COOPERATE WITH ISRAEL. IF IT DOESN'T, SYRIA WILL END UP CONTROLLING ALL OF LEBANON AND GEMAYEL WILL NOT BE PRESIDENT FOR LONG. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE SHOULD GO TALK TO THE SYRIANS BEFORE DISCUSSING QUOTE NEW SCHEMES UNQUOTE WITH ISRAEL. ISRAEL WILL GO AHEAD AND

64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

B

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF * JERUSALEM 02794

PRESERVATION COPY

NODIS

REDEPLOY ITS FORCES AND TRY TO COORDINATE WITH THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT. BUT BECAUSE OF THE LEBANESE POSITION THIS COORDINATION WILL NOT SUCCEED. WITHOUT THE EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION OR A LETTER ASKING THE SYRIANS TO LEAVE, THERE AREN'T INCENTIVES FOR THE SYRIANS TO ACT. SHAMIR OPINED THAT HE DID NOT THINK THE GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE ITS POSITION FROM THAT WHICH IT ARTICULATED IN WASHINGTON. ISRAEL HAS NO INTENTION TO STAY IN LEBANON SO THERE SHOULD NOT BE TALK OF CHANGE BUT ISRAEL WILL NOT LEAVE UNTIL IT IS SURE ABOUT ITS SECURITY AND IT CANNOT HAVE CONFIDENCE ABOUT ITS SECURITY UNTIL THE PLO AND SYRIANS LEAVE. THIS HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE BASIS OF DISCUSSIONS BY THE PARTIES. EVEN IF THE PLO AND SYRIANS LEAVE, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL ONLY BE BARELY SUFFICIENT. IF THEY DON'T LEAVE, THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS WILL BE OF NO USE. AND NOW THERE SEEMS TO BE AN OPPORTUNITY TO GET RID OF THE PLO WHICH SHAMIR HOPED MCFARLANE COULD EXPL RE. NO ONE SHOULD FORGET THAT THE REASON FOR THE OPERATION IN LEBANON WAS TO GET RID OF THE PLO AND NOT THE SYRIANS. BUT NOW THE TERRORISTS ARE UNDER THE PROTECTION OF THE SY IANS. NONE OF THIS DEPENDS ON WHAT THE LEBANESE SAY. THE LEBANESE ARE A LESS IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THIS EQUATION. QUOTE LEBANON IS THE OBJECT, NOT THE SUBJECT UNQUOTE. ISRAEL IS READY TO HELP THEM BECOME A STRONG GOVERNMENT BUT THE LEBANESE ARE PUTTING OBSTACLES IN THE WAY.

8. MCFARLANE REAFFIRMED HIS CONFIDENCE IN THE LEBANESE PLEDGES OF SUPPORT TO THE AGREEMENT BUT THAT WHAT ISRAEL WANTS NOW WOULD HAVE A QUOTE CATASTROPHIC UNQUOTE AFFECT ON THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO SURVIVE. WHETHER THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL LEAVES AT ALL OR NOT, THE PERCEPTION OF A PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL IS PARTITION. THIS PERCEPTION IS CORROSIVE AND COULD BRING ABOUT THE FALL OF THE GOVERNMENT. THE LEBANESE ARE TRYING HARD TO WORK OUT POLITICAL ARRANGEMENTS WHIC WILL LEAD TO SUCCESSFUL REDEPLOYMENT AND TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY. IF ALL WORK TOGETHER, A PROCESS CAN BE DEVELOPED TO BRING ABOUT THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL THAT WE ALL SEEK. MCFARLANE SAID QUOTE I EXPECT TO BE HERE A LONG TIME. UNQUOTE.

9. SHAMIR ASKED MCFARLANE TO MEET WITH THE INTER-MINISTERIAL GROUP TO DISCUSS DETAILS BUT REAFFIRMED THAT THE PRINCIPLES, AS STATED IN WASHINGTON, WERE CLEAR AND STAND. HE THEN ASKED MCFARLANE WHEN HE WOULD GO TO DAMASCUS. MCFARLANE RESPONDED THAT WE MAY FIRST GO TO JIDDA AND THEN ON TO DAMASCUS THIS WEEKEND. SHAMIR CLOSED BY ASKING MCFARLANE IF HE WOULD SEE PRIME MINISTER BEGIN, PERHAPS TOMORROW. MCFARLANE . AGREED TO IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL. CLUVERIUS

BT

#2794

NNNN

PRESERVATION COPY

VZCZCJMI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUSNNOA RUEHBL
 RUFHFR RUEHLD RUEHRO RUEHTV
 DE RUEHJM #2795/01 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050117Z AUG 83 ZFF6
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6138
 INFO RUEA WW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS / SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEKJCS / JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUSNNOA / USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0149
 RUFHFR / AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE 1628
 RUEHLD / AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE 2998
 RUEHRO / AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 0596
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 1169
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * JERUSALEM 02795

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/3/83
 APPRV: AMB. MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: PDUR
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 HTEICHER
 CROSS
 DISTR: CG
 MCFARLANE-4

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD9-1749/2 #57749

BY RWS NARA DATE 5-3-10

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 JCS FOR J-5

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356; DECL; OADR
 TAGS; PREL, MDPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, FR, IT, UK
 SUBJECT; MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MEETING WITH MNF AMBASSADORS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS TEAM MET FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS WITH MNF AMBASSADORS IN BEIRUT PM 02 AUG AFTER REVIEW OF U.S. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON AND OUTLINE OF CURRENT U.S. STRATEGY FOR OBTAINING WITGDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, MCFARLANE ASKED FOR IMPRESSIONS AND IDEAS OF FRENCH AND ITALIAN AMBASSADORS HENRY AND OTTIERI AND BRITISH CHARGE PALMER. AMBS PROVIDED INSIGHTS AND SUBJECTIVE ANALYSES OF FACTORS BEARING ON LEBANON PROBLEMS GENERATING CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ABOUT IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF MNF. MCFARLANE OUTLINED TENTATIVE THOUGHTS ABOUT POSSIBLE ROLES FOR MNF IN LIGHT OF PLANNED IDF REDEPLOYMENT AND INDICATED NEED FOR CAREFUL COORDINATION AMONG CO-CONTRIBUTORS AND HIS INTENTION TO CONSULT FURTHER IN BOTH BEIRUT AND CAPITALS. MCFARLANE CLOSED MEETING WITH REQUEST FOR AMBASSADORS' IMPRESSIONS OF THE SOVIET ROLE IN SYRIA AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE OF THE MNF FOR DISCUSSION AT HIS NEXT MEETING WITH THEM. END SUMMARY.

3. MCFARLANE SUMMARIZED LATEST U.S. THINKING ABOUT ISRAELI REDEPLNYMENT PLANNING AND LEBANESE REACTIONS, STRESS NG NECESSITY FOR SEEING THIS AS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS CULMINATING IN COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. MCFARLANE OUTLINED U.S. APPROACH TO SYRIA AND

PRESERVATION COPY

THE NEED FOR BOTH INCENTIVES AND PRESSURES. IN THIS REGARD, HE NOTED THAT OUR CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT WOULD LEAVE IDF IN PLACE IN EASTERN LEBANON ADJACENT TO SYRIAN LINES AND SUGGESTED THIS WAS IMPORTANT FORM OF PRESSURE TO INDUCE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE THEN ASKED FOR IMPRESSIONS FROM THE EXPERTS ON THE SCENE AND ESPECIALLY THEIR VIEWS OF WHAT ROLE THE MNF MIGHT PLAY FOLLOWING IDF REDEPLOYMENT NOTING APPARENT CONFUSION WITHIN GOL ABOUT PRECISELY WHAT IS REQUIRED OR DESIRED BY THE LEBANESE.

4. ITALIAN AMBASSADOR SUMMARIZED HIS GOVERNMENT'S IMPRESSIONS ABOUT PROSPECTS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. IN BRIEF, AMBASSADOR OTTIERI EXPLAINED--AS THE ITALIANS HAVE EXPLAINED TO GOL--THAT, FOR TIME BEING, SYRIA APPEARS CONVINCED THAT ASSAD HAS EVERYTHING TO LOSE AND NOTHING TO GAIN BY WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON: HE "OWNS" THE PLO, DOMINATES LEBANESE OPPOSITION FACTIONS, AND USES LEBANON ISSUE TO GALVANIZE SYRIAN AND ARAB PUBLIC OPINION. ITALIAN THINKING IS THAT BY WITHDRAWING FROM LEBANON HE LOSES THESE ADVANTAGES AND JEOPARDIZES HIS DOMESTIC POSITION. OTTIERI THEN PROVIDED HIS IMPRESSIONS OF LEBANESE DESIRES FOR MNF AND CURRENT ITALIAN THINKING. ALTHOUGH EARLIER GOL THINKING SEEMED TO INCLUDE AN MNF PRESENCE IN THE SHOUF, MORE RECENTLY GENERAL TANNOUS HAD INDICATED HE DID NOT WANT AN MNF PRESENCE THERE WHEN ISRAELIS LEAVE. OTTIERI'S THINKING WAS THAT IF THE LAF ANTICIPATED PROBLEMS, THEY DID NOT WANT MNF WITNESSES AS THEY WENT ABOUT SETTLING THEM, PERHAPS FORCIBLY. OTTIERI THEN NOTED DIMINISHING IMPORTANCE OF ALL MNF CONTINGENTS, NOTING THAT WHILE MNF HAD ORIGINALLY "MESMERIZED" LEBANESE BY PRESENCE, EFFECT HAD ERODED OWING TO LARGELY PASSIVE AND ISOLATED FORM OF PRESENCE.

5. THE BRITISH CHARGE PALMER SPOKE NEXT NOTING THAT HMG WAS CONCERNED WITH SYRIAN ABILITY TO INTERVENE IN THE AREAS WHICH THE ISRAELIS PLAN TO VACATE. LONDON IS WONDERING WHETHER WE SAW ANY MILEAGE IN WARNING SYRIANS AGAINST THIS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR HENRY OPENED BY EXPLAINING THAT HE VIEWS PROBLEM OF RESTORING LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AS A PROCESS OF RESOLVING A SERIES OF "LOCAL" PROBLEMS. THE FRENCH VIEW DISCOUNTS PROSPECTS FOR COMPREHENSIVE PLANS. INSTEAD HE POSITED NEED FOR

PRESERVATION COPY

MODIS

GOL TO RESOLVE LOCAL ISSUES AND SUGGESTED THE ISRAELIS HAD TO PROCEED VERY CAREFULLY LEST THESE ISSUES ERUPT INTO VIOLENCE WHICH CONFLAGRATES. HENRY NOTED THAT FIRST GOL "TEST" WILL BE THE SHOUF. HE SAID THAT WHILE GOL PLANNING WAS SKETCHY, THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE TOO LITTLE FEEL FOR WHAT IS GOING ON ON THE GROUND. HIS PRINCIPAL OBSERVATION WAS THAT THE GOL APPEARS CONFUSED AND IS GUARDED ABOUT HOW IT PLANS TO SETTLE ISSUES IN THE SHOUF AND ELSEWHERE, (GEN FARIS ALLEGEDLY TOLD THE FRENCH THAT "ALL THE SCENARIOS" ARE WRONG.) AND THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE INSUFFICIENT INFORMATION FROM OWN SOURCES BECAUSE THEY DON'T GET AROUND THE COUNTRY TO SEE FOR THEMSELVES. THESE TRENDS ARE PROBLEMATIC BECAUSE THE SY IANS ARE UNPREDIBTABLE AND THE MNF COUNTRIES HAVE TOO LITTLE INFORMATION ON WHICH TO PLAN.

6. AMB OTTIERI THEN RAISED TWO ISSUES WHICH HE THINKS WILL REQUIRE URGENT ATTENTION. ONE IS ITALIAN INTELLIGENCE SUGGESTION THAT THE LF WILL NOT DROP ITS MILITARY ORGANIZATION OR DISARM OWING TO ITS DISTRUST OF THE LAF, PESSIMISTIC VIEW OF THE ARMY'S INTEGRITY AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND CHRISTIANS. AMB FAIRBANKS ASKED OTTIERI ABOUT ITALIAN IMPRESSIONS OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAF AND OTTIERI AGREED WITH FAIRBANKS THAT, WHILE THE LAF WAS VASTLY IMPROVED AND MIGHT BE MILITARILY CAPABLE OF HANDLING LOCAL MILITIAS, IT COULD NOT CONFRONT THE SYRIANS. FRENCH AMBASSADOR HENRY CONCURRED NOTING THE ENORMOUS IMPROVEMENTS MADE BY THE SYRIAN ARMY AS THE LAF WAS REBUILDING.

