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File: Records, 1981-1985

Folder Title: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) -
CHRON Cables (07/20/1983-08/01/1983)

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: SUBJECT FILE

Withdrawer

CAS 12/5/2008

File Folder MIDDLE EAST TRIP (MCFARLANE) CHRON CABLES
[7/20/83-8/1/83]

FOIA

M10-370/1

Box Number 91407

BROWER

31

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
57729	LETTER	REAGAN TO KING FAHD R 5/3/2010 M08-099/2 #57729	3	7/20/1983	B1
57731	MEMO	NICHOLAS VELIOTES TO THE SECRETARY RE MCFARLANE R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#48	1	7/21/1983	B1
57732	MEMO	VELIOTES TO THE SECRETARY RE NEXT STEPS IN LEBANON [HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON VERSO OF PP. 4,5) PAR 11/5/2002 F98-008/1#49; PAR 11/2/2011 M08-099/2; PAR UPHELD 4/5/2013 M370/1	7	ND	B1
57733	MEMO	VELIOTES TO THE SECRETARY RE BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT FOR THE GEMAYEL MEETING R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#50	1	7/22/1983	B1
57734	TALKING POINTS	FOR BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#51	3	ND	B1
57735	MEMO	VELIOTES TO THE SECRETARY RE CHECKLIST FOR YOUR BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT [HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON VERSO P. 4] R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#52	5	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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57737	CABLE	271703Z JUL 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#54	2	7/27/1983	B1
57738	CABLE	RE PROPOSED MEETING WITH CARDINAL CASAROLI R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#55	1	7/28/1983	B1
57739	CABLE	281301Z JUL 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#56	2	7/28/1983	B1
57740	CABLE	281714Z JUL 83 D 11/5/2002 F98-008/1#57; R 5/3/2010 M08- 099/2 #57740	5	7/28/1983	B1
57741	CABLE	281429Z JUL 83 PAR 11/5/2002 F98-008/1#58; R 5/3/2010 M08- 099/2 #57741	8	7/28/1983	B1
57742	CABLE	311455Z JUL 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#59	1	7/31/1983	B1

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57743	CABLE	311533Z JUL 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#60	2	7/31/1983	B1
57744	CABLE	311914Z JUL 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1#61	1	7/31/1983	B1
57745	CABLE	311920Z JUL 83 R 4/19/2006 NLSF98-008/1#62	2	7/31/1983	B1
57746	CABLE	311431Z JUL 83 R 11/5/2002 NLSF98-008/1#63	1	7/31/1983	B1

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Archivist: dlb

File Folder: Middle East Trip (McFarlane) Chron Cables [7/20/83-8/1/83] Page 1 Box 91407

Date: 11/30/99
Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Letter	Reagan to King Fahd, 3 p.	7/20/83	P1/F1
2. Memo	Nicholas Veliotos to the Sectry., re: [McFarlane], 1 p.	7/21/83	P1/F1
3. Memo	Veliotos to the Sectry, re: Next Steps in Lebanon, (handwritten notes on verso of pages 4,5), 7 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
4. Memo	Veliotos to the Sectry, re: Briefing the President for the Gemayel Meeting..., 1 p.	7/22/83	P1/F1
5. Talking Pts	Talking Points for Briefing the President, 3 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
6. Memo	Veliotos to the Sectry, re: Checklist for Your Briefing of the President....., (handwritten notes on verso of page 4), 5 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
7. Memo	McFarlane to President through George Shultz, William Clark, re: Proposed Strategy of My Middle East Mission, 8 p.	7/27/83	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #271703Z Jul 83, 2 p.	7/27/83	P1/F1
9. Cable	No Cable #, re: Proposed Meeting with Cardinal Casaroli, 1 p.	7/28/83	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #281301Z Jul 83, 2 p.	7/28/83	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #281714Z Jul 83, 5 p.	7/28/83	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #281429Z Jul 83, 8 p.	7/28/83	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #311455Z Jul 83, 1 p.	7/31/83	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #311533Z Jul 83, 2 p.	7/31/83	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #311914Z Jul 83, 1 p.	7/31/83	P1/F1

R 4/16/06 " RESTRICTION CODES #61

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
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Records

Archivist: dlb

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8/1/83] Page 2 Box 91407

Date: 11/30/99
Bowditch F98-008-1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
16. Cable	Cable #311920Z Jul 83, 2 p. <i>R 4/19/06 NLSF98-008/1 #62</i>	7/31/83	P1/F1
17. Cable	Cable #311431Z Jul 83, 1 p. <i>R 11/5/02 NLSF98-008/1 #63</i>	7/31/83	P1/F1

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~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 20, 1983

Your Majesty:

Bud McFarlane has reported on his meeting with you. I am most appreciative of your personal involvement which will be central to our prospects for success. You may be confident of my firm commitment to a final resolution of the problem in Lebanon and of the broader dispute.

I have now considered the results of his meetings in London, Jidda and Damascus with a view toward determining where we go next.

In this regard I think it is important that we review our common goals and how we might proceed to achieve them. Although our two countries share many interests, two, in particular, command our attention at this time; Lebanon and the Palestinian problem. If we are to avoid major upheavals in your part of the world which can only benefit the Soviet Union and the forces of radicalism, we must work even more closely together.

Concerning Lebanon I believe our efforts to resolve the problem ought to be founded upon two principles. The first is that every country is entitled to define autonomously its own security interests with respect to its neighbors and to determine how those interests will be protected. In the current context, the simultaneous withdrawal of all foreign forces under arrangements which are mutually agreeable seems to me a proper application of this principle. Establishing a stable security environment between Lebanon and both its neighbors must be our first priority.

~~TOP SECRET~~

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NLRR M08-D99/2 #57729
BY RW NARA DATE 5-6-10

~~TOP SECRET~~

- 2 -

The second principle is that every country is entitled to decide autonomously how it will conduct its peacetime relations with its neighbors. Surely Lebanon deserves to get on with this process as soon as possible.

We know that the immediate problem is to persuade President Assad that it is in his and Syria's interests to negotiate with Lebanon for the withdrawal of Syrian forces and for future security arrangements between the two countries. As a long-term matter we would welcome a stable mutually beneficial relationship with Syria. But based on Bud's conversations in Jidda, I know you share my view that President Assad is unlikely to show flexibility until he appreciates that there are risks associated with continued obstinacy. For this reason I hope we can devise a strategy for bringing President Assad into the negotiating process. Obviously formal meetings between Syrian and Lebanese officials would be a good place to start.

In the meantime I strongly believe that closer ties between Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt would be in the interests of stability in the region and would send a clear signal that there is strong support for Lebanon's integrity. Similarly the prospects that the PLO and Mr. Arafat will eventually fall under Syrian control cannot serve the cause of peace and cannot bring closer a resolution of the Palestinian question. For this reason, we believe it would serve everyone's interest for arrangements to be agreed upon for the PLO to leave Lebanon as soon as possible. Such a move would have the backing of yourself and those other Arab leaders who do not wish to see the Palestinian cause turned into a pawn in Syria's plans.

Your Majesty, our two countries have the resources to resolve these problems. If you and I commit ourselves to do whatever is necessary to break


~~TOP SECRET~~

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- 3 -

the deadlock in Lebanon, we will have made a good beginning. For my part I am prepared once more to try to persuade Israel to agree to a withdrawal schedule that would occur without the agreement being brought formally into force and would have the Israelis begin their process of withdrawal first. I would hope that you could help in sounding out President Assad to see if he could accept this approach as a basis for total Syrian withdrawal within an agreed timeframe either in the context of a simultaneous, or non-associated, phased and possibly non-simultaneous Israeli withdrawal.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Ronald Reagan".

His Majesty
Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud
King of Saudi Arabia
Jidda

~~TOP SECRET~~



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

July 21, 1983

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

This is a first draft, done by my staff, on next steps on Lebanon. It has to be reworked and refined, with some time phasing concerning the decisions and actions we will have to take--for example, in the period before McFarlane leaves, as well as the mechanics of his mission and his preliminary objectives. I suggest you look at it before our meeting at 9:00 tomorrow, since it does try to pull together the status of the Lebanon situation after our talks with Gemayel. It might be helpful in focussing your thoughts both for our meeting at 9:00 tomorrow and the subsequent lunch with Gemayel.

Nicholas A. Veliotos

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~
~~DECL:OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1#48
BY LOJ, NARA, DATE 11/5/02



INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

S/S

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Next Steps on Lebanon

We must regain momentum in achieving our fundamental policy objective in Lebanon--the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The visit of President Gemayel marks a natural starting point for this new initiative. We should begin immediately, therefore, to work out with the Lebanese a coordinated diplomatic strategy to attain this goal. At the same time, we must continue to bolster the GOL with economic and military assistance.

I. Diplomatic Strategy:

We are confronted by three basic problems: (A) the inevitability of an Israeli partial withdrawal, (B) continued communal violence, especially in the Shuf, and (C) Syrian intransigence. All three problems are interrelated and must be approached at the same time with a shared U.S.-Lebanese strategy.

A. Israeli Partial Withdrawal:

We agree with the Lebanese that any partial withdrawal must be linked to our mutual goal of the withdrawal of all foreign forces. The immediate problem posed by an Israeli partial withdrawal is to decide what kind of linkage we want and what we can get. During President Gemayel's visit a rough consensus emerged in favor of some kind of phased withdrawal plan. Under the plan proposed by the Lebanese, there would be a phased withdrawal with a set timetable, but the final phase of Israeli withdrawal would be linked with a Syrian withdrawal. The Lebanese-Israeli Agreement would only be formally implemented after a full Israeli withdrawal, but security arrangements would be set up as the withdrawals proceed, using an ad hoc committee arrangement to ensure both Israeli security as well as GOL control of areas vacated by

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NLRN M08-099/2#57732
BY RW NARA DATE 11/2/11

Israelis. Some variation of the Fahd Plan, employing a phased withdrawal and postponement of normalization negotiations, might also be adopted. In any case, we must:

-- Decide on and win Israeli support for a plan linking their partial withdrawal to an eventual total withdrawal.

-- Undertake through both diplomatic channels and a public affairs campaign a coordinated U.S.-Lebanese-Israeli strategy for portraying the Israeli partial withdrawal as a step in the right direction. The Israeli move must not be seen as a step toward permanent occupation of southern Lebanon and de facto partition.

-- Initiate contingency planning both here and with other MNF contributors for either an expanded MNF presence or a new MNF mission. (The LAF seems to think that the MNF could expand its "presence" without increasing its size.)

-- Work to establish better coordination between LAF and IDF forces on the ground in preparation for the Israeli withdrawal. Israelis should state that any attempt by Syria to expand its area of control in Lebanon by movement into areas from which IDF has withdrawn would constitute crossing a "red line".

-- Activate the new McFarlane mission as soon as possible to ensure we have a negotiating team on the ground.

B. Communal Violence

Continuing communal violence, especially in the Shuf, is undermining efforts to restore Lebanon's unity and sovereignty. The GOL should therefore:

-- Immediately begin negotiations with the Druze to end the fighting in the Shuf.

-- Begin talks with the Shia to assure them that an Israeli partial withdrawal will not lead to the partition of southern Lebanon.

-- Use these talks as the first step in negotiations aimed at the broader goal of achieving national reconciliation.