7. OTTIERI ASKED WHAT OUR SENSE WAS OF WHEN THE IDF WOULD BEGIN MOVING AND FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT IT COULD BE "WITHIN A COUPLE OF WEEKS." THE DISCUSSION THEN TURNED TO SYRIAN OBJECTIVES IN LIGHT OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. HENRY THINKS THE SYRIANS WILL REMAIN LONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH LOCAL ORGANIZATIONS LOYAL TO OR SUPPORTIVE OF SARG. HE POSITED THAT RECENT SYRIAN ARMY DEPARTURE FROM TRIPOLI MIGHT BE A PRECEDENT IN THAT MILITIAS LOYAL TO SYRIA HAD REPLACED SYRIAN SOLDIERS. HE NOTED THAT WHILE SARG MAY EVACUATE ITS TROOPS IN FAVOR OF LOCAL SURROGATES, THE PR CESS WILL TAKE TIME. OTTIERI THEN TURNED TO URGENCY OF DEVELOPING A COORDINATED MNF PLAN FOLLOWING ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

8. MCFARLANE OUTLINED TENTATIVE US THINKING ABOUT MNF PRESENCE OUTSIDE BEIRUT WHICH IS BASED ON VERY FAVORABLE IMPRESSION OF LAF CAPABILITIES AND GOL DETERMINATION TO SETTLE LOCAL ISSUES WITHOUT OUTSIDE HELP. MCFARLANE NOTED SOUTH OF BEIRUT BY SHOWING THE FLAG. HE IS INCLINED AGAINST ESTABLISHING A PERMANENT PRESENCE AND MOVE TOWARD PERIODIC MOBILE OPERATIONS ON A REGULAR BASIS. MCFARLANE ALSO SUGGESTED THAT CIVIC ACTION PROGRAMS BY SMALL MNF CADRES MIGHT BE USEFUL. MCFARLANE INQUIRED ABOUT WILLINGNESS OF OTHER COUNTRIES TO UNDERTAKE SIMILAR MEASURES. OTTIERI RESPONDED FIRST BY NOTING THAT ITALIAN MILITARY FAVORS MUCH LARGER MILITARY PRESENCE (INCLUDING

PRESERVATION COPY

TANKS) AND ACTIVE PRESENCE WITH THE LAF IN THE AREAS
VACATED BY IDF. OTTIERI NOTED THAT POLITICAL LEADERS
WERE NOT ENTHUSIASTIC SUPPORTERS OF THIS APPROACH. WHILE
NOTING THAT THE 2000-MAN ITALIAN CONTINGENT IS A FINANCIAL
BURDEN ON ITALY. ITALY IS INCLINED TO MAINTAIN THE FORCE
AT STRENGTH IF WE CAN DEFINE AN MNF MISSION WHICH
WARRANTS THE EXPENSE. FRONCH AMBASSADOR HENRY ADDED THAT
IF THE MNF WAS NEEDED OUTSIDE BEIRUT TO VERIFY IDF
REDEPLNYMENT AND THE REASSERTION OF GOL AUTHORITY, THAT
MISSION COULD BE PERFORMED BY MNF "OBSERVERS." HE ASKED
GROUP TO CONSIDER WHETHER MNF PRESENCE SHOULD BE
MILITARILY EFFECTIVE OR SIMPLY SYMBOLIC. IF THE FORMER
IS THE PREFERENCE, HE IMPLIED THE MNF SHOULD NOT REMAIN
GARRISONED IN BEIRUT. IF THE LATTER WAS THE CHOICE,
THE MNF COULD BE GREATLY REDUCED TO A FORCE OF "OBSERVERS"

PRESERVATION COPY

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02795

NODIS

FOR THE SHOUF AND BEYOND.

9. MCFARLANE FOLLOWED UP THESE LAST POINTS BY RAISING TWO PROBLEMS FOR CONSIDERATION AT HIS NEXT MEETING WITH AMBASSADORS. HE ASKED HOW THEY REGARDED THE SOVIET ROLE IN SYRIA AND ITS EFFECT ON SYRIAN SENSITIVITIES AND HOW THEY THINK THE SOVIETS AND SYRIANS PERCEIVE THE MNF IN ITS CURRENT DISPOSITION.

10. MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS PLAN TO MEET WITH AMBASSADORS DURING NEXT VISIT TO BEIRUT. BY THAT TIME WE HOPE TO CLARIFY GOL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MNF AND SUBMIT FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS. CLUVERIUS

RT

#2795

NNNN

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 JERUSALEM 02795

PRESERVATION COPY

57750

A

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

JERUSALEM 2796

VZCZCJMI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHDM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHDT
 DE RUEHJM #2796/01 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050141Z AUG 83 ZFF6
 FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6141
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 3704
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0152
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 9539
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 6238
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 3764
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 1829
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 7103
 BT

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/3/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: PDUR
 CLEAR: RMC FARLANE
 DISTR: CONGEN; MCFARLANE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * JERUSALEM 02796

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM AMB MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: AUGUST 3 MEETING
 WITH ARENS

REF: JERUSALEM 2794

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND LEWIS, DATT AND CDR DUR MET 3 AUGUST WITH DEFENSE MINISTER MOSHE ARENS, CHIEF OF STAFF GEN LEVY, AMB LUBRANI, DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE M/G BARAK FOR ONE AND ONE-HALF HOURS AT MCD IN TEL AVIV. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH DESCRIPTION OF GOL POSITIONS AND THINKING BEHIND THEM. HE THEN STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE USG ATTACHES TO BOLSTERING PROSPECTS FOR GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT AND EXTENSION OF ITS AUTHORITY BEYOND BEIRUT. MCFARLANE STRESSED GOL'S NEED FOR TIMELINES OR APPROXIMATE BOUNDS FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL TO GIVE APPEARANCE THAT FIRST PHASE WAS THE BEGINNING OF A CONTINUOUS PROCESS. ARENS RESPONDED WITH ARGUMENTS ABOUT IMPORTANCE GOI ATTACHES TO EXCHANGE OF RATIFICATION INSTRUMENTS AND DIRECT, FREQUENT EXCHANGES WITH THE GOL AS CONDITIONS FOR FURTHER REDEPLOYMENTS. MCFARLANE EXPLAINED LEBANESE POSITIONS ON EACH OF THESE POINTS AND STRESSED THE GROWING LEBANESE MISTRUST OF GOI INTENTIONS. ARENS AND GEN LEVY REFUTED LEBANESE ALLEGATIONS OF ULTERIOR ISRAELI MOTIVES AND AGAIN STRESSED URGENT NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS OR NEGOTIATIONS TO REDUCE MISTRUST. END SUMMARY.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MDR-09/2 #57750
 BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-10

PRESERVATION COPY

A

~~SECRET~~/NODIS

JERUSALEM 2796

3. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH PRESENTATION SIMILAR TO THAT GIVEN TO FOREIGN MINISTER SHAMIR IN MORNING MEETING (SEE REFTTEL), RECOUNTING GOL CONCEPT OF REDEPLOYMENT AS A CONTINUOUS PROCESS WITHIN DEFINED TIME LIMITS AND FIRM GOL RESPONSE TO ISRAELI REQUESTS FOR EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION AND FORMAL DEMANDS FOR SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL. MCFARLANE SUMMARIZED BY SAYING THAT THERE WAS A FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENT IN STRATEGY BETWEEN THE GOL AND THE GOI ALTHOUGH BOTH SHARED THE SAME OBJECTIVES OF OBTAINING ISRAELI AND SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND STRENGTHENING THE AUTHORITY AND CONTROL OF THE GOL.

4. ARENS BEGAN HIS RESPONSE BY NOTING THAT ISRAEL SEES PROBLEMS THAT MUST BE OVERCOME BEFORE PROGRESS CAN BE MADE ON GOL REQUESTS. FOREMOST IS THE NEED FOR A PROMPT EXCHANGE OF THE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION. ARENS EXPRESSED SERIOUS CONCERN OVER LEBANESE MOTIVES IN QUOTE ABORTING UNQUOTE RATIFICATION PROCESS AND PERSISTENT REFUSAL TO COORDINATE ON IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM SHOUF. ARENS WONDERED RHETORICALLY IF THIS MEANT THAT GOL THOUGHT IT COULD PERSUADE ISRAEL NOT TO REDEPLOY; IF THIS OBSTINACY WAS A FORM OF PRESSURE. ARENS STRESSED NEED FOR AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS SO THAT GOI CAN UNDERSTAND AND ATTEMPT TO SATISFY LEBANESE CONCERNS. HE NOTED POINTEDLY THAT GOL SPOKESMEN ARE PROMOTING A SELF FULFILLING PROPHECY ABOUT THE IMMINENCE OF PARTITION FOLLOWING IDF REDEPLOYMENT, BECAUSE ISRAEL QUOTE HAS NO ONE TO TALK TO UNQUOTE ABOUT NEXT STEPS.

5. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT LEBANESE RELUCTANCE TO EXCHANGE INSTRUMENTS OF RATIFICATION STEMMED FROM THE FRAGILITY OF THE GOL AND A PERCEPTION THAT THE GEMAYEL GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO GAIN STRENGTH AND PUT PRESSURE ON SYRIA WITH THE REMAINDER OF THE ARAB WORLD. LEBANESE INSIST THAT EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS CANNOT THEREFORE TAKE PLACE UNTIL COMMITMENT EXISTS FOR COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL ACCORDING TO THE SCHEDULE INCLUDED IN THE AGREEMENT AND REQUIREMENT EXPRESSED IN SIDE LETTER. GOL OPPOSES PUBLIC CONSULTATIONS AND NEGOTIATIONS WITH GOI BECAUSE THE CONTEXT OF IDF REDEPLOYMENT FROM THE SHOUF IS TOO NARROW. MOREOVER, ISRAELI DECISION IS SEEN AS UNILATERAL. ARENS REJOINED THAT ISRAEL HAS

NODIS

CONSISTENTLY SOUGHT TO NEGOTIATE AND COORDINATE THIS REDEPLOYMENT.

6. MCFARLANE THEN DESCRIBED THE SOURCES OF LEBANESE ANXIETY INCLUDING: (1) THE PROBLEMS IN THE SHUF, E.G., LEBANESE ALLEGATIONS THAT IDF IS ACQUIESCING IN ARMS TRANSFERS FROM SYRIA TO DRUZE MILITIA AS REPORTED BY BOTH LEBANESE AND MNF SOURCES; (2) COMPLAINTS THAT ISRAEL IS DEALING WITH CONFESSORIAL FACTIONS; AND, (3) MNF AND LEBANESE ACCOUNTS OF ISRAELI STOCKS AND SUPPLIES MOVING NORTH FROM ISRAEL. TAKEN TOGETHER, HE SAID, THESE IMPRESSIONS, HOWEVER ERRONEOUS OR UNFOUNDED, CREATE GRAVE CONCERNS. HE STRESSED NEED FOR A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE BASED ON PROCESS AND CLEAR PROGRESS TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL. ARENS PROPOSED THAT ISRAEL AND LEBANON RATIFY AGREEMENT AND ESTABLISH A DIALOGUE BASED ON SYRIAN OBSTINACY AND QUOTE URGENT CONSULTATION UNQUOTE CLAUSE CONTAINED IN ISRAELI-U.S. SIDE LETTER. MCFARLANE REITERATED LEBANESE INSISTENCE ON MORE CONCRETE ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAWAL AS CONDITION FOR THIS DIALOGUE STRESSING HIS BELIEF THAT, GIVEN FRAGILITY OF LEBANESE CONSENSUS, THE CONDITION WAS NOT UNREASONABLE. ARENS NOTED THAT LEBANESE SEEMED PREOCCUPIED WITH DATES (QUOTE WINDOW DRESSING UNQUOTE) WHEN THEY HAVE MORE IMPORTANT EVIDENCE OF ISRAELI INTENTIONS, QUOTE THE WILL OF THE ISRAELI BODY POLITIC UNQUOTE WHICH IS COMMITTED TO WITHDRAWAL. FAIRBANKS REFERRED TO GOL CONCERNS ABOUT QUOTE FROZEN LINES UNQUOTE ON THE GROUND AND THE APPEARANCES OF PARTITION. HE SAID THE GOL BADLY NEEDS QUOTE WINDOW DRESSING UNQUOTE TO HOLD THE CONSENSUS TOGETHER.

7. ARENS RETURNED TO THE NEED FOR A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH LEBANESE AND AN EXCHANGE OF INSTRUMENTS. FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT GOI SHOULD MAKE AN EFFORT TO SEE PROBLEM FROM LEBANON'S PERSPECTIVE. LEBANON SEES ITSELF AS HAVING MADE MAJOR CONCESSIONS IN THE AGREEMENT AND THAT ABSENT CERTAIN ISRAELI COMMITMENT TO COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL, IT WOULD NOT GET WHAT IT BARGAINED FOR. HE NOTED THAT THE SIDE LETTER TO WHICH ARENS REFERRED WAS NOT PART OF THE AGREEMENT AND THAT THE AGREEMENT ENVISIONED COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL WITHIN TWELVE WEEKS.

8. ARENS CLOSED MEETING STRESSING URGENCY OF CONSULTATION REFERRING TO ISRAELI DRUZE ACCOUNTS THAT LEBANESE DRUZE ARE QUOTE ARMING THEMSELVES TO THE TEETH UNQUOTE AND THAT THEY ARE PRESENTLY DISPOSED TO FIGHT THE CHRISTIANS. GEN. LEVY DENIED ALLEGATIONS THAT ISRAEL IS EITHER ACQUIESCING IN THE ARMING OF THE DRUZE (ABSURD) OR MOVING PREPOSITIONED STOCKS TO THE SHUF (THEY ARE MOVING SOUTH).

9. COMMENT: IT BECAME CLEAR DURING SESSION WITH ARENS THAT GOI TIMING FOR REDEPLOYMENT (SIX-EIGHT WEEKS) IS PREDICATED SIMPLY ON POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS. (IN A SIDE CONVERSATION, GEN LEVY NOTED THAT IDF COULD REDEPLOY TO AWWALI FROM POSITIONS IN SHOUF QUOTE WITHIN

PRESERVATION COPY

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02796

TEN HOURS UNQUOTE. ASSUMING 15 OCTOBER DEADLINE, THIS
GIVES US A BETTER FEEL FOR HOW LONG WE MAY HAVE BEFORE THE
IDF WOULD HAVE TO BEGIN MOVING BACK.

CLUVERIUS

BT

#2796

NNNN

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 02 JERUSALEM 02796

PRESERVATION COPY

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8531

VZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHDM RUEHC RUEHJI RUEHTV RUEADWW

DE RUEHBL #8531 217 **

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 050304Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0758

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2048

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0543

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0712

RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08531

CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG 8/4/83

APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE

TD: RFAIRBANKS

CLEAR: NONE

DISTR: MCFARLANE -5 AMB

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE

REF: (A) DAMASCUS 5907; (B) JERUSALEM 2791

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS INDICATED IN REFTEL B, OUR PRIMARY PURPOSE IN VISITING DAMASCUS IS TO HAVE SERIOUS, DETAILED AND HOPEFULLY PRIVATE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD. THUS, WHILE WE HAVE NO PROBLEM IN MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT SCHEDULED AUGUST 7, PER REFTEL (A), WOULD STRONGLY PREFER RELATIVELY SHORT AND TIME-LIMITED ENCOUNTER WITH FONMIN KHADDAM. THEREFORE, REQUEST YOU ALTER SCHEDULE (USING EXCUSE OF MEETINGS SCHEDULED HERE AS NECESSARY) TO LIMIT DIRECT ENCOUNTER WITH KHADDAM TO ONE MEETING. IF, IN YOUR JUDGMENT, WORKING LUNCHEON IS THE BEST FORUM, WILL PLAN TO ARRIVE IN TIME FOR THAT. WOULD PREFER A MEETING LATE AFTERNOON AUGUST 6 INSTEAD.