The U.S. could:

-- If asked, act as an intermediary to get the inter-communal negotiations started.

-- Maintain links with all responsible Lebanese leaders to assure that we are aware of their concerns vis-a-vis the government.

-- Ask the Saudis and other influential outsiders to encourage inter-communal dialogue.

C. Syrian Intransigence:

Even if the Israelis agree to some sort of phased withdrawal from Lebanon, we have no indications that the Syrians are willing to withdraw as well. In addition to the overall problem of Syrian intransigence, the Syrians will represent a more immediate threat when the Israelis partially withdraw. We have no guarantees that the Syrians will not attack the LAF as it takes control of areas vacated by the Israelis. Moreover, the Syrians are continuing their support for opponents of the GOL. Our objectives with the Syrians, therefore, should include obtaining, in the short-term, Syrian acquiescence in any LAF redeployment, and over the long-term convincing the Syrians to withdraw. To achieve these objectives we should:

-- Maintain regular diplomatic dialogue supplemented by high-level visits to:

Inform the Syrians of relevant details of the Israeli withdrawal, including LAF plans for deployment, and to outline any revised MNF deployments and operating instructions.

Tell the Syrians we expect no Syrian military move into vacated areas or any Syrian interference by themselves or through others in Israeli vacated areas during or after the redeployment.

Attempt, if possible, to win Syrian assurances of non-interference.

-- Increase diplomatic pressure on Syria through our friends in the area, including Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Jordan, emphasizing the anti-Arab nature of the continuing Syrian occupation.

-- Gain Algerian support for Syrian withdrawal by, inter alia, exploiting Syria's meddling with the PLO.

-- Give discreet support to improvement of relations between Egypt and Iraq to help blunt the Syrian momentum by establishing a new locus of power in the inter-Arab context.

-- Seek public and diplomatic support and pressure from our MNF partners, Turkey and other NATO countries.

-- Use other forms of pressure on the Syrians, including discussions with the Israelis on a more aggressive, albeit carefully calculated, posture vis-a-vis Syrian provocations.

The GOL should:

-- Undertake more active lobbying with Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Iraq and other Arab states for Syrian withdrawal.

-- Step up public and private efforts (including the Haddad channel) to engage the Syrians in dialogue.

-- Encourage public statements by Lebanese communal leaders calling for Syrian withdrawal.

-- Reiterate to the Syrians a willingness to negotiate arrangements to protect Syria's security interests. Offer a Gemayel visit to Damascus to break the ice.

II. Economic and Military Assistance

The U.S. has already provided Lebanon with substantial economic and military assistance. This support must continue.

A. Military Assistance

LAF has told us it has no immediate needs which would prevent deployment to areas vacated by the Israelis. Nevertheless, there are steps we could take if the LAF absorbs new equipment faster than we expect and which would also further bolster LAF morale:

-- We are already acting to expedite, as requested, deliveries of M1-16 rifles, ammunition, bullet-proof vests and APCs.

-- We should consider increasing the projected FY-84 FMS program for Lebanon which now stands at \$15 million.

-- Responding favorably to the LAF request for more tanks.

Lebanon - Internal

= What can/will Gemayel do

- Vis a vis Druze?

- " " " LF

- What can we do

- vis - a - vis - Israel

- Forward Druze

B. Economic Assistance

Lebanon will soon receive \$150 million in grant aid from the FY-83 Lebanon Supplemental package. This ESF assistance is intended to extend over the next two years. There would be little Congressional support for more massive aid. Nevertheless, we can:

-- Continue to encourage aid to Lebanon from the industrial countries, as we have done at the World Bank's Donor Group meeting in Paris.

-- Urge the oil-producing Arab countries to contribute a fair share of assistance.

-- Respond favorably to President Gemayel's request for economic cooperation between the U.S. and Lebanon through such devices, however marginal, as a bilateral tax treaty.

-- Encourage the Eximbank to respond favorably to GOL requests for loans.

Drafted: NEA/ARN:WStanton:pdw
7/22/83, x 21018, #4798C

Cleared: NEA/ARN:DLMack
NEA/IAI:EAbington

Visible Arab Rallying - Isolate Syria

- ① Saudi - Syria ^{dialogue} first to obtain probable Syrian turn down
- ② Arabet - Travel to Jidda, Tunisia
- ③ Mse to Alger, Mor, Iraq, Cairo, S.A, Jordan, GCC
- ④ Leb travel to mod Arab States (Alger, Mor, Cairo?)
- ⑤ Mod Arab travel to Lebanon
- ⑥ [REDACTED]
- ⑦ [REDACTED]

- Mod Arab rallying around Arabet/Fatah

- ⑧ ~~At some point, after achieving Syrian isolation~~ - Hussein - Arabet dialogue
 - Convene Arab summit
 - Pre-wire Leb formal request for Syr ^{wld} support of Leb. request



United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

JUL 22 1983

BRIEFING MEMORANDUM
S/S

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TO : The Secretary
FROM : NEA - Nicholas ~~AA~~ Veliotos
SUBJECT: Briefing the President for the Gemayel Meeting, Friday, July 22, 1983

*How to stop shelling
Very important...
To Feb.*

Following the dinner with the Vice President, I prepared the Talking Points at Tab 1 for your briefing of the President. At Tab 2 is additional background that you may wish to draw on during your briefing of the President and in the subsequent meeting. This is a more thoughtful reiteration of our follow-on meeting yesterday afternoon.

Attachments:
As Stated

Sessing - Habib Sart

~~SECRET/NODIS
DECL/OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 #50
BY LOI, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TALKING POINTS FOR BRIEFING THE PRESIDENT

--We need to come out of the meeting with the President with a clear sense of direction for our mutual efforts and thus restore momentum to the pursuit of the policy goals in Lebanon.

--We have had over six hours of discussions with President Gemayel and his colleagues and finally believe we are talking to each other rather than past each other.

--President Gemayel was pleased with the working session yesterday afternoon when we focussed specifically on actions we could take together. We had a productive exchange on how to make a virtue out of the inevitability of partial Israeli withdrawal, agreeing that this must be linked in some way to a schedule for total Israeli withdrawal. There are several approaches to this which we will be further refining with the Lebanese.

--We also discussed ways of dealing with Syria. The key is Syrian withdrawal and all of our discussions including those concerning Israeli partial or "phased" withdrawal were related to this central goal. For example, we discussed the need to coordinate and reinforce our diplomatic efforts with the Arabs and Europeans, including working on the prospect of early PLO withdrawal; we also discussed the need for covert efforts to induce Syrian withdrawal.

--We also should be prepared to respond positively to Lebanese requests to accelerate the delivery of our military assistance in order to allow the Lebanese army to grow as fast as possible. The army is the key to the hopes for the future of Lebanon.

--We did not really have an in-depth discussion on the Multinational Force. The Lebanese will probably press for a larger American contingent to be deployed with the Lebanese army as it moves into the Shuf.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
~~DECL/QADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1#51
BY HOS, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

--The Lebanese appreciate our economic assistance to date, including the FY 83 supplemental \$150 million grant. Gemayel may press for a massive long-term assistance program which would be highly unrealistic. In this event you will want to assure him of our continued commitment and note that we will be working with other donors including the World Bank to meet Lebanon's economic priority needs.

Have Treasury agree to work with them immed. on tax treaty.

Our most immediate short term priority will be how to deal with the Israeli decision to redeploy. I recommend that you take charge of the meeting from the outset making the following points:

--We remain committed to the territorial integrity, sovereignty and unity of Lebanon. We know today's problem. In a word, Syria. We are determined to work with you to achieve total withdrawal of all foreign forces. This will not be easy. Our determination will match your courage. Let us go forward together.

--The most immediate short term problem is the Israeli decision to redeploy. We agree that this must be done in the context of total withdrawal of Israeli, Syrian, and other foreign forces. The Prime Minister's suggestion of a phased withdrawal linked to a timetable, with the final Israeli withdrawal linked to a Syrian withdrawal has been an extremely useful contribution to our deliberations. We have also noted a ~~special~~ statement by the Defense Minister of Israel suggesting something along the same lines. This suggests there may be flexibility in the current Israeli position which will help us put any Israeli redeployment into the appropriate context of withdrawal of all foreign forces.

--It is important that we also work in other ways to keep the pressure on Syria. In this respect we have to be imaginative in finding the way to keep the Syrian problem before our friends and the international community. We will do our best with our own contacts direct with Syria but so far these have not been too promising.

--I know you have also addressed issues in the military assistance field with Secretary Weinburger and his colleagues in Defense.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
~~DECL/OADR~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

--I want to take advantage of the limited time we have to hear your views on how we can best move together in the several related areas to achieve our mutual objective of an independent and free Lebanon.

--To show our continued commitment and the priority of our Lebanon policy, I will today announce the appointment of _____ and _____ who will leave shortly to work on the ground in the area to achieve our goals in Lebanon.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~
~~DECL/OADR~~

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

TO: The Secretary

FROM: NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotis

SUBJECT: Checklist for Your Briefing of the President in Preparation for his Meeting with Amin Gemayel, President of Lebanon, on Friday, July 22, 1983, at 11:30 a.m.

In your briefing of the President in preparation for his meeting with Amin Gemayel, you need to discuss the following key items.

Issues in the Negotiations for Withdrawal of All Foreign Forces:

1. Full Withdrawal of All Foreign Forces

Gemayel is not interested in partial withdrawal in absence of any understanding on full withdrawal, but is prepared to agree with us on a strategy which links the two in furtherance of our goal of getting all foreign troops out.

If the Israelis unilaterally redeploy, then the Lebanese may void the Agreement; we need to avoid this.

He wants to reach agreement with us on how to handle Syria.

We have discussed a process by which the U.S. approaches Israel and Saudi Arabia goes to the Syrians, with two basic proposals in hand.

2. Partial Withdrawal

Gemayel understands partial withdrawal is inevitable.

He also believes that any partial withdrawal must be linked somehow to full withdrawal. In this sense, the Israeli scheme stops too soon, leaving Israel in control of a large part of Lebanon, with little prospect that they will get out completely.

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F98-008/1 #52

BY WJS NARA, DATE 11/5/02

Gemayel has proposed a phased Israeli withdrawal with a timetable but with the final phase linked to Syrian withdrawal. He has support within his government for this idea. He would clearly package it for maximum political emphasis on full withdrawal.

He wants us to try it on Israel. It could be attractive, for it does not require Israel to get completely out unless Syria has in some fashion agreed to do likewise.

We would also try other ideas which would link partial withdrawals to a full withdrawal, but not necessarily by establishing a fixed date.

3. Status of the Agreement

In their phased withdrawal scenario, the Lebanese insist on no residual Israeli presence and no other conditions than those already set out in the Agreement. This is important for Lebanese sovereignty.

The Agreement would be implemented after full withdrawal, but it would not be formally in effect during the withdrawal phases.

Normalization portions would be deferred until after full Israeli withdrawal. Security arrangements would be set up as withdrawals proceed, using an ad hoc committee arrangement. Israeli security would thus be protected.

The proposal also calls for Israeli help to the Lebanese in establishing control over the vacated areas.

Lebanon needs from us a decision on implementation of the Agreement under these circumstances and under the eventuality of a unilateral Israeli partial withdrawal.

4. Dealing with Syria

Gemayel also wants us to raise with Israel a second proposal, the so-called "Fahd proposal," as an option to deal with the hardline Syrian refusal to talk.