3. ACTION REQUESTED: PLEASE ADVISE FINAL PLANS MOST FEASIBLE FROM YOUR PERSPECTIVE. DILLON

BT

#8531

NNNN

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8531

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-0081 #83

CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/06

(05) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

K 1VZCZCBL0420
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHDM #5907 2160930
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 040928Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0654
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5627
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3086
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6452
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8510
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8258
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0379
BT

LOC: DISK 08 790
04 AUG 83 0931
CN: 05832
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 05907

NODIS

BEIRUT/JERUSALEM FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT TO DAMASCUS

REF: JERUSALEM 2791

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PER REFTTEL, AMBASSADOR AND A/DCM MET WITH DR. SAMI GLAIEL, SYRIAN FOREIGN MINISTRY DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN AFFAIRS, AT 0900 HOURS LOCAL, AUGUST 4 TO DISCUSS ARRANGEMENTS FOR MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION VISIT TO DAMASCUS. WE REQUESTED AUGUST 6 MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD AS EARLY AS CONVENIENT AND SUGGESTED MEETING AND/OR WORKING LUNCH WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM. WE NOTED MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS REQUIREMENT TO DEPART FOR SAUDI ARABIA ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 7. GLAIEL SAID HE WOULD CONSULT IMMEDIATELY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM AND GET BACK TO US WITH SYRIAN RESPONSE.
3. GLAIEL CONTACTED US AT 1100 HOURS AUGUST 4 AND SAID KHADDAM WELCOMES MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS AUGUST 6-7 VISIT TO DAMASCUS. PRESIDENT ASSAD NOT REPEAT NOT AVAILABLE FOR MEETING UNTIL SUNDAY, AUGUST 7. KHADDAM PLEASSED TO MEET WITH MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS ON MORNING AUGUST 6 AND ACCEPTED INVITATION FOR WORKING LUNCH THAT DAY AT AMBASSADOR'S RESIDENCE.
4. WE ASSUME AUGUST 7 MEETING WITH ASSAD WILL BE SCHEDULED FOR MID/LATE MORNING, BUT AS IS THEIR USUAL PRACTICE, SYRIANS WILL NOT CONFIRM SPECIFIC TIME UNTIL VERY LAST MINUTE.
5. WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU ACCEPT SCHEDULE AS OUTLINED ABOVE. SARG IS AWAITING CONFIRMATION, SO PLEASE ADVISE

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1284
BY 107 NARA, DATE 11/17/02

~~S E C R E T~~/NODIS

DAMASCUS 005907

SOONEST.

6. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

BT
#5907

NNNN.

~~S E C R E T~~/NODIS

DAMASCUS 005907

Chrom

57755

~~SECRET~~

PROG 8/3/83
AMB MCFARLANE
RFAIRBANKS
RMCFARLANE
CONGEN; MCFARLANE-4

RCM
RF

AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
SECSTATE WASHDC, NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS, NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT, NIACT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY JIDDA, NIACT IMMEDIATE
INFO, AMEMBASSY CAIRO, IMMEDIATE
WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV, IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.:12356

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: TENTATIVE TRAVEL
PLANS

REF: DAMASCUS 5888

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. PRESENTLY PLANNED FOLLOWING ONWARD TRAVEL FROM ISRAEL:
DEPART ISRAEL FOR BEIRUT APPROXIMATELY 1330 LOCAL 4 AUG.;
DEPART BEIRUT FOR DAMASCUS EARLY A.M. SATURDAY, 6 AUG.
(TIME CONTINGENT UPON MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS); DEPART
DAMASCUS FOR SAUDI ARABIA SUNDAY, 7 AUG. (TIME AND DESTINA-
TION IN COUNTRY CONTINGENT UPON MEETINGS IN DAMASCUS AND
LOCATION OF KING FAHD).
3. FOR DAMASCUS: PLEASE SEEK MEETING WITH PRESIDENT
ASSAD AS EARLY AS CONVENIENT ON SATURDAY, 6 AUG. BRIEF
SEPARATE MEETING OR MEAL WITH FONMIN KHADDAM PER
YOUR ADVICE. PLEASE ARRANGE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATIONS
FOR THE FOLLOWING TRAVELING PARTY:

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR m08-099/2 #57755
BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-10

~~DECLASSIFIED~~
NLS F98-008/1 #85
BY KJ NARA DATE 11/5/02

SECRET

- ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, X156488, WASHDC, 8/27/81,
D/POB: WASHDC USA, JUL 12, 1937
- JONDA R. MCFARLANE, X190662, WASHDC, 7/27/83,
D/POB: MARYLAND USA, DEC 8, 1938
- RICHARD M. FAIRBANKS, X170061, WASHDC, 5/15/82,
D/POB: INDIANA USA, FEB 10, 1941
- PATSY B. MEYER, X165534, WASHDC, 2/11/82,
D/POB: GEORGIA USA, OCT 26, 1939
- CHRISTOPHER ROSS, X178968, WASHDC, 9/9/82,
D/POB: ECUADOR, MAR 3, 1943
- JAMES M. CROWE (SY), X190641, WASHDC, 7/26/83,
D/POB: TENNESSEE USA, AUG 27, 1949
- DAVID HAAS (SY), X190642, WASHDC, 7/26/83,
D/POB: NEW YORK USA, DEC 16, 1951
- WILMA G. HALL, X190667, WASHDC, 7/27/83,
D/POB: NORTH CAROLINA USA, JUL 3, 1940
- PHILIP DUR, X190663, WASHDC, 7/27/83,
D/POB: MARYLAND USA, 22 JUN 1944
- HOWARD TEICHER, X190660, WASHDC, 7/27/83
D/POB: MASSACHUSETTS USA, 9 MAY 1954

4. RE REFTTEL PARA (4), ALL MEMBERS OF PARTY HAVE SYRIAN VISAS EXCEPT REPEAT EXCEPT ROSS. ENTIRE PARTY WILL ARRIVE AND DEPART VIA USG AIRCRAFT.

5. REFTTEL PARA (8) FOR SECURITY AGENTS CROWE AND HAAS, WEAPONS INFORMATION FOLLOWS: CROWE-WEAPON: BARETTA 92SB, 9MM, SN B75794Z; HAAS-WEAPON: COLT 45 GOVT. MODEL, SN 70G97460.

6. FOR JIDDA: PLEASE SEEK MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR ON SUNDAY P.M., 7 AUGUST, AND SUBSEQUENT MEETING WITH THE KING. PLAN TO OVERNIGHT IN APPROPRIATE SAUDI CITY AND RETURN TO BEIRUT MONDAY A.M., 8 AUGUST. PLEASE ARRANGE APPROPRIATE ACCOMMODATIONS FOR EVENING. PARTY WILL BE SAME AS DAMASCUS AND ALL HAVE SAUDI VISAS WITH EXCEPTION OF ROSS.

7. FOR DAMASCUS AND JIDDA: WILL NEED THREE CARS AND ONE BAGGAGE VAN ON ARRIVAL AND ASSISTANCE IN BAGGAGE HANDLING. ALSO PASS TO RSO: COORDINATE WITH LOCAL SERVICE.
CLUVERIUS##

OUT

SECRET/NODIS

BEIRUT 8532

VZGZCBLI *

OO RUEHAM RUEHJI RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHDM RUEHTV
RUEHJM

DE RUEHBL #8532 217 **

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 050310Z AUG 83 ZFF4

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0569

RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 0544

INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2049

RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0759

RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0713

RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0691

BT

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08532

CLASS: SECRET

CHRG: PROG 8/4/83

APPRV: AMBMCFARLANE

DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS

CLEAR: RMCFARLANE

DISTR: MCFARLANE (5)

AMB

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY AND CHARGE DJEREJIAN
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT SCHEDULE

REF: JIDDA 6283

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. CONCUR WITH YOUR SUGGESTION OF MEETING WITH KING
FAHD MONDAY. SUNDAY WILL BE FULL INDEED. WOULD PREFER
MEETING WITH BANDAR WELL PRIOR TO MEETING WITH KING.
WOULD BE PREPARED TO OVERNIGHT MONDAY EVENING IF
NECESSARY.

3. FOR AMMAN: AM CONSIDERING STOP IN AMMAN AFTER
JIDDA BOTH TO BRIEF KING HUSSEIN ON THE STATUS OF MY
MISSION CONCERNING LEBANON AND TO COUNSEL WITH HIM ON THE
QUESTIONS OF THE FUTURE OF THE PLO AND THE PROSPECTS
FOR THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS GENERALLY. AS YOU CAN SEE
FROM FOREGOING, TENTATIVE ARRIVAL IN AMMAN WOULD BE
LATE MONDAY EVENING OR TUESDAY MORNING. WOULD APPRECIATE
YOUR VIEWS ON PRACTICALITY OF STOP SOONEST. DILLON

BT

#8532

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

NNNN

OUT

SECRET/NODIS

BEIRUT 8532

(09) ACTION ROSS INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

HTGVZCZCBLO433

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6283 2161057

ZNY SSSSS ZZH

O 041056Z AUG 83

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0174

INFO RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 3159

RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 1945

RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 6432

RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075

RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 3502

RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 6191

RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06283

LOC: DISK 08 851

04 AUG 83 1121

CN: 05845

CHRG: PROG

DIST: ROSS

NODIS

FOR MCFARLANE

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT TO SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A) JERUSALEM 2791 B) DAMASCUS 5907

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. IN LIGHT DAMASCUS REFTTEL, I PROPOSE WE SEEK MEETING WITH FAHD FOR MONDAY MORNING INSTEAD OF SUNDAY. SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT YOU WILL LEAVE DAMASCUS PRIOR TO LATE SUNDAY AFTERNOON. FLIGHT TO TAIF WOULD BE APPROXIMATELY TWO AND ONE-HALF HOURS. YOU WILL HAVE HAD LONG SESSION WITH ASSAD AND BE READY FOR REST HERE ON ARRIVAL, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY MEETING WITH BANDAR. THIS WOULD HAVE ADVANTAGE OF LETTING BANDAR BRIEF FAHD BEFORE YOUR MEETING FOLLOWING DAY.

3. SINCE FAHD ROUTINELY MEETS WITH COUNCIL OF MINISTERS ON MONDAY EVENINGS WE COULD EXPECT SESSION WITH HIM ABOUT NOON ON MONDAY GETTING YOU BACK TO BEIRUT AROUND 1800 HOURS.

4. FOREGOING FOR YOUR REACTION BEFORE I APPROACH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY WHO KNOWS ONLY THAT YOU PLAN ARRIVE TAIF LATE SUNDAY. FAHD MAY PREFER LATE NIGHT MEETING SUNDAY.

MURPHY

BT

#6283

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/97

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM POL ROSS PM CHRON

JOCHVZCZGBL0559
 OO RUEHBL
 DE RUEHC #9818 2170723
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 050404Z AUG 83
 FM SECSTATE WASHDC
 TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9165
 INFO RUEADWW/ WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8792
 RUEKJCS/ SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0876
 RUEKJCS/ JCS WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8260
 BT
~~SECRET~~ STATE 219818

LOC: DISK 09 354
 05 AUG 83 0731
 CN: 05966
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: POL

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MASS, PREL, LE, US
 SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL

1. ~~(S)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. PLEASE PASS THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN, DATED 8/4/83, TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. NO REPEAT NO SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW.
3. BEGIN TEXT:

HIS EXCELLENCY AMIN GEMAYEL
 PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF LEBANON
 BEIRUT, LEBANON

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:

AS A RESULT OF YOUR RECENT VISIT TO WASHINGTON, I AM PLEASED TO INFORM YOU THAT WE HAVE TAKEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION ON EACH OF YOUR INITIATIVES TO BETTER PREPARE THE LEBANESE ARMY FOR THE MONTHS AHEAD. THE FIRST IS THE IMMEDIATE APPROVAL TO SELL 68 M-48A5 TANKS TO THE LEBANESE ARMY, AS YOU REQUESTED. IN ORDER TO MAKE THESE

TANKS AVAILABLE TO YOUR FORCES, WE HAVE HAD TO REMOVE THEM FROM ACTIVE UNITS OF THE U.S. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD. BECAUSE THE TANKS ARE NEEDED URGENTLY, THEY WILL NOT BE NEWLY REFURBISHED AS WERE THE 34 TANKS PROVIDED EARLIER THIS YEAR. THEY WILL, ;OWEVER, MEET THE U.S. ARMY STANDARD FOR FULLY OPERATIONAL TANKS. WE HAVE FORMALLY NOTIFIED THE U.S. CONGRESS TODAY OF THIS PLANNED SALE, AND WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO DELIVER THE TANKS BEFORE THE END OF SEPTEMBER. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE WILL BE IN CONTACT WITH YOUR STAFF TO MAKE THE NECESSARY ARRANGEMENTS TO EXPEDITE DELIVERY OF THE TANKS TO LEBANON.

OUR SECOND INITIATIVE IS THE ADDITION OF MORE CAPABLE RADAR IN THE UNITED STATES CONTINGENT OF THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT. INFORMATION DERIVED FROM THESE RADARS WILL BE PROVIDED TO LEBANESE AUTHORITIES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ONGOING INTELLIGENCE EXCHANGE

07 - CL NLS #86
 DECLASSIFIED
 F98-0081-#86
 NARA, DATE 4/19/96

PRESERVATION COPY

ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN US.

IN ADDITION, WE ARE NOW IMPLEMENTING PROGRAMS TO DELIVER M16 RIFLES AND AMMUNITION AND PROTECTIVE VESTS ON A HIGHLY ACCELERATED SCHEDULE. WE WILL ALSO DISPATCH TOMORROW THE AIR FORCE SURVEY TEAM YOU REQUESTED.

BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON CAN BE VERY PROUD OF THE EXTREMELY POSITIVE RESULTS OF OUR MUTUAL EFFORTS TO EQUIP AND TRAIN THE LEBANESE ARMY. VERY SOON, THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES WILL EXTEND THE SOVEREIGN AUTHORITY OF YOUR GOVERNMENT TO AREAS WHICH HAVE BEEN OCCUPIED BY EXTERNAL FORCES. MANY MORE OF LEBANON'S PEOPLE WILL BENEFIT FROM YOUR STRONG AND WISE LEADERSHIP, AND THEY WILL PRIDE THEMSELVES IN THE PROFESSIONALISM OF THE LEBANESE ARMY, WHICH UNITES ALL OF LEBANON'S COMMUNITIES IN THE GREATER CAUSE OF LEBANON.