This track would use Saudi Arabia's channels to the Syrians, thus keeping an active and vigorous Saudi involvement.

Israel and Syria would withdraw simultaneously and any normalization would be suspended for six months, after which "cosmetic renegotiations" would occur. Security arrangements would be put into effect. Subsequent Lebanese-Israeli negotiations would be possible, but not in furtherance of this particular Agreement.

If this doesn't work, we talked about having the Saudis try out the phased withdrawal plan on the Syrians.

The Lebanese, however, have no indication that Syria is interested in withdrawal under any of these ideas. They believe they are worth trying, however.

The Fahd proposal is not likely to be attractive to Israel, where normalization was an important selling point for the Agreement.

We discussed positive and negative pressures on the Syrians. They need to appreciate the costs and benefits. This would include a more active and coordinated diplomatic effort with the Arabs.

5. PLO willingness to withdraw

We have had a signal that Arafat may be interested in pulling his fighters out of Lebanon.

We will follow this up, with Lebanese cooperation.

U.S. Military Help for Lebanon

1. Military aid

Gemayel is not expected to table specific military aid requests; his army has improved appreciably with our help so far. He has tools to work with.

You will soon have for signature a supplemental appropriations bill providing Lebanon with another \$101 million in military assistance.

Our projected assistance for FY 84 is \$15 million; we could consider increasing this if the Lebanese army absorbs new equipment faster than we expect.

2. The Multinational Force (MNF)

The Lebanese have definite ideas for an MNF role as a factor in a partial withdrawal scenario. The suggested U.S. role is limited but still troublesome unless the Lebanese meet strict criteria.

A big problem for Gemayel is controlling the factions in areas vacated by the Israelis. He wants our help--in the MNF--and also Israeli help, using their influence and local strength.

Gemayel knows the MNF will not solve his problem, which he sees as essentially the disastrous effect over time of foreign occupation, resulting in partition.

U.S. Economic Assistance

The Lebanon supplemental also includes \$150 million in grant economic aid.

Gemayel has proposed several other specific forms of economic cooperation. Our initial analysis shows these would be only marginally beneficial

He may, however, also ask for a massive long-term assistance program. Although we should continue our financial as well as political support for Lebanon, direct budget support is increasingly difficult to justify to Congress. Our ability to help in this way is limited.

Our Diplomatic and Political Role


Gemayel is a brave man who needs reassurance that we are not backing away from your Lebanon policy.

An American role is essential. We need an active negotiating presence on the ground.

It is with a deep sense
of conviction ~~and~~ humility and
determination that I take
on the ~~role~~ assignment

My life overriding ~~character~~ ^{character}
The issues are it
~~is~~ human anguish ~~and~~
~~which~~ which ~~is~~ each
day grows more tragic
~~the~~ The lives
people deserve peace
The Pagan has pledged
his total commitment to
use that ~~power~~ ^{power} ~~and~~
it is ~~his~~ ^{his} instrument
to that pledge

Sent to Night Editor
Sat, July 23, 1983



official text

JULY 23, 1983

REAGAN, GENAYEL AGREE ON 'NEXT STEPS' TO PEACE
BY ALEXANDER M. SULLIVAN
USIA WHITE HOUSE CORRESPONDENT

WASHINGTON -- PRESIDENT REAGAN AND LEBANESE PRESIDENT GENAYEL AGREED JULY 22 ON "THE NEXT STEPS" TO RESTORE LEBANESE INDEPENDENCE.

AT THE SAME TIME, THE PRESIDENT ANNOUNCED APPOINTMENT OF ROBERT MC FARLANE AS HIS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE TO THE MIDDLE EAST, REPLACING PHILIP HABIB. THE PRESIDENT SAID HABIB NEEDED TO RETURN TO PERSONAL DUTIES IN BUSINESS AND ACADEMIA. HABIB HAD HELD THE POST SINCE MAY, 1981.

MC FARLANE IS EXPECTED TO LEAVE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST IN ABOUT TEN DAYS, AFTER ASSEMBLING A DIPLOMATIC TEAM AND ARRANGING HIS DUTIES AS DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS. HE WILL CONTINUE TO HOLD THAT POST IN ADDITION TO HIS DUTIES AS MIDDLE EAST EMISSARY.

A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID MC FARLANE WILL BE TALKING TO OTHERS ON THE HABIB TEAM TO DETERMINE THE

PAGE 02 -- PEACE

PERSONNEL FOR HIS MISSION. THOSE HE WILL BE TALKING TO INCLUDE AMBASSADOR MORRIS DRAPER AND RICHARD FAIRBANKS. THE OFFICIAL SAID REAGAN WAS "INSISTENT" THAT FAIRBANKS, AN OLD COLLEAGUE OF MC FARLANE'S, REMAIN ON THE TEAM.

MC FARLANE, IN BRIEF REMARKS TO REPORTERS AFTER HIS APPOINTMENT WAS ANNOUNCED BY REAGAN, SAID THE "OVERRIDING" ISSUE IN THE MIDEAST IS "THE HUMAN ANGUISH, WHICH EACH DAY WORSENS. THE SCALE OF TRAGEDY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SEEMS TO DEEPEN AND ELUDE OUR BEST EFFORTS TO BRING IT TO A CLOSE."

NONETHELESS, HE SAID, REAGAN HAS CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES HAS AN OBLIGATION TO DO ITS BEST TO HELP END THE SUFFERING IN THE REGION." AS AN INSTRUMENT OF THAT VERY DEEP PERSONAL CONVICTION (BY THE PRESIDENT), I AM MOST HUMBLE, AND SHARE HIS SENSE OF COMMITMENT... (AND I WILL BE) DOING WHAT I CAN TO RELIEVE THE LONG HISTORY OF SUFFERING AND TRAGEDY IN LEBANON," HE SAID.

MC FARLANE WAS COUNSELOR TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT BEFORE JOINING THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF IN 1982. HE HAD PREVIOUSLY SERVED ON THE STAFF OF THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE,



United States Information Service
Tel Aviv, 71 Hayarkon Street, 63903 Tel. 654338 ext. 204
Jerusalem, 19 Keren Hayesod Street, 94188 Tel. 222376

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AND HAD BEEN A MILITARY ADVISER TO HENRY KISSINGER WHEN KISSINGER WAS NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER TO PRESIDENTS NIXON AND FORD.

REAGAN TOLD REPORTERS AS HE SAID FAREWELL TO PRESIDENT GENAYEL THAT HE HAD REAFFIRMED THE PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY TOWARD LEBANON -- THAT WASHINGTON CONTINUES TO SEEK THE "FULL WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES FROM LEBANON," THAT IT SUPPORTS "A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT CAPABLE OF ASSERTING ITS AUTHORITY OVER ALL OF LEBANON," AND THAT IT DESIRES "SECURITY FOR ISRAEL'S NORTHERN BORDER" WITH LEBANON.

REAGAN SAID HE AND HIS VISITOR HAD REVIEWED THE "DIFFICULT AGENDA" OF THE MIDDLE EAST AND LEBANON, AND "HAVE AGREED ON THE NEXT STEPS WHICH WE SHOULD TAKE TOGETHER TO SET THIS PROCESS IN MOTION AND CARRY IT THROUGH."

A SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL SAID THE TALKS PROVIDED THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A "THOROUGH EXAMINATION ON BOTH SIDES" OF WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE IN LEBANON. "THERE HAVE BEEN CHANGES IN EMPHASIS" GROWING OUT OF GENAYEL'S CONSULTATIONS

PAGE 04 -- PEACE

WITH REAGAN, WITH SECRETARY OF STATE SHULTZ AND WITH DEFENSE SECRETARY WEINBERGER, THE OFFICIAL SAID. HE NOTED THAT REPORTERS SHOULD EXPECT "NO FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN STRATEGY" BUT SUGGESTED A NEW MEASURE OF FLEXIBILITY AND A DETERMINED NEW EFFORT TO REACH AGREEMENT WILL FLOW FROM THE MEETINGS.

WHILE DECLINING TO BECOME SPECIFIC ABOUT THE CONTENT OF REAGAN'S DISCUSSIONS WITH GENAYEL, THE OFFICIAL SAID HE BELIEVES THE ISSUE OF SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO NEGOTIATION. SAYING THERE IS NO SUGGESTION THAT A "MAGIC FORMULA" WAS FOUND IN THE CONSULTATIONS, THE OFFICIAL SAID, "WE HAVE SOME IDEAS, WE'VE RECONSIDERED SOME OF OUR EARLIER POSITIONS. WE'VE TRIED TO REACH SOME HARMONIZATION OF OUR ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBLEMS WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON."

THE OFFICIAL SAID THE VISIT HAD BEEN "ENORMOUSLY VALUABLE IN REACHING A VERY STRONG CONSENSUS ON WHAT IT IS GOING TO TAKE TO ACHIEVE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES...WE AND THEY (THE LEBANESE) ARE OF A COMMON MIND OF WHAT THE STRATEGY MUST BE."

HE ADDED THAT "THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFERING EMPHASIS BY

PAGE 05 -- PEACE

WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT IN THE PAST "AS TO WHAT OUGHT TO BE TACKLED FIRST...AND WHAT THE PROSPECTS WERE FOR DEALING WITH WHAT THEY VIEWED AS THE FOREMOST ISSUE...NOW, THAT DOESN'T EXIST. WE HAVE A VERY SOLID CONSENSUS...AND WE SHALL SEE HOW THAT COMMON VIEW, AS IT TRANSLATES THROUGH OUR DIPLOMACY, WILL HAVE A DIFFERING OUTCOME" ON SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL.

ANOTHER OFFICIAL SAID THE DISCUSSIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN THE CONTEXT OF SUPPORT FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON'S GOAL OF COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, AND HOW TO SUPPORT THAT GOAL IN SPECIFIC WAYS.

ASKED IF THE SOVIET UNION HAD BEEN ASKED TO EXERT A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, THE OFFICIAL SAID WASHINGTON IS IN CONTACT WITH MOSCOW AND DOES DISCUSS MIDEAST ISSUES WITH THE SOVIETS. "WE KEEP LOOKING FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE SOVIET ROLE," HE SAID. "I HAVE YET TO FIND IT. WE DO DISCUSS THESE MATTERS."

THE OFFICIAL SAID THE LEADERS ALSO DISCUSSED THE MULTINATIONAL FORCE IN BEIRUT AND THE INJURIES TO SEVERAL

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9515 DTG: 262307Z JUL 83 PSN: 066166
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~~SECRET~~ STATE 209515

EXDIS, NSC FOR MCFARLANE/HALL EYES ONLY
E O. 12356: DNG: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IT, XF, OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS)
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

1. ~~(SECRET)~~ - ENTIRE TEXT)

2. AMBASSADOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE, DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS AND THE PRESIDENT'S PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST, WILL DEPART US FRIDAY, JULY 29 6:45 PM (LOCAL) ON TWA

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State
By dlb NARA, Date 11/30/99

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 03 SECSTATE WASHDC 9515 DTG: 262307Z JUL 83 PSN: 066166

EXDIS

FLIGHT 840 AND ARRIVE ROME, SATURDAY, JULY 30 8:50 AM (LOCAL). AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE WILL BE ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR RICHARD FAIRBANKS, THE SPECIAL NEGOTIATOR FOR MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL:

- MRS. JONDA MCFARLANE
- PAT MEYER
- WILMA HALL -
- HOWARD TEICHER
- PHIL DUR

EXDIS

TWO (2) SECURITY PERSONNEL WILL JOIN IN ROME (NAMES TO BE FURNISHED). (CHRIS ROSS WILL JOIN THE PARTY UPON ARRIVAL IN THE MIDDLE EAST.)