YOU MAY BE ASSURED OF MY SUPPORT AND BEST WISHES IN THE MONTHS AHEAD, AS WE STRIVE TOGETHER TO GIVE ALL OF LEBANON BACK TO ITS PEOPLE.

SINCERELY,
RONALD REAGAN

END TEXT.

4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT

#9818

NNNN

Handwritten notes:
Shultz
128 (201) 2273
128 (201) 2273
128 (201) 2273
128 (201) 2273

PRESERVATION COPY

8573

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION
PROG 8/5/83

CHARGE DATE
CWSROSS

BY
CWSROSS

ORIGINATION
AMB. MCFARLANE (SUBSTANCE)

TRANSIT (4) AMB

ORIGINATOR

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

ACTION ADDRESSEE, PRECEDENCE

AMEMBASSY JIDDA, NIACT IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

JIDDA FOR AMB. MURPHY
DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BANDAR TRIP

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. NEITHER WADI' HADDAD NOR I HAS RECEIVED ANY WORD FROM BANDAR ON THE TIMING AND FORMAT OF BANDAR'S PROJECTED VISIT TO BEIRUT. HADDAD HAS BEEN MAKING FREQUENT ATTEMPTS TO TELEPHONE BANDAR WITHOUT SUCCESS. THIS HAS ME PERSONALLY VERY CONCERNED, AND I REQUEST THAT YOU GET IN TOUCH WITH BANDAR IMMEDIATELY TO DISCOVER HIS INTENTIONS.

3. IN DOING SO, YOU MAY POINT OUT THAT I WILL BE OUT OF BEIRUT BY EARLY SATURDAY AFTERNOON, AND HE COULD THEREFORE COME UP HERE WITHOUT RISKING ANOTHER "TRIPARTITE CONSULATION" STORY EITHER LATE SATURDAY OR SUNDAY.

4. I WOULD VERY MUCH LIKE A RESPONSE FROM BANDAR BY THIS EVENING. DILLON##

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 198-008/1-#87

CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/06

*Follow-up callow:
Jidida 6287 (0518172)
Jidida 6316 (0613222)*

INITIALS
AUTH

CWSR
DRAFTER

RMCF
I CLEAR.

2
3
4
5

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHFO RUEHC RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEKJCS RUFQJQ
 DE RUEHEL #8572 217 **
 ZNR UUUUU ZZH
 O 051416Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHFO / USINFO WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2069
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0572
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0530
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0765
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0694
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0547
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0490
 RUEKJCS / SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUFQJQ / COMSIXTHFLT IMMEDIATE

CLASS: UNCLASSIFIED
 CHRGE: PROG 8/5/83
 APPRV: USIS:JMREID
 DRFTD: USIS:JMREID:DLP
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: USIS AMB DCM
 POL ROSS-4 P-M
 CHERON

BT

UNCLAS BEIRUT 08572

SECSTATE FOR NEA/ARD; COMSIXTHFLT FOR PAO

MCFARLANE STATEMENT

FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A PRESS STATEMENT BY U.S. ENVOY ROBERT MCFARLANE AFTER HIS ONE AND A QUARTER HOUR MEETING WITH LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN, FRIDAY MORNING, AUGUST 5:

(BEGIN TEXT) IT'S WITH CONSIDERABLE HUMILITY BUT EQUALLY DETERMINATION THAT I'VE ARRIVED IN BEIRUT TO UNDERTAKE A MISSION THAT I'M TO CARRY ON THE EFFORTS OF MY COUNTRY TO ADVANCE THE PROCESS OF PEACE IN LEBANON AND THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. I'M HERE (INAUDIBLE) AN EXPRESSION OF PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DETERMINATION TO LEND THE FULL WEIGHT OF UNITED STATES RESOURCES, DIPLOMACY AND ALL OTHER EFFORTS WHICH CAN CONTRIBUTE TO ADVANCING THE CAUSE OF STABILITY AND PEACE IN LEBANON. I'VE BEEN HERE A SHORT TIME. IN THAT SHORT TIME, TWO OR THREE THINGS ARE VERY APPARENT. FOREMOST AMONG THESE IS THE EXTRA-ORDINARY RESILIENCY AND DETERMINATION OF THE LEBANESE PEOPLE TO RESTORE THEIR COUNTRY, TO GET ON WITH THE PROCESS OF MAKING A BETTER WAY OF LIFE FOR THEIR PEOPLE. IN ADDITION TO THE STRENGTH AND DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE, IT IS VERY APPARENT THAT THE LEADERSHIP PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IS A LEADERSHIP CONCERNED FOR ALL OF LEBANON; A LEADERSHIP DETERMINED TO PROVIDE A BETTER WAY OF LIFE FOR THEIR PEOPLE THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY -- FOR ALL OF THE PEOPLE. IT IS EQUALLY CLEAR THAT FOR THIS PROCESS TO GET STARTED AND SUCCEED, WE MUST ACHIEVE THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL THE FOREIGN FORCES NOW IN LEBANON. THIS IS A PRO FORMA PRIORITY AND IT IS A TASK TO WHICH I WILL BE DEVOTING MY EFFORTS WITH THE DELEGATION, IN COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, THE PRIME MINISTER AND OTHER OFFICIALS HERE IN LEBANON. I MUST SAY THAT TO THE EXTENT THAT THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCEEDING ARE INFLUENCED BY THE DETERMINATION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THIS GOVERNMENT, I'M VERY ENCOURAGED. TO

PRESERVATION COPY

UNCLASSIFIED

BEIRUT 8571

THE EXTENT THAT THERE WILL BE A PRODUCT OF THE DETERMINATION OF THIS GOVERNMENT TO SUCCEED, AND YES, TO TAKE RISKS, I'M VERY ENCOURAGED. I DON'T MINIMIZE THE JOB. THERE HAS TO BE A WILLINGNESS ON THE PART OF OTHERS, OTHER COUNTRIES -- ISRAEL, SYRIA, THE PALESTINIAN COMMUNITY ALSO TO TAKE RISKS (INAUDIBLE) AND IN THE UNITED STATES. BEARING THIS IN MIND, I ANTICIPATE GOING TO SYRIA TOMORROW, TO MAKE VISITS TO OTHER CAPITALS IN THE MIDDLE EAST; TO SEEK THE ADVICE AND COUNCIL OF THE LEADERSHIP OF THESE COUNTRIES, AND TO PRESS ON WITH DETERMINATION WITH THE ABSOLUTE COMMITMENT OF THE UNITED STATES TO SUCCEED. REID

BT

#8572

NNNN

UNCLASSIFIED

BEIRUT 8571

PRESERVATION COPY

ZCBLI *
 RUEHDM RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHJI RUEHTV
 RUEHBL #8575 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 O 051553Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 0768
 INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2073
 RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0551
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0719
 BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08575

CLASS: ~~SECRET~~
 CHRGE: PROG< 8/5/83
 APPRV: RMCFARLANE
 TD: RFAIRBANKS
 CLEAR: RMCFARLANE
 DISTR: AMB
 MCFARLANE-5

NODIS

FOR AMBASSADOR PAGANELLI
 DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE

REF: DAMASCUS 5946

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SCHEDULE REFTTEL SOUNDS FINE. WILL PLAN TO ARRIVE DAMASCUS AIRPORT APPROXIMATELY 1700 HOURS LOCAL. WILL CONFIRM PRECISE PLANS THROUGH DAO CHANNEL.
3. RE MEETING WITH ASSAD, I WOULD PREFER THE OPPORTUNITY FOR BOTH A SMALL GROUP MEETING WITH MY TEAM PLUS HIS ADVISORS AND A ONE-ON-ONE WITH ASSAD PLUS INTERPRETER. I WOULD LIKE TWO HOURS FOR PRIVATE MEETING; IF IT IS EITHER/OR THE PRIVATE MEETING IS MOST CRUCIAL.

DILLON
 BT
 #8575

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/97

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AME PM CHRON

NPJAAVZCZCBL0563
00 RUEHBL
DE RUEHDM #5946 2170741
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 050740Z AUG 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

LOC: DISK 09 372
05 AUG 83 0746
CN: 05969
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

TO RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA NIACT IMMEDIATE 6457
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0657
INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3099
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8262
RUEADWW/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
BT
~~S E C R E T~~ DAMASCUS 05946

NODIS

FOR MCFARLANE FROM PAGANELLI

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, SA, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: DAMASCUS SCHEDULE

REF: BEIRUT 8531

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. REFTEL RECEIVED AT OPENING OF BUSINESS AUGUST 5.
3. IN LINE WITH YOUR WISHES, WE CONTACTED KHADDAM'S OFFICE DIRECTOR AT 0900 AUGUST 5 TO REQUEST A LATE AFTERNOON MEETING FOR SATURDAY, AUGUST 6 AND TO REITERATE OUR REQUEST THAT YOUR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD ON SUNDAY, AUGUST 7 BE SCHEDULED DURING THE MORNING.
4. KHADDAM'S OFFICE DIRECTOR WAS ABLE TO REACH THE MINISTER IMMEDIATELY, AND WE HAVE A CONFIRMED APPOINTMENT FOR YOU FOR 1800 LOCAL SATURDAY, AUGUST 6 AT THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. (WE HAVE CANCELLED THE WORKING LUNCH WE HAD PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED FOR AUGUST 6.)
5. IF YOU WISH TO SPEAK WITH ASSAD ONE-ON-ONE (PLUS ASSAD'S INTERPRETER), I WILL MAKE THE REQUEST. IF, HOWEVER, YOU INTEND TO INCLUDE OTHER MEMBERS OF YOUR TEAM IN THE ASSAD MEETING, HE WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY INCLUDE KHADDAM. IN FACT, DURING MY ALMOST TWO YEARS HERE, ASSAD INCLUDED KHADDAM IN EVERY MEETING WITH YOUR PREDECESSOR.
6. AS YOU KNOW, ASSAD MAKES ALL FINAL DECISIONS, BUT KHADDAM IS A TRUSTED CONFIDANT AND COUNSELOR. THE TWO MEN DIFFER IN THEIR PRESENTATIONAL STYLE, BUT INVARIABLY COME OUT IN THE SAME PLACE WHEN DISCUSSING SYRIAN POLICY. I BELIEVE YOU ARE WISE TO ACCEPT KHADDAM'S SUGGESTION THAT YOU MEET FIRST WITH HIM, SINCE ANY SUSPICION HE MIGHT DEVELOP THAT YOU WISH TO END-RUN HIM OR OTHERWISE DIMINISH HIS ROLE COULD, IN MY VIEW, UNDERCUT YOUR

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 #88
BY 10J NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 005946

MISSION.

7. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. PAGANELLI

BT
#5946

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

DAMASCUS 005946

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHAM RUEHC RUEHJI RUEHDM RUEHTV RUEHJM
 DE RUEHBL #8576 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 Q 051555Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN NIACT IMMEDIATE 0575
 INFO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2074
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0552
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0769
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0720
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0697

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG: 8/5/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: RFAIRBANKS
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS; RMCFA
 NE
 DISTR: AMB
 MCFARLANE-5

BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08576

NODIS

FOR CHARGE DJEREJIAN
 DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, JO, IS, SY, SA, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: JORDAN VISIT

REF: AMMAN 6872

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WILL CONFIRM ARRIVAL/DEPARTURE TIMES AMMAN AS
 SOON AS OUR SCHEDULE IN SAUDI ARABIA BECOMES CLEAR.
 SCHEDULE REFTEL FOR MEETINGS WITH HIS MAJESTY SOUNDS
 FINE. DILLON

BT
 #8576

NNNN

Follow on cables re schedule
 AMMAN 6872 (0511 472 Aug)
 AMMAN 6899 (7 Aug 83)
 AMMAN 6936 (8 Aug 83)

DECLASSIFIED
 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHEG RUEHDM RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV RUEHDT
 DE RUEHBL #8578/01 217 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 051618Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2075
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0576
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 0533
 RUEHDM / AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0770
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 0698
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 0553
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 0493
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 0721
 RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0124
 BT
 S E C R E T BEIRUT 08578

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG:8/5/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: PDUR
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS;HTEICHER;
 CROSS
 DISTR: AMB;MCFARLANE-4

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR M08-D99/2 #5776D

BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-11

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
 USUN FOR AMB. KIRKPATRICK, EYES ONLY

FROM AMB. MCFARLANE

E.O.: 12356: DECL:OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, JS
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: MEETING WITH
 DEFMIN ARENS, 4 AUGUST 1983

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: AMBASSADORS MCFARLANE, FAIRBANKS AND LEWIS, DATT AND CDR DUR MET WITH DEFMIN ARENS, GEN LEVY, AMB. LUBRANI AND GEN BARAK AT MOD FOR ONE HOUR JUST PRIOR TO DEPARTURE ISRAEL. MEETING WAS TO SUMMARIZE DISCUSSIONS TO DATE AND OUTLINE TENTATIVE NEXT STEPS. ARENS LISTENED TO DRAFT FORMULA FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. WHILE AGREEING TO POSSIBLE NEED FOR SUCH A FORMULA, ARENS EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT THIS WOULD RESOLVE IMPASSE WHICH HE SEES AS A RESULT OF LEBANESE REFUSAL TO NEGOTIATE WITH ISRAEL. MCFARLANE AGAIN STRESSED GEMAYEL'S NEED TO REFUTE PERCEPTION OF PARTITION, PROTECT THE FRAGILE CONSENSUS IN LEBANON, AND GARNER SUPPORT FROM THE MODERATE ARABS. END SUMMARY.
3. MCFARLANE OPENED MEETING WITH A DESCRIPTION OF LATEST DISCUSSIONS WITH FORMIN SHAMIR AND PM BEGIN. CHARACTERIZING THE VISITS AS USEFUL, MCFARLANE POINTED TO COMMON AGREEMENT ON THE NEED FOR STABILITY IN LEBANON, FOR A STRATEGY TO INDUCE SYRIA TO WITHDRAW AND FOR THE NEED TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTING THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS MUST BE TO STRENGTHEN THE GOL AND ENHANCE ITS PROSPECTS FOR SURVIVAL. SECCNDLY, MCFARLANE NOTED URGENT NEED TO BRING ALL THE PRESSURE TO BEAR THAT WE CAN TO GET SYRIA OUT. THE PROBLEM AS WE SEE IT, HE SAID, WAS TO CONSIDER HOW THOSE

TWO IMMEDIATE OBJECTIVES ARE EFFECTED BY ISRAEL'S DECISION ON REDEPLOYMENT.

4. MCFARLANE SAID THAT THE UNFORTUNATE REALITY IN LEBANO IS THAT REDEPLOYMENT HAS BEEN CHARACTERIZED BY THE SYRIAN AND OTHERS OPPOSED TO THE GEMAYEL REGIME AS ISRAELI INTENTION TO PARTITION THE COUNTRY. GEMAYEL'S WORST FEAR IS THAT THESE PERCEPTIONS WILL ERODE THE CONFIDENCE OF THOSE WHO CURRENTLY SUPPORT THE GOVERNMENT. MCFARLANE STRESSED THAT GEMAYEL NEEDS A FORMULA TO PORTRAY REDEPLOYMENT AS A STEP WHICH LEADS TO A PROCESS OF CONTINUOUS WITHDRAWAL. HE EMPHASIZED THAT PHASED WITHDRAWAL PROCESS DID NOT NECESSARILY REQUIRE A PRECISE TIMETABLE. WHAT IS NEEDED IS A FORMULA TO REMOVE THE IMPRESSION THAT THE AWWALI LINE HAS PERMANENCY. OUR JOINT TASK THEN IS TO FORMULATE A STATEMENT WHICH WILL DRAW ON ISRAEL'S STATED DESIRE TO LEAVE LEBANON CONDITIONED ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE PERFORMANCE OF THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES IN MAINTAINING SECURITY. SUCH A FORMULA SHOULD BE SUFFICIENT TO CREATE THE CONDITIONS THAT ARE NECESSARY.

5. MCFARLANE THEN INDICATED THAT WE ARE WORKING ON SUCH A FORMULA AS A FIRST CUT AND IT WILL NEED MODIFICATION. IT IS AN ABSTRACT PROPOSITION THAT, IN EFFECT, POSITS BOTH THE POSSIBILITY AND THE FEASIBILITY OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WITHIN A CERTAIN TIMEFRAME.

6. ARENS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT HE THOUGHT WE MIGHT BE ABLE TO FIND SUCH A FORMULA WHICH DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH ISRAELI OBJECTIVES, BUT HE SAID HE WAS NOT CONVINCED HIMSELF THAT THE PROBLEM IS AS MCFARLANE DESCRIBED IT. HE SAID HE FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THERE IS SUCH A WIDELY-HELD FEAR OF PARTITION. FAIRBANKS NOTED THAT THE AWWALI LINE HAS TAKEN ON A CHARACTER OF ITS OWN AS THE DE FACTO LINE OF PARTITION. ARENS RESPONDED THAT THE BEST WAY TO ALLAY THESE FEARS WOULD BE TO COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT AND MAKE A POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT WITH THE DRUZE. HE ALSO REITERATED GOI READINESS TO HAVE THE GOL TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR LOCAL ADMINISTRATION OF LEBANESE TERRITORY SOUTH OF THE AWWALI. GEN LEVY UNDERLINED THE POINTS MADE AT AN EARLIER MEETING BY RECOUNTING HIS EARLIER FRUITLESS EFFORTS AT ESTABLISHING A MEANINGFUL DIALOGUE WITH HIS LEBANESE COUNTERPART. HE ALLEGED AGAIN THAT THE LEBANESE HAD CREATED THE

ENVIRONMENT DEPICTING THE REDEPLOYMENT AS PARTITION. IN GENERAL, HE WAS CRITICAL OF THE CONTINUING REFUSAL OF THE GOL TO COORDINATE ON PROBLEMS AND THEN TO CRITICIZE ISRAEL FOR UNILATERAL ACTION. MCFARLANE NOTED THAT THE PROBLEMS ARE FUNDAMENTALLY POLITICAL AND NOT MILITARY. THE LEBANESE FEEL THEY CANNOT COORDINATE BECAUSE THAT LEADS TO A POLITICAL CHARACTERIZATION WHICH HAS THEM NEGOTIATING PARTITION WITH ISRAEL. MCFARLANE SAID THAT WE MUST FIND A WAY TO DEPICT COORDINATION AS THE BEGINNING OF A PROCESS AND NOT AS AN ENDING. ARENS RESPONDED BY SAYING THAT ISRAEL DOESN'T REALLY UNDERSTAND WHAT LEBANON MEANS. HE STRESSED THAT ISRAEL HAS TRIED TO MEET LEBANESE CONCERNS BUT THEY WILL NOT COMMUNICATE WHEN NECESSARY.

7. MCFARLANE CONCLUDED THE DISCUSSION ON LEBANON BY NOTING AGAIN THAT SOME OF THE MISUNDERSTANDING HAS TO DO WITH THE FACT THAT WE ARE DEALING WITH A VERY FRAGILE GOVERNMENT WHOSE INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS ARE IMPERFECT, WHICH IS NOT IN CLOSE CONTACT WITH ITS OWN PEOPLE, AND IS VULNERABLE TO SYRIAN AND OTHER PROPAGANDA. MCFARLANE INDICATED HIS INTENTION OF PARTICIPATING IN A FORTHCOMING TRIPARTITE MEETING WITH LEBANESE AND ISRAELI OFFICIALS TO CONSIDER THE FORMULA OUTLINED EARLIER. HE THEN SAID THE MISSION WOULD PROCEED TO SYRIA TO ENSURE THAT THE SARG UNDERSTANDS EXACTLY WHERE WE STAND AND TO REINFORCE SYRIAN UNDERSTANDING OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO A SOVEREIGN LEBANON, FREE TO CONCLUDE AGREEMENTS WHICH IT PERCEIVES TO BE IN ITS BEST INTERESTS. DILLON

BT

#8578

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006287

09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

MLTWVZCZCBL0674

OO RUEHBL

DE RUEHJI #6287 2171817

ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK

O 051817Z AUG 83 ZFF4-*OK*

FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA

TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0175

INFO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2076

RUEADWW/THE WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

BT

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06287

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

FROM AMBASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA

SUBJ: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: BANDAR TRIP

REF: BEIRUT 8573

1. (~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. HAVE LOCATED BANDAR ON BAHRAIN FROM WHERE HE EXPECTS RETURN JIDDA LATE TONIGHT. HIS TELEPHONE ON BAHRAIN IS [REDACTED] HE WILL BE AT JIDDA RESIDENCE (TELEPHONE [REDACTED]) ON HIS RETURN HERE.

3. HE ADVISED HE HAS NOT YET GOTTEN FAHD'S CLEARANCE ON IDEA OF HIS TRAVELING TO BEIRUT TO MEET WITH HADDAD. I ASKED HIM TO TRY TO SECURE DECISION FROM KING TONIGHT AND ADVISE ME ASAP. I EMPHASIZED YOU WOULD BE OUT OF BEIRUT AS OF EARLY SATURDAY AFTERNOON AND THERE NO PROSPECT OF STIMULATING RUMOR OF TRIPARTITE CONSULTATIONS. WILL RELAY ASAP HIS ANSWER BUT THIS MAY NOT BE UNTIL SATURDAY MRONING.

MURPHY

BT

#6287

NNNN

~~SECRET~~

JIDDA 006287

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS F98-008/1 #90

By LDS, NARA, Date 11/5/02

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASED
NLS F98-00811 #91

2. CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/06

TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ASSAD

US Commitment to Lebanon

-- Over the last several months we have observed various efforts by outside powers to undermine the legitimacy of the Government of Lebanon and prevent it from extending its authority throughout Lebanese territory.

-- President Reagan is determined to take all possible measures to strengthen the Government of Lebanon and insure its ability to assert control throughout Lebanese territory.

-- For example, you may have heard an announcement regarding the provision of additional tanks to the Lebanese Army.

-- We are examining other ways to strengthen the military capabilities of the army and are dispatching special forces training teams to accelerate the development of Lebanese strike forces capabilities.

-- Such forces will prove extremely useful in the event that Lebanese factions prove unwilling to cooperate with the exchange of central government control. Leaders of these communities should have no doubt of the will of the Lebanese Government to persevere in bringing its control to the entire state, or of the will of the US to support this effort.

In this regard, we are improving US capabilities in a manner, which will facilitate the Lebanese Government's awareness of the source of certain military actions.

-- As a military man, I am sure you are aware of special radars that provide the capability to pinpoint the source of incoming fire. Because of the attacks on the Beirut area, we are bringing such radars to the US component of the MNF to enable

us to determine from where the fire is coming. Obviously such knowledge will help combat anti-government forces.

-- Our commitment to strengthen the government goes well beyond military means. There is no question that increased economic resources must be made available to improve the lot of the people in rural areas.

-- As you know from our own experience in Syria, the US can provide many types of economic development and assistance. Our Congress has recently agreed to provide a special fund of \$ _____ million for economic development in Lebanon.

-- Tragically the destruction of our Embassy left several key members of our economic staff dead or wounded. But we have already replaced these people and strengthened our mission and are now looking at other ways for America to help galvanize the Lebanese economy and thereby strengthen the confidence of the people in the government.

Turn to Shouf/Aley

-- I have met with various Lebanese officials in the last week and we have spoken extensively about their impending move into the Aley/Shouf regions.

-- This move has to clear components: political and military aspects.

-- On the political level, you know better than I the attitude of the Druze leadership and their requests for concessions from the Government of Lebanon. Surely you would agree that

reconciliation between the communities in the Shouf and the central authorities is imperative to a peaceful assertion of central control in these areas.

-- Surely stability in these areas serves Syrian interests as well as Lebanese interests and I would hope you could use your extensive influence with the Druze leadership to encourage a political reconciliation,

-- I have met with General Tannous, the Chief of Staff of the Lebanese Army, and have discussed his plans for asserting control in the Shouf and Aley.

-- While the Lebanese Army has the capability to forcibly assert control, this is not how the political leaders wish to proceed.

Discussion on Syrian "Redeployment"

-- Play to Syrian rhetoric about "strong, free, independent Lebanon."

-- Point to Israeli redeployment as an imminent reality which will allow GOL to extend its control and sovereignty beyond Beirut (whatever Israel's motivation).

-- Couldn't we have a reciprocal gesture from Syria? Such a commitment, however tentative, might facilitate further Israeli moves thereby expediting entire process.

-- Believe it best that such a possibility be discussed by SARG with the GOL directly. Would an opening request from the Lebanese side be desirable?

Stability in the METN and Shouf

-- Israeli redeployment from Aley and Shouf offers Lebanese first opportunity to reestablish authority and to develop working relationship with local authorities to reinstitute delivery of government services.

-- GOL is working hard to defuse confessional strife in Shouf and Aley; I believe the government is prepared to guarantee the safety of the local population, especially the Druze, from attack by the militias which have provoked them in the past.

-- The years of strife and the crimes on both sides will make the pacification of the Shouf a demanding task.

-- The GOL must pass this first test of its ability to govern beyond Beirut. We see this as a critical milestone in the restoration of Lebanon's territorial integrity.

-- We have been in close consultation with some of the other countries with a manifest commitment to the territorial integrity of Lebanon (i.e. our MNF co-contributors) and we are resolved to assist and facilitate restorative process as necessary.

-- The USG certainly would take serious exception to violence in Shouf originating from areas not under Lebanese control.

-- As you will appreciate, it will be difficult for the GOL to reconcile differences with Druze authorities and make meaningful gestures of concern for Druze people unless entire Lebanese Druze community could be brought into accord from beginning.

-- Would SARG be prepared to facilitate this process:

- Allowing GOL to extend services and permit Lebanese authorities to operate in METN as they extend reach into Aley and Shouf.

- Better yet, withdrawing Syrian Army from METN to facilitate entry of Lebanese security forces.

Chron 8/6

TALKING POINTS

-- BECAUSE MY COUNTRY IS A LARGE, DIVERSE ONE WITH A ROBUST DEMOCRATIC SYSTEM, MANY PEOPLE MISTAKE OUR INTENTIONS AND RESOLVE. THERE IS A CONSTANCY OF U.S. POLICY GOALS THAT GOES BEYOND INDIVIDUALS AND EVEN CHANGES IN POLITICAL PARTIES OR ADMINISTRATIONS. THOSE WHO MISUNDERSTAND OUR PERSISTENCE ARE IN ERROR.

-- YOUR PRESS HERE IN SYRIA AND OTHERS IN THE ARAB WORLD HAVE SPECULATED THAT I AM A NEW FACE, BUT NOT BRINGING A NEW POLICY. ALTHOUGH THAT WAS MEANT IN A NEGATIVE SENSE, IN A FUNDAMENTAL WAY IT IS CORRECT: U.S. POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AS ARTICULATED BY PRESIDENT REAGAN HAS NOT CHANGED. WE ARE DEEPLY AND FUNDAMENTALLY COMMITTED TO A JUST AND LASTING PEACE, ONE THAT CAN BE LASTING BECAUSE IT IS BASED ON EQUITY FOR ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION. THIS DEEP ASPIRATION ON BEHALF OF MY GOVERNMENT IS BASED BOTH ON A MORAL IMPERATIVE AND OUR SELF INTEREST, BECAUSE WE ARE A FUNDAMENTALLY CONSERVATIVE POWER IN THIS AREA: PEACE AND STABILITY SERVE OUR NATIONAL INTEREST.

-- THIS REGION HAS CARDINAL STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE FOR MY COUNTRY AND THE OTHER INDUSTRIALIZED NATIONS OF THE FREE WORLD. THOSE GEOPOLITICAL REALITIES INCLUDE THE VAST OIL AND

DECLASSIFIED/RELEASABLE
NLS F98-008/1 #97

BT CU NARA, DATE 4/19/00

OTHER NATURAL WEALTH OF THE AREA, AS WELL AS THE TRADITIONALLY GEOGRAPHIC NEXIS THAT HAS MADE THE EASTERN LEVANT A KEY CROSSROAD THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY OF MAN.

-- IN ASSIGNING ME THIS MISSION, PRESIDENT REAGAN STRESSED TO ME THE HIGH POLITICAL PRIORITY THAT HE PLACES IN OUR CONTINUED EFFORTS TO HELP THE PEOPLES OF THIS REGION ACHIEVE PEACE AND STABILITY. OUR COMMITMENT IS LARGE IN THIS AREA -- ECONOMICALLY, POLITICALLY, AND MILITARILY -- BECAUSE OUR INTERESTS ARE LARGE. THEY WILL NOT GO AWAY AND NEITHER WILL WE. WE WILL BACK OUR COMMITMENT IN ALL WAYS NECESSARY; NOT BECAUSE WE WANT BASES OR DESIRE HEGEMONY, BUT TO CONTINUE THE COMMITMENT TO OUR UNSHAKEABLE POLICY GOALS I HAVE MENTIONED.