EXDIS

3. PLEASE MEET AND ASSIST AT AIRPORT AND ARRANGE FOR TRANSPORTATION AND APPROPRIATE OVERNIGHT ACCOMMODATIONS. BILLETING INFO: 1 DOUBLE ROOM FOR AMB. AND MRS. MCFARLANE; 7 SINGLES (FOR REMAINDER OF PARTY).

EXDIS

4. AMB. MCFARLANE AND PARTY WILL DEPART NEXT DAY (JULY 31) BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT O/A NOON (LOCAL). WILL REQUIRE TRANSPORTATION AND EXIT ASSISTANCE.

5. DEPARTMENT ADVICE ON PRESS QUERIES WILL BE PROVIDED SEPTEL.

6. FOR ROME: SHORT NOTICE AND TIMING THIS TRIP PRECLUDE MCFARLANE MEETING WITH ITALIANS AT THIS TIME. HOWEVER, DEPARTMENT CONTEMPLATES FUTURE MEETINGS WITH ITALIANS AS WAS DONE WITH AMB. HABIB. EMBASSY MAY IN ITS DISCRETION SO INFORM ITALIANS ON A CLOSE HOLD BASIS.

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03

SECSTATE WASHDC 9515

DTG: 262307Z JUL 83

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7. PLEASE CONFIRM RECEIPT OF THIS CABLE.

8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SHULTZ
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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 27, 1983

Wil,

Attached FYI. Red tag copy
with RCM this afternoon.

klm

July 27, 1983

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

THROUGH: GEORGE P. SHULTZ
 WILLIAM P. CLARK

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

SUBJECT: Proposed Strategy of For My Middle East Mission

This memorandum seeks your approval of a proposed strategy for my mission to the Middle East which in this first instance, will focus on the Lebanon crisis.

Introduction

Our objective in Lebanon remains an independent, sovereign country free of all foreign forces. The key to a resolution of the Lebanon crisis is Syrian withdrawal. Israel has agreed to withdraw under the terms set out in the May 17 Israel-Lebanon agreement and the accompanying side letters. Over the past eight months, Syria has managed to position itself as the arbiter of inter-Arab politics. Rearmed by Moscow, unconcerned by the entreaties of other Arab

~~SECRET~~

states, financially indebted only to the Soviets and the Saudis, the Syrians will continue to be difficult to get out of Lebanon unless new pressures can be brought to bear.

President Assad sees time working in his favor. Opposition to the Lebanon war in Israel is growing, significantly contributing to the decision to redeploy the Israeli forces. The Lebanese are beset by increasing internal strife; this can lead to a rapid unraveling of Gemayel's consensus and therefore the credibility of his government. Assad's grip on the PLO (and consequent veto over the peace process) is tightening without negative consequences for Syria among the Arabs. Moreover, Assad is now more confident that the Syrian military, with Soviet support, would inflict heavy losses on Israel in limited war. In this context, Assad is demonstrating his dominance over the Arabs (not isolation from them) and does not see it in his interest to agree to withdraw in the near future. Rather, he has adopted a strategy designed to wreck the Lebanon-Israel agreement by waiting out the Israelis, bringing down Gemayel and undermining U.S. influence with the other Arabs. Assad does, however, have three basic weaknesses which we must exploit. His grip on the regime is based on control by the army of a hostile population. Domestic unrest in Syria, while not immediately

~~SECRET~~

threatening to him, would create major difficulties as was experienced two years ago. His capital, Damascus, is within artillery range of Israeli military forces in Lebanon. He knows that only the United States can endow him with true leadership in the Arab world, because only the United States can work out a deal with Israel on the Palestinian problem and the Golan Heights.

The Strategy

In light of Syrian policy, our near-term strategy should be to ensure that a partial Israeli withdrawal takes place in a manner that increases the incentives and pressures on the Syrians to withdraw. To this end my trip will focus on the following priorities:

1. Ensuring that a partial withdrawal is conducted in the context of interim steps toward complete withdrawal, with the last phase linked to Syrian withdrawal, not a date-certain.

2.


 intensifies

Assad's fear of a major war while increasing the economic burden of a presence in Lebanon and defense against the IDF.

13526
E.O. 12958
As Amended
Sec. 3.3(b)(1)

3. Increasing Syria's diplomatic isolation in the Arab world by working with the Saudis, Egyptian and other Arab countries.

4.



Country-By-Country Approaches

Based on the strategy outlined above, I would use my initial meeting in each capital to try to accomplish the following objectives.

Lebanon

- Reaffirm the commitments you made to President Gemayel.
- Brief the Lebanese on this week's meetings with Arens and Shamir.
- Explain how we plan to take advantage of the partial withdrawal, stressing the requirement for accelerated and frequent coordination meetings with the IDF and LAF plus our determination to ensure that partial withdrawal is an interim measure.
- Emphasize our tough posture toward Syria and explore how we can increase the pressures on Assad.
- Explore additional military measures, unilateral or in the MNF context, which would reassure the Lebanese while strengthening our diplomacy.

Syria

- Reassure Assad that we recognize Syria's security interests in Lebanon and are prepared to discuss how to satisfy them.

- Reemphasize that our commitment to the Lebanon-Israel agreement will not waiver and that we are prepared to be patient and not despair over a lack of quick results.
- Stress that the situation will only become more dangerous, and that Israeli redeployment will not reduce prospects for war. Indeed, Israel is likely to hold Syria responsible for Israeli casualties.
- Make clear the limits of our ability to restrain the Israelis.
- Try to undermine Syrian confidence in Soviet support for Syria in the event of renewed fighting with Israel.

Saudi Arabia

- Emphasize our wish to keep the Saudis fully engaged in the Lebanon negotiations.
- Be prepared to present the Fahd plan for Lebanon withdrawal to Syria and if Syria shows interest, I will talk to the Israelis about it.

- Stress the dangers to Saudi Arabia of pursuing a cautious foreign policy. Urge Prince Saud to visit Cairo.
- Try to get Saudi support for policy to get PLO out of Lebanon and out of Syrian control.

Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Magreb

- Emphasize the need to support Gemayel.
- Discuss ways of isolating Assad.
- Solicit views on how to play the Palestinian card.

Israel

- Restate the U.S. commitment to the Israel-Lebanon agreement.
- Stress that the side letter is unimplementable. Thus by acting unilaterally, Israel effectively amends the agreement.
- Seek Israeli agreement to a formula that ensures the redeployment is cast as an interim step leading to full withdrawal with the final phase linked to Syrian withdrawal.

- Seek Israeli reaction to our ideas for increasing the pressure on the Syrians, including possible Arab League actions, IDF measures, Lebanese initiatives,
- Depending on the status of outstanding Israeli military assistance requests, it would be important to be forthcoming on items that strengthen our strategic relationship. In return, we would expect Israel to be more accepting of our need for close military relations with our Arab friends.

Operational Issues

I plan to begin my talks next Sunday in Beirut. I would then go to Damascus, Jidda and Jerusalem before initiating visits on a daily basis if necessary to each of the capitals.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ROME 7375
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AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3903
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1787

~~SECRET~~ ROME 17375

EXDIS

EXDIS
FROM VATICAN OFFICE
DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS TO NSC FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356 DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PREL, VT, XF
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION
REF: (A) STATE 209515 (B) ROME 16571 (C) ROME 16783

1. - ENTIRE TEXT
2. RRGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE MEETINGS MENTIONED PARA 6, REF A, DEPARTMENT MAY ALSO WISH TO CONSIDER A FUTURE MEETING WITH VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE CARDINAL CASAROLI DURING A ROME STOPOVER, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF THE POPE'S RECENT STATEMENT ON LEBANON (REF B) AND WHAT

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NLS #98-008/#54

BY NOJ NARA DATE 11/5/02

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ROME 7375

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THE VATICAN IS DOING ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE (REF C).
WE REALIZE THE TIME PRESSURES ARE SEVERE AND THIS HAS
NOT BEEN POSSIBLE IN THE RECENT PAST BUT, GIVEN THE
RENEWED FIGHTING INVOLVING CHRISTIAN GROUPS AND THE
FACT FIRST HAND USG VIEWS WOULD REACH THE POPE DIRECTLY,
(DEPENDING ON CIRCUMSTANCES WE WOULD NOT DISCOUNT THE
POSSIBILITY OF A BRIEF AUDIENCE) IT COULD BE WELL
WORTH THE INVESTMENT OF AN HOUR'S TIME.

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S/SN:PMEYER:0005A
07/28/83 EXT. 25324
S/SN:RFAIRBANKS

NSC:RMC FARLANE
S/S-O:GUSREY

S/S:CHILL

COMMENT

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

IMMEDIATE ROME

EXDIS
FOR VATICAN OFFICE FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

DNG: OADR

PEPR, IT, XF, OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS)

PROPOSED MEETING WITH CARDINAL CASAROLI

REF: A) ROME 17375; B)

STATE 209515

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. REGARDING POSSIBLE FUTURE MEETING WITH VATICAN SECRETARY OF STATE CARDINAL CASAROLI: SINCE SHORT NOTICE AND TIMING THIS TRIP PRECLUDE MEETING WITH ITALIAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, OUR ANSWER AND RATIONALE IN REF B APPLIES TO MEETING AT THIS TIME WITH VATICAN OFFICIALS. WE DO, HOWEVER, HOPE TO MEET WITH BOTH GOI AND VATICAN OFFICIALS AT EARLY OPPORTUNITY. YY

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BY

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11/5/02

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 PARIS 7873
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EXDIS

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: PADR
TAGS: PREL, FR, XF, LE
SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF MIDDLE EAST SPECIAL ENVOY MACFARLANE
REF: STATE 209253

1. ~~(~~ENTIRE TEXT)
2. WE NOTE FROM REFTEL THAT SPECIAL ENVOY MACFARLANE IS TO BE TRAVELING TO THE MIDDLE EAST SHORTLY. WE BELIEVE IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT THAT HE VISIT PARIS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS TRAVEL, PREFERABLY ENROUTE TO THE MIDDLE EAST.
3. AS THE DEPARTMENT IS AWARE, FOREIGN MINISTER CHEYSSON RECENTLY COMPLETED A SWING THROUGH THE

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BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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DTG: 281301Z JUL 83 PSN: 068920

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MIDDLE EAST. IT APPEARS TO US THAT FRANCE MAY BE
GROPING AROUND FOR A NEW ROLE FOR ITSELF AND THAT
THIS EFFORT COULD LEAD THE FRENCH IN UNHELPFUL
DIRECTIONS UNLESS WE MAINTAIN CLOSE COORDINATION
WITH THEM. PARIS IS CURRENTLY WORRIED ABOUT BEING
DRAGGED ALONG BY OUR POLICY WITHOUT BEING SURE HOW WE ARE
PROCEEDING. THEY FEEL WE HAVE NOT CONSULTED CLOSELY
ENOUGH WITH THEM AS AN IMPORTANT PARTNER IN THE MNF. THE
CHANGE IN MIDDLE EAST NEGOTIATORS HAS REINFORCED THEIR
FEELING OF BEING OUT OF TOUCH WITH WASHINGTON VIEWS.