-- IN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE PRESIDENT REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS HE OUTLINED ON SEPTEMBER 1 LAST YEAR TO TRY TO BRING ABOUT DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND ALL OF HER ARAB NEIGHBORS IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH PEACE WITHIN SECURE BORDERS AS CONTEMPLATED BY UNSC 242.

-- WE HARBOR NO ANIMOSITY TOWARD SYRIA. INDEED I HAVE SPOKEN TO A NUMBER OF AMERICAN LEADERS SUCH

AS FORMER PRESIDENTS NIXON AND CARTER AND SECRETARY
KISSINGER WHO HAVE ALL DEALT WITH YOU AND BEEN
IMPRESSED WITH YOUR ABILITY AND INTELLECTUAL
INTEGRITY. THEY HAVE ALL COUNSELED THAT YOU RETURN
HONESTY FOR HONESTY. I WILL NOT MISLEAD YOU ABOUT
OUR GOALS NOR OUR SPECIFIC POLICY POSITIONS TO
IMPLEMENT THOSE GOALS. I COUNSEL YOU NOT TO
UNDERESTIMATE OUR RESOLVE.

-- YOU HAVE CRITICIZED AMERICAN POLICY IN THIS
REGION FOR GEING PRO-ZIONIST AND FOR SEEKING THE
SOLE ADVANTAGE OF ISRAEL. I CHALLENGE YOU TO TEST
OUR EVEN-HANDEDNESS. ON BEHALF OF THE PRESIDENT,
I CAN GUARANTEE THAT WE WILL ENSURE THE TOTAL
ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE ARAB LAND OF LEBANON
IF WE CAN ALSO BRING ABOUT THE WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR
FORCES AND THE PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS.

-- WITH REGARD TO LEBANON...

Chron 8/6

TALKING POINTS RE AGREEMENT

-- I HAVE NOTED THE ARGUMENT YOU HAVE BEEN MAKING ABOUT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON IN VARIOUS SPEECHES THAT YOU HAVE GIVEN. IT MAY BE THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS THAT YOU HAVE BEEN QUOTED AS RAISING WITH THAT DOCUMENT ARE THE PRODUCTS OF EITHER FACTUAL MISUNDERSTANDINGS OF WHAT IT PROVIDES OR A MISAPPREHENSION ABOUT THE HISTORIC PARALLELS AND EVOLVED PRACTICES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW IN ANALAGOUS SITUATIONS.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, YOU HAVE SAID THAT "THE AGREEMENT DEEPLY INFRINGED ON LEBANON INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY."

-- TO THE CONTRARY, THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES A MEANS FOR LEBANON TO SECURE FIRMLY ITS INDEPENDENCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY. IT PROVIDES FOR ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL OF LEBANON "CONSISTENT WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF LEBANON THAT ALL EXTERNAL FORCES WITHDRAW FROM LEBANON."

-- ISRAEL SPECIFICALLY AGREES TO RESPECT THE "SOVEREIGNTY, POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE, AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY" OF LEBANON AND TO "CONSIDER THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL BOUNDRY BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON INVIOLABLE."

DECLASSIFIED/REMOVED

NLS EGW/11 #23

OK NARA, DATE 4/19/06

-- ALL INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS TO SOME DEGREE LIMIT FREEDOM OF ACTION BY THE SIGNATORIES, BUT ARE EXERCISES OF SOVEREIGNTY. THIS AGREEMENT IS THUS NOT OUT OF THE ORDINARY. IT HAS THE SAME CHARACTER OF THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS AND OTHER DISENGAGEMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND OTHER COUNTRIES IN THE REGION, INCLUDING YOURS.

-- THE BALANCE STRUCK BY LEBANON IN ITS AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WILL DIFFER FROM YOURS, BUT THEY GOT MORE IN RETURN: TOTAL WITHDRAWAL OF ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL OF THEIR TERRITORY.

-- YOU HAVE ARGUED THAT ONE-THIRD OF LEBANON HAS BEEN DESIGNATED A SECURITY REGION UNDER ISRAELI CONTROL.

-- IT IS UTTERLY UNTRUE THAT ISRAEL WILL CONTROL THE SECURITY REGION. IN FACT, ALL ISRAELI FORCES WILL DEPART THE COUNTRY AND THE SECURITY OF SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL BE IN THE HANDS OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THE FIRST TIME IN A DECADE.

-- FOR EXAMPLE, THE AGREEMENT EXPLICITLY PROVIDES THAT WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE, "THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR MILITARY, POLICE AND OTHER CONTROL OPERATIONS RESTS WITH THE LEBANESE ARMED FORCES, POLICE AND OTHER AUTHORIZED LEBANESE ORGANIZATIONS, AND NOT WITH THE [JOINT SUPERVISORY TEAMS]".

-- THE RETURN OF LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY AND CONTROL IS FURTHER UNDERSCORED BY THE STRUCTURE OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEES CREATED BY THE AGREEMENT. ALL JOINT LIAISON COMMITTEE DECISIONS MUST BE AGREED TO BY LEBANON, SO THERE IS A TOTAL VETO OF ANY ACTION TO WHICH THE GOVERNMENT IS OPPOSED. (THESE ARRANGEMENTS ARE SIMILAR IN CHARACTER TO THOSE PROVIDED IN THE 1949 ARMISTICE AGREEMENTS -- INCLUDING THE ISRAELI-SYRIAN ARMS AGREEMENT. A MIXED ARMS COMMISSION CONSISTING OF A REPRESENTATIVE OF EACH STATE AND THE UNTSO WAS ESTABLISHED TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION. EACH COMMISSION OPERATED FROM A HEADQUARTERS AND DISPATCHED TEAMS OF OBSERVERS TO VERIFY MILITARY UNDERSTANDINGS.

-- YOU HAVE ALSO ALLEGED THAT "LEBANON IS FORBIDDEN TO OVERFLY THE SOUTH EXCEPT WITH PERMISSION FROM ISRAELI AUTHORITIES."

-- THIS IS SIMPLY NOT THE CASE. THE AGREEMENT PROVIDES THAT THE LEBANESE GIVE ADVANCE NOTICE OF OVERFLIGHTS IN THE SECURITY REGION TO AVOID MISIDENTIFICATION BUT THAT "APPROVAL OF THESE FLIGHTS IS NOT REQUIRED."

-- YOU HAVE ALSO SAID THAT "LEBANON IS FORCED TO OPEN THE BORDERS (WITH ISRAEL) TO ALLOW THE PEOPLE TO CROSS, WHICH IS A THREAT TO THE ECONOMY AND SECURITY OF LEBANON AND THE ARAB HOMELAND."

-- IN FACT, THE AGREEMENT DOES NOT IMMEDIATELY OR AUTOMATICALLY OPEN THE BORDER TO THE PASSAGE OF PEOPLE AND GOODS. INDEED, IT PROVIDES ONLY THAT WITHIN SIX MONTHS AFTER THE COMPLETION OF ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL, NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE UNDERTAKEN ON THE MOVEMENT OF GOODS, PRODUCTS AND PERSONS. THUS, THE AGREEMENT IS A LARGE STEP FORWARD FROM THE PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES ALONG THE BORDER AND PROVIDES FOR A FULL NEGOTIATION BY THE GOVERNMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS SOVEREIGNTY.

-- THERE ARE A NUMBER OF OTHER POINTS THAT YOU HAVE RAISED REGARDING THE AGREEMENT WHICH WE BELIEVE MISAPPREHEND ITS CHARACTER, PROVISIONS AND PRECEDENCE. PERHAPS YOU WOULD LIKE TO DISCUSS THEM IN A SEPARATE MEETING WITH MY TEAM OR BILATERALLY WITH MINISTER SALEM AND THE LEBANESE WHO NEGOTIATED THEM.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PAGE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROG: 876/83

AMC MCFARLANE

REAIRBANKS

RMCFARLANE

MCFARLANE-5; AMB. *2 SPACES*

AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

AMEMBASSY RABAT, IMMEDIATE

INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE, IMMEDIATE

WHITE HOUSE WASHDC

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY
RABAT FOR RSO
DEPARTMENT FOR A/SY/CC

FOR THE AMBASSADOR

FROM FAIRBANKS

E.O.: 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: OVIP (MCFARLANE, R.C. & FAIRBANKS, R), PREL, MOPS,
LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, ASEC
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION: VISIT TO MOROCCO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. ALL OF OUR PLANS ON THIS FIRST ROUND IN THE AREA ARE NECESSARILY INDEFINITE, AS YOU CAN UNDERSTAND. BOTH MCFARLANE AND I ARE FULLY AWARE OF THE IMPORTANCE OF A PERSONAL MEETING WITH KING HASSAN, BOTH WITH REGARD TO THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEBANESE SITUATION AND THE BROADER PEACE PROCESS. THUS WE WILL MAKE EVERY EFFORT FOR ONE OR BOTH OF US TO VISIT WITH HIS MAJESTY PRIOR TO OUR NEXT RETURN TO WASHINGTON.

3. KINDEST REGARDS. DILLON##

INITIALS AUTHRCM

DRAFT

1 CLEAR.

2

3

4

5

6
5
4
3
2
1
0

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By *db* NARA, Date *12/1/97*

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM POL CHRON

DFZPVZCZCBL0779
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHC #1730 2180720
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 060453Z AUG 83
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 9204
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 7591
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 5292
BT

LOC: DISK 10 037
06 AUG 83 0718
CN: 06170
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

~~SECRET~~ STATE 221730

EXDIS FOR MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF
SUBJECT: JUMBLATT VISIT

1. (S) - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN FROM AMMAN CABLES THAT WALID JUMBLATT INTENDS TO TRAVEL TO U.S. AUGUST 7 OR 8 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING MEDICAL ATTENTION FOR HIS INFANT SON. WE HAVE ARRANGED FOR CHILD TO BE TREATED AT CHILDREN'S NATIONAL MEDICAL CENTER IN WASHINGTON AND EXPECT TO BE FACILITIATING FAMILY'S ENTRY AND INITIAL CONTACT WITH HOSPITAL THROUGH LEBANON DESK OFFICER BILL STANTON. WE HAVE INFORMED LEBANESE EMPASSY OF HIS VISIT.
3. WHEN JUMBLATT HAD PLANNED TO VISIT EARLY LAST MONTH, WE HAD LET HIM KNOW THAT NICK VELIOTES WOULD SEE HIM, THOUGH APPOINTMENTS AT A HIGHER LEVEL WOULD PROBABLY NOT BE POSSIBLE. IN VIEW OF GEMAYEL'S GREAT SENSITIVITY ABOUT OUR CONTACTS WITH JUMBLATT AT THIS TIME AND YOUR OWN RECENT REQUEST THAT A VISITING U.S. OFFICIAL AVOID MEETING WITH CONFSSIONAL GROUP LEADERS, WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR GUIDANCE ON HOW WE SHOULD HANDLE HIS POSSIBLE REQUEST FOR SUBSTANTIVE MEETINGS IN THE DEPARTMENT.
4. ON A SEPARATE SUBJECT, YOU MAY WISH TO REVIEW PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE ON THE DELIVERY OF COUNTER-BATTERY RADARS TO THE MNF, IN LIGHT OF ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT ON GOL NEGOTIATIONS WITH CONFSSIONAL LEADERS AND OUR PERCEIVED ROLE THERIN.
5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ

BT
#1730

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F98-008/1#94

BY

LOT

NARA, DATE

11/5/02

(09) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DGM PM CHRON

ILSVZCZCBLO760
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHDM #5980 2180613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH ZK
O 060612Z AUG 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0663
BT
~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ DAMASCUS 05980

LOC: DISK 10 001
06 AUG 83 0634
CN: 06151
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AND AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS
NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, US, SY
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION:ARRIVAL IN
-- DAMASCUS

REF: (A) BEIRUT 8575 (B) BEIRUT 8581

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. LOOK FORWARD TO GREETING YOU AT 5 P.M. LOCAL (1400 Z).
MFA VICE MINISTER AMBASSADOR RASHID KAYLANI, AND AMERICAN
AFFAIRS DIRECTOR DR. SAMI GLAIEL, WILL REPRESENT THE
MINISTER AT THE AIRPORT.

ent+3

1700
1605

3. WE NOTE REF B, USDAO MESSAGE, PROPOSES ARRIVAL IN
DAMASCUS AT 6 P.M. LOCAL TIME, RATHER THAN 5 P.M. AS IN
REF A. WE ASSUME THAT MESSAGE IS IN ERROR. WE WILL
REQUIRE 30 MINUTES AT A MINIMUM FROM THE AIRPORT TO THE
MINISTRY. SUGGEST PRE-BRIEFING AT THE EMBASSY FOR 15
MINUTES OR SO ON THE WAY TO MFA FOR 6 P.M. KHADDAM
MEETING. PAGANELLI

BT
#5980

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By db NARA, Date 12/1/97

ACTION: AMB INFO: MACF FAIR/RS

VZCZCIY0620
OO RUEHDM
DE RUEHJI #6316 2181323
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
O 061323Z AUG 83 ZFF4 CTG STATE SVC 335W
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHEL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0179
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS NIACT IMMEDIATE 3164
INFO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 6437
RUEHIV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 3507
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1950
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2089
BT

06-AUG-83
TOR: 13:45
CN: 10927
CHRG: PROG
DIST: NOAL

File

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 006316

NODIS

(CORRECTED COPY/PARA 4 NUMBER ADDED)

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
FROM AMEASSADOR MURPHY

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US, SA
SUBJ: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION; BANDAR-HADDAD MEETING

REF: JIDDA 6287, PARA 2

1. (S-ENTIRE TEXT)
2. IN AISENCE BANDAR, I SPOKE TO FORMIN SAUD AT NOON TO-DAY TO ENCOURAGE THE BANDAR-HADDAD MEETING. SAUD BELIEVES THAT MEETING SHOULD FOLLOW YOUR MEETING WITH FAHD IN TAIF SUNDAY/MONDAY.
3. ON HEARING THAT HADDAD HAD BEEN ATTEMPTING TO REACH BANDAR FOR THE PAST SEVERAL DAYS, SAUD SAID HE WOULD ENSURE THAT BANDAR CALL HADDAD TODAY. SAUD SAID HE APPRECIATED THE NEED FOR THE LEBANESE AND SAUDIS TO SHARE FULLY THEIR THOUGHTS ON THE PRESENT SITUATION AND ALSO RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR THERE TO BE PUBLIC AND VISIELE VISITS.
4. I HAVE JUST REACHED BANDAR WHO ASKED ME TO INTERCEDE WITH FAHD TO AUTHCRIZE HIM TO MAKE A QUICK ROUNDTrip TO SEE HADDAD IN BEIRUT SUNDAY. I HAVE DONE SO THROUGH KING'S PRIVATE SECRETARY.
5. ALSO HAVE ADVISED PRIVATE SECRETARY OF YOUR PREFERENCE FOR MCNDAY MEETING WITH FAHD IF POSSIBLE, INCLUDING YOUR READINESS STAY OVER MONDAY NIGHT AS NECESSARY. HE SAID FAHD MAY DECIDE ON SUNDAY EVENING MEETING BECAUSE OF SCHEDULING PROBLEM MONDAY, BUT WOULD CHECK BACK WITH US

NLS
 #95
 4/19/85
 NARA, DATE
 OLS

PRESERVATION COP.