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4. CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON AND BEIRUT ARE FINE, BUT
THE KEY FRENCH POLICY-MAKERS ARE HERE IN PARIS. THEY DO
NOT KNOW MACFARLANE, AND SUCH PERSONAL CONTACT IS
IMPORTANT TO THEM. DIRECT TALKS BY MACFARLANE COULD
BE IMPORTANT IN KEEPING FRANCE ON TRACK WITH US --
PARTICULARLY IF FOLLOWED UP WITH MORE OF A DIALOGUE
IN PARIS.

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5. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5754

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0091
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AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1475
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6449
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2494
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 0986
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 5485
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 5730
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5076
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 7464

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 PARIS 27947

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, FR, LE, XF

SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S MIDDLE EAST VISIT AND LEBANON
REF: (A) STATE 196901, (B) PARIS 24702 (BOTH NOTAL),
 (C) STATE 209253

1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. OUR CONTACTS INSIST THAT EXTERNAL RELATIONS MINISTER

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR M08-099/2 #57740
BY RW NARA DATE 5-6-10

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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CHEYSSON'S RECENTLY-CONCLUDED SWING THROUGH THE MIDDLE EAST WAS ONLY AN INFORMATIONAL (FACT-FINDING) TRIP AND THAT FRANCE FOR THE MOMENT HAS NO NEW IDEAS OR PROPOSALS TO PUT FORWARD. THE TRIP WAS UNDERTAKEN BECAUSE THE FRENCH ARE CONCERNED THAT THE WAY THE U.S. HAS BEEN HANDLING THE SITUATION IS UNLIKELY TO LEAD TO POSITIVE RESULTS. THEY FEEL OUT OF TOUCH WITH U.S. THINKING, AND CHEYSSON NEEDED FIRST-HAND IMPRESSIONS ON WHICH TO BASE HIS OWN JUDGMENTS. IN PARTICULAR, THE FRENCH ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE STAYING POWER OF THE GEMAYAL GOVERNMENT.

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3. IN DISCUSSING THE TRIP, ONE SOURCE AT THE QUAI BROUGHT UP THE MATTER OF REDEPLOYMENT OF FRENCH MNF TROOPS TO THE SHUF, WHICH LEADS US TO BELIEVE THAT CHEYSSON MAY HAVE BEEN TAKING SOME SOUNDINGS IN SYRIA ON THAT QUESTION.

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OUR SOURCE SAID THAT THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR IN WASHINGTON WAS INSTRUCTED TO INFORM THE DEPARTMENT THAT FRANCE WOULD BE WILLING TO MOVE TROOPS INTO THE SHUF ONLY IF CERTAIN CONDITIONS ARE MET. FIRST, A REQUEST MUST BE MADE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON. ALL PARTIES MUST AGREE TO IT, AND BY ALL PARTIES THE FRENCH INCLUDE ISRAEL, SYRIA, THE PHALANGE, WALID JUMBLATT, ETC.

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4. IN JULY 28 MEETING WITH QUAI SEC GEN MARTIN, CHARGE DREW ON POINTS IN REFTEL C. IN RESPONSE, MARTIN (PROTECT) CONFIRMED TO CHARGE THAT THE FRENCH HAVE NO NEW IDEAS FOR ADVANCING THE SITUATION. HE SAID THE FRENCH ANALYSIS OF THE SYRIAN ATTITUDE HAS BEEN DEDUCED FROM WHAT THE SYRIANS SAY THEY DO NOT WANT, COUPLED WITH THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE SITUATION ON THE GROUND AND OF A NUMBER OF VEILED SYRIAN STATEMENTS. MARTIN NOTED THAT LEBANON IN MANY WAYS IS A EUROPEAN (MAINLY FRENCH) CREATION DATING FROM THE MIDDLE AGES. WITHOUT THE CRUSADES, AND THEIR AFTER-EFFECTS, SYRIAN CONTROL OVER MUCH OF MODERN LEBANON WOULD BE NATURAL. EVEN NOW, MARTIN SAID, THE

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LEBANESE POPULATION IN AREAS UNDER SYRIAN CONTROL HAS COME TO ACCEPT MANY ASPECTS OF SYRIAN ADMINISTRATION. MARTIN ALSO RECALLED THE SYRIAN CLAIM THAT BEIRUT WAS THE "NATURAL" PORT FOR MUCH OF SYRIA. THESE INDICATIONS APPEARED TO SUGGEST THAT THE SYRIANS HAD IN MIND A DE FACTO PARTITION, BUT WERE UNWILLING TO STATE THIS PUBLICLY. THE SYRIANS ALSO APPEAR TO BELIEVE THAT THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS HAS PUT THEM IN A POSITION WHERE FOR THE FIRST TIME THEY HAVE SOME LEVERAGE FOR ADVANCING THEIR OWN INTERESTS AND THEIR OWN VERSION OF HOW THINGS SHOULD BE ORGANIZED. ASSAD WAS NOT ABOUT TO RELINQUISH THIS LEVERAGE WITHOUT ADVANCING IN THE DIRECTION HE WANTED.

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5. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, MARTIN RECALLED AN IDEA WHICH HAD CIRCULATED IN THE QUAI D'ORSAY SOME MONTHS AGO FOR A REFERENDUM ON A LAIC LEBANESE STATE. THIS IDEA HAD SUPPORT FROM WALID JUMBLATT, AND MARTIN NOTED THAT AMIN GEMAYEL HAD ALLUDED TO IT FOLLOWING HIS MEETING WITH MITTERRAND EARLIER THIS WEEK. THE IDEA WOULD BE THAT THROUGH A NATION-WIDE REFERENDUM ON REORGANIZING THE LEBANESE STATE ALONG NON-RELIGIOUS LINES THE LEBANESE COULD REAFFIRM THEIR ATTACHMENT TO NATIONHOOD. THIS, IN TURN, COULD UNDERCUT IDEAS ABOUT DE FACTO PARTITION AND ENCOURAGE SYRIAN AND ISRAELI DEPARTURE.

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6. MARTIN ALSO SAID CHEYSSON HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY ARAFAT'S LACK OF IDEAS FOR ADVANCING THE SITUATION. ARAFAT EXPOUNDED ON HIS THESIS OF AN OBJECTIVE U. S. - SYRIAN ALLIANCE WHICH WOULD GIVE THE SYRIANS PRACTICAL CONTROL OVER THE REMNANTS OF THE PLO IN LEBANON IN EXCHANGE FOR A DE FACTO ISRAELI PROTECTORATE IN SOUTHERN LEBANON. ARAFAT SHOWED NO INTEREST IN GOING
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5755

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INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0092
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 6017
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 1476
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6450
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2495
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 0987
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 5486
AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 5731
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 5077
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 7465

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 PARIS 27947

EXDIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, FR, LE, XF

SUBJECT: CHEYSSON'S MIDDLE EAST VISIT AND LEBANON
BACK TO THE JORDANIAN OPTION. MARTIN CONCLUDED THAT
THE OVERALL APPEARANCE OF THE MIDDLE EAST SITUATION WAS
GLOOMY AND THAT FOR THE MOMENT THERE WERE NO POSITIVE
POINTS AT ALL ON WHICH TO BUILD.

7. COMMENT: THE FRENCH WANT TO PLAY A GREATER ROLE IN

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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THE EVOLUTION OF EVENTS IN LEBANON AND THE MIDDLE EAST IN GENERAL. THEY ARE NOT SATISFIED WITH THE WAY THE U.S. IS HANDLING THE SITUATION, AND IT SEEMS THAT CHEYSSON WANTED TO TAKE THE PULSE OF THE AREA TO SEE IF THERE WAS ROOM FOR A FRENCH INITIATIVE. WE TAKE FRENCH STATEMENTS AT FACE VALUE AND DO NOT REPEAT NOT BELIEVE THEY CURRENTLY HAVE CONCRETE IDEAS FOR ACTION. IN ANY EVENT, BEFORE LAUNCHING INTO SOMETHING OF THEIR OWN, THEY WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THAT ALL OF THE PARTIES CONCERNED WERE WILLING TO ACCEPT A FRENCH INITIATIVE. NONETHELESS, THINKING IS CLEARLY GOING ON. WE BELIEVE THIS MAKES CONTINUATION OF A DYNAMIC U.S.-FRENCH CONSULTATION PROCESS NECESSARY. AS WE HAVE ARGUED IN A SEPTEL, SUCH CONSULTATIONS, BEGINNING WITH A VISIT BY SPECIAL ENVOY MACFARLANE, WILL HELP TO KEEP FRENCH SUPPORT AND TO PRECLUDE UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES.

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8. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. MARESCA
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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 03 CAIRO 1790
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INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3387
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EXDIS

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 CAIRO 21790

EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PLO, EG, LE, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON THE EVE OF THE MCFARLANE
- MISSION

1. SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: KAMAL HASSAN ALI EMPHASIZED TO ME ON JULY 26 THAT THE GOE LOOKS FORWARD TO A VISIT BY AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AT SOME POINT DURING HIS FORTHCOMING

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR MOB-090/a #57741
BY RW NARA DATE 5-6-10

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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TRIP TO THE AREA. THE EGYPTIANS ARE ANXIOUSLY HOPING THAT THE USG CAN FIND SOME WAY OF DEMONSTRATING TANGIBLE PROGRESS AND INSTILLING NEW CONFIDENCE IN THE PEACE PROCESS, IF NOT ON THE LEBANON FRONT, THEN IN CONNECTION WITH WHAT THEY SEE AS INCREASINGLY DISTRESSFUL BEHAVIOR BY ISRAEL IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES. ALI ALSO MADE CLEAR THAT THE ABSENCE OF ANY MENTION OF CAIRO IN PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S RECENT REAFFIRMATION OF EGYPT'S CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE WAS DELIBERATE. END SUMMARY.

EXDIS

3. I MET FOR ABOUT AN HOUR ON TUESDAY, JULY 26 WITH DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER KAMAL HASSAN ALI -- MY PRIMARY PURPOSE BEING TO REVIEW A VARIETY OF CURRENT ISSUES WITH HIM (SEPTELS) BEFORE LEAVING CAIRO TOMORROW ON HOME LEAVE. IN THE PROCESS, I MENTIONED THE FACT OF PHIL HABIB'S RETIREMENT AND THE APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE AS HIS SUCCESSOR, STRESSING THAT THIS DEMONSTRATED PRESIDENT REAGAN'S UNDIMINISHED COMMITMENT TO WORK ACTIVELY FOR PROGRESS ON LEBANON AND IN THE OVERALL PEACE PROCESS. MAKING CLEAR THAT I WAS SPEAKING ON MY OWN PERSONAL INITIATIVE, I SAID THAT I ASSUMED MCFARLANE AND HIS TEAM WOULD BE TRAVELING TO THE MIDEAST IN THE FAIRLY NEAR FUTURE (THIS WAS PRIOR TO OUR RECEIPT OF STATE 209515), AND THAT WE WOULD CERTAINLY ENCOURAGE HIM TO VISIT CAIRO WHILE HE IS IN THE AREA. I ASKED ALI IF ANY PARTICULAR PERIOD IN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS WOULD BE DIFFICULT OR INAPPROPRIATE FOR SUCH A VISIT FROM THE EGYPTIAN VIEWPOINT. ALI REPLIED THAT PRESIDENT MUBARAK HAS NO PLANS TO TRAVEL ABROAD BEFORE SEPTEMBER AND THAT HE HIMSELF PLANS TO REMAIN IN EGYPT UNTIL MID-SEPTEMBER (SAVE FOR PERHAPS

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COUPLE OF DAYS AT THE END OF AUGUST). HE SAID IT WOULD BE EMINENTLY REASONABLE FOR THE MCFARLANE MISSION TO INCLUDE CAIRO

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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IN ITS FIRST AREA TOUR.