~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 006316

5 AFTER TALKING TO KING.

6 MURPHY

8 BT
#6316

10 NNNN

12 ~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 006316

14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
50
52
54
56
58
60
62
64
PRESERVATION COPY

VZCZCDYI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV
 DE RUEHDM #5990/01 218 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 061508Z AUG 83 ZFF-4
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3119
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0393
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0670
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8518
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5637
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6467
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2341
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8271
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF * DAMASCUS 05990

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG 8/6/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

File

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR MD8-099/2 #57769
 BY RW NARA DATE 5-3-10

EXDIS
 DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH
LEBANESE, AUGUST 4

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.)
2. SUMMARY. AMBS. MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS MET WITH HADDAD AND SALEM AUGUST 4 TO BRIEF THEM ON THEIR TALKS IN ISRAEL AND BEGIN EXPLORING NEXT STEPS, PARTICULARLY ON THE PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF ISRAELI REDEPLOYMENT. MCFARLANE TABLED U.S. DRAFTS OF STATEMENTS THAT THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS MIGHT MAKE. WHILE SALEM HAD TWO SPECIFIC OBJECTIONS TO THE DRAFT LEBANESE STATEMENT, HADDAD OBJECTED TO HAVING THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT ISSUE A STATEMENT AT ALL, PREFERRING THAT THE U.S. DO SO. SALEM PUT FORTH A LEBANESE PROPOSAL FOR AN ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM THE COASTAL REGION IN STAGES, WITH AD HOC IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, INCLUDING SUPERVISORY TEAMS, FORESEEN IN THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT. HADDAD, SEIZING ON ISRAELI WILLINGNESS TO WITHDRAW FROM TH COASTAL SECTOR WITHOUT FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT IF THE SYRIAN AND PLO THREAT WAS REMOVED, URGED THAT THIS "CARD" BE EXPLOITED WITH THE SYRIANS. MCFARLANE AGREED THAT HE WOULD DO SO, AND INDICATED THAT HADDAD SHOULD DO THE SAME WITH BANDAR. ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MERIT IN PURSUING THE IDEA OF GETTING THE PLO OUT OF THE BIQA' AND NORTH LEBANON IN THE SHORT TERM AS A WAY OF MEETING ISRAELI CONCERNS, HADDAD SAID IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO GET THE NON-ARAFAT FIGHTERS TO LEAVE. ON THE SPECIFIC PROBLEM OF THE SHUF, HADDAD EMPHASIZED THE ISRAELIS HAD TO HELP THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT REASSERT ITS AUTHORITY AS THEY LEFT. MEETINGS FOR COORDINATION WERE NOT ENOUGH. ACTION ON

THE GROUND WAS NEEDED, SPECIFICALLY THE COLLECTION OF HEAVY WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF THE DRUZE AND LEBANESE FORCES BEFORE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. JUMBLATT'S POSSESSION OF 130 MM MORTARS WHICH COULD REACH BEIRUT GREATLY STRENGTHENED HIS POSITION. MCFARLANE AGREED THIS WAS SOMETHING TO DISCUSS WITH THE ISRAELIS, BEGINNING WITH THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED FOR LATER AUGUST 4. END SUMMARY.

3. AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR FAIRBANKS AND ROSS, MET WITH NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER WADI HADDAD AND FOREIGN MINISTER ELIE SALEM FOR 90 MINUTES AUGUST 4 TO BRIEF THEM ON HIS TALKS IN ISRAEL AND EXPLORE NEXT STEPS.

4. TALKS IN ISRAEL

MCFARLANE HIGHLIGHTED THE FOLLOWING ASPECTS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS IN ISRAEL:

-- WE HAD STRESSED TO THE ISRAELIS LEBANON'S POLITICAL PROBLEM ON REDEPLOYMENT -- I.E., HOW TO COUNTER THE PERCEPTION THAT A WITHDRAWAL TO THE AWWALI RIVER CONSTITUTED A STEP TOWARD PARTITION -- AND HAD UNDERLINED THE NEED TO AGREE ON A PUBLIC CHARACTERIZATION OF THIS STEP THAT CREATED A SENSE OF PROCESS, OF MOVEMENT BEYOND THE SHUF. IN THIS CONTEXT, WE HAD EXPLORED THE IDEA OF STAGED WITHDRAWALS DOWN TO THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER IN THE COASTAL SECTOR, WITH THE ISRAELIS REMAINING IN THE BIQA' VALLEY TO KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS.

-- THE ISRAELIS HAD RECOGNIZED LEBANON'S POLITICAL PROBLEM AND INDICATED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO BE HELPFUL, BUT THEY REJECTED ANY TIMETABLE WITH DATES CERTAIN THAT WAS NOT LINKED TO THE IDEA OF A STABLE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE AREAS EVACUATED. THIS PRESENTED THEM WITH SEVERAL PROBLEMS, SOME POLITICAL, SOME PRACTICAL. POLITICALLY, THEY DID NOT WANT TO BE SEEN AS MAKING THIS KIND OF CONCESSION WITHOUT HAVING ACHIEVED ONE OF THEIR DECLARED GOALS -- THE REMOVAL OF THE PLO FROM LEBANON, PARTICULARLY IN THE FACE OF LABOR PARTY DEMANDS ALONG THESE LINES. PRACTICALLY, THEY HAD SERIOUS DOUBTS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE LEBANESE ARMY TO PERFORM ITS SECURITY MISSION IN THE AREAS EVACUATED WHILE THE PLO WAS STILL IN LEBANON. IT
BT

#5990

NNNN

VZCZCDYI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV
 DE RUEHDM #5990/02 218 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 061508Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3120
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0394
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0671
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8519
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5638
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6468
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2342
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8272
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF * DAMASCUS 05990

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH
 WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE TO EXPOSE NORTHERN ISRAEL TO THE
 RISK OF RENEWED ATTACKS. THEY HAD, HOWEVER, FINALLY
 AGREED TO EXPLORE WAYS OF MEETING LEBANON'S POLITICAL
 NEEDS AS LONG AS THEIR OWN CONCERNS, INCLUDING THE NEED
 TO MAKE A FINAL STEP IN WITHDRAWAL CONTINGENT ON SYRIAN
 WITHDRAWAL, WERE MET.

-- IN A RELATED CONCERN, THE ISRAELIS HAD EXPRESSED REAL
 DOUBTS ON THE SITUATION IN THE SHUF FOLLOWING THEIR
 WITHDRAWAL. THE DRUZE WERE STILL NOT CONFIDENT THAT THE
 LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE RESPONSIVE TO THEIR INTERESTS,
 AND THEY FEARED THE POSSIBILITY OF A LEBANESE FORCES
 OFFENSIVE. WE HAD RESPONDED THAT THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT
 WAS ALREADY DEEPLY ENGAGED IN A DIALOGUE WITH THE FACTIONS
 INVOLVED IN THE SHUF UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF DR. HADDAD.

-- ALL OF OUR ISRAELI INTERLOCUTORS HAD STRESSED REPEATEDLY
 THE NEED FOR INTENSIVE POLITICAL AND MILITARY COORDINATION
 BETWEEN THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS. THIS WAS
 PARTICULARLY URGENT FOR THE PURPOSES OF THE REDEPLOYMENT
 OPERATION. WE HAD RESPONDED THAT ANY EXCHANGES THAT WERE
 PUBLICLY PERCEIVED TO BE LIMITED TO REDEPLOYMENT WOULD BE
 UNACCEPTABLE TO THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT.

-- WE HAD RAISED THE THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT'S CONCERN
 OVER THE REPORTED INFILTRATION OF WEAPONS AND SUPPLIES
 TO THE DRUZE FROM SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS, APPARENTLY
 WITH ISRAELI ACQUIESCENCE. WHILE THE ISRAELIS HAD
 DENIED THIS WAS OCCURRING, THEY DID PROMISE TO LOOK INTO
 THE REPORTS. THEY HAD CLEARLY GOTTEN OUR MESSAGE.

FORM 0801 PRINTED AT THE STUBBS REGISTER COMPANY, U. S. A.

-- FINALLY, KIMCHE, SPEAKING PERSONALLY IN A DESIRE TO BE HELPFUL, HAD RAISED THE ISSUE OF THE ISRAELI OFFICE IN YARZAH, WHICH THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT WISHED TO MOVE TO MORE SECURE QUARTERS FOLLOWING REDEPLOYMENT. KIMCHE POINTED OUT THAT THIS ISSUE HAD ACQUIRED SOME SIGNIFICANCE TO THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP, AND A HELPFUL STEP ON THE PART OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD HELP CONDITION THE ISRAELI FRAME OF MIND. WE HAD RESPONDED THIS WAS OF COURSE A MATTER FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT TO DECIDE, BUT HAD NOTED THAT, TO THE EXTENT THE ISRAELI OFFICE LOOKED LIKE A CONTINUING MILITARY PRESENCE, IT WOULD BE UNACCEPTABLE. THE ISRAELIS HAD TAKEN OUR POINT AND AGREED THAT THERE WOULD BE NO MOVEMENT OF MILITARY TRAFFIC TO OR FROM THE OFFICE AND NO GUARDS IN UNIFORM.

5. NEXT STEPS: PROPOSED TEXTS

MCFARLANE TOLD SALEM AND HADDAD THAT, SINCE THE ISRAELIS HAD AGREED TO LOOK AT WAYS TO ENSURE THAT THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF REDEPLOYMENT WAS NOT ONE OF PARTITION, WE HAD BEGUN LOOKING AT WAYS TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. SPECIFICALLY, WE HAD DEVELOPED DRAFT TEXTS OF STATEMENTS THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI GOVERNMENTS MIGHT WISH TO MAKE IN CONJUNCTION WITH REDEPLOYMENT TO MEET THE NEEDS OF BOTH PARTIES. MCFARLANE SHARED OUR DRAFTS WITH SALEM AND HADDAD AND ASKED THEM TO THINK ABOUT THEM.

AFTER A QUICK REVIEW OF OUR TEXTS, SALEM SAID THE TEXT WE WERE PROPOSING FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE "IMPOSSIBLE" IN TWO RESPECTS: (A) IT MADE SUCCESSIVE WITHDRAWALS IN THE AREA SOUTH OF THE AWWALI CONTINGENT ON SECURITY CONDITIONS OF WHICH ISRAEL, NOT LEBANON, WAS TO BE THE JUDGE. THIS WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE FOR HIM TO DEFEND IN PARLIAMENT, SINCE CONCEIVABLY ISRAEL WOULD STAY FOR YEARS AND YEARS. THE REGIME, NOT TO MENTION THE CABINET, WOULD FALL. SALEM STRESSED HE NEEDED SOME NOTION OF A DATE CERTAIN TO USE WITH PARLIAMENT TO OVERCOME THIS PROBLEM; (B) ANY STATEMENT MADE BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD TO HIGHLIGHT THE TRIPARTITE NATURE OF ANY TALKS WITH THE ISRAELIS TO COORDINATE REDEPLOYMENT.

HADDAD, UPON FURTHER REFLECTION, SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE
BT

#5990

NNNN

VZCZCDYI *
OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHJM
RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV
DE RUEHDM #5990/03 218 **
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 061508Z AUG 83
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3121
INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0395
RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0672
RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8520
RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5639
RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6469
RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2343
RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8273
BT
SECRET SECTION 03 OF * DAMASCUS 05990

CLASS: SECRET
CHRG: PROG 8/6/83
APPRV: RMC FARLANE
DRFTD: CWSROSS
CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH

THERE SHOULD BE A LEBANESE STATEMENT AT ALL, SINCE ALL THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT SOUGHT WAS FULL WITHDRAWAL. IT WAS UP TO THE ISRAELIS TO PUT LESSER STEPS INTO A SUITABLE CONTEXT. IF THE U.S. WANTED TO MAKE A STATEMENT, THAT WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO LEBANON.

6. NEXT STEPS: LEBANESE PROPOSAL

MCFARLANE THEN ASKED WHAT THE LEBANESE WOULD PROPOSE BE DONE. SALEM PROPOSED THAT THE ISRAELIS WITHDRAW TO THE SECURITY REGION, WAIT TO SEE WHAT DEVELOPED IN THE EVACUATED AREA, AND THEN ANNOUNCE A WITHDRAWAL SCHEDULE FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE WESTERN SECTOR OVER A ONE OR TWO MONTH PERIOD. AS THIS WAS CARRIED OUT, LEBANON WOULD IMPLEMENT THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS IN THE AGREEMENT ON AN AD HOC BASIS, AND THE SUPERVISORY TEAMS COULD BE PUT INTO PLACE. AS A FINAL STEP, THE ISRAELIS COULD STATE THEY WERE PREPARED TO WITHDRAW FROM THE BIQA' IN ANOTHER TWO MONTHS PROVIDED THE SYRIANS WITHDREW. THIS WOULD GIVE THE LEBANESE A DATE THEY COULD EXPLOIT TO BUILD PRESSURE ON SYRIA IN THE ARAB WORLD.