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4. I THEN ASKED ALI IF HE HAD ANY THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE PEACE PROCESS AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS THAT WE MIGHT CONVEY TO AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE. ALI REPLIED INSTANTLY THAT THE SITUATION IN THE MIDEAST IS "VERY CRITICAL." HE DESCRIBED SYRIA'S CONTINUED ADAMANT OPPOSITION TO THE LEBANON-ISRAEL AGREEMENT AS PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS. SYRIA, HE SAID, ALREADY CONTROLS THE PLO. ARAFAT CLEARLY HAS NO AVENUE OF ESCAPE FROM SYRIAN DOMINATION. HIS DEPUTIES, IN ORDER TO PLACATE THE SARG, HAVE ALREADY BEGUN TO SHUN ALL INTEREST IN MODERATION. UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, SAID ALI, THE POSSIBILITY OF RENEWED DIALOGUE BETWEEN ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN IS NIL.

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5. THE SYRIANS THEMSELVES, ALI CONTINUED, ARE HOLDING OUT FOR MORE THAN A "GOLAN GUARANTEE." THEY MAY EVEN HAVE THEIR CAPS SET FOR THE PARTITION OF LEBANON. AT THE VERY LEAST, THEY WILL INSIST ON MAINTAINING A "SPECIAL INFLUENCE" THERE. THE "NATIONALIST LEBANESE FRONT" THEY HAVE FORMED (KARAME, JUMBLATT AND FRANGIEH) IS AIMED AT ACHIEVING THAT OBJECTIVE. THE PROBLEM OF A PARTIAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL IN THIS CONTEXT, SAID ALI, IS THAT IT COULD LEAD TO A REAL PARTITION OF LEBANON. IF THIS HAPPENS, THE EGYPTIANS FEAR THAT ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS WOULD SOON FOLLOW IN SOUTH LEBANON.

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6. ANOTHER, PERHAPS EVEN GREATER DANGER FOR THE PEACE PROCESS, IN ALI'S VIEW, IS REFLECTED IN ISRAELI DEFMIN ARENS' LATEST REMARKS REGARDING THE FUTURE APPLICATION OF ISRAELI LAW TO THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. "WHENEVER THEY START TALKING LIKE
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AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3388
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0130
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0839
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 6258
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 2540
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2643
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0863

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 CAIRO 21790

EXDIS

EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PLO, EG, LE, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON THE EVE OF THE MCFARLANE
THAT," ALI OBSERVED, "SOMETHING IS ON THE WAY."
IN ADDITION, ISRAELI OCCUPATION PRACTICES ON THE
WEST BANK ARE SEEN BY EGYPT AS DESIGNED INCREASINGLY
TO ACCELERATE AND ENSURE ISRAELI CONTROL. SETTLEMENTS
ACTIVITY IS NOT THE ONLY ASPECT. THE APPOINTMENT
OF AN ISRAELI MAYOR IN HEBRON, REGULATIONS FAVORING
ISRAELI BANKS AT THE EXPENSE OF ARAB-OWNED ENTERPRISES,
AND MANY OTHER POLICIES THAT ENCOURAGE A STEADY FLOW

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

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OF WEST BANK EMIGRATION -- ALL THESE PRACTICES ARE DASHING PALESTINIAN HOPES FOR A BETTER LIFE IN THEIR HOMELAND. (TO PROVE HIS POINT ABOUT EMIGRATION, ALI CITED STATISTICS TO THE EFFECT THAT 706,000 PALESTINIANS INHABITED THE WEST BANK IN 1967, AND THAT -- DESPITE A VERY HIGH BIRTHRATE THAT SHOULD HAVE DOUBLED THAT FIGURE IN FIFTEEN YEARS -- ONLY 660,000 (INCLUDING FORMER REFUGEES) LIVE THERE TODAY.) ALI CONCURRED WITH WHAT HE SAID WAS A RECENT OBSERVATION BY LORD CARADON: THAT THE WEST BANK AND GAZA ARE ALREADY BEING ANNEXED TO ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH A GRIM AND PERSISTENT PLAN, AND THAT THE BEGIN GOVERNMENT IS DOING ITS UTMOST TO ACCELERATE THAT TREND. ALI NOTED WITH IRONY THAT DR. BURG, ISRAEL'S INTERIOR MINISTER AND AUTONOMY NEGOTIATOR, HAD SPOKEN TO THE EGYPTIAN CHARGE ON JULY 23 ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF RENEWING THE AUTONOMY TALKS IN THEIR PREVIOUS FORMAT. "WHAT A BIG JOKE", ALI SAID, "WHILE ALL THIS CONTINUES IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES." "ALL THIS," IN EGYPT'S VIEW, IS THE REAL OBSTACLE TO PEACE.

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7. I POINTED OUT TO ALI THAT THE STANDARD ISRAELI RESPONSE TO THESE COMPLAINTS IS THAT THEY HAVE NO ONE OTHER THAN THE EGYPTIANS TO NEGOTIATE WITH, SINCE THE SYRIANS HAVE EFFECTIVELY BLOCKED THE PROSPECT OF EXPANDED PEACE TALKS, AND THAT THEY CANNOT BE EXPECTED TO SIT STILL IN DEALING WITH THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES IN THE HOPE THAT THOSE TALKS MAY EVENTUALLY TAKE PLACE. I WONDERED IF THERE MIGHT NOT BE SOME WAY TO FIND A NEW APPROACH THAT WOULD BYPASS THE SYRIAN HURDLE AND GIVE NEW MOMENTUM TO THE PEACE PROCESS. I CALLED ALI'S ATTENTION, IN THIS CONNECTION, TO PRESIDENT MUBARAK'S JULY 21 REITERATION OF EGYPT'S CALL FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 03 OF 03 CAIRO 1790

DTG: 281429Z JUL 83 PSN: 068614

EXDIS

IN-EXILE. ALI SAID HE THOUGHT THE LATTER DEVELOPMENT MIGHT OFFER THE PLO LEADERSHIP AN ESCAPE-HATCH FROM "SYRIAN CAPTIVITY," ONE THAT COULD ALSO HELP THE PLO MODERATES TO ACT MORE IN CONCERT WITH WEST BANK/GAZAN OPINION. IT WOULD, IN EFFECT, CONSTITUTE THE PLO'S "LAST CHANCE."

EXDIS

8. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUERY AS TO WHERE HE THOUGHT A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT-IN-EXILE MIGHT BE HEADQUARTERED, ALI RECALLED THAT PRESIDENT SADAT HAD FORMERLY OFFERED CAIRO FOR THIS PURPOSE. HE ADDED, RATHER POINTEDLY, THAT MUBARAK HAD REFRAINED FROM DOING THIS IN HIS JULY 21 SPEECH.

EXDIS

9. IN CONCLUSION, ALI SAID SOMEWHAT WISTFULLY THAT IF THE ISRAELIS COULD BE PERSUADED TO WITHDRAW UNILATERALLY AND COMPLETELY FROM LEBANON, THIS WOULD PUT THE SYRIANS IN A VERY AWKWARD POSITION. I NOTED THAT THE ISRAELIS, EVEN IF THEY AGREED TO SUCH A COURSE, WOULD CERTAINLY INSIST ON EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF THEIR MAY 8 AGREEMENT WITH THE LEBANESE, WHICH THE SYRIANS COULD THEN USE AS A PRETEXT TO RETAIN THEIR PRESENCE IN LEBANON. THE ONLY OTHER WORTHWHILE POSSIBILITY, ALI CONCLUDED, WOULD BE TO FIND SOME CONVINCING WAY TO ENSURE THAT A PARTIAL IDF WITHDRAWAL IN LEBANON (SAY, TO

EXDIS

THE AWALI RIVER) WOULD CONSTITUTE A FIRST STEP TOWARD TOTAL ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL. I OPINED THAT THIS IS VERY LIKELY THE SORT OF PROPOSITION WE ARE EXAMINING THIS WEEK WITH SHAMIR AND ARENS IN
BT

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 CAIRO 1790
SIT799 AN011432

DTG: 281429Z JUL 83 PSN: 068615
TOR: 209/1438Z

DISTRIBUTION: MCF /001

EXDIS

OP IMMED
DE RUEHEG #1790/03 2091437
O 281429Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO

EXDIS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6788

EXDIS

INFO WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3389
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0131
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0840
AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 6259
USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 2541
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 2644
AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 0864

EXDIS

SECRET SECTION 03 OF 03 CAIRO 21790

EXDIS
WHITE HOUSE FOR AMBASSADOR MCFARLANE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, PLO, EG, LE, SY, IS, XF
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN VIEWS ON THE EVE OF THE MCFARLANE WASHINGTON.

10. COMMENT: NEWS OF THE TRAGIC EVENTS IN HEBRON DID NOT REACH CAIRO UNTIL LATER IN THE DAY. (SEE FBIS AND SEPTTEL FOR DETAILS OF EGYPTIAN OFFICIAL AND MEDIA REACTION.) I HAVE NO DOUBT, HOWEVER, THAT ALL -- HAD HE KNOWN OF THOSE EVENTS -- WOULD HAVE USED

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 CAIRO 1790

DTG: 281429Z JUL 83 PSN: 06

EXDIS

THEM TO UNDERSCORE THE POINT HE WAS TRYING TO MAKE TO ME. THIS IS THAT THE USG NEEDS TO TAKE FURTHER STEPS SOON TO BOLSTER MODERATE ARAB AND PALESTINIAN HOPES IN A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS, AND THAT THESE STEPS SHOULD INCLUDE EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO BRING ABOUT A VISABLE SHIFT IN ISRAEL'S BEHAVIOR IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES THAT WOULD ENCOURAGE SUCH HOPES TO PERSIST.

EXDIS

11. WE THINK THE DEPTH OF EGYPTIAN ANXIETY ON THIS SCORE PROBABLY EXPLAINS THE VIRTUALLY TOTAL ABSENCE OF EDITORIAL COMMENT IN THE GOVERNMENT-INFLUENCED CAIRO PRESS OVER THE PAST WEEK IN REACTION TO THE JULY 22 ANNOUNCEMENT OF HABIB'S RETIREMENT AND HIS REPLACEMENT BY MCFARLANE. ASIDE FROM A FEW SNIPES IN THE OPPOSITION PRESS (TO THE EFFECT THAT U.S. NEGOTIATORS COME AND GO BUT MISGUIDED U.S. STRATEGY NEVER CHANGES), WE HAVE SEEN ONLY FACTUAL NEWS COVERAGE AND THE SUPPORTIVE MFA STATEMENT ISSUED JULY 24, WELCOMING THE U.S. ANNOUNCEMENT AND EXPRESSING SATISFACTION THAT THE USG REMAINS COMMITTED TO WORK TO RESTORE STABILITY TO LEBANON AND TO ACHIEVE COMPREHENSIVE MIDEAST PEACE. AS ALWAYS, THE EGYPTIAN LEADERSHIP IS ANXIOUSLY HOPING TO SEE THIS FERVENT WISH TRANSLATED INTO TANGIBLE PROGRESS, AND SOON. THEY ARE REALISTS, HOWEVER, AND ARE NOT HOLDING THEIR BREATH. END COMMENT.

EXDIS

EXDIS

12. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ATHERTON
BT

~~SECRET~~

UNCLAS

Approved KCM

As amended _____

DACON
to Charbi
Hill

7-29-83

TO AMEMBASSY ROME

FROM ~~MCFARLANE~~ *Seestate*

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV

EXDIS

SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION--PRESS QUERIES

REF: STATE 209515

1. ^u (~~ENTIRE~~ ENTIRE TEXT)

2. POST SHOULD ONLY COMMENT THAT "AS PRESIDENT SAID THE MCFARLANE TEAM IS ON ITS WAY TO THE MIDDLE EAST". THERE SHOULD BE NO FURTHER COMMENT ESPECIALLY REGARDING STOPS IN EUROPE.

Shultz

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01
SIT120

ROME 7523
AN011730

DTG: 291353Z JUL 83 PSN: 070350
TOR: 210/1354Z

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTION: MCF HALL /002

EXDIS

OP IMMEDIATE
DE RUEHRO #7523 2101353
O 291353Z JUL 83

FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1367
NSC WASHDC IMMEDIATE

cor sent to Jucker/Kemp

EXDIS

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1497
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0046
AMEMBASSY CAIRO 3908
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1016
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1792
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4382

~~SECRET~~ ROME 17523

EXDIS

EXDIS, NSC FOR MCFARLANE/HALL EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IT, XF, OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS)
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION--PRESS QUERIES
REF: STATE 209515

1. ~~(S-ENTIRE TEXT)~~
2. POST HAS NOT RECEIVED DEPARTMENT'S ADVICE ON PRESS QUERIES RE MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS VISIT, AS PER PARA 5 REFTEL. PLEASE ADVISE ASAP.
RABB
BT

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dh NARA, Date 11/20/99

FROM WHITE HOUSE-

TO AMEMBASSY ROME

7.29.83

EXDIS

PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING MESSAGE TO AMBASSADOR RAAB FROM BUD McFARLANE:

Ref: Rome 17430

Dear Max,

Many thanks for your thoughtful invitation to lunch on Saturday. Dick Fairbanks, Jonny and I would like nothing better. Regretably, in typical fashion, I have procrastinated on a few essential preparations and must devote full time in Rome to completing this work. We will plan a visit to Rome as an early priority following our first round. Will look forward to seeing you and GOI officials at that time.

Warm regards,

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 01 OF 02 ROME 7430
SIT916 AN011543

DTG: 281356Z JUL 83 PSN: 068941
TOR: 209/1814

EXDIS

DISTRIBUTION: WPC MCF JP SIT HALL /008

EXDIS

OP IMMED
STU6357
DE RUEHRO #7430 2091356
O 281356Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY ROME

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1308

~~SECRET~~ ROME 17430

EXDIS

EXDIS
NSC FOR MCFARLANE/HALL EYES ONLY
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, IT, XF, OVIP (MCFARLANE AND FAIRBANKS)
SUBJECT: MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS MISSION

EXDIS

1. (~~SECRET~~-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. I WAS PLEASED TO HEAR THAT YOU AND YOUR TEAM WILL BE STOPPING IN ROME ON YOUR WAY TO THE MIDDLE EAST' I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.
3. WHILE WE OF COURSE WILL RESPECT YOUR DESIRE NOT TO BE OFFICIALLY SCHEDULED HERE IN ROME, I WOULD LIKE TO INVITE YOU AND JONDA AND DICK FAIRBANKS TO COME TO THE VILLA AT ABOUT 1300 ON SATURDAY. IT WILL BE AN INFORMAL LUNCH. IF YOU WOULD PREFER TO REMAIN AT YOUR HOTEL IN PREPARATION FOR THE REST OF YOUR TRIP, I WOULD, OF COURSE UNDERSTAND. AGAIN, LOOKING FORWARD TO SEEING YOU.

RABB

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/30/99

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 02 ROME 7430

DTG: 281356Z JUL 83 PSN: 068941

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7/29/83 - 12:05 pm

NOTE: SIT ROOM

PLEASE LDX TO CHARLIE HILL,
STATE/SECRETARIAT.

SECRET

FROM: SECSTATE
TO: AMEMBASSY JIDDA
INFO: BEIRUT
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRE BANDAR IN BEIRUT

1. Entire text ~~SECRET~~.
2. Charge is requested to contact PrinBandar in behalf of Ambassador McFarlane to request a meeting discuss the outcome of Bandar's meetings in Damascus, now schled to take place this weekend.
3. McFarlane/Fairbanks party will arriBeirut mid-afternoon Sunday July 31 and would propose meeting his Highness' convenience on Sunday or Monday. FYI: McFarlane/Faianks plan visit to Saudi Arabia probably toward the end of rt week. In addition to the benefit of having the debrief to info our discussion in Beirut, there is obvious value in having Bandar vit Lebanon for the visible Saudi show of support it carries. End FY
4. Please send reply action Rome for Mcrlane; info SecState and Beirut.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/20/99

SECRET

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM / CHRON

THVZCZCBL0927
 OO RUEHEL
 DE RUEHAM #5698 2121456
 ZNY CCCCC ZZH
 O 311455Z JUL 83
 FM AMEMÉASSY AMMAN
 TO RUERC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5028
 RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 4281
 INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE 0198
 RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 2069
 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE 0219
 RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 6340
 RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE 9456
 RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH IMMEDIATE 3226
 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 7235
 BT

LOC: DISK 07 092
 31 JUL 83 1458
 CN: 05411
 CHRG: PROG
 DIST: EXPI

8/11 Jamboree has seen

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 06698

EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 RAGS: PRL, UNSC, IS, JO, XF
 SUBJECT: UNSC DEBATE ON WEST BANK

REF: (A) USUN 1905, (B) AMMAN 6662, (C) AMMAN 6664

1. - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT A BREAKFAST MEETING WITH COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF GENERAL BIN SHAKER THIS MORNING (JULY 31) SUBJECT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE ON THE WEST BANK CAME UP IN PASSING. BIN SHAKER TOLD CHARGE THAT JORDAN HOPES THE U.S. WILL NOT VETO THE RESOLUTION. IF COMPROMISE LANGUAGE CANNOT BE AGREED ON, JORDAN EXPECTS THE U.S. TO ABSTAIN ON THE PROPOSED RESOLUTION NOW BEFORE THE COUNCIL. HE INDICATED THAT THIS WAS THE MINIMUM JORDAN COULD UNDERSTAND GIVEN AGREEMENT BY ALL THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE COUNCIL TO THE DRAFT AND JORDAN'S WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE ON ALL ISSUES EXCEPT THE REFERENCE TO SETTLEMENTS AS HAVING NO LEGAL VALIDITY.

3. REGARDING PARA (6) REF (A) STATEMENT THAT IT IS UNCLEAR WHY THE JORDANIANS HAVE CHOSEN TO PRESS THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS' LEGALITY AT THIS POINT, EMBASSY NOTES THAT JORDANIAN RATIONALE WAS SET FORTH BY BOTH FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM AND KING HUSSEIN (REFS (B) AND (C)) ON JULY 28. BIN SHAKER'S COMMENTS THIS MORNING ONLY UNDERSCORE THE DEPTH OF FEELING HERE ABOUT THE ISSUE OF SETTLEMENTS' LEGALITY AND THE JORDANIAN DETERMINATION TO PRESS THIS ISSUE AT THIS TIME.

4. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. DJEREJIAN

BT #6698

NNNN

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F98-008/1 #59
 BY NSI, NARA, DATE 11/5/02

Handwritten notes:
 Bud. Assuming we veto we sought to get credit for at least 90% of some requests our concern pertains largely on GOI settlement plans in Lebanon.
 Is this worth a cable to DC or is such a demand likely to be in NEA?
 Bud

(6) ACTION AMB INFO DCM ROSS POL PM CHRON

YVOVZCZCBL0989
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHAM #6701 2121534
NY CCCCC ZZH
O 311533Z JUL 83
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5029
INFO RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 0199
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 2070
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0220
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM PRIORITY 6341
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA PRIORITY 9457
RUEHRH/USELO RIYADH PRIORITY 3227
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 7236

LOC: DISK 07 096
31 JUL 83 1534
CN: 05413
CHRG: PROG
DIST: EXDI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ AMMAN 06701

EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: GADR
TAGS: PREL, JO, EG, SY, XF
SUBJECT: KING HUSSEIN COMMENTS ON RELATIONS WITH SYRIA,
- EGYPT

1. Q - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. DURING CHARGE'S MEETING WITH KING HUSSEIN JULY 28 (OTHER TOPICS REPORTED SEPTELS), THE KING OFFERED A FEW REMARKS ABOUT JORDANIAN RELATIONS WITH SYRIA AND EGYPT. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT WHETHER THERE WERE ANY NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN JORDANIAN-SYRIAN RELATIONS, KING SAID THERE WAS NOTHING NEW TO REPORT. IN ANOTHER CONTEXT, HOWEVER, HE TOLD CHARGE THAT JORDAN DOES PLAN TO ASK THE "TOP LEADERSHIP" OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD TO LEAVE JORDAN. ALTHOUGH THE KING WOULD NOT BE SPECIFIC ABOUT WHO WAS INVOLVED, WE BELIEVE HE IS REFERRING TO MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERS WHO HAVE COME TO JORDAN FROM SYRIA.

3. ON EGYPT, CHARGE ASKED THE KING WHETHER HE HAD GIVEN ANY FURTHER THOUGHT TO SENDING FOREIGN MINISTER KASIM TO CAIRO. KING SAID HE HAD NO PRESENT PLANS TO SEND KASIM.

4. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE KING DREW NO CONNECTION BETWEEN SYRIA AND THE DECISION TO HAVE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERS LEAVE JORDAN, IT IS NO SECRET THAT THE PRESENCE IN JORDAN OF A NUMBER OF MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD LEADERS FROM SYRIA HAS BEEN A MAJOR COMPLAINT BY ASSAD AGAINST JORDAN. AT THE LEAST AND IF JORDAN IS CONTEMPLATING SOME NEW OPENING TO DAMASCUS, WE WOULD EXPECT THE JORDANIANS TO MAKE MUCH OF THIS STEP AS A GESTURE OF GOOD INTENTION TOWARD THE ASSAD REGIME. HOWEVER WE AGAIN WANT TO STRESS THAT THE KING INSISTED THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THE RELATIONSHIP WITH SYRIA.

Handwritten notes:
Stanton's has seen
11
11
Did Is not worth
to be seen as
Hussein to
do this?