FAIRBANKS COUNTERED THAT, WITH THE PLO STILL IN LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS WOULD VIEW THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS CONTEMPLATED IN THE AGREEMENT AS INSUFFICIENT. ONE WAY TO BREAK THE LOGJAM WOULD BE SIMPLY TO PUT THE ENTIRE AGREEMENT INTO FORCE. THIS HAD THE ADVANTAGE OF BRINGING THE 8 TO 12 WEEK TIMETABLE OF THE AGREEMENT INTO PLAY. HADDAD EXPRESSED GREAT SKEPTICISM OVER THE WISDOM

OF THIS COURSE OF ACTION. SALEM ADDED THAT IN ANY CASE PRIME MINISTER WAZZAN WOULD ABSOLUTELY REFUSE TO HAVE THE AGREEMENT PUT INTO FORCE WITHOUT SOME BREAKTHROUGH ON SYRIA, SUCH AS THE OPENING OF LEBANESE-SYRIAN TALKS AND THE SUSPENSION OF SYRIAN ATTEMPTS TO ASSASSINATE LEBANESE LEADERS.

LATER IN THE DISCUSSION, HADDAD CAME BACK TO MCFARLANE'S EARLIER BRIEFING ON THE TALKS IN ISRAEL AND ASKED WHETHER HE WAS CORRECT IN UNDERSTANDING THAT THE ISRAELIS WERE WILLING TO WITHDRAW FROM THE COASTAL REGION WITHOUT FORMAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI AGREEMENT IF RPT IF THE SYRIAN AND PLO THREAT WERE NEUTRALIZED AS FAR AS THE AREAS EVACUATED WERE CONCERNED. FAIRBANKS RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS INDEED THE CASE. HADDAD POINTED OUT THIS WAS A CARD THAT MIGHT HAV SOME VALUE WITH THE SYRIANS. IF THIS IDEA WERE TO BE DEVELOPED, LEBANON WOULD OF COURSE GIVE "TACIT ASSURANCES" THAT IT WOULD IMPLEMENT THE AGREEMENT FULLY AFTER THE WITHDRAWALS WERE COMPLETED. MCFARLANE SAID HE WOULD GIVE THIS IDEA "THE HARD SELL" WITH THE SYRIANS AND ASKED HADDAD TO PURSUE IT WITH BANDAR.

7. NEXT STEPS: THE PLO

MCFARLANE ASKED WHETHER THERE WAS ANY MERIT TO TRYING TO GET A PALESTINIAN WITHDRAWAL FROM LEBANON IN THE SHORT TERM AS A WAY OF MEETING ISRAELI CONCERNS. THIS WOULD MAKE IT MUCH EASIER FOR THE ISRAELIS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE COASTAL REGION. FAIRBANKS ADDED THAT THIS WOULD PLAY VERY WELL IN ISRAEL, SINCE THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT COULD SAY THE "TERRORISTS" HAD BEEN GOTTEN OUT OF LEBANON.

HADDAD SAW LITTLE VALUE IN PURSUING THIS SCENARIO, SINCE IT WOULD CREATE PROBLEMS IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED AREAS (RESUMABLY BY REMOVING A BODY OF SUNNI PALESTINIAN FIGHTERS FROM AREAS IN WHICH ALAWITES AND SHI'ITES WERE NUMEROUS). IN ANY CASE, HE SAID, THE NON-ARAFAT FIGHTERS COULD NOT BE GOTTEN OUT OF THE BIQA', AND EVEN IN SMALL NUMBERS THEY COULD CAUSE PROBLEMS FOR THE ISRAELIS.

8. NEXT STEPS: THE SHUF

HADDAD RETURNED TO THE PROBLEMS OF THE SHUFF, INDICATING
BT

#5990

NNNN

VZCZCDYI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHAM RUEHBL RUEHEG RUEHJM
 RUEHJI RUEHRH RUEHTV
 DE RUEHDM #5990/04 218 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 061508Z AUG 83
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3122
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0396
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0673
 RUEHEG / AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 8521
 RUEHJM / AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 5640
 RUEHJI / AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 6470
 RUEHRH / USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 2344
 RUEHTV / AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 8274
 BT
 S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 DAMASCUS 05990

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG 8/6/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: CWSROSS
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 DISTR: ROSS (4) AMB

EXDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, MOPS, MARR, LE, IS, SY, PLO, US
 SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION -- MEETING WITH

THAT THE ISRAELIS HAD TO HELP IN THE REASSERTION OF
 LEBANESE
 AUTHORITY AS THEY WITHDREW. FAIRBANKS REMINDED HIM THE
 ISRAELIS WERE ANXIOUS FOR MEETINGS IN ORDER TO COORDINATE.
 THIS, HADDAD REJOINED, WAS NOT ENOUGH. THERE HAD TO BE
 CONCRETE ACTION ON THE GROUND. ONE THING THE ISRAELIS
 COULD DO AS THEY LEFT WOULD BE TO TAKE THE HEAVY WEAPONS
 IN THE POSSESSION OF BOTH THE DRUZE AND THE LEBANESE
 FORCES AWAY. THIS WOULD MAKE BOTH FACTIONS MORE AMENABLE
 TO DISCUSSIONS. ONE PARTICULARLY BAD PROBLEM WAS THE
 EXISTENCE OF 130 MM "ARTILLERY" (MORTARS) IN THE HANDS OF
 THE DRUZE. WALID JUMBLATT HAD THREATENED TO USE THESE
 ON BEIRUT IF ANY DECISION WAS MADE TO MOVE THE LEBANESE
 ARMY INTO THE SHUF WITHOUT A POLITICAL AGREEMENT.
 MCFARLANE AGREED THIS COULD BE RAISED WITH THE ISRAELIS,
 BEGINNING WITH THE TRIPARTITE POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED
 LATER IN THE EVENING.

9. COMMENT: THIS WAS AN INITIAL, AND IN SOME SENSES
 INCONCLUSIVE, DISCUSSION WITH THE LEBANESE. IT WAS
 SUPPLEMENTED BY SEVERAL FURTHER INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
 WITH HADDAD AND SERVED AMONG OTHER THINGS TO PREPARE
 THE LEBANESE-ISRAELI-U.S. POLITICAL MEETING SCHEDULED
 FOR LATER AUGUST 4, WHICH MCFARLANE ATTENDED (SEPTTEL).
 PAGANELLI

BT
 #5990

NNNN

VZCZCDYI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHBL
 DE RUEHDM #5992 218 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 O 062057Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3124
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0674
 BT
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 05992

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRGE: PROG 8/6/83
 APPRV: RMCFARLANE
 DRFTD: RMCFARLANE
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 DISTR: AMB MCFARLANE-4

NODIS

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF
 SUBJECT: SYRIAN POSITION ON DIALOGUE WITH GOL AND OTHER MATTERS

File

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT
2. IN GEMAYEL-MCFARLANE PHONE CALL REPORTED SEPTEL, PRESIDENT GEMAAEL ALSO DEBRIEFED ON POINTS RECEIVED VIA SENSITIVE GOL-SARG HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT (PLEASE PROTECT). THE FIRST CONCERNED SYRIAN INSISTENCE THAT NO MEETING BETWEEN FOREIGN MINISTERS KHADDAM AND SALEM COULD TAKE PLACE UNLESS LEBANON AGREED IN ADVANCE TO CANCELLATION OF THE AGREEMENT.
3. AS A SEPARATE MATTER, THE SARG PORTRAYED THE DECISION TO DELAY IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT AS A MATTER OF US INSISTENCE IN GOL AUTONOMOUS JUDGMENT. GEMAYEL WAS QUITE CONCERNED AT THIS SYRIAN EFFORT TO UNDERMINE HIS CREDIBILITY AND ASKED THAT I CORRECT THE RECORD DURING MY MEETING WITH KHADDAM AND ASSAD.
4. AS A SUMMAY JUDGMENT GEMAYEL STATED HIS INTERLOCUTORS ASSESSMENT THAT SYRIA INTENDED TO PRESENT AN ABSOLUTE STONEWALL TO USG AND GOL PROPOSALS FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. PAGANELLI

BT
 #5992

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F98-00811 #97

BT - CIS NARA, DATE 4/19/06

VZCZCDYI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHBL RUEHAM
 DE RUEHDM #5993 218 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZZK
 O 062104Z AUG 83 ZFF4
 FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3125
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITE HOUSE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE
 RUEHBL / AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0675
 RUEHAM / AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 0397
 BT
~~SECRET~~ DAMASCUS 05993

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG: 8/6/83
 APPRV: RMC FARLANE
 DRFTD: RMC FARLANE
 CLEAR: RFAIRBANKS
 DISTR: AMB MCFARLANE-4

EXDIS

STATE FOR THE SECRETARY
 WHITEHOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, US, LE, XF
 SUBJECT: CONTACTS WITH JUMBLATT DURING TREATMENT OF HIS SON

REF: STATE 221730

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. REFTEL INVITES MY VIEWS ON OFFICIAL CONTACTS WITH WALID JUMBLATT DURING TREATMENT OF HIS SON IN WASHINGTON. AS A FOOTNOTE I AM PUZZLED AS TO HOW/WHY THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR TREATMENT WERE MADE WITHOUT MY KNOWING ABOUT IT. IT IS NOT A MATTER OF SUBSTANCE -- INDEED IT IS AN ENTIRELY SENSIBLE THING TO DO. RATHER, I AM PROMPTED TO WONDER WHAT OTHER CONTACTS WITH LEBANESE CONFESSIONAL LEADERS MAY BE GOING ON WITHOUT MY KNOWLEDGE. I AM SURE YOU CAN APPRECIATE THE IPORTANCE OF CLOSE COORDINATION OF THESE MATTERS GIVEN THE SENSITIVITY OF PRESIDENT GEMAYEL PERSONALLY (SEE BELOW) AND THEIR EFFECT ON MY MISSION.

3. COINCIDENT TO RECEIPT OF THE INCOMING REFTEL, I RECEIVED A CALL FROM WADIA HADDAD WHO HAD MENTIONED TRAVEL OF JUMBLATT'S SON TO ME LAST NIGHT. IN SEEKING HIS VIEWS ON THE POSSIBLE VALUE OF A MEETING IN WASHINGTON WITH A DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL, I STRESSED THAT ANY SUCH MEETING WOULD OF COURSE BE DESIGNED TO REINFORCE GOL BONA FIDES AND TO INSIST THAT JUMBLATT ENTER GOODFAITH NEGOTIATIONS WITH THEM AND FURTHER TO CEASE HIS ACTIVITIES WITH THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT. AS A TACTICAL MATTER I ASKED WHETHER GOL MIGHT LIKE TO MAKE THE CONTACT WITH JUMBLATT SO AS TO REMOVE THE LEADERS ABILITY TO EXPLOIT SUBSEQUENTLY THE MEETING FOR SELF-SERVING PURPOSES.

4. JUST BEFORE LEAVING BEIRUT FOR DAMASCUS I WAS CALLED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL WHO HAD DISCUSSED JUMBLATT MATTER WITH HADDAD. WITH CONSIDERABLE EMOTION, GEMAYEL ASKED

NLS
 #98-0081-#98
 4/19/06
 NARA, DATE

PRESERVATION COPY

THAT THERE BE NO OFFICIAL CONTACT WHATSOEVER WITH JUMBLATT. HE STATED WITH ABSOLUTE CERTAINTY THAT JUMBLATT WOULD NOT BE MOVED BY US ARGUMENTS AND MORE IMPORTANTLY WOULD EXPLOIT THE MEETING TO ELEVATE HIS STANDING IN THE NATIONAL SALVATION FRONT AND AMONG HIS OWN PEOPLE. AFTER MAKING CLEAR THAT OUR MOTIVES WERE SIMPLY TO OFFER THE GOL THE OPPORTUNITY TO INDICATE ITS CONTROL OVER EVENTS TO JUMBLATT, I INDICATED THAT IT WAS ESSENTIAL THAT WE COORDINATE CLOSELY ON THESE MATTERS. AFTER SOME TO AND FRO, GEMAYEL STATED THAT IF IT WERE POSSIBLE FOR SOME THIRD PERSON (NON-USG) TO MAKE PRIOR CONTACT WITH JUMBLATT AND TO SECURE HIS AGREEMENT THAT AS A CONCESSION FOR HAVING THE MEETING, HE WOULD AGREE TO SUPPORT ACCOMMODATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON, THAT SUCH A MEETING MIGHT BE POSSIBLE BUT ONLY ON THESE TERMS. COMMENT: THIS CONCESSION BY GEMAYEL CAME UP ONLY AFTER CONSIDERABLE DEBATE DURING WHICH HIS NEURALGIA WAS CLEARLY HIGHER THAN ON ANY OTHER ISSUE WE HAD DISCUSSED. IT IS MY STRONG RECOMMENDATION THAT NO SUCH MEETING TAKE PLACE. PAGANELLI

BT
#5993

NNNN

S E C R E T

DAMASCUS 5993

PRESERVATION COPY

~~SECRET~~
PROG: 8/7/83
RMCFARLANE
PDUR
RMCFARLANE
AMB; MCFARLANE-4

AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE
SECDEF WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

EXIDS

DEPARTMENT FOR THE SECRETARY
WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: MASS, PREL, MOPS, OPRC, LE, US
SUBJECT: PRESS GUIDANCE ON MORTAR LOCATING RADAR

REF: (A) STATE 221730; (B) SECDEF 042245Z AUG 83

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE SHARE CONCERN STATED REFTEL A ABOUT PRESS
GUIDANCE PROPOSED REFTEL B. TO ENHANCE DETERRENT
EFFECT IN DEPLOYMENT OF SUBJECT EQUIPMENT, PARA 3
REFTEL A MIGHT BE MODIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

QUOTE YES NEW RADAR EQUIPMENT HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO THE
US MNF CONTINGENT IN BEIRUT TO ENHANCE THE POSTURE
OF FRIENDLY FORCES IN THE BEIRUT AREA. THE DEPLOYMENT
OF THIS EQUIPMENT IS A MEASURE DESIGNED TO ENHANCE THE
TACTICAL DEFENSIVE CAPABILITIES OF FRIENDLY FORCES
IN LEBANON. UNQUOTE. PAGANELLI##

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 12/1/99

SECRET