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #60

BY LOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

REPRODUCTION COPY

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMMAN 006701

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED FOR BEIRUT. DJEREJIAN

BT
#6701

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AMMAN 006701

PRESENTATION COPY

ZCZCBLI *

OO RUEHC RUEADWW RUEHDT

DE RUEHBL #8335 212 **

ZNY CCGG ZZH

O 311914Z JUL 83

FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1961

INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

RUEHDT / USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0114

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ BEIRUT 08335

CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL
 CHRGE: PROG 7/3L/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: HTEICHER/PDUR
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

EXDIS

WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK
 USUN FOR KIRKPATRICK

FROM MCFARLANE/FAIRBANKS

E.O. L2356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PREL, JO, UNSC

SUBJECT: DRAFT U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON
 WEST BANK SETTLEMENTS

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I CONCUR IN PROPOSED TEXT CONTAINED IN REFTEL.
 IF THERE IS TIME TO CHANGE THE SPEECH, YOU MIGHT
 CONSIDER SUBSTITUTING THE FOLLOWING FOR THE SECOND
 SENTENCE OF THE LAST PARAGRAPH: QUOTE THE UNITED STATES
 REMAINS COMMITTED TO THE RESOLUTION OF ALL ASPECTS OF
 THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT AND THE UNDERLYING CAUSES.
 UNQUOTE. DILLON

BT

#8335

NNNN

OUT.

CONFIDENTIAL/EXDIS

BEIRUT 8335

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1 #61BY CA NARA, DATE 4/19/06

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8336

VZCZCBLI *
 OO RUEHC RUEADWW
 DE RUEHBL #8336 212 **
 ZNY SSSSS ZZH
 O 311920Z JUL 83
 FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 TO RUEHC / SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1962
 INFO RUEADWW / WHITEHOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
 BT
~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 08336

CLASS: SECRET
 CHRG: PROG 7/31/83
 APPRV: AMB MCFARLANE
 DRFTD: HTEICHER/PDUR
 CLEAR: NONE
 DISTR: MCFARLANE-4

NODIS

DEPARTMENT FOR SECRETARY SHULTZ, EYES ONLY
 WHITE HOUSE FOR JUDGE CLARK, EYES ONLY

FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: MOPS, JO, US
 SUBJECT: JORDAN LOGISTICS PLANNING

DECLASSIFIED
 NLS F98-0081, #62
CH NARA, DATE 4/19/01

REF: STATE 214430

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. IN RESPONSE TO REFTTEL, I AGREE ON THE NEED FOR YOU TO BRIEF HOUSE CONFEREES AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE ON IMPORTANCE OF JLP FUNDING. IN ADDITION TO THE POINTS SUGGESTED BY DAVE SCHNEIDER, THE FOLLOWING POINTS MAY BE USEFUL:

- THE JLP IS DESIGNED TO ENHANCE JAF CAPABILITIES TO INTERVENE IN NE/SWA WHERE US INTERVENTION IS EITHER UNWARRANTED, IMPRUDENT, OR INFEASIBLE.
- IN CERTAIN GULF CONTINGENCIES, PARTICULARLY INTER-ARAB CRISES THE AVAILABILITY OF READY JORDANIAN FORCES COULD BE DECISIVE IN DEFENDING US INTERESTS.
- JORDAN IS IN ANY CASE ALREADY HEAVILY INVOLVED IN SECURITY ASSISTANCE AND DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH A VARIETY OF GULF STATES. THE JLP, SIGNIFICANTLY ENHANCES THE JORDANIAN ABILITY IN THIS REGARD.
- OUR OWN CAPABILITIES FOR RESPONDING TO NE/SWA CONTINGENCIES ARE LIMITED AND HAVE NOT INCREASED AS QUICKLY AS WE WOULD LIKE (E.G. STRATEGIC MOBILITY, BASE ACCESS, DEDICATED SUPPORT FORCES).
- WITH INCREASING PRESSURES ON DEFENSE BUDGETS, WE NEED PROGRAMS WHICH MAXIMIZE EFFECTIVENESS OF EXISTING RESOURCES FROM FRIENDLY STATES CLOSER TO THE REGION. THIS APPLIES TO ISRAEL AS WELL AS JORDAN.
- THE ENHANCEMENT OF JAF CAPABILITIES UNDER THE JLP SHOULD NOT BE SEEN AS THREATENING TO ISRAEL. THE PROGRAMS AND ASSOCIATED PLANNING EFFORTS ARE MANAGED

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8336

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8336

BY THE USG AND DESIGNED FOR GULF CONTINGENCIES.

- IN SUM, CURRENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE EMPHASIZES INCREASED CONTRIBUTIONS FROM A VARIETY OF FRIENDS AND ALLIES AND ENHANCED COOPERATION TO DEFEND SHARED INTERESTS IN THIS VITAL REGION. WE SHOULD NOT BE ANY LESS DETERMINED TO COOPERATE WITH JORDAN THAN WE ARE RESOLVED TO TREAT ISRAEL AS AN ALLY IN OUR FUTURE DEALINGS. SENSITIVE AND DISCRETE PROGRAMS SUCH AS THE JLP DEMONSTRATE OUR INTEREST IN HELPING FRIENDS WHO ARE WILLING TO TAKE RISKS IN COOPERATING WITH US.

3. ALTHOUGH I DON'T THINK IT SHOULD BE THE FOCUS OF YOUR PRESENTATION, ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS IN CONGRESS MUST RECOGNIZE THAT COOPERATION WITH JORDAN, AND THE JLP IN PARTICULAR, ALLOW US MORE INSIGHT AND INFLUENCE IN JORDANIAN DEFENSE PLANNING. THIS WOULD BE IN THE LONG-TERM INTEREST OF THE ISRAELIS. FINALLY, IF YOU THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE, YOU MIGHT WANT TO STRESS THE PIVOTAL ROLE WE HOPE JORDAN WILL YET PLAY IN ADVANCING THE PRESIDENT'S PEACE INITIATIVE. WITH JORDANIAN SENSITIVITIES ALREADY AROUSED OVER THE HEBRON ISSUE AND THE UN RESOLUTION, AN UNTOWARD DECISION ON THE JLP WILL BE ANYTHING BUT HELPFUL. DILLON

BT

#8336

NNNN

OUT

~~SECRET/NODIS~~

BEIRUT 8336

JULY 31 ABC-TV

DONALDSON: PARTIAL WITHDRAWAL; WHEN WITHDRAWAL?

ARENS: "WELL, WE'RE NOT IN SYRIA AT ALL AS YOU KNOW. WE ARE IN PARTS OF LEBANON. WE ARE EAGER TO WITHDRAW. WE ARE STARTING THE FIRST STAGE OF REDEPLOYMENT THAT WILL GET US OUT OF A SIGNIFICANT PART OF LEBANON THAT WE'RE IN TODAY. WE WILL GO ALL THE WAY CONSISTENT WITH ONE REQUIREMENT, AN ELEMENTARY REQUIREMENT; NAMELY, THAT WE ASSURE THE SAFETY AND SECURITY OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN THE NORTHERN PART OF ISRAEL."

STATE 215439 (~~SECRET~~/NODIS)

RE: AGREED POINTS AGREED TO BY ARENS.

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 11/30/97

(3) ACTION ROSS4 INFO AMB DCM PM CHRON

LOC: DISK 07 070
31 JUL 83 1438
CN: 05407
CHRG: PROG
DIST: ROSS

TGVZCZCBLO983
OO RUEHBL
DE RUEHJI #6126 2121431
ZNY SSSSS ZZH ZK
O 311431Z JUL 83 ZFF4
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 2002
RUEHBL/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT NIACT IMMEDIATE 0154
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME IMMEDIATE 1877

BT
~~SECRET~~ JIDDA 06126

NODIS

PASS MCFARLANE PARTY

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL SA LE
SUBJ: REQUEST FOR MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR IN BEIRUT

REF: (A) STATE 214009 (B) JIDDA 6067

1. (~~X~~-ENTIRE TEXT)

2. WITH REGARD TO MCFARLANE'S REQUEST REFTEL A FOR A BEIRUT MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR, PRINCE BANDAR'S TRIP TO DAMASCUS HAS SLIPPED UNTIL TODAY JULY 31. BANDAR LEFT FOR DAMASCUS AT NOON AND IS EXPECTED TO RETURN TO SAUDI ARABIA SOMETIME THIS EVENING. ALSO KING HUSSEIN JUST ARRIVED IN TAIF TO SEE KING FAHD, SO WE ARE NOT SURE WHETHER HUSSEIN'S VISIT HERE WILL BE AN ADDITIONAL COMPLICATION REGARDING BANDAR'S AVAILABILITY FOR A MONDAY MEETING WITH MCFARLANE IN BEIRUT.

3. UNLESS OTHERWISE ADVISED, WE WILL CONTINUE TO PURSUE BANDAR UPON HIS RETURN HERE FOR HIS RESPONSE TO MCFARLANE'S REQUEST FOR A MONDAY BEIRUT MEETING. WOULD APPRECIATE KNOWING IF MCFARLANE IS AVAILABLE FOR BEIRUT MEETING AT ALTERNATIVE TIME BEYOND MONDAY, IF BANDAR'S SCHEDULE REQUIRES.

COMMENT: WE NOTE OFFICIAL SAUDI PRESS AGENCY DENIAL JULY 31 OF BEIRUT DAILY AN-NAHAR STORY (REPORTED JIDDA SEPTEL) THAT MCFARLANE, WADI HADDAD AND BANDAR ARE TO COMPRISE A TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE TO MEDIATE BETWEEN SYRIA AND LEBANON. WE DO NOT EXPECT THAT THE NAHAR STORY, GIVEN SAUDI PENCHANT FOR QUIET DIPLOMACY, IS A HELPFUL DEVELOPMENT IN KING FAHD DICISION WHETHER OR NOT TO APPROVE BANDAR-MCFARLANE MEETING IN BEIRUT.

SUDDARTH
BT
#6126

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-008/1#63

NNNN

BY NOT NARA, DATE 11/5/02

There thru Tues. should stay w/ Band if he could come. O'Connell - neg. O'Connell - follow in end of week.

OUTGOING TELEGRAM

TEL EXT.

PA

~~SECRET~~ ON
 CH PROGRAM 8/1/83
 AP AMB MCFARLANE
 DR HTEICHER
 CL NONE
 DT MCFARLANE-4
 ORIGINATOR
 AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
 AMEMBASSY JIDDA, NIACT IMMEDIATE
 INFO SECSTATE WASHDC, IMMEDIATE

NODIS

AMEMBASSY JIDDA FOR AMBASSADOR MURPHY EYES ONLY
 FROM MCFARLANE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
 TAGS: PREL, JO, UNSC
 SUBJECT: MEETING WITH PRINCE BANDAR

REF: JIDDA 6126

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. I NOW PLAN TO REMAIN HERE THROUGH TUESDAY NIGHT,
 BUT WOULD BE PREPARED TO STAY THROUGH WEDNESDAY IF
 PRINCE BANDAR COULD COME TO BEIRUT. OTHERWISE, PLEASE
 REQUEST A DEBRIEF OF PRINCE BANDAR'S MEETING IN DAMASCUS
 AND INFORM HIM THAT WE INTEND TO ARRIVE IN SAUDI ARABIA
 FOR A FOLLOW-ON MEETING AT THE END OF THE WEEK.
 DILLON##

INITIAL AUTH

DRAFT

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DECLASSIFIED
 Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
 By dlb NARA, Date 11/20/